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
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MANNING THE NAVY.

In the analysis of the Report of the Commissioners for Manning the Navy which we gave last month, we promised to review the evidence upon which that Report was supposed to have been based. The "Blue Book" is now before us, and, as a critique upon the Naval Service, it possesses an interest seldom attaching to those expensive, dry, Parliamentary publications. The evidence, with the appendices, runs to 469 pages, printed in double columns, containing matter enough to fill three closely printed octavo volumes. And this mass must be gone through, page by page, by he who would arrive at the gist of the argument. This task we have performed. To us it is a labour of love, and it is "our vocation."

The Commission, it should be stated, was the result of a motion made by Admiral Sir Charles Napier in the House of Commons; and accordingly that officer was the first called up for examination. His voluminous evidence fills the first twelve pages. He was followed by Rear-Admiral Milne, whose examination occupied the Commission two entire days. Rear-Admiral Lord Clarence Paget was next examined at some length; and on the succeeding meeting Sir James Graham. Rear-Admiral Elliot's evidence concluded the summer sittings, and the Commission adjourned on the 16th July until November 12th.

During the recess the Commissioners seem to have decided upon the line of evidence to be pursued at their future meetings, and accordingly, when they reassembled, with the exception of the examination of Admiral Sir George Seymour, the inquiry was chiefly directed to the question of a Naval Reserve. Commodore Eden, the Controller-General, and seven captains of the coast guard ships, were questioned relative to the coast guard reserve. These were Captains Carnegie, Leopold G. Heath, W. R. Mends, J. M'Neill Boyd, George Randolph, E. P. Charlewood, and Commander Thomas Heard. Vice-Admiral Sir Richard S. Dundas was also examined relative to the force in commission, and Captains B. J. Sulivan, the Naval Commissioner at the Board of Trade, and the Hon. Joseph Denman of the Queen's yacht, both of whom have given years of study to the subject, were heard in much detail.

Greenwich Hospital was then brought on the carpet, it having been stated by several witnesses that that institution exercised no beneficial influence upon the sea service. The witnesses summoned to give evidence with respect to this time-honoured institution, were

Sir John Liddell, the Medical Director-General of the Navy, who was for many years connected with Greenwich as Medical Inspector, Mr. Joseph Allen, superintendent of the halls, who gave the result of twenty-eight years' experience, Mr. John W. Nicholls, the secretary, and Mr. John L. Jay, the assistant-secretary.

The scene again changed, and the internal discipline of the service was enquired into, the witnesses being six warrant officers, Messrs. T. Howels, R. Hall, J. Uffen, J. Carden (of Portsmouth Dockyard), G. Lumb, and W. Smith, and six petty officers and seamen. The Commission then turned to the merchant service, examining the Registrar-General of Seamen, Commander Brown, and thirteen shipping masters, as well as several collectors of customs, and other officials, supposed to be competent to speak to the feelings of merchant seamen. The boy-question also received patient investigation. Lastly, the attention of the Commission was occupied in hearing evidence relative to the victualling, and whether it was desirable to increase the quantity of the seaman's rations.

We should require space almost equal to the "Blue Book" itself were we to analyse the details of the evidence, and think, therefore, we shall best consult the time and taste of our readers by taking up the leading points and features. Reversing the order of the "Blue Book," we are disposed first to advert to

VICTUALLING.

Nothing tends so much to make a man contented with small pa and hard work as good food and plenty of it. The weight of e dence, however, against the Navy diet made the Admiralty sc fairly kick the beam. The warrant officers and petty offi examined, all gave it as their opinion that the bread was not cient in quantity, and the beef and pork of bad quality, whi to its shrinking so much in the cooking as to make very commons indeed."

In order to unravel the mystery, for such it would see when it is known that for many years, until 1840, the qu salt meat was one-fourth less, and yet was made suffic further, that the ship's company are in the habit of being surplus, we must look into the examination of Rear-Admi For the last ten or twelve years that indefatigable officer sided over the victualling department of the Navy. It w in his zeal to give "Jack" preserved fresh meat, supplie the celebrated "Goldner's preserves." The collection tion contained in the tin cans of the distinguished Ger tractor defied description; and our readers will have recal the "sweet smells" which greeted the nostrils o to examine the cases prior to condemnation. Equall purveyance of other articles of food, the Rear-Admi of economy, probably, has preferred Hamburg, Berl beef, and swine's flesh, to that once supplied by merchants. But it would be unfair to visit the tractors with unmitigated censure. It is just p commodities had fair play they would not be

generally found to be. The salt meat is warranted for one year, and if not found fault with within that period, it would be unjust to condemn it afterwards.

But what is the plan pursued by the economical Lord of the Admiralty? In reply to question 325, Rear-Admiral Milne said, "In regard to salt meat it is generally somewhat over two years old before it is issued."

326. "Do you mean (asked Sir James Elphinstone) before the meat is issued?" "Yes; we can get no salt meat abroad. We have a return every year, in the month of October, from every foreign station as to what supplies can be obtained upon that station, for the use of her Majesty's ships, *in order to save the unnecessary expense of sending out provisions* from England to those stations; but we have never been able to obtain any from abroad."

Question 327. "Have you any brand upon your casks by which you may know exactly the age of the provision?" "Yes; the oldest is bound to be used first."

328. "Do you condemn your provisions at a certain age?" "No, certainly not; the salt meat is warranted to keep one year, but no provisions are condemned by the Naval Department until found unfit for use."

329. "Under these circumstances is there not a good deal of provisions condemned on foreign stations?" "No, very little, as the supply is regulated by the expenditure."

Further light was thrown upon this by Sir George Seymour.

Question 1045 "Is there any age at which the beef and pork are condemned?" "They are warranted only for a certain time from the victualling office."

1046. "At the end of that period are they condemned?" "No; *they are then re-surveyed and re-packed.*"

1047. "And they continue to be issued after that period?" "Yes, if perfectly good."

1048. "Do you approve of that practice?" "Yes."

1049. "Do you think that the beef and pork, after the expiration of the period for which they are warranted, are equally nutritious for the sustenance of the men?" (The gallant Admiral fenced with this home question.) "I think," said he, "it is desirable that the Comptroller of Victualling should see to that, and prevent any quantity of old provisions remaining upon any station; but that is very much checked by periodical returns."

Now let us see to "the proof of the pudding." Mr. Howels, a gunner, declared that he had known "a four-pound piece of beef to weigh only eighteen ounces when boiled." Mr. Howels believed that it was meat cured in India which thus shrivelled up into a mass of red wood; but we are more than half inclined to think it some of the "re-packed" meat which Sir George Seymour appeared to think nutritious enough to give men to eat. A seaman rigger, named Donelly, who has served very recently, said: "He had seen a four-pound piece boil down to two pounds (no uncommon thing, by the way), and one pound three quarters, bone included."

Had the Commissioners sought for information upon this head, they

would have had enough to convince them that the quality of the beef and pork was most faulty. And yet the inquiry was scarcely needed. The fact that a shrinkage of 49 per cent. is tolerated, and is not provided for by Admiralty circular, and that the shrinkage is frequently over 50 per cent., is enough to show that the quality must be indeed inferior.

And who is to blame for this? There are those who will point to the Lord of the Admiralty, who for the last ten or twelve years has occupied a seat at the board, simply for the reason that this important branch of the service should be well looked to. To call it mismanagement is to use a mild term. The mischief it has occasioned in the Royal Navy is inconceivably great. Thousands of men have left the service in the meanwhile, carrying with them tales of Goldner's filth, fishy pork, and beef six or seven years in salt, to eat which they found to be impossible.

Compare the provisions of the navy, both in quality and quantity, with the scales adopted on board the Peninsular and Oriental, and Royal West India Mail Companies, and with the ships belonging to Mr. Green, and you have the following results. In the Royal Navy the allowance is, per week: biscuit, 7 lbs.; beef or pork, 7 lbs.; flour, 2 lbs.; peas, 1¾ lbs.; tea, 1¾ oz.; coffee or chocolate, 7 oz.; sugar, 12¼ oz.; vinegar, 1 gill; raisins, 5¼ oz.; spirits, ½ gill per diem, or ½ pint wine. In the Peninsular and Oriental Company, the "sea" scale of diet is, per week, 7 lbs. biscuit, 6 lbs. beef, 4½ lbs. pork, 3 lbs. flour, 1 pint peas, 4 oz. tea, 12 oz. sugar, ½ lb. suet; and in harbour, on the Indian stations, 10½ lbs. soft bread, 9 lbs. fresh meat, 14 lbs. vegetable 1 lb. flour, 4 oz. tea, 12 oz. sugar, ¼ lb. suet. Lime juice accordi to Government regulations. No spirits, but 5s. per month in li to men who conduct themselves to the satisfaction of the comm ders. In the Royal West India Mail Company the allowance is week, 7 lbs. bread, 6 lbs. beef, 4½ lbs. pork, 1½ pints peas, 3½ tea, 14 oz. sugar, 8 oz. suet, and a gill of rum per diem. A pint of lime juice, sugar, and vinegar, while on salt provisions week. In harbour, 1½ lbs. of fresh meat per diem, with barle vegetables, and 1 lb. potatoes or yams. Oatmeal, 1 pint pe weekly, and extra to engine men when the steam is up, at wh the firemen and trimmers are allowed half a gill of rum ad Mr. Green divides his men into messes of five, to whom t ing is apportioned for eight days: Bread unlimited, flo 2 lbs. raisins, 1 lb. suet, 32 lbs. beef, 24 lbs. pork, 4 pin oz. tea, 2½ lbs. sugar, 4 oz. mustard, per week, and spirit by the master. Vinegar 2½ pints per mess, per week days after and during the supply of salt meat, and half of lime juice.

The last mentioned scale gives very nearly two meat per diem to each man, and upon the presum Green does not go to the foreign provision merchan or, if he does, that the meat is not kept in store hold, for "*two years*" before it is issued, we sho Mr. Green's ration is quite worth two of that supp the Royal Navy! The Peninsular and Oriental C

also very liberal, and so, likewise, is that of the Royal Mail Company. The former, we observe, supplies the men in harbour with a pound and a half of soft bread. In the navy the men are nominally entitled to a pound and a quarter; but we never recollect an instance of its being issued to them. Convicts can have soft bread, but sailors of the Royal Navy never, unless they buy it.

Notwithstanding all these startling facts, the Royal Commissioners could see nothing very wrong in the victualling. The meat and the bread, in their judgment, were not sufficient in quantity—it never occurred to them, apparently, to inquire into the quality—so they recommended an additional quarter of a pound of each of those articles of provisions, but coupled with a reduction in the price for savings, which if acceded to would be tantamount to a positive loss.

An Englishman has the character of paying very great respect to his gastronomic organs; but to what straits must he not put them if he goes into the navy? Beef and pork, two, three, or four years old, hard as a shot, or woolly as a sheep's back, a southerly wind in the bread bag, and, if in port, a pound of fresh beef, which there is reason to fear, in many instances, never grew on an ox, or at least not upon a well-fed beast. Pork, mutton, and "soft tack" may be plentiful and cheap on shore, but the sailor must be content with boiled beef, vegetable soup, and biscuit. Is it surprising, when this main question is so much neglected, that the Royal Navy should be unpopular, while the shipping offices of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, and West India Mail Company, and the establishments of Green, Wigram, Smith, and other great and liberal shipowners, are besieged by candidates for employment?

There are three things necessary to render the Royal Navy desirable—good feeding, good wages, and good usage. We have treated of the first, let us now turn to the second condition.

WAGES.

In the Navy there are two rates of wages, one for continuous service seamen, the other for the limited or five year term. As the continuous service seamen labour under what they consider a disadvantage, and as few merchant seamen will ever be found engaging for ten years' service, we shall take as a naval seaman's wages the short or limited scale. Under the term "Seamen" must be included petty officers, since petty officers in the Royal Navy are of an hour's creation, and may be of an hour's duration. Chief petty officers—it is not necessary to particularise the several ratings—receive £3 9s. 9d. per calendar month; first class, £2 14s. 3d.; second class, £2 9s. 1d. Leading seaman, £2 6s. 6d.; able seaman, £2 1s. 4d.; ordinary, £1 13s. 7d.; second class ordinary, £1 8s. 5d. To institute a fair comparison we must suppose a chief petty officer in the navy to be equal to a third mate, or boatswain, in the merchant service. The wages of these vary according to the different trades, ranging from £3 3s. to £4 8s. per month. The lower rate only applies to small vessels engaged in the West Indian, South American, and African trades. In large ships the rate is from £4 to £4 8s. First and second class petty officers have no corresponding position


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In the year 1853, 5,069 men and 1,155 boys accepted the terms of continuous service. In 1854, 6,565 men and 4,852 boys joined; 4,206 men and 4,012 boys took the shilling in 1855; 3,378 men and 3,377 boys in 1856, and in 1857, 1,237 men and 1,898 boys. Of these, however, 534 *purchased their discharge, and* 13,827 *were discharged by Admiralty order* in the course of the five years. The latter figures include 2,994 who accepted their discharge, in consequence of Sir Charles Wood's gracious circular of May 13, 1857. It was the general remark at the time that these latter were the very pink of the class—the bone and muscle of the continuous service system.

Before adducing the objections to the system brought under the consideration of the commissioners by some of the most enlightened among our naval captains, we will hear what "Jack" had to say about it. As "Jack's" type, we accept John Donnelly, now a seaman rigger in Plymouth dockyard. Donnelly served his time in merchants' employ, and afterwards successively joined the Constance, Phaeton, Blenheim, and, lastly, the Urgent trooper. He was closely interrogated by Admiral Shepherd.

3550. "You have stated that the men dislike continuous service because they may get with a set of officers who are not agreeable to them, and that then they are obliged to remain with them?" "Yes, you are obliged to remain for the commission."

3551. "Is it not the case, that whether a man be for continuous, or non-continuous service, he goes into his first ship for from three to five years, and that he is with the same officers, whether he is for continuous service or not?" "He might be shipped with them again."

3553. "Then where is the advantage? For instance: There is a continuous service man paid off in a ship as an able seaman, and he states, before he is paid off, what guard ship he intends to return to. When he goes back to that ship he goes as an able seaman; and the first draft that is required he is sent to the ship, as an able seaman. So that he might continue on like that for years.

3554. "True, but both continuous and non continuous service men change their officers, who might be agreeable or disagreeable to them alike. Are you aware that a continuous service man can purchase his discharge?" "Yes."

3555. "And that a non-continuous service man cannot purchase his discharge?" "I believe that there is an instruction for the non-continuous service man, that he can obtain his discharge by application."

3556. "Suppose that a continuous service man enters for ten years, and a non-continuous service man for five, if the continuous service man dislikes his ship at the end of one year, or five years, he can get his discharge, whereas the non-continuous service man must serve on his five years, if the Government choose to exact that service from him?" "Yes: but that non-continuous service man can obtain his discharge by application, if the Captain sanctions it."

3557. "Are you aware that at the expiration of three years, the

service man is always at liberty to purchase his discharge, and as Admiral Shepherd tried to make Donelly believe, possesses an advantage over the five years' man in that respect, why in the name of common sense are we expending so much money and exciting discontent and disgust, in order to bolster up so rotten a system?

If we turn from the *argumentum ad hominem* to the theory, we find Captain Denman laying it down very correctly. He says in answer to 2691: "I believe one great object towards obtaining seamen is to make the service agreeable to their tastes and feelings, to which the continuous service runs counter. This is proved by the fact that a great increase of wages, and a pension to be obtained three years sooner than by men entered for shorter service, are necessary to induce men to accept it. I know that when the Monarch was paid off at Sheerness a large number of men paid the forfeit of £12 each to free themselves from this obligation of continuous service, and such cases and desertions are of frequent occurrence. The continuous service does not the least assist the object of attracting merchant seamen to the fleet in time of war, which has always been the great difficulty; on the contrary, its operation is certainly not favourable to this important object. An A.B. entering not for continuous service, would receive £4 11s. per annum less than a continuous service man. Government could not promise to keep the 50,000 or 60,000 additional seamen suddenly required by war for ten years. Thus, just the moment that the country imperatively required the services of merchant seamen, and just as wages in the merchant service would probably increase greatly, the country would offer to these men not only much lower wages than in merchant ships, but less by nearly £5 a year than the other men in the navy, entered during peace, would be in the actual receipt of.

"Two rates of wages," he adds, "are at all times dangerous, and the continuous service men entering in peace, receiving much higher wages, with a pension at thirty-eight years of age, would be regarded with a jealous eye by men who, in the hour of peril, whether voluntarily or under compulsion, came to fight the battles of their country."

The honourable Captain's argument is very complete, but it failed to be convincing. As Hudibras says,

> The man convinced against his will,
> Holds to the same opinion still.

The prominent naval members of the commission were the great progenitors of the scheme, and stuck to their bantling with paternal fondness. In their Report they say: "The system has been in practical operation between five and six years, and although it has not been carried out to the full extent contemplated by the committee (of 1852), it has already been attended with very beneficial results, and has secured to the country a body of well trained and efficient seamen, whose attachment to the service is the best security for the faithful performance of their duties.

Beneficial results! Attachment to the service! when, where, and how have they been manifested? From the fervent imagination

of the founders these platitudes could alone have proceeded; for there is hardly a tittle of evidence in the Blue Book to warrant the assumption.

When treating of the proposed reserve we may again allude to this topic; but upon this point all must be united—that continuous service will never be acceptable to the reserved merchant seamen, even if double wages and permanent service were guaranteed.

The third essential towards rendering the navy popular is good usage. Under this head discipline should be included: but inasmuch as the subject is a very broad one, and one upon which few officers are, or ever will be, agreed, we shall defer that question, and confine ourselves to the offer of

PROMOTION.

The Royal Commission have recommended as a strong inducement to continued good service in the Royal Navy, the promotion of warrant officers and petty officers to commissioned rank. Nothing can sound more liberal than the recommendation of the Commissioners. After quoting the circular 121, which sets forth the promise of promotion to warrant officers who distinguished themselves, together with a gratuity of £100, to enable them to provide a suitable outfit, the report goes on to say, "We anticipate the best results from the occasional promotion of a warrant officer to the quarter deck," and then adds, "and it should not be limited to the warrant officers, but should be open in the case of very original and extraordinary services to any seaman in your majesty's navy."

People, however, are accustomed to look more to performance than promises. It is one thing to say such a man is eligible f promotion, and ought to be promoted; and another to give him t for which he is eligible, and which he ought to have. Mr. W. Sm a boatswain, was questioned upon this point. He had signed warrant officers' memorial, which complained that there wer rewards to his class for war service. The chairman then re him to the extract from the circular, authorizing promotion, him if he had seen it. Mr Smith replied in the affirmati said that it had never been acted upon, although warrant offi been recommended by their captains. He quoted one case Mr. Spry.

Mr. Green very pertinently asked would he accept it if o him? and the reply was dubious. "He," (Mr. Smith) know." The naked truth is that the word "promotion" biguously employed, that no one knows how to take it. rank is the promotion to raise the distinguished Warrant seaman? It is hardly to be supposed that a Warrant O be found competent to undertake the multifarious an duties of a Master, and the rank of Mate or Second M place him in a worse position, in a pecuniary point of a first or second class Warrant Officer. To make hir would be to place him in a position on active servic was not qualified by previous training, and, upon t promise remains in its present indefinite conditio unfulfilled to the end of the century.

There is one class which must inevitably be swept away before the road of promotion can be fairly open to the gallant young seaman—it is that of Master. That rank was formed when the Navy was in a state of infancy. When there was no education, professional or otherwise, required from the Captain, or any other executive officer, not even the simplest rudiments of nautical knowledge, a Master was essential—nay, indispensable. The Master had to make up for the shortcomings of the Captain and other officers, and it was his province to navigate and *work* the ship, while others were engaged at the guns. Times have changed. The acquisitions once monopolised by the Master are patent, or should be, to every passed Midshipman, and it is probable that if there were no Master, every Lieutenant would, in the course of a few years, be found as competent to pilot or navigate as the most skilful Master is now. But while that barrier remains this proficiency can hardly ever be expected. Moreover, until the intermediate grade of Master is swept away, the Naval apprentice will find his upward progress impossible. He can never hope to become a Mate so long as the grade of Second Master has any existence, and never to attain the rank of Lieutenant while that of Master remains on the Navy list. Ambition must be fed with noble food. If we expect to draw from the humble individual bright sparks of heroism, and hope to stimulate him to deeds of daring, we must not be content with offering him a rank which is no better than a *cul de sac*. He must see his way, in imagination, to the Admirals flag, as he did during the long war. The recruiting sergeant can with truth tell the energetic lad who is about to take the shilling, that he may live to be a colonel, or a general, and may quote hundreds of examples of young soldiers rising to high rank in the army. In that service, although of course extremely difficult of access, there is a road to the Marshal's batôn, and the path to the highest Naval rank might also be opened if the anomalous and obsolete rank of "Master" were swept away.

We have now touched upon the victualling, wages, and prospects of promotion of seamen, glancing at the objections to continuous service. We now come to a very important consideration which has a great deal to do with the comforts of men engaged in fitting out ships, or in port, while their ships are under repair, we mean

NAVAL BARRACKS.

It is not necessary to do more than briefly allude to the miseries of the hulk system. Let our naval readers recal to mind their first introduction to a hulk! The black dirty decks, pitched sides, foul smells, slovenly aspect, which presented themselves on first entering. The neatness and regularity of a sea going ship strikes everyone with admiration; while the hulk brings to the recollection everything which is sickening and disgusting. If this be so to the officer, what must it be to the man? But it is not in this point of view that we would present the hulk system. The hulk is the lodging house of officers and ship's company, while the ship is getting ready to receive them. The ship is probably in the fitting basin in

the dockyard, while the hulk lies moored at some distance in the harbour, a mile, more or less. In summer the men have a very early breakfast in order to enable them to get on shore to the dock yard to draw stores, fit rigging, and do the needful work. At a quarter to twelve they must knock off, and go down to the boats, which are to convey them to the hulk to dine. Again at three bells the working party is mustered to return to the dockyard. It is perhaps blowing, and raining, but there is something which particularly requires them on shore, and go they must. Wet or dry, cold or heat, makes no difference. Time is necessarily lost, and so is labour.

The day's work over "Jack" would like to go on shore for a run. He puts his name down for liberty, and a boat is provided to take the liberty men on shore; but in too many instances coming off is another matter. For this he must pay his fare to the waterman, or break his leave. He has no money, and the consequence is the commission of an offence against discipline. Under the most favorable circumstances of wind and tide, time is lost, money expended, and enjoyment abridged; and all because the men are berthed on board a hulk, moored out in the middle of the harbour.

We have searched the evidence in vain for one solid argument in support of the system. Three officers were especially summoned from Portsmouth to give evidence in support of the hulks. These were Captain Hewlett, of the Excellent, a gunnery hulk, but with man-of-war arrangements. Commander Bickford, of the Victory, hulk, and Captain Preedy. The first said, "I am entirely in favor of hulks for seamen. I think they would get into long shore habits in barracks, and be, perhaps, less willing to go to sea, from a barrack than from a hulk," but Captain Hewlett could not deny the loss of time in going to and fro, and that days sometimes elapsed without communication from the shore being possible. He thought "sailo in a barrack would acquire long shore habits, and that they sho be *habituated to wet and dry.*" He had better have carried argument a step further, and have said that men should be n targets of, to *habituate them to stand fire.*

Captain Preedy's reasons were no less illogical. He do whether men on leave would return to the barrack if allowed for a run outside the yard, and seemed to think a hulk the or place for a seaman to live in. Commander Bickford considered a sailor "shook down" better into his place in a hulk than he wo in a barrack. By such fallacies, for they deserve no better did these three officers attempt to bolster up a most injurious How long does it take a marine or a soldier to "shake down embarked on board a man-of-war, we would ask Commander F What greater inducement we would ask Captain Preedy, man have for breaking his leave, if he knew that he h fortable bed ready for him in a barrack on shore, and minutes' walk, than a less comfortable one in a hulk, to g which, on a dark rainy night, would cost him sixpence advantage is gained by subjecting a seaman to the vi climate and weather we demand of Captain Hewlett

Fortunately there is a fact which cannot be gainsaid by the advocates for the hulk system. At Sheerness naval barracks have been some years in successful operation. Rear Admiral Elliot, who was examined before the commissioners, said—"I have had a crew living in a barrack, and I know the advantage of it. There is only one in the service, and that is at Sheerness." The Rear Admiral anticipated from the establishment of barracks the greatest possible advantages. He thought that the discipline of the service would undergo a considerable improvement, if the men could be allowed liberty for a few hours when the work was done. And one would think that there could be no difference of opinion on this head.

Generally speaking, men do not join a ship until they have spent all, or very nearly all their money; yet even an empty pocket is not enough to keep them on board. They will borrow, sell their clothes, or do anything to get on shore for a run; but it is argued that if these men were lodged on shore in a comfortable barrack, they would be content to go out for an hour or two, to smoke their pipes, and, having no waterman to pay, would return in good time to their "home," satisfied and pleased. To the married man the boon would be even yet greater. After working hours he has to repair on board the hulk, and then again to the shore; and if he has leave till the following morning, he must turn out at 3 or 4 o'clock, to go down to the liberty-boat, or pay a waterman. Now if he had only to go into the dockyard, he could rise with the workmen, and be at his post in time to commence work, and ready for his comfortable breakfast at the barrack.

Sir Charles Napier, who expatiated at great length upon the advantages of naval barracks, went so far as to say that the hulks "ought to be burnt"—that they were an incumbrance to the harbours, and a source of mischief and misery. In the event of a fire in the yard, the advantage of having a body of men immediately available would be beyond calculation. It was stated by Captain Johnstone, the Superintendent of the Sailor's Home, at Portsmouth, that during the Russian war hundreds of men slept on the floors, for want of other accommodation. The men had not money to pay for beds, and not being able to get off to the hulks, were obliged to sleep in boats, or wherever they could find the least shelter. All these evils would be obviated by barracks on shore.

Captain M'Neill Boyd said, "the hulk system involved loss of time, and labour. There is a loss of time in getting the working parties into the boats, in reaching their destination, in leaving off work before the dockyard hours require it, in order that the parties should be on board by the dinner hour. There is a loss of labour in having to retain a certain number of ship keepers, boats' crews to answer signals, row guard, &c. In barracks, with the ship in the basin (where if need be she might be completed with guns and everything but powder on board), the officer employed in raising men can have ready communication. The economy of time, and the command of greater labour power are obvious: leave of absence can be granted without detriment to the comfort of those who do not want any, without the interference of seditious watermen; and in such a

manner as to be acceptable to the men, and enable the officer to restrain the undeserving, and prevent fraud. The unnecessary antique forms that still obtain in the making, presenting, and hunting about after demands for stores, are considerably divested of their tediousness. The dreadful exposure consequent on the passage from hulk and dockyard, in blowy, rainy weather, is entirely obviated; and even where the men are unavoidably exposed, the barracks afford warmth and means of drying clothing."

The hardships to which men are exposed in this way are, Captain Boyd thinks, "sufficient to drive men out of the service. The fatigue and exposure," says he, "in making the passage in wintry weather, especially where the wind and tide are adverse, are of the most trying description: never encountered in the general course of service, except under most urgent and important circumstances. On the ultimate arrival of the working party, their dinners are frequently cold, or overdone, and there is no substantial evening meal to anticipate." The latter very important consideration gave rise to further question. Captain Boyd was asked why the officer in command on board the hulk could not take care of the dinners of the men on shore. Captain Boyd replied that "it was a very difficult duty, even for an experienced and considerate commanding officer." He said: "It is by no means certain that in a newly-commissioned ship there is a professed ship's cook, indeed very frequently the post is filled by a volunteer. In no case can the dinner undergo division by the cook." In a word, if men are not off to their time, their chance of having a comfortable dinner is very small indeed.

Now all these and a score more evils might be enumerated in support of barracks, without any countervailing drawback worth noticing. According to the estimate of Mr. Moody, the assistant master shipwright at Portsmouth, the cost of fitting up the four hulks at Portsmouth harbour would amount to £2,500. They comprise three old frigates, and a line of battle ship, and therefore could not accommodate, with any degree of comfort, more than 1,500 men. But this number could not be accommodated unless the ships happened to be of the proper size; but as two small ships' company's cannot conveniently be berthed on board one hulk, it takes a frigate to accommodate the crew of a sloop of war, &c. But all these points were lost sight of, and the report recommends the adoption of the Bellerophon plan.

WARRANT-OFFICERS' WIDOWS' PENSIONS.

The recommendation of the Commissioners with regard to the restoration of pensions to the widows of warrant officers, suggests not only a just act, but one of the most politic that could have been offered. We find, however, with deep regret, that the enemies by whom this oft-repeated request has been resisted hitherto, have been the well-paid clerks at Whitehall.

For many years the late Sir George Cockburn had to bear the onus of resisting this claim; it now turns out that one of the great obstacles was an Admiralty clerk. Mr. Pennell, chief clerk of the Admiralty, being asked to give an opinion as to the claim for pen-

sions for the widows of warrant-officers, objected to it on two grounds, first for financial reasons, and second for "*moral considerations.*" Being requested to explain his "moral considerations," he said,—"The fact of a man being married, led him naturally to shrink from sea service, and he was not so ready to accept it as before. It was ascertained, moreover, that a considerable number of widows were living with other men, without declaring their marriage,—the result being that those who were conscientious lost their pensions, in consequence of re-marriage, and those who were not conscientious, lived in a state of concubinage with other men."

The same argument might apply to other widows; and we are sure that Mr. Pennell's statement will be received as a gross libel upon a body of respectable women. So this Admiralty gentleman with his £1200 a year, who never had his feet wet with salt water, considers that a warrant officer is no longer fit for sea if he marries, and that if he dies, the pension which his widow will receive will only be an encouragement to concubinage!

We are ashamed of such logic, and right glad to think that such an assertion was treated with the disdain it merited. But we have arrived at the end of our tether, and must therefore leave the consideration of the proposed reserve for a future number.

OUR MILITARY ADMINISTRATION, AND THE RECRUITING OF THE ARMY.

CONSIDERING the great magnitude of the interest we have at stake, and how much depends upon our always being prepared with at least a good system of organization, by which the full power of our enormous resources might if necessary be developed, it is remarkable the little attention we pay, under ordinary circumstances, to the smooth and efficient working of everything connected with our military establishments. It may emphatically be said that we live from hand to mouth in these matters, that we are content with whatever serves us at the moment, without caring to consider whether it will meet the exigencies of more critical times. When the political atmosphere is clear, and peace seems unlikely to be disturbed, anything satisfies us. We may know that the organization of our departments is extravagant and defective, that our navy cannot be manned, or our army recruited, under any pressure, but we still drag on with whatever we may have in these respects, never looking to the future, nor adapting anything to the capability of meeting those real emergencies for which an army and navy are intended, and the probable recurrence of which almost alone render them necessary. In quiet times we are content to go on with our institutions whatever they may be. They may have become antiquated and useless, abuses and obstructions to their proper working of every kind and description may have accumulated around them, but it is seldom, except when actual war threatens, and when due and

careful deliberation are almost altogether out of the question, that we set about amending them.

In the threatening appearance just now existing on the continent of Europe, when it is of the utmost importance for the preservation of peace that the power and influence of England should have its greatest weight, and when we might really hold the balance which would decide it, it is rather unfortunate that, in addition to the unsettled state of our domestic politics, we are in the usual condition with regard to our military affairs, almost everything connected with them being as confused and unsatisfactory as our greatest enemy could wish them to be. The manning of the navy, the recruiting of the army, the dockyards, the militia, the very weapons our soldiers and sailors are to use, are at this moment the subject of discussion and enquiry for the purpose, if they serve any purpose at all, of the most radical changes and reforms. The Enfield rifle has been already discredited in India, and was equally so in the Crimea, but no one would listen to it; and as for the artillery we are to use in the next war, no one knows anything about it. The race just now is in preparation, and in this contest we are altogether behind hand; we have only got so far as to throw doubt upon everything we have without much idea, as yet, of what we are to substitute in lieu of it. The very foundation of what is required has to be laid, and just as an army and navy are most wanted, we are awakening to the difficulty, if not impossibility, of recruiting the one or manning the other, and to the best weapons for arming both. In addition to this, we are engaged, we are told, in reconstructing our fleet, and we are certainly questioning with no little dear bought experience to justify it, whether the changes we have so recently adopted in the creation of the office of a Secretary for War, from which so much was at one time expected, has not placed us in a much worse position than we were in before. With abundance of time to have thoroughly reorganized our military system during the long interval of peace, from 1815 until 1854, we neglected the subject then. We delayed to act, as is our wont, until we were in the midst of the excitement and turmoil of actual war; and, as might reasonably be expected under such circumstances, most of the changes then made have, in the opinions of most of those best competent to judge, done us more harm than good. There is very little doubt now but that the old and much decried Board of Ordnance did the public work better, at a less cost, and with more despatch and regularity, than anything we have constructed between the Horse Guards and the War Office to serve instead of it.

A few judicious alterations would have done all that was wanted, but, in the excitement of the moment, we perpetrated a revolution, and we have been reaping the consequences ever since in an extravagant outlay, and the perpetrations of incessant blunders. The consolidation of our departments, as it was called, though, in point of fact, the consolidation was altogether a myth, has ended in more officials having been created, and a greater difficulty in carrying on the service than before existed. We have created a state of things

in which the highest of our military authorities are as likely as not to be engaged at any moment, however critical, in a struggle for superiority the one over the other, without any limits being laid down by which the powers of either can be described. We have created two rival powers whose time and attention will be sure to be as much absorbed by their own antagonism to each other, and the provocation to encroachment which their relative positions afford, as by anything connected with their public duties. There may be a lull in this feeling every now and then, as there is just now, but while the cause of an evil exists, the evil itself may at any time be looked for. Lord Hardinge, as the Commander-in-Chief, was a mere cipher, and acknowledged himself to be so. The Secretary for War, as he described it before a Parliamentary Committee, overrode him in everything. Our army, and everything connected with it, was ruled during his time, and for some while afterwards by Lord Panmure, a civilian with the thinnest lacquer of soldiership—and with what results the country who paid for it can best tell. At the present moment we have a less arrogant and less presumptuous head of the War Office, but in practical knowledge he is little, if at all, superior to his predecessor, and matters are only a shade better. We do not do so many foolish things, but our wise ones are just as few and far between as they ever were. This must always be the case in the manner in which we act, for where responsibility is so undefined as it is, and where authority is dependent as much, or rather more, upon courtesy, or the deference due to a high social position, as in the case of the Commander-in-Chief, rather than to the possession of any real power or control on his part, the conduct of our affairs must needs be defective. Where we have two officials of the highest rank in the same department, or in what ought to be considered as the same department, with their respective powers indifferently defined, or not laid down at all, we must expect that the administration of the army will fall into arrear; or, as we see is the case from the committees of enquiry now going on, that it will, more likely still, be altogether neglected. The necessity to think and act under such circumstances devolves upon no one, the consequences of neglect cannot be made to fall anywhere. There will be no disposition to approach, or consider great administrative questions, for it is precisely on these questions that differences of opinion might arise, and that the antagonism of our military chiefs, or rather the chiefs of our military departments, would be most liable to be exhibited. It is to the divided nature of the administration of the army, the independence, real or usurped, of every one of our military departments, and the jealousy of each other created and fostered by it between them, that we may trace by far the greater portion, and by far the worst and most prominent of the defects of which we are so continually complaining. Instead of alterations being made from time to time as circumstances point them out to be necessary, every defect is suffered to go on and increase in intensity, until in some moment of trial the whole thing fails us, and then there is nothing but indignation and surprise on the part of the country at what it was previously quite indifferent to, and about

which no one in authority had in the least troubled himself. Until we can bring our military departments, one and all, in the closest connection with each other, under one responsible head, capable of looking at them and treating them with the same impartial consideration in all that concerns them, we may depend upon it that military reform and improvement will make but very halting and unsatisfactory progress. It is not the efficiency of the army, or the best measures to maintain its efficiency as it ought to be, that occupies so much of the time of the officials at the Horse Guards, it is the comparatively paltry interests of this or that individual on some favoured branch of the service. The merest trifle connected with the Guards, or the maintenance of purchase, the cut of a coat, or the shape of a spur, attracts far more attention and discussion in official quarters than the most important matters relating to the recruiting or organization or anything else of the army. If we had men at the head of affairs capable of taking one half the pains to promote any important improvement in our military legislation that is, in many instances, frequently taken by them to obstruct and impede it, matters would never have arrived at the state in which we now find them, no one thing relating to our army being exactly as it should be. It is some comfort as things are that the question of manning the navy has reached a more advanced stage than most of our other enquiries, and that, at least, in this instance, those in authority have been furnished with some clear notions as to what ought to be done. A portion only of the suggestions made by the committee on the subject are, it would seem to be, carried out; but even a portion is better than nothing.

The worst of it is, that it must be some time, do what we will, before what is proposed to be done can be got into proper working order. Knowing how miserably deficient we were in this most important point, we have so foolishly delayed the necessary measures with regard to it, that it is in vain to expect much from them for present purposes. It is a doubtful point on the continent whether even in a navy we are as strong as some of our neighbours; and it is impossible but that our influence must suffer by even an approach to thi impression, especially when so many of our other departments a in a transition state. We have been going on year after year, kn ing that a great deal connected with our armaments was not as should be, but it is only at the moment when the pressure comes t we commence the process of making them so. When the mate should be forged and ready almost every thing is in the furnace. is absurd to suppose that the condition we are in is not well kr both to friends and enemies abroad; and from the absence of nization—that organization which we ought to have, independ what may be the aspect of affairs at the moment—and the w administrative ability to give it to us, the power of England, it would be so desirable to have felt in its fullest force at the p moment, is in no slight degree lost. The dissolution of Parl dependent as we are on committees of the latter, rather t our paid officials, for getting us out of our difficulties, must a considerable time the changes which have been pronounc

sary; and the probabilities are that war will overtake us before even the preliminaries of getting our affairs in order to meet it are settled. It is a most extraordinary and unaccountable way of doing the work to be always calling in Parliamentary assistance, and to invoke committees of inquiry about facts which are well known to every one. Surely neither the Horse Guards nor the War Office could plead the slightest denial or ignorance of the perfect absurdity of everything relating to the militia; of the extravagance and blundering going on since the abolition of the Board of Ordnance; or of the fraud and abominations, to say nothing of the absolute failure attached to our recruiting system; and yet, before we can obtain the alterations required, or get things on a better footing, there are long and tedious preliminaries to be gone through, for the purpose of supplying the deficiencies and neglect of those who, if they fairly earned the pay they receive, ought to do the work without any assistance. What an instance of delay, in a matter of the utmost importance, is that of the Committee obtained by Capt. Vivian, and which has now, until the assembling of the new Parliament, necessarily suspended its operations. It will be a year at least from the time of its being ordered before it will have finally closed its labours, and it will probably be some time longer before its recommendations obtain any practical result. In the meanwhile we are to get on how we can, no matter what happens, with a divided and irresponsible system between the War Office and the Horse Guards, which every impartial authority condemns, but which somehow or other we have no one sufficiently capable to change for us into something better. Every thing relating to the defects of the present state of things is as well known as it is ever likely to be, and it is rather inexplicable, if we have such able people at the head of our military affairs as we are constantly being told we have, why we should waste a year or perhaps two in a Parliamentary Committee to inquire into what almost every one admits, with another discussion over again before the necessary reforms are instituted. It surely is not beyond the power of the Government on its own responsibility to direct whatever is necessary for the improvement and greater efficiency of our military departments. If our authorities cannot do this, high and well paid as they are, it is very difficult to understand of what use they are at all. It is hardly possible that so practical a people as we are continually taking credit to ourselves for being, will be content to go on for ever, with such disastrous results every now and then; having its army and navy so ruled that those who are paid for administering them, and who ought, in common fairness, to be held responsible for the proper working of all the machinery connected with them, are as helpless as children calling out, when they get into difficulties which their own neglect and incapacity have accumulated, for some extraneous aid to get them out of them, and to enable them to take a fresh start. We have had experience enough, without further inquiry, to know how the present organization of our departments leaves us during peace, and what we may reasonably expect from it in case of war. We know that it has brought discredit upon us in ordinary times, and most people have arrived at a logical conclusion

that it will do still worse when the pressure is greater; and yet such is the use to us of those we have in office, that we are virtually told we must be content to go on as we are, under circumstances so critical as to the preservation of peace, although we have a military staff alone at the Horse Guards costing upwards of £15,000 per annum, and a band of officials at the War Office set down in the estimates at double that amount.

It is rather hard upon the country, as any reasonable person will admit, that for all this outlay we are to have little or nothing done but such routine work as any commonly stupid set of persons might easily get through for half the money. Improvements of administrative importance are almost entirely neglected; or, as is about to take place in the artillery, they are entered upon without consulting those most competent to give advice. There is nothing but confusion and mismanagement everywhere at the present moment, and swamped as we are by committees and enquiries, by and bye we shall have more of them. It will be many a day before things settle down into anything like order, and if war is to come within the next year or two there is no period in our history when we shall have been less prepared to meet it. No one doubts for a moment the strength or resources of the country; if those resources had not been what they are we could never have got on at all. What we want is the organization to make our enormous means available. Without this, and without a particle of administrative talent in the conduct of our affairs to give it, we must fall short of what we might and ought to attain. Our deficiency is not in men or material, or in the goodness of either, but in the want of knowledge of those who rule, in knowing how to get at them, or to put them into shape and order. It is to the means of getting those who have this capability that all our attention and energies should be directed. We are working now by sheer dint of money, and a very miserable exhibition we are making of it. There is nothing whatever to inspire confidence. Every enemy we have on the continent exults in seeing us go lower and lower, and the moral greatness of our position has, by our own folly and stupidity, been more than half lost to us. We turned out one of the most pugnacious of our ministers for his subserviency to France, but those who have succeeded have been equally humble. With strong hearts and arms, and abundant means, they all know our real weakness, and, until we have some decided reform, we may rest assured that the aggressive policy going on across the channel will never be restrained. It is not more money that is wanted to set us right; we spend enough, and more than enough already, but we want some well arranged system, to be maintained on no extravagant scale during peace, but which can be expanded to any extent when circumstances require it; we want this, and we want the necessary administrative ability that will make our institutions keep pace with the times, and keep up in them a sustained and continued efficiency. Committees of enquiry, parliamentary or otherwise, are only stop gaps for a time; the shortcomings and defects which we are always complaining of are sure to recur over and over again, so long as we depend on this mode of doing the

work. It would be better, instead of relying upon it, at once to recognize the officials we have as being only intended for mere matters of detail, and to have a second set who will make it their business to analyse and study the information pouring in daily into our public departments, and who would, by timely legislative measures, prevent our getting into those difficulties which we are now so very frequently involved in. A sum of money set apart in the estimates for this purpose, even though it might be of no inconsiderable amount, would be well bestowed.

How, it may be asked, are we to expect efficiency, if we continue to go on from year to year, however time or circumstances may alter, interminably working upon the same system until we can work it no longer, and it utterly fails us. The strongest instance, perhaps, of our perseverance in this respect is to be found in our rigid adherence to the same inducements and mode of recruiting that were instituted almost with the earliest establishment of our army, until at last we have arrived at a state of things that, out of the number of men enlisted, nearly, if not quite, one half of them desert, and accepting men of the smallest stature, and the most moderate possession of physical capabilities, we fail to fill our muster rolls to the extent voted by parliament. The desertion that has been going on for some years, and which is going on now under the very eyes of the authorities, without the slightest effort to check it, is something incredible. If a faithful return of it was presented to-morrow, it would show the utter demoralization it has caused in our population, and the period of its continuance would do more we believe than anything else that could be thought of, to exhibit the incapacity or neglect of those who have the control of these matters. Knowing the fraud and the unsatisfactory results in every way which attached to our manner of getting recruits, it was the joint duty of the War Office and the Horse Guards to have established some other and better means of doing so, but up to this moment nothing of the kind has appeared, and at the eleventh hour the recruiting of the army, like all the other questions relating to making it what it ought to be, is the subject of investigation before a committee. This committee consists of six persons, of whom the name of one only, that of Colonel Tulloch, can give much of a confident hope that a sound practical measure will result from their labours. There seems very little disposition, moreover, to proceed energetically in the matter. It is not one which, if taken up at all as it ought to be, is likely to present any unsurmountable difficulty to being properly arranged. It requires, however, the most careful consideration; and as it is secondary only to that most important one, the manning of the navy, we purpose to conclude this article by a few remarks regarding it. We suggested last month that one of the greatest boons to the recruit would be to have some receiving depôt, where he would be housed and fed until he joins his regiment, apart from the tramps and vagabonds with whom he is obliged to associate in billets. It would be a further great improvement, as we conceive, if the bounty was reduced simply to the recruit receiving a free kit and double pay, say for a fortnight or three weeks after his enlistment, so that

he might commence his career with an impression as favourable as it is now quite the contrary of the service, and to enable him properly to meet the greater expenses he must be put to for his living as a recruit than it will cost him as a soldier in his regular mess, as well as to permit his partaking more freely in such amusements as he may like to enjoy, or to treat in moderation the friends he may be about to part with. Every recruit, we maintain, ought to have fourteen shillings a week for the first three weeks, counting from the day of his enlistment, to be paid in daily payments; and this sum and a free kit should be substituted instead of the present bounty of three pounds, £2 10s. of which is given to the recruit in one payment, and which answers no other purpose but to demoralize him and a good many of his comrades as long as it lasts. It is notorious that men are given leave to for the sole purpose of getting rid of this money; how and where they pass their time may be easily guessed. Not one man in a thousand is one whit the better of the bounty as it is now given; and for one man made better ten are made a great deal the worse. It is a mistake to suppose that this bounty is much inducement to good recruits really intending to serve. It may entice a few such, but not many. The men who are tempted by it are those who intend to receive it and desert, who in fact make desertion a trade by means of the bounty. Nothing is more clear than that we ought to abolish this part of our recruiting system; the talked of enlightenment of the age must be altogether a myth, if it can be thought necessary any longer to continue it.

There is a view of another part of the subject which might, perhaps, well be considered at the present moment, and that is, whether it might not be better somewhat largely to increase the soldier's pay, and to leave it to himself to lay by the means of support when he comes to be discharged, than to continue the present system of giving him a pension which, acceptable as it may be, is not after all sufficient to keep him in anything like respectability, far more good would accrue to the service if men were encouraged to save and given higher pay, so as to enable them, by means of the savings' bank, to take care of themselves. The Government is bound to keep one object mainly in view, and that is how best to get recruits; and the point to be decided is, and we should think there would be found statistics which would help to a decision, whether men would be most induced to enlist by high pay and no pension in case of discharge for mere length of service (of course in the case of wounds the matter would be altogether different), or whether they would be more inclined to come forward for low pay while serving, and such pension on discharge as is now given, varying as it does from eightpence to a shilling a day, the latter sum being only obtainable under circumstances of particular good conduct. At the present rate of pay few men have on an average much more than twopence a day to spend in indulgence and amusement, and it does seem rather unreasonable and absurd to expect a man to save out of this sum, but it would be far otherwise if the pay of the soldier was higher. Three fourths, and more, of the money that is now put in the savings' bank is deposited in the colonies, where the soldier has often

some pecuniary advantages. Very little indeed of it is contributed by men at home, who have nothing but their ordinary military pay. It is all very well to talk of teaching a man thrift, but to carry it out in practice we should give him the wherewithal to be thrifty with, without expecting that he is to cut himself completely off from those enjoyments and amusements of which, in fair right and reason, he ought to partake, and to be wholly deprived of which is to make life hardly worth having. We are inclined to think that the time may have arrived, when it would be desirable to consider whether it would not answer recruiting purposes, and the good of the service best to be more liberal in pay; and, except in the case of wounds, to be less so in pensions. It would be a great gain in every way if we could contrive some system by which the soldier would be taught to think, and act, and be responsible for himself. A great deal of care and caution would require to be used in the attempt to effect this object, but if only a reasonable portion of what is so frequently told us of the great advance in society in every grade is true, the risk, in judicious hands, ought not to give us much uneasiness.

The working man at this moment is held up as a model of good sense and moderation; and, if from what is known of the habits of our labouring population generally, we are enabled to say that they have made that progress which is asserted for them, it is surely very reasonable to think and to argue, that a very different mode of legislation to what we have practised hitherto, might be initiated for the recruiting of the army, and the inducements held out to men to join it. The more instructed and educated a man is, the more impatient he is to have the entire control of himself in his own hands, and he will not in this state be so much attracted to the military profession, which denies him this self-responsibility, as to other callings in which he possesses it. We know of no drawback to the life of the English soldier but the constant meddling with him. He is a victim to the very best intentions. Every regulation is drawn out with the evident impression, that those it is intended for are inherently bad, and it is sure to be clogged with a host of devices, intended to meet this state of things.

It is not possible, with due regard to discipline, to make the soldier as free as the same man in civil life, but the nearer we can do this the more popular, we may depend upon it, will the soldier's calling become. We are now literally taking the very dregs and sweepings of the country, both morally and physically, for our soldiers. The greatest tramp and vagabond who offers himself is accepted, and while we are enormously increasing our estimates in improving the condition of the army, we do not seem to make the slightest advance in attracting to its ranks, in any but exceptional cases, the classes above the lowest, which, to keep up its numbers, we ought to have. If there would be too much risk, which might be the case, in running at once from one system to another, in throwing off altogether what we have been accustomed to for years and adopting something new, might we not, in a new recruiting code, leave it optional to the recruit to enlist under the present

state of things—small pay and a smaller pension on discharge after twenty-one years' service—or to do so under a new code, in which his pay would be considerably increased while serving, but with the distinct understanding that his means of subsistence on discharge would depend entirely upon himself. We are convinced that if all the rubbish, for it is little better, of good-conduct pay was abolished, and if bounties and pensions were withheld, that the soldier's pay might nearly be doubled without any addition, after a very short time, to the estimates; and we think that with this increased pay, a better and more respectable class would enter the service; and that by means of the savings' bank, which is almost the only institution we would keep up of those now existing, very few, if any, men would go back to civil life a bit worse off than the mass of the pensioners do at present.

We may think what we like, but no mere pittance of pension such as we give our soldiers, and which we can hardly exceed to any amount without an enormous expenditure, cannot be an inducement to many men to enlist. The ignorant don't appreciate it, and the better classes would prefer high pay, and to be left to themselves.

With voluntary enlistment there is nothing binding on the Government to give pensions, except for wounds. It does all that is necessary in giving fair wages during the working years of a man's life, and affording him, by the institution of a savings' bank, the means of providing for the future. This course is attractive enough, and not proved to be, generally speaking, attended by any bad consequences in other callings. What reason, therefore, can there be for not thinking it would be conducive to the public interests, and as beneficial for the soldier, to try it in the army? The adoption of it would enable us to sweep away a mass of complex regulations which entail far more trouble and correspondence than they are worth, and which are dependant in their working as much upon chance and the temper of a commanding officer, as upon anything else. The good-conduct warrant, as it is called, is as much a boon to men who are cunning enough not to be found out, as to those who really deserve the provisions made by it. A hard-headed fellow who can bear a good deal of drink, or who becomes merely drowsy and stupid in his cups, gets a badge, while his more lively and excitable comrade is lodged in the guard-room. Many men have at times been detected in the receipt of good-conduct pay who have never been legally entitled to it. It is bestowed upon officers' servants and others, who from not being regularly at their duty, have a far better chance of it than their comrades who are. A man by means of it, who has been a scandal and a disgrace to the service for many years at the commencement of his service, by keeping out of trouble at the end of it, gets a higher pension than another who has not perhaps been guilty of one half so much crime. Any one who will go into the characters and history of men discharged, will soon be convinced what a delusion it is. Many an excellent soldier never gets it, while crowds of the most vicious and dissipated, who get cunning as they get old, have it added on to their pensions.

It is difficult to understand the justice of giving different pay to

men while performing the same duty in the same grade; the one who perhaps knows his work best, and doing it best while he is at it, as likely as not getting the least. This is, however, what our regulations go to establish. The whole practice of our good-conduct warrants opens a wide door to the admission of as much misconduct as otherwise to its benefits.

The large sum of money voted in the estimates for this purpose, and which serves no useful end whatever, might be turned to far more profitable and beneficial uses. Before we are justified in continuing the expenditures of £43,000 a-year on this item, we ought to ascertain whether the results it yields are at all worth it—whether it does not give the appearance rather than the reality of making men better. The system we would like to see established would be that of good and comfortable barracks, with schools, libraries, reading-rooms, gymnasiums, and, in moderation, space for other amusements; conveniences in connection with the canteen, which would make the soldier's barrack his home, and a very comfortable home too; these, with as good pay as the country could afford, and a savings' bank, are the whole of what is necessary; and to help towards attaining them we would sweep away the somewhat sentimental theories as to the advantages of good conduct-pay, which are of a very costly nature. Few soldiers are much influenced by them at any time, and as to recruits, they are of no benefit with regard to them at all; all the latter inquire about is the pay they are to get, and what immediate good they will do themselves by enlisting. The giving of bounties should also be abolished. A recruit should have a free kit, and nothing more, on joining his regiment; the bounty, as now given, only furnishes the means of initiating him, by the aid of others, in vice and intemperance. There should be a higher rate of pay than the ordinary one until men get into mess; a recruit, on a shilling a day, until he is subsisted with a number of others in the ordinary manner, is in a state of abject poverty. What man will give up ten, twelve, fourteen, or more shillings a week to become a soldier on seven? He has no time to go into the intricacies by which it is made up to him in other ways. It is here the hitch exists. The code we would recommend should be as clear and simple as possible—immediately, and until arrival at his regiment, twelve or fourteen shillings a week to the recruit; then a free kit, and a start clear of all debt or deductions. He should then commence on the present rate of pay; or, doing away with the good conduct warrant, a trifle higher, and the claim to existing pensions on discharge. On this he should continue for six months, at the end of which period he would have the option of going on in the same manner, or of claiming the higher rate of pay and no prospective advantages. If he selected the latter, there would be six months difference of pay coming to him, and this sum, with or without his assent, should be lodged in the savings' bank, partly as a security, but principally as an encouragement to him, having that sum lodged, to go on and add to it. By this plan there would always be more or less a hold on the soldier, and the disgraceful desertion which we have seen of late in the British army, both to the enemy and otherwise, would be effectually checked without

resort to that severity of punishment which seems likely to be adopted, and which will only add to our criminal population. During the late war the great mass of deserters to the Russians were Englishmen, and here at home we may count them not merely by thousands, but by tens of thousands. It is very certain from all we see, that if the bounty now given entices recruits, the small rate of pay, with the distant prospect of a smaller pension on discharge, fails to keep them, and in some way or other we must depart from this system. There is the great comfort in approaching the question that it is utterly impossible, by any alteration, to make things worse than they are. Whatever we do, if it has any effect at all, must make us better off. Hitherto we have contrived mainly to recruit our army from those men who enlist solely out of necessity. It is surely not impossible to devise some plan by which we might get men who would enlist from choice. We are inclined to think that an entirely different system from the present mode of recruiting, in which the bringers of recruits could be made to play a more prominent part, and in which a single government official or two might alone be requisite, would be the best to establish. It is ruinous to the discipline and efficiency of soldiers, and not a little degrading to the military profession, the way in which they are employed in obtaining recruits. The whole affair, seen under any of its aspects, in any large town, has (we can use no other expression about it) a blackguard look. The prostitute and the public house go hand in hand with it. The sooner it is demolished to its very foundation the better. We hope that the committee appointed to examine into the matter will spare nothing, for there is nothing in it that deserves to be spared, or that can benefit us in the least by being retained.

OUR HOME DEFENCES.

ON THE FORMATION OF A STEAM FLOTILLA TO BE MANNED BY A MARITIME MILITIA.

In various remarks which have been published from time to time on the organization of our navy, the public have been made acquainted with some of the most prominent defects of the existing system, and whilst some writers, regarding it as a whole, have endeavoured to prove the necessity of reducing the various discordant elements of which it is composed to something like harmony, others have contented themselves with directing their attacks against some individual portion of it, and by not extending their views in any other direction, have retarded rather than advanced the reformatory process they would wish to set in motion. The writers in each case may be equally correct in what they describe, but it seems natural that we should be most favorably inclined towards the opinions of those

who occupy the highest ground, for the same reason that we should set the greatest value upon the description of the physical features of a country given by a traveller, who, standing on a lofty mountain, had studied them as they lay mapped out at his feet, rather than upon the report of one who with even greater powers of observation, had, by remaining at a lower level, necessarily confined his attention to the narrow limits of some particular locality.

We do not now intend to enter upon the much vexed question of naval reform, or to advocate or combat any particular opinions connected with the subject, but taking the re-organization of the "personnel" of the navy on the best possible basis, as "un fait accompli," to proceed briefly to consider how—in the event of certain contingencies occurring—Great Britain would have to act, so as to be able at one and the same time, to defend her shores, protect her commerce, and preserve her colonies.

This question is very often answered by the simple suggestion of an overwhelming fleet, but here we are met by a difficulty at the very outset, for there is, and must be, a limit beyond which it is impossible to pass, and this limit may be one which will not do more than give us a decided superiority at sea over any single maritime power. How then would it be possible in the event of two or more of these powers combining against us to operate successfully by such a disposition of our fleets as would enable us to attack them in detail, (the method in which an inferior force has the best chance of combatting successfully an inferior one) when the greatest portion of our fleet would be necessarily confined to the channel for the protection of our own shores.

It is the release of this portion of our fleet by the adoption of some plan that will enable us to defend our shores, without interfering with the free action of our naval forces, that we are now about to consider.

Of all the difficulties connected with the sudden increase of our navy from a peace to a war establishment, the difficulty which would be found in procuring a sufficient supply of seamen is said to be the greatest; if this be true, as it undoubtedly is, it becomes evident that the services of each individual seaman should be made the most of, and we should not allow him to be employed in the performance of duties which might be as efficiently performed by others.

Naval operations of war may be divided into two classes:—

1. Operations not limited to any particular scene of action, and which may involve distant voyages and long periods of service on foreign stations.

2. Operations confined within fixed and narrow limits, and not entailing any lengthened absence from a home port.

For the first class of operations, it is desirable that we should have ships propelled by both sails and steam, and manned by a large proportion of experienced sailors.

For the second class it is contended that we require ships propelled by steam only, manned by able-bodied men, with sea-legs, well-trained in gunnery, and a very small number of able seamen for the performance of a few special duties.

Now let it be supposed that from some unforeseen entanglement Great Britain suddenly finds herself called upon to resist the united attack of any two first-rate maritime powers, over either of whom, singly, she possesses a considerable naval superiority. She has to provide for the safety of her shores, her colonies, her commerce, and the enemy must be met at sea, for the arguments used by Sir Walter Raleigh in the days of Elizabeth, in opposition to those who advocated military rather than naval preparations against the expected invasion of the Spaniards, apply with even greater force to the circumstances of the present day than they did to those of the period in which he lived.

A large fleet is hurriedly equipped and assembled in the Channel; to some of our widely-separated foreign stations reinforcements have to be distributed; whilst from others to which we are unable to afford sufficient support, our squadrons are withdrawn; we have been unable to effect all this without drawing largely upon our reserves, and our seamen have been distributed without much discrimination (for there has been no time for it) throughout every description of ships, from the smallest gun vessel to the three-decker.

When all this has been done, the following becomes our position:—Our Channel Fleet, composed, let us say by way of argument, of our whole naval force,—minus the squadrons we are obliged to retain on foreign stations,—is now only barely equal to the navy of either one of the attacking powers; and though whilst their fleets remain separate we have no difficulty in keeping command of the Channel, yet in the event of their detaching a strong force to act against our colonies or commerce, we dare not follow it for fear of permitting them to become masters of the Channel for even a few days.

From such a position we might, perhaps, be extricated by the skilful combinations of our Naval Commanders, and the bull-dog courage of our men; but where the odds are greatly against us we cannot calculate upon victory, we can only hope to obtain it.

Now to prevent the possibility of such a state of things taking place, it is proposed, in accordance with the rules previously laid down, that we should base our defence of the Channel on a separate and distinct system, so that the fleets and ships of war comprising our Royal Navy, might be left free to undertake offensive operations in whatever direction, or at whatever distance, might be deemed most advisable.

It is proposed to effect this by means of a flotilla, composed of vessels of a peculiar construction, propelled by steam only, and manned by a force which, "for want of a better name, might be called the "Maritime Militia."

Let us first briefly investigate the principles upon which the vessels comprising the steam flotilla should be constructed; then having shewn how they might be distributed so as to allow of their being rapidly concentrated upon any given point, we will proceed to inquire into the best mode of organizing the force by which they are to be manned.

ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE VESSELS OF WHICH THE STEAM FLOTILLA IS TO BE COMPOSED.

A very valuable authority on naval matters, Captain Moorsom, C.B., in a small pamphlet on the construction of Ships of War, observes:—"The value of a ship, as an engine of war, depends on two qualities: the first is the power of destroying the enemy to which the ships may be opposed, which may be called the 'Power of Destruction.' The second is the power of resisting the destructive effect of that enemy's armament, which may be called the 'Power of Resistance.'"

Taking then, these two qualities for our guide, we must, in order to ensure the first, combine a very great degree of speed with the capability of carrying a very powerful armament; and, in order to ensure the second, we must, as far as possible, render our vessels shot-proof.

As it is intended that the flotilla should be composed of two classes of vessels, let us first take into consideration the construction of the largest.

We know that in our steam three-deckers, however unsuited they may be for modern warfare, we have vessels possessing immense power and great speed; let us see if it be not possible to construct vessels which shall be superior to them in both particulars.

It must be remembered that the description of duties which the vessels composing our flotilla will be called upon to perform, will permit of our dispensing with the aid of sails, and to our trusting entirely to steam for our motive power; the advantages we gain by this are manifold; we get rid of a heavy weight aloft,—a vast amount of combustible stores below; there is less resistance to progress under steam, and our progress is proportionably increased,—there are no tell-tale masts to betray our whereabouts in action when our position would be otherwise concealed by smoke; and there is no danger of our screw being rendered useless by entanglement in the wreck of our rigging and fallen spars. We have next to convert a huge top-heavy mass of combustible material carrying an enormous number of guns, out of which, except at short ranges, a very few can be worked with advantage at the same time, and whose wooden sides endanger rather than protect the lives of those on board,—into an engine of war possessing greater speed and stability; presenting a smaller mark for the enemy's aim; retaining the same amount of momentum; affording a reasonable degree of security to the persons serving on board; and carrying an armament of such a nature, that the reduction in the number of guns would be amply compensated for by their individual superiority.

A screw three-decker cut down to the lower deck, fitted with shot proof iron sides, and armed with breech loading rifled cannon on the non-recoil principle, would fulfil all these conditions, and the expense of conversion would in a short time be more than covered by the saving which would be effected in masts, yards, rigging, and sails; and in the greatly reduced crews which would be required to man it.

The mechanical construction of such a vessel might probably be greatly improved upon, and curvilinear sides might be substituted with good effect for rectilinear ones; but these may be considered as matters of minor detail, rather than points affecting the general principles at issue.

The two great objections which are most likely to be advanced against this plan are these:—

1. That we shall have a number of large vessels confined in their application to special purposes, and unfit for general service.

2. That being without sails, any accident happening to the machinery would render them perfectly helpless.

The protection of our shores is an object of such vital importance, that it is hardly reasonable to object to any system which professes to have that for its end, because it can do no more; but these iron-sided steam vessels could do much more, for when circumstances would admit of their being so employed, they might be advanced from their proper line of defence and take their share in the offensive operations against the enemy's arsenals and fleets: can as much be said in favor of the land batteries, upon which such large sums are annually spent, and which can only be made useful on the occurrence of one single eventuality,—the enemy's choosing to place himself within range of their guns?

The second objection is easily disposed of, for a vessel so circumstanced would be no worse off than the old sailing ship was when dismasted or becalmed, or even than a masted screw-ship with a damaged engine when in the latter predicament; besides, these vessels, always acting in squadrons, would never be without assistance, and there is no reason why they should not be fitted with small jury masts capable of being raised or lowered at pleasure, upon which in extreme cases just sufficient sail might be set to give them a small progressive movement.

The smaller vessels, intended to carry one gun of the largest size, would have to be constructed on a somewhat different plan; their size would not permit of their being rendered shot proof in the same manner, by built up iron sides protecting the whole deck; but having provided for the safety of the hull, the gun and guns' crew might be protected by a circular shot proof screen on the plan of those proposed by Captain Cowper Coles, R. N.; a method of protecting guns which will probably ere long have a very extensive application, now that we have succeeded in obtaining an effective breech loading rifled cannon.

In the construction of these smaller vessels it must not be forgotten that they ought to possess in a large degree both stability and speed.

NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE VESSELS COMPRISING THE STEAM FLOTILLA.

Let us suppose that we have decided on constructing twenty vessels of the first, and one hundred vessels of the second class:—

That in order to man them easily in the way I shall hereafter

describe; we have distributed them over a considerable line of coast, at twenty different stations, in sub-divisions of one vessel of the first and five vessels of the second class. And that we have made our arrangements so that in the event of a war suddenly breaking out they may be manned and sent to sea with the smallest possible delay.

We might then arrange for the defence of the Channel by dividing our whole force into three separate divisions, one, of four first and twenty second class vessels at Dover or in the Downs; another of the same strength at Plymouth or Falmouth; and the third of eight first and forty second class vessels in Portland Roads. A portion of our sea-going fleet would watch the movements of the enemy, while the main body would be held in readiness to follow him, in the event of his leaving port, in whatever direction he might sail.

The construction or conversion of so many vessels would require time; but in the first instance we might make up the number by dismasting our block ships, and applying them, together with as many gun boats as could be spared, to this service.

ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCE BY WHICH THE FLOTILLA SHOULD BE MANNED

It is proposed to man the flotilla with a volunteer force bearing somewhat the same relation to our navy, as is borne by the militia to their brother soldiers of the line; because, as has been already stated, in the event of a war, every man of the regular force, including the reserves (whether of seamen or marines), would be required for our sea-going fleets, and we should be sadly wasting their services were we to apply them in any other way.

The idea of a maritime militia is not a new one, and it has within the last year been most ably advocated in an article which appeared in the pages of the *Nautical Magazine*, by Captain Sheringham, R.N. It is an idea which might be elucidated by ancient practices, for if we were to go back to the middle ages, we should find that the duties now performed by our navy were carried on by private ships, which were either contributed by various sea-port towns towards carrying out some particular object, or were fitted out for the service of the State at the expence of wealthy and patriotic individuals. In the natural course of events, permanently established navies as well as standing armies, began to be looked upon as part of the machinery by which Governments could alone preserve the existence and protect the interests of their respective states; it was, however, found impracticable to keep up these establishments in periods of peace on a footing that would enable them to meet the exigencies called into being by a state of war; hence it became necessary at such times to fall back upon a widely extended system of enrolment for the temporary reinforcement of the military force of the state; whilst, in order to increase the navy to the necessary limits, forced levies of seamen were made, who from the first moment of their service became, not a distinctive, but an integral part of the regular sea-forces.

A time came when the compulsory system of manning our fleets

could no longer be enforced, and a voluntary system had to be substituted for it, yet, strange to say, no steps were taken towards rapidly increasing our naval strength in the event of war by raising men for the special duty of home defence in a manner corresponding to that which enables us to add so considerably to our military resources, by the establishment of militia regiments. Of late years, however, public attention having been particularly directed to the subject of our navy, this very prominent defect could not well remain unnoticed, and we have had in consequence various projects for its rectification; of these, one of the latest put into practical operation has been the enrolment of a force called the Coast Volunteers, but however ingenious the theory upon which this force has been constructed, it has, when brought into practice, been pronounced "a failure," and for this very plain and simple reason, that these volunteers—notwithstanding that their services can only be made use of within a certain distance of our shores—have no distinct and special organization like their military brethren, but are made use of by being distributed throughout the fleet, constituting from that moment part and parcel of a body, with a large majority of which they have no community of interests, and from whom they must naturally be separated by all those petty jealousies which the peculiar circumstances of their position would be sure to engender.

To succeed in the formation of a volunteer force, it must be based on sounder and more attractive principles than these,—it must be permitted to participate in the higher as well as the lower duties connected with what may be termed "military service afloat"—and commanded by their own officers the men must be made to feel that it is as necessary to maintain a good individual character, as it is to uphold their general reputation as a corps.

Eleven thousand men would be more than sufficient to man a flotilla such as has been described, and this number would include the Officers, Permanent Staff, and Engineers, amounting perhaps to a thousand, leaving us to provide for the enrolment of the remaining ten thousand, and these distributed over the twenty different stations into which the whole force would be sub-divided, gives us an average of five hundred for each district, a number that we might reasonably expect to obtain from the yachtsmen, boatmen, fishermen, and sailors employed in the coasting trade; though there is no absolute necessity for our not, in many instances, availing ourselves of the services of men not belonging to either of those particular classes.

The Permanent Staff would be composed of officers, petty officers, and men of approved character, appointed at their own request from the regular navy (to which they would cease to belong), and the general corps of officers would include retired and half-pay Naval Officers (under a certain age), and private gentlemen with nautical tastes and habits; it being required from each officer on appointment that he should go through a regular course of instruction in a gunnery ship.

The whole force might be under the command of a Flag-officer,

assisted by three Captains (one for each division), appointed for a term and still retaining their position in the regular service; once a year, the whole force would be embodied for a month's training, during a certain portion of which time the different vessels of the flotilla would be assembled in their respective divisions for the purpose of manœuvring under steam.

The minor details of such a scheme can be easily worked out, but they must be considered with reference to our whole plan of action, and not solely on their own merits, or when brought together they will present us with an apparent refutation of the truth of the time-honored maxim, that "union is strength."

There is one great objection to which I have not yet alluded:—"the expense!"—true, nothing can be done without money, and vast sums are yearly spent in carrying out complicated systems of defence, which seem tacitly to admit that the time will soon arrive when we shall be unable to protect our soil from the polluting foot-prints of an invading foe. Let us rather trust in our wooden walls even if we have to face them with iron, let us build batteries on the sea rather than on the shore, and let it be remembered that the creation of a steam flotilla, manned by a Maritime Militia, would afford us the best means of developing those vast naval resources which have made England what she is, and without which it would be impossible for her to preserve her greatness.

FORTIFICATION OF ANTWERP.*

SINCE the discussions which took place some years ago, regarding the fortification of Paris, no question of the same character has excited so much attention on the Continent as that now pending, with reference to the fortification of Antwerp; and although the scale is smaller, the question is the same, and the additional experience gained during the last fifteen years renders the new controversy so important, that a brief account of it can hardly fail to be interesting to military men, and to all those who pay any attention to such subjects.

In order to understand the real bearings of the question it is necessary to go back to the year 1814, when any one acquainted with the military history of the period will recollect a dispatch of the Duke of Wellington, dated 22nd September, wherein he, acting on the advice of Col. Chapman, Sir Chas. Pasley, and Sir F. Smith, recommended the re-establishment of the old barrier fortresses of the reign of Louis XIV. The Dutch, who were the parties who ought to have been the most interested in the question, seem to have treated it with the greatest indifference. They seem to have made up their

* Projet d'Agrandissement general D'Anvers. Lettre de M. M. Keller et compie à M. le Ministre de la Guerre, 1855. Seconde lettre avec atlas, 1858. Atlas Complèmentaire, 1858.

minds that the existence of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands depended wholly on the support of its allies, and consequently they cared little in what manner their frontier was to be defended. The Germans, on the other hand, who really felt a deep interest in having a strong barrier against the ambition of France on this side, protested loudly, and with a strong show of reason, against so antiquated a system of defence. But the Duke was then supreme in the councils of the allied monarchs, and as the English were the parties who bore the largest share of the expense, and were also supposed to be those most interested in the question, they were allowed to have their own way, and the work proceeded uninterruptedly during the next twelve or fifteen years, and more than 8,000,000*l.* sterling were spent on a line of defence which, on the continent at least, every military man knew to be utterly useless and untenable. Things remained in this state till after the revolution which separated Belgium from Holland. When the former became a separate and independent kingdom, and felt the necessity of maintaining its own position, the authorities naturally turned their attention to their means of defence, and one of the first discoveries they made was, that if they were to garrison all the strong places they possessed, the whole of their available forces would be absorbed in the process, and they would have no army to keep the field. It was also painfully evident that if their troops were thus shut up in the fortresses, an enemy might march unmolested on the capital, or any point, and conquer the country without striking a blow. They consequently set to work to remedy this state of affairs, first by dismantling Ath, Ypres, Menin, Phillippeville, and other places, and have gone on steadily razing fortification after fortification, till about one half of those which were erected at such expense have disappeared, and the process is going steadily on. Even Mons, the most extensive and the most expensive of all their fortified places, is condemned, and in the course of a few years it is understood that Namur, and Huy, and the citadels of Ghent, Tournay, and Liege, will be all that will remain of this great line of works, and if it is expected that the Belgian army is also to keep the field, even these works may be considered as more extensive than such a country ought to possess.

While this work of destruction was going on on the one hand, it was felt on the other that without some class of fortification so small a state as that of Belgium, surrounded by such powerful neighbours, would be at the mercy of any one of them. Even those who felt most strongly that a line of frontier fortresses, without some strong places in their rear, was a strategetical absurdity, still insisted that something must be done to secure to the army a "point d'appui" in the event of an invasion. The most natural and obvious suggestion was to imitate what had been done in France, and fortify the capital.

Unfortunately, Brussels affords few facilities for such an operation. It is equally open, and equally commanded by heights all round, and a line of detached forts, or of works in advance of an *enceinte* at such a distance as to secure the town from bombardment, must have been so extensive that it would be as much beyond the means of the Bel-

gian army to defend it as even the barrier fortresses themselves. The only other place that appeared at all suitable for the purposes of an entrenched camp was Antwerp, which seemed to afford all the desired advantages. In the first place it was as far in the rear as almost any town in the kingdom, and an army unable to keep the field could retire and concentrate upon it, either along the right or left bank of the Scheldt, and it could be succoured and provisioned either from the sea or from the rear, through Holland or from Germany, with more facility than any other town in the kingdom. But, besides these strategetical advantages, its local position afforded extraordinary facilities for defence. On the west it was defended by the Scheldt with the polders of Zwyndrecht beyond, on the north and east by inundations, so that there only remained a front of about five or six miles in extent on the south side to be defended. This being so it was easy for the government to determine, which they did at a very early period, that Antwerp should be the great strategetical pivot for the defence of Belgium; but the mode in which the intention should be carried out was by no means so clear, and the question has given rise to an almost endless series of polemics, of which we can only now indicate the results.

After a long series of discussions among themselves the government determined on retaining the present fortifications of the town as the enciente, and to defend the southern front by seven detached forts, extending from the river on the right to the inundations on the left; they also resolved on enlarging the town on the north, so as to include the new docks now being constructed there, and eventually also to erect a fortress on that side to serve as a citadel of retreat in the event of the town being lost. As soon as the determination of the government was known, it was pointed out that the present defences of the town were totally useless, that they were so encumbered by houses, both in front and rear, as to be untenable; and besides this, that an enemy could at any time, under cover of the suburbs, advance to within 200 or 300 yards of these works, and bombard and burn the town. It was also urged that the proposed forts were too far advanced to receive any effectual support from the old enciente, and not far enough to protect the town from incendiary fire. All this was only too true; but any alternative that would obviate these objections seemed to involve so enormous an outlay, and likewise also to be productive of so long a delay, that the government, in the year 1852, determined to proceed at once with the scheme of fortification indicated above, and during the next two years expended £260,000 in carrying it into effect. No sooner were the works completed than it was seen what a mistake had been committed, as Captain Brialmont well expresses it in his introduction when speaking on this subject—"There is a very great advantage in making the public the judge in such matters as these, for although they may not be able to discuss them scientifically, any man of common sense and intelligence can understand them, and arrive at correct conclusions if he enters into the controversy without prejudice or passion. No error or false system can long be hidden from the knowledge of the multitude, and whenever a question is badly stated

or a problem wrongly solved, it is sure to be one that has only been discussed in a clique of the initiated, who judge without appeal in conformity with traditions which, though old, are not always respectable." (page v.) So it turned out here. The detached forts were either squares or pentagons of only 150 metres each front, and consequently the ramparts were so twisted and broken as to afford no real power of defence, the masonry redoubts which closed the gorges were weak and insignificant, and the forts so far detached from one another, and from the enciente which was to support them, that they could all be attacked by the rear and easily taken. The consequence was that every one was dissatisfied. The citizens demanded that either the fortifications should be of such a character as to save them from the probability of an attack, or that they should be freed from the inconvenience and risk inherent on their commercial city being considered as a place of war. Those most capable of judging were loud in their condemnation of this imperfect scheme; while, on the other hand, government felt themselves bound in honour to defend what they had done, and retorted on their assailants with a bitterness that was scarcely justified.

Among those who took part in this controversy, none have been more distinguished or taken a more prominent part than Captain Brialmont, who is so well known in this country from his "Life of Wellington," which is, perhaps, the best and fairest book that has been produced on the subject on the continent of Europe. He, in conjunction with Messrs. Keller and Co., one of the largest contracting firms in Antwerp, submitted to the government in 1855 a scheme for fortifying Antwerp on a more extensive scale than had hitherto been proposed.

Their project is to surround the town with an entirely new *enciente*, concentric, or nearly so, with the present fortifications, but at a distance of about 2000 metres in advance. This would enclose one, and in its most improved form two, of the new government forts; four others would be used as bastions or horn works to the new wall, and one only is left sufficiently advanced to be used as a detached work.

After various ameliorations at particular points, this is the scheme that seems to be definitively agreed upon by all parties. The government indeed have proposed several less extensive plans; their favourite one being merely to draw a straight line of bastioned wall from the inundations to the river at the old citadel, so as to form a base for the detached forts already existing, and thus to utilize them. To this it is very justly objected that it would leave the whole of the important suburb of Berchem outside the walls, and in the event of any one of the detached forts falling into the hands of the enemy, would admit of their approaching sufficiently near to bombard the town with facility.

Having thus, after ten years' discussion, arrived at something like a definite conclusion as to the manner in which the town ought to be fortified, with regard to the position of the *enciente*, and of the detached forts, it is amusing to observe the changes that have taken place in that time with reference to the form and details of the works which it is proposed to erect. As the Belgian School of En-

gineers is an offset of that of France, the corps, or at least all the older members of it are, as a matter of course, partizans of the bastion system, and all the works proposed by government or hitherto sanctioned, are carried out in conformity with the principles of that school.

Even Brialmont's scheme, when first proposed, consisted of a bastioned enciente with lunettes—they can scarcely be called ravelins—in advance of each front, and pentagonal, bastioned detached fronts.

The outworks first disappeared, and gradually the bastions themselves have been eliminated; and if we may take Plate VIII. of the "Atlas Complèmentaire" as representing the present state of the question, it is evident that the progress that has been made towards a new state of affairs is somewhat startling. In this elaborate design the northern citadel is a large circular work of earth, "tracée d'apres les idees que M. Fergusson cherche à faire prèvaloir en Angleterre depuis plusieurs annéss," with double ramparts of earth on the sides liable to be attacked, and with a broad ditch in front flanked by caponieres, some of them with Haxo casemates. The enciente of the town is an extended flat-fronted earthwork, with detached semicircular works beyond the ditch, covering caponieres with Haxo casemates at distances of about 2000 yards from one another; and the detached forts also are semicircular earthworks, with ditches flanked by casemated caponieres; the whole being designed, as its author himself expresses it, more according to the ideas of Montalembert and Mr. Fergusson than to the more fashionable principles of the Vauban school. Such a form of works is simpler and much less expensive than any bastioned trace could be, and much more capable of a protracted defence; but whether the authorities are prepared to accept such radical innovations remains to be seen. In Germany there is little doubt but that such a system would be very much preferred to any of the earlier designs, but it is very questionable whether it will be equally appreciated in Belgium, or in any country where the influence of the French school of engineering prevails.

The point in these designs which has given rise to the greatest amount of controversy is the question, whether or not certain portions of the enciente ought or ought not to be revêted with masonry. The disciples of Vauban have contended throughout that the eleven fronts forming the southern portion of the enciente, being those most liable to attack, ought to be so protected. They maintain that unless this were done, the place could not be secure against a "*coup de main*;" that if the ditches were not dry it would be impossible to maintain the communications with the country during a state of siege, or to take advantage of the larger class of sorties, which are the true mode of defending a large strategetic fortress, covering an army; and that is assumed to be the normal state of such a place as Antwerp.

The partizans of the more advanced school contend, on the other hand, that it must cause an immense and useless additional expense to construct such revêtments of masonry, and entail a continual

outlay to maintain them; that a wet ditch, 50 metres wide, and with two or three metres of water, is a sufficient protection against a "*coup de main*," and that by bridges either permanent or temporary there is no difficulty in obtaining the requisite access to the country at all times. Owing however to the rise in the level of the country at the centre of the line opposite to Berchem, it is admitted that the level of the water could only be maintained in the ditch by means of batardeaux, and these it is contended could be destroyed, if not by direct fire, at least by mines. The question of direct fire seems to be practically abandoned, and it is evident, from the position of the works, that this objection is really untenable; and it is contended by those who advocate wet ditches that mines could only be employed when the attacking party are in possession of the counterscarp, that it would then be easy to breach and destroy any masonry revêtment, and that even if one of the bartardeaux were destroyed it would not lower the water in the upper levels to a sufficient extent to allow the ditch to be passed without the construction of bridges and other works, which would be impossible while any flanking defence remained. But besides these local arguments, they appeal to the experience of almost all engineers, from Cohorn down to Todleben, to shew that wherever wet ditches can be obtained, and even sometimes, as at Sebastopol, where no such advantage existed, that revêtments are not indispensable, and indeed have been more prejudicial to the defence than otherwise, and certainly when the parapets are supported by the masonry, they inevitably ensure their destruction at a very early period of the siege.

In a complicated question of this sort, it is not of course to be expected that one party should be entirely right and the other entirely wrong, but on the whole the superiority of reasoning seems to be immensely on the side of those who contend for simple unrevêtted earthworks for the defence of Antwerp, as against those who could revête the faces of the bastions and curtains according to the usual form. Whether or not the flanks of the bastions ought not to be of masonry and casemated is another question, but this is prejudged in this case, if we are to accept Brialmont's last design; for as he entirely abandons the bastion form in this plan, and hides the flanks behind circular earthworks, so that this question does not arise at all if his proposals are adopted.

There are other points of detail which have come up, and been discussed in the course of this controversy, which are of great interest to military men, but which it would be very wearisome to attempt to describe here, and almost impossible to render interesting without going into the whole question of attack and defence, which it is of course impossible to do in the limited space at our command; but they are of such importance in themselves that we would strongly recommend to military men to follow the progress of the discussion, as it cannot fail to prove both interesting and intructive to any one who may master it in all its details.

Of course it cannot be expected that such a controversy could be carried on without a great deal of angry feeling, and of exaggerated statements being introduced on one side as well as on the other.

Throughout the discussion there were ranged in opposition to one another the old men of the service, full of years and honours, "laudatores temporis acti," and clinging with pertinacity to the traditions of the school in which they were educated, and to the system through which they gained their rank and position: and on the other hand, the young men of the service, anxious to distinguish themselves and to bring the science of war more into harmony with the progress of the age to which they belong, by the introduction of improved methods through which they hope to attain to the same distinction of their predecessors. Notwithstanding this, the controversy is on the whole most creditable to the officers of the Belgian army. They have shewn throughout a knowledge of the subject in all its details, which cannot be surpassed by any service in Europe, and a willingness to receive information, and a readiness in adapting their reasoning and methods to the circumstances of the case, which reflects the highest credit on all concerned. To us as Englishmen the most curious phase of the question is the mode in which it was discussed in the Belgian Chambers during eight days in August last. Not only military men, but burgomasters and civilians took part in the debate, and reasoned on it with an intelligence and with a moderation which so far commanded the respect and attention of the country, that government were forced to admit the mistake they had made in erecting the inefficient defences which had been carried out before the public discussion of the matter took place, and to promise that whatever was done in future would be more in conformity with the results of the unofficial discussion, the principal points of which have been detailed above.

So far from any evil consequence having arisen from the extensive publicity which has been given to the various questions arising out of the fortification of Antwerp, it is now admitted on all hands that nothing but good has resulted from the discussion. Instead of being confined to a few over-worked and irresponsible officials, the whole Belgian army, indeed the whole people, have lent their aid in perfecting the scheme. Every point of enquiry has been thoroughly ventilated, and turned over and over, and looked at in all its bearings. Every objection raised either by one side or the other has been met and answered. So that not only is it admitted that a far better design is now before the public than that originally proposed by government, but the people themselves, feeling that they have now got the best scheme that can be obtained, are willing to submit cheerfully to the inconvenience and sacrifice that must be entailed in carrying it out; so that this public discussion must now be regarded as having been, in every respect, productive of advantage both to the government and to the people.

The question, however, was adjourned *sine die*, because the authorities did not at the time feel justified in incurring the expense involved in so extensive a system of defence as it was now apparent must be executed if the place were to be fortified at all; and it is fortunate for them that this delay has taken place, for a revolution has been effected in the art of war since August last, which, when fully appreciated, will probably induce all parties to pause before proceeding further in this matter. At that time it was contended

that an enciente 2000 yards in advance of the old walls, and detached forts 2000 to 3000 yards in advance of that, gave a practical cover to the town of from 5000 to 6000 yards, and this was beyond the range of any artillery then known. Since that time, however, the range of artillery has been doubled at least, and long before the new works of Antwerp could be completed, the ordinary range of incendiary projectiles will certainly not be less than from 9000 to 10,000 yards.

Besides this, the invention of iron-plated steam gun-boats makes it very uncertain whether a flotilla of these could not pass the forts in the Scheldt, and burn the town and shipping in spite of any defences that could be erected.

Under these novel circumstances the question arises whether any national government would be justified in exposing the one great commercial emporium of the kingdom, to the chance of such a catastrophe, and if they did whether their so doing would not in fact be the means of defeating the object they had in view.

As the question now stands it is simply this;—Supposing Antwerp to be fortified according to the "Grand projet Keller," or any similar scheme, could any commander of national forces allow the place to be bombarded and burnt; could he resist the influence of the wealthiest and most industrious of his fellow countrymen, or withstand the appeal to his humanity, when the lives and fortunes of 100,000 of the citizens were at stake, and when not only men, but women and children would be sacrificed if he held out. On the other hand, an invader knowing all this, would certainly have recourse to bombardment, instead of wasting his time and means in the slow process of a regular siege, and the stronger the works were made the more certain he would be to adopt this expedient. It is true that Sebastopol did resist, but it was a purely military town. So did Saragossa, but it was inhabited by fanatics, and it would require men of sterner stuff than the inhabitants of Antwerp are supposed to be, or the place would fall in four and twenty hours, and the government would then have the misery of handing over to an invader a completely fortified town, with its stores and munitions of war, and although a patriotic general could not dare to expose his compatriots to the horrors of a bombardment, a stranger would have no such qualms, and the possession of such a place as Antwerp, fortified as proposed, would enable him to hold Belgium against all comers, and with a very small force. This reasoning, however, applies to every important town as well as to Antwerp, and indeed it seems to be a fact, that since the introduction on the one hand of rifled cannon into all the services of Europe, and on the other the increase of wealth, and the decay of fanaticism, it is impossible to defend large and populous cities by any class of fortification, however strong or extensive they may be. To be defensive places must be erected for military purposes only, and such a question as this, of how Antwerp or any such place should be fortified, must be abandoned *in limine* in parliamentary language by moving the previous question, or at all events must be approached in a very different spirit, and treated upon entirely different principles from any that have been propounded in any of the works that have yet appeared in the course of this controversy.

THE SHORES OF THE CHANNEL IN A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW.

[The following article is translated from the German estimate of our military position, and at the present moment will command interest, as showing the views entertained in Germany respecting the practicability of an invasion of England.]

No. I.

THE events of former wars had produced an impression among nations in general, and especially among the English, that only under the most extraordinary circumstances could fortresses withstand successfully the attacks of fleets, and that, in order to be able to do this, they must be of the strongest possible construction. Proceeding on this idea, England fortified to the uttermost her ports in the Mediterranean, but considered that no marine fortification, subject to the other nations, could possibly hold out against the attack of her fleets—a one-sided and over-weening estimate of her own strength, which, in the Russian war, produced for her bitter fruit, before Sweaborg, Cronstadt, and Sebastopol. Then another idea suggested itself. With large ships of heavy draught well-fortified harbours were not to be taken, in consequence of the difficulty of finding a sufficient depth of water, and the easiness with which a channel may be rendered impracticable. There was built, therefore, a whole flotilla of iron gun-boats, which, armed with a few heavy guns, had only a light draught of water, and were provided with steam engines. From these were expected important and unprecedented results; when unexpectedly, before opportunity had been afforded of bringing them in a body into the presence of an enemy, and thus of proving their practical serviceability, the peace was concluded. The main subject to which the English directed their attention was that of offensive operations; to defensive they attended only so far as the isolated fortresses on the coasts of the mother country were concerned. For the fortifying of their own soil there was the least possible consideration: they confided in this respect as formerly they had confided in the invincibility of their floating castles.

The coasts of England exposed to danger are those which lie nearest to the Continent, and could most easily be invaded from it; consequently, those on the channel. Hitherto the prevailing winds and currents have been an altogether different protection from what they are now that they have lost so much of their importance through the application of steam power to ships. Both of these (wind and current) prevail in a direction from east and west. England, consequently, has been forced to place a great military port in the East, in order that, by availing herself of these powers of nature, she might remain mistress of the channel. For this purpose the estuary of the Thames appeared to be most suitable, and Sheerness was raised to the rank of a grand depôt—a place in all respects favourably situated for the carrying out of the above intimated object. There was only the Foreland to double, and through

the Straits of Calais the passage was direct into the Channel itself. The central and main harbour, however, could be no other than Portsmouth; the sheltered position of which, behind the Isle of Wight, withdraws it from the attack of hostile fleets, as well as from the force of wind and storm. This was therefore the chief depot for the Channel and Mediterranean fleets, and hence sailed forth the squadrons which conquered formerly the Spanish Armada, more recently the Dutch, and then the united Spaniards and French.

By means of this fortress the English were so completely masters of the Channel, that the French, in the last war, scarcely ventured at last to quit their fortified harbours. Napoleon, in 1808, threatened an invasion from Boulogne. To be sure he had not under his command a great fleet; nevertheless, an invasion was a constantly impending possibility, whenever wind and weather might permit the transport of troops in flat boats; and once on English ground with an army he would have known very well how to maintain himself.

At this juncture the English sought to protect their coasts with fortifications. Time pressed, and quickly arose that system of marine works which exists to this day, of the eastern wing of which Dover, the first of the so-called Cinque Ports, is the extreme point.

An old Roman castle, situated on a steep hill, was newly fortified, and additional closed redoubts were placed on the opposite heights, the two systems being separated from each other by a road, which through a cutting leads to the town, which lies immediately on the shore. Some batteries were also placed on the sea-shore itself, and similar works erected on the declivity of the hill, on which lies the Castle, with range to the east. From the open town itself, which has not even a simple wall, a small winding staircase passes to the harbour, of which said staircase the entrance is guarded by a small work. This, and the fore-mentioned road, are the only communications between the town and the fortifications.

To give a greater extent to a not very capacious harbour, a lofty breakwater has been built out on the west of the town, where the rocks abruptly break off in deep water. What vitiates this position is that it entirely cramps the range of the strand-batteries lying to the east, and even the view from them. Moreover, the only point in which a battery could have been placed with advantage—*i. e.*, a small plateau that is thrown forward like a natural bastion—has been taken advantage of, not for any such adaptation, but appropriated as the site of the first hotel of the town, called "The Lord Warden."

In consequence of this vice of position, an attacking fleet coming from the west has nothing to fear from the strand batteries, so long as it remains beyond the breakwater; and is, for that time, exposed to the fire of only the castle and the redoubts. Considering, however, that this can be but a plunging fire, because the redoubts lie high above high-water mark, this would be to encounter no great danger. The road which leads to the harbour is scarcely anywhere commanded, and lies almost entirely against the blank angle. The chief communication (the railroad from London), passes from Folkestone, often close to the shore, and in some places exposed to the fire of ships.

This extremity then, of the system is, according to what we have here seen and said, too weak to serve as a base of operations; the town is without walls, and might therefore be at once taken by troops landed in boats. These would then endeavour to gain the harbour by the above described road behind the redoubts, which, notwithstanding that they command the rear within rifle range, have not been included in the net-work of the fortifications, since no idea has been entertained of an organized attack from the landwards.

Coast fortifications alone, without appropriate supports, are always defective, especially on important spots, the loss of which may entail serious consequences. The ground at Dover is of such a nature that a fortress of the first rank could easily be here made, and this its strategic position, in close proximity to the French coast, seems imperatively to demand, in order that it may serve as main point and advanced work of the fortification of the whole south of England. No fortress lies between this and London. The road from this point is entirely open to a hostile army landed here. Dover, without a fortified camp, possesses no value; for as matters are, it could be observed and kept in check by a few troops, directly they should be landed, and should have established themselves.

From Dover begin the works erected in 1808, consisting of a line of small casemated round towers, which are distributed along the whole south-east coast. These towers lie sometimes immediately on the shore, sometimes on the heights, or the declivities which immediately skirt the shore; and in the two latter cases are surrounded by trenches with revetted escarps and counterscarps, over which communication is maintained by means of drawbridges. They contain at most sixty or one hundred men, and can be armed only with few guns. In time of peace they are mostly without garrison, and only tenanted by a single keeper.

The distance at which they stand from one another varies; but at any rate it is too considerable to allow of their making any serious opposition to an invasion. They are simply forlorn hopes, and their garrisons would (should the enemy press forward), become at once prisoners of war. Works of this kind can be available for the protection of a country only when they lie at points where resistance may be maintained, and which cannot be turned; or when some central work is situated behind them, whence reinforcements may be able to reach them. Such a work, however, is entirely wanting, and they are left isolated. Their value can therefore be estimated as being no greater than what may attach to them as look-out stations.

Between Dover and Hythe (which as the second of the Cinque Ports mounts some batteries, which now are being armed with heavy guns), lies the harbour of Folkestone. This is protected only by some of those towers, although it has Boulogne just opposite, and drives with that town a considerable trade. The French have a permanent camp in Boulogne. The English have placed a similar one on the hill between this and Dover, at Shorncliffe; but since it is not fortified, its only value as a coast defence is that the point immediately threatened by the enemy might be strengthened by troops drawn from it.

If the English think with this camp to provide for the same end, which the French, in case of war, do provide for with their camp at Boulogne, they are utterly mistaken. In the first place, France has not to trouble herself about an invasion of English troops, and does not require large camps for the protection of her coasts. These camps have with her not a defensive but an offensive object. Although, being for strategic reasons constructed on defensive principles, they have been placed in immediate proximity to fortresses. Let us consider the above mentioned small tract of country from Dunkirk to the embouchure of the Somme, which lies over against the Kentish coast, and so on as far as the fortress of Abbeville, which lies on this river. We shall see that it would be out of the question for any but a very numerous enemy to advance on this line, even if, by good luck, he should have effected a landing. For he would by his advance be entangled in a net work of fortresses,which would hold him in check long enough to allow time for the drawing of considerable reinforcements from the interior of France, which would force him to retreat. The extreme point of this wing of the system is the strongly fortified Dunkirk, with a fortified camp. The enemy cannot advance from Calais, since he is outflanked by the first mentioned, and then would have to hit upon the strong fortresses of St. Omer, Aire, Douai, and Arras, which again have the mighty Lille on the right, and Amiens on the left flank. From all this is manifest the impracticability of a hostile invasion on this tract of coast, consequently since the troops in the camp of Boulogne are not needed for its own defence, they must have an *offensive* object.

Let us now consider in the same point of view the coast of the county of Kent, from Dover to Hythe. We shall see that the last place is only feebly defended by strand batteries. As for the camp of Shorncliffe (which can have only a defensive intention) it is, as we have observed, altogether unfortified. In front of it, to the seaward, there are two of those above described towers, but neither to the rear, nor on the flanks has it any fortified work. Thus it assuredly possesses no higher value than that already by us assigned to it. The way that leads hence to London is the shortest and most secure for the purpose of arriving at that city, the metropolis of the kingdom, and acquiring possession of it, together with the Thames. No river, no mountain offers interruption to the operations of an invading army; no fortress, no fortified camp blocks the way; and the country is so rich, that an army might maintain itself by requisitions, without being obliged to depend for its existence on the fleet, as was the case with the Anglo-French army in the Crimea.

The camp of Aldershot, which lies not far off, is not fortified, and can be considered only as a central cantonment, which, by reason of the nature of its structure, may with very great ease be set on fire, so that the troops would be compelled to leave it. If now we pass over and along the coast, we come to the marine fortification of Portsmouth. The distance between Portsmouth and Dover amounts perhaps to 200 miles, and all this tract of country, since it is not protected by fortresses, lies nearly open to a hostile invasion, supposing no other measure of protective character to have been taken.

This protection is afforded in a high degree by two fleets, of which one is stationed at Sheerness, the other at Portsmouth; which fleets would enflank a hostile squadron, and through their concentrated attack, render vain every hostile attempt to land in this direction. Having an eye to this, the French concerted measures that they might contrive a marine fortification, with a harbour sufficiently spacious to protect a fleet, which, in point of numbers, should be able to contest the palm with both the above-mentioned (English) fleets, if not to be superior to them, and Cherbourg was chosen to be such a fortress. This, lying in the retreating angle of a far projecting promontory of Brittany, has lately assumed a significance that England ought not to misapprehend. For although the question is not at present of an invasion from France, it most certainly is of the disputing of the naval supremacy in the Channel, and the neighbouring seas.

If the members of the House of Commons, who on the occasion of the visit of Queen Victoria were in Cherbourg, were unable to understand the danger which this fortress can cause to England, and the entire importance of the place, it is a blindness which can only be lamented. At a meeting, Mr. Lindsay said he had seen a considerable harbour, a large fortress, but no ships. That might be true; but the Emperor probably would not shew more to the English. He would have them see only the fortifications and a show ship. The fleets which really had significance were lying in other harbours. They might, however, when necessary, be concentrated very soon, since they are not, like the British, scattered over every sea; and those of the Mediterranean might, through the application of steam power, seeing that they could not be hindered from Gibraltar (for this is fortified only towards the harbour, and not towards the straits), appear in the Channel within five days. The memory of the battle of Trafalgar will prove no obstacle to all this; and the consoling conviction that the French are not so good sailors as the English is calculated to do much injury. England has no longer the sailors who fought Nelson's battles. It is very difficult for her to man her fleets, since the sailors prefer the merchant service. This may be learned from the most recent parliamentary dealings with the subject; and the events on the coasts of the Crimea are enough to warn a government possessed of the least foresight. At Serpent's Island the French were concentrated sooner than the English, at Eupatoria soon debarked; and at the attack of Kinburn, the English ships of war, which had sailed at the same time with them, reached their station nearly two hours after the bombardment was finished. To over-estimate oneself, and to depreciate one's adversary, leads always to deplorable results.

That a somewhat different opinion has been formed of things by the military, is proved by the hasty arming of the above-described English batteries, and fortresses, with guns of the heaviest calibre, of which guns fresh batteries are being sent weekly from Woolwich. One cannot trust implicitly in the maxim, "l'Empire c'est la Paix." Far other means against England are available to the Emperor than formerly were to his uncle. The perfecting of machinery must bring

to bear an overwhelming influence on the power of making warlike advances. Steam-carriages and steam-ships shorten all distances: the latter overmaster contrary winds and tides, and afford the means of beginning and breaking off engagements at sea, without any great dependence on the weather; they favour a rapid confident style of manœuvring; and a battle, such as was that when the Spanish Armada was destroyed by the English, is by no means likely to take place again.

No. II.

PORTSMOUTH AND CHERBOURG.

A characteristic distinction between the plans of the English and French marine fortifications may be found in the fact, that England so builds her protective works as that they may command with their guns the immediate entrance into the harbours, and the harbours themselves on all sides, whilst the protection of the roads is mainly left to ships, and that the shutting up in harbour of the ships themselves is contemplated only as a last expedient; whilst France endeavours by all possible means to protect her roads by detached forts, and provides for her ships timely shelter from superior fleets. The English scarcely ever place batteries at the end of their moles and breakwaters, while the French always do so. The English regard the fire of ships as superior to that of land-batteries; the French assign this superiority to the land-batteries; an opinion which, according to our latest experience, we may consider to be well founded. This, then, is the point of view from which we must consider Portsmouth and its road, Spithead, in order to detect the characteristic difference between the plan of this fortification and that of Cherbourg.

Portsmouth, the chief naval harbour of the English in the Channel, is by nature protected against the attack of a hostile fleet, so as no other could easily be, and this mainly through the relative position of the Isle of Wight, which is thrown out before it, and covers its entire front. Henry III. gave much attention to this harbour, and since his time it has gradually grown to be what it now is, and even quite recently much has been done to strengthen it. The entrance into this harbour may be effected from the east or west, and on both courses it is for large ships practicable only at the flood-tide, and then only with the help of pilots and buoys. It is protected by detached casemated forts, which lie both on the Isle of Wight and on the mainland, and command the water at point-blank. The fortification itself consists of three independent parts—Portsmouth, Portsea, and Gosport,—which are so planned that they reciprocally protect each other. The works to the landward are partly surrounded by wet ditches, and command with their guns the surrounding country. Those to the seaward consist of solid casemated batteries, which so support each other, and so command the water, that an entrance is impossible till they shall have been demolished,—a difficult consummation, considering that their main front is altogether withdrawn from the direct fire of the enemy.

The harbour and the road of Spithead are spacious enough to afford room for the largest fleets; the Arsenal so complete that ships may thence be provided with all requisites. The guns, however, with which the works are armed are somewhat too light, considering that during the last year all the naval powers have been taking measures to arm their ships as heavily as possible. Availing themselves of their experience during the recent Russo-Turkish war, the English have placed many detached batteries on the Isle of Wight, of which one of the largest lies near the Needles. Should a hostile fleet make its way so far as this, the difficulty of hitting the passage (which scarcely could be found were the buoys to be removed and no pilots to be forthcoming), would obstruct their progress. Nothing would be left to the enemy under such circumstances, except to gain possession of the Isle of Wight, and thence, after taking the strand batteries, to annoy the road and harbour.

The only method by which France could paralyze this harbour was by fortifying at immense expense a point on its own coast in this vicinity. This has been done. Cherbourg, which has long been destined to become a French Portsmouth, has even surpassed its pattern and model. It has been constituted a harbour of the first class, which is calculated to bring into dispute with England the command of the channel. Cherbourg can be used as the rendezvous for fleets intended to act offensively, and may also serve as a retreat for defeated fleets. Its naval arsenals also are so complete in themselves that they may not only make good, damages, but may build new ships, without needing for this purpose in any material respect the help of other docks.

We have said that the object of this harbour is quite as much offensive as defensive. Had defence only been proposed, the harbour never would have been constructed at such enormous expense in such immediate proximity to the English coast, certainly not immediately over against the greatest naval port of England, certainly not on the most salient point of the coast of Brittany. Most assuredly the fusion of the lines of railroad, and the facilities which have openly been provided, not only for concentrating troops as quickly as possible on this point, but also of embarking them with ease and convenience, bear the aspect of an offensive fortification. Considering the strength of the works, no such conditions were required for their simple protection.

The works completely enclose the town, which lies in a plain on the shore, and has behind it a circuit of heights. To the westward of the town, and having a much greater extent, lies the port, with its docks and arsenal; in the centre is the road, with its protecting moles; to the eastward is a high grey rock, La Roule, with its citadel, which commands the entire of the fortification, the port, and the road. A bastioned wall, of semi-circular form, surrounds the establishments of the port to the landward, and rests its flank on the sea, having to the landward only one gate most strongly fortified. The large seventy-foot deep basin, which has been artificially formed by blowing away the rocks, has at its side seven docks. These are connected with it by means of flood-gates, and are available as well

for the refitting as the building of the ships. The mole, which shuts off the inner road, is truly a gigantic work; it serves not only to protect from bad weather the ships of war that may be lying at anchor behind it, but most assuredly also to prevent the approach of a hostile fleet. That it may subserve this latter purpose, four strong forts have been placed on it, of which three are armed with sixty, and the fourth with thirty-five guns.

Each of these forts has two tiers of casemates, and a third row of guns range outward from the platform. We must not overlook a great advantage which they secure to the position. So long as they remain untaken by the enemy, it will be impossible for him to cannonade and destroy the port itself and the marine establishments contained within it. The entrance into the port itself is protected by other heavily armed forts. Their guns are of enormous calibre, conformably to the idea of the Emperor, which he announced in his work on Artillery, and which he has brought into use also in the case of field-guns, by means of increasing their calibre. The armament in question consists entirely of 64 pounders and 10-inch mortars. Such heavy guns must of course be handled with difficulty, but they have a most important effect against shipping. The English coast batteries have a much lighter armament; as a rule, only long 32's, or sometimes even lighter ordnance, while the English ships have heavier guns. Batteries are to be found at Portsmouth, Dover, and Weymouth, mounted only with 18-pounders, or short 24's. The mistake of the original conception has been subsequently perceived, and as many 68-pounders have been already sent to them from Woolwich, as were in store or could be got ready.

All the forts of Cherbourg are so arranged that they flank each other, and also command with a cross fire the inner and the outer road, and the port; while the citadel, La Roule, can direct the mass of its fire on any point that may be desired. The terminus of the railway with its establishment lies at the foot of this rock, altogether under the fire of the citadel Just as Cherbourg is thus united with Paris, so is Portsmouth by a similar railroad with London, and can (especially as the line passes near Aldershot), at a moment's notice bring together troops for its reinforcement. Still the communication between London and Portsmouth has so far less worth than that between Cherbourg and Paris, in that the latter is fortified and constitutes a military central point; while London, an open city, requires protection and help from its fortified positions, and could assure no help to them.

Here we are brought back to the value of central fortifications, without which marine fortifications, to a great extent, lose their value. Marine fortifications, however strong they may be, are always exposed to the attacks of an enemy, if he happen to be in superior force; and must be eventually reduced by such a one, unless duly supported from the inland. The best example of this is the siege of Sebastopol, which was taken in spite of this kind of support which was continually being afforded from the north-east side. Where central fortifications are entirely wanting, as they are in the case of England, the fall of a marine fortification must be attended by the most

disastrous consequences. The country lies thenceforward open to the advance of the enemy, and a single pitched battle lost gives it up as a prize to the enemy. The beaten army can find no sheltered rendezvous, nor fortified depôts, in order to renovate their losses in men and *matériel*, and under such circumstances it is only too probable that they may be altogether destroyed. The objection, that in 1801 fortresses did not by any means protect Prussia, is not to the purpose; for they were, for the most part, altogether undefended, or very badly so, and only a very few afforded an honorable exception to this state of things. Napoleon I. was well aware of this, and it was on account of this that Carnot was led to write his work on the defence of fortification.

The prominent tongue of land on which Cherbourg lies, forms the east boundary of the bay of St. Michael, in the background of which lies the strongly fortified St. Malo, which is required for the purpose of covering the bay itself, and flanking the promontory of Brittany. Over against this bay lies the second great naval harbour, Plymouth. The estuary of the Plym and the Tamar forms here a wide bay, which has been fortified and adapted as a port. Before this lie the moles 5,100 feet long; which, since no forts are placed on them, have only the object of protecting the road from the force of the sea. The port, which is more than a mile broad, could hardly offer any material opposition to a hostile fleet, unless it were to be supported from the inland. It is rather a station for a fleet than a marine fortress; and its arsenal is intended simply for the making good of damages, and not for the building of men-of-war. Beyond this to the west there is neither English nor French naval port on the Channel.

The English assume that they could operate against Cherbourg from three sides, by means of fleets from Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Sheerness: and that consequently they would have the advantage of advancing in converging lines of operation. The French (they assume) would, in case of an attempt on their part to land in this quarter, have to run the gauntlet of these fleets, and would therefore be found in a very disagreeable position. The idea however rests on a delusion; for the French also have two strong external points whence they might sail—Dunkirk and Brest—and so throw the English back on an inner line of operation. Hitherto the French marine has not, on the whole, attained to the power and magnitude of that of the English; but then she is not obliged to keep ships of war in so many seas, and consequently so to fritter away her force as England is. No one can question the fact that France has lately made gigantic progress in naval matters. It is impossible to predict when she will cease the work of creating a new force: at present there is not the slightest appearance of such an intention.

From the above-stated conditions it follows that the requirements of England are—

1.—That her steam navy should be strengthened as much as possible.

2.—That her coast defences should be completed.

3.—That inland fortifications should be constructed.

4.—That her standing army should be re-organized and strengthened.

Should the English Government refuse to look into these requirements, there will, sooner or later, be reason to lament their carelessness. It is well known that the alliance between the cabinets of London and Paris has not taken root in the hearts of the people; and that the old national antipathy is not extinguished. If the press be in any degree the exponent of the sentiment of nations, one need only to read the newspapers of the two countries to be convinced of the truth of our opinion. The visit to Cherbourg, and the speeches interchanged on the occasion are no proof to the contrary. In fact we might almost say that both people are in the attitude of shewing their teeth, since, immediately after the return of the Queen, orders were given at the Woolwich Arsenal to send off as quickly as possible heavy guns to the works and forts on the south coast.

We have said, in the first place, that England must strengthen her steam fleet. For this statement we have the following grounds. In order to be able to succour the coasts at the points where they at any time may be attacked, and to reach as quickly as possible the spot against which hostile operations may be directed, ships are wanted that shall combine great speed with the least dependance on the wind, *i.e.*, steam ships. There must, moreover, be the power of appearing before such threatened points in overwhelming force, if the enemy is to be beaten, and a landing prevented. Therefore a great number of these steam-ships is required. It has been proved to be unadvisable in most cases to alter old sailing ships into steam-ships. These old vessels may with more advantage be kept together at Portsmouth as a reserve fleet, since from this station, pretty nearly in the middle of the line of Channel coast, they can take the shortest course to any threatened point. Steam-ships constitute the appropriate manœuvring fleet. Their light craft must be like look-out posts, pushed forward against the French ports. In order that they may be able to give immediate notice of every movement of the fleet at those ports they must be attended by despatch boats. The main body of the steam fleet would have to advance to oppose an enemy immediately on his sailing out, and to drive him back, or at any rate to hold him in check till, by the junction of the reserve fleet, they should have been so strengthened as to be able to beat the enemy in a general action. To this fleet the steam gun-boats would be added. They must be kept continually near the shore, since in a battle on the open sea they would be of little use; while their efficiency for the protection of the coast wheresoever attacked, is a much more essential requisite. If the fleet be distributed in this manner, a hostile invasion would be rendered very difficult, since in any case it would have to be preceded by an engagement at sea.

When, secondly, we say that the coast defences must be strengthened, it must be understood of course that our notion is not of a style of fortification like the great wall of China. We simply mean that Dover and Folkestone, which have good harbours, and are much exposed to a hostile landing, should be better fortified,

especially since London is so near, and they are threatened from Boulogne and Dunkirk. At Dover and Folkestone there are permanent camps, consequently there are there always troops in readiness for embarkation.

To trust entirely to the fleet for warding off an invasion we consider to be unadvisable. The dominion of the sea has often changed hands, and small navies have often disputed it with more numerous navies. A single very able admiral, favoured by good fortune, may of himself give a great superiority to a very weak squadron; and why should not such an one appear in France as well as elsewhere? Genoese, Portuguese, Spaniards, and Dutch have in their turns ruled the seas. Why then, in a world where everything is subject to change, should not this command, at some time, be lost by the English? France is making every effort to improve the condition of her navy, while in England the actual state of things is maintained, so far as the main purpose is concerned, and they are making slow progress with the building of steam-ships.

Thirdly.—The weaker an army is, numerically, the more necessary are points of support. In a country where there are no natural walls and ditches, *i.e.*, large rivers and impassable mountains, they must be artificially supplied.

To have numerous fortresses (on account of their requisite garrisons) would weaken the forces operating in the field; besides, they could not be kept up to the necessary strength, without too heavily burdening the finances of the country. Under existing circumstances in England, a few central fortifications, serving to protect the camps, would completely answer the purpose of checking an advancing enemy, until the army should have been reinforced. The strategic situations of these fortifications are sufficiently pointed out by the requirements they would have to fulfil—*i.e.* the supporting of the marine fortifications, and the protecting of the metropolis and the country behind them, until the army should have been concentrated. According to this rule they should be placed before the line between Bristol and London. A glance at the map will show that in the east of the kingdom, Chatham might serve as such another, if the land side were strengthened. Another should be placed at Farnham, perhaps where the camp of Aldershot now is. A third should be placed on the Kennet and Avon Canal. If a fourth could be placed in the district of Taunton it would be highly advantageous. These works properly used, would render immensely difficult the advance of an enemy, even if he should have effected a landing. The condition of the English army urgently demands such internal works of defence, in case of an enemy being able to make a sudden descent; and that the French would not neglect this main condition of success, is proved by the entire of the dispositions at Cherbourg.

Fourthly: The numerical weakness of the English army, and their distribution over all parts of the world, rendered pressing, even of old, the necessity for the organizing of other forces, wherewith the protection of the mother-country might be undertaken. These forces consist of the Militia, and Yeomanry Cavalry; which since the late Russo-Turkish war have been called out more frequently than

formerly, and at this moment, on account of the Indian revolt, are partly kept under arms. A collateral use of the Militia is to keep up by volunteering the supply for the royal army, which on account of the prevailing system of recruiting, is often in want of men. Their numerical amount is very considerable, and may reach to the number of 200,000—men however, who for the most part would have been called out for the first time, shortly before or during a war, when there would be no time to exercise them sufficiently, and make them acquainted with the specific duties of the soldier. They would, whatever their numbers, be still an army of recruits, commanded by officers of less than moderate pretensions. We may safely assume that it would be impossible in less than four weeks, so to drill and concentrate these Militia, as to allow of their being marched against the enemy. But in that space of time might not everything be lost? The enemy would have gained a firm footing, and would have been reinforced; he would attack the depôts and rendezvous of Militia, which since they are not fortified, could offer no considerable resistance, and would rout them all successively.

Hence it is evident that England urgently requires in the mother-country, a strong body of men to be kept in readiness to take the field. The times are passed when the invincibility of her Army and Navy were a general article of faith, and it will be well for her, in the actual state of these forces, not to trust to that idea too absolutely. England does not sufficiently realize the possibility of an invasion; though ever and anon there has been a faint breathing of such a thing.

We can only wish that she may be brought to a clear understanding of her position, before it is too late.

OUR SAILING NAVY.

(Continued from page 530.)

By Theseus. Late R.N.

Sailing Corvettes.—Each of these vessels carries an armament of 18 32-pounders on a flush deck.

Calypso, 18 guns, 734 tons, 120 feet in length, 37½ feet beam, and 18 feet depth of hold. Built at Chatham, 1845. Plan, Symonds. Served 8 years in commission. Complement 185 men. Captain, Frederick Byng Montressor. Commissioned November, 1857. Station, Pacific.

Daphne, 18 guns, 726 tons, 120 feet in length, and 37½ feet beam. Built at Pembroke, 1838. Plan, Symonds. Served 11 years in commission. War services, Syria. Station, Chatham.

Dido, 18 guns, 734 tons, 120 feet in length, and 37½ feet beam. Built at Pembroke, 1836. Plan, Symonds. Served 15 years in commission. War services, Syria and Borneo. Station, Chatham.

Remarks.—These three corvettes are all fast sailing vessels, and very comfortable ships for officers and men to serve in. In order to

explain the great increase of expenditure of the Royal Navy, it is only necessary to point out the difference in cost between a sailing corvette and a screw steam corvette.

Dido, 18 guns, 734 tons, sailing corvette. Built 1836, cost £15,000.

Pearl, 21 guns, 1461 tons, screw corvette. Built 1855, cost £46,000. The Pearl is expected to perform the same duties for a steam fleet, as the Dido was thought capable of executing for a sailing fleet. Thus twenty years have more than trebled the cost of corvettes, and this comparison will generally hold good as regards the other small ships belonging to the Navy.

Another corvette of this class called the Coquette, building at Chatham, was taken to pieces a few years ago, before being finished, and her timbers used to build a screw corvette. The Dido, when commanded by Captain Hon. Henry Keppel, was the smartest cruiser on the China station, in 1843.

SAILING SLOOPS, BRIGS, AND BRIGANTINES.—The sloops and many of the brigs are commanded by Commanders, and the other vessels by Lieutenants or Masters.

	In Com. for Active Ser.	In Com. for Harbour Ser.	In Ordinary.	Total.	Non-effective Service.
Sailing Sloops...	8	0	28	36	14
Sailing Brigs.	1	4	7	12	45
Sailing Brigantines.	1	0	1	2	3
Total	10	4	36	50	62

SAILING SLOOPS.—These vessels may be divided into four classes.

1st Class.—Arachne, 18 guns, 601 tons. Built at Devonport, 1847. Plan, Symonds. Served about 3 years in commission. Complement 140 men. Commander John Eglington Montgomerie. Commissioned October 1855. Station, West Indies.

Terpsichore, 18 guns, 600 tons, 113 feet in length, 35½ feet beam, and 16 feet 9 inches depth of hold: Built at Blackwall by Wigram, 1847. Plan, Symonds. Has never been commissioned. Station, Chatham.

2nd Class.—Atalanta, 16 guns, 551 tons. Built at Pembroke, 1847. Plan, Symonds. Served 3 years in commission. Complement, 130 men. Commander, Thomas Malcolm Sabine Pasley. Commissioned May, 1856. Station, North America and West Indies.

Camilla, 16 guns, 549 tons. Built at Pembroke, 1847. Plan, Symonds. Served 3 years in commission. War services, China. Complement, 130 men. Commander, George Twisleton Colville. Commissioned July, 1856. Station, China.

Frolic, 16 guns, 511 tons. Built at Portsmouth, 1842. Plan, Captain Hendry. Served 11 years in commission. Station, Chatham.

Helena, 16 guns, 549 tons. Built at Pembroke, 1843. Plan, Symonds. Served 7 years in commission. Station, Portsmouth.

Jumna, 16 guns, 548 tons. Built of teak, at Bombay, 1848.

Plan, Symonds. Was formerly called the Jamaica and the Zebra. Has never been commissioned. Station, Chatham.

Musquito, 16 guns, 549 tons. Built at Pembroke, 1851. Plan, Symonds. Has never been commissioned. Station, Devonport.

Rover, 16 guns, 549 tons. Built at Pembroke, 1853. Plan, Symonds. Has never been commissioned. Station, Devonport.

Siren, 16 guns, 549 tons. Built at Woolwich, 1841. Plan, Symonds. Served 10 years in commission. Armament, 16 32-pounders of 25 cwt. Complement, 130 men. Commander, George Macintosh Balfour. Commissioned August, 1855. Station, South East Coast of America.

3rd Class.—Comus, 14 guns, 462 tons. Built at Pembroke, 1828. Plan, Inman. Served 20 years in commission. War Services, River Plate and China. Was formerly called the Comet. Station, Chatham.

Electra, 14 guns, 461 tons. Built at Portsmouth, 1837. Plan, Inman. Served 12 years in commission. Station, Chatham.

Hazard, 14 guns, 429 tons. Built at Portsmouth, 1837. Plan, Rule, after Cruiser. Served 8 years in commission. War services, Syria and New Zealand. Station, Portsmouth.

Hyacinth, 14 guns, 435 tons. Built at Plymouth, 1829. Plan, Rule, after Cruiser. Served 10 years in commission. War services, China. Station, Portsmouth.

Larne, 14 guns, 463 tons. Built at Pembroke, 1829. Plan, Inman. Served 13 years in commission. War services, China. Station, Sheerness.

Racehorse, 14 guns, 438 tons. Built at Plymouth, 1830. Plan, Tucker. Served 15 years in commission. War services, China. Station, Devonport.

4th Class.—Acorn, 12 guns, 485 tons, 105 feet in length, 33 feet beam, and 15 feet depth of hold. Built at Devonport, 1838. Plan, Symonds. Served 9 years in commission. War services, China. Armament consists of 12 32-pounders. Carries 6 months provisions. Draught of water, 14½ feet. Complement, 125 men. Commander, Richard Bulkeley Pearse. Commissioned, May, 1856. Station, China.

Albatross, 12 guns, 484 tons. Built at Portsmouth, 1842. Plan, Symonds. Served 7 years in commission. Station, Chatham.

Arab, 12 guns, 481 tons. Built at Chatham, 1847. Plan, Symonds. Served 7 years in commission. Station, Chatham.

Childers, 12 guns, 385 tons. Built at Chatham, 1827. Plan, Rule, after Cruiser. Served 17 years in commission. War services, China. Station, Chatham.

Contest, 12 guns, 459 tons. Built at Cowes, 1845. Plan, White, after Daring. Served 7 years in commission. Station, Portsmouth.

Daring, 12 guns, 426 tons, 104 feet in length, and 31½ feet beam. Built at Portsmouth, 1844. Plan, White. Served 7 years in commission. Draught of water, 16½ feet. Station, Chatham.

Despatch, 12 guns, 483 tons. Built at Chatham, 1851. Plan, Symonds. Has never been commissioned. Station, Chatham.

Elk, 12 guns, 483 tons. Built at Chatham, 1847. Plan, Symonds. Served 3 years in commission. War services, China. Complement, 125 men. Commander, Hubert Campion. Commissioned May, 1856. Station, Australia.

Espeigle, 12 guns, 442 tons, 104½ feet in length, and 31½ feet beam. Built at Chatham, 1844. Plan, Messrs. Chatfield, Read, and Creuze. Served 7 years in commission. Draught of water, 16 feet. Station, Chatham.

Fantome, 12 guns, 484 tons. Built at Chatham, 1839. Plan, Symonds. Served 10 years in commission. Station, Chatham.

Grecian, 12 guns, 484 tons. Built at Pembroke, 1838. Plan, Symonds. Served 10 years in commission. War services, River Plate. Station, Devonport.

Heron, 12 guns, 483 tons. Built at Chatham, 1847. Plan, Symonds. Served 2 years in commission. Complement, 125 men. Commander, William Henderson Truscott. Commissioned October, 1857. Station, West Coast of Africa.

Kangaroo, 12 guns, 481 tons. Built at Chatham, 1848. Plan, Symonds. Has never been commissioned. Station, Chatham.

Kingfisher, 12 guns, 445 tons, 103 feet in length, and 32 feet beam. Draught of water, 14½ feet. Built at Pembroke, 1845. Plan, Symonds, as Flying Fish. Served 7 years in commission. Station, Devonport.

Liberty, 12 guns, 482 tons. Built at Pembroke, 1850. Plan, Symonds. Has never been commissioned. Station, Devonport.

Mariner, 12 guns, 481 tons. Built at Pembroke, 1846. Plan, Symonds. Served 8 years in commission. Station, Chatham.

Martin, 12 guns, 481 tons. Built at Pembroke, 1850. Plan, Symonds. Has never been commissioned. Station, Devonport.

Persian, 12 guns, 484 tons. Built at Pembroke, 1839. Plan, Symonds. Served 10 years in commission. Complement, 125 men. Commander, Edward Hardinge. Commissioned October 1857. Station, Cape of Good Hope.

Pilot, 12 guns, 481 tons, 105 feet in length, 32½ feet beam, and 15 feet depth of hold. Draught of water, 14½ feet. Built at Devonport, 1838, Plan, Symonds. Served 11 years in commission. Station, Devonport.

Squirrel, 12 guns, 481 tons. Built at Pembroke, 1853. Plan, Symonds. Has never been commissioned. Station, Devonport.

Remarks.—A large proportion of sailing sloops were constructed on the plan of the late Sir William Symonds, and it must with justice be allowed, that he introduced the greatest improvements in the building of these small vessels of war. It was in 1825 that Sir W. Symonds, then only a Lieutenant in the Royal Navy, obtained permission to construct the Columbine, an 18 gun sloop, which was launched in December, 1826, at Portsmouth. Having been made a Commander, he commanded the Columbine in her numerous trials with the old fashioned sloops and brigs. She beat her opponents on all points, and Commander Symonds was made a Captain, but owing to the strenuous opposition of the Navy Board, and the professional naval architects, the Admiralty declined for a time to allow him to

build any more. The Duke of Portland then patronized him, and built the Pantaloon, an 8 gun brig, at his own expense. This small vessel was found so superior to all her competitors, that the Admiralty purchased her into the Navy, and, after some delay, Captain Symonds was appointed Surveyor of the Navy, and shortly afterwards was knighted. It was principally by the exploits of these two vessels, and the Vernon frigate, that Sir W. Symonds attained so much fame in shipbuilding. The Columbine is now a coal hulk at Sheerness, and the Pantaloon was broken up some years ago.

The Serpent and the Snake, 16 gun sloops, and the Rover, 18 gun sloop, were next built by Sir William Symonds, and were found very successful. The Rover after serving about 12 years in commission was broken up in 1845, but the Arachne and the Terpsichore have since been built on her lines. About thirty-eight sailing sloops have been constructed by Sir W. Symonds, but only twenty-five now remain upon the effective list. The Snake and Wolverene have been wrecked, whilst the Nerbuddah and Sappho have been lost at sea with all their crews.

In 1844 a squadron of experimental sailing sloops, built by different constructors, assembled at Spithead, under the command of the late Admiral A. L. Corry. This squadron included the Flying Fish, 12, and Pantaloon, 8, built by Sir W. Symonds, the Daring, 12, and Waterwitch, 8, built by Mr. White, the Espeigle, 12, built by Messrs. Chatfield, Read, and Creuze, the Mutine, 12, built by Mr. Fincham, the Osprey, 12, built by Mr. Blake, and the Cruizer, 16, built by Sir W. Rule. After numerous trials the Daring was reported to be first, and the Flying Fish second. The Daring, however, drew two feet more water than the Flying Fish. This latter vessel has lately been broken up. The Mutine and Osprey were both wrecked. The Daring and the Espeigle are still among the "crack brigs" on the navy list.

It ought to be stated that the three last classes of sailing sloops are rigged as brigs, but as it is generally the custom to style them sloops, they have been classed as such here.

It does seem a very great pity to condemn all these fine sloops to be broken up, but unless they can somehow be converted into screw ships, it would be better to get rid of them at once, than allow them gradually to rot and become of no value.

On careful consideration it might be found advisable to attempt the conversion of the first two classes, as the Terpsichore and the Mosquito. If these sloops were cut in half amidships and lengthened some thirty or forty feet, they might be found capable of receiving engines of eighty or a hundred horse power, and so become useful vessels. This might be found cheaper than to build new ships. The example of the Cruizer, of only sixty horse power, which ship has lately been found so useful in Lord Elgin's exploring expedition, will at once point out the utility of this class of screw steam vessels. The third class or 14 gun sloops are now quite out of date, though some of them have been long employed in commission. The Comus was wrecked and sunk on the coast of Brazil, but by the great energy and perseverance of her Commander, E. Tennyson D'Eyncourt, she

was recovered, and has since served a long commission on the China station.

Some of the 12-gun sloops, as the Daring, Contest, Mariner, and Pilot, might be usefully employed as tenders to the training ships about to be instituted, and if these vessels were occasionally to meet and try rate of sailing, it would serve as a stimulus to their crews. Young naval officers could also be taught more of seamanship in one of these sloops than in any of the screw liners forming the Channel fleet.

SAILING BRIGS.—These vessels will be separated into two classes.

First class.—Crane, 6 guns, 359 tons, 95½ feet in length, 30 feet beam, and 13 feet depth of hold. Built at Woolwich, 1839. Plan, Symonds. Served thirteen years in commission. Station, Devonport.

Express, 8 guns, 362 tons. Built at Deptford, 1835. Plan, Symonds. Served 16 years in commission. Station, Chatham.

Ferret, 8 guns, 358 tons. Built at Devonport, 1840. Plan, Symonds. Served 8 years in commission. Complement, 150 boys. Lieutenant and Commander, Alfred P. H. Helby. Commissioned April, 1859. Station, Instruction-brig for Naval apprentices. Tender to the Nile, at Queenstown.

Heroine, 8 guns, 369 tons. Built at Woolwich, 1841. Plan, Symonds. Served 10 years in commission. Station, Devonport.

Hound, 8 guns, 358 tons. Built at Deptford, 1846. Plan, Symonds. Served 8 years in commission. Station, Devonport.

Sealark, 8 guns, 369 tons. Built at Portsmouth, 1843. Plan, Symonds. Served 12 years in commission. Complement, 80 men. Lieutenant and Commander, Marcus Lowther. Commissioned January, 1859. Station, Instruction-brig for Novices. Tender to the Britannia, at Portsmouth.

Swift, 6 guns, 360 tons. Built at Deptford, 1835. Plan, Symonds. Served 17 years in commission. Station, Devonport.

Waterwitch, 8 guns, 324 tons, 90½ feet in length, 29½ feet beam, and 12½ feet depth of hold. Built at Cowes, 1832. Plan, White. Purchased for the Navy, 1834. Served 20 years in commission. Station, Sheerness.

2nd Class.—Nautilus, 6 guns, 233 tons. Built at Woolwich, 1830. Plan, Naval School of Architecture. Served 20 years in commission. Complement, 150 boys. Lieutenant and Commander, William B. Grant. Commissioned January, 1857. Station, Instruction-brig for Naval Apprentices. Tender to Impregnable, at Devonport.

Rolla, 6 guns, 231 tons. Built at Plymouth, 1829. Plan, Peake. Served 20 years in commission. Complement, 150 boys. Lieutenant and Commander, Charles Gudgeon Nelson. Commissioned January, 1858. Station, Instruction-brig for Naval Apprentices. Tender to Victory, at Portsmouth.

Saracen, 4 guns, 228 tons. Built at Plymouth, 1831. Plan, Peake. Served 16 years in commission. Complement, 48 men. Master and Commander, William Stanton. Commissioned October, 1858. Station, Surveying Service in the East Indies.

Scorpion, 4 guns, 228 tons. Built at Plymouth, 1832. Plan, Peake. Served 15 years in commission. Station, Chatham.

Brigantines.—Dolphin, 3 guns, 318 tons, 90½ feet in length, 29 feet beam, and 14½ feet depth of hold. Built at Sheerness, 1836. Plan, Symonds. Served 15 years in commission. Station, Chatham.

Spy, 3 guns. 319 tons. Built at Sheerness, 1841. Plan, Symonds Served 12 years in commission. Complement, 65 men. Lieutenant and Commander, Tathwell Benjamin Collinson. Commissioned December, 1858. Station, south-east coast of America.

Remarks.—The first class of brigs were built on the improved lines of the Pantaloon, and are all very fine vessels of their class. The Crane, Express, and the Swift, were originally employed in the Packet Service, between Falmouth and Rio Janeiro. Many of these brigs have been lately fitted up as watch vessels for the Coast Guard Service.

The second class of brigs have been termed "floating coffins," owing to many of them having foundered at sea. The sooner they are all removed from the Navy List the better for the good of the service. The Brigantines are very fine vessels, and sail very fast. The Bonetta and Dart are similar vessels to the Dolphin, but are now used as receiving hulks. The Wizard brig, similar to the Saracen, was lately wrecked in Bantry Bay.

The following is stated to have been the cost of constructing the undermentioned sailing sloops, brigs, &c. The Siren, 16, cost £10,900; the Comus, 14, cost £12,960; the Grecian, 12, cost £10,350; the Daring, 12, cost £9,321; the Espeigle, 12, cost £9,723; the Childers, 12, cost £9,750; the Heroine, 8, cost £6,900; the Dolphin, 3, cost £6,500.

The following sloops, brigs, &c., belong to the non-effective service. Receiving Ships.—The Seaflower, at Portsmouth. The Favourite, Lapwing, and Spider, at Devonport. The Modeste, at Woolwich, The Bonetta, at Deptford. The Royalist, police vessel, off Somerset House. The Bittern, at Hong Kong. The Doterel, at Bermuda. The Bramble, at Australia. The Safety, at Tortola. The Wolf, at Dublin.

Watch Vessels, Coast Guard Service.—The Acute, Bathurst, Beagle, Britomart, Cadmus, Chanticleer, Clinker, Cygnet, Dart, Dwarf, Eclipse, Emulous, Flamer, Forester, Griper, Icarus, Linnet, Pandora, Penguin, Pelter, Partridge, Pelican, Philomel, Raven, Safeguard, Shamrock, Snapper, and Star.

Mooring Vessels.—The Speedy, at Sheerness. The Badger, Pacific, and Progresso, at the Cape of Good Hope. The Despatch, and Devonport, at Bermuda. The Savage, at Malta. The Carron, at Harwich.

Quarrantine Service.—The Hope and Tyrian.

Church Ship.—The Swan, off Blackwall, and the Ranger at Kingstown.

Coal Depôts.—The Champion, Lily, Orestes, Serpent, Peterel, and Griffin, at Portsmouth. The Harlequin, Nimrod, and Fly, at Devonport. The Columbine, at Sheerness. The Enterprise, at Chatham. The Columbia, at Halifax.

SAILING STORE SHIPS, HOSPITAL SHIPS, YACHTS, AND TENDERS.—THE NON-COMBATANT PORTION OF THE SAILING FLEET.

	In Com. for Active Ser.	In Com. for Harbour Ser.	In Ordinary.	Total.
Sailing Store Ships ...	1	8	6	15
Sailing Hospital Ships	1	4	0	5
Sailing Yachts	0	6	0	6
Sailing Tenders ...	9	8	2	19
Total	11	26	8	45

Sailing Store and Depot Ships.—Æolus, 2 guns, 1077 tons. Built at Deptford, as a 42-gun frigate, 1825. Plan, after French frigate Leda. Served 3 years in commission. War services, Baltic. Station, Portsmouth.

Africa. Purchased 1858. Station, Gibraltar.

Atholl, 4 guns, 503 tons. Built of larch, at Woolwich, as a 28-gun frigate, 1820. Plan, Surveyor of the Navy. Served many years in commission. Complement, 35 men. Lieutenant and Commander, George S. Boys. Commissioned November, 1854. Station, Greenock.

Crocodile, 8 guns, 500 tons. Built at Chatham, as a 28-gun frigate, 1825, Plan, Surveyors of the Navy. Served many years in commission. Complement, 35 men. Commander, William Greet. Commissioned January, 1858. Station, off the Tower of London.

Hercules, 2 guns, 1750 tons. Built at Chatham, as a 74-gun ship, 1815. Plan, Surveyors of the Navy. Served 18 years in commission. Station, Hong Kong.

Madagascar, 4 guns, 1167 tons. Built of teak, at Bombay, as a 44-gun frigate. Plan, after French frigate President. Served many years in commission. Complement, 48 men. Commander, Edmund M. Leycester. Commissioned September, 1853. Station, Rio de Janeiro.

Naiad, 4 guns, 1020 tons. Built in a Merchant's Yard, as a 42-gun frigate, 1797. Plan, Rule. Served many years in commission. War services, Trafalgar, &c., &c. Complement, 35 men. Master and Commander, William W. Dillon. Station, Callao.

Nereus, 4 guns, 1094 tons. Built at Pembroke, as a 42-gun frigate, 1821. Plan, after French frigate Leda. Served many years in commission. Complement, 35 men. Master and Commander, J. C. Barlow. Station, Valparaiso.

North Star, 2 guns, 501 tons. Built at Woolwich, as a 28-gun frigate, 1824. Plan, Surveyors of the Navy. Served 15 years in commission. War services, China. Station, Chatham.

Princess Charlotte, 12 guns, 2443 tons. Built at Plymouth, as a 104-gun Ship, 1825. Plan, after Victory. Served 5 years in commission. War services, Syria. Complement, 48 men. Master and Commander, Henry G. Thomsett. Commissioned, June, 1857. Station, Hong Kong.

Resolute, 2 guns, 430 tons. Purchased 1850. Formerly called the Baboo. Employed in two expeditions to the Arctic regions. Aban-

doned by her crew, she was recovered by some Americans, and presented by the United States Government to Her Majesty Queen Victoria in 1856. Station, Chatham.

Talbot, 2 guns, 500 tons. Built at Pembroke as a 28-gun frigate, 1824. Plan, Surveyors of the Navy. Served 15 years in commission. War services, Navarino and Syria. Station, Sheerness.

Tortoise, 12 guns, 962 tons. Purchased 1806. Formerly called the Sir Edward Hughes. Served many years in commission. Complement 65 men. Captain William Fanshawe Burnett, C. B. Commissioned January, 1858. Station, Ascension.

Tyne, 4 guns, 600 tons. Built at Woolwich as a 28-gun frigate, 1826. Plan, Sir R. Seppings. Served 16 years in commission. Station, Chatham.

Volage, 2 guns, 516 tons. Built at Portsmouth, as a 28 gun frigate, 1825. Plan, School of Naval Architecture. Served 13 years in commission. War services, Baltic. Station, Chatham.

SAILING HOSPITAL SHIPS.—Alligator, 2 guns, 500 tons. Purchased 1821. Served many years in commission as a 28-gun frigate. War services, Burmah and China. Station, Hong Kong.

Belleisle, 6 guns, 1709 tons. Built at Pembroke as a 74 gun ship, 1819. Plan, Rule, after Repulse. Served many years in commission. War services, China and Baltic. Complement 150 men. Commander, Henry M. Bingham, acting. Commissioned April, 1857. Station, China.

Inconstant, 2 guns, 1422 tons, 160 feet in length, and 44½ feet beam. Built at Portsmouth as a 36-gun frigate, 1836. Plan, Captain Hayes. Served 12 years in commission. Station, Emigration Hospital ship, at Cork.

Melville, 6 guns, 1768 tons. Built of teak at Bombay, as a 74-gun ship, 1817. Plan, after Christian VII. Served 16 years in commission. War services, China. Station, Hong Kong.

Minden, 2 guns, 1720 tons. Built at Deptford as a 74 gun ship, 1810. Plan, after Culloden. Served many years in commission. War services, Capture of Java and Algiers. Station, Hong Kong.

REMARKS.—The Princess Charlotte, old three-decker, and Belleisle, old two-decker, have been ordered home from China. The Crocodile, Alligator, North Star, Talbot, Tyne, and Volage, were formerly known as the "donkey frigates." The Resistance and Rattlesnake are still retained on the Navy List, although they have been broken up some time. The Belleisle is the fastest sailing ship of the old 74 gun ships, but it is reported that she is very rotten. The Inconstant was a fast sailing frigate, and the opponent of Sir W. Symond's "Pique" frigate.

SAILING YACHTS.—These yachts are for the use of the Port-Admirals, or Superintendents of the Dockyards, &c.

Chatham. Built 1765. Station, tender to Wellesley, Chatham.

Fanny, 75 tons. Station, tender to Victory, at Portsmouth.

Plymouth. Built 1814. Station, tender to Royal Adelaide, at Devonport.

Portsmouth. Built 1806. Station, tender to Illustrious, at Portsmouth.

Royal George, 330 tons. Built at Deptford, 1817. Plan, Peake. Station, tender to Victoria and Albert, Portsmouth.

Sylph, 114 tons. Built 1821. Station, tender to Impregnable, Devonport.

Sailing Tenders.—Adelaide, schooner. Station, Sierra Leone.

Ceres, cutter. Station, tender to Dasher, Channel Islands.

Cerus, cutter, 60 tons. Station, Portsmouth.

Cuba, schooner. Station, tender to Imaum, Jamaica.

Gossamer, cutter, 70 tons. Built 1836. Station, Sheerness.

Gipsy, cutter. Built 1836. Station, tender to Nile, at Queenstown.

Gulnare, cutter. Station, Coast of Ireland.

Hart, cutter. Station, Sheerness.

Hope, cutter. Station, Sheerness.

Indian, cutter. Station, Surveying Service.

Kingston, schooner. Station, tender to Imaum, Jamaica.

Mercury, cutter, 105 tons. Built at Chatham, 1837. Plan, Symonds. Station, tender to Dasher, Channel Islands.

Netley, 8 guns, 122 tons. Cutter. Built at Devonport, 1823. Plan, Seppings. Station, tender to Indus, North America.

Rose, Surveying vessel.

Snipe, 2 guns, 122 tons. Built at Pembroke, 1828. Station, Devonport.

Sparrow, 2 guns, 160 tons. Ketch. Built at Pembroke, 1828. Plan, Seppings. Station, Surveying Service, Devonport.

Sylvia, 6 guns, 70 tons, cutter. Built 1827. Plan, Symonds. Station, Devonport.

Thames, cutter, 65 tons. Built 1805. Station, Sheerness.

Woodlark, 2 guns, cutter, 83 tons. Built at Deptford, 1821. Plan, Peake. Lieutenant and Commander, T. W. L. Thomas. Station, Surveying Service, Orkney Islands.

Remarks.—The sailing yachts are all very antique, and only fit for harbour service.

The Cuba and Kingston schooners were formerly slave vessels, which have been purchased by the Admiralty from their captors. Small steam gun-boats, as the Jasper and Jaseur, are much more serviceable craft than the above small schooners. In purchasing the Kingston, Sir John Pakington has added another useless sailing vessel to the Navy. The Gipsy, Mercury, and Sylvia, are all built after the model of the "Nancy Dawsou," Sir W. Symonds' famous little yacht.

Concluding Remarks.—All the sailing vessels of the Royal Navy have now been enumerated; and as the details of the steam ships of war have been previously given, it only remains for us to consider the combined strength of the Navy. There has, however, been so much alteration in the condition of many ships since last October, when the first of these papers appeared, and so much new light has been thrown upon the present state of our Navy in the late debates in Parliament, and in the Admiralty returns, that it is thought best to defer the summary for the present.

In their anxiety to clear themselves and attack each other, Sir

Charles Wood and Sir John Pakington managed to make matters so confused, that even naval men have been quite unable to find out what were the precise opinions of each regarding our naval strength. As not even these two magnates can agree as to the exact number of screw line of battle ships we now possess, it is not to be expected that a non-official can make an exactly correct statement.

As there is some talk of a naval review at Spithead this summer, we shall doubtless have great curiosity excited as to the merits of each ship belonging to the steam fleet, and it is hoped that the Admiralty will boldly furnish these particulars in their next edition of the Navy List.

At the present time the Navy List is perfectly unintelligible to a casual reader; and it is only a naval man who has studied the subject for some years that can form any opinion as to the state and capabilities of each ship.

In the remarks made upon the different classes of ships, we have given our own opinion as to the sea-going qualities of each vessel; but our knowledge is, of course, very limited and imperfect. There can be no doubt, however, that foreign governments, having numerous agents at our seaports, are well-informed upon these matters, and that it is only the English public who are in fact unacquainted with them.

The Admiralty would do well to remove all the Harbour and Depôt ships from the Effective List of the Navy, give the particulars of the exact number of guns each vessel carries, weight of broadside, tonnage, length and beam of ship, horse-power, both nominal and indicated, average speed, complement of men and boys, whether commissioned, belonging to the first or second class steam reserve, repairing, converting, building, or ordered to be built. By knowing these particulars, we should always be acquainted with the exact strength of our Navy, and first Lords of the Admiralty would not need to speak mysteriously in order to hide their ignorance, or cover their faults. A large quantity of details belonging to our screw fleet have lately been published in a weekly journal, by the sanction of the Admiralty, but the information is so collected that the public can scarcely comprehend them. It would be much better for the Admiralty to publish in the official Navy List all important facts, so that it might be easy to understand them without having to wade through a mass of engineering detail.

In the report of the Committee appointed by the Treasury to inquire into the Navy Estimates, there is an Appendix giving a list of the Sailing Ships which may be considered as effective, on the authority of Sir B. Walker. The effective Sailing Ships are stated to comprise—13 ships-of-the-line, 13 first-class frigates, 14 second-class frigates, and 23 sloops and brigs. Total, 63.

NAVAL STATISTICS OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE FROM 1852 TO 1858.

THERE is perhaps no subject that addresses itself more earnestly to the attention of the English nation than the welfare of the Navy. Almost any details upon the commonplace questions of docks, factories, victualling, stores, to say nothing about the more important matters of ship-building, gunnery, and manning the fleet, are certain to claim public consideration. The whole matter possesses an interest peculiarly its own, and the reason is obvious enough. It is to this national arm that Great Britain is chiefly indebted for the proud position she occupies as a powerful nation. Her fame and her renown are not like that of Continental States, confined to Europe. No; England's grandeur extends over the entire earth. The maintenance of her colonies and commerce is dependant upon her Navy. No wonder, then, that the efficiency of her maritime power is a subject of constant solicitude to her people.

But when to the interest which naturally belongs to this favourite service, is appended a searching investigation of the growth and threatening power of the rival Navy of France, the topic then becomes one that appeals most sensitively to every man interested in the stability of the British Empire. Such a case is before us. We have it now in our power to lay before our readers the most minute details respecting the Naval yards, stores, and forces of the two great maritime nations of the earth. The whole subject is laid bare in a remarkable State paper, presented to Parliament by her Majesty's command, for reasons which we will now proceed to state.

In introducing this document it is necessary to refer to events that are now become historical. Since the flash of the *coup d'état* prepared Europe for the future Empire of France, the Navy of our "faithful ally" has more than doubled itself. So important an event did not fail to awaken in the minds of an insular community like Great Britain a serious desire to know why, at a period of profound peace, the docks and arsenals of Louis Napoleon should be ringing with Naval effort. And it must be in the recollection of the readers of the *United Service Magazine*, that public attention has been drawn in these pages to the ambitious and crafty policy of the present ruler of France on various occasions. We are now glad to know that our government have, although tardily, felt the necessity of instituting comparisons between the force and efficiency of the two Navies, that must, in all human probability, be again soon striving for the sovereignty of the seas. The comparison is not over flattering to the foresight and capacity of our "higher powers," as we propose to show in the following paper.

Our shortcomings will, of course, appear more apparent when placed in juxta-position with the earnest activity that has spurred on our "faithful ally" to increase the proportions of his Navy, until it has passed in some important particulars the bulk of our own. While we have been squabbling about petty details, Louis Napoleon has leaped at once into grand results. But, as it is not our purpose to

burden this vexed question with many remarks of our own, we will at once proceed to investigate the principal facts connected with the introduction of steam, and its effects upon the growth of the Navies of both England and France for the last six years.

It is familiar knowledge to every tax-payer of this country, that a very serious increase has taken place in our Naval Estimates lately, while at the same time public attention has been painfully directed to the fact, that our Naval force is far inferior to what it ought to be. This feeling remained singularly torpid, until it was roused into activity by a paper that appeared in the *Conversations Lexicon of Leipsig*, in which a German critic drew comparisons injurious to the efficiency of our Navy as compared with that of France. We replied to that article in the number of this Magazine for February last, in which paper it was our aim to prove that many of that writer's statements were unfounded. Yet there was in it this important truth, that the Naval force of this country was then, and is now, far inferior to what it ought to be with reference to that of other powers, and especially of France.

It would appear from the attention those papers elicited from all quarters, that increased efforts are needed to place the Navy of England on a proper footing, and, with a view to this object, a committee was appointed to inquire into the Navy Estimates from 1852 to 1858, and also into the comparative state of the Navies of both powers.

The statistics which we are now about to introduce to the reader are dry and bald, all sentiment, and even opinions, being excluded. Yet hard and rigid as these facts are, they possess such a paramount importance at the present threatening aspect of politics, that we make no apology for plunging at once into the consideration of the huge totals that are now required to maintain the Navy of Great Britain far in advance of that of any other power on earth.

The subject naturally divides itself into three branches, viz.,—the sums voted in the years 1852 and-'56 as compared with the sums voted in the year 1858, and the causes of the increase in expenditure; 2nd, the character and power of the British Navy, and its state of preparation at the present time as compared with 1852, involving the important questions of dockyards and stores; and 3rd, the progress of the Navy of France since the year 1852 as compared with that of England, and the present condition of the French Navy as regards the construction and armament of ships of war.

In approaching this very important subject, the commissioners felt that financial considerations could not be overlooked. A few remarks are here necessary. In instituting a comparison of sums voted for naval purposes between one or more years, it is necessary to take into consideration the altered condition of warfare since the introduction of steam. Who, for instance, could have anticipated the wonderful progress of this motor, which has in a few years superseded the use of sailing vessels in the British Navy.

We shall see that by the introduction of screw steamers of immense size and power, an additional expense has been incurred, which bears with significant weight upon the subject. Thus the total

amount voted for the Navy in the financial year 1852, was £5,835,588, and for the financial year 1858, £8,851,371, being an increase in the estimates of 1858, as compared with 1852, of £8,015,783, or an increase of 51 per cent. on the votes of 1852.

It is not desirable to go into the minute and perplexing details of the increase of the estimates generally, although it is obvious that the various items of sea wages, victuals, artificers, stores, new works, and naval transports, represent enormous totals. But to show what expenses naval powers must be prepared to bear, we will examine a few of the increases that show the difference of expenditure between sailing and steam men of war.

As an illustration of the addition to the expense of sea wages, occasioned by the substitution of steam for sailing ships of war, and by the augmented rates of pay, we present the following comparison between a sailing line of battle ship and frigate, and steam ships of the same classes.

	SHIPS.	GUNS	MEN	WAGES.
1858	"Marlborough," Steam . . .	131	1,100	35,248
1852	"Britannia," Sailing . . .	120	970	26,693
	Increase in 1858 . .			£8,555
1858	"Shannon," Steam . . .	1	560	19,341
1852	"Arethusa," Sailing . . .	50	500	14,585
	Increase in 1858 . .			£4,756

It will be observed that a considerable part of the increase in the complement of men, as between a steam ship and a sailing ship of similar armament, results from the establishment of engineers and stokers, which is an addition to the ordinary complement for working the ship and her guns.

With respect to the financial aspect of the years of 1852-58, it is shown in the inquiry that the main cause of the increase in the estimates of 1858, as compared with 1852, was due to the increased price of provisions and the wages of seamen, which depends upon the numerical strength of the navy in men. Thus in 1852 we had 40,761 officers, seamen, boys, and marines, and in 1858 we had 55,500 of all grades. The other items of expenditure are classed under the titles of "*Establishments at home and abroad*," "*Artificers at home and abroad*," and "*Naval stores*."

It is obvious that under the head *Naval Stores*, and the establishments and artificers in dockyards and factories at home and abroad, the question of the naval strength of England in ships of war is involved, as well as how far the large expenditure in our naval yards has been productive of an adequate return.

As this is one of the most important subjects connected with the navy estimates, it will be necessary to enter into some details explanatory of the causes of increase, and having reference not merely to the year 1852, but to the years between 1852 and 1858.

It should also be noticed that the number of men voted for the navy affects materially almost every vote in the estimates. It affects peculiarly the votes for stores and artificers' wages, as the entire cost of fitting ships for sea, and of wear and tear, falls on the estimates of the year; whereas the expense of building new ships, however costly, is spread over a number of years. The cost of a new ship of the first class, the *Duke of Wellington*, is stated to be

	£	s.	d
For hull, in labour and materials	106,291	0	0
For masts, rigging, sails, stores	19,224	0	0
For engines and gear	46,220	0	0
	£171,735	0	0

But the maintaining rate annually is on

	£	s.	d.
Hull	6,377	0	0
Masts, riggings, sails, &c.	3,748	0	0
Engines and gear	4,200	0	0
	£14,325	0	0

Being more than eight per cent. on the original cost, viz. 8 per cent. on hull and masts, and 9 per cent. on engines. Thus every additional ship put into commission entails an annual charge from 8¼ to 9¾ per cent. on its original cost, which is expended in stores and wages of artificers. An increased ratio in the cost of maintenance appears to apply to smaller vessels. Thus a second rate, as the "Agamemnon"=8⅜ per cent.; a fourth rate as "Euryalus"=8¾ per cent.; a sixth rate as "Curacoa"=9¾ per cent.; a sloop, as "Harrier"=9¾ per cent.

Another item of expenditure is the duration of ships. It seems that at the end of every fifteen years, on an average, the hull of a ship requires a complete and expensive repair. That the duration of a ship cannot be estimated at more than thirty years. That during the last ten years, thirty-five ships of the line, and forty-six frigates have been removed from the effective list of the navy, and that on an average *three line of battle ships* ought to be produced every year, merely to maintain the navy on a proper footing as respects line of battle ships.

With reference to the rate at which new ships can be added to the navy, the Naval Surveyor states that the present force in the dockyards comprises 4,000 shipwrights and apprentices, and that these are not more than is requisite to build three line of battle ships, three frigates, and six sloops per annum, besides executing all the necessary repairs to all the ships in the navy.

If, therefore, the naval supremacy of Great Britain is to be maintained, it is impossible to deny that a large force of artificers, stores, materials, &c., must be kept in our yards. This force consists of 16,334 persons, including 1,279 convicts, employed in our arsenals, dockyards, and factories at home. The number of persons employed in the steam factories has increased from 1,046 in 1852, to 2,361 in 1858.

Steam Engines have also wonderfully increased the annual expenditure; thus in the year 1851 the expenditure for steam engines did not amount to 100,000*l.*, in 1852 it exceeded 200,000*l.*, in the last six years 3,423,021*l.* has been expended, giving *an average of* 570,503*l. a year*. In the year 1852 the navy possessed horse power to the extent of 44,482, in the last six years it has more than doubled, amounting now to 99,512 horse. The number of steam ships and vessels has increased from 177 in 1852, to 464 in 1858. The tonnage from 182,562 to 457,881, and the guns from 3,045 to 8,246.

The *Money Votes* in the six years from 1852 to 1858 for *labour, timber, and stores* for the purposes of building and converting ships, and keeping the navy in repair, exclusive of the purchase of steam engines and coal, and building vessels by contract, amounted to 14,105,096*l.* The amount provided during the Russian war for building gun boats, floating batteries, and other vessels, was 1,633,147*l.*, but a sum exceeding 3,000,000*l.* was actually expended. The whole sum expended between 1852 and 1858, not including ordnance, amounts to 24,000,000*l.*!

The grand result of this enormous outlay we lay before the reader in the subjoined tabular statement, which exhibits at a glance the number of ships afloat, building, and converting for the two periods 1852—58. Thus in 1852 England possessed the following steamships according to the report of the Surveyor of the Navy:—

		Guns.	Hrs. Pwr	Tonnage.
Line of Battle first rates	4	484	1600	14,113
„ second rates	18	1147	5050	38,164
Blockships	4	240	1800	7,201
Frigates (including seven now reduced) ...	28	620	11497	41,435
Corvettes and Sloops	60	436	16461	55,281
Gun Vessels	24	95	3306	9,564
Gun Boats	2	5	50	599
Floating Batteries	...	...	...	...
	135	3027	39,164	166,357

Total 135, exclusive of 42 troop ships and other steam vessels, making an aggregate of 177 steam ships and vessels.

In 1858 England possessed, according to the report of the Surveyor of the Navy the following steamships:—

		Guns.	Hrs. Pwr	Tonnage.
Line of Battle Ships completed	29			
„ receiving engines ...	4			
„ converting	6	4735	29050	155,885
„ ordered to be converted...	1			
„ building	10			
Blockships	50	4735	29050	155,885
Frigates (afloat and building) { Screw 25 / Paddle 9 }	9	540	2800	16,033
	34	1239	18690	75,308
Mortar Ships	4	48	850	4,731
Corvettes and Sloops	82	971	23702	84,766
Small Vessels	27	100	4766	14,278
Gun Vessels	26	116	5350	17,535
Gun Boats	162	333	8820	38,125
Floating Batteries	8	120	1400	13,998
	402	8202	95428	420,159

Exclusive of 62 troop ships, store ships, yachts, tenders, dispatch vessels, &c., making an aggregate of 464 steam ships and vessels, 8,246 guns. Horse power, 105,962, and 457,881 tons.

The next class of naval expenditure to which the Commissioners directed their attention is comprised under the heads of *New Works, Improvements, Repairs, Docks, &c.* These items are, of course, represented by huge totals, but as they represent no features of interest beyond their enormous bulk, we refrain from burdening the reader with their recital.

We now approach that part of the labours of the Commissioners where the enquiry is directed to the state of the French navy. This, as the reader may well imagine, is at once the most confidential and difficult part of the commission. However, the communications respecting the tonnage, guns, and horse power of the French navy, which we shall state hereafter, may be relied on for accuracy, but with regard to fitness for sea, durability, and general efficiency as ships of war, the information is imperfect. So is the critical knowledge respecting each ship in the French navy, which the responsible officers of France can alone be supposed to possess.

In entering into the details of the respective powers of the two navies, we shall begin with the outbreak of the French revolutionary war, when England possessed 145 sail of the line, and France 77. These comparative numbers were reduced in 1850 to 86 for England, and 45 for France. With a view of showing how gradually the French navy has been approximating to the English, we subjoin the following table, containing a statement of the following classes of sailing British and French ships at the undermentioned periods:—

	SHIPS OF LINE.		FRIGATES.		SLOOPS AND BRIGS.		TOTAL.	
YEAR.	British.	French	British.	French	British.	French.	British.	French.
1778	126	68	126	54	71	96	328	218
1794	145	77	176	72	67	...	388	...
1804	175	50	244	32	171	...	590	...
1812	245	113	272	72	314	...	831	...
1815	218	69	309	38	261	...	788	...
1820	146	58	164	39	145	38	455	135
1825	120	58	156	42	173	61	449	161
1830	106	53	144	67	102	83	352	203
1840	89	44	108	56	87	89	284	189
1845	88	46	104	50	83	72	275	168
1850	86	45	104	56	79	87	269	188

At this latter period (1850) the effective strength of the two navies in line of battle ships exclusively, and almost exclusively in frigates, consisted of sailing vessels, but the French having subsequently decided on, and nearly carried out, the conversion of all their sailing ships that were fit for it into steam ships, as *sailing ships* could not be opposed to *steam ships* with any chance of success, the latter must now be considered as the only ships really effective for purposes of war, and the following is at present the relative strength of the two navies in steam line of battle ships and frigates, including ships building and converting:—

	LINE OF BATTLE SHIPS.		FRIGATES.	
	English.	French.	English.	French.
December, 1858.				
Complete Hull and Machinery	29	29	Screw 17 / Paddle 9 } 26	Screw 15 / Paddle 19 } 34
Receiving Engines .	4	2	2	3
Converting . . .	7	4	...	1
Building . . .	10	5	6	8
	50	40	34	46
Iron-plated ships building		4		

The result of the comparison is that England and France have at present time the *same* number of steam line of battle ships complete, that France has *eight more steam* frigates complete than England, that on the completion of the ships now in progress, England will have *ten steam line of battle ships* more than France, and France *twelve steam frigates* more than England.

It is, however, necessary to observe with reference to the line of battle ships "building," that the *five French* are in a much more *forward* state, and represent more work actually executed than the ten English. The quantity of work executed on the five French ships being thirty-one eighths, whereas on the ten building in England it is only a fraction more than twenty-seven eighths. But this advantage of our neighbours is in a certain degree qualified, when it is stated that of the ten English ships building three are *three deckers*, of which class the *French are not building any*.

France will soon have *four iron-sided ships*, with engines of 800 and 900 horse-power. It is stated that two are more than half completed, and that they will be substituted for line-of-battle ships. Their timbers are of the scantling of a three-decker; their armament will consist of 36 heavy guns, most of them rifled 50-pounders, which will throw 80lb. hollow percussion shot. So convinced do naval men seem to be in France of the irresistible qualities of these "Ironsides," that they are of opinion that *no more ships-of-the-line will be laid down*, and that in ten years that class of vessels will be obsolete. In corroboration of this French statement it must be mentioned, that *no line-of-battle ship* has been laid down in France *since* 1855, and there has not been a single three-decker on the stocks in that country since the last named year.

In addition to the fifty steam line-of-battle ships (English) enumerated in the foregoing statement as "built," "building," and "converting," there are *six sailing line-of-battle ships* proposed to be converted into steam ships. These six ships would raise the number of English *screw ships of the line to fifty-six*, and if the estimates for artificers and the purchase of ship-building materials, as proposed by the Surveyor of the Navy, be assented to, the whole could be completed by the year 1861. This number is only conjectural, as at the present rate and mode of expenditure in the naval yards, it is estimated that *forty-three* only would be ready in 1861, and, according to the present scheme of work, the *French* would possess *forty* screw line-of-battle ships and *four iron-sided ships*. With the existing establishment of shipwrights and scheme of work, the number of our

screw line-of-battle ships could not be raised to *fifty-six* before the year 1863; and it may be inferred that in the interval between 1861 and 1863 further additions will have been made to the French *steam navy*.

Indeed the proposed increase in the French is no secret. In addition to the 40 steam line-of-battle ships and four ironsides (French) "built," "building," and converting" the "*Hercule*" and "*Jemappes*" are supposed to be in a fit state for conversion, but it is doubtful whether they are to be converted as line-of-battle ships, or to be cut down and plated with iron.

Two more *iron-sides* (French) are to be built, and these with the two line-of-battle-ships, *Hercule* and *Jemappes*, if converted, would raise the *French navy* to the number of 48 in 1861, as compared with the *English* 56 before referred to.

To show the English reader the grand proportions to which the French navy has expanded, it is calculated that by the year 1860, the Emperor (our faithful ally) will have a steam fleet, and transports capable of carrying an army of 60,000 men, with all its horses, provisions and materials for *one month*, and that he may (if his ambitious policy requires them) have ready by 1860—*Forty steam line of-battle ships, six iron-plated frigates, thirty screw frigates, nineteen paddle frigates, and twenty-six steam transports of huge dimensions.*

Of course the English reader will put what conjectures he pleases upon the uses to which this enormous naval force may be applied. But considering the insignificance of French commerce, and the small extent of her colonial possessions, and the improbability, nay, the all but impossibility of invading France except by sea, by any naval power, except England, and that is out of the question, he will have but little difficulty in concluding that the Emperor Napoleon will, as soon as it suits his views, try conclusions with *his* "faithful ally."

We now append a statement showing the comparative force of English and French steam line-of-battle-ships at present built, building and converting in respect of guns and horse power:

	Number	Total	Guns	Total	Horse power	Total
ENGLISH.						
Line of battle ships—						
Afloat ...	33	50	3,089	4,735	17,550	29,050
Building, &c.	17		1,646		11,500	
Frigates—						
Afloat ...	28	34	993	1,239	15,090	18,690
Building, &c.	6		256		3,600	
Total Line of battle ships and frigates		84		5,974		47,740
FRENCH.						
Line of battle ships—						
Afloat ...	32	40	2,878	3,636	20,790	26,590
Building, &c.	8		758		5,800	
Frigates—						
Afloat ...	37	46	1,216	1,658	17,000	20,300
Building, &c.	9		442		3.300	
Total Line of battle ships and frigates		86		5,294		46,890

In addition, France has *four iron-sided* ships building, to carry 36 guns each with 800 or 900 horse power.

England has *nine block ships* afloat, each carrying 60 guns, with from 200 to 450 horse power.

It is necessary to observe that *nine of the English line-of-battle ships* carrying collectively 720 guns, and engines of 3,600 horse power, are 80 gun converted ships, and reported to be *inferior* to the French ships of the same class. On the other hand, *England has fifteen ships* of 100 guns and upwards, carrying collectively 1,694 guns, and engines of 10,800 horse power, while *France has only six ships* of 100 guns and upwards, and 3,590 horse power.

We have mentioned previously that the rapid growth of the French Navy dates from the period of the *coup d'état*, which happened in 1852. The respective forces of the two nations were then as follows:—The English Navy was augmented in horse power by 44,482, and the French by 27,240. Since that period the dockyards of our "faithful ally" have been working equal tides with that of England. Since 1852 the increase of 55,030 horse power has been added to the English Navy, and 54,804 to the French, including, in both cases, the engines in course of construction, and which may be ready by the end of this year; showing a difference of only 226 horse power increase within seven years in favour of England. *The increase in horse power* in the English Navy during this period of 18,700 has been on account of *line-of-battle ships*, while our neighbours have added 24,640 horse power to their steam liners, besides 3,600 horse power for their iron-sided frigates, equal to 28,240, or nearly 10,000. horse power *more* than the increase to the English Navy as respects the application of this motor to ships of the line. In frigates the English have added 7,793 horse power, and the French 13,100 Total addition to the horse power of engines for line-of-battle ships and frigates since the flash of the *coup d'état* prepared the world for the Empire's thunder—

England	26,493
France	41,340
Difference in *favour of France* in the period	14,847

It will be seen that since 1852 France has added considerably more than England to the horse-power of engines of her line-of-battle and heavy frigates.

On the other hand *England* has added 15,073 in *excess of France*, to the horse power of engines for vessels below the rank of frigates.

England (including 8,690 for gun-boats)	28,537
France (including 2,240 for gun-boats)	13,464
Difference in *favour of England* in the periods . . .	15,073

The aggregate horse-power of the English Navy at the end of this year will be 99,512. Of the French, 82,044.

We will now proceed to state the result as regards ships of all classes, dockyards, stores, and expenditure in the French Navy, comparing the state of that Navy in 1852 and 1858, and with our own at the same periods. In the year 1852 the comparative number of British and French ships of war will be seen from the subjoined Tables:—

STEAM VESSELS, 1852.

CLASSES.	ENGLAND.			FRANCE.		
	Afloat.	Building.	Total.	Afloat.	Building.	Total.
Ships of the Line	5	12	17	2	4	6
Blockships	4	...	4	...	...	...
Frigates	24	5	29	21	...	21
Corvette Sloops	56	3	59	28	3	31
Gun Vessels, Brigs, &c. ...	66	1	67	62	2	64
	155	21	176	113	9	122
Total		176*			122	

* Royal Frederick, building as a sailing ship, not included.

SAILING VESSELS, 1852.

CLASSES.	ENGLAND.			FRANCE.		
	Afloat.	Building.	Total.	Afloat.	Building.	Total.
Ships of the Line	66	7	73	25	20	45
Frigates	88	7	95	36	18	54
Corvettes and Sloops ...	84	2	86	28	5	33
Brigs and smaller vessels ...	45	...	45	122	4	126
	283	16	299	211	47	258
Total		299			258	

In the year 1858 the comparative numbers and condition of British and French ships of war will also be seen from the following Tables:

STEAM-VESSELS.—1858.

	ENGLAND.					FRANCE.				
	Complete.	Receiving Engines.	Converting.	Building.	TOTAL.	Complete.	Receiving Engines.	Converting.	Building.	TOTAL.
Line-of-Battle ships (screw)	29	4	7	10	50	29	2	4	5	40
Frigates (iron-plated) ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4	4
Block ships (screw) ...	9	...	...	...	9	...	...	...	...	...
Frigates, screw	17	2	...	6	25	15	3	1	8	27
,, paddle... ...	9	...	...	...	9	19	...	...	...	19
Mortar ships	4	...	...	...	4	...	...	...	...	...
Corvettes and sloops, screw	38	...	...	9	47	9	...	...	4	13
,, ,, paddle	35	...	...	...	35	9	...	...	...	9
Gun, despatch, and small vessels { screw ...	141	6	7	25	179	81	5	5	21	112
paddle .	29	...	...	...	29	17	...	...	10	127
Floating batteries, screw ...	24	...	...	...	24	66	...	...	...	66
	8	...	...	...	8	5	...	...	...	5
	202	6	7	25	240	169	5	5	31	210
Gun-boats, screw ...	161	...	...	1	162	28	...	...	...	28
Troop and store-ships, steam	15	...	...	...	15	22	...	...	4	26
Yachts, tenders, tugs, &c., st.	47	...	...	...	47	...	...	...	...	...
	425	6	7	26	464	219	5	5	35	264
TOTAL			464					264		

SAILING-VESSELS.—1858.

	ENGLAND.			FRANCE.		
	Afloat.	Building.	Total.	Afloat.	Building.	Total.
Line-of-battle ships ...	35	...		10	...	
Frigates	70	...		28	4	
Corvettes and sloops ...	43	...	248	11	2	86
Brigs and despatch vessels...	15	...		26	2	
Mortar vessels	45	...		3	...	
Mortar floats (towed) ...	40	...		...	...	
Schooners, cutters, &c. ...	48	...	48	32	...	32
Transports	..	...	...	26	...	26
	296	...	296	136	8	144

It is notified that of the *thirty-five British sailing ships*, the Surveyor of the Navy proposes to convert *six of them into screw line-of-battle ships*, and he is now considering whether others may not be converted into screw frigates.

Of the *ten French line-of-battle ships*, it is stated that all but *two* are too old to be converted.

To recapitulate. It will be seen that *France* since 1852 has increased her steam line-of-battle ships from *two* to *forty*, of which there are five building and four converting, and that the increase has been effected by the *conversion* of twenty-six sailing ships and the *building* of fourteen screw ships.

England in the same time has increased her line-of-battle screw steamers from *seventeen* to *fifty*, of which there are ten building and seven converting. This has been effected by the *conversion* of twenty-seven sailing ships and the *building* of twenty-three screw ships.

The addition, therefore, to the *French Navy* in steam line-of-battle ships complete, building, and converting, is *thirty-eight*, and of *England thirty-three* since 1852. But it must be remembered that *France* has at present *four iron-sided ships* (Frégates Blindées) in course of construction, as before stated.

The *steam frigates of France*, screw and paddle, have been increased from twenty-one to forty-six; and *England* has increased her steam frigates, screw and paddle, from twenty-two to thirty-four, and her blockships of 60-guns each from four to nine.

The *superiority of France in steam frigates* deserves notice, as in the event of hostilities these vessels might occasion serious loss to this country, by the interruption of commerce on the high seas.

On the other hand the *French* steam corvettes, which in 1852 were thirty-one, are now only twenty-two, while those of Great Britain, which in 1852 were fifty-nine, are now eighty-two. Again, our screw floating batteries are eight as against five French. Our screw gun-vessels, and other small craft, are fifty-three, whereas the French have ninety-three. Our screw gun-boats are a hundred and sixty-two, and those of France twenty-eight. And the whole Steam Navy of Great Britain now amounts to 464 vessels, while that of France numbers 264.

As regards *sailing vessels*, it will be observed that *England* still

possesses a great *superiority over France*. England has thirty-five line-of-battle ships, of which six are proposed to be converted into steam-ships. But of the remaining twenty-nine, only thirteen are considered as effective; and if it is deemed advisable to convert them, they can only be converted into frigates. *France* has only *ten line-of-battle ships*, of which two only are convertible. *England* has also seventy frigates, of which twenty-seven are reported as effective. France has thirty-two, of which it is supposed that nine or ten may be converted into steam transports, the remainder being too old for conversion. The total numbers in the two Sailing Navies is, England, 296; France, 144.

It has been remarked that when we speak of an army we allude to the men; but when we speak of a navy we mean the ships. It would seem that there is some truth in the saying—for in the foregoing remarks, we have chiefly attended to the material. But in balancing the resources the two nations have at their disposal for the formation of a navy, it is necessary to take into consideration the mercantile marine of each country. For it is evident that success in a lengthened struggle upon the ocean will depend upon the maritime population each nation has to recruit its sailors from. No doubt a state of preparedness for sudden war may be achieved by a nation not possessing a seagoing population; but it is certain that when the war is prolonged, the vitality and energy of a great maritime power must tell in the long run. It did so in the last war with France, when the disparity was not so great between the commercial marines of the two nations as it is at present. We now give a comparative statement of shipping and seamen in the merchant services of England and France.

ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

Shipping and Seamen Merchant Service.

Number of Vessels Registered.

ENGLAND.		FRANCE.	
Sailing .	24,406	Sailing . .	14,845
Steam . .	1,813	Steam . .	330
Total	26,219	Total	15,175

Upon analysing these totals, some remarkable facts present themselves, showing the petty character of French commerce as compared with that of this country. Thus *England* possesses 882 ships of 800 tons and upwards—while *France* has only 30—and it is only when we descend to vessels under 100 tons that the number of French vessels exceeds that of England, this country having 8,641 of these small craft, and France 12,038. The superiority of *England* over *France* is made quite evident when we compute the registered tonnage of the two commercial navies—England claiming 4,491,377 tons, and France 1,052,535.

We are enabled to arrive at the number of men employed in the following manner:—Thus, in the 860,406 tons of shipping employed in the home trade (exclusive of river steamers) 43,600 men are en-

gaged in England. This does not include masters, so that one man is required for every 19¾ tons, which, upon the 4,491,377 tons of shipping registered, gives an aggregate crew of 227,411 men engaged in English ships

In the 360,664 tons of shipping employed in the French fisheries and in vessels trading between France and the French colonies, 30,997 men are employed; this gives one man to every 11⅝ tons, which, upon the 1,052,535 tons of shipping registered, gives an aggregate crew of 90,217 men.

The above numbers are confined exclusively to merchant seamen.

In comparing the naval expenditure of France with our own for a series of years, some facts are developed that call for a few remarks; thus England expended in the last seven years in victualling, pay, clothing, new works, repairs, and labour and materials, the enormous sum of £53,179,586; while France has expended in the same period for the same purpose only £38,935,384; and it must be remembered that the huge amount expended upon our navy does not include about £4,000,000 for ordnance, which has of course to be added, making altogether £57,179,586, or £18,244,202 in excess of France.

It may seem strange that our rival should have achieved such great results in the development of her State navy for a smaller sum than our own. This circumstance is, however, more apparent than real. The chief cause in the increase consists in *fittings and repairs*. France also, during the last seven years, has had the benefit of all our experiments. The outlay was ours, and she took advantage of it. Again, the navy of France is more compact than ours, and not scattered abroad, nor has she so many ships in commission, and, consequently, not so many ships to *fit out and repair*, and, of course, not so much wear and tear to supply. This work of fitting out, victualling, sea wages, &c. &c. is the heaviest drain upon the resources of a dockyard. Of course, the more ships there are in commission the greater the expense in time and money, and reduces the amount available for the building of new vessels. Now, France has been expending her time and money in construction, with but little fitting out and repairs, and, consequently, she exhibits a visible product in new ships. While in England our expenses have been spread over docks, factories, experiments, &c. &c., leaving but a small margin to be applied for building or conversion. But it is calculated that in France only about one-fourth of the money applied for naval purposes is productive of increase of force. In England it is much less, and thus is the solution to the puzzle why France, with less means, has approached us so close in results.

While we are upon the subject of dockyards we may as well here introduce the acreage that each nation possesses for fitting, docking, construction, &c. The *importance of Cherbourg* will at once strike the most casual observer. We subjoin a comparative statement of the dockyard area of England and France, with available land annexed, together with the number of building slips and docks:—

ENGLAND.

	DOCKYARD AREA.	SLIPS.	DOCKS.	DOCKS, BUILDING.
	Acres.	Number.	Number.	Number.
Deptford	38	5	2	—
Woolwich	56	6	3	—
Chatham	95	8	4	—
*St. Mary's Island, &c.	284	—	—	—
Sheerness	57	1	5	—
Portsmouth	115	5	9	2
Devonport	71	6	5	—
Keyham	73	—	3	—
Pembroke	77	13	1	—
Total	866	44	32	2

* This land adjoins Chatham dockyard, but is *unappropriated.*

FRANCE.

	DOCKYARD AREA.	SLIPS	SLIPS, BUILDING.	DOCKS.	DOCKS, BUILDING.
	Acres.	Number.	Number.	Number.	Number.
Cherbourg	256	12	—	7	—
Brest	131	12	—	4	—
L'Orient	106	16	2	1	1
Rochefort	132	13	1	2	1
Toulon	240	20	—	3	5
Total	865	73	3	17	7

The general result that appears to arise, after a careful analysis of the important returns contained in this paper, is that France contains many elements necessary for a great naval power. In some respects she can bear comparison with England. However, the chief duty that devolves upon us at the present moment is to briefly notice the rapid conversion of *sailing ships* in France to *steam ships*. It will not have escaped the English reader that the large increase in the navy of our "faithful ally," since 1852, has been mainly effected by *conversion*. She has converted 26 sailing ships and built 14 screw ships. The process of conversion is cheap and expeditious compared with building new ships. Thus, the number of men required to convert a three decker into a 90 gun steam ship is $\frac{2}{3}$ths of the number required to build a new 90 gun steam ship. The chief difference in the cost of conversion arising from the saving in materials. The cost of converting a line of battle ship of 90 guns is estimated at £25,000, and the cost of building the same at £105,000, but the latter will of course be a far more efficient and durable vessel.

Another important fact presents itself in the *weakness of England in steam frigates*, as the importance of this class of ships in the event of hostilities cannot be doubted. The neglect is very culpable

on the part of our Admiralty, as the state of our naval store of timber is reported to be very favorable for their construction or conversion.

And further, that the *present is a state of transition*, as regards *naval architecture*. No man seems certain whether gun boats or three deckers will be most efficient in a future naval war. The French government are evidently of this opinion, for they have suspended laying down ships of the line altogether.

The present is not more a period of transition for ships than for artillery. The invention of Armstrong's gun it has been stated may supersede the use of the ordinary ship's guns, and possibly affect even the size and structure of ships of war. The committee, therefore, suggests, with great show of reason, that the dockyard force for the next year be used in the conversion of ships of the line and frigates, as far as the available accommodation will admit, so that the most useful results may be attained at the least possible expense.

And lastly we must notice the prospective outlay contemplated by France to complete her steam navy and her naval establishments. According to a report of the Minister of Marine it is intended to *raise the French steam navy to* 150 *vessels* of war, of all classes, built after the best models, with engines of full power, in addition to 72 *steam transports*. And also that it is contemplated to complete the building in the several military ports, the dry docks and factories indispensable to meet the requirements of the new steam fleet. The sum which France intends to devote to these purposes up to 1871, when the fleet will have reached the limit of its proposed extension, will be £8,840,000.

We now take leave of this very important subject with a farewell notice, that the progress which France has made in her navy under Louis Napoleon has been remarkable, and her prospective increase cannot fail to arrest the attention of every Englishman, if for no other consideration than in determining the amount of our future naval expenditure, and promoting by every means in our power, the efficiency of that service upon which the safety and honour of these islands depend.

Portsmouth.

PEEPS FROM THE LOOPHOLES OF RETREAT.

By Retired Major Marksman.

There appear to be few matters more difficult of adjustment than the determination of the age at which men shall be declared incapable of fulfilling certain active duties. Proceeding upon the principle in force in the French army, our authorities some time since decreed that officers should be shelved at various periods of life, from fifty-five years and upwards, forgetting, apparently, that the habits of men in the British service operate rather favourably than otherwise upon longevity. A Frenchman rapidly ages after he has passed his

fortieth year. Bad and scanty food in early life, uncleanly habits, a devotion to the cigar, and the want of nourishing beverages, disqualify him for severe physical exertion, at the very age when most Englishmen who have not been worn out in the Tropics, are in the very prime of their existence. It was a mistake, therefore, to limit the service of our officers to a maximum only applicable to a less vigorous people, and while it has deprived the State of the abilities of able men, it has been prolific of great injustice to highly deserving persons. In the line, sixty years of age are sufficient to mark the limit of regimental efficiency, and in the medical service a surgeon must relinquish employment if he should have reached his fifty-fifth year, without attaining the grade of Deputy-Inspector-General.

There may be something reasonable in the restriction of a combatant officer's period of activity, because he is sometimes called upon for a certain amount of physical effort of which he may no longer be capable; still, sixty is too young in very many cases, and in the Medical Department it is preposterously early in all cases. It is not until a man has practised for a great many years in various climates that he really acquires that abundance of professional knowledge, and that superior skill, which qualify him for the higher duties of direction, inspection, and superintendence. Few of the able men in the civil line of the medical profession, attain that eminence which imparts confidence to their juniors, and causes their advice to be sought after by the wealthy and the titled, in dangerous and desperate cases, until they are far advanced in life. It is only when the knife has to be dexterously used that a more youthful practitioner is preferable to a venerable leech, whose nerves may have become so unstrung by time as to neutralize all the advantage of experience. But even in such cases the supervising presence of one deeply versed in the mysteries of human anatomy is often desirable.

Entertaining this view, I really think, that the War Minister would do no harm were he to procure a reconsideration of Warrants which have been prolific of injustice to valuable servants, and mischief to the State. By all accounts, several of the medical officers who have been placed on the shelf because they had exceeded the fancied age of ultra-efficiency, are yet in their prime, and feel most acutely the slur of impotency, involved in the operation of the last Warrant. As for the regimental combatant officers, they are not quite in so bad a predicament, for it is left discretional with the Commander-in-Chief to continue a person in the performance of his functions if the interests of the service render it desirable. It may be questioned, however, if it be good policy to allow of this discretion. Commanders-in-Chief, like other men, have their prejudices and partialities; political and family considerations are not without their weight in the determination of comparatively small questions, and if it should happen that one case of favoritism is made out, every sexagenarian will have a good right to protest against his being removed to half-pay or non-effective service when he has attained the grand climacteric.

The remedy, in both cases, seems to me to lie in an extension of

the period of disqualification. With such examples before us of hale and vigorous intellect and powerful frames, as are supplied by Sir Howard Douglas, Lord Seaton, Lord Gough, Lord Cathcart, Lord Beauchamp, Lord Downes, Sir Robert Gardiner, Sir John Burgoyne, Sir George Browne, Lord Clyde, and others I could name, who must be much above seventy years of age, and who have seen a great deal of active service, we need not fear that there will be many drivellers among those who have been unfortunate in their promotion. Once fixed, however, let the maximum age be adhered to, and above all things let it be the care of the authorities that no man is superseded because he only wants two or three months of the stipulated age. If he be merely one day short of the period, justice and the importance of adhering scrupulously to the Regulations, would require that he should have the benefit of that space. It is known that a most able and accomplished medical officer was deprived of the promotion to which his standing and peculiarly active career had entitled him, because he was within a short period of the maximum age.

Much has been said of late of the relative positions of the Guards and the Line, and the advocates of the privileges of the latter, in trying to prove too much, have forced impartial writers to bring out some facts, which establish beyond all question the superiority of the advantages possessed by the Line in regard to the tendency of staff appointments. If it had not been shewn that of the fifty or sixty staff appointments held by General Officers, fifty-two of these are in the hands of Line Officers, and all of them exceeding in value those held by Guards' Officers, people would have continued to protest against the partiality shown to the latter. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that certain extraordinary privileges do attach to the Guards which are not shared by their fellow soldiers of the Line. The possession of a step of army rank in advance of their regimental position has great influence in accelerating progress to the highest position and prizes. Exemption from service in the colonies and India is another extraordinary favour. But who will say that this ought not to be? Immemorial usage has given to every Sovereign in every part of the world a special body of protectors, and there is no reason why our gracious Queen should not equally be guarded by a *corps d'élite*. That the high prerogative of defending the throne has certain ennobling results is proved by the conduct of the Guards, whenever they have been sent abroad. Holland, Lincelles, the Peninsula, Waterloo, and the Crimea, severely tested the courage and discipline of the Household troops, and they passed the ordeal triumphantly. But with all this the composition of the Guards is wholly defective. The men are enlisted because they are tall; the officers are selected because they have certain interests with the Colonels of the several regiments. Herein lies the grievance. *The privileges of the Guards should be earned by the Line.* The officers should be those who had passed the best competitive examinations; the men ought to be selected by reason of their good conduct and their stature. In was in this way that Napoleon I. formed his Imperial Guard—the men who were prepared to die rather than sur-

render.* The Emperor required that every member of the Guard should have served four years, including two campaigns, in the line, and the men who fulfilled these conditions were, at the same time, the strongest and bravest of their respective companies. It is true, that with even these grounds of preference the Imperials did not escape the jealousy and the gibes of the *Ligne*; they were called "immortals" because they did not run the same risks of mortality in combat with their less fortunate brethren—and *mules*, because they were a step above *asses*. What of that? Reserved for great occasions they turned the scale of battle whenever they were called upon, excepting on the memorable day when Adams' flank movement broke their several ranks and elicited the cry of "*sauve qui peut!*" Selection, on the grounds of service, stature, and good conduct, or good conduct and stature only when there has been no scope for war service, might reasonably form the qualifications of the privates of the Household troops; and it is the more necessary because too many instances have been brought before the public of the disorderly habits of the young men specially enlisted for the Guards. London, Windsor, Winchester, and Chichester, comprise the home garrisons of the Guards; and no one can doubt that service, in at least the first named place, has a very demoralising tendency. The abominable use made of the belt, an ornamental appendage of which soldiers should be proud, proceeds from drink, of which the guardsman easily obtains too much in the great metropolis. His superior pay admits of a little extra indulgence, and the kindly feeling of the men and women with whom he forms acquaintance leads to "treats" which tell upon the soldier's intellectual faculties as the night gradually folds the day in her sable mantle. There have been during the past six months from forty to fifty recorded brawls, in each of which the waistbelt with its heavy brass clasp has been employed as a weapon of offence, to the serious damage of many a poor citizen's sconce. The General commanding in chief, would consult the dignity of the Queen in thinking of these matters. As for the officers of the Guards, they need only be told that they must earn advancement by occasional scholastic competitions with others of corresponding rank in the Line, and my life on't they will be found grinding away at the sciences and the languages with an earnestness worthy of collegiate graduates fighting for a fellowship. If we but glance at the contents of the model room of the United Service Institution, we shall see that the Guards' officers do not wholly commit themselves to the pastimes and dissipations of London life.

The reference above to the Imperial Guard reminds me of a charming military work called "*La Vie Militaire sous l'Empire*," translated by the late Sir Charles Napier in his "*Lights and Shades of Military Life*." A few pages of the work are devoted to a

* Cambronne's famous reply to the summons to surrender was never uttered. An officer whom I have met, was by his side when he answered, and he assured me that so far from making the heroic response, Cambronne simply uttered a beastly French expression which will not bear translation.—*M.*

suggestion, that a special corps of *marchers* should be established in order to train the men to make long marches without a halt. There are tales on record of marches made by the French troops during the campaign in Germany which are almost fabulous. Forty leagues in thirty-six hours, for example, would be a strain upon human strength, utterly beyond its endurance. That practice may do very much we all know, and nothing makes a good *marcher* more than habitual marching. Pedestrians who walk for wagers, train for matches by prolonged perambulations; they seldom stake their coin until long continued peripateticism has determined their capability. Now, for the military application of this truth; why does not the Commander in Chief require the "marching out" ordered two or three months ago, to be continued for a longer period than the three hours a day or so which comprise the period usually employed in that operation? Any one who has seen a regiment engaged in the marching out, will have noticed that most of the time is consumed in straggling and halting. To be effectual as a means of preparation for marching in an enemy's country, every corps should be accustomed to march in compact order for at least five or six hours, so that in the event of a sudden attack from an ambuscaded enemy, or one suddenly appearing in front, there will be no difficulty in establishing the requisite formations. By the system of long marches the Lieut-Colonel would even get to know which of the men were incompetent to the task, from flat-foot, constitutional feebleness, or other muscular causes, and would thus be enabled to make their selections from the depôt when the regiment is ordered on active service.

THE BATTLE OF THE LINES OF BATTLE.

THE character of Englishmen, as drawn by foreign artists, is not very flattering. The French call us perfidious, proud, and rich. Most continental people think of us as the French do. Brother Jonathan says, we are a fusion of distant and opposing elements, for ever doing and undoing, as though discontent is our normal condition.

Well, perhaps we have a talent for grumbling, and grumbling and discontent are separated by a very thin partition—still there is a partition. This characteristic of our English temperaments must be, however, considered in an English sense. And we don't care who knows it, as Meagrim said in the play, "discontent is an excellent quality." Are not dissatisfied men discontented men, and have not dissatisfied men been our great discoverers and inventors? When a man is dissatisfied with a thing he sets about improving it. Your lazy contented men, on the contrary, have an easy way of "letting well alone." Discontent progresses—content is stationary—steam, railways, and electricity are the sublime efforts of dissatisfied minds So, perhaps, after all, we have no reason to be angry with our neighbours for calling us a grumbling race.

However, there is no general rule without an exception, and it seems there is one subject upon which our national discontent does not appear to work out corresponding beneficial results. And not wishing to shock the reader, promote rebellion, or affect the funds we abstain from mentioning the exact number of weeks since the national brain was in a state of torpidity respecting the welfare of the navy. Perhaps the public temperament had been over excited with Indian mutinies, the aggressive overbearing policy of our "faithful ally," and other odd notions. But, be that as it may, there were but few that bestowed any alarming anxiety about the condition of the navy. We slumbered, as it turned out, in a fool's paradise.

Nevertheless, to show how much wit and folly can exist in the national brain, a German critic took it into his head to rouse us out of our lethargy. He was a master, and knew how to strike us in a tender part. He drew invidious comparisons between the maritime resources of the two naval powers that fought for the mastery of the world in the bay of Trafalgar. In the *Conversations Lexicon*, of Leipsig, this writer told the continent of Europe, as well as the British people, that the navy of France was in a better condition, both in men and material, than that of England. There was some sediment of truth at the bottom of his froth, and the touch upon John Bull was electric. From that hour the navy has become a quotation. Its condition is upon every man's lips. We now know all about the service—Jack, neglected Jack, is fondled in the national arms like a doll. Our sensitive nostrils have taken quite a fancy to *tar*. We have been counting our ships too, our "lines of battle," issuing commissions for manning the navy and improving the condition of our seamen, finding out all sorts of grievances and proposing remedies, and doing and undoing with untiring zeal that promises to leave nothing undone for the future.

The chief drawback that now disturbs the official mind is that we cannot agree as to the number of ships in our navy. One would imagine that nothing was easier than to reckon the number of lines-of-battle by which a fleet had been increased in a particular year, but no such thing. However able we may be to calculate the millions spent in constructing a certain class of ships, we cannot arrive at a correct estimate of their number; and, like dunces, we are now standing in foolscap for the edification and amusement of our "faithful ally" on the other side of the channel. He must be diverted at our awkward attempts at notation. Is dot-and-go-one such a serious affair? One would think so, judging from what happened the other night between a late and the present "first Lord," in a house where the collective wisdom of the nation is supposed to be assembled.

Not wishing to draw upon our imagination for facts, we will refer to the debate, and give the words as near as may be, as they fell from official lips, on that occasion.

"I understand the right honorable gentleman to say," said Sir John Pakington, "that eight line-of-battle-ships were *launched* in 1858."

"No," replied Sir Charles Wood, "I said that eight line-of-battle-ships were *added* to the navy in 1858."

Sir John now returns to his slate and refreshes his memory. "I hold in my hand" (not in his teeth) "a return from which it appears that the number is four."

But Sir Charles also held in his hand a return, stating "that the number was eight."

"Well," retorted Sir John, doggedly, "I hold in —— in my hand a document that certifies that only four were added."

Now what in the name of sober reasoning is the meaning of all this? Would not any sensible man at once conclude, that each of these astute arithmeticians had a valve in his brain which he could close at pleasure, to shut out conviction and truth, as an engineer shuts off his steam. In the other portions of the debate they talked logically enough, and showed the "house" the magnificent results of their respective "boards." But Sir John shut down his valve and looked grave when he approached the doings of Sir Charles's "board," and Sir Charles imitated Sir John's example.

At the risk of being thought a candidate for Bedlam, we will endeavour to explain the explanations of the last and present Admiralties. But we fear the reader will give us a certificate of qualification, when we admit that both Sir John and Sir Charles are right. That is to say, that each "First Lord" by shutting down his valve, and closing his eyes to certain facts, makes his own statement appear true, as far as it goes. Any examination of his opponent's facts or figures was interdicted with screams of terror. Each held in his hand a return which they swore by—any reasoning was out of the question. No, down goes the valve, and Sir John was as deaf to the logic of Sir Charles as Sir Charles was to the logic of Sir John.

We will now make an attempt to escape from this official bewilderment, and content ourselves with a very simple process of notation. But before attempting to regain the region of common sense, we will endeavour to define what is meant by a line of battle ship, and we have no doubt about our being able to arrive at the sum total of these costly vessels that now belong to our navy.

We intend to proceed slowly, for the subject requires thought, as matters stand. A line of battle ship is not to be trifled with, particularly as there seems to be no recognised method of reckoning ships of war, when they assume certain dimensions. There is no mistake about a frigate, a sloop, a corvette, or a gun boat. But during certain processes of *construction*, *reconstruction* and *conversion*, which a ship has now-a-days to pass through, there is no knowing what she may turn out. Then in addition to these bewildering elements, there is the doubt, whether a block ship of 60 guns is or is not a line of battle ship.

The Jesuits' motto is, "when in doubt abstain." Now we are not Jesuits, so we shall take high ground at once, and state our opinion boldly. We think, therefore, that a line of battle ship ought not to find its way into the navy list, until turned out of the shipwright's hand, and fit to do duty afloat. We presume that taking a common sense view of things that a ship ought to be built and launched before she is included in her Majesty's navy. We ought not to reckon ships, as ships before they are launched, any more

than we ought to reckon chickens, as chickens, before they are hatched. Neither except in official minds can the present inefficient block ships receive Brevet rank as ships of the line without detriment to the navy. Nor should ships undergoing "conversion" from "sailing to steam" be considered as ships "constructing."

A little attention to these simple rules would have assisted our late "First Lord," and our present "First Lord" in this controversy. They would then have discovered that in the year 1858, four ships of the line were "built," and four "converted." Anybody can see that there is a difference between *adding* eight ships of the largest dimensions to the navy, and *building* eight in a particular year. The ships may all be line of battle ships, but four were "conversions," and four were "built." The expense of the "conversions" fell on the estimates of the navy for that year, while the expense of building the new ships, however costly, was spread over the estimates of a number of preceding years. It is just possible therefore, that one of the naval Lords wished to make out a better case for his "Board" than he was entitled to, and this the other naval Lord objected to. And this we believe to be the cause of the controversy between the late and present Admiralties. But it is

> "Strange that such a difference should be
> 'Twixt tweedledum and tweedledee."

We apologise to the reader, professional or otherwise, for introducing so rudimentary a subject to his notice. Our excuse is, that if the highest officials in naval affairs cannot come to an understanding as to the exact number of these costly structures we have in the service, some such simple initiatory statement as the above is necessary to assist the general public in its attempt to glean some knowledge of the manner the public money is expended.

R.P.

FROM CAMP TO QUARTERS.

OR LIFE IN AN INDIAN CANTONMENT AFTER FIELD SERVICE.

CONTENTS.—Our Reception—Dandgunge—State of the Onety-Oneth—Circumstances of the Times—Causes of the Change—The Royals and the Locusts—The Staunch Sepoys—Clandestine Correspondence, and Sudden Death—Ichabod—Our Soldiers—Luxuries of a Quiet Life—The Soldier's Bane.

"THE sun rose bright and glorious,"—No he didn't! He emerged lurid and fierce, as only an Indian Midsummer sun knows how to do; from an horizon rendered obscure by impalpable dust, such as during the hot season in the plains of Bengal renders still more stifling an atmosphere already too stifling from its heat, and from the extreme stillness that pervades it.

In this way, then, this luminary did actually rise on the twentieth of June, in the year of grace eighteen hundred and fifty-eight, as the gallant Onety-Oneth approached the outskirts of the well-known and hitherto very favourite station, Dandgunge.

Six long months before, we had marched from this very station, to take a part in the operations then commencing against the rebels in Oude. On that occasion we had rather flattered ourselves that our appearance collectively, and individually, was such that in the elegant jargon now so fashionable, "we were not to be sneezed at." So also had evidently thought not a few of the fair sex, whose charms had brought under complete subjection some of the disposable young men among both officers and soldiers.

But six months of an Indian campaign—particularly when a great portion of it is included in the hot season, and when a regiment is engaged, even against a Sepoy enemy, on eighteen different occasions, as the Onety-Oneth had been, cannot pass over a body of men without leaving a few traces of its course behind. Not only had a change taken place in our externals, but our very persons were not what they had been. The bright, well-fitting scarlet uniform, once the source of conscious pride to most of us, had now given place to loosely fitting habiliments of "calky" cloth, most unsuited by its mud-like hue to show off to advantage even the most favoured complexion, or by its make, the most elegant figure, albeit it possesses some other advantages, such as extreme comfort in wear, and extreme usefulness on service.

Time, too, had indeed worked wonders in respect to our personal appearance. Who would now have recognised in the pale and bearded faced, emaciated, worn-like, and extremely dirty mortals we unquestionably were—the fine-looking, well set up, and dashing body of men who had left the station some months before.

Yes!—I say it myself, although perhaps I shouldn't say it, seeing that I, the writer of this account, formed one portion of the body corporate of the Onety-Oneth on this occasion. We did flatter ourselves that before the campaign, we were rather a fine-looking set of fellows—and what is more, we were not the only people who did so. Self satisfaction may be all very well in its way, and no doubt is a mighty fine thing in that same particular way, but it strikes me forcibly, that for a young swell to make a favourable impression upon some frail fair one, who by acts, if not words, proclaims the fact, is quite as flattering, if not more so, to the vanity of that particular "swell," than the mere fact of his making an impression upon himself alone can possibly be; and if there be any doubt upon the subject, I leave you, most courteous reader, to decide the point. You have, I presume, paid your money, and are therefore lawfully entitled to take your choice.

While on field service we had not been utterly forgotten by the people of Dandgunge. The chit-chat of private letters told us that the departure of the regiment was regretted—our return anxiously looked forward to—and that some of the more enthusiastic among the unmarried ladies, never spoke of us except as "the dear Onety-Oneth."

Knowing these little facts as we did, a smile of pleasant anticipation brightened up our service-worn faces, as we halted for a few minutes to get ourselves a little in shape before entering the station, where we were led to think a cordial and flattering recep-

tion awaited us. During our absence another regiment,—the invincible *aughty aughth* had arrived; and occupied a portion of the extensive range of barracks, still leaving room for us however. Their magnificent band came out to meet and "play us in,"—striking up as we resumed our march, "See the conquering hero comes"—although in our numerous engagements with the rebels, the rapidity of their retreat rendered it a matter of some difficulty to fairly earn the appellation,—and then, as equally appropriate, our progress was further enlivened by the merry strains of "Auld lang syne," although the two regiments had never,—not in the memory of the oldest inhabitant—never met.

And now we are met by some people of both sexes—gentlemen on horseback, ladies—fair, pale, and delicate, lolling back in well-cushioned carriages,—private soldiers on foot, and half caste boys on wretched bazaar ponies, all intent upon one purpose—to see the Onety-Oneth march into the station, covered as they were with a very small quantity of glory, but by a disagreeable amount of dust and perspiration.

Hearty recognitions were exchanged by former acquaintances—hearty smiles by those who were or wished to become more than mere acquaintances, and even the indifferent spectators seemed to express a passive pleasure at the circumstance of our advent.

Thus excited by what had become a goodly cavalcade, we entered the large and dreary-looking barrack square of Dandgunge; and while the regiment is being told off in companies previous to once more getting under a roof, let us, if you please, dear reader, take a short survey of what are to become our hot weather quarters.

On a slightly elevated narrow strip of land skirting the bank of the holy Ganges, stand in the shape of a gigantic oblong square the military buildings that constitute the station of Dandgunge, this gigantic square being converted into two smaller ones, by the very simple measure of building a range of quarters directly across, for the accommodation of officers.

As far as the general appearance of the place was concerned, there was little, or indeed nothing at all in it to create in us a favorable impression. Yet we looked forward with pleasant anticipation to being allowed for some months at least to enjoy the rest and quiet—nay, even the monotony of cantonment life, after the severe and arduous service we had performed, and the exposure to climate to which we had been subjected.

And, were our reception indicative at all of the treatment to be expected from the residents, we had every reason to look forward hopefully to the enjoyments that awaited us during the few months that, under any circumstances, we should be permitted to remain in quarters, for the rainy season was close upon us; heavy clouds had for some days been darkening more and more the eastern sky, thus indicating the near approach of the rains, which we well knew must necessarily terminate, for three months at least, all military operations upon a large scale against the mutinous Sepoys.

It may well be said that no body of men ever arrived at a cantonment in India more ready to appreciate civility, and to return it with

compound interest, than we of the onety-oneth were when we marched into Dandgunge.

Hard work in every shape, discomfort in every conceivable form, frequent attacks, and scarcely less frequent midnight alarms, had made up the sum of our existence during the preceding six months. Death, wounds, and sickness had each done their work amongst us, and the "shattered remnant" of what we had once been (to quote an expression employed afterwards by the clergyman, in his address to the corps), conscious as it was of having wholly done its duty, not only in upholding the honour of beloved England, but in dealing retribution to the murderers of the fair and the helpless, did look for some definite expression of welcome from people whose apparent enthusiasm had induced a considerable number of them to come out to some distance, for the mere pleasure of meeting us.

How far our anticipations were realized, how far disappointed, shall appear in the sequel. As, however, the proceedings about to be related form but a mere type of every-day life at almost every military station in Bengal, I take leave to chronicle them with more minuteness than they would otherwise deserve, being after all little more than happen every day on board large passenger ships, and little Peddlingtons every where, where people know a vast deal too much of each other's business, and take a little too much interest in what does not in any manner of way concern them.

It must be mentioned, as one of the peculiar customs of Indian society, that those last arriving at a station are expected to call upon the residents. This custom has many advantages, and is upon the whole, perhaps, better adapted for the particular circumstances of the country than would be the English custom of the residents being the first to call.

With us, however, we could not be said to be about to form new acquaintances. Many of the people who constituted "society" were old friends, and a still larger number old acquaintances; while some few only, who had arrived in our absence, were to be visited for the first time.

During the terrible ordeal through which our fellow-countrymen —aye, and fellow-countrywomen—in Bengal had but recently passed, we need not wonder that a settled melancholy was for a time thrown over society. How could it have been otherwise, when scarcely a family throughout the length and breadth of the land had not to mourn the cruel and untimely death—if, indeed, no worse fate—of several of its members? Other families were completely broken up by the sad circumstances of the times. In some instances the wife and children had, on the first outbreak of Sepoy fury and treachery, been hurried away to England to escape the fate that overtook their less fortunate brothers, sisters, and cousins at Meerut, Delhi, and Cawnpore. In others the husbands were still on field service, their wives clubbing together in houses or barracks, endeavouring by this means to mitigate as far as possible the anxiety and the painful uncertainty they naturally experienced on account of those whose faces they were, in some cases, alas! doomed never again to behold on this side the grave.

There was thus much, very much, in the circumstances of the residents of Dandgunge to put entertainments, or any description of gaiety, far from their thoughts. So also there was during all 1857, and the greater part of 1858, to break up the demonstrations of society over all this side of India. But will matters in this respect ever recover their former state before the mutinies? I believe they never will. Late events have changed, and will still more change, the whole face of society in India; and this by the operation of many causes, some of which may be noted here—some of which may be left untold.

The type of the "old Indian" ceased to exist from the first moment his adored and much admired high-caste native soldier turned traitor to his Government, and in return for the devoted kindness and solicitous attention of the officer who had grown grey in ministering to his wants, in consulting his peculiar feelings and prejudices, until at last he admired, and would fain have himself adopted them, —slew that very officer's children, put to a cruel death his wife and daughters, and would have hacked himself to pieces had the fleetness of his steed not carried him beyond their reach.

It was officers of this description—and be it remarked that I am not applying the term "old Indian" to the class as an epithet of disrespect—who in India's palmy days gave society the character for hospitality and friendliness that contrasted so favourably with the stiffness, the coldness, and reserve of society in England; but with the first terrible blast of mutiny that, sirocco-like, swept over the country, carrying death and destruction in its course, the old state of society perished in an instant; and even yet that which will in due time be reconstructed from its ruins has scarcely assumed a definite shape.

Then, with the suicide of the native army, came the painful conviction to the minds of the British officers attached to it, that their prospects in life had sustained a heavy blow, if indeed they were not, as they unquestionably were, in many instances utterly annihilated.

Accustomed, as they had hitherto been, to consider the Sepoys as the real guardians of the empire, they felt themselves not unnaturally not only astonished, but utterly overwhelmed and amazed, when the very men in whom they had trusted with a confidence that now surprises themselves, threw off their allegiance, burst into open mutiny, dealing destruction upon lives and property they had sworn to protect and defend. Still more overwhelming than even this circumstance, unexpected as it was, was the influx of British troops that almost immediately set in, and has up to the present time continued, like one interminable stream, to pour into the country, carrying with it home feelings, sympathies, and ideas, that must, as inevitably as cause is followed by effect, swamp, drown, and utterly destroy the habits, the prejudices, and the faith, that have for thousands of years retarded the people of the land in the march of civilization, and given to our own countrymen who have resided long among them certain characteristics that distinguish them as a body from the purely English, whose nationality has not been destroyed.

The old residents in India generally, and those in Dandgunge in

particular, had scarcely begun to recover from the feelings of disappointed confidence, chagrin, and amazement, produced by the circumstances just related, when another skeleton, more terrible to look upon, perhaps, than any of these, rose before their already more than astonished eyes. The Honourable East India Company—that mysterious power, towards which from early infancy they had been taught to look with reverence and respect, and in comparison to which the Queen's Government was weak and helpless—the East India Company was about to be extinguished, in as far as its political functions were concerned. "The Royals" were about to sweep over India, and like a flight of locusts eat up every green thing. Staff appointments, snug situations, patronage in various shapes, to say nothing of the old and well beloved pecuniary "allowances." All, all these were about to be swept away for ever, and in their stead to arise a state of affairs uncertain in its hideous form, and most disastrous to existing interests.

Such at least was the general view taken of the transition state through which India has been gradually advancing since 1857. The residents of our station were almost to a man servants of that very Company whose existence now hung not only upon a slender thread, but upon a thread one of whose strands was broken. Is it then to be wondered at if we soon discovered a certain amount of reserve, if not positively adverse feeling towards us, and indeed that we were looked upon as being a necessary evil, rather than an acquisition?

But before proceeding further with my account of cantonment life, I must say a few words regarding the remnants of the Sepoy regiments that have remained at Dandgunge since the mutiny of the corps to which they belonged, in July, 1857.

It is said that these men have remained loyal, or, in the language of the time, "staunch." Let us see for a few minutes what the latter expression means as applied to them; but, in order to prosecute the inquiry, we must go back to a time eleven months prior to that when my narrative, properly speaking, begins.

As we marched into Dandgunge, from the westward, several ranges of temporary barracks for European troops, built upon a ridge of land that separated the principal road from the river-bank, indicated what had once been the site of the native "lines" or huts in which the Sepoys had been allowed to live, congregate, discuss imaginary grievances, and form plans for what fortunately proved to be their own destruction.

One of the principal civil authorities in India has placed upon record his opinion that the mutiny of the Sepoys at Dandgunge was *inconceivable;* the result was, that, acting upon this conviction, he refused permission to the local authorities to adopt such preventive measures as their less clouded judgment enabled them to see were absolutely necessary if mutiny, and perhaps murder, were to be averted.

But even the local authorities gave the Sepoys credit for possessing far higher courage than the result proved them to possess.

On the 26th July, almost three entire black regiments broke away. Artillery guns were brought up against them, but were not opened upon

them until the fleeing masses had got well beyond range. This very regiment, the *Onety-Oneth* had been, by order of a station official, drawn up behind their own barracks, where they were further ordered to load, as the mutinous Sepoys, were they to see them, would become frightened. While the general officer, either seized with a terrible conviction that the brave native troops were about to anihilate every white man, woman, and child in the neighbourhood, or with a powerful desire to examine the mysteries of the steam engine, proceeded direct on board a steamer, then in the river, and it is even said picked himself up in the stoker's room.

Meantime, while the General, accompanied by his brilliant staff, was studying the steam engine in action, the native regiments were fleeing across the half submerged rice fields that skirt the station; but there were a few of their numbers who, happening to have been upon various duties within the range of barracks at the commencement of the outbreak, had not an opportunity to join their comrades, and of this remnant one small body deserves especial notice.

A native sergeant and twelve privates formed a guard over some mess property belonging to one of their own regiments, that, for the sake of greater security, was kept in the quarters of one of the officers. This officer was a married man; but he happening to have been away in the direction of the Sepoy lines when the alarm of mutiny was first raised, his wife was thus left alone with men whom she well knew only wanted courage and opportunity to renew the atrocities that had been committed in other stations.

Already had these men flown to their arms, when the lady, knowing that hesitation or indecision would inevitably be fatal to herself, coolly walked up to them, and demanded that they should give up their arms.

The request was received with loud mutterings and scowls, the meaning of which could not be misunderstood. "Give up your arms this instant," she reiterated in a still more resolute tone, and with more determined manner.

"What if we do not give up our arms?"

"I will call upon the soldiers, and they will kill every one of you!"

"And if we do give them up, will you promise to spare our lives?"

"I will do my best to keep the soldiers from you."

"Mema-Sahib—you are our father and our mother, and we are your slaves!" So saying, the whole guard gave up their arms to this one lady; and not only gave up their arms, but some of them insisted upon concealing themselves from the dreaded soldiers by taking refuge under her bed, and in other somewhat peculiar places.

Small guards elsewhere throughout the station were only too glad to be allowed to throw down their arms to any body, and the remnants thus collected form what is now called the loyal Sepoys of the late native army; loyal merely because they could not help themselves.

For some time after this occurrence, the habitual strut of the Sepoy was, to use a very vulgar but expressive phrase, completely

taken out of the sorry remnant that remained; and it was shortly afterwards still more taken out of them by a trifling occurrence that may be mentioned here.

It was not only suspected, but absolutely demonstrated to all who were not wilfully blinded to the fact, that this very remnant, who were allowed to remain in the immediate vicinity of the barrack square, were in the habit of harbouring emissaries from the rebel camp, and holding secret correspondence with their comrades who had mutinied.

Spies were on more than one occasion followed into the small group of tents in which the Sepoys were accommodated, but, as a matter of course, not found; representations were made of the circumstance to the officers of the mutinous regiments, but they, blinded and infatuated to the last, could not or would not believe it. At last, one evening, just as darkness was closing in, an unmistakeable spy was followed by some soldiers to the Sepoy camp, but, as usual, with no further success. The man was lost in the crowd, but before the following morning several of the loyal men had died suddenly by bayonet wounds through the chest, and several more were lying in hospital, suffering from severe attacks of the same description.

Henceforward the Sepoys doffed the uniform they had disgraced; they resumed their original costume as tillers of the ground; and instead of their hitherto overbearing manner, now walked with stooping gait and downcast looks.

But towards the end of the year the Onety-Oneth, of which they evidently had stood in wholesome awe, took the field; and now the staunch Sepoys, relieved of an incubus, once more appeared the full-blown swells they wished themselves to be considered. Uniform was once again resumed, albeit the wearers felt and looked more awkward in their regimental habiliments than they had ever done before. Once more the head was borne aloft, the chest stuck out until the jacket buttons snapped, or dragged their stems half off; and the ridiculous salute with which the Sepoy had once upon a time loved to greet the hated Feringhee, again took its place in his daily ritual.

Alas! alas! that so much glory must, like all sublunary things, have an end. The writer of this paper had occasion to precede the regiment into Dandgunge, where I arrived on the day before it was expected, and beheld the gallant remnant of the native regiments parading in various directions, as I have just related. Having transacted the business that brought me there, I rejoined the corps, but judge, most respected reader, what was my surprise when, as we marched in, not one Sepoy in uniform was to be seen. They had ascertained that the to them terrible Onety-Oneth was about to enter the station, and the result was that from that day till this day, some eight months afterwards, when we again left the place, not one of the native "details," as the remnants were called, ever presumed to appear in uniform.

From Sepoys let us turn for a little to our own brave soldiers—worn and weary as they were by arduous service during the hottest

period of an unusually hot season. "How dreadfully sickly they must have been, poor fellows," is no doubt the spontaneous exclamation of some comfortable, although gouty "old English gentleman," who, seated in his easy library chair, does me the honour to peruse these pages.

My very dear Sir, they were less sickly than the soldiers of the Aughty-Aughth, who had not been actively employed, and who now occupied some of the same range of barracks as ourselves.

It had been the custom of the superior officers, with the force of which we had lately formed a part, to send to the nearest station any men who became severely ill; the result was that those who remained with us throughout the operations in which we had been engaged were in reality the very strongest and naturally the most healthy in the regiment; yet we scarcely expected to have contrasted so favourably as we did in this respect with a corps that had been comfortable in quarters throughout the previous unhealthy months.

"But were the men not delighted to get back to barracks?"

"Yes, my good sir, very much delighted indeed, and for various reasons, some of which, I will, if you please, do myself the gratification to tell you."

As second in the list of military virtues, obedience being the first, so also second among social virtues, but chief among personal necessities in India, stands cleanliness; we all, both officers and men, had missed this extreme luxury for months, and one of the principal enjoyments to which we looked forward in quarters was the luxury of frequent personal ablution and clean linen. But there were many other luxuries to which we had looked forward in hopeful anticipation, and which we most thoroughly did enjoy.

Our meals—breakfast, dinner, tea, coffee, soup—in fact every article or description of food, had for months and months been so copiously sprinkled with sand and dust, from having to be cooked in the open air, that the ordinary life-long allowance of a peck of dust could scarcely, under the most favourable circumstances while campaigning, have lasted the most moderate eater among us a month. What an extreme luxury then it was to obtain nicely cooked meals, containing neither sand, nor dust, nor the debris of still more objectionable matters.

Then we had the luxury of clean bedding—no alarms at night, no sudden wakening up by a dust storm, half smothering us as we lay in bed, and momentarily threatening to carry our flimsy tent away into the higher regions of the atmosphere, leaving us devoid of extra drapery, to do battle with the elements on mother earth.

For some time, therefore, all went smooth and pleasant; we enjoyed our change, and when by and bye the heavy rain poured down in torrents, the barrack square becoming one dismal swamp, tenanted only by frogs, great and small, and adjutant birds standing on one leg, or awkwardly stalking after some drowned reptile, we even began to congratulate ourselves, and talk in tones of sympathy of less fortunate regiments that still were in the field. Nor must I omit to mention one other luxury of which we partook on coming into quarters. Hitherto we had scarcely known what it was to taste fruit or

vegetables, neither of which could be obtained in the part of the country through which our route lay. It may certainly appear strange at first sight that a body of men, marching as we were from day to day, through some of the richest and most prolific portions of India, were unable to procure some of the very products for which the country is famous. Yet so it was; probably much on the same principle that, during long voyages at sea, fresh sea fish becomes one of the greatest rarities at table.

The consequence of this continued want of vegetables and fruit was a state of loss of health, that would unquestionably have obliged numbers to succumb had the deprivation continued much longer. As it was we were all, both soldiers and officers, seized with a craving absolutely painful for these productions of the garden; and when first we had an opportunity of indulging our appetite in this respect, the quantity of green food that disappeared was only less marvellous than the fact that, instead of dying of cholera as we ought, according to all rules, to have done, not only did we all feel much better after the feast, but some of us who had been suffering from the particular diseases in which fruits and vegetables are most rigidly prohibited by "the faculty," underwent so immediate and so definite an improvement, that in the height of their enthusiasm they could not resist exclaiming mentally, if not actually, "Astringents to the dogs, and mangoes for ever!" a sentiment in which I cordially coincide.

But among all these causes of self-gratulation upon our return to quarters, there was one horrid phantom that haunted us, blasting by its pestiferous breath much of our sources of happiness. This was that terrible and irresistable desire for spirituous drinks, that constitutes the bane of the soldier wherever and whenever circumstances permit him to indulge his vicious taste in this respect.

Not that the men of the Onety-Oneth were a whit worse than their comrades in other regiments. On the contrary, they were perhaps better than the majority. And yet it was sad to think of the amount of injury, in many respects, that they brought upon themselves from this cause during the first few weeks they were in barracks. Loss of character, degradation to the ranks, wounds and bruises, disease in various forms, some the most hideous and revolting, were among the results of indulgence in this vice. And yet I do not see how such things can be altogether prevented under circumstances such as ours on the present occasion.

There are various methods, all more or less effectual, for meeting this evil, but a general narrative, such as this, is not the proper place to enter at length into a consideration of their comparative advantages. I may observe, however, that one of the most certain methods I have ever witnessed to put an effectual stop to drunkenness in a regiment is to "work" the men literally so hard that they have not time to leave barracks in search of liquor, the crime being at the same time punished with the utmost rigour it is in the power of the commanding officer to exert. This seems to be a cruel proceeding, and so it may be to the individuals concerned, while the fact of exacting extra duty from the men brings immediate punishment upon the good, as well as deserved punishment upon the irregular characters.

This, however, must necessarily be the case, and we can only deplore the necessity, for as in the government of all large bodies, so in that of a regiment, the consideration of what is most conducive to the general well being of the whole, must effectually overweigh the particular circumstances and convenience of individuals.

But I find there are so many subjects to claim attention in an account of "Soldiering" in India at the present time that the dimensions of my paper have already almost reached the permissable limits. The further remarks upon manner of life in cantonments after field service must therefore be reserved till next month.

FRENCH VIEW OF THE MILITARY POWER OF THE ENGLISH IN INDIA.

IT was the poetic prayer of a well-known writer that some power might endow us with the faculty of seeing ourselves as others see us. The gratification of such a wish may not always produce a very pleasing impression, and to say the truth, our neighbours, whether we speak as individuals or as a nation, seldom leave us in doubt as to what they think of us. As a nation, no people are so self-fault-finding as the English, and, perhaps, no nation is so indifferent to the opinion of others. There is a strong honesty of intention in John Bull that makes him self-reliant, and a stubborn pride that renders him defiant. Still we are not wholly regardless of opinion, but the value we attach to it, must be commensurate with the estimate we form of the judgment and good faith of him who assumes the task of pronouncing on our conduct. The flippant remarks of a superficial thinker we pass unheeded by, but the approval of an earnest man is ever a welcome tribute to our honest pride, and his reproof—if he reprove—is sure to bespeak our attention.

In the latter class we must place the distinguished French writer, whose work now lies before us. Le Commandant-Ch. Martin has chosen for his subject:—"The Military Power of the English in India, and the Insurrection of the Sepoys."

The talented author describes the trying phase of our political existence in India in a spirit of the most generous admiration for the valiant who fought and triumphed, and with the tenderest sympathy for the doomed who fell victims in that terrible struggle.

To do justice to the book would require a larger space than we can afford, but we shall endeavour to lay before our readers in a brief view, the design of the author, and the manner in which his objects are carried out.

M. Martin's work may be divided into two parts. The first gives a brief account of the early history of India, beginning at a period anterior to the conquest of Alexander, sketching the career of the various Mogul sovereigns, to the time when Nadir Schah invaded Delhi. We have then an account of the discovery of the passage round the Cape by the Portuguese, of their settlements on the east coast of Africa, and in Asia; and we are told how they were followed

by other Europeans, the Dutch, the English, and the French. We then learn the forty years' struggle between the two latter powers, and how the English remained masters of India. From this time, the history of India is only a record of wars between the English and the native princes, until by force of arms, by treaties, or by annexation, the company ruled over those vast tracts as they were before the revolt of 1857.

The second part of the work is devoted exclusively to an account of the Sepoy insurrection. The author has found materials for the first part in the works of writers on Indian history, but for the second part the sources of his information were very different

The despatches of French generals are sufficiently minute in detail to gratify the curiosity of every individual in the nation, whilst the despatch of an English general is for the most part limited to stating the result of an action, rarely entering into details. English despatches are, as our author remarks, of "incomparable dryness." In this dearth of information from head quarters, we should be in pitiable anxiety, touching our absent soldiers, did not the daily press by the publication of private letters allay our inquietude and satisfy our longings.

The sentiments of Le Commandant Martin are so *apropos* of this state of things, that we cannot forbear quoting his words :—"France and England do not differ alone in their mode of making war, each has a peculiar manner of relating its events. It would be necessary to study as we have done, in the English journals, this interesting phase of cotemporary history, in order to have an idea of the confusion, the disconnection, the chaos that prevailed for a long time in all the accounts relating to Indian affairs. Official documents, private letters, interesting details are furnished in abundance, but considerable embarrassment arises from the difficulty of discriminating and selecting from this confused heap; and when we have chosen, we are often at a loss how to arrange them with a due regard to place and chronological order. In France, the official reports are, in general, full of interest, and depict in glowing language the military deeds recounted for the information of the home authorities. On the other hand, the correspondence in our journals is singularly barren, and as to private letters, the few that are published do not excite any regret for those that are suppressed. In short, in war, as in other matters, the French are fond of delegating to one the task of acting as mouthpiece for the community."

"The despatches of the English generals are, on the contrary, of incomparable brevity. Military literature is still a desideratum amongst our neighbours. Officers from the highest to the lowest grade generally content themselves, in their reports, with narrating with imperturbable coolness, the movements of the different regiments, and the result of the action. The most terrible engagements are talked of as calmly as if they were only reviews, and probably a French officer would describe a review with more eloquence and animation. But it is not in these despatches that the English seek the history of their wars. They seek and they find it in books and in the glowing descriptions of their journals, and in the open-hearted

letters which the officers, for the most part well-educated men, write to their families. It is from these sources they learn the truth, and there they see it depicted in the most glowing colours. Each relates his adventures, and each comments upon them with the energy and *humour* characteristic of our neighbours. It is in the narrative of private individuals that the English public learn at the same time the events that occur and the measures that ought to be taken—these letters satisfy, at once, public curiosity, and tend to form public opinion."

Our author comes to the review of the Sepoy insurrection with sentiments avowedly favourable to England: he will not for a moment hear of any but a triumphant result for the arms of Great Britain, and he founds this belief upon the experience of past events. The natives have never been able to stand against the Europeans, even with odds of ten to one in their favour; witness the battle of Plassy, where Clive, with 9,000 Europeans and 2,000 Sepoys, defeated an Indian army 60,000 strong. The Duke of Wellington at the battle of Assay, at the head of 5,000 men, of whom only 2,000 were Europeans, defeated 50,000 Mahrattas, commanded by Holkar. "No," exclaims our author, "notwithstanding the numerous imperfections of the military system of Great Britain—imperfections which, as we shall see hereafter, are amongst the main causes of the Indian insurrection, England will emerge victorious from this struggle." She has more to dread from the climate than from the Sepoys, who, even when trained to the art of war by the English themselves, proved their inefficiency when brought in contact with their masters. At the siege of Delhi, if indeed the presence of a handful of men before a vast city could be called a siege, the Sepoys were in an overwhelming majority, and were defeated. Our Continental neighbours err in estimating our real strength by our numerical force. M. Martin bids them remember the small number of English soldiers, scattered through Bengal, that were able to make head against the first outbreak.

It is not often that we hear ourselves eulogized by a stranger in such terms as these: "Those who base their calculations on the presumed exhaustion of the military strength of England, appear to forget that England is, after all, a nation of twenty-eight millions, and whatever might be the defects of her military organization, she was able to send 50,000 men to Sebastopol. And shall we not take into account the moral strength of a nation that has always proportioned her efforts to the difficulties to be overcome; a nation that might indeed be beaten, and that generally is beaten at the commencement of her wars, but that rarely allows her courage to sink, and that, on the contrary, seems to gain strength as the conflict is prolonged."

M. Martin further assures sceptics that even were all the troops stationed in India, all the civil officers, all the resident Europeans, all the reinforcements, destroyed, massacred, annihilated, still Great Britain would not abandon India. An European war even would not induce her to renounce these possessions, and twenty years hence, she would be as ready to sacrifice, as she is at the present day, ships

gold, and soldiers, to re-establish her sovereignty in these lands. "An inflexible firmness, of which we have had so many proofs, is one of the good qualities of those Anglo-Saxons who possess so many others to compensate for their pride and egotism. We may be certain that the Sepoy revolt will be suppressed, if not in six months, in a year, or in two, or in twenty; but appearances lead us to believe that tranquillity will be speedily restored."

M. Martin having spoken thus confidently of the restoration of Anglo-Indian power, proceeds to consider the causes that led to the Sepoy insurrection. This revolt, he believes, to be military, not national, though he by no means denies that the mal-administration of the Company aggravated the general feeling of discontent and hastened the development of the outbreak. He altogether refuses a feeling of patriotism or a sense of national honour to the Indian populations, and believes their moral inferiority to be so great that they must always stand awed in the presence of Europeans; besides, they could not be insensible to the advantages of British rule, which, with all its defects, was far more lenient than that of any of their former masters. Viewed in this light, the Hindoo is sensible of only two influences, the loss of caste, or the diminution of pay. Caste is with him rather a social than a religious distinction; it is caste that gives him the strongest hold on the affections of his family and his friends; it is to caste he is indebted for his social rank. It was under the influence of such feelings that the suspicion of having been betrayed into tasting the fat of pork excited his utmost indignation. He believes it to be the result of a conspiracy on the part of the Government to deprive him of caste. The spirit of revolt was ripe before the greased cartridges came into existence; their appearance was only the last drop that makes the bucket overflow. Besides, there had been defalcations on the part of the Government with respect to pay. On one occasion, when the Sepoy army was ordered to cross the Sutledge, the men refused, unless their pay was increased. Their demand was granted; but after the annexation of Oude, when the Government found themselves strong, this addition was withdrawn. That was another cause of discontent for the Sepoys. Still were there no other causes of dissatisfaction, or were the Sepoys the sole malcontents, the insurrection of 1857 might have been suppressed as easily as several that preceded.

It cannot be denied that the mal-administration of the Company was the radical cause why the late insurrection was so widespread. When, either by the fortune of war or by treaty, a native prince was obliged to yield his throne, the Company was very glad to settle on him and his heirs an ample income. After the death of the first annuitant, it too often happened that the Company sought a pretext to disinherit the heirs. Sometimes they were females, and not cognizable by the Mahommedan law; sometimes they were adopted sons, and not legal heirs, according to English law. By quibbles of this kind a great number of queens and princes had been deprived of their inheritance; and we may suppose with what feelings they regarded their English rulers. The terrible Nana Sahib was one of those who had to complain of an estranged inheritance; and there

is no doubt that the gold of these dethroned princes was one of the great levers of the insurrection.

Another cause (we are still quoting the sentiments of M. Martin) was the mistaken philanthropy of the missionaries, who, condemning the proceedings of the Company, became partisans of the natives, whose good qualities they extolled to the skies; and the freedom, or rather, license of the press, which permitted the publication of these sentiments, tended to lower the Executive in the eyes of the natives, and to lead them to exaggerate their own importance. On the other hand, the conduct of those officers who endeavoured to induce their soldiers to embrace Christianity, excited distrust upon another ground; for the Sepoys, dreading above all things the loss of caste, wavered in their fidelity to officers, whose friendship seemed to be purchaseable only by the sacrifice of their dearest prejudices. The greased cartridges might have produced on minds influenced by these feelings, an effect which, without a knowledge of previous circumstances, might appear disproportionate to the cause.

Considered in this point of view, it is evident that the late insurrection was a military, not a national, movement. Sepoy revolts had not been unfrequent during the previous half century, and it must be admitted that provocation was always given by the government. Fifty years ago, the great insurrection of Vellore, though fomented and encouraged by the family of Tippoo Saib, owed its origin to some attempted alterations in the distinctive marks of the Sepoy castes.

Twenty-five years later, we find the Sepoys revolting at Barrackpore. It happened that two regiments, the one European, the other native, had received orders to march to Arracan. The place was known to be pestilential, and every precaution was taken to secure the well-being of the European soldier, whilst the native regiment was wholly neglected. The Sepoys, exasperated by such treatment, refused to march, unless they, as well as the Europeans, were provided with the means of transporting their baggage. On this a small sum of money was granted by government, which the men refused, because it was neither sufficient for the purpose required, nor could beasts for transport be procured at so short a notice. The Sepoys obstinately refused to move, unless the government supplied all the requirements for the march. This was decisive. The native regiment was passed in review before two of Europeans, and it is said a masked battery of six cannon. The refusal of the Sepoys to lay down their arms, was followed by a shower of grape and a discharge of musketry from the two European regiments. One hundred Sepoys fell. A short while after, the government issued an order, importing that in future native regiments should be supplied with beasts for the transport of their baggage.

M. Martin finds a complete analogy between these early revolts and that of 1857, and maintains that had Sir John Lawrence been present on the occasion of the disaffection about the greased cartridges, he would have acted with as much firmness as Gillespey did formerly at Vellore, and the insurrection might have been nipped in the bud. Unfortunately, the Generals, Hearsay and Hewitt, did not seem to comprehend that their position being similar, they ought to

have adopted the same means that had been successfully tried by their predecessors a quarter of a century before.

Theoretically speaking, European officers trained to the Indian service, have all held the same opinion, both as to the ever-present peril that results from the enormous disparity between the native and European troops, and the means of suppressing insubordination. And the procedures of the English in India during the last year, justify the theory. The circumstances of the last insurrection, even the mode of punishment,—the disarming of the Sepoys, the execution of the criminals,—all correspond exactly with the events of fifty years before. Unfortunately, weak and nerveless imitators are not competent to play the part of those stout warriors, who conquered India for Britain. The burdens they bore cannot be supported by feeble successors. The same means employed too late, or inopportunely by a Hewitt or a Lloyd, might produce results diametrically opposite to those contemplated.

The disbanding of the Sepoys must be regarded as a grave error, because, as the great Wellington remarked on a former occasion, when the armies of the deposed Indian princes were broken up, by depriving the native soldier of his pay, you fling him upon his own resources, and he becomes a highway robber. The soldiers thus dismissed took refuge under the standard of Nana Sahib and the leaders of the rebellion.

If the conduct of the commanders at Meerut excites the ire of Commandant Martin, he is loud in praise of the brothers Lawrence, "these two worthy representatives of old England, who by their valour and devotedness have preserved the honour of her flag inviolate."

Without doubting for a moment the final result of the struggle in India, M. Martin does not always approve the tactics of the British commanders. He thinks the campaign of March against Lucknow was premature; that it would have been wiser after the deliverance of the Residence, to defer the reduction of Oude for some time, to have left full scope to the insurgents, amongst whom dissensions would have certainly sprung up, and to have employed all the disposable strength of the army in re-establishing order along the right bank of the Ganges.

The army of Sir Colin Campbell would have amply sufficed for this purpose, during the cold weather, and before the warm season set in; all the important frontier points might have been strengthened by military posts, which would have secured the ultimate success of the Commander-in-Chief on the Goumty. The hot season might have been employed in re-establishing the civil administration of the country on its original basis, and in preparing quietly for the campaign in Oude, where the rebellion might, under such circumstances, have been finally suppressed.

It is with many apologetic expressions that M. Martin proceeds to criticise the general plans of the later military operations in India. On so gigantic a battle-field the best drawn plans on paper become useless, so much must be allowed for the exigencies of the moment, and the unexpected turn of events. Still there are certain fundamental principles in war which belong to all times and all places, the neglect of which will infallibly induce fatal consequences.

Judging according to these principles, it was imprudent, after the check given by the Gwalior troops to General Windham in November, to leave this important contingent on the right flank, and in the rear of the army; it was contrary to the rules of war to march on Lucknow before having destroyed or dispersed a focus of resistance, the more dangerous, as it would necessarily serve as a rallying point to the stragglers, who would drop off from the main army in its advance on Oude.

On the other hand, Rohilcund might be looked upon as one of the principal centres of the rebellion in the north. Its situation with regard to the English possessions was such that an army occupying Rohilcund would be in a position to attack simultaneously all the important posts in the neighbourhood; Rohilcund, in fact, occupied on the left flank of the main army of Lucknow a position similar to that which Bundelcund and the south-eastern districts of Oude occupied on the right flank.

It is to be lamented that the original projects of the Commander-in-Chief, as indicated by the establishment of his head-quarters at Futteghur in the month of January, were not carried into execution. If, on the one side, Sir Colin Campbell had continued his movement northward; if, on the other hand, the Walpole division, which had been despatched towards Etawah, had marched directly southwards, so as to support the operations of Roberts, of Sir Hugh Rose, and of Whitelock, Rohilcund, which had offered so little resistance in May, when all its forts were filled with rebels from Lucknow, could have presented still less in the month of January, and the English army might have occupied it in sufficient strength to impede the entrance of the rebels after the capture of the capital of Oude.

Supported by the troops of Walpole, Sir Hugh Rose might have terminated more quickly the operations against Jhansi and Calpy. Opposed on the west by General Roberts, on the south and east by the columns of Sir Hugh Rose and Whitelock, and on the north by the division of Walpole, the rebels of Bundelcund might have been exterminated, and Gwalior would not have fallen into their hands. The remnants of the rebel forces, instead of taking refuge in central India, as they did after their march on Jonk and Hindown—a proceeding that threatens to prolong if not to eternalize the war—if, we say, the Gwalior contingent had had no other resource than to cross the Ganges, and to throw themselves into Oude in the month of January, the success of Sir Colin Campbell's plan would have been more certain than ever.

Another important consequence which would have resulted from the possession of Rohilcund and Bundelcund previous to the capture of Lucknow, would be the impediments opposed to the circular retreat of the rebels, as they withdrew before the fan-like movements of the main army of Lucknow. This retreat, or this flight, whichever it might be called, undeniably lessened the hopes that might have been legitimately conceived, had Lucknow been taken under other circumstances. Had Rohilcund and Bundelcund been first reduced, the capture of Lucknow *would have been the termination of the war;* but conquering Lucknow, whilst those two districts were open to the fugitives, was only transplanting the conflict, throwing

it from the centre to the circumference. As a proof of the truth of this assertion, and as a consequence of this kind of circular flight, we need only remark that the capture of Gwalior, the blockade of Schahdjihanpore, and the occupation of Judigspoor by the rebels, were contemporaneous with those movements of Sir Colin Campbell, Sir Hugh Rose, and Sir Lugard, which seemed to strike the final blow on the rebel forces.

The defects of our military system are largely commented on by Le Commandant Martin, but no one ever bore nobler testimony to the bravery of our soldiers and to the inherent courage of the English people. The private letters of our officers, often young lads of only sixteen or seventeen, come in for a large share of admiration. These letters recount the incidents of the war with "the vivacity natural to the age of the writers, and with the energy inherent to the English character. The whole European population, scattered over an immense space and unexpectedly attacked, displayed on all occasions a heroic contempt for death, and an equally great contempt for the enemy."

But the constitutional courage and coolness of our soldiers are not sufficient to remedy the defects of our military organization. M. Martin supports his opinion on that of a German general, who declares that "England must re-model her army on the continental type, if she do not wish to see her influence in the world decline."

Those statesmen, who through a mistaken spirit of economy have urged the reduction of our military establishment, come in for a considerable share of censure. They say that England, strong in her insular position, needs not to keep up an aggressive army, "but," says our adviser, "it is with nations as with individuals, when two persons stand in a fighting attitude opposite each other, a disinclination on the part of one to strike the first blow does not afford sufficient protection; even the moderation exhibited, if not supported by a stout army, only gives an advantage to the opponent." In short, the pith of these counsels is contained in the generally received maxim, that the best way to preserve peace is to be prepared for war.

M. Martin finds England placed at an immense disadvantage by the loss of Hanover, and the drain that pestilence, famine, and immigration have made on the population of Ireland. These sources for replenishing the army are exhausted, and how much England felt the loss was proved during the Crimean war. She had, at that time, in her pay, six foreign legions. The Turkish legion, commanded by General Beatson; the Turkish foot, commanded by General Vivian; the Anglo-Polish, commanded by Prince Czartoryski; the Anglo-German, under Colonel Steimbach; the Swiss legion, commanded by Colonel Dickson, besides which many attempts were made to enrol American and Scandinavian regiments.

The Crimean war might be regarded as the result of a combination of circumstances such as might never occur again, whereas the danger of an Indian revolt is an ever-existing possibility, the means of meeting which should be always ready. The revolt of the native army in India ought to be less a matter of surprise, than the subjection in which it was so long held. "When," says M. Martin,

we reflect on the very small number of English soldiers in India at the outbreak of the insurrection, we must look upon it as an actual miracle, that this small handful of Europeans should have resisted, as they did, the first shock of this terrible tempest."

Our system of voluntary enlistment does not seem to M. Martin sufficient for the exigencies of the time. The problem he lays down to be solved by every country in the organisation of her military establishment is this:—"To organise her army so that it should be always strong, well-disciplined, and well-instructed, always fit for service, if war break out, but, never in time of peace, burdensome to the mass of the people or to the public finances."

He remarks rather drily that the second part of this proposition receives much more favour in England than the first—retrenchment of our peace establishment being as favourite a theory as if the actual world were an Utopia. M. Martin brings the Duke of Wellington to his aid as a testimony against the efficiency of our military system, which, in a letter to the Marquis of Wellesley, he declared to be "irremediable as long as England has had a system of enlistment that will not permit her to lose every year with impunity, in case of war, half her army in the field, from the effects of fatigue and privation alone."

However efficient the system of conscription may be in keeping up the strength of the continental armies, it is repugnant to the constitutional freedom which is an Englishman's boast. Though we cannot on this point agree with M. Martin, we are, perhaps, for that very reason more touched with the generous praise he bestows on "the handful of men" that did such good battle in India.

Our prescribed limits forbid us to dwell longer on a book, the perusal of which has afforded us great satisfaction. We have no doubt that this delightful volume will become popular in England, for, though professing to treat the subject exclusively from a military point of view, the order in the arrangement and the charm of style are such as to recommend it to the general reader, who will find in its pages a compendium of the history of India, and a clear and instructive history of the late Sepoy Insurrection.

PAY OF OFFICERS IN UNITED STATES' NAVY.

It is desirable, at this juncture, when the consideration of the First Lord, and the Board of Admiralty, is engaged in the revision of the Navy List, to shew how these matters are managed in America. Accordingly we have procured the present scale of pay of the Sea Officers and Marines in the United States' Navy, and converted the dollar value, four shillings, one penny, half-penny, and one-third of a farthing, according to the present rate of exchange, into English sterling money, for the convenience of our readers. It will be seen that the disparity of pay, particularly in the junior ranks, is very great, to the disadvantage of our officers, who meet American Ships of War in all parts of the world, and who are, on such occasions, put to the usual expenses of hospitable rites, &c., so as to maintain a friendly feeling.

PAY OF THE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES' NAVY.—1858.

GRADE.	On leave, or waiting orders.		Navy Yards and other duties.		Sea Service.		Of the Fleet.	
	American Money.	English Money.	American Money.	English Money.	American Money.	English Money.	American Money.	English Money.
	Dollars.	£ s. d.	Dollars.	£ s. d.	Dollars.	£ s. d.		
Captains—Senior	3,500 00	723 1 9½	4,500 00	929 13 9	4,500 00	929 13 9		
,, of Squadrons	.....				4,000 00	826 7 9½		
,, on full pay	2,500 00	516 9 10	3,500 00	723 1 9½	3,500 00	723 1 9½		
,, promoted to full vacancies created by Reserved List	1,800 00	371 17 6	2,800 00	578 9 5½	2,800 00	578 9 5½		
Commanders—(Full pay)	1,800 00	371 17 6	2,100 00	433 17 1	2,500 00	516 9 10		
,, promoted to fill vacancies created by Reserved List	1,200 00	248 6 4	1,900 00	392 10 8½	1,900 00	392 10 8½		
Lieutenants Commanding					1,800 00	371 17 6		
,, (Full pay)	1,200 00	248 6 4	1,500 00	309 17 10¾	1,500 00	309 17 10¾		
,, promoted to fill vacancies created by Reserved List	750 00	154 18 11½	1,050 00	216 18 6½	1,050 00	216 18 6½		
Surgeons—First five years after date of Commission	1,000 00	206 11 11¼	1,250 00	258 4 11	1,333 33	275 9 3	1,500 00	309 17 10¾
,, Second ditto ditto ...	1,200 00	248 6 4	1,500 00	309 17 10¾	1,600,00	330 11 1½	1,800 00	371 17 6
,, Third ditto ditto ...	1,400 00	289 4 8½	1,700 00	351 4 3½	1,866 66	385 12 11½	2,100 00	433 17 1
,, Fourth ditto ditto ...	1,600 00	330 11 1½	2,000 00	413 3 10½	2,133 33	440 14 7	2,400 00	495 16 8
,, Twenty years and upwards...	1,800 00	371 17 6	2,250 00	464 16 10½	2,400 00	495 16 8	2,700 00	557 16 3
Passed Assistant Surgeons ...	850 00	175 12 1¾	1,500 00	309 17 10¾	1,200 00	248 6 4		
Assistant Surgeons	650,00	134 5 9	950 00	186 5 4	950 00	186 5 4		
Pursers—of ships of the line ...	.....	.....	.....	.....	3,500 00	723 1 9½		
,, of frigates or razees ...	.....	.....	.....	.....	3,000 00	619 15 10		
,, of sloops or steamers, 1st class	.....	.....	.....	.....	2,000 00	413 3 10½		
,, of brigs and steamers, 2nd class	.....	.....	.....	.....	1,500 00	309 17 10¾		
,, of first-class navy yards and receiving ships	.....	.....	2,500 00	516 9 10				
,, second-class ditto	.....	.....	2,000 00	413 3 10½				
,, naval stations	.....	.....	1,500 00	309 17 10¾				
,, first five years after date of commission ...	1,000 00	206 11 11¼						

PAY OF THE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY *(Continued)*.

GRADE.	On leave, or waiting orders.		Navy Yards and other duties.		Sea Service.		Of the Fleet.	
	American Money.	English Money.	American Money.	English Money.	American Money.	English Money.	American Money.	English Money.
	Dollars.	£ s. d.	Dollars.	£ s. d.	Dollars.	£ s. d.	Dollars.	£ s. d.
Pursers, second five years after date of commission ...	1,200 00	248 6 4	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
,, third ditto ditto ...	1,400 00	289 4 8½	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
,, fourth ditto ditto ...	1,600 00	330 11 1¼	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
,, twenty years and upwards ...	1,800 00	371 17 6	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Chaplains	1,000 00	206 11 11¼	1,500 00	309 17 10¾	1,500 00	309 17 10¾	.....	.....
Professors of Mathematics ...	800 00	165 5 6½	1,500 00	309 17 10¾	1,500 00	309 17 10¾	.....	.....
Masters in Ships of the Line ...	.....	.....	.....	.....	1,100 00	227 5 1½	.....	.....
,, on full pay	750 00	154 18 11½	1,000 00	206 11 11¼	1,100 00	227 5 1½	.....	.....
Passed Midshipmen	300 00	61 19 7	350 00	72 6 2	400 00	82 12 9¼	.....	.....
Masters Mates (warranted) ...	300 00	61 19 7	450 00	92 19 4½	450 00	92 19 4½	.....	.....
,, (not warranted) ...	.....	.....	.....	.....	300 00	61 19 7	.....	.....
Boatswains, Gunners, Carpenters, Sailmakers who have not served one year at sea	* 600 00	123 19 2	* 700 00	144 12 4¼	* 900 00	185 18 9	.....	.....
Chief Engineers, first five years ...	1,200 00	248 6 4	1,500 00	309 17 10¾	1,500 00	309 17 10¾	.....	.....
,, after five years ...	1,400 00	289 4 8½	2,000 00	413 3 10½	2,000 00	413 3 10½	.....	.....
Engineers, first assistant ...	850 00	175 12 1¾	1,000 00	206 11 11¼	1,000 00	206 11 11¼	.....	.....
,, second do.	600 00	123 19 2	800 00	165 5 6½	800 00	165 5 6½	.....	.....
,, third do.	400 00	82 12 9¼	600 00	123 19 2	600 00	123 19 2	.....	.....
Secretaries to Commders of Squadrons	.....	.....	.....	.....	1,000 00	206 11 11¼	.....	.....
Do. when not Commanding-in-Chief	.....	.....	.....	.....	900 00	185 18 9	.....	.....
Clerks to Commanders of Squadrons	.....	.....	.....	.....	500 00	103 5 11½	.....	.....
Clerks to Captains of Fleets and Commanders of Vessels	.....	.....	.....	.....	500 00	103 5 11½	.....	.....
Clerks to Pursers in Ships of the Line	.....	.....	.....	.....	700 00	144 12 4¼	.....	.....
,, ,, in Frigates ...	.....	.....	.....	.....	500 00	103 5 11½	.....	.....
,, ,, in smaller vessels ...	.....	.....	.....	.....	400 00	82 12 9¼	.....	.....

* These rates of pay are increased two per cent. for each full year of Sea Service; and a further addition of ten per cent. upon 900 dollars is allowed while the officer is serving in a ship with 400 men, and twenty per cent upon 900 dollars while he is serving in a ship with 900 men. The above rates to be estimated from August 5th, 1854.

PAY AND EMOLUMENTS OF THE SEVERAL GRADES OF OFFICERS IN THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.

GRADE.	Pay.		Servants.			Rations.			Forage.			Total.		
	Annual in American Money.	Annual in English Money.	Number of Servants.	Annual Pay and subsistence for, at 19 dols. 50 cents, per month.	Ditto in English Money.	Number of Daily Rations.	Annual amount of Rations at 30 cents per ration.	Ditto in English Money.	Number of Horses.	Annual amount at 8 dols. per month each horse.	Ditto in English Money.	Total Pay & Emoluments in American Marines.	Ditto in English Money.	
	Dollars.	£ s. d.		Dols.	£ s. d.		Dollars.	£ s. d.		Dols.	£ s. d.	Dollars.	£ s. d.	
Colonel Commandant	1140 00	235 10 5	2	540 00	111 11 3	12	†1314 00	271 9 4½	3	288 00	59 10 0	3,282 00	678 1 0½	
Lieut.-Colonel, on leave ...	960 00	198 6 8	2	540 00	111 11 3	5	†547 50	113 0 2	...	...	...	2,047 50	423 0 2	
„ commanding ...	960 00	198 6 8	2	540 00	111 11 3	10	†1095 00	226 4 5⅔	3	288 00	59 10 0	2,883 00	595 12 4⅔	
Majors, on leave	840 00	173 10 10	2	540 00	111 11 3	4	†438 00	90 9 9⅓	3	288 00	59 10 0	2,106 00	435 1 10½	
„ commanding	840 00	173 10 10	2	540 00	111 11 3	8	†876 00	180 19 7	3	288 00	59 10 0	2,544 00	525 11 8	
Staff Majors, Adjutant and Inspector, Pay and Quarter-Master	960 00	198 6 8	2	*564 0	116 10 5	4	†438 00	90 9 9½	3	288 00	59 10 0	2,250 00	464 16 10½	
Staff Capt., Assist. Quarter-Master	840 00	173 10 10	1	*282 0	58 5 2½	4	†438 00	90 9 9½	1	96 00	19 16 8	1,656 00	342 2 6	
Captains, shore duty	720 00	148 15 0	1	270 00	55 15 7½	4	†438 00	90 9 9½	...	...	...	1,428 00	295 0 5*	
„ at sea or on leave ...	720 00	148 15 0	1	270 00	55 15 7½	4	†438 00	90 9 9½	...	...	...	1,428 00	295 0 5*	
First Lieutenants at sea, leave, or shore duty	600 00	123 19 2	1	270 00	55 15 7½	4	†438 00	90 9 9½	...	...	...	1,308 00	270 4 7*	
Second Lieutenants at sea, leave or shore duty	540 00	111 11 3	1	270 00	55 15 7½	4	†438 00	90 9 9½	...	...	...	1,248 00	257 16 8*	

* All Commissioned Officers in the Marine Corps are entitled to one additional ration for every five years' service.

† Pay and subsistence allowed for each servant, 20 dollars 50 cents.

Note 1.—Double rations are allowed to Commissioned Officers of the Marine Corps as follows :—When commanding permanent posts ; to Officers commanding the guard on board of receiving ships at Boston, New York, and Norfolk ; to the Commanding Officer of the guard of a squadron, when the number of marines in the squadron is not less than the guard of a frigate ; and to the Commanding Officer of the guard of a ship of the line, or frigate, when acting singly on separate service.

Note 2.—Clothing responsibility. All Commissioned Officers of the Marine Corps, when not above the rank of Captain, or below that of Lieutenant, are entitled to an allowance of 10 dollars per month for the care and responsibility of marine clothing when commanding the marines of a squadron having the number of marines allowed to a frigate ; of ships of the line or frigates in commission ; and at naval stations.

Note 3.—Where there are no public quarters furnished a commutation is allowed. Officers on shore duty are allowed a commutation for fuel.



REMINISCENCES OF A VETERAN.

BEING A NARRATIVE OF PERSONAL ADVENTURES DURING A PERIOD OF FORTY-THREE YEARS IN PORTUGAL, SPAIN, FRANCE, MALTA, NEW SOUTH WALES, NORFOLK ISLAND, NEW ZEALAND, ANDAMAN ISLAND, AND INDIA.

(Continued from page 51.)

From similar stories I have heard on other occasions, I am inclined to believe that the unnatural state of a number of young women huddled together as they are in a convent, although secluded from the world, does not always alter their temperament; rather it is like a ship on fire, with the hatches battened down to exclude the air. The moment the hatches are opened the flame bursts forth with uncontrolable energy, spreading alike its influence and contagion.

With one of my Caçadores I found it somewhat difficult to maintain my authority. The Colonel was absent, and on one occasion the Caçadore was exceedingly insubordinate and insolent, and as I had no means of punishing him, I could not resist the temptation of belabouring him.

The following morning, meeting with an old officer of the regiment, he said, "I hear you have thrashed ——. You have done wrong, he is the greatest villain in the battalion, and he will try to shoot you the first opportunity." He did not do so; but in the sequel, it will appear, that he was the cause of my being wounded, and very nearly taken prisoner.

Some days after this, we made a reconnaissance of the fortified camp near Bayonne; and at night, when the troops retired to their cantonments, the 5th Caçadores were ordered to cover the retreat. The weather had been very wet, and some sapient [illegible] ordered our men an extra ration of grog be[illegible]arting [illegible]quence was, that one half of them were [illegible]ult to keep the men together; the night [illegible]dingly slippery, so I was ordered to the [illegible] leave a man behind. Finding, from [illegible] could do nothing, I told the officer co[illegible] his sergeants to the rear of th[illegible] none of [illegible] came; I then [illegible] sample [illegible] state of discip[illegible] ately [illegible] I co[illegible] I ha[illegible] sile[illegible] wo[illegible] "I[illegible] th[illegible] ti[illegible] co[illegible] I [illegible] wh[illegible]

see the men merry on the line of march. "Yes," I replied, "and I like to be obeyed," giving him, at the same time, a tap between the eyes, that sent him reeling to the opposite side of the road. My friend was a pet in the corps, and being of good family, was a nondescript between a sergeant and a cadette; he was also a sort of second sergeant-major. He attempted to close with me, and I had hurt my right hand in the first rencontre; so pretending to hit him again with the same hand, he parried it, when I delivered a blow with my left on his temple, which to my horror caused him to fall forward, to all appearance dead.

There was plenty of water on the road, and by opening his shirt collar they soon got him round. When sufficiently recovered, he said, "I think, sir, you might have placed me under arrest, instead of treating me in this manner." I replied, he and the other sergeants had better look after their men and regain the ground they had lost, or I should certainly serve him again in the same manner.

I never saw men conduct themselves better, or behave more respectfully during the remainder of that night's march. It is a curious circumstance, which I have also heard others remark, that the Portuguese soldiery always like to try their officers, to see what lengths they can go with them. With me, ever afterwards, I received the same ready and prompt obedience, as if I was really the major of the regiment.

The next morning we were under arms, a little before day-break, when the sergeant made his appearance, with his face much swollen and covered with blood. The colonel, observing it, asked him what was the matter; when he told him he had been thus treated by the new English captain. St. Clair was very angry at seeing his favourite thus disfigured; but I told him I had been dared, and the men were so insolent, I had no other alternative but to be firm, and shew that I would be obeyed and see the orders he had given me executed.

Our Portuguese soldiers had a great dislike to and contempt for the Spanish troops. I witnessed, some time before, an extraordinary instance of this. There had been some skirmishing with the enemy, and our Caçadores had been halted on the spur of a mountain in the Pyrenees, with a battalion of Spanish infantry halted in a similar manner immediately underneath. Below these again, in a valley, through which a stream meandered, there was a considerable sized village on our side of the stream, in possession of some Spanish regiment of Longa's division. For the enemy to approach the village, it was necessary for them to pass the stream by a wooden bridge, which admitted only one person at a time. The Spanish troops were halted in an open space, forming two sides of a square, the village being interposed between them, and the enemy and the Spaniards appear to have thrown out no videttes or sentries, but were reposing in perfect security.

A marauding party, of about forty men, from the French side, were seen to pass the brook. Both the Portuguese and Spanish battalions sprang on their feet, in breathless anxiety to see what would be the result; for it was evident, that should the French be vigorously pushed, they would not be able on such a ricketty bridge to recross the stream. They were not aware of the vicinity of Longa's division, and the Frenchmen therefore dispersed and spread through

the village in search of plunder. Six of these marauders came suddenly and unexpectedly on the Spanish troops; but instead of retiring before so large a force, the six men drew up deliberately in line, and fired right into them. Such of the Spaniards as were not asleep, took to their heels and fled; and the marauders lost no time in regaining the bridge, while the panic they had caused prevented their being pursued. The Portuguese Caçadores now took off their caps, and commenced a grand chorus, singing the Spanish patriotic song, "Vivan los Espanoles valerosos Companeros." The rage of the Spanish battalion below knew no bounds, and amounted almost to frenzy; they screeched and shook their fists at our people, which produced in return a roar of laughter, followed by a fresh chorus of "Vivan los Espanoles valerosos Companeros," until we were obliged to order them to desist from their ironical praises, and the Spanish battalion moved away.

CHAPTER VII.

Affair at the Major's house, 10th Nov. 1813—Wounded and narrow escape of being taken prisoner—The Caçadores suffer further loss—Visit from Major-General Sir J. Bradford—Promotion—Kindness of the inhabitants—Wreck of gun-boats—Pontoons—Rocket practice—Investment of Bayonne—Brunswick Œls Riflemen—Post of 5th Caçadores during the siege—Removed to command the 6th Caçadores—Conduct of its officers—Colonel Hardinge in command of the Brigade—Quarters and deputy-quarter general.

On the morning after the reconnaissance of the French camp before-mentioned we again fell in, very early, and I was ordered with three companies (half the battalion) to march beyond the Mayor's house, on the St. Jean de Luz and Bayonne Road, to relieve a picquet of one of the infantry regiments of our brigade. Arriving at the ground, after a little search, I found the picquet, which was commanded by a son of my old Portuguese major's wife (of the 20th) by a former marriage.

He told us he had received no orders during the whole time he had been there, had thrown out no sentries, nor had he seen any enemy; neither did he know anything of the ground; but he believed none of our troops were in his front, and, consequently, that his was the advanced party.

Leaving my men with him, I rode my mule to take a survey of the ground, and to select a place where I might post my picquet. I never met with ground more intricate; continuity of the line of defence was nowhere to be found, and the position could be approached by an enemy unperceived at several points. I ultimately selected a coppice at some distance in front of the Mayor's house, connecting this post, across a sunken narrow road to the right (by which an enemy might advance unperceived), with an orchard. The trees formed but indifferent shelter for my men, yet the coppice I could have held against any force; and the ground in its front being a meadow, lay completely exposed to the fire of my men from the coppice; to the left of which ran the high road to Bayonne, from St. Jean de Luz.

I could not inform the officer I had relieved where his regiment was; I knew, however, that it had marched that morning; so he decided upon remaining where he was until he received further orders.

I had assigned each man his post, and explained to them what was to be done. About half an hour afterwards we heard a firing of musketry to our front, when a number of our men were driven in; a perfect rabble, composed of almost all the regiments in the division—Portuguese and English. It was now evident that we were not the advance. One officer was very conspicuous, and on seeing my men he commenced calling out "Advance, advance," in Portuguese. I afterwards understood it was Major O'Hara, of one of the Caçadore battalion, and wished him at the devil, for I had no desire to mix my men up with such a rabble for no ostensible purpose. I tried all I could do to keep my men where they were, but they would go on; and, leaving their strong post in the coppice, I was obliged to follow. We drove the trifling force of the enemy opposed to us back; but my men had straggled a good deal, so I got to those who were most advanced and halted them, until I could collect my picquet again. My attention was then called by one of the party to a field in our immediate front where the enemy were assembling a large force and preparing for a general attack. Our party had not been perceived by them, and I was preparing to draw off my men back to their old position, when the fellow I had thrashed some days before with a stick made his appearance, and finding the party halted, said—"What, captain, are you brought to a stand still?" I put my finger to my mouth to impose silence, and pointed with the other hand over the embanked hedge, to show him the cause; he replied—"Oh! that's nothing;" and scrambling up the bank, he commenced shouting and vociferating so much, that a force was immediately sent to dislodge us. Before the enemy could conveniently get at us, they had to pass by our right through some brushwood, consequently we could only see them from their waists upwards. They wore grenadier caps, and in my opinion were grenadiers, but the men insisted that they were cavalry; and the Caçadores having a particular dread of this arm of the service, they all scampered off together. I wanted to get myself and party back into the coppice, but the ditch with the bank was so slippery and steep that it was quite impossible.

We were now pent up in a corner of the meadow with no outlet for escape, but through a gap bordering the high road at the corner of the coppice, and it was too narrow to admit the number of persons collected. Matters were made worse by the lieutenant of my company coming to me and saying that he could not move another step, as he had been attacked with a severe fit of asthma—a disease to which he was subject. I pushed him through the crowd to the gap into the high road, and remained myself a short time to see if I could get off any more of my men, when finding the greater part of the crowd had thrown down their arms to surrender as prisoners of war, I made another dash for the gap and got through. O'Hara, with eleven more of my company, were taken prisoners. Similar disasters took place on our right; but the enemy appeared to know as little of the nature of the country as we did, and made as many blunders. A body of five hundred of their men advanced too far, and getting entangled amongst our advanced posts, were made prisoners; others contrived to get into the coppice, and thence

into the high road. They fired into the head of one of our columns and killed five officers—amongst the rest, the captain I had relieved in the morning. I was now completely cut off by this party, which interposed itself on the high road, between me and the column. My fellows were exceedingly clever in securing themselves under cover; and when our men ceased to appear at the gap, every Frenchman who approached was sure to pay for his temerity. Here we kept them at bay; but the question was, how were we eventually to escape?

I was senior captain, and should lose my promotion, and I did not like the idea of being sent a prisoner to Verdun. At length we observed some skirmishing below us, and I told one of the men to lead on and skirt the road under the brow of the hill, to try and rejoin our troops. The French soldiers at the gap were not long in following, keeping up a running fire upon us. I was nearest to them, from being the last of our party, and we had got some distance when I was struck in the thigh by what at the moment I considered to be a spent shot, for it gave me no pain; however, I soon found my boot full of blood, and my leg getting very stiff, I was beginning to lag behind, when a sergeant, who was with the party, observing it said: "The captain's wounded; we must not let him be taken;" and, although there was little chance of escape, they insisted on placing me in a blanket, and carrying me with them. Strange to say not a shot touched any of us afterwards, although the same party continued in pursuit.

Looking up towards the road, the first regiment I saw was the 47th, and I was just in time to see them face about and retire. My bearers were much fatigued, although they were in sufficient numbers to relieve each other. I begged to be put down, but the sergeant would not permit it; so on we went, with a line of English skirmishers, who were firing upon the enemy to cover the retreat of the column, we could not keep up with them, and it seemed folly to attempt to carry me any further.

My Caçadores would listen to no remonstrance, until at length we came up with a subaltern's party of the 14th Light Dragoons. These at first put about also; but a sergeant of the party called the officer's attention to the Caçadores; when he ordered the dragoons to the front, and they made a most brilliant charge upon the enemy, who evidently were not prepared for it. The officer's name was Beckwith, of Bristol riot celebrity. Great numbers of the French were sabred, and that part of their line ceased to advance any further. I was now safe in the meantime, for I had got a little beyond the Mayor's house; but here found another misfortune awaited me. A wounded officer had taken away my mule, and I was recommended to follow his example, by taking the first one I could meet with, which I did. I had scarcely gone a hundred yards, when its owner was brought to the rear wounded also, and he was obliged to do as I had done.

I suffered a great deal of pain before I reached my quarters, arising, I suppose, from the wound rubbing against the saddle; but nothing could exceed the kindness of the bricklayer's family, when I was once more amongst them.

The action continued in different parts of our line during the

three following days. I was told that Lord Wellington directed in person the attack made the next day on some works which the enemy had thrown up beyond the Mayor's house. That on the enemy's right (our left) I was told had been carried by a portion of our Caçadores. The lieutenant of my company had behaved very gallantly, and whilst standing on the top of the parapet cheering on his men to follow him, he was killed; a French soldier amongst those who had been driven from the work was seen to turn round and fire at him.

After the action was over, the body was examined, but no wound was discovered; it was in consequence more generally believed that he had burst a blood vessel, or that he had dropped down dead from exhaustion. The sergeant who had insisted on carrying me off the field was also killed the same day. He was a townsman of the lieutenant's, and his loss was much regretted in the battalion. I forget the amount of our loss, but without including the staff, out of eleven officers who had gone into the action of the Nive, with the six companies of which the battalion was composed, only four came out with them, the others having been all either killed or wounded!

When the action was over, and the 5th Caçadores returned to their quarters, the grief of the bricklayer's family when they found the lieutenant did not return was excessive. Even the old lady, with whom during his lifetime he had been no favourite, in consequence of making her husband tipsy so often, grieved for him as much as the rest of the family, and the house after his death seemed very lonely and triste.

Amongst my early visitors, was Major-General Bradford, commanding the brigade. He told me that he had recommended me for promotion; but that the Marshal (Beresford) had anticipated him, by promoting me to the rank of major in the General Orders of the army, for good conduct in the field. He also asked him to appoint me to the battalion, as the majority was vacant; but he would not do it, telling the Major-General he had other intentions towards me, so soon as I should be sufficiently recovered. Two subalterns were sent from one of the infantry regiments to command temporarily the two companies that had no officers left. The young man who took the command of mine, declared that he never before had to deal with such a set of scamps.

The battalion was subsequently moved some miles in advance, and as I could not be removed, I was left behind. My wound did not get on well, and as it would not heal over, I was kept on very low diet. I lived principally on roasted apples, which the daughter of the head man of the village used to procure for me. Indeed, nothing could exceed the kindness of this poor creature. She and her brother contrived by passing through our line of sentries, and those of the enemy, to get into Bayonne; and when they returned she always brought me something nice, which I was not, however, permitted to eat.

By the time I was recovered and able to move I had quite a stock of claret and brandy, which she had brought from Bayonne.

The people in the neighbouring houses experienced great annoyance from the number of camp followers and marauders who visited

them, now that there were no troops stationed in the village. A number of families, principally females, came in consequence to reside at my quarters, as it was found that the presence of even a wounded officer was a check upon the vagabonds. Although they never visited the house where I was, yet I could not keep a couple of young pointers of a particular breed which I had from them. They were taken when outside the house by some English soldiers passing through the village, and my Portuguese servant remonstrated with them to no purpose when they learned that I could not stir.

I afterwards discovered that the dogs had been seen with the 87th regiment, but I never had an opportunity of meeting with the corps.

I was becoming very anxious to rejoin, and when I mentioned my intention the Basque girl told me I must not go until she could get me a horse from Bayonne, and to my surprise she made her appearance three or four days afterwards with a very creditable five-year-old steed. I forgot the sum she charged for it, but I certainly could not have purchased it myself for three times the amount.

When I rejoined my wound was still open, but as the 5th Caçadores were not far off, my journey was a short one. Some days afterwards I witnessed a fleet of gun-boats enter the Adour. The weather was very boisterous, and a number of them grounded and were wrecked, a captain of the navy being drowned. I dragged out of the water a sailor boy, and we had some difficulty in restoring him from his state of suspended animation. He turned out to be a Portuguese lad, whose father was serving in the brigade. He told me the youngster had run away from home, and he would feel very much obliged to me if I would find some employment for him, candidly telling me that his son was a sad pickle, but that if ever he misbehaved, if I would send him over to him he would give him a good thrashing. I found him a smart, active lad, yet, like most boys I have seen as servants, they require a servant to look after them.

We had afterwards to cross the Adour ourselves in what I termed tin-kettles. These were pontoons, without any rudder or means of steering them, and we kept our feet on the framework. We were pulled across with oars, but were obliged to take the opportunity of the top of the tide, or slack water, otherwise the current would have taken our unmanageable craft either out to sea or up to Bayonne.

About 500 guardsmen had crossed the preceding day, and had fortunately taken over some intrenching tools, for when the tide turned all communication with the rest of the division was cut off. In this predicament a column of about 2,000 raw conscripts moved out of Bayonne to attack them, but whilst advancing they were dispersed by a rocket thrown from our side of the river. It went right through the column, doing great execution.

The French having never heard of nor seen such a thing before, they broke and fled, nor could they be again rallied until they reached Bayonne. Another rocket struck a frigate anchored higher up the stream, mortally wounded its commander, and did considerable damage. Hence they termed it "the infernal machine." Nor were there wanting some Frenchmen, with whom I spoke, who, sympathising with their brethren in the town, hinted at the unfairness of using such a diabolical invention.

A bridge having been established above the town, the left wing of the army was passed over and the town invested. I do not think that Bradford's Portuguese brigade had orders to take any part in this last operation beyond supporting the troops engaged in the duty, and the 5th Caçadores were originally posted in rear of the Brunswick Riflemen; but the major-general, it was said, was a terrible fire-eater, and always anxious to get the regiments of his brigade engaged. On this occasion he ordered me to take a portion of the battalion, and prolong the line of the Brunswick Œil Skirmishers to prevent their left being outflanked and turned by the enemy. There was a fine clear space to my front, and I had my forebodings that the Brunswickers would not have left their flank so exposed without some good reason; but I did as I was ordered, and soon found that, with the exception of the high road, the whole country was a labyrinth of canals and ditches, which had been made for the purpose of draining the marsh. My operations must therefore necessarily be confined to the high road, without the power of communicating with the troops on my right. A body of about thirty or forty of the enemy were drawn up across the road, as if to oppose us; but after losing some men I thought it high time to make a rush at them to drive them back. To my astonishment they stood as firm as a rock, and continued firing as if they had been on a parade. On nearing them I discovered there was a broad, deep canal between us, when I, of course, ordered my fellows to run and get out of their fire, and from that of the fortresses, as quickly as possible. The wound I had before received was not yet healed, and my knee began to pain me to such a degree that I thought I should have fainted. The enemy now began to ply us with grapeshot. At the side of the road between us and the Brunswick riflemen there was a broad ditch, which appeared very deep, and I was endeavouring to persuade my men to cross it and join them, but none of them would try it; I suppose they could not swim. At length I determined to try it myself, and jumped in, when, to my great joy, I found it did not take me up much higher than the waist; but I had scarcely gained the other side when I observed a group of eight or ten of my men standing on the road, and amongst these was the quartermaster of the battalion (who never lost an opportunity of leaving his duties to join in a skirmish), the master-tailor, and some other valuable men. A discharge of grape swept round the party, and killed or wounded every man of them, with the exception of the quartermaster. The men after that made no difficulty in following me, and opening out as much as possible, in order to baffle the enemy's artillery, passing one or two smaller channels, we succeeded in joining the troops on our right.

An extraordinary occurrence had taken place. Before entering the water I was in an agony of pain, but the moment my knee touched the cold water the pain ceased.

The Germans seeing this reinforcement, continued to advance a little further, at length they posted themselves in two houses too close to the fortifications. Here almost every man who attempted to pass across the road to the other building was shot.

Having posted my men further to the rear, I went up to the Germans to see what they were about. The captain who commanded the Brunswickers had lost three officers, attempting to carry orders across the road; and now that he was in this predicament, he wished me to take the command of the whole as senior officer. This, I told him, I had no authority to do; I was merely ordered to support him. He then asked my advice whether he should stay, with the danger of having his retreat cut off, or whether it would be better to retire. I informed him I had some time before sent an officer to the rear for instructions, and I was surprised he had not returned; and pointing to some high ground on his right, where the enemy were advancing in force, I said, "If you remain two minutes longer without getting your men out of the opposite building, you will not be able to fall back and effect your retreat; besides, I see no advantage in your present position, unless you have positive orders to hold it." They suffered very severely afterwards, the captain himself being wounded, and my own party did not get away without some trifling loss.

I was in a great rage at the officer I had sent out, not returning. Col. St. Clair told me he had not sent him back, because it was clear to every body, that we had no business where we were, and that we should soon be forced to return. There is however a great difference between retiring at your leisure and retiring in the face of an enemy. That night, although I had a good quarter, and a good bed, I passed in great agony, the pain in my knee having returned.

A few days after this, the Cagadore Battalion, was removed further in advance, and we occupied a sort of villa, about 800 yards from the fortress. I did not much like the way the men were put up; there was only one door-way into that part of the building where the men were quartered. I told the Lieutenant-Colonel if the enemy attacked or made a sortie, early in the morning, he would not be able to get his men out, and half of them would be taken. It was then decided that I should rouse the men up, half an hour before day-break, make them fold up their blankets, and get them out.

(To be continued.)

ON PIACENZA AND OTHER LOCALITIES IN NORTHERN ITALY.

By Lieut.-General Macintosh.

A description of the present state of the fortifications of Piacenza may at this crisis possess some interest; and having passed through it last summer, the writer is enabled to give a hurried sketch of them.

The Austrians have greatly increased the capacity of this fortress

by the erection of detached forts around the old walled city, near enough to each other to afford mutual support. Their distance from the centre of the city is probably three quarters of a mile; and as the fort first seen from the east, which the road from Parma passes, is marked in large Roman numerals No. VIII., and that close to the road to Alessandria and Turin, passed on quitting the town in that direction, is marked No. XIII, I imagine, from the circumference of the town, their total number is sixteen. Not having entered any of these works, the writer can only judge of their interior construction from their general appearance, and from a surmise suggested by the following circumstances.

Some years ago, when at Venice, he visited and entered the whole of the forts, upwards of twenty in number, in the Laguna, by permission of Marshal Radetsky, when he was accompanied by a Captain of Austrian Engineers, who explained to him the most minute particulars, and showed him the plans. He has no doubt, from what he could see from without, that the forts surrounding Piacenza, although not exactly of the same external form, very nearly resemble, in their interior construction, a new fort lately erected within the old work of S. Nicolo del Lido, which last is about half a mile in length, and a quarter of a mile in breadth, and is the chief fort which closes the Lido passage into Venice. This new fort is of a novel construction, which was carried out with much ability by Colonel Henningsen, of the Austrian Engineers. The outer *enceinte* consists of four bastions, connected by curtains, with a broad dry ditch, strongly revetted. The peculiarity in the work is comprised in a bomb-proof *Réduit* of solid masonry, which occupies its centre, commanding the interior of the outerwork, and capable of defence, even after the latter might fall into an enemy's hands. In order to prevent the enemy, in such a case, from taking shelter in the ditch, a vaulted passage, like a small tunnel, is pierced through each curtain of the outer *enceinte*, connecting it with the corresponding face of the *Réduit*, which is square. These passages terminate in a bomb-proof stone vault, which crosses two-thirds of the ditch, and is rounded off near the counterscarp revetment, but not sufficiently near to be accessible by mining from the glacis. These vaulted constructions are called *Coffres*, and each is pierced with two embrasures for three-pounder guns pointing through them, to sweep the ditch in both directions. There is a twelve-pounder in each face of the bastions, and an eighteen-pounder *en barbette* at their salient angles; and the stone *Réduit* has also small *Coffres* projecting from it, to bear on the interior of the outer work. The old inclosure of Fort Lido, near the centre of which this work is situated, is—excepting the side towards Malamocco, which consists of two strong fronts of fortification, inclosed by a wet ditch—a mere parapet, faced with brick walls, *en crémaillère*. The ordnance at the forts of Piacenza is probably heavier than that just described at the Lido, the place being surrounded by much larger open range. The numerous forts around Venice are extremely curious, and are nearly all approached by water. Their examination, in consequence, occupied the writer three days, although he engaged a small steamer

to visit the most distant, where the channels permitted it. They command every passage, and, by sinking vessels in the channels, these could be effectually closed.

The writer having previously passed through the north of Italy in 1848, in rear of the Sardinian army, during the campaign between Carlo Alberto and the Austrians, paid a visit to his Majesty's head-quarters, which were established at Somma Campagna before Verona, then occupied by the main Austrian army under Radetsky. At that period, the Sardinians were also prosecuting the siege of Peschiera; and the writer having on his subsequent visit stopped a few hours at that fortress, found that between the two periods the fortifications there had been very greatly extended, as he remarked that even the heights which the King of Sardinia and his staff used to occupy during the siege, were now inclosed within formidable works. The writer's impression is, that not only Verona and every other fortified place in Lombardy, Pavia probably included, have been enlarged and greatly improved. The last-mentioned place is one of great importance, being the only spot at which the Austrian territory may be said to cross the Ticino, as the small island of Gravelone, a mere bank of gravel in the river, belongs to Austria, though divided from the Lombard territory by the main channel of the Ticino, while it is only separated from Sardinia by a very narrow channel, easily crossed, and it was for this reason selected by Marshal Radetsky as his route, before the battle of Mortara, thus causing the surprise of the Piedmontese, who expected him to cross by the bridge of Buffalora, in front of Novara.

On the Sardinian side, Casali may be looked upon as the first strong place that presents itself; and, as such, will very probably play some part if the Austrians advance. The country on the left bank of the Po, in its front between Mortara and the Sessia, is much interspersed with marshy land and rice grounds, making it almost impassable for troops, except on the highways. It is said that, notwithstanding this, it presents no positions of strength, which it is difficult to believe, since an advance could be much obstructed by merely fortifying the roads. The river Sessia, where it is crossed by the Mortara road, is in itself a great obstruction, its left bank presenting a scar of sand, and the right a wide extent of sand and gravel, through which the post-horses tug the carriage for several hundred yards with great difficulty, before again reaching a solid road. This arises from the shifting of the banks of the river during torrents, which are very common in this region. The Sessia is crossed when not flooded, by a flying bridge, resting on two large barges, the cable being supported on a series of small boats. Soon afterwards, the Po is crossed at Casali by an iron suspension bridge, covered by a *tête de pont* on the left bank, commanded by a fort on the right bank, which has lately been constructed, or, at least, greatly strengthened. It has brick walls, pierced for musketry, at the base of its earthen slopes; the parapet above is mounted with guns firing over them. The ditches are wet. The town itself is fortified, but not very strongly; and a new stone fort on the heights to the west of the town, which it commands, was nearly finished in 1852.

EDITOR'S PORTFOLIO;

OR,

NAVAL AND MILITARY REGISTER.

THE WAR.—Probably before these pages appear, the Austrian cannon will have fired that first shot, which is to be to all Europe the signal of battle. We cannot concur with those who think this a false step on the part of the great German power; and, as regards the character of the struggle about to commence, the mere fact of Austria stealing a march on France, after the Emperor NAPOLEON has been so long preparing, indicates what an advance she has made in the art of war. We look, then, for a desperate and sanguinary contest. At the same time, it is not likely that the prompt action of Austria will be attended with those signal results which are generally apprehended. The interesting and important communication of General MACINTOSH, which will be found in another portion of our pages, shows that it is in the power of Sardinia to oppose considerable obstacles to an Austrian advance on the side of Casali, and though the approach may be more accessible by way of Mortara, we do not believe that an Austrian army could reach Turin before the arrival of French succours. The Emperor NAPOLEON himself is hurrying to the scene of action, and it is more than probable that the advanced columns of the French will enter the Sardinian territory simultaneously with the passage of the Ticino by the Austrians. We may fear that France has not provoked this war, without some promise of support from Russia.

THE THANKS TO THE INDIAN ARMY.—Her MAJESTY'S troops in India, native and European, have received from Parliament that vote of thanks which forms the national recognition of their devotion. This solemn act was not needed as a testimony to their deserts, for never had military virtue stood before the world with such prominence or such effect. Senatorial eloquence failed to magnify deeds, which carried on their face their own history, and had already received the world's applause. Taken by surprise, in the midst of apparent security, when they were actually engaged in the public worship of GOD, a few scattered bands of soldiers were required to prove to India that Englishmen were still the men of Arcot, Plassey, and Assaye—still able to hold their own against any

odds, and retain the broad empire they had received from their fathers. We turn from the laggard movements of Lord CLYDE to that solemn, that awful hour, when England and the civilised world stood breathless, as if stunned, while the words Delhi and Lucknow were in every mouth, and carried a panic to every heart. What assurance was then brought to us by the very first tidings received, announcing the men were there—few, indeed, in number, but how strong, how indomitable in character! and what confidence was awakened by the names of HAVELOCK, NEIL, NICHOLSON, OUTRAM, CHAMBERLAIN, VAN CORTLAND, and a dozen others, who met the first shock, and broke it into fragments. These were the handful that saved India. England rose in her strength; regiment on regiment was dispatched; and India was occupied by a mighty army; but, meanwhile, the blow had been struck. The rebellion, indeed, was still smouldering, as the embers of a conflagration; but its life and soul had been stamped out. Delhi was captured; Lucknow was relieved; and Sir COLIN CAMPBELL had but to march on Oude, and take possession. Instead of this, he resorted—and, we are now told, against his own better judgment—to a series of FABIAN movements and combinations, which, however suited to European warfare, were wholly out of place in India. It is notorious that the whole rebel army might have been dispersed, and Lucknow captured, when Sir COLIN relieved the Residency; but the great opportunity was not seized. The retirement of such a powerful English force before a disorganised native army gave a new fillip to the rebellion; it again assumed a formidable appearance; and our brave troops, who might have decided all in a single battle, were called upon to endure unheard-of fatigues, in endless pursuit of a flying foe. Their valour, endurance, and devotion have at length triumphed over every difficulty, and they now deservedly receive the thanks of their country for a redeemed prestige and a recovered dominion. Let us get rid of the Sikh levies, and India is once more our own.

THE CASE OF CAPTAIN CARNEGIE.—Captain CARNEGIE, R.N. has retired into private life. His letter to Sir JOHN PAKINGTON, in reply to the exposition in Parliament, sets a seal on the transaction. Instead of refuting the statement of the First Lord, it confirms it in every particular; and places Capt. CARNEGIE's conduct even ina more equivocal light than it appeared before. Everything is fair in love and war; everything may be fair in party warfare, and on the eve of a general election; but still there are manœuvres which, though we may take advantage of their effects, some of us object to bear part in ourselves. They invariably devolve on a particular class. Captain CARNEGIE, by his own account, has nothing to complain of. He was appointed to a political post with an express understanding that, on the first opportunity, he would endeavour to enter Parliament: two openings were offered to him, and, on one pretence or another, he shirked both. But this was not all. Aware that he had thus broken a positive engagement, and consequently that he could no longer retain office, he telegraphs his own version of the affair to a

prominent member of the Opposition; and this at a moment when, in the opinion of the knowing ones, the leaders of the Opposition were likely very soon to have it in their power to redress his grievances. Suppose two hostile squadrons on the point of action: the Commander of a ship is ordered by the Admiral to lay himself alongside one of the enemy, and fight it out; but, instead of complying, he signals to his antagonist the order he has received, and runs his ship aground. Captain CARNEGIE, in pursuance of the engagement he had made, was recommended to contest Devonport, but he declared he had no chance at Devonport: he was offered the choice of Dover, but Dover was also declined—for, good, scrupulous man! (O, very scrupulous!) his return could only be secured "by a course he could not condescend to adopt." People are not generally so nice at elections, but we have not all the same aversion to tar on our fingers as Captain CARNEGIE.

The gallant Captain's letter—no doubt, unintentionally—makes the most of every little point that may be expected to tell, in the pending elections, against the Government of which he was a member, and the party to which he professed to belong. In this spirit, the Government Reform Bill is described as "a millstone round his neck," and the dockyard men are gently reminded that they should not support "a *nominee sent down by a Government* that had determined to deprive them of their franchise." There is also an extract from a letter, which appears to have been written by a confiding friend. Beyond doubt, the writer has sanctioned its publication, although we may doubt whether, after such a revelation, he will remain "high in the confidence" of Sir JOHN PAKINGTON, whose counsels it betrays. The extract, the rigmarole explanation,—which leaves every fact where it was before—and the little pellets for the electors, make up, after all, a very lame demonstration. They may afford ground for a little buffoonery to Mr. OSBORNE, at Dover; but they will catch no votes; and we believe the good ship will weather the storm, in spite of the flight of—Captain CARNEGIE.

THE ARMSTRONG GUN.—We can state from information afforded by persons familiarly conversant with this gun, that no correct drawing or description of it has yet appeared, and that the criticisms made upon it have in most cases been founded upon wholly inaccurate asssumptions. The same observation applies to the projectiles, respecting which we can state with certainty that they consist of two kinds, the one adapted for field service, and the other for naval and siege purposes. The former admits of being used indifferently as solid shot, shrapnel, percussion shell, and common case, and possesses extraordinary efficiency in all these capacities. The latter is a shell differing from the other in having none of the attributes of a shrapnel, but containing a large charge of powder, by which great explosive effects are produced. Contrary to what has been repeatedly asserted, these last-named shells contain much larger charges than the common spherical shells of equal weight, and they are caused to burst either at the instant of penetration, or as much before or after as may be

desired. The great range and accuracy effected by this gun, as well as its lightness and durability are now matters of notoriety; but those who are best acquainted with its performances, declare that its chief excellence consists in the efficacy of its shell firing.

THE ALLEGED TRAFFIC IN COMMISSIONS.—The investigation at Bow-street police-court has not resulted in those exposures which were so confidently expected. It has simply developed a case of crooked dealing, in which the actors were only ordinary sharpers, and the victims extraordinary flats; and we doubt much whether the transaction can be made to appear illegal, or the persons implicated be punished. The mythical firm of "ARMSTRONG & Co." proceeded in such a manner that, so far as now appears, they might claim to be paid by Mr. BRIDSON, or any one who employed them, without infringement of the law, and in the face of the world. They, in fact, made no concealment, but announced their peculiar operations in public advertisements, offering their services to all comers. Mr. BRIDSON and Mr. CUNINGHAM fell into the trap. They believed that commissions in the British Army could be obtained, in these days of Parliamentary and newspaper supervision, by some back-door influence, which might be audaciously advertised in the public journals; and, acting under this delusion, they paid some £400 for a result, which they might have achieved by the same course of procedure, without disbursing a farthing. It is, indeed, clearly established that no part of the money was expended in facilitating the object; for though there is a suspicious payment of £50 to Colonel STEINBACH, the interposition of that officer had no effect: and Mr. CUNINGHAM, by using the good offices of Generals VIVIAN and STEELE, obtained his appointment solely through his own interest. The Duke of CAMBRIDGE refused his application in the first instance, not only because he was over age, but because it rested on unsupported statements; but when the services of his father were attested by two officers of eminence, His ROYAL HIGHNESS, with characteristic kindness of heart, took a more indulgent view, and as the regulation respecting age had been relaxed, appointed the young gentleman to a regiment. The whole affair was, as regards the appointment itself, highly creditable to the administration of the Horse Guards. The Duke showed a prudent shyness of Colonel STEINBACH; but when he received testimonials from a reliable quarter, he admitted the claims of the son of a meritorious officer. He has now announced, in the most public manner, that the army is open to the whole country, and that every application will be fairly considered. An anonymous correspondent of a morning journal proposes that Mr. CUNINGHAM should be deprived of the commission he has obtained, and Mr. BRIDSON be prosecuted, under the impression that the transaction with "ARMSTRONG & Co." amounts to a misdemeanour; but the act of GEORGE III. evidently does not apply to a case of this kind, but to transactions in which one of the parties implicated, either in his own right or through his influence, actually has the disposal of a commission, which is made

the subject of barter. In this instance the commission was obtained gratuitously; Mr. BRIDSON and Mr. CUNINGHAM retained "ARMSTRONG & Co." as their counsel; and though they indeed appear to have contemplated some dexterous *coup*, under the guidance of the German Colonel, nothing seems to have been done out of the regular course. It would have been just as well to have settled the affair in the police court; for all the public wanted was investigation; and as no jury will find the prisoners guilty on the evidence adduced, we see not what object is to be gained by keeping the scandal afloat. The letters that now daily appear throw no new light on the matter, and are mere personal tirades, having no public interest.

POSTSCRIPT.—THE NECESSITY OF IMMEDIATE WAR.— astounding revelation which has broken like a thunder-cloudever Europe, announcing the existence of two treaties of alliance, offensive and defensive, between France and Russia, and of a similar treaty between France and Denmark—thus, if we include Sardinia, marshalling four powers of Europe in one camp—must be regarded by England as a menace to herself, and a warning to prepare for immediate war. This quadruple alliance alters entirely the aspect of our foreign relations, and of our own more perilous position. It annuls our alliance with France, and it fully justifies the Austrians in taking the initiative in a war which they appear to have known was inevitable. Indeed, we stated last month that the intervention of Russia in the negotiations, just as Lord COWLEY was bringing them to a successful issue, was evidently suggested by France, for the purpose of preventing a pacific settlement. The Austrians have made the first move, just as FREDERICK the Second, when Russia, Austria, and France were leagued against him, took the initiative, to attack and capture the whole Saxon army at Pisna, while they were temporising till the storm had fully gathered against Prussia.

This alliance between France and Russia unmasks the bad faith which the EMPEROR of the French was covertly pursuing towards us. It carries us back to the raft on the Niemen and the treaty of Tilsit in 1807, when those two despotic powers leagued together in hostility to England, and assigned to each other their several missions—to overthrow the independence of nations and the system of Europe, and to ruin England. It left NAPOLEON I. at liberty, with the consent and countenance of Russia, to pursue his ambitious designs—to dethrone the BOURBON dynasty in Spain, and hand over

that realm to one of his own family; and it pledged that crowned robber, when his Spanish project should be consummated, to assist ALEXANDER of Russia to drive the Turks out of Europe.

The part for England to take at this grave crisis is plain and obvious. Shall we wait till the might of Austria and Prussia has been worsted, and then meet the combined enemy single-handed, or shall we at once announce to Russia, that the first battalion she marches over her frontier, shall bring down on her coasts, north and south, the blockading squadrons of England? With this war in Italy we have no immediate concern, so long as it is confined to Sardinia, France, and Austria. The moment there is any movement on the part of Russia, any way to support the French aggression, then we become directly interested in the conflict. The united squadrons of France, Russia, Sardinia and Denmark, must prepare to meet the English fleet. The COMMANDER IN CHIEF has declared our army to be ready, and Sir JOHN PAKINGTON has provided squadrons for the Channel and the Mediterranean; but neither of these high functionaries, in speaking of our armaments, had any suspicion of the potent combination—we may even say, the dark conspiracy—which the last few hours have revealed. We have no hesitation in saying that both our naval and military forces are inadequate to our requirements. Let us immediately arm for this awful, this inevitable struggle. As regards our home defences, we may hope that the suggestion for volunteer rifle corps, which was made some time ago in our pages by a distinguished contributor, and has just been brought forward by a morning journal as its own idea, will now be carried out. Not a moment should be lost in embodying and perfecting the militia, and giving a war strength to the army. But above all, and before all, let us prepare, with the whole energy and the whole material power of the country, to launch such a fleet as shall, despite this formidable combination of the navies of Europe, preserve to England the absolute command and undisputed sovereignty of the seas. While we retain the trident, England—Europe is safe.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

A Good Time Coming. By the Author of "Matthew Paxton." 3 v

The future is not only mysterious, but, unless we are incorrigibly gl
it is always promising. Whatever our lot, we may look to time for
amelioration, and consider we may yet be recompensed by destiny. T
forward is an instinct, which more or less animates us all, and buoys
under difficulties that would otherwise be unendurable. This is espe
the case in the humbler walks of life, among those whose whole care
struggle; and, accordingly, it is among such characters that the tale
us, which takes this sentiment for its theme, runs its course. The a
has entered a fruitful field, but one which, dealing with but every d
cidents, can only be grasped by a dexterous hand. The story is laid c
at Liverpool, and turns on the fortunes of a young artisan, who has a
cousin in Cheshire; and, of course, takes advantage of a holiday to pa
a visit. But if the reader supposes that Oswald has any designs on b
Kate, or that the stars have fated them for each other, he will prove
taken; for, though not unimpressed by her boarding-school grace
Liverpool lad makes no sign. We soon find him plunging into the M
to rescue a young girl from drowning, and now the simple tale beg
expand, and takes in a wider sweep of characters. Quinta, as the
girl is named, is the daughter of an eccentric old gentleman, fam
known as "old Cockolorum," and his family circle is very happily desc
Herein lies, indeed, the author's forte, for the story necessarily de
much on the delineation of character, and the manner in which it is sust
But a pervading interest is created by the manly struggles of the hero
his battle with fortune, which ends, at last, in deserved success.
story is remarkable for its simplicity and truthfulness, and without
straining after effect, retains its hold on the mind, and leaves beh
pleasing impression.

Life's Foreshadowings. 3 vols.

In these days everything is settled by statistics, and the Registrar-Ge
announces that the most marrying classes of her Majesty's subject
widowers, particularly those who have reached a respectable age.
experience, however, goes to attest that second marriages are seldom h
and it is not reasonable to expect that such a connection can be formed
late period of life without great hazard. Poets and novelists have wr
largely on this text, and here we have a very agreeable story, found
the same theme. The author aims to convey a practical moral lesso
dramatic form, and through the medium of a domestic history. If
marriages call for mutual forbearance in the two principals, the marria
later life exacts the same demeanour, not only from the parties themse
but from all around and near them. In the tale before us, Mr. P
Henderson is left a widower, with a pretty daughter, who, of course
little spoiled, and now thinks herself her own mistress. Jay—for so
named—has a friend, Annie, as pretty as herself, and about her own
In due course she attracts the attention of Mr. Pierce Henderson, wh
comes her accepted lover, to the great chagrin of Christie Roach, a
known rival. Annie is intercepted by the latter in a lonely spot, and
is a very effective scene, ending in the young girl's escape, and the conf
of her assailant. She next appears as the bride of Mr. Henderson, and
finds herself entangled with her former friend Jay, who resists all over
of peace, and keeps up continual strife. At last, Annie breaks down,
when too late, Jay repents of her harsh conduct, and solicits and rec

forgiveness. From this point, the interest of the story centres on Jay, and there is a spirited sketch of conventual life in France, whither she is sent by her father, and where she passes some time under the charge of the sisterhood. The whole narrative is forcibly written, and cleverly worked out, giving promise that the author, by following up his success, will take a more than average place as a novelist.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE.

With a view of promoting the interests of the Service, this department of the Magazine is open to all authentic communications, and, therefore, the Editor cannot hold himself responsible for the opinions expressed.—Ed. U. S. Mag.]

MANNING THE NAVY.

To the Editor of the United Service Magazine.

Reigate, 18th April, 1859.

Sir,—I have been reading with great interest the bulky Blue Book, lately published, containing the evidence taken before the Royal Manning Commission; with many valuable suggestions and statistical tables in the appendix.

As many persons of different degrees, who were considered worthy of a hearing, were examined before the Commission, and appear to have given their evidence without reserve, myself and others have now the opportunity of forming a more correct judgment of the real state of matters, and the means of confirming, qualifying, or abandoning the notions we have hitherto entertained, for every officer has formed some opinion about Manning the Fleet.

The concurrent evidence of the Shipping Masters, the Superintendents of Steam Companies, and others, prove that impressment can no longer be depended on to gather sailors, and even if gathered they would not be available until they had undergone a training in gunnery, for things are greatly changed since the introduction of steam, and the perfection to which naval gunnery has been brought. It is, therefore, under such circumstances, a happy thing that the Commissioners have pointed out and recommended a scheme for forming a reserve of merchant seamen, under regulations which will benefit all parties. The scheme appears to be not only feasible and admirable, but to have met the support of the Coast Guard Officers, the Shipping Masters, and other parties who are to carry it into effect. The title of these last-named officials is new to me, and I last week took the opportunity of visiting a shipping office in a principal sea port, and found the system established for some years past—for engaging and paying of crews, remitting wages, recording character, &c.—working most admirably. If the cordial co-operation of these agents—and I find there is one or more in every port in the kingdom, and also the colonies—can be secured, anything can be done with our merchant seamen, for they have, evidently, great influence over them; and from what I have seen and heard, they are very intelligent men. It cannot be expected that they will lend their aid to procuring men for the navy in ordinary times, particularly when crews are in demand for merchant ships, as I find is the case at present. I should as soon expect a naval rendezvous to enter men for the merchant service; but I am assured that for selecting fit subjects for the proposed Royal Naval Volunteers, who are only to be called into permanent service in case of war, they would be invaluable agents, as in many ports, every individual seaman—his character and connections, is known to them; and, moreover, the sea-

men working out of these ports, come under their review at every opera of signing articles or paying wages. I learn that there will be no diffic in establishing an admirable reserve force of reliable men, on the condi set forth in the Report of the Committee, and I am also assured that if regulation *was now in force*, there would be no difficulty in obtaining p men for the navy, for many young seamen would, when training for Volun Corps, enter the navy, and many would, by association with the crews o Coast Guard ships, and by their insight into naval duties when on board come acquainted with the advantages of the naval service, which advanta strange to say, are at present little known to merchant seamen, the na of the service being falsely represented by those who have deserted, or l rejected as worthless characters, with indifferent certificates.

A Captain, R.I

A MIDSHIPMAN'S GRIEVANCE.

To the Editor of the United Service Magazine.

Mr. Editor,—I hope you will excuse my troubling you on such a tri subject; but at the same time I shall be much obliged to you if you be so kind as to place this in your widely-circulated journal.

The subject of my letter is based on the new regulation lately issued the Lords of the Admiralty with respect to midshipmen.

The old regulation was that, after entering the service, you should se two years as Naval Cadet, and four years as Midshipman, after which, if s to pass a certain examination, you attain the rank of Mate. About a y or more ago, their Lordships were pleased to make a new regulation, by wh the examinations were made more difficult, and a Naval Cadet's time service was reduced to eighteen months, and a Midshipman's to three ye and five months, at which time the candidate, if nineteen years of age, a competent to pass the harder of the two examinations, is allowed to att the rank of Mate. And now allow me to refer you to my own ca of which there are many similar ones. I entered the service in the lat part of 1856, and on the same day in 1858 I passed for Midshipman. I endeavour to pass by the new regulation, my time will be up in January 1862, which is four months prior to the new regulation coming entirely in force; but if I should wait for the six years, my time is not up till Decemb 1862, which is after the time of the new regulation coming into force; a so if I pass, the five or six years being up, I must in both cases pass t hardest of the two examinations.

Now this, Sir, is the question which I would ask:—Are those who enter in the latter part of 1856 to pass the hardest of the two examinations, havi served six years? I should be much obliged if you would be so kind as to answ this question in a satisfactory manner, as it is of the most vital importance the present midshipmen of the service, and I have the honour to be,

One of the Numbers.

NAVAL AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

THANKSGIVING FOR OUR SUCCESSES IN INDIA.

"At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 12th day of April, 1859, present, the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

"It is this day ordered by Her Majesty in Council that his Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury do prepare a form of prayer and thanksgiving to Almighty God for the constant and signal successes obtained by the Troops of Her Majesty and by the whole of the Forces serving in India, whereby the late sanguinary mutiny and rebellion which had broken out in that country hath been effectually suppressed, and the blessings of tranquility, order, and peace are restored to her Majesty's subjects in the East; and it is ordered that such form of prayer and thanksgiving be used in all churches and chapels in England and Wales, and in the town of Berwick-upon-Tweed, upon Sunday, the 1st day of May next.

"And it is hereby further ordered that Her Majesty's printer do forthwith print a competent number of copies of the said form of prayer and thanksgiving, in order that the same may be forthwith sent round and read in the several churches and chapels in England and Wales, and in the town of Berwick-upon-Tweed. WM. L. BATHURST."

A similar order is also made extending to Scotland.

THE VOTE OF THANKS TO THE INDIAN ARMY.

The following are the terms of the resolutions passed, in the House of Lords and in the Commons:—

"1. That the thanks of this House be given to the Right Hon. Charles John Viscount Canning, G.C.B., Her Majesty's Viceroy and Governor-General of India; the Right Hon. Lord John Elphinstone, G.C.B., Governor of the Presidency of Bombay; Sir John Laird Mair Lawrence, Bart., G.C.B., late Lieut.-General of the Punjaub; Sir Robert North Collie Hamilton, Bart., agent to the Governor-General in Central India; Henry Bartle Edward Frere, Esq., Commissioner of Scinde; Robert Montgomery, Esq., late Chief Commissioner in Oude—for the ability with which they have severally employed the resources at their disposal for the re-establishment of peace in Her Majesty's Indian dominions.

"2. That the thanks of this House be given to General the Right Hon. Lord Clyde, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief in India; Lieutenant General Sir James Outram, Bart., G.C.B.; Major General Sir Hugh Henry Rose, G.C.B.,; Major General Henry Gee Roberts; Major General George Cornish Whitlock; Major General Sir Archdale Wilson, Bart., K.C.B.; Major General Sir James Hope Grant, K.C.B.; Major General Sir William Rose Mansfield, K.C.B.; Major General Sir Thomas Harte Franks, K.C.B.; Major General Sir Edward Lugard, K.C.B.; Major General Sir John Michel, K.C.B.; Brigadier General Robert Walpole, C.B.; Brigadier General Sir Robert Napier, K.C.B.—for the eminent skill, courage, and perseverance displayed by them during the Military operations by which the late insurrection in India has been effectually suppressed.

"3. That the thanks of this House be given to the other gallant Officers of Her Majesty's Army and Navy, and also of Her Majesty's Indian Forces, for the intrepidity, zeal, and endurance evinced by them in the arduous operations of the late Indian campaign.

"4. That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the vi self-devotion, and brilliant services, of the Non-Commissioned Officers Private Soldiers, both European and Native, who have taken part in the pression of the recent disturbances in India; and that the same be sig to them by the Commanders of their several Corps, who are desired to t them for their gallant behaviour."

THE VICTORIA CROSS.

WAR-OFFICE, April 12.—The Queen has been graciously pleased to co the grant of the decoration of the Victoria Cross to the undermen officer and private of her Majesty's Army, which decoration has provisionally conferred upon them by the Commander-in-Chief in Ind accordance with the rules laid down in her Majesty's warrant instit the same, on account of acts of bravery performed by them during the o tions under his personal command, as recorded against their names, v

23rd Regiment—Lieut. (now Captain) Thomas Bernard Hackett; d act of bravery, Nov. 18, 1857.—For daring gallantry at Secundra Lucknow, on the 18th Nov., 1857, in having with others rescued a Cor of the 23rd Regiment, who was lying wounded and exposed to a very fire; also for conspicuous bravery, in having under a heavy ascended the roof, and cut down the thatch of a bungalow, to pr its being set on fire. This was a most important service at the time.

23rd Regiment—Private George Monger; date of act of bra Nov 18, 1857.—For daring gallantry at Secundra Bagh, Lucknow, o 19th of Nov., 1857, in having volunteered to accompany Lieut. Ha whom he assisted in bringing in a Corporal of the 23rd Regiment, wh lying wounded in an exposed position.

Her Majesty has also been graciously pleased to signify her intenti confer the decoration of the Victoria Cross on the undermentioned of and soldiers of her Majesty's Army and Indian Military Forces, claims to the same have been submitted for her Majesty's approva account of acts of bravery performed by them in India, as recorded a their several names, viz.:—

79th Regiment—Colour Serjeant Stewart M'Pherson; date of a bravery, Sept. 26th, 1857.—For daring gallantry in the Lucknow Resi on the 26th Sept., 1857, in having rescued, at great personal risk, a wou private of his company, who was lying in a most exposed situation, un very heavy fire. Colour Serjeant M'Pherson was also distinguished on occasions by his coolness and gallantry in action.

64th Regiment—Drummer Thomas Flinn; date of act of bravery, 28, 1857.—For conspicuous gallantry in the charge on the enemy's gun Nov. 28, 1857, when being himself wounded, he engaged in a hand-to- encounter two of the rebel Artillerymen.

Bengal Horse Artillery—Captain George Alexander Renny; date o of bravery, Sept. 16, 1857.—Lieutenant Colonel Farquhar, commanding 1st Belooch Regiment, reports that he was in command of the t stationed in the Delhi magazine, after its capture on the 16th of Sept., Early in the forenoon of that day, a vigorous attack was made on the by the enemy, and was kept up with great violence for some time, wit the slightest chance of success. Under cover of a heavy cross fire fron high houses on the right flank of the magazine, and, from Selinghur and palace, the enemy advanced to the high wall of the magazine, and endeavo to set fire to a thatched roof. The roof was partially set fire to, which extinguished at the spot by a Sepoy of the Belooch Battalion, a soldi the 61st Regiment having in vain attempted to do so. The roof having been set on fire, Captain Renny with great gallantry mounted to the top of the

of the magazine, and flung several shells with lighted fuzees over into the midst of the enemy, which had an almost immediate effect, as the attack at once became feeble at that point, and soon after ceased there.

Bengal Army (Unattached)—Ensign (now Lieutenant) Patrick Roddy; date of act of bravery, Sept. 29, 1858.—Major General Sir James Hope Grant, K.C.B., Commanding Oude Force, bears testimony to the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Roddy on several occasions. One instance is particularly mentioned. On the return from Kuthirga of the Kappurthulla Contingent, on the 27th of September, 1858, this officer, when engaged with the enemy, charged a rebel (armed with a percussion musket) whom the Cavalry were afraid to approach, as each time they attempted to do so the rebel knelt and covered his assailant; this, however, did not deter Lieutenant Roddy, who went boldly in, and when within six yards the rebel fired, killing Lieutenant Roddy's horse, and before he could get disengaged from the horse the rebel attempted to cut him down. Lieutenant Roddy seized the rebel until he could get at his sword, when he ran the man through the body. The rebel turned out to be a Subadar of the late 8th Native Infantry, a powerful man and a most determined character.

RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN ARMY SCHOOLS.

War-Office, April 2.—In order to prevent as much as possible interference with the ordinary school duties in Garrisons and Camps, and to secure uniformity of practice at home and abroad, the Secretary of State for War desires that the following rules for the management of schools for religious instruction shall be observed:—

1. Children attending the day schools of Regiments and Garrisons, as well as the band and Drummer boys, may attend the Chaplain for religious instruction at such hours and at such places as may be appointed by the authorities on the spot.

2. Religious instruction shall be communicated on two days in every week for one hour each day, to be taken out of the ordinary hours of school attendance. It will also be given on Sunday, either before or after the morning service, as shall be found most convenient.

3. The children and others of the several persuasions shall attend their respective Chaplains for religious instruction.

4. The hour from 11 to 12 is recommended as best suited to this purpose, and Tuesday and Thursday seem to be appropriate days, provided other duties are not thereby interfered with.

5. The young persons under religious instruction by the Chaplain of the Church of England, and by the Presbyterian Chaplain, may assemble in the same room, in separate compartments. The Roman Catholics will assemble separately, the Commanding Officer assigning the place for each class, as local convenience and their relative numbers may dictate.

6. The children attending these classes should be in their places a minute or two before 11 o'clock each day, so as to afford time for calling the roll, and devoting an entire hour to the purposes of instruction, and the classes should open with prayer.

GENERAL ORDERS AND CIRCULARS.

Distribution of a Regiment.—A Circular Memorandum directs that Regiment and Battalions of Infantry of the Line at home and abroad (except those in India, and the 65th Regiment, which remain as at present) are to be divided as follows, in consequence of the recent augmentation of two Serjeants and two Corporals, viz.:—10 Service Companies—3 Field Officers

10 Captains, 12 Lieutenants, 8 Ensigns, 6 Staff, 46 Serjeants (exclusive of Schoolmaster), 21 Drummers, 40 Corporals, and 760 Privates, 2 Depot Companies—2 Captains, 2 Lieutenants, 2 Ensigns, 10 Serjeants (exclusive of Schoolmaster), 4 Drummers, 10 Corporals, and 140 Privates. Highland Regiments have a Pipe-Major and five Pipers in addition, who belong to the Service Companies.

BILLETTING.

WAR-OFFICE, April 11.—The Mutiny Act for the present year has provided that allowances at the following rates shall be paid for billetting Soldiers:-

IN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND.

	Per Day.
On a march—payable to the innkeeper when the Soldier is provided by him with a hot meal, according to the Mutiny Act.	10d.
The same—payable to the innkeeper for bed, fire, candles, &c.	2½d.
In stationary quarters—the same	4d.

IN IRELAND.

On march and in stationary quarters—payable to the inhabitant for bed, use of fire, candle, &c.	4d.

The increased allowances above specified may be paid and charged from and after the 1st of April, 1859.

The allowances chargeable in the public accounts for Soldiers on the march, or billetted in stationary quarters, will, therefore, be as follows:—

	Great Britain. Per day.	Ireland Per day.
In stationary quarters—payable to the innkeeper or inhabitants	4d. ...	4d.
On the march—payable to the innkeeper or inhabitant, for a hot meal	10d. ...	—
The same—to the innkeeper or inhabitant for bed, fire, candle, &c.	2½d. ...	4d.
The same—to the Soldier himself,		
Of Cavalry	1d. ...	3d.
Of Infantry	3d. ...	4d.

ORDERS IN COUNCIL RELATIVE TO SECOND MASTERS.—The following important Order in Council, bearing date 11th January last, has just been promulgated:—

"Whereas there was this day read at the Board a Memorial from the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated 30th November, 1858, in the words following, viz.;—Whereas by the Regulations of the Government of your Majesty's Naval Service, cap. 3, article 6, page 24, we are empowered, in cases of distinguished conduct, to confer the rank of Lieutenant on Masters of your Majesty's Navy, and being of opinion that it would tend to the advantage of the Naval Service if the same boon were to be extended in particular and deserving instances to the Second Masters of your Majesty's Fleet, we would humbly propose that in future we be empowered by your Majesty to promote a Second Master to the rank of Lieutenant, in cases in which he has performed, while in the execution of his duty, such special and brilliant service as, in our opinion, may entitle him to the boon. We would further humbly suggest that, before a Second Master be considered eligible to be promoted, he shall be required to have served at sea for seven years, but that there shall be no necessity for his having been rated as Midshipman during any of that period, as required in ordinary cases of advancement to the rank of Lieutenant.' Her Majesty, having taken the said Memorial into consideration, was pleased by and with

the advice of Her Privy Council, to approve of what is therein proposed; and the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly. — Signed, WM. L. BATHURST."

IMPROVED ORDNANCE.

THE DIAPHRAGM SHELL.—The improved description of Shrapnel shell, introduced and invented by Captain Boxer, R.A., Superintendent of the Royal Laboratory Department at Woolwich Arsenal, and for which and other inventions that officer received a reward of £5,000 from the Government, is to be adopted in the Artillery Service, in accordance with the following general Regimental Order from the Adjutant General, promulgated at Head-Quarters, Woolwich :—

"On the recommendation of a Committee of Officers recently appointed to investigate and report upon the diaphragm Shrapnel shell, proposed by Captain Boxer, the Secretary of State for War has approved of the adoption of that shell, fitted with a gun-metal screw-plug; and diagrams, prepared by Captain Boxer, for the gauges and dimensions have been signed by Secretary Major General Peel, and deposited with the Superintendent of the Royal Laboratories with instructions to adhere strictly to them. The adoption of Capt. Boxer's diaphragm Shrapnel shell is not to affect the order which directs that all natures of shells in the ammunition-boxes of field artillery carriages are to be carried unloaded; but as there is no reason to doubt that the diaphragm Shrapnel shell may be carried loaded with safety for short periods, commanding officers may, at their discretion, load a small number of these shells before they may be required."

Each battery of field artillery in the United Kingdom will shortly be furnished with a fresh equipment of shells, fuzes, and shell implements, in exchange for those in store; and all obsolete shells, fuzes, and tubes, will be withdrawn from the different stations as soon as possible, and replaced by the latest approved description.

GUNROOM AND ENGINEERS' MESSES.—An Admiralty Circular has been recently issued, directing that the same restrictions be placed on the use of wine and spirits in the Engineers's Messes as are placed on the Gunroom Messes of her Majesty's ships, by their Circular, No. 282 of 12th December, 1856; and further that no spirits, except the ship's allowance be permitted to be received on board any of her Majesty's ships, for either the Gunroom or Engineers' Messes, unless with the written permission of the Captain.

THE ROYAL ARTILLERY.—The Commander-in-Chief has issued instructions for the designations of battalions, troops, and companies to be abolished, and the appropriation of brigade and battery in their stead. The following is the detail of the various stations to which the brigades have been appointed, namely—Horse Brigade, head quarters Woolwich; 1st Brigade Siege Artillery, head quarters Woolwich; 2nd Brigade Siege Artillery, head quarters Dover; 3rd Brigade Siege Artillery, head quarters Plymouth; 4th Brigade, Field Artillery, head quarters Woolwich; 5th Brigade Siege Artillery, head quarters Gibraltar; 6th Brigade Siege Artillery, head quarters Malta; 7th Brigade Siege Artillery, head quarters Quebec; 8th Brigade, Field Artillery, head quarters Portsmouth; 9th Brigade Field Artillery, head quarters Ballincollig; 10th Brigade Siege Artillery, head quarters Guernsey; 11th Brigade Field Artillery, head quarters Bengal; 12th Brigade Siege Artillery, head quarters the Mauritius; 13th Brigade Field Artillery, head quarters Bombay; and 14th Brigade Field Artillery, head quarters Bengal. The regimental staff of the existing battalions are to form brigades bearing corresponding numbers, and proceed in the early part of June, in the first

instance, to the stations already named at head quarters. The depot brigade at Woolwich will supersede the present Adjutant's and Field Battery detachments at Woolwich, to which the regimental staff of the Field Batteries will be transferred, and will recruit for foreign service brigades. The reliefs will be carried on by entire brigades.

GARRISON ORDER AT DINAPORE.—The following order was issued by Brigadier Christie, on the departure of the 1st Battalion, 10th Regiment, from Dinapore:—"In directing the march of the 10th Foot, *en route* to the Presidency, for the purpose of embarking for England after a most honourable career in India of upwards of sixteen years, Brigadier Christie desires to express his unqualified approbation of the high state of discipline which the regiment has always maintained since it has been under his command, now off and on upwards of fifteen months; and begs to assure every individual composing it of the high estimation in which they are held by him. Brigadier Christie further desires to express to Lieutenant-Colonel Long, and to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, his admiration of their gallant conduct in the field, as well as the orderly and steady conduct of the men in quarters. It is thus they have sustained the reputation for gallantry and high discipline which Brigadier Christie is happy to believe has ever distinguished the 10th Foot, whenever and wherever employed. It is impossible not to regret the departure of such a magnificent regiment from the Dinapore Brigade. Brigadier Christie assures both officers and men that he will always entertain the warmest interest in their future welfare, and they will ever bear with them his hearty good wishes. To one and all he wishes an affectionate farewell, and safe arrival in their native and."

WOOLWICH GARRISON.—The official department of the Royal Engineers, hitherto situate in one of the west wings of the Royal Artillery Barracks, has been transferred to the new department erected near the White-gate in Millwall-lane. The old offices are ordered to be forthwith converted into mess quarters for the use of the non-commissioned officers belonging to the regiments in garrison, an arrangement which will confer a great boon on the unmarried quartermaster sergeants, and others of that class, who have heretofore been provided with no accommodation for mess distinct from the private soldier and raw recruits. The method recommended by the Sanitary Commission in their recent official inspection of Woolwich Garrison, for furnishing a number of baths and wash-houses for the free accommodation of the private soldiers is now complete. Seven of these rooms were yesterday given over to the authorities for that purpose. Each room contains seven spacious baths, supplied with hot and cold water at discretion, and are situated so as to be easily accessible, being contiguous to the barrack quarters.

THE LATE ADMIRAL HATTON.—The will of Vice Admiral Villiers Francis Hatton, of Eaton-place, Belgrave-square, and of Delgarry, Ireland, was proved in London, in the Principal Registry of the Court of Probate, by Colonel the Hon. James Lindsay, and Lieut. Colonel Villiers Latouche Hatton, the son, the joint executors. The personal property in England was sworn under £8,000.

ARMSTRONG'S GUNS FOR THE NAVY.—The question of adapting Armstrong's gun for naval service is now under the consideration of a committee, consisting of Admiral Sir Thomas Hastings, Chairman; Captain Caffin, C.B., Secretary; Sir John Burgoyne, G.C.B., Inspector General of Fortifications, and General Sir Howard Douglas. The committee has conferred with the Ordnance Select Committee at Woolwich, of which Major General Cator, C.B., Royal Artillery, is President, and Colonel Tulloch, Superintendent of the Royal Carriage

Department, is now engaged in directing the construction of various specimens of gun carriages, which will be tested, with a view to enhance the efficiency of Sir W. Armstrong's invention, for the Military and Naval Services.

Improved Gun Carriages.—After various experiments to test the advantage of a new description of gun carriage invented by Major Clark, R.A., the Ordnance Select Committee have recommended its adoption in the service; and the following general Regimental Order on the subject has been notified at Head Quarters, Woolwich:—"The General Commanding-in-Chief has concurred with the Secretary of State for War in the desirability of substituting for the present bracket trail-carriage for 18-pounder guns a block trail-carriage, constructed on Major Clerk's principle, which has been fully subjected to trial, and is found to possess the great advantage of carrying 24 rounds of ammunition constantly with the gun, as well as being of simpler construction." An alteration is also to be made in the construction of the wheels of siege carriages, by fitting them with a double row of 6-inch tiers, and having the felloe parallel and rounded off in the inside, and the tennons of the spoke round, and of the same form as those proposed by Major Clerk.

The Chatterhouse Memorial to Havelock.—The military memorial proposed to be erected by Carthusians to perpetuate the memory of Sir Henry Havelock and other Carthusians, who fell in the service of their country in the late Indian and Russian wars, will assume the form of a monument, and the foundation of a scholarship connected with the school. Amongst the subscribers are Lord Panmure, Sir J. D. Harding, the Queen's Advocate, the Bishop of St. David's, Sir E. A. H. Lechmere, Bart., Archdeacon Hale, Mr. T. Collins, M.P., Mr. DuCane, M.P., Archdeacon Clerke, the Hon. W. Byron, Admiral O'Brien, and other gentlemen.

The Indian Mutiny Relief Fund.—The general committee for the relief of the sufferers by the Indian revolt have published a report relative to the affairs of the fund from the date of the last report—viz., the 3rd of February, 1858, to the close of that year. Having laid down a plan for administering relief, the committee state that in accordance therewith relief had been afforded from the commencement of the fund to December 31, 1858, in the following cases, and to the amount specified:—Donations (Military), 27,924*l.* 1s. 9d.; loans (Military), 4,533*l.* 19s. 11d.; donations (civil classes), 8,613*l.* 5s. 9d.; loans (civil classes), 1,877*l.* 7s. 7d.—total, 42,948*l.* 15s. The sum of 6,204*l.* 17s. 4d. over and above expenses had been added to the available resources for the past year. The total amount of subscriptions, with interest and premium, was, on the 31st of December, 440,963*l.* 19s. 3d., swelled afterwards by repayments of loans to 442,476*l.* 10s. 1d. In addition to the subscriptions in the three kingdoms, subscriptions had been received from Australia, Africa, Brazil, California, China, Egypt, France, Falkland Island, Grenada, Greece, Holland, Ionian Islands, Java, Mexico, Malta, North American colonies, New Holland, New South Wales, New Granada, Norway, Prince Edward's Island, Portugal, Prussia, Persia, Peru, Russia, South America, Sardinia, Spain, St. Helena, Turkey, Tunis, United States, and the West Indies. From the legislature of Victoria the committee had received a sum of 25,000*l.*, and from a "Lady in Belgravia" 850*l.* The total expenditure up to December 31, 1858, was 175,710*l.* 7s., of which 127,286*l.* 10s. 7d. had been sent out to India. The sum given to sufferers in Great Britain up to the same time was 42,948*l.* 15s.—viz., to Military classes (donations), 27,924*l.* 1s. 9d.; ditto (loans), 4,533*l.* 19s. 11d.; to civil classes (donations), 8,613*l.* 5s. 2d.; ditto (loans), 1,877*l.* 7s. 7d.

We have lately seen exhibited, at the Society of Arts and at Lloyd's, a very clever and useful invention for the purpose of intimating disasters at sea. It is called "Graham's Patent Rescue Buoy," and intended to be thrown over-

board from a sinking vessel, or vessel on fire, at the last moment; and it has capacity for holding, besides the record paper in which the few last words are to be written, giving an account of the calamity up to the latest moment, the ship's log and other articles, such as letters, wills, or valuables, to the extent of ten or twelve pounds' weight. It is of course water tight, and has a space all round between the outer case and the cylinder, which being filled with cork shavings prevents it from sinking, even when fractured and water-logged. In order to render it conspicuous at sea, and distinct from any other floating object, it has elevated on its surface a strong glass silvered ball, of six or eight inches diameter, which reflects the light and renders it visible at a long distance. No doubt these buoys will be generally adopted, particularly by passenger ships; and we think that the patentee should bring it under the notice of the Board of Admiralty. Had one or more of them been available and thrown overboard from the unfortunate Sappho, the anxious relatives of the officers and crew would long since have been put out of suspense, and informed of the manner of her loss.

THE INDIAN MUTINY.—A voluminous return has been issued of the names or numbers of all the Regular and Irregular regiments which have mutinied or manifested a disposition to mutiny since the 1st of January, 1857. Much detailed information is also given as to the exact time when symptoms of disaffection were observed, their nature, the number of officers and men present with the regiment at the time, and so forth, while remarks are in each case subjoined by the commanding officers. The Bengal establishment is taken first. The return contains no sort of summary, and the information it contains is therefore in a very unmanageable form; we find, however, that in all sixty-four regiments on this establishment mutinied, or manifested a disposition to mutiny. The following are the regiments of Native Infantry, the whole or a large portion of which absolutely mutinied:—the 17th, 32nd, 34th, 7th, 8th, 17th, 37th, 40th, 9th, 44th, 54th, 69th, 23rd, 52nd, 5th, 36th, 60th, 61st, 46th, 45th, 57th, 14th, 51st, 55th, 15th, 30th, and 72nd. In the Peshawur district eleven regiments either mutinied or manifested a disposition to do so, the greater number being regiments of Native Infantry. Eight regiments or parts of regiments only in the Bombay army are returned in the present lists as having joined the rebellion.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF INDIAN TELEGRAPHY.—Indian telegraphs are, it appears, liable to extraordinary accidents. Not only do rebels cut the wires, but wild beasts repair to the posts under the impression that they are provided with the benevolent thoughtfulness which secured for the Duke of Argyll the blessing of his grateful countrymen; and when elephants allay cutaneous irritation by a good rubbing against a pole, it generally comes to grief. Then, again, monkeys, under a complete misapprehension of the objects of the telegraphic system, delight to use the wire for athletic sports and pastimes. Half a dozen great monkeys or baboons may sometimes be seen at work on one feeble stretch of wire, posturing, grinning, and chattering away in the highest spirits—some walking topsy-turvy along it, others tugging it up and down with main force, considerably increased by the circumstance that other monkeys were hanging on by their tails, and others striving to detach the wire from the posts, so as to give their friends a sudden fall; white ants eat the base of the posts away; sudden gusts of wind blow miles of wire and posts flat to the earth—in a word, there are special disturbing influences at work in India from which European telegraphs are exempt; and in addition to these physical causes of interruption, there are the moral impediments presented by the nature of the materials with which the superintendent has to work.

MILITARY SAVINGS BANK.—The total balance due by the public depositors in military and militia savings banks, on the 31st March, 1857,

amounted to 161,353*l.*, and the number of accounts then open to 10,781. 114,482*l.* had been withdrawn during the past year (275,136*l.*—114,482*l.*—161,354*l.*), allowing aliquot parts of the pound sterling. 196,108*l.* is given as the total amount of the fund for military savings banks up to the date of the account (March, 1859).

Death of Lieutenant-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, G.C.B., and K.H.—We regret to learn that Lieutenant-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, G.C.B., died suddenly at Aghada Hall, his seat in County Cork, from disease of the heart. The gallant officer, who had greatly distinguised himself, was fourth son of the late John Thackwell, Esq., of Ryecourt, Worcestershire. He entered the army in April, 1800, and during his career of nearly sixty years had gained the highest distinction in the service, particularly in the East Indies. Sir Joseph's services in the Peninsula are thus recorded by Hart:—"Served the campaign in Gallicia and Leon under Sir John Moore, and was engaged in several skirmishes, and present at the battle of Corunna; served the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 in the Peninsula, including the battles of Vittoria, the Pyrenees, in front of Pampeluna, the 27th, 28th, 29th, and 30th July; blockade of Pampeluna from the 18th to the 31st of October, when it surrendered; battle of Orthes, affairs of Tarbes, and battle of Toulouse, besides many affairs of advanced guards, outposts, &c. At Grenada he boldly attacked and forced back upwards of two hundred French dragoons with fifty of the 15th Hussars, making several prisoners, for which he was recommended for the rank of brevet-major by Lord Combermere. Served also the campaign of 1815, including the action at Quatre Bras, the retreat on the following day, and Battle of Waterloo. Commanded the cavalry division of the army of the Indus during the Affghanistan campaign; was present at the storm and capture of Ghuznee, and commanded the 2nd column of the army on its march from Cabul to Bengal." He commanded the cavalry division of the army of Gwalior throughout the Mahratta war in 1843, and commanded the cavalry divison at the action at Maharajpore, on the 29th December of that year. Was chief of the cavalry throughout the Sutlege war in 1846, and was present at Sobraon, where he led the 3rd Light Dragoons in single file into the intrenchments during the heat of the battle. Commanded the cavalry division in the Punjaub campaign, during which he repulsed the Sikh army at Sadolapore with a small British detachment. Sir Joseph greatly distinguished himself in these operations against the Sikhs in the campaigns of 1846 and 1849, for which eminent services he received the thanks of Parliament and of the East India Company, and was rewarded in the last-mentioned year by her Majesty nominating him a Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, the gallant General having formerly for his military services been made a Companion and Knight of that Order. During his honourable career in the service he had been several times wounded. Has been engaged in the suppression of many riots. Contused on the right shoulder at Vittoria, and twice severely wounded at Waterloo (left arm amputated close to the shoulder), in charging squares of infantry, and also had two horses shot under him; also received an almost fatal injury on the head at the Birmingham riots in 1816. On his return to England from the East Indies he was appointed Inspector-General of Cavalry in succession to his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge. In 1834 he was made a Knight of the Hanoverian Order, had received the silver war medal and three clasps for his services in the Peninsular, a medal for Sobraon, where he commanded the cavalry; and medal and clasps for the last Punjaub campaign; also the empty honour of the Dooranee Order for services in Affghanistan. In November, 1849, he was appointed Colonel of the 16th (the Queen's) Regiment of Light Dragoons (Lancers), which becomes at the disposal of the Horse Guards by his lamented decease. He was an intimate friend of the late General Havelock, and of Lord Clyde, Sir Harry Smith,

Lord Gough, and other noble and gallant veterans of the army. His commissions bore date as follows:—Cornet, 22nd of April, 1800; lieutenant, 13th of June, 1801; captain, 9th of April, 1807; major, 18th of June, 1815; lieutenant-colonel, 21st of June, 1817; colonel, 10th of January, 1837; major-general, 9th of November, 1846; and lieutenant-general, 20th of June, 1854. He owed everything to his own exertions, and was correctly described as a soldier of fortune. He was strongly recommended for a baronetcy by Lord Hardinge, when Commander-in Chief, but Lord Palmerston declined to give effect to the recommendation.

THE NAVY.—The sums required to be voted on account towards defraying the charges of certain naval services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st of March, 1860, amount to £2,500,000.

THE TEREDO-NAVALIS.—Admiral Dupetit Thouars has sent into the French Academy of Sciences some extraordinary specimens of the destructive powers of certain sea worms, consisting of fragments of vessels, which had been sent to him from Toulon. He has also sent, in a glass globe, a collection of those animalculæ, almost invisible at their birth, which have the power of penetrating into the hardest timber, in which they take up their residence, and in the end totally destroy it These specimens are to be deposited at the Jardin des Plantes. They are perforated with almost mathematical precision, and the question which naturally arises is, how vessels can be defended against the incessant attacks of those almost invisible enemies.

RED SEA SOUNDINGS.—The soundings obtained by Captain Pullen were as follows:—From Aden to Maculla, from 20 to 742 fathoms; from Maculla to the Kooria Mooria, from 100 to 1,150; from Ras-el-Had, from 21 to 897; from Ras-el-Had to Kurrachee, from 21 to 2,020 fathoms. Except between Hallania Ras-el-Had, where it is rocky, the entire bottom consists of mud and sand. The great inequalities in the sea-bed are supposed to be undulations which will not obstruct the successful submergence of the cable throughout the whole line.

INDIAN NAVY.—The *Gazette* thus notices an erratum in the *London Gazette* of the 26th of February, 1858:—"In the notification of the appointment of two officers of the Indian Navy to be Extra Members of the Military Division of the Third Class, or Companions of the Order of the Bath, for Captain John William Young, read Captain John Wellington Young."

DISTRIBUTION OF THE BOMBAY ARMY.

The following is the distribution of the Bombay Army, corrected to the 1st February.

HER MAJESTY'S HOME TROOPS.

3rd (The Prince of Wales') Dragoon Guards	Ahmednuggur
Squadron Field Service	Field Service
Detachment	Sattara
Detachment	Sholapore
6th Inniskilling Dragoons	Kirkee
8th Hussars	Seepree
Left Wing	Nusserabad
14th Light Dragoons	Gwalior
Detachment	Field Service
Depot	Kirkee
17th Lancers	Mhow

Royal Regiment of British Artillery.

D Troop Horse Artillery	Mhow
8th Company, 1st Battalion	Rajpootana
2nd Company, 3rd Battalion	Poona
3rd Company, 4th Battalion	Neemuch
2nd Company, 11th Battalion	Aden
7th Company, 11th Battalion	Mhow
2nd Company, 13th Battalion	Baroda
5th Company, 14th Battalion	Calpee
8th Company, 14th Battalion	Kulladghee and Dharwar

Royal Corps of Engineers.

11th Company	Rajpootana Field Force
21st Company	Gwalior

Royal Regiments of British Infantry.

4th (The King's own Regt.)	Ahmedabad
18th Royal Irish 1st Battalion	Field Service
28th (North Gloucestershire) Regiment	Bombay
Detachment	Nassick
31st Huntingdonshire Regiment	Poona
33rd (The Duke of Wellington's Regiment)	Baroda
46th (South Devonshire) Regiment	Kurrachee
51st Regiment	Mooltan
56th West Essex Regiment	Belgaum
Detachment	Kulladghee
Detachment	Sholapore
Detachment	Sattara
57th Regiment	Field Service Khandeish
Detachment	Malligaum and Dhoolia
Wing	Aden
64th Regiment Foot	Futteghur
Depot	Belgaum
71st Highlanders	Gwalior
72nd Highlanders	Field Service, Rajpootana
74th Highlanders Detachment	Dharwar
78th Highlanders	Bareilly
Depot	Poona
83rd Regiment Foot	Rajpootana
Depot	Deesa
86th Regiment Foot	Gwalior, under orders to Poona
Depot	Poona
89th Regiment	Rajpootana Field Force
92nd Highlanders	Mhow
Detachment	Indore
95th Regiment Wing	Seepree
Depot	Deesa
German Legion	Poona

HER MAJESTY'S INDIAN BRITISH TROOPS

Regiment of Artillery.

Horse Brigade, Head quarters	Poona
1st (or Leslie's) Troop, Head Quarters	Jhansi
2nd Troop	Rajpootana
3rd Troop	Central India
4th Troop	Booranpor
1st Battalion, Head-quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Ahmedabad
2nd Company	Belgaum
3rd Company	Hydrabad
4th Company	Bombay
2nd Battalion, Head-quarters	Bombay
1st Company	Rajpootana
2nd Do.	Sattara
3rd Do.	Sholapore
4th Do.	Gwalior

Reserve Artillery.

1st Company	Shikarpoor
2nd Do.	Gwalior
Detachment	Jaulna
3rd Company	Kolapoor
4th Do.	Kurrachee

Corps of Engineers.

Head Quarters	Poona

Infantry.

1st European Regiment (Fusiliers) Head Quarters	Mooltan
Detachment	Umritseer
Depot	Kurrachee
2nd European Regiment L. I.	Belgaum
Wing	Kolapore
Detachment	Sanglee
3rd European Regiment	Jhansi
Depot	Ahmednuggur

HER MAJESTY'S NATIVE TROOPS.

Artillery.

3rd Battalion, Head-quarters	Ahmedabad
1st Company	Ahmedabad and Rajcote
2nd Do.	Ahmedabad
3rd Do.	Deesa
Detachment	Field Service
4th Company	Rajpootana Field Force
5th Do.	Ahmedabad
6th Do.	Aden
4th Battalion, Head Quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Booranpoor
Detachment	Chopra
2nd Company	Ahmednuggur
4th Do.	Mhow
6th Do.	Booranpore

Corps of Sappers and Miners.

Head Quarters (Bombay)	Poona
1st Company	Poona
2nd Do.	Aden
Detachment	Jhansi
3rd Company	Rajpootana
4th Do.	Poona
5th Do.	Poona
Detachment	Jhansi

Light Cavalry.

2nd Regiment Madras Light Cavalry	Sholapore
1st Regiment (Lancers)	Gwalior
Wing	Nusserabad
2nd Regiment Light Cavalry	Rajpootana
Detachment	Deesa
3rd Regiment Light Cavalry	Jhansi

Infantry.

1st Regiment N I. (Grenadiers)	Bombay
2nd do. do	Ahmedabad
3rd Regiment N. I.	Sholapore, under orders to Mhow
Detachment	Malligaum
4th do. do. (Rifles)	Sehore
5th do. N. I. I.	Ahmednuggur
6th do. N. I.	Poona
Detachment	Jaulna
7th do. do.	Bombay
8th do. do.	Baroda
9th do. do.	Central India
10th do. do.	Gwalior
11th do. do.	Ahmedabad

12th do. do. - -	Nusserabad
13th do. do. - -	Rajpootana
14th do. do - -	Kurrachee
Detachment - - - -	Ahmedabad
15th do. do. - -	Kolapore
Left Wing - - - - -	Kulludghee
16h do. do. -	Surat
Detachment - - -	Broach
17th do. do. -	Rajkote
18th do. do. -	Belgaum
Detachment - - -	North Canara
19th do. do. -	Malwa Division
20th do. do. -	Dharwar
22nd do. do. -	Sattara
Detachment - - -	Mahableshwur
Detachment - - -	Punderpore
23rd do. N. L. I. -	Mhow
24th Regiment N. I. -	Jhansi
Depot - - - -	Mhow
25th do. do. -	Gwalior under orders to Poona
Depot - - - -	Poona
26th do. do. -	Khundera
28th do. do. -	Sholapore
29th do. do. -	Aden
30th do. do. -	Dholia
Detachment - - -	Asseerghur
31st do. do. -	Deesa
1st Extra Battalion -	Kurrachee
2nd Extra Battalion -	Baroda
3rd Extra Battalion -	Belgaum
1st Belooch Extra Battalion	Allahabad
Depot - - - -	Hydrabad
2nd Belooch Extra Battalion	Deera Ghazee Khan
Depot - - - -	Shikarpoor
ENROLLED PENSIONERS.	
Detachment - - -	Tanna
Do. - - -	Poona
Detachment - - -	Doolapee
Do. - - -	Malwan
Do. - - -	Ahmednuggur
IRREGULAR AND LOCAL CORPS.	
Military.	
Poona Irregular Horse -	Field Service Khandeish
1st Regiment Scinde Irregular Horse - - -	Jacobabad
2nd Regiment Do. -	Jacobabad
3rd Regiment Do. -	Jacobabad
1st Regiment Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse	Kulladghee
Detachment - - -	Beejapore
2nd Regiment Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse	Kulladghee
Detachment - - -	Special Service Malwa Field Force
Marine Battalion - -	Bombay
1st Regiment Jacobs Rifles	Jacobabad
2nd Regiment Jacobs Rifles	Jacobabad
Native Veteran Battalion	Dapoolie
Civil	
Guzerat Irregular Horse -	Ahmedabad
Kutch Irregular Horse -	Bhooj
Kutch Legion - - -	Kutch
Guzerat Police Corps -	Kaira
1st Khandeish Bheel Corps	Dhurrumgaum
2nd Khandeish Bheel Corps	Dhurrumgaum
Ghaut Police Corps - -	Tanna
Sawunt Waree Local Corps	Sawunt Waree
Kolapore Infantry Corps -	Kolapore
Rutnagherry Rangers -	Rutnagherry
Guzerat Coolly Police Corps	Ahmedabad
Aden Police Troop - -	Special Service Malwa Field Force
Sind Extra Battalion -	En route to De

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

The following is the Distribution List of the Madras Army, corrected up to October, 1858.

CAVALRY.

Right Hon the Governor's Body Guard .....Madras
H. M. 1st Dragoon Guards ....Bangalore
H. M. 12th Royal Lancers Head quarters and Rt. Wing .....Secunderabad
Left Wing—Field Service—Gen. Whitlock's Division
1st Regt. Native Light Cavalry..Trichinopoly
2nd do. do.....Sholapore (under orders to Secunderabad.
3rd Regt. Native Light Cavalry, Head quarters. Left Wing.....Bangalore
Right Wing .....Bellary
th Regt. Native Light Cavalry..Bengal Field Force
5th do. do.....Bellary
6th do. do.....Bengal Field Service
7th do. do.....Kamptee
1 squadron Secunderabad

ARTILLERY.

H. Troops Royal Horse Artillery..St. Thos.' Mount
Head quarters Madras Horse Artillery .....Bangalore
A. Troop, Field Service Gen. White'ock's Division
B. Troop .....Secunderabad
C. Troop .....Bangalore
D. Troop .....Kamptee
E. Troop.....Bengal Field Service
F. Troop .....Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
No. 5. Comp. 1st Bat. Royal Artillery, and No. 1 Field Battery...St. Thos.' Mount
No. 3 Comp. 3rd Bat. Royal Artil. lery, and No. 9 Field Battery...Bellary
No. 5 Comp. 14th Bat. Royal Artillery, & No. 8 Field Battery..Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
No. 6 Cpy. 9th Bat. Ryl. Artillery. Secunderabad

FIRST BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters .....St. Thos. 'Moun
A Company — Head quarters & 2-thirds Co. ..Singapore; Half Company ...Penang; Detachment .....Masulipatan
B. Company .....Moulmein
C. Co. (No. 7 Horse Battery).....Bellary
D. Com. (No. 3 Horse Battery)...Rangoon

SECOND BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters .....Kamptee
A. Cop. (No 8 Bullock Battery) Trichinopoly
B. Co. Head quarters and ½ Co...Tonghoo; Half Company ...Shodygheen
C. Comp. (No. 5 Horse Battery) Bangalore
D. Copy. (No. 4 Bullock Battery) Head quarters and half .....Kamptee
Half Company.....Segtabildee

THIRD BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters .....Rangoon
A Company (No. 2 Horse Bat.) Bengal Service

B. Company (No. 4 Horse Bat.) Tonghoo
C. Company (No. 2 Bullock Bat.) Thayetmyo
D. Company (No. 5 Bullock Bat.) Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division

FOURTH BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters.....Secunderabad
A. Company (No. 1 Horse Bat.)...Field Service Gen. Whitelock
B. Company (No. 10 Bulk. Bat.) Ditto
C. Company (No. 3 Bulk. Bat.)...Secunderabad
... Company Head quarters and two-thirds.....Rangoon
One-third .....Bassein

FIFTH OR GOLUNDAUZE (NATIVE) BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters.....St. Thos.' Mount
A. Company Head quarters and two-thirds Company .....Penang
One-third Company .....Malacca
B. Company.....Singapore
C. Company (No. 1 Bulk. Bat.) Bengal Service
D. Company (No. 7 Bulk. Bat.)...Cannanore and Mangalore
E. Company (No. 9 Bulk Bat.)...Cuttack and Sambulpore
F. Company.....Meaday
1st Supplemental Company .....St. Thos.' Mount
2d do. do. .....Vizianagram
Details of several Companies ...Labuan

MADRAS ENGINEERS.

Head quarters .....Fort St. George

MADRAS SAPPERS AND MINERS—NATIVE.

Head quarters .....Dowlaishweram
A. Company.....Ditto
One Section with Gen. Whitlock's Field Service
B. Company .....Nerbudda (Bombay) Field Service
C. Company .....Bengal Service
D. Company .....Rangoon
E. Company ... .Dowlaishweram
One Section with Gen. Whitelock's Division
F. Company .....Secunderabad
One Section .....Paumbem
G. Company .....Padoungmyo
H. Company .....Thayetmyo
I .Company .....Tongho
K. Company .....Dowlaishweram
L. Company .....Field Division Gen. Whitelock
M, Company .....Dowlaishweram

INFANTRY.

EUROPEAN.

H.M. 1st Royal Regt. (1st Bat.),.Secunderabad
H.M. 43rd Light Infantry .....Gen. Whitelock's Division Field Service
H.M. 44th Regiment .....Fort St. George
H.M. 60th Royal Rifles (3d. Bat.) Bangalore
3 Companies .....Bellary
1 do. .....Mysore
1 do. .....Hurryhur
H.M. 66th Regiment .....Cannanore
1 Company .....Mangalore
1 do. .....Sircee
H.M. 68th Regiment .....Rangoon
H.M. 69th Regiment .....Tonghoo
H.M. 74th Highlanders .....Bellary
1 Company .....Sholapore
3 Companies.....Field Service Southern Mahratta Country
The Madras Fusiliers .....Bengal on Field Service
2nd European Light Infantry . Trichinopoly
3rd Madras European Regiment. Field Division under Gen. Whitlock

NATIVE INFANTRY.

1st Regiment N.I. (Rifle Comp.) Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
2nd Regiment N. I.....Quilon
3rd N. I. or Palamcottah Light Infantry.....Cannanore
4th N. I. .....Mercara
5th N. I. (Rifle Company) Head quarters Right Wing.....Berhampore
Left Wing .....Sumbulpore
6th N. I. .....Rangoon
7th N. I. .....Secunderabad
8th N. I. .....Tonghoo
9th N. I. .....Secunderabad
10th N. I. .....Secunderabad
11th N. I. .....Cannanore
12th N. I. .....Rangoon
13th N. I. .....Maulmein
14th N. I. .....Singapore
15th N. I. .....Thayetmyo
16th N. I. (Rifle Company).....Mangalore
17th N. I. .....Bengal Field Service
18th N, I. .....Bellary
19th N. I. .....Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
20th N. I. .....Bangalore
21st N, I. .....Trichinopoly
22nd N I. .....Penang
23rd N. I. (or Walajahbad Light Infantry) .....Rangoon
24th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Henzada
25th N. I. .....Madras
26th N. I. .....Kamptee
27th N. I... .....Bengal, on Service
28th N. I. .....Hoshingabad
29th N. I. .....Masulipatam
30th N. I. .....Bellary
31st N. I., or Trichinopoly Light Infantry.....Vizianagram
32nd N. I. .....Kamptee
33rd N. I. .....Kamptee
34th or (Chicacale Lt. Infantry) Trichinopoly
35th N. I. .....Hurryhur
36th (Rifle Company) .....Kurnoul
37th N. I., (Grenadiers) Head quarters .....Shoaygheen
Left Wing .....Tonghoo
38th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Vizagapatam
39th N. I. .....Thayetmyo
40th N. I. .....Cuttack
41st N. I, ...Burmah
42nd N. I. .....Raichoor Field Service
43rd N, I, ...Russelcondah
44th N. I. .....Thayetmyo
45th N. I. .....Madras
46th N. I. .....Vizagapatam
47th N. I. .....Bellary
48th N. I. .....Moulmein
49th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Secunderabad
50th N. I. .....Service Gen. Whitlock's Division
51st N. I. .....Palamcottah
52nd N. I. .....Mercara
Left Wing .....French Rocks
1st Extra Regiment N. I. .....Samulcottah
2nd Extra N. I. .....Trichinopoly
3rd Extra N. I. .....Cuddapah
Sappers' Militia .....Madras
Madras Rifles, temporarily formed for Service in Bengal by the Rifle Companies of the 1st, 5th, 16th, 24th, 36th, 49th, Regiments N. I., and 2 Companies 34th N. I.—Service Bengal.

VETERANS' ESTABLISHMENT.

EUROPEAN VETERANS.

Artillery Company .....Palaveram
Infantry Company .....Vizagapatam

NATIVE VETERANS

1st or Madras Native Vet. Bat. .Madras
2nd or Arnu Native Vet. Bat. .Arcot

DEPÔTS.

For H.M. Regiments .....Poonamullee
European Infantry .....Arcot
Native Infantry .....Palavaram

NATIVE INFANTRY RECRUITING DEPOTS.

No. 1 Recruiting Depot.....Dandigul
No. 2 do. .....Arcot
No. 3 do. .....Chicacole
No. 4 do .....Ellore

STATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

(Corrected up to 26th April, 1859, inclusive.)

[Where two places are mentioned, the last-named is that at which the Depôt is stationed.

1st Life Guards—Hyde Park.
2nd do.—Windsor.
Royal Horse Guards—Regent's Park.
1st Dragoon Guards—Madras: Canterury.
2nd do.—Bengal: Canterbury.
3rd do.—Bombay: Canterbury.
4th do.—Aldershott.
5th do.—Manchester.
6th do.—Bengal: Maidstone.
7th do.—Bengal: Canterbury.
1st Dragoons- -Dublin.
2nd do.—Dublin.
3rd do.—Newbridge.
4th do.—Birmingham.
5th do.—Newbridge.
6thdo.—Bombay: Maidstone
7th Hussars—Bengal: Canterbury.
8th do.—Bombay: Canterbury.
9th Lancers—Bengal: Maidstone
10th Hussars—Aldershott.
11th Hussars—Brighton.
12th Lancers—Madras: Maidstone.
13th Light Dragoons—Dublin.
14th do.—Bombay: Maidstone.
15th Hussars—Hounslow.
16thLancers—Edinburgh.
17th do—Bombay: Canterbury.
18th Dragoons—York.
Military Train [1st bat.]—Shorncliffe.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal. } Depot at Bristol
Do. [3rd bat.]—Woolwich. } Depot at Bristol
Do. [4th bat.]—Aldershott. } Depot at Bristol
Do. [5th bat.]—Curragh } Depot at Bristol
Do. [6th bat.]—Woolwich. } Depot at Bristol
Grenadier Guards [1st bat.]—Windsor.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Wellington Barracks.
Do. [3rd bat.]—Portman-st. barracks
Coldstream Guards [1st bat.]—St. George's bar.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Wellington Barracks.
Scots Fus. Guards [1st bat.]—Tower..
Do. [2nd bat.]—Dublin.
1st Foot [1st.]—Madras: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—China: Birr.
2nd do. 1st [bat.]—C. of G. Hope: Walmer.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Corfu: Walmer.
3rd 1st [bat.]—Bengal: Limerick.
Do. do. Malta: Limerick.
4th. do. [1st bat]—Bombay: Chichester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Chichester for Corfu.
5th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Mauritius, Pembroke.
6th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Cork.
7th do. [1st. bat.]—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Walmer.
8th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Templemore.
9th do. [1st. bat.]—Aldershott: Limerick.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Corfu: Limerick.
10th do. [1st bat.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
11th do. [1st bat.]—Aldershot: Fermoy.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershott.
12th do. [1st bat.]—N. S. Wales: Walmer.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Glasgow.
13th do [1st bat.]—Bengal: Fermoy.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Portsmouth, for the Cape
14th do. [1st bat.]—Cephalonia: Fermoy
Do. [2nd bat.]—Dublin
15th do.—Portsmouth: Pembroke
Do. [2nd bat.]—Malta, Pembroke.
16th do.— Dublin: Templemore.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
17th do.—Canada: Limerick.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Plymouth.
18th do.—Bombay: Buttevant.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
19th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Shorncliffe.
20th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Clonmel.
21st do.—Malta: Birr.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Newport.
22nd do.- Manchester: Parkhurst.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot for Malta.
23rd do.—Bengal: Chatham
Do. [2nd bat.]—Depot at Deal; Malta.
24th do.—Bengal: Chatham
Do. [2nd bat.]—Sheffield.
25th do.—Gibraltar: Pembroke.
26th do.—[bat.]—Bermuda: Belfast
27th do.—Bengal: Buttevant.
28th do.—Bombay: Fermoy.
29th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
30th do.—Dublin: Parkhurst.
31st do.—Bombay: Pembroke.
32nd do.—Bengal;
33rd do—Bombay: Fermoy
34th do—Bengal: Colchester
35th do—Bengal: Chatham
36th do—Aldershott: Athlone
37th do.—Bengal: Colchester
38th do.—Bengal: Colchester
39th do.—Canada: Templemore
40th do.—N. S. Wales: Birr.
41st do.—Jamaica: Jersey
42nd do.—Bengal: Sterling.
43rd do.—Madras: Chatham
44th do.—Madras: Colchester
45th do.—Cape of Good Hope: Parkhurst
46th do.—Bengal: Templemore
47th do.—Aldershott: Cork.
48th do.—Bengal: Cork.
49th do.—Barbadoes: Belfast.
50th do.—Ceylon: Parkhurst
51st do.—Bombay: Chichester.
52nd do.—Bengal: Chatham
53rd do.—ditto: ditto
54th do.—Bengal: Colchester
55th do.—Dublin: Jersey
56th do.—Bombay: Colchester
57th do.—Bombay: Cork.
58th do.—Shorncliffe: Curragh.
59th do.—Cape: Athlone
60th do.—[1st bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [2nd bat.]—Beugal. Winchester
Do. [3rd bat.]—Madras: Winchester
Do. [4th bat.]—Dover.
61st do.—Bengal: Chatham
62nd do.—Nova Scotia: Belfast
63rd do.—ditto: Belfast
64th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
65th do.—New Zealand: Birr.
66th do.—Madras: Colchester
67th do.—Bengal: Athlone
68th do.—Madras: Fermoy
69th do.—Madras: Fermoy
70th do.—Bengal; Canterbury
71st do.—Bombay; Stirling
72nd do.—Bombay; Aberdeen
73rd do.—Bengal: Jersey
74th do.—Madras: Aberdeen
75th do.—Bengal: Chatham
76th do.—Curragh: Belfast
77th do.—Bengal: Jersey
78th do.—Bengal: Aberdeen
79th do.—ditto: Perth,
80th do.—ditto: Buttevant.
81st do.—Bengal: Chatham
82nd do.—Bengal: Canterbury
83rd do.—Bombay: Chichester.
84th do.—Bengal: Chatham

85th do.—Cape: Pembroke
86th do.—Bombay: Buttevant.
87th do.—Bengal: Buttevant.
88th do.—Bengal; Colchester
89th do.—Bombay: Fermoy
90th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
91st do.—Bombay: Pembroke
92nd do.—Bombay; Stirling
93rd do.—Bengal; Aberdeen
94th do.—ditto: Chatham
95th do.—Bombay: Fermoy
96th do.—Plymouth: Parkhurst
97th do.—Bengal: Colchester
98th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
99th do.—Bengal: Cork
100th do.—Aldershot for Gibraltar [Winchester
Rifle Brigade [1st bat.]—Newcastle-on-Tyne,
Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [3rd bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [4th bat.]—Malta, Winchester
1st West India Regiment—Bahamas
2nd do—Jamaica
3rd do.—Barbadoes
Ceylon Rifle Regiment—Ceylon
Cape Mounted Rifles—Cape of Good Hope
Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment—Canada
St. Helena Regiment—St. Helena
Royal Newfoundland Corps—Newfoundland
Royal Malta Fencibles—Malta
Gold Coast Corps—Cape Coast Castle

STATIONS OF THE EMBODIED MILITIA.

ENGLAND (18).

Bedford—Dover	North Lincoln—Waterford	Sussex—Edinburgh
2nd Cheshire—Tipner	5th Middlesex—Curragh	1st Tower Hamlets—Curragh
	Northumberland Artillery—Hesham.	
Hampshire Artillery—Plymouth	Nottingham—Newark	2nd Warwick—Plymouth
East Kent—Aldershott	Oxford—Aldershott	Wilts—Portsmouth
Lancashire Artillery—Dover	1st Stafford—Aldershott	1st York, (W. R.)—Aldershott
4th Lancashire—Warrington	2nd Stafford—Cork	3rd York—Carlisle

SCOTLAND (3).

Forfar Artillery—Kinsale	2nd Lanark—Dublin	Stirling—Aldershott

IRELAND (12).

Antrim Rifles—Woolwich	Dublin (city)—Shorncliffe	Louth (Rifles)—Yarmouth
Antrim Artillery—Belfast.	Dublin City Artillery—Dublin.	
North Cork—Aldershot	Fermanagh—Bradford & Burnley	Tipperary Artil.—Portsmouth
Donegal—Dover	Kerry—Chester	Waterford Artillery—Gosport
North Down—Belfast	Limerick (County) Portsmouth	Wexford—Waterford

STATIONS OF THE ROYAL NAVY IN COMMISSION.

(Corrected to 27th April.)

With the Dates of Commission of the Officers in Command.

Acorn, 12, Com. R. B. Pearse, 1856, East Indies.
Actæon, 26, Com .J. Ward (b), 1858, East Indies.
(venture, sc. troop-ship, Com. E. Lacy, 1856, East Indies.
Ajax, 60, screw, Captain J. McNeil, Boyd, 1846, Coast Guard.
Alarm, 26, Capt. D. Curry, 1846, Pacific.
Alert, 17, screw, Com. W. A. R. Pearse, 1855, Pacific.
Algerine, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. Arthur, 1854, East Indies.
Algiers, 91, screw, Capt. G. W D. O'Callaghan, 1846, Devonport.
Amethyst, 26, Capt. S. Grenfell, 1850, Pacific.
Antelope, 3, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. J. W. Pike, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Arachne, 18, Com. J. E. Montgomerie, 1855, North America and West Indies.
Archer, 13, screw, Capt. J. Sanderson, 1855, Coast of Africa.
Ardent, 5, steam-vessel, Com. J. H. Cave, 1855, Woolwich.
Argus, 6, st.-vessel, Com. H. F. W. Ingram, 1856, Mediterranean.
Ariel, 9, sc., Com. C. Bromley, 1856, Mediterranean.
Arrogant, 47, screw, Capt. L. G. Heath, C.B., 1854, Coast Guard.
Assistance, screw troop-ship, Com. W. A. J. Heath, 1856, East Indies.
Assurance, 4, screw, Com. C. M. Aynsley, 1856, Portsmouth.
Atalanta, 16, Com. T. M. S. Pasley, 1855, North America and West Indies.
Atholl, 4, Lieutenant-Com. G. S. Boys, 1845, Greenock.
Banterer, sc.-gunbt., Lieut.-Com. J. Jenkins. 1853, East Indies.
Basilisk, 6, st.-vessel, Com. G. A. Phayre, 1854, North America and West Indies.
Belleisle, hospital ship, Com. H. M. Bingham, East Indies.
Bittern, tender to Calcutta, East Indies.
Black Eagle, st.-yacht, Mast.-Com. J. E. Petley, 1844, Woolwich.
Blenheim, 60, screw, Capt. F. Scott, C.B., 1848, Coast Guard.
Boscawen, 70, Rear Admiral the Hon. Sir F. W. Grey, K.C.B., Capt. R. A. Powell, C.B., 1855, Cape of Good Hope.
Brisk, 16, sc., Master, C. Parkinson, 1855, Devonport.
Britannia, Training Ship, Capt. R. Harris, 1849, Portsmouth.
Brune, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. E. F. Lodder, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Brunswick, 80, sc , Captain E. Ommanney, 1846, Channel Squadron.
Buffalo, screw, Mas.-Com.—particular service.
Bustard, 2, sc -gunbt., Lt.-Com. F. W. Hallowes 1856, East Indies.
Buzzard, 6, st.-vessel, Com. F. Peel, 1855, S.E. Coast of America.
Cadmus, 21, sc. Master E. Wise, 1855, Chatham.
Cæsar, 90, screw, Capt C. Frederick, 1842, North America and W. Indies.
Calcutta, 84, Rear-Adm. Sir M. Seymour, K.C.B., Capt. W. K. Hall, C.B., 1853, East Indies.
Calypso, 18, Capt. F. B. Montresor, 1851, Pacific.
Cambrian, 40, Captain J. J, M'Cleverty, C.B. 1848 East Indies.
Cambridge, Gunnery Ship, Capt. A. W. Jerningham, 1851, Devonport.
Camilla, 16, Com. G. T. Colville, 1855, East Indies.
Caradoc, 2, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. C. M. Buckle 1847, Mediterranean.
Centurion. 80, sc., Capt. C. G. E. Patey, 1846, Mediterranean.
Chesapeake, 51, screw, Rear-Adm. J. Hope, C.B Com. R. Gibson, 1858, East Indies.
Clown, sc.-gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. F. Lee, 1855, 1842, East Indies.
Conflict, 8, sc., Com. R. W. Courtenay, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Conqueror, 101, screw. Capt. H. R. Yelverton, C.B., 1843, Mediterranean.
Coquette, 4, sc.. Com. the Hon. F. A. Foley, 1855, Mediterranean.
Cordelia, 11, sc., Com. C. E. H. Vernon, 1855, Australia.
Cormorant, 4, sc., Com. A. Wodehouse, 1856, East Indies.
Cornwallis, 60, Captain G. G. Randolph, C.B., 1854, Coast Guard.
Coromandel, st.-vessel, Second Master W. H. Vine (acting, East Indies.
Cressy, 80, screw, Capt. E. P. Halsted, 1842, Sheerness.
Crocodile, 8, rec.-ship, Com W. Greet, 1854 off the Tower,
Cruiser, 17, sc., Com. J. Bythesea, 1856, S E. Coast of America.
Cumberland, 70, Rear Adm. Sir . Lushington K. C. B. Captain H D. Rogers, C. B. 1854, South America.
Curaçoa, 31, screw, Capt. T H. Mason, 1849, particular service.
Cyclops, 6, st.-v., Capt. W. J. S. Pullen, 1856, East Indies.
Dasher, 2, st.-vessel, Com. E. G. Hore, 1854, Portsmouth.
Dee, 4, troop-ship, Mast-Com. T C. Pullen, 1844, particular service.
Devastation, 6, st.-ves, Com. C. Wake, 1855, North America, and West Indies.
Diadem, 32, sc., Capt. P. W. Moorsom, C.B., 1857, North America and W. Indies.
Doris, 32, screw, Capt. E. Heathcote, 1852, Devonport.
Dove, screw gunbt., Lieut. C. J. Bullock, 1855, East Indies.
Drake, sc. gunbt., Lieut-Com. A. R. Blane, 1856, East Indies.
Eagle, 50, Capt. E. Tatham, 1854, Coast Guard.
Edinburgh, 58, screw, Capt. E. C. T. D'Eyncourt, 1849, Coast Guard.
Elk, 12, Com. H. Campion, 1855, East Indies.
Esk, 20, sc., Capt. Sir. R. J. Le M. M'Clure, 1850 East Indies.
Euryalus, 51, sc., Capt. J. W. Tarleton, C.B., 1852, Mediterranean.
Excellent, 46, gunnery ship, Capt. R. S. Hewlett C.B., 1850, Portsmouth.
Exmouth, 90, sc., Capt. R. S. Robinson, 1840, Devonport.
Fairy, sc. yacht, tender to Victoria and Alberyacht, Portsmouth.
Firm, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. R. Boulton, 1854, East Indies.
Fisguard, 42, Commodore the Hon. J. R. Drummond, C.B., Woolwich
Forester, 2, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. A. J. Innes, 1853, East Indies.
Formidable, 84, J C. Fitzgerald, 1840, Sheerness

Furious, 16, st.-ves., Capt. S. Osborn, C.B., 1855, East Indies.
Fury, 6, st.-ves., Com. J.E. Commerell,1855, E.I.
Ganges, 84, Rear-Adm. R. L. Baynes, C.B., Capt. J. Fulford, 1848, Pacific.
Gannett, 11, Com. E. H. G. Lambert, 1854, Mediterranean.
Growler, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. H. E. Crozier, 1854, Mediterranean.
Hannibal, 91, sc., Capt. G. T. Gordon, 1846, Portsmouth.
Harrier, 17, screw, Com. Sir M. McGregor, Bart., (1856), 1857, South America.
Hastings, 60, screw, Captain W. R. Mends, C.B., 1852, Coast Guard.
Haughty, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. G. D. Broad, 1851, East Indies.
Havannah, 19, Capt. T. Harvey, 1848, Pacific.
Hawke, 60, sc., Capt. W. Crispin 1852, Coast Guard.
Herald, 8, surv.-ves., Capt. H. M. Denham, 1846, South Seas.
Hermes, 6, st.-v., Com. W. E. A. Gordon, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Hero, 91, screw, Capt. Sir G. N. Broke, Bart, C.B., 1845, Chatham.
Heron, 12, Commander W. H. Truscott, 1855, Coast of Africa.
Hesper, sc st.-ship, Mast.-Com. J. Loane, 1846, East Indies.
Hibernia, rec.-ship, Rear-Admiral H. J. Codrington, C.B., Captain F. Warden, C.B., 1845, Malta.
Highflyer, 21, sc., Capt. C. F. A. Shadwell, C.B., 1853, East Indies.
Himalaya, sc. store-ship, Com. J. Seccombe, 1855, particular service.
Hogue, 60, screw, Capt. J. Moore, C.B., 1848, Coast Guard.
Hornet, 17, sc., Com. Viscount Gilford, 1858, East Indies.
Hydra, 6, st.-vessel, Com. R. V. Hamilton, 1857, Coast of Africa.
Imaum, 72, Commodore H. Kellett, C.B., Com. H. J. Grant, 1855, rec.-ship, Jamaica.
Impregnable, 104, Vice-Adm. Sir B. Reynolds, K.C.B., Capt. W. H. Stewart, C.B., 1854, Devonport.
Indus, 78, Rear-Admiral Sir H. Stewart, K.C.B., Capt. J. C. D. Hay, 1850, North Americ, and West Indies.
Industry, st.-ves., 2, st.-ship, Mast.-Com. G. J. Hodges, 1841. particular service.
Inflexible, 6, st.-ves., Com. G. A. C. Brooker, 1856, East Indies.
Intrepid, 6, screw, Mast. J. Waye, 1855, Devonport.
Iris, 26, Capt. W. Loring, C.B., 1848, Australia.
James Watt, 91, screw, Capt. E. Codd, 1851, Devonport.
Janus, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. H. P. Knevitt, 1855, East Indies.
Jaseur, sc. gunboat Lieut.-Com. J. B. Scott 1846, W. Indies.
Jasper, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. H. Pym, 1849, W. Indies.
Kestrel, sc. gunboat Lieut.-Com. G. D. Bevan, 1853, East Indies.
Lapwing, 4, screw, Com. M. F. O. Reilly, 1856, Mediterranean.
Lee, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. H. Jones, 1852, East Indies.
Leopard 18, st.-ves., Capt. J. F. B. Wainwright, 1856, North America and West Indies.
Leven, 3, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. S. Hudson, 1854, East Indies.
Liffey, 51, screw, Capt. G. W. Preedy, C.B., 1855, Channel Squadron.
Locust, 3, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. J. B. Field, 1846, particular service.
Lynx, 4, screw, Lieut.-Com. H. Berkeley, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Lyra, 9, sc. Com. R. B. Oldfield, 1855, Cape of Good Hope.
Madagascar, receiving ship, Commander E. M. Leycester, 1856, Rio Janeiro.
Magicienne, 16, st.-vessel, Capt. N. Vansittart, C.B., 1854, E. Indies.
Marlborough, 131, sc., Vice Adm. A. Fanshawe, C.B., Capt. the Rt. Hon. Lord F. H. Kerr, 1852, Mediterranean.
Medina, st.-ves., 4, Capt. T. A. B. Spratt, C.B., 1855, Mediterranean
Medusa, 4, steam-vessel, Com. W. Bowden, 1854, Coast of Africa
Megæra, 6, sc., Com. G. T. M. Purvis (b), 1852, particular service
Mersey, 40, screw, Capt. H. Caldwell, C.B., 1853, particular service.
Mohawk, 4, screw. Com. P. C. C. McDougall, 1856, East Indies.
Monkey, steam tug, Sec. Mas. G. Syndercombe, (acting), Woolwich.
Nalad, 42, store-ship, Mast.-Com. W. W. Dillon, 1843, Callao
Nautilus, 6, Lieut.-Com. W. B Grant, 1852, apprentice ship, Devonport
Nereus, 42, store-depôt, Mast.-Com. J. C. Barlow, 1835, Valparaiso
Niger, 14, sc., Capt. P. Cracroft, 1854, East Indies.
Nile, 90, sc., Rear-Adm. C. Talbot, Capt. A. P E. Wilmot, C.B., 1854, Devonport.
Nimrod, 6, sc., Com.———————East Indies
Oberon, 3, st.-vessel, Lieut-Com. F. G. C. Paget, 1852, South America.
Opossum, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. C. J. Balfour, 1850, East Indies.
Orion, 91, screw, Capt. W. Houstoun, 1847, Mediterranean.
Osprey, 4, screw, Com. H. J. Blomfield, 1855, Mediterranean
Pearl 20, sc., Capt. E. S. Sotheby, C.B., 1852, East Indies.
Pelorus, 21, sc., Capt. F. B. P. Seymour, 1854, East Indies.
Pembroke, 60, Capt. E. P. Charlewood, 1855, Coast Guard.
Perseverance, 2 troop ship, Com. E. R. Power, 1850, particular service
Persian, 12, CommanderE. Hardinge 1856, Coast of Africa.
Plover, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. H. Rason, 1855, East Indies
Plumper. 9, screw, Capt. G. H. Richards, 1854, Pacific,
Pluto, 4, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. C. H. Simpson, 1848, Coast of Africa
Porcupine, 3, st.-ves. Capt. H. C. Otter, 1854, Devonport.
Princess Charlotte, 104 Mast.-Com. H. G. Thomsett, 1854, Hong Kong.
Princess Royal, 91, sc., Capt. T. Baillie, 1845, Mediterranean
Pylades, screw, 21, Capt. M. de Courcy, 1852, Pacific
Qua'l, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. N. Osborn, 1856, Mediterranean.
Queen Charlotte, 104, Vice-Adm. E. Harvey, Capt. H. Harvey, 1852, Sheerness.
Racer, 11, screw, Com. the Hon. T.A. Pakenham 1856, North America and West Indies.
Racoon, 21, screw, Captain J. A. Paynter, 1854 particular service.
Recruit, 6, st.-v., Com. D. Spain, 1856, Mediterranean.

Renown, 91, screw, Capt. A. Forbes, 1846, Channel Squadron.
Retribution, 28, st.-vessel, Commodore H. E. Edgell, East Indias.
Rhadamanthus, 4, st.-ves., Master-Com. F. R Sturdee, 1843, particular service.
Roebuck, 6, sc., Com. E. C. Symons, acting, E.I.
Rolla, 6, Lieut.-Com. C. G. Nelson, 1854, Portsmouth.
Royal Albert, 121, sc., Rear-Admiral Sir C. H. Freemantle. K.C.B., Capt. E. B. Rice (1855), Channel Squadron.
Royal Adelaide, 104, Rr.-Ad. Sir T. S. Pasley. Bt.; Capt. W. J. Williams, 1841, Devonport.
Russell, 60, sc., Capt. G. Wodehouse, 1854, Coast Guard.
St. Jean D'Acre, 101, screw, Capt. T. P. Thompson, 1847, Channel squadron.
St. Vincent, Capt. T. Wilson, 1853, Portsmouth, training ship.
Sampson, 6, st.-v., Capt. G. S. Hand, 1852, S.E. Coast of America.
Saracen, 4, Mast.-Com. W. Stanton, 1852, East Indies.
Satellite, sc., 21, Capt. J. C. Prevost, 1856, Pacific.
Saturn, 72, Capt. G. Ramsay, C.B., 1843, Pembroke.
Scourge, 6, sc, Com. Prince of Langenberg, 1857, Mediterranean.
Seagull, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. Chimmo, 1850, particular service.
Sharpshooter, 8, screw, Lieut.-Com. C. Gibbons, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Simoom, 8, sc., Com. J. M. Cooke, 1852, E. Indies.
Siren, 16, Com. G. M. Balfour, 1856, South America.
Skipjack, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. J. Murray, 1848, Channel Squadron.
Slaney, 2, sc. gunbt., Lt.-Com. R. J. Wynniatt, 1850, East Indies.
Sparrowhawk, 4, sc., Com. J. C. Byng, 1856, East Indies.
Spitfire, 5, st.-v., Lieut.-Com. W. C. Chapman, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Spy, 3, Lieut.-Com. T. B. Collinson, 1850, South America.
Starling, sc.-gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. A. Whitshed, 1854, East Indies.
Staunch, 2. sc.-gunboat, Lt.-Com. E. J. Pollard, 1855, East Indies.
Styx, 6, st.ves., Com. C. Vesey, 1854 N. America and W. Indies.
Supply, st.-sh., Mast.-Com. W. H. Ballister, 1845, Woolwich
Surprise, 4, sc., Com. Lord E. H. Cecil, 1857, E.I.
Tartar, 20, sc., Capt. H. Dunlop, 1850, W. Indies and N. America.
Tartarus, 4, st., Com. A. L. Mansell, 1855, Mediterranean.
Termagant, 25, screw, Capt. R. Hall, 1855, Devonport.
Terrible, 21, st.-vessel, Capt. F. H. H. Glasse, C. B., 1846, Mediterranean.
Terror, 16, Capt. F. Hutton, 1844, Bermuda.
Tortoise, 12, store-ship, Capt. W. F. Burnett, C.B., 1854, Ascension.
Tribune, 30, screw, Captain G. T. P. Hornby. 1846, East Indies.
Trident, 6, st.-v. Com. F. A. Close, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Triton, 3, st.-ves. Lieut.-Com. R. H. Burton, 1849, Coast of Africa
Urgent, sc. troop ship, Com. H. W. Hire, 1854, particular service.
Valorous, 16, st.-ves., Capt. W. C. Aldham, C.B., 1853, particular service.
Vesuvius, 6, steam-vessel, Commodore C. Wise, Coast of Africa.
Victoria and *Albert*, 2, steam yacht, Captain the Hon. J. Denman, 1841, Portsmouth.
Victor Emanuel, 91, sc., Capt. J. Willcox, C.B. 1850, Mediterranean.
Victory, 101, Admiral W. Bowles, C.B.; Capt A. Farquhar, 1849, Portsmouth.
Vigilant, 4, sc., Com. W. Armytage, 1855, Mediterranean.
Viper, 4, screw, Com W. N. W. Hewett, V.C L.H., 1858, Devonport.
Virago, 6, st.-ves., Com. M. B. Dunn, 1856 particular service.
Vixen, 6, st.-ves., Com. L. Lambert, 1858. Pacific.
Volcano, 3, st.-ves. Mast.-Com. J. M. Hockly, 1855, E. Indies.
Vulture, 6, st.-v., Captain F. A. Campbell, 1856, Mediterranean.
Wanderer, 4, screw, Com. M. R. Pechell, 1854, Mediterranean.
Watchful, 2, sc.-gunbt., East Indies.
Wellesley, 72, Captain Superintendent G. Goldsmith, C.B., 1842, Chatham.
Weser, st. v., 6., Com. A. H. J. Johnstone, 1859, Mediterranean.
Woodcock, 2, sc., gunbt., Lt.-Com. G. S. Bonsanquet, 1855, East Indies.

STATIONS OF THE INDIAN NAVY IN COMMISSION.

(Corrected to the 26th April, 1859.)

With the dates of Commission of the Officers in command.

Acbar, 22, Flag-ship of Commodore G. G. Wellesley, C.B., Com. H. A. Drought, 1851, Com. H. W. Grounds, 1856, Gunnery Officer, Bombay.
Assaye, 10, paddle, Commander G. N. Adams, 1858, Zanzibar.
Auckland, 8, paddle, Com. J. Stephens, 1848, Aden.
Assyria, 2, paddle, Master-Com. E. Davies, 1858, Indus.
Augusta, 6, yacht, Bombay.
Australian, screw troop ship, Master-Com. E. Boon, Bay of Bengal.
Berenice, 2, paddle troop ship, Lieut.-Com. A. W. Chitty, 1847, Malabar Coast.
Bheemah, 4, surveying vessel, Lieut.-Com. A. D. Taylor, 1847, Malabar Coast.
Becas, 2, flat, Master-Com. E. Nash, 1850, River Indus.
Clive, 18, Lieut.-Com. J. Sedley, 1847, school ship, on a Cruize.
Cursetjee, Flat, Master-Com. ——, Indus.

Charlotte, 4, Lieut.-Com. T. N. Philbrick, 1857, Andaman Islands.
Constance, 3, Lieut.-Com. C. H. Walker, 1847, Aden.
Comet, 5, paddle gunboat, Com. W. B. Selby, 1830, Mesopotamia.
Coromandel, screw troop ship, Lieut.-Com. S. B. Hellard, 1847, Bay of Bengal.
Chenaub, 2, paddle, Master-Com. T. Gourley, 1858, River Indus.
Conqueror, 2, paddle, Master-Commander T. K. Linton, 1849, River Indus.
Dalhousie, screw troop ship, Lieut.-Com. T. W. Hopkins, 1858, Bay of Bengal.
Dromedary, Flat, Master-Com. ———, River Indus.
Elphinstone, 18. Lieut.-Com. H. A. Fraser, 1859, Bombay.
Euphrates, Flat, Master-Com. W. Walton, 1858, River Indus.
Ethersey, Flat, Master-Com. T. O. Jones, 1858, River Indus.
Emily, 2, Lieut.-Com. P. W. Tendal, 1857, Persian Gulf.
Falkland, 12, Commodore G. Jenkins, C.B., 1855, Persian Gulf.
Ferooz, 10, paddle, Commander C. J. Cruttenden, 1830, Bombay.
Freere, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J. McNeil, 1852, River Indus.
Goolanair, paddle yacht, Master-Commander J. D. Kennelly, 1850, Bombay.
Georgiana, 2, Lieut.-Com. W. Collingwood, 1857, Persian Gulf.
Indus, 2, paddle, Master-Commander E. S. H. Neale, 1856, River Indus.
Jhellum, 2, paddle, Master-Com. R. L. Lawson, 1856, River Indus.
Keddywarree, receiving ship, Master-Com. J. S. Amos, 1856, Kurrachee.
Lady Falkland, 2, paddle, Mast.-Com. W. Barras, 1859, Kurrachee.
Lady Canning, 4, paddle, Lieut.-Com. E. Peevor, 1846, Red Sea.
Mahi, 3, Lieut.-Com. R. W. Whisk, 1849, Bombay.
Marié, 3, Lieut.-Com. C. G. Constable, 1839, Surveying Ship, Malabar Coast.
Mootvee, 1, pendant ves., Capt. E. W. Daniell, 1857, Kotree.
Napier, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J. Forster, 51, River Indus.
Nerbudda, 2. Lieut.-Com. C Forster, 1856, Malaba. Coast.
Nimrod, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J. B. Butter, 1856, River Indus.
Nitocris, Flat, Master-Com. A. Harrison, 1856, River Indus.
Outram, 4, paddle, Mast.-Com. W. Fivey, 1858, River Indus.
Punjaub, 10, paddle, Commander A. Foulerton, 1857, Calcutta.
Planet, 2, paddle, Master-Com. T. K. Fletcher, 1853, River Indus.
Prince Arthur, screw troop-ship, Com. J. Tronson, 1858, *en route* Timor Islands.
Pleiad, 2, screw, Lieut.-Com. J. G. Nixon, 1847, Persian Gulf.
Ravee, Flat, Master-Com. ———, River Indus.
Semiramis, 8 paddle, Com. W. Balfour, 1858, Bombay.
Sutledge, Flat, Master-Com., River Indus.
Satellite, 2, paddle, Master-Com. A. Wilkins, 1852, River Indus.
Snake, paddle, tender to Acbar, Bombay.
Sir H. Havelock, 2, paddle, Master-Com. D. Morrison, 1858, River Indus.
Sir H. Lawrence, 2, paddle, Master-Com. C. Tickel, 1845, River Indus.
Sydney, screw troop ship, Master-Com. J. Nibblet, Bay of Bengal.
Tigris, 5, Lieut.-Com. G. T. Robinson, 1847, Persian Gulf.
Victoria, 4, paddle, Lieut.-Com. T. S. W. Twynham, 1845, Bombay.
Zenobia, 10, paddle, Com. F. E. Manners, 1857, Murat.

NAVAL BRIGADE.

1st Brigade, Bombay, 1st Company, Surat, Lieut.-Com. J. B. Bewsher, 1856, commanding.
2nd Brigade, Bengal, Capt. C. D. Campbell, 1857.
1st Company, Fort William, Lieut.-Com. C. B. Templer, 1857.
2nd Company, Guyah, Lieut.-Com. T. H. B. Banon, 1854.
3rd do. Dacca, Lieut.-Com. H. W. Etheridge, 1847.
4th do. Andaman Islands, Lieut.-Com. F. Warden, 1857.
5th Company Sasseram, Lieut.-Com. G. O. B. Carew, 1855.
6th do. Patna, Lieut.-Com. D. S. Duval 1854.
7th do. Chybassa, Lieut.-Com. T. E. Lewis, 1848.
8th do. Barackpore, Lieut.-Com. W. H. M. Davis, 1849.
9th do. Jepore, Lieut.-Com. A. T. Winders, 1851.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

NAVY.

WHITEHALL, APRIL 20.

The Queen has been pleased to direct letters patent to be passed under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, constituting and appointing the Right Honourable Sir John Somerset Pakington, Baronet, Vice Admiral William Fanshawe Martin, Vice Admiral the Honourable Sir Richard Saunders Dundas, K.C.B., Rear Admiral Sir Henry John Leeke, K.C.B., Rear Admiral Alexander Milne, K.C.B., and the Honourable Frederick, Lygon, to be her Majesty's Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of the said United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dominions, islands, and territories thereunto belonging.

ADMIRALTY.

(*The following Commissions bear date April* 14.)

CORPS OF ROYAL MARINES.—To be Captains — First Lieutenant H. Hewett, First Lieutenant and Quartermaster McArthur, First Lieutenant and Quartermaster H. B. Roberts, First Lieutenants J. Shute, J. B. Seymour, A. J. Stuart, C. B. Parke, and First Lieutenant and Adjutant J. Y. Holland.

***To be First Lieutenants.* — Second Lieutenants G. F. Gamble, S. E. W. Hemmans, E. H. White, A. Fonblanque, M. A. H. G. Heriot, J. R. Leeds, B. D. Kennicott, G. C. Boase, W. M. Prichett, W. V. B. Hewett, G. M. Shewell, J. M. Hamilton, J. S. Bontein, J. W. Scott, H. Wolrige, S. T. Collins, G. L. Tupman, G. H. Elliot, W. W. G. B. Willis, G. W. Oliver, J. G. Fitzgerald, W. E. Despard, and W. J. Barker.**

PROMOTIONS.

Paymasters. — Samuel G. Robison, confirmed in *Assurance*; Silas W. Parker confirmed in *Adventure*.

APPOINTMENTS.

Captain.—Thomas Wilson, 1853, to *St. Vincent*, re-commissioned.

Commanders.—H. W. Hire, 1854, to *Urgent*, vice Mc'Donald; W. E. Triscott, 1846, to be Superintendent of the Packet Service at Dover; Charles L. Waddilove, 1855, to *St. Vincent*.

Deputy Medical Inspector.—John M. Minter, F.C.S., 1859, to *Victoria and Albert*.

Lieutenants.—Henry G. Belson, 1854, to *Excellent*; J. P. Jones Parry, 1854, to *Brunswick*; A. G. E. Murray, 1846, to command *Jackal*; T. F. Studdert, 1855, to *Excellent*; S. H. Babington, 1854, to *James Watt*; S. G. Price, 1857, to *Hero*; Charles G. Jones, 1858, to *Mersey*; George Robinson, 1855, and Charles D. Davies, 1856, to *Excellent*; Francis Osburn, 1856, to *Arrogant*.

Masters—Jabez H. W. Rowlett, 1858, to *Trident*; John W. McI. Hall, 1845, additional to *Fisgard*; George Williams, 1851, to *Lightning*; George B. F. Swain, 1851, to *Algiers*; Richard Sturgess, 1853, to *Terrible*; William T. Tregidgo, 1849, to *Madagascar*.

Paymasters — James T. Bignell, to *Trident*; R. T. Crispin, 1840, to *Illustrious*; E. W. M. Millman, 1854, additional to *St. Vincent*; Henry J. R. Miall, 1855, additional to *Hannibal*.

Surgeons—John C. Sabben, 1851, to *Illustrious*; William T. Wilson, 1856, to *Perseverance*; John Rose, 1856, to *Eagle*.

Assistant Surgeons (Acting)—William Lockhart, to *Impregnable*; John K. Smallhorn, to *Victory*; W. H. Cruice, 1853, to *Illustrious*; John L. Palmer, 1848, to *Jackal*; Benjamin Crabbe, to *Impregnable*; Edward P. Forrest, 1856, to *Brunswick*; James Stevenson, 1858, acting, to *Spy*; William S. Fisher, 1859, acting, to *James Watt*; William Lockhart, 1859, acting, to *Imaum*; Francis W. Davis, 1853, to Greenwich Hospital; Alexander Minnoch, acting, to *Victory*; Robert Walker, to *Impregnable*.

Assistant Paymasters. — Edward H. Stanton, 1846, to *Exmouth*; Frederick Burne, 1852, Thomas W. Harriott, 1855, and John Bremner, 1859, to *Ganges*; Thomas Goodman, 1852, to *Hawke*; W. H. Thompson, 1851, (in charge) to *Jackal*; William Noble, 1855, to *Hannibal*; Francis Oliver, 1855, to *Illustrious*.

Master.—Samuel Libby (b.) 1 *Trident*.

Mates.—Charles R. Macdonell to *St. Jean d'Acre*; and J. V. C. 1857, to *Algiers*.

Chief Engineers.—G. Glasson, 1850, to *Exmouth*, for service in *St. George*; R. Fothergill, 1848, to *Edinburgh*.

Second Master.—Francis O. Simpson, 1856, to *Jackal*.

Assistant Engineers.—J. W. Traill, 1st Class (in charge), to *Jackal*; J. Bell, 2nd Class, to *Edinburgh*; J. Walsh, additional to *Pisgard*, for service in *Bann*, surveying vessel.

Clerks.—Charles D. Lee to *Virago*; Henry H. Wyatt to *Racoon*; Charles J. Dawson to *Mersey*; H. W. P. Kooystra to *Boscawen*.

Assistant Clerk.—Alfred Hirtzel to *Illustrious*.

Midshipman.—Henry McInroy to *Doris*.

Masters' Assistants.—Christopher L. Pope to *Cressy*; Thomas Pidwell to *Urgent*.

COAST GUARD.

APPOINTMENT.—*Inspecting Commander*—Commander Fitzjames S. McGregor to Bangor Division.

Chief Officers—Mr. Benjamin Woolley, Master, to command Sutton Station. Lieut. Francis Osburn to command Pevensey, and Henry R. Stewart, Fairlight Stations.

REMOVALS.—*Chief Officers*—Lieut. Charles D. Warren, from Jack's Hole to Oyster Haven; Master Francis B. Henwood, from Studland to Sidmouth; Mr. Peter Loney, Master, from Babbicombe to Dartmouth, in exchange with Mr. Charles M. Hughes, Master.

ARMY.

WAR-OFFICE, MARCH 22.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to give orders for the appointment of Major General J. Michel, C. B., to be an Ordinary Member of the Military Division of the Second Class, or Knights Commanders, of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath.

Her Majesty has also been graciously pleased to make and ordain a Special Statute of the said Most Honourable Order, authorising the following appointments to the said Order: —

To be an Extra Member of the Military Division of the Second Class, or Knights Commanders, viz.:—

Colonel C. Shepherd Stuart, C. B., of the Bombay Infantry.

To be Extra Members of the Military Division of the Third Class, or Companions, viz.:—

Colonels M. W. Smith, 3rd Dragoon Guards; J. A. R. Raines, 95th Regiment; A. I. Lockhart, 92nd Regiment.

Lieut. Colonels E. Price, Royal Artillery; W. Parke, 72nd Regiment; H. E. Longden, 10th Regiment; R. D. Campbell, 71st Regiment; W. Hope, 71st Regiment; R. H. Gall, 14th Light Dragoons; E. Steele, 83rd Regiment; A. Scudamore, 14th Light Dragoons.

Major J. R. Gibbon, Royal Artillery.

Colonels J. K. M'Causland, 66th Regiment of Bengal N. I. G. Le G. Jacob, 31st Regiment of Bombay N. I. J. Liddell, Bombay Infantry. T. W. Hicks, late of the Bombay Artillery.

Lieut. Colonels G. Malcolm, 1st Regiment of Bombay N. I. C. J. Owen, 3rd Regiment of Bombay Light Cavalry. E. S. Blake, Bombay Artillery, G. H. Robertson, 25th Regiment of Bombay Native Light Infantry. W. A. Orr, Madras Artillery.

Majors T. F. Wilson, 13th Regiment of Bengal N. I. J. D. Woolcombe, Bombay Artillery. H. D. Abbott, 31st Regiment of Madras Native Light Infantry. G. Hare, 20th Regiment of Madras N. I. J. G. Lightfoot, Bombay Artillery.

F. S. Arnott, Esq., M. D., Surgeon on the Bombay establishment of her Majesty's Indian Military Forces. W. Mackenzie, Esq., M. D., Surgeon to the Madras Establishment of her Majesty's Indian Military Forces.

WAR-OFFICE, MARCH 25.]

(*The following Commissions to bear date March* 25, 1859.)

3rd Dragoon Guards—Lieut. C. Costobadie, from the 1st Dragoons, to be Lieut., vice Park-Yates, who exchanges.

1st Dragoons—Lieut. E. W. Park-Yates from the 3rd Dragoon Guards, to be Lieut., vice Costobadie, who exchanges.

3rd Light Dragoons—A. Strother,

Gent., to be Cornet by purchase, vice Pifford, promoted.

6th Dragoons—Lieut. D. M. M. Inge, from the 18th Light Dragoons, to be Lieut., vice Shafto Orde, who exchanges, Jan. 20.

7th Light Dragoons—Assist. Surg. T. A. Thornhill, M.D., from the 42nd Foot, to be Assist. Surg .vice Lynch, deceased.

18th Light Dragoons—Lieut, W. J. Shafto Orde, from the 6th Dragoons, to be Lieut., vice Inge, who exchanges, Jan. 20.

Royal Artillery—Assist. Surg. L. Carey, M.D., from the staff, to be Assist. Surg., vice Milton, deceased.

Grenadier Guards—Captain G. H. Grey, from the Rifle Brigade, to be Lieut. and Captain, vice Coulson, who exchanges.

4th Foot—Assist. Surgeon E. B. Kearney, from the Staff, to be Assist. Surg.

6th—Ensign J. Giffard to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Bolton, promoted.

7th—Captain B. C. Russell, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Captain, vice C. E. Thornton, who exchanges.

9th—The date of Ensign Henning's appointment is 18th March, 1859, and not 18th February, 1859, as previously stated.

10th—Lieut. H. Henderson to be Captain without purchase, vice Cator, deceased, Feb. 24; Lieut. F. B. Sandwith to be Captain without purchase, vice Ward, deceased; March 13; Ensign H. L. W. Phillips to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Henderson, Feb. 24.

15th—Captain H. Robinson, from the 43rd Foot, to be Captain, vice Hudson, who exchanges, Jan. 11.

18th—C. Dawson, Gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Thacker promoted.

29th—Assist. Surg. St. John Killery, from the staff, to be Assist. Surg., vice Mackinnon, appointed to the 42nd Foot.

42nd—Assist. Surg., W. A. Mackinnon, from the 29th Foot, to be Assist Surg., vice Thornhill, appointed to the 7th Light Dragoons.

43rd—Capt. J. Hudson, from the 15th Foot, to be Captain, vice Robinson, who exchanges, Jan. 11.

59th—H. T. Herchmer, Gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Wakefield, who retires.

70th—Lieut. A. Saltmarshe to be Captain by purchase vice Cumberland, who retires; Ensign A. B. Wright to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Saltmarshe.

87th—A. H. H. Smith, Gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Devereux, promoted.

98th—The first Christian name of Lieut. Wolseley, is George, and not John, as stated in the *Gazette* of March 18.

Rifle Brigade—Lieut. and Captain J. B. B. Coulson, from the Grenadier Guards, to be Captain, vice Grey, who exchanges.

3rd West India Regiment—Lieut. Col. H. E. M'Gee, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Lieut. Col., vice Lewes, who exchanges; Captain Sir W. Parker, Bart., from Half Pay 44th Foot, to be Captain, vice F. R. Taylor, who exchanges; Lieut. R. Eckford to be Captain, by purchase, vice Sir W. Parker, Bart., who retires.

Gold Coast Artillery Corps—Ensign J. J. Matthew to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Lazenby, promoted to an Unattached Company, without purchase; G. Horner, Gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Mathew.

HOSPITAL STAFF.—To be Assistant Surgeons—J. D. Sainter, Gent., vice Milton, appointed to the Royal Artillery, March 1; E. G. Ley, M. D., vice Bourke, appointed to the Royal Artillery, March 1; E. C. Markey, Gent., vice Hogg, appointed to the Royal Artillery, March 1; H. Crump, M. D., vice Graves, appointed to the Royal Artillery, March 1; J. Clarke, M. D., vice Temple, appointed to the Royal Artillery, March 1; W. Millar, Gent., vice Harrison, appointed to the Royal Artillery, March 1; H. A. Coglan, Gent., vice Burland, appointed to the Royal Artillery, March 1; K. J. Parr, Gent., vice Lewer, appointed to the Royal Artillery, March 1; W. Orr, Gent., vice Lindsay, appointed to the 39th Foot, March 1; E. Parsonage, M. D., vice Greig, appointed to the 23rd Foot, March 1; J. W. C. N. Murphy, Gent., vice Pinkerton, appointed to the Royal Artillery, March 1; C. A. Fraser, Gent., vice Semple, appointed to the 75th Foot, March 1; H. S. E. Schroeder, Gent., vice Lynch, appointed to the 12th Foot, March 1.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

North Salopian Yeomanry Cavalry—Captain H. F. Cust (late Captain 8th Hussars) to be Captain, vice W. H. Poole, deceased; J. H. Nichson Walford, Gent., to be Cornet, vice Atcherly, resigned, March 18.

3rd King's Own Staffordshire—Lieut.

C. J. Webb to be Capt., vice Priaulx, resigned; Ensign T. Donaldson to be Lieut., vice Webb, promoted, March 7.

Oxfordshire—C. Legge, Gent., to be Lieut., vice Lloyd, retired, March 16.

Northumberland Artillery—H. St. George Priaulk, Gent., to be Captain, March 15.

Forfar and Kincardine Artillery—Captain C. Campbell, to be Major, vice L'Amy, resigned, Jan. 25.

[The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* of March 8.]

Royal Anglesey—Ensign W. K'Kee to be Lieut., Oct. 21, 1858.

[The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* of March 18.]

Royal South Gloucester Light Infantry—J. M. Bernado, Gent., to be Ensign, March 12.

Prince Albert's Own Leicestershire Volunteer Cavalry—Her Majesty has been pleased to accept of the resignation by Lieut. R. Gough, of the commission which he holds in the above Regiment.

Warwickshire—2nd Regiment—R. D. Knight, Esq., to be Adjutant, vice Capt. and Adjutant Mackenzie, resigned, Dec. 18.

Warwickshire—1st Regiment—S. G. A. Thursby, late Captain 1st Royals, to be Captain, vice Wanchope, resigned; March 15; H. S. B. Watson, Gent., to be Captain, vice N. Porter, resigned, March 19.

2nd Regiment—Adjutant R. D. Knight to serve with the rank of Capt. Jan. 17.

3rd West York—Ensign J. H. Palmer to be Lieut., vice Thunder, resigned; T W. Lambert, Gent., to be Ensign, vice Murray, resigned March 17. Memorandum—Lieut. W. Armit has been removed from the strength of this Regiment.

Oxfordshire—E. Ramsay, Gent., to be Ensign, vice Perry, promoted; T. R. Brown, gent,, to be Ensign, vice Arney, promoted, March 18.

Huntingdonshire—H. J. Thornhill, gent., to be Captain; W. W. Goldicutt, gent., to be First Lieutenant, March 21.

Hampshire Artillery—W. A. Harrison, B.A., to be Assistant Surgeon, Feb. 26.

[This Appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* of September 7, 1858.]

Royal Carnarvonshire—Major J. MacDonald, late Lieutenant Colonel of Her Majesty's 5th Regiment of Foot, to be Lieutenant Colonel Commandant (as of and from the 28th day of August), vice the Hon. E. G. D. Pennant, resigned, but who retains the honorary rank of Colonel, Sept. 4.

WAR OFFICE, APRIL 1.

(The following Commissions to bear date April 1.)

Royal Horse Guards—Lieut. W. W. Hartopp to be Captain by purchase, vice Sir B. P. Henniker, Bart., who retires; Cornet M. B. B. Adderley to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Hartopp; J. R. H. Maxwell, gent., to be Cornet by purchase, vice Adderly.

3rd Dragoon Guards—Major F. B. Barron to be Lieutenant Colonel by purchase, vice Brevet Colonel Dyson, who retires; Captain F. Chaplin to be Major by purchase, vice Barron.

Scots Fusilier Guards—The Christian name of Ensign and Lieut. Ram, are Stephen James, and not James Stephen, as stated in *Gazette* of 18th March.

4th—H. J. M. Williams, Gent., to be Ensign without purchase.

6th—Ensign H. Mahony, from the Kerry Militia, to be Ensign without purchase, vice O. Robinson, superseded, being absent without leave.

7th—Ensign C. H. Kempson to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Rumbold, who retires.

8th—T. H. Skinner, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Wheeley, promoted; Ensign W. J. Watson to be Instructor of Musketry, Feb. 17.

10th—R. M. Dickinson, Gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Phillips, promoted; S. F. Poole, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Brouncker, appointed to the 24th Foot.

11th—Brevet Lieutenant Colonel E. Moore to be Lieutenant Colonel without purchase, vice Brevet Colonel H. K. Bloomfield, who retires upon Half Pay; Captain T. Peebles to be Major without purchase, vice Moore.

15th—Lieut. W. G. Hawkins to be Captain without purchase, vice Fry, deceased; Ensign D. D. Cartwright to be Lieutenant without purchase, vice Hawkins, March 23; Serjeant Major J. McMurray to be Ensign without purchase, vice Cartwright.

17th—Lieut. C Græme Grant to be Captain without purchase, vice Walton, deceased; Ensign Robert G. W. Wrench to be Lieutenant without purchase, vice Grant, Jan. 30.

22nd—Louis R. G. Vaughan, gent., to be Ensign without purchase.

23rd—Lieut. J. De Vic Tupper to be Captain by purchase, vice Gilmore who retires; H. F. Hutton, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Gerard, promoted.

24th—H. A. Harrison, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice O'Mahony, promoted.

38th—Captain W. D. W. R. Thackwell, from the 39th Foot, to be Captain, vice Brevet Major A. C. Snodgrass, who exchanges.

39th—Brevet Major A. C. Snodgrass, from the 38th Foot, to be Captain, vice Thackwell, who exchanges.

51st—Lieut. C J. Hughes to be Captain by purchase, vice Mitford, who retires; Ensign R. N. Cobb to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Hughes.

62nd—The Christian name of Captain Hunter is Edward only, and not Edward Henry, as hitherto stated.

69th—Ensign G. E. Brace to be Instructor of Musketry, vice Bulger, promoted in the 10th Foot, March 4.

71st—Lieut. J. C. H. P. Callen to be Captain, by purchase, vice Denny, who retires; Ensign J. H. Leslie to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Callen.

73rd—Ensign J. T. Turner to be Instructor of Musketry, Feb. 26.

78th—Lieutenant R. C. C. Graham, from the 80th Foot, to be Lieut., vice Ewing, who exchanges.

80th—Lieut. A. Ewing, from the 78th Foot, to be Lieutenant, vice Graham, who exchanges.

85th—G. R. S. Ramsbottom, gent., to be Ensign by purchase.

94th—Lieutenant W. P. Gaskell to be Captain by purchase, vice Buchanan, who has retired.

96th—Lieut. G. K. Hallett to be Captain by purchase, vice Lowry, who retires; Ensign J. Morrison Kirkwood to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Hallett.

Rifle Brigade—Serjeant Major C. Johnston to be Ensign without purchase.

3rd West India Regiment—Ensign J. Moore to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Landon, who has retired.

Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment—Ensign E. C. Wilford to be Instructor of Musketry, Feb. 23.

Cavalry Depot—Cornet E. Pulleyne, of the 8th Light Dragoons, to be Instructor of Musketry, Feb. 15.

Recruiting District—Brevet Col. J. Franklyn, from the 84th Foot, to be Inspecting Field Officer, vice Macpherson, promoted to the rank of Major General.

Royal Hospital (Kilmainham).—Assistant Surgeon W. Carte, from the 4th Light Dragoons, to be Physician and Surgeon, with the local rank of Staff Surgeon, vice Dr. Macaulay, Aug. 13, 1858.

Purveyor's Staff. — Purveyor's Clerk of the First Class, E. Simpson to be Purveyor to the Forces, vice Dalton, deceased.

Chaplain's Department. — To be Chaplains of the Fourth Class, the Rev. F. J. Abbot, the Rev. M. Cuffe, the Rev. T. Molony, the Rev. J. O'Flaherty, the Rev. J. McSweeney, the Rev. J. O'Dwyer, the Rev. W. G. Morley, the Rev. R. Shepherd, the Rev. J. Hamilton, the Rev. J. F. Browne, the Rev. T. Coghlan, the Rev. C. Morgan, the Rev. E. Butler, the Rev. M. Hogan, the Rev. J. Carey, the Rev. R. Blake.

Brevet—Captain T. Rattray, of the 64th Bengal Native Infantry, to be Major in the Army.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Prince Albert's Own Leicestershire Yeomanry Cavalry—Cornet D. S. Perkins to be Lieut., vice Gough, resigned; R. P. Apthorp, late Captain 14th Light Dragoons to be Cornet, vice Story, promoted; A. C. Johnson, gent., to be Cornet, vice F. H. Beaumont, promoted.

Worcestershire—G. Garde, gent., to be Ensign.

Royal Ayrshire Rifles—J. Montgomerie, M.D., to be Surgeon.

West Kent Yeomanry Cavalry—Lieutenant Oswald Augustus Smith, to be Captain, vice Berens, deceased; Cornet Charles Lawrie, to be Lieut., vice Smith, promoted; Richard Benyon Berens, gent., to be Cornet, vice Lawrie, promoted.

West Kent Light Infantry—George A'Court Webb, gent., to be Lieutenant, vice Thompson, resigned; Markland Barnard, gent., to be Lieutenant, vice Hodges, resigned.

3rd King's Own Staffordshire—Chas. Donaldson, gent., to be Ensign.

Forfar and Kincardine Artillery—Second Lieut. Augustus Walter C[illegible]shank, to be First Lieutenant, vice Clervaux Chaytor, promoted.

City of Edinburgh Artillery—Lieut. Herbert Jones Hughes, t[illegible]

Captain, vice Home, struck off the strength of the establishment; First Lieut. George Roland, junior, to be Captain, vice Fraser, resigned; Second Lieut. Robert Nicol, to be First Lieut., vice Hughes, promoted; George Finlay, gent., to be First Lieut., vice Roland, promoted; George Bowman, gent., to be Second Lieut., vice Bruce, resigned.

WAR OFFICE, APRIL 5.

(The following Commissions bear date April 1, 1859.)

Royal Artillery—Lieutenant J. L. Clarke to be Second Captain.

Royal Engineers—Captain and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel C. D. Robertson to be Lieutenant Colonel, vice Brevet Colonel James, placed upon the Supernumerary List; Captain and Brevet Major C. Fanshawe to be Lieutenant Colonel, vice Brevet Colonel Yorke, placed upon the Supernumerary List, Captain and Brevet Colonel F. E. Chapman, C B., to be Lieutenant Colonel, vice Bainbrigge, placed upon the Supernumerary List; Second Captain E. Belfield to be Captain, vice Robertson; Second Captain the Hon. G. Wrottesley to be Captain, vice Fanshawe; Second Captain and Brevet Major E. C. A. Gordon, on the Seconded List, to be Captain; Second Captain and Brevet Major W. Porter to be Captain, vice Chapman; Second Captain J. J. Wilson to be Captain, vice Brevet Major Gibb, placed upon the Supernumerary List; Second Captain J. H. Smith to be Captain, vice Binney, placed upon the Supernumerary List; Second Captain A. R. V. Crease to be Captain, vice Brevet Major Cook, placed upon the Supernumerary List; Second Captain E. M. Grain to be Captain, vice Hutchinson, placed upon the Supernumerary List; Second Captain A. M. Lochner to be Captain, vice J. G. Jervois, placed upon the Supernumerary List; Second Captain and Brevet Major P. Ravenhill to be Captain, vice Chesney, placed upon the Supernumerary List; Second Captain H. T. Siborne to be Captain, vice J. J. Wilson, placed upon the Supernumerary List; Lieutenant F. E. Pratt to be Second Captain, vice Belfield; Lieut. A. G. Goodall to be Second Captain, vice Wrottesley; Lieutenant J. M. C. Drake to be Second Captain, vice Porter; Lieutenant E. R. James to be Second Captain, vice Wilson; Lieutenant W. Bailey to be Second Captain, vice Smith; Lieutenant F. E. B. Beaumont to be Second Captain, vice Crease; Lieutenant C. G. Gordon to be Second Captain, vice Grain; Lieutenant O. H. Stokes to be Second Captain, vice Lochner; Lieutenant J. B. Edwards to be Second Captain, vice Ravenhill; Lieut. J. F. D. Donelly to be Second Captain, vice Siborne; Lieutenant J. E. Cornes to be Second Captain, vice Farrell, placed upon the Supernumerary List; Lieut. Alexander de Courcy Scott to be Second Captain, vice Phillips, placed upon the Supernumerary List.

WAR OFFICE, APRIL 8.

1st Life Guards—Lieut. the Hon. R. W. Grosvenor to be Captain by purchase, vice de Winton, who retires; Cornet and Sub. Lieutenant the Hon. W. H. J. North to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Grosvenor, April 8.

1st Dragoon Guards—Ridingmaster G. Rayment, from the 15th Light Dragoons, to be Ridingmaster, vice Noake, who exchanges, April 8.

7th Dragoon Guards—Lieut. J. R. Welstead to be Captain by purchase, vice Costello, who retires; Cornet R. S. Cleland to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Welstead, April 8.

15th Light Dragoons—Ridingmaster M. Noakes, from the 1st Dragoon Guards, to be Ridingmaster, vice Rayment, who exchanges, April 8.

Royal Artillery—To be Second Captains—Lieutenant H. Thornhill, Lieut. A. T. G. Pearse, Lieut. T. P. Carey, Lieut. W. F. Walker, Lieut. G. J. Shakerley, Lieut. H. J. Alderson, Lieut. A. H. Hutchinson, Lieut. F. G. Ravenhill, Lieut. T. H. Pitt, on the Seconded List; Lieut. F. L. H. Lyon, April 1. Lieut. A. P. Joy has been allowed to resign his Commission, Jan. 31. The undermentioned Gentlemen Cadets to be Lieuts., viz.:—J. Sladen, S. P. Oliver, C. S. Harvey, R. H. Robertson, A. J. Cullen, J. T. M. Loughman, O. F. Layton, C. F. Dixon, R. B. Butt, W. M. Glasgow, April 1. To be Ridingmaster—Serjeant Major W. Donald, April 1.

Royal Engineers—The undermentioned Gentleman Cadets to be Lieut., with temporary rank, viz.:—J. C. Ardagh, J. J. J. Robertson, W. E. Peck, E. Stephens, C. J. Russell, J. M. Morgan, April 1.

10th Foot—Quartermaster J. Darker, from the 23rd Foot, to be Quartermaster, vice O'Donnell, who exchanges, Jan. 26.

12th—Lieut. G. de L. Lacy to be Instructor of Musketry, March 28. Assist. Surg. J. W. C. N. Murphy, from the Staff, to be Assist. Surg., March 1.

13th—Ensign W. Moffet to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Turville, deceased, Jan. 30. The appointment of Cornet J. Landrey, from half-pay of the late Land Transport Corps, to be Quartermaster, as stated in the *Gazette* of 5th Feb., 1858, has been cancelled. Lieut. J. Landrey, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Quartermaster, Feb. 1858.

14th—The appointment of Cornet J. Spry, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps, to be Quartermaster, as stated in the *Gazette* of 31st Dec., 1857, has been cancelled; Lieut. J. Spry, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Quartermaster, Dec. 31, 1857.

17th—The appointment of Cornet J. Falkner, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps, to be Quartermaster, as stated in the *Gazette* of 26th March, 1858, has been cancelled; Lieut. J. Falkner, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Quartermaster, March 26, 1858.

18th—Assist. Surg. H. A. Coghlan, from the Staff, to be Assist. Surg., March 1.

20th—Assist. Surg. H. Crump, M.D., from the Staff, to be Assist. Surg., March 1.

21st—Assist. Surg. E. G. Ley, M.D., from the Staff, to be Assist. Surg., March 1.

22nd—Captain W. T. Hickman, from the 50th Foot, to be Captain, vice Ellis, who exchanges, April 8.

23rd—Quartermaster M. O'Donnell, from the 10th Foot, to be Quartermaster, vice Darket, who exchanges, Jan. 26.

29th—Capt. S. M. Clarke, from the 93rd Foot, to be Captain, vice Levinge, who exchanges, Feb. 2.

38th—Brevet Major B. Walton, from the 53rd Foot, to be Capt., vice Quickie, who exchanges, April 8.

50th—Captain R. R. Ellis, from the 22nd Foot, to be Capt., vice Hickman, who exchanges, April 8.

53rd—Captain S. G. Quicke, from the 38th Foot, to be Captain, vice Walton, who exchanges, April 8.

55th—Ensign and Adjutant T. Dunn to have the rank of Lieut.; Ensign W. M. Frobisher to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Heberden, deceased, March 28.

56th—Ensign R. Pythell, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Harford, promoted; G. D. Grimes, Gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Pythell, April 8.

60th—C. F. Terry, Gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Coxen, superseded for being absent without leave, April 8.

70th—Brevet Major T. E. Mulock, to be Major without purchase, vice Brevet Lieut. Col. Timins, deceased; Lieut. A. Saltmarshe, to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Mulock, Feb. 6. Ensigns A. W. Crozier, to be Lieut. without purchase, vice M. Bell, deceased, Jan. 12. Ensign A. B. Wright, to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Saltmarshe, Feb. 6; Ensign R. S. Riddle, from the 10th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Crozier, April 8.

76th—Lieut. W. Monro, from the 1st West York Militia, to be Ensign without purchase, vice Beachy, promoted in 18th Foot, April 8.

82nd—Lieut. C. Spencer, to be Adjt., vice Brown, who resigns the Adjutancy only, Jan. 26.

90th—Paymaster T. Cassidy, from a Depot Battalion, to be Paymaster, vice Williams, who exchanges, April 8.

93rd—Captain C. H. Levinge, from the 29th Foot, to be Capt., vice Clarke, who exchanges, Feb. 2.

99th—Captain N. Chichester, late Paymaster 7th Dragoon Guards, to be Captain, vice Johnston, seconded, having been appointed Permanent Instructor at the School of Musketry; Lieut. T. H. Clarkson, to be Captain by purchase, vice Chichester, who retires, April 8.

2nd West Indian Regiment—Lieut. J. L. Byrne, to be Captain without purchase, vice Brevet Major Anderson, deceased; Ensign E. McMahon Forbes, to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Byrne, Jan. 15.

3rd West Indian Regiment—Assistant Surgeon W. D. Carbery, from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Moore, appointed to the Staff, April 8.

Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment.—Ensign E. Whyte, to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Onion, who retires, April 9.

Depot Battalion.—Paymaster S. Williams, from the 90th Foot, to be Paymaster, vice Cassidy, who exchanges, April 8.

The appointment of Cornet R. P. Brooks, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps, to be Quartermaster,

as stated in the *Gazette* of the 30th July, 1858, has been cancelled.

Lieutenant R. P. Brooks, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Quartermaster, July 30.

UNATTACHED.—Brevet Colonel J. K. Pipon, from Half Pay, as Captain, 68th Foot (Assistant Adjutant General at Head Quarters), to be Major without purchase, April 8.

(The following Commissions bear date April 1, 1857.)

To be Majors without purchase—Brevet Major C. R. Shervington, from the Military Train; Captain P. J. Macdonald, from the Military Train; Capt. R. Daunt, from 9th Foot; Capt. J. S. F. Dick, from the Military Train; Capt. H. J. Buchanan, from Adjutant of a Depot Battalion.

To be Captain without purchase—Lieut. T. Grace, from 57th Foot.

To be Lieutenants without purchase—Cornet R. Crowe, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps; Cornet B. M. Hallowes, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps; Cornet J. Malley, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps; Cornet J. Spry, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps; Cornet J. Falkner, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps; Cornet J. Landrey, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps; Cornet W. McIntosh, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps; Cornet W. Talbot, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps; Cornet R. P. Brooks, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps; Cornet J. H. Kean, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps; Cornet H. Clarke, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps.

HOSPITAL STAFF.—Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, T. G. Logan, M.D., to be Inspector General of Hospitals, April 8. Assistant Surgeon, T. G. Fitzgerald to be Surgeon, April 8. Assistant Surgeon F. W. Moore, from the 3rd West India Regiment, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Murphy, appointed to the 12th Foot, April 8.

BREVET.—Major General R. H. Wynyard to have the local rank of Lieut.-General at the Cape of Good Hope, April 8. Lieut.-Colonel T. A. Larcom, of the Royal Engineers, having completed three years' service in that rank previous to the date of the Royal Warrant of 3rd November, 1854, February 17, 1857. Brevet Colonel T. A. Larcom, Retired Full Pay Royal Engineers, to be Major General, the rank being honorary only. April 1, 1858. Captain R. B. McCrea to be Major in the Army, April 8.

The following promotions to take place consequent on the death of Major General J. Reed, on 24th March, 1859, and of General F. C. White, on 1st April, 1859:—

Lieutenant General H. C. E. Vernon, C.B., to be General, April 2.

Major General Sir J. R. Eustace, to be Lieutenant General, April 12.

Brevet Colonel D. A. Cameron, C.B., Half Pay as Lieutenant Colonel 42nd Foot, Vice President of the Council of Education, to be Major General, March 25.

Brevet Colonel T. Matheson, upon Half Pay as Lieut. Col. Unattached, to be Major Gen., April 2.

Brevet Lieut. Colonel J. Impett, 74th Foot, to be Colonel, March 25.

Brevet Lieut. Colonel G. W. Mayow, upon Half Pay as Major Unattached, Assistant Adjutant General in South Eastern Dist. of Ireland, to be Colonel, April 2.

Brevet Major T. B. Mortimer, 76th Foot, to be Lieut. Col., March 25.

Major R. M. Sutherland, 22nd Foot, to be Lieut. Col., April 2.

Captain C. Pattison, Half Pay 56th Foot, Staff Officer of Pensioners, to be Major, March 25.

Captain J. E. Sharp, Half Pay, 1st Foot, Staff Officer of Pensioners, to be Major, April 2.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

East Kent—R. M. Nicols, Esq., late Captain in the 65th Regiment of Foot, to be Paymaster from the 3rd February, 1859, vice Atkinson, appointed to the 21st Fusileers, March 14.

Royal Lancashire Artillery—First Lieutenant J. Sothern, to be Captain, vice C. B. Molyneaux, resigned; Second Lieutenant D. G. Atchison, to be First Lieutenant, vice J. Sothern, promoted; T. Christie, gent., to be Second Lieutenant, vice G. J. Wilson, resigned, March 26.

Royal Aberdeenshire Highlanders—Lieutenant R. Macfarlane, to be Captain, vice A. Garden, removed from the strength of the Regiment, March 28.

Durham Artillery—O. Pelly, gent., to be Captain, vice G. J. Scurfield, resigned; F. Blacklin, gent., to be Second Lieutenant, March 31.

(The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* of the 29th March last.)

Royal Ayrshire Rifles—J. Montgomerie, F.R.C.S., to be Surgeon, Mar. 25

North Riding of Yorkshire—E. H. Turton, Esq., to be Deputy Lieutenant, April 2.

2nd Regiment of Royal Bucks Yeomanry Cavalry—Cornet Leicester Hibbert to be Lieutenant, vice Parker, resigned.

South Salopian Regiment of Yeomanry Cavalry—Lieut. St. John W. C. Charlton, to be Captain, vice Lord Forester, resignsd; Cornet W. Curtis to be Lieutenant, vice Charlton, promd ted April 5.

WAR OFFICE, APRIL 15.

(*The following Commissions bear date April* 15.)

2nd Regiment of Dragoon Guards—Captain G. T. Gough, from the 12th Light Dragoons, to be Captain, vice King, who exchanges.

3rd Light Dragoons—Lieut. R. J. M. St. George, from the 94th Foot, to be Lieut., paying the difference between Infantry and Cavalry, vice Teevan, who exchanges.

12th Light Dragoons—Captain W. W. King, from the 2nd Dragoon Guards, to be Captain, vice Gough, who exchanges.

Military Train—Captain W. Banks, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps, to be Captain, vice Macdonald, promoted to an Unattached Majority, without purchase; Captain C. F. Hutton, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps, to be Capt., vice Brevet Major Shervinton, promoted to an Unattached Majority, without purchase; Lieut. G. Hall, from Half Pay late Land Transport Corps, to be Lieut., vice Banks, who reverts to the Half Pay of his former rank of Captain in that Corps from the 1st April, 1857; Lieut. G. Edwards, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps, to be Lieut., vice Hutton, who reverts to the Half Pay of his former rank of Second Captain in that Corps from the 1st April, 1857; April 8.

9th Foot—Captain J. Molloy, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Captain, repaying the difference, vice Brevet Major A. B. Scott, seconded, having been appointed District Inspector of Musketry at the Cape of Good Hope; Lieut. H. C. Vibart, to be Capt. by purchase, vice Molley, who retires; W. Quaale, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Roberts, promoted.

11th—Captain E. C. K. Ravenhill, from the 99th Foot, to be Captain, vice Dickinson, who exchanges. Feb. 11.

15th—Lieutenant W. R. Tyler, to be Captain by purchase, vice Morshead, who retires.

36th—Lieut. A. F. Kelsey, to be Adjutant, vice C. D. James, who resigns the Adjutancy only.

39th—Ensign E. J. Armytage, from the Rifle Brigade, to be Ensign, vice Kerr, who exchanges.

41st—Lieut. H. S. Hill, to be Capt. without purchase, vice Dixon, deceased; Ensign R. Sadler, to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Hill, Feb. 15.

52nd—Lieut. A. Henley, to be Capt. by purchase, vice Brevet Major Bayley, who retires; Ensign R. G. Wilberforce, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Henley.

64th—Lieut. D. Gardiner, to be Instructor of Musketry, March 8.

70th—For Lieut. A. Saltmarshe, to be Lieut., &c., which appeared in the *Gazette* of 8th April, 1859, read Lieut. Arthur Saltmarshe, to be Capt. without purchase, vice Mulock, Feb. 6.

72nd—Lieut. C. C. W. Vesey, to be Captain by purchase, vice Buchanan, who retires; Ensign J. D. Stewart, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Vesey.

74th—Ensign W. H. Beere, from the 12th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Whimster, deceased.

84th—The appointment of Surgeon La Presle, from the Staff, as stated in the *Gazette* of 31st Dec. 1858, has been cancelled.

86th—Lieut. G. A. Conran has been permitted to retire from the service by the sale of his commission.

94th—Lieut. G. J. Teevan, from the 3rd Light Dragoons, to be Lieut., vice St. George, who exchanges.

96th—Ensign C. E. Wright, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice H. L. Williams, who retires.

99th.—Capt. W. S. Dickinson, from the 11th Foot, to be Capt., vice Ravenhill, who exchanges, Feb. 11.

Rifle Brigade—Ensign F. E. Kerr, from the 39th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Armytage, who exchanges; Surgeon J. T. La Presle, from the Staff, to be Surgeon, vice Sander, who exchanges, Jan. 14.

DEPOT BATTALION.—Captain W. E.

Wallace, from the 26th Foot, to be Adjutant, vice Buchanan, promoted to an Unattached Majority, without purchase.

COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT.—Dep. Commissary General W. Bishop, to be Commissary General, April 1; Deputy Commissary General T. C. Weir to be Commissary General, April 1.

HOSPITAL STAFF.—Surgeon H. S. Sanders, from the Rifle Brigade, to be Surgeon, vice La Presle, who exchanges, Jan. 14.

UNATTACHED.—Captain and Brevet Lieut. Col. D. Stewart, from Half Pay 84th Foot, Staff Officer of Pensioners, to be Major without purchase.

BREVET.—Captain J. Molloy, of the 9th Foot, to be Major in the Army, June 28, 1838; Brevet Major J. Molloy, of the 9th Foot, to be Lieut. Col. in the Army, Nov. 11, 1851.

WAR OFFICE, APRIL 15.

MEMORANDUM.—Lieut. R. H. Coldwell, having obtained a First Class Certificate at the School of Musketry at Hythe, has been appointed by the Gen. Commanding-in-Chief, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War, to act as Instructor of Musketry to the 2nd Stafford Regiment of Militia, vice Captain Wilson, promoted, April 1.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Leicestershire—C. H. Morris, Esq., to be Captain, vice Thomas, deceased.

Worcestershire—Lieut. W. Taylor to be Captain, vice T. W. Kinder, resigned; J. Sechmere, Gent., to be Lieut., vice Taylor, promoted.

Royal South Gloucestershire Light Infantry—E. D. Gibson, Gent., to be Ensign, vice Jackson, promoted.

Hampshire—Captain W. H. Digweed to be Major, vice Robbins, resigned.

Hampshire Artillery—C. Bayntun, Gent., to be Second Lieutenant.

Northumberland Artillery—A. J. M'Bay, Gent., to be Lieutenant.

Hussar Yorkshire Yeomanry Cavalry—Major Sir J. V. B. Johnstone, Bart., to be Lieutenant Colonel, vice Beckett, who retires; Captain the Right Hon. B. Richard Baron Wenlock to be Major, vice Sir J. V. B. Johnstone, promoted; Lieut. the Hon. R. N. Lawley to be Captain, vice Lord Wenlock promoted; Cornet R. Swann to be Lieutenant, vice Lawley, promoted; H. F. C. Vyner, gent., to be Cornet, vice Swann, promoted.

Royal Cheshire—Captain J. H. Daniell, late of the 49th and 42nd Regiments, to be Captain, vice S. J. Saunders, resigned. Memorandum.—Lieut. St. George Lowther, resigned.

[The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in *Gazette* of the 15th inst.:—]

Durham Artillery—Captain O. Pelly, half-pay 7th Madras Light Cavalry, to be Captain, vice G. J. Scurfield, resigned.

Memorandum.—Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the Commission held by the following gentlemen:—

West York Rifles—Lieut. J. V. Monckton.

3rd West York Light Infantry—Ensign J. M. Mangin.

Hussar Yorkshire Yeomanry Cavalry—Lieut. Colonel W. Beckett.

King's Own Light Infantry—J. Little Esq., to be Paymaster.

1st Duke of Lancaster's Own—Capt. B. Thornhill to be Adjutant.

Royal Glamorgan Light Infantry—Lieut. G. R. Gompertz to be Captain, vice Traherne, promoted.

Norfolk Artillery—Second Lieut. the Hon. Harbord Harbord to be First Lieut., vice Thierens, resigned.

Forfar and Kincardine Artillery—G. D. Ormsby, Gent., to be Second Lieut., vice J. A. Johnson, resigned; W. C. B. Constable, Gent., to be Second Lieut., vice J. Hay, promoted; J. A. Johnson, Gent., to be Second Lieut., vice A. W. Cruickshank, promoted.

[The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* of the 12th inst.:—]

Worcestershire—J. Lechmere, Gent., to be Lieut., vice Taylor, promoted.

Royal Sherwood Foresters—The Queen has been pleased to accept the resignation of his Commission by Ensign E. R. Ives.

WAR OFFICE, APRIL 22.

The following Commissions bear date April 22.

2nd Dragoons—Lieut. G. Paulett, from the 8th Light Dragoons, to be Lieutenant, vice G. C. Ross, who exchanges.

5th Light Dragoons—Cornet R. Mather to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Bright, who retires.

8th Light Dragoons—Lieut. G. C. Ross, from the 2nd Dragoons, to be Lieut., vice G. Paulet, who exchanges.

17th Light Dragoons—Lieut. W. R. Nolan to be Captain by purchase, vice Baring, who has retired.

Military Train—Lieut. C. T. Wilson, from the Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment, to be Lieut., vice Whittington, who exchanges. The appointment of Cornet H. D. J. Macleod, from half pay of the late Land Transport Corps, to be Ensign, as stated in the *Gazette* of 30th July, 1858, has been cancelled.

6th Foot—Quartermaster P. Sheeran, from the 96th Foot, to be Quartermaster, vice Jamieson, who exchanges.

7th—Captain T. D. G. Payn, from the 61st Foot, to be Captain, vice Thurston, who exchanges, Feb. 25.

8th—Lieut. W. F. Metge to be Capt. by purchase, vice J. A. McDonald, who retires ; Ensign P. H. Page to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Metge.

9th—Captain T. Grace, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Captain, vice Baillie, who exchanges ; Ensign B. V. Layard to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Vibart, promoted.

10th—Captain W. J. Hales, from the 60th Foot, to be Captain, vice Medhurst, who exchanges, Feb. 16.

11th—Lieut. A. F. De B. Dixon to be Captain by purchase, vice Peebles, promoted ; Ensign P. W. Jordon to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Dixon.

18th—Ensign F. W. Lipscomb to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Watt, deceased, Jan. 31.

38th—Lieut. P. H. Eyre to be Adjutant, vice Lieut. Evans, who has retired.

39th—Lieut. J. Du B. Blennerhassett, from the Royal Wiltshire Militia, to be Ensign without purchase, vice Hussey, who resigns.

40th—Lieut. T. Bolton to be Captain by purchase, vice O'Hara, who retires.

43rd—Ensign T. M'Goun to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Benett, who retires.

60th—Captain J. W. Medhurst, from the 10th Foot, to be Captain, vice Hales, who exchanges, Feb. 16.

61st—Captain H. N. C. Thurston, from the 7th Foot, to be Captain, vice T. G. D. Payn, who exchanges, Feb. 25.

69th—Major P. Fenwick, to be Lieut. Colonel by purchase, vice Hickey, who retires ; Captain A. B. Hankey, to be Major by purchase, vice Fenwick.

75th—Captain G. A. Currie, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Captain, repaying the difference, vice Brevet Major B. D. W. Ramsay, who exchanges ; Lieut. W. C. Justice, to be Captain by purchase, vice Currie, who retires ; Ensign H. B. Gledstanes, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Justice.

76th—Lieut W. F. Field, from the Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment, to be Lieut., vice Macdonald, who exchanges.

78th—Captain A. E. Warren, from the 82nd Foot, to be Captain, vice Brevet Major H. T. Macpherson, who exchanges, Feb. 26.

82nd—Brevet Major H. T. Macpherson, from the 78th Foot, to be Captain, vice Warren, who exchanges, Feb. 26.

96th — Quartermaster J. Jamieson, from the 6th Foot, to be Quartermaster vice Sheeran, who exchanges.

97th—Ensign R. B. H. Lowe, to be Lieut. without purchase, vice M'Kay, deceased, Feb. 14.

99th—Ensign A. Gray, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Clarkson promoted.

Gold Coast Artillery Corps—Lieut. T. C. Danger, to be Adjutant, vice Bolton, who resigns the Adjutancy only.

Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment—Lieut. G. J. C. Whittington, from the Military Train, to be Lieut., vice Wilson, who exchanges ; Lieut. M. J. Macdonald, from the 76th Foot, to be Lieut, vice Field, who exchanges.

School of Musketry—Ensign J. Slack, from the 63rd Foot, to be Quartermaster, with the rank of Lieutenant.

HOSPITAL STAFF.—Acting Assistant Surgeon, G. Hayward has been permitted to resign his appointment.

UNATTACHED.—Cornet A. D. J. Macleod, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps, to be Lieutenant without purchase, April 1, 1857.

BREVET.—Lieutenant Colonel Sir H. C. Rawlinson, K.C.B., a Member of the Council for India, and a Retired Officer on the Bombay Establishment, to have the local rank of Major General in Persia, while holding the office of Her

Majesty's Minister in that country. Captain G. A. Currie, 75th Foot, to be Major in the Army, June 20, 1854. Captain H. R. Gardiner, 2nd Bengal Native Infantry, to be Major in the Army, Dec. 26.

The undermentioned promotions to take place consequent on the death of Lieutenant General Sir J. Thackwell, G.C.B., Colonel of the 16th Light Dragoons, on the 8th April:—

Major General B. Drummond, Colonel of the 3rd Foot, to be Lieut. General, April 9; Brevet Colonel G. Bell, C.B., Inspecting Field Officer of a Recruiting District, to be Major General, April 9; Brevet Lieutenant Colonel J. F. Du Vernet, Captain Half Pay Royal African Corps, Staff Officer of Pensioners, to be Colonel, April 9; Brevet Major W. H. Kenny, Captain Half Pay 61st Foot, Staff Officer of Pensioners, to be Lieutenant Colonel, April 9; Captain T. Teulon, 35th Foot, to be Major, April 9.

The following promotions should have been included in the succession to the late General F. C. White:—Major General J. H. Richardson, upon Half Pay as Lieutenant Colonel Unattached, to have the rank of Lieut. General, April 2.

The undermentioned promotions to take place in the Indian Military Forces of Her Majesty, consequent on the death of General W. C. Fraser, Madras Infantry, on 4th March, and of General J. MacInnes, Bengal Infantry, on March 12:—

To be Generals—Lieutenant General J. Carfrae, Madras Infantry, March 5; Lieutenant General G. Jackson, Madras Infantry, March 13.

To be Lieutenant Generals.—Major General S. Shaw, Bengal Artillery, March 5; Major General F. L. Doveton, Madras Cavalry, March 13.

To be Major Generals.—Colonel H. Macan, Bombay Infantry, March 5; Colonel W. Sage, Bengal Infantry, March 13.

The undermentioned Officers of the Indian Military Forces of Her Majesty, retired upon Full Pay, to have a step of honorary rank, as follows: Colonel A. S. Hawkins, Bombay Infantry, to be Major General.

To be Colonels.—Lieutenant Colonel F. C. Cotton, Madras Infantry; Lieut. Colonel T. Lavie, Madras Artillery; Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Auld, Bombay Infantry.

To be Lieutenant Colonels.—Major W. C. Western, Madras Infantry; Major W. H. Larkins, Bengal Infantry.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Suffolk Artillery.—P. Fitzpatrick' Gent., to be Quartermaster from the 8th of March, March 23.

4th or Duke of Lancaster's Own (Light Infantry), Royal Lancashire.—J. F. Stenier, Gent., to be Ensign, vice E. R. Lloyd, promoted, April 14.

6th Royal Lancashire—M. Thompson, Gent., to be Ensign, April 13. T. H. Tracey, Gent., to be Ensign, April 14.

5th or Royal Elthorne Light Infantry Middlesex—W. G. Stack to be Lieutenant, vice Cookney, resigned, March 31.

East Suffolk Artillery Corps—First Lieutenant W. T. Harvey to be Capt., vice Barlow, resigned, April 14. E. G. Austin, Gent., late of Bengal Artillery, to be First Lieutenant, April 12. J. T. Rowley, Gent., to be First Lieutenant, April 13. R. W. Coates, Gent., to be First Lieutenant, April 14. J. B. Wilkinson, Gent., to be First Lieutenant, April 15. G. T. W. Ferrand, Gent., to be Second Lieutenant, April 12. C. A. Cooper, Gent., to be Second Lieutenant, April 13. C. C. R. Brooke, Gent., to be Second Lieutenant, April 14.

City of Edinburgh Artillery.—J. Davidson, Gent., to be Second Lieut., vice R. Nicol, promoted, March 1.

Wilts—J. Du Boulay, Esq., to be Deputy Lieutenant. W. H. Hitchcock, Esq., to be Deputy Lieutenant, Apr. 9.

Denbighshire Yeomanry Cavalry—C. Lord Worsley, to be Captain, vice Nanney, resigned, April 18.

West Kent Yeomanry Cavalry—Captain the Earl of Darnley, to be Major, vice Chapman, resigned, April 18.

Queen's Own Yeomanry Cavalry—Cornet R. P. Featherstonhaugh, to be Lieutenant, vice Lieutenant the Lord Ashley, resigned, April 19.

4th or Royal South Middlesex—M. Angelo, gent., to be Ensign, vice Jackson, promoted, April 18.

5th or Royal Elthorne—J. E. Gibson, Gent., to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Pierce, resigned, April 14.

4th Duke of Lancaster's Own—Lieutenant G. Barlow, to be Captain, vice J. H. Blake, resigned. Ensign H. M. Howard to be Lieutenant, vice G. Barlow, promoted, April 18.

Royal Ayrshire Rifles—R. S. Patrick, Gent., to be Lieutenant, April 20.

DEATHS.

At her residence, Woolwich, on the 14th April, Hester, relict of Captain John Fullom, formerly of H. M. 43d Regiment and of the Royal Military Asylum.

On the 30th of March, 1859, Agnes Duncan, widow of the late Capt. D. Anderson, 1st W. I. Regiment, 71 years of age, daughter of the late J. Shaw, Esq., Mureton, North Britain, at Sandgate, in Kent.

On the 29th March, accidentally drowned, in the 9th year of his age, William James, eldest son of Captain John Dawson, of the 43rd Bengal Light Infantry.

On the 30th March, Henry Leslie Grove, eldest son of Commander Dunsterville, R.N., Hydrographic Office, Admiralty, aged 21.

On the 11th April, at Elm Cottage, Hampstead, Isabella, wife of Joseph Glynn, Esq., F.R.S., and only daughter of the late Peter Black, Esq., R.N.

On the 12th April, at 21, Mornington-road, Regent's-park, Stephen Groom, Esq., late of the War-Office.

On the 2nd April, at Cliftonville, Brighton, Susanna Wilson, the wife of Rear Admiral Sir John Hindmarsh, in the 73rd year of her age.

On the 6th April, at Bigadon, S. Devon, aged 15, Robert Thomas Ryan, younger son of the late General Sir John Hunter Littler, G.C.B.

On the 11th April, Harriet Gordon, only daughter of the late T. R. Mitchison, Esq., Com. Gen., Corfu.

On the 9th April, at No. 9, Devonshire-terrace, Hyde-park, Lucy Mary Eleanor, the beloved wife of J. W. Safe, Esq., of the Admiralty, deeply lamented.

On the 31st March, at Florence, in her 17th year, Erminia, daughter of the late Colonel Stibbert.

On the 4th April, at the Spa, Gloucester, Louisa, widow of the late Capt. Thomas Sykes, R.N., aged 84.

On the 9th April, at Colchester, Eliza, the daughter of Dr. Taylor, Deputy Inspector General, aged 3 years and 8 months.

On the 7th April, in Connaught-terrace, Hyde-park, Lady Teesdale, widow of Major General Sir George Teesdale, K.H.

On the 6th April, at No. 4, Upper Fitzroy-street, and at an advanced age, Juliet, widow of the late Captain Thomas Wing, R.N.

THE RECENT CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY.

The long talked of and but little needed reorganization of the Royal Artillery, rumours of which had been keeping the corps in a state of anything but healthy excitement and expectation for some time previously, made its appearance in the early part of April last. As everything connected with this important and increasing part of the service is of interest at all times, and must needs be peculiarly so at the present moment, it is proposed in this article to enter into an examination of the changes that have thus recently been made, and to combine with it such other remarks with regard to the position and prospects of the corps generally, in continuation of similar former observations on the same subject in the pages of this Magazine, as the circumstances of the case may seem to justify or require; and the consideration of which, it is hoped and believed, will do more to promote efficiency, as well as to prevent confusion in every way, than is likely to be the case by pursuing the changes we have lately, and for some time been in the habit of making.

Leaving this for the present, it will perhaps be no useless occupation of a short time to explain, not so much for the information of mere professional readers as for others, and more particularly for members of the legislature, many of whom are beginning to feel an interest in these matters, what the recent new arrangements in the Royal Artillery consist of, mention of which has appeared in most of the newspapers. To do this with sufficient clearness, it is necessary to go back a little, and to state that, previous to these alterations the corps consisted of fourteen battalions, and of ten troops of horse artillery. It is unnecessary, for the purpose we have in view, to make any mention of the invalid artillery or of the riding-house establishment. Each of the fourteen battalions consisted of eight companies. Those of the latter which were attached to horses and field-guns were called field-batteries. The reliefs at home and abroad were carried on by companies. The time of service at each of the colonies was fixed, and until very lately generally adhered to. As soon as the time of service abroad of a company expired, it was relieved by the longest at home. There was a regular roster in this respect which had existed for a considerable number of years, and which worked smoothly and efficiently. There might possibly (though we hardly think it) have been some advantage in departing, at least in the first instance, from this roster, when the army embarked for the East in 1854, but even then it was adhered to; several companies low down on the list of foreign service, and at the moment attached to field batteries had to give them up, and to transfer their best drivers in order to complete the companies at the top of the roster required for embarkation. There was not a single company, until just on the eve of starting, that was up to a war establishment, or anything approaching it; and the necessary transfers to make them up, caused considerable confusion at the moment and for some time after. The companies for the reliefs at home and abroad were taken

without reference to the battalions they belonged to. The last at home was the first to go abroad. The establishment of the officers of a company was five, two captains and three subalterns, but few of them were ever complete in this respect. The number of non-commissioned officers and men varied every now and then. Officers and men of companies embarked together, and a company of artillery on the old system was exactly similar to a regiment of the line. Whether as a company on foot, or as a field battery, it proved the unity of command, and moved complete in itself, or it might be broken up and detached in any proportion without inconvenience or difficulty as circumstances required. Each battalion with its eight companies had four lieutenant-colonels, and the whole of these officers were placed on a roster for service very similar in every respect to that maintained for the companies. They took their places for stations abroad according to the date of their promotion, or of arrival in England, if they had been serving out of it as captains previously. The system was a perfectly fair one. Everyone understood it, and those most concerned were satisfied with it. It completely shut out favouritism and no one wishing simply for fair play could complain of it.

It was first broken through in 1854, on the departure of the expedition for the East; the field officers to accompany which were taken by selection. One of these, who deservedly bore a very high character for zeal and professional knowledge and ability, and who subsequently rose to the highest position in the corps in the Crimea, had been taken from Gibraltar. In 1856, on the outbreak in India, the system of roster for the field officers was completely set aside, with but little or no reason to justify it, and a wide door has been opened ever since for that jobbing and favouritism which are the great bane of the service, and which, in the Artillery particularly, is most certain to act injuriously upon efficiency. An opportunity is now readily afforded, also, for giving a slight to any officer, however actively and efficiently he may discharge his duty, whom the authorities have reason to dislike, and whose claims they may desire for their own official ease to get rid of. When a bad or a distant station now becomes vacant it can go in turn, for the name of a roster is still retained, or it can be offered as if it was a favour bestowed. The course pursued is to pay some high-flown compliment to the victim selected as to his zeal and ability, which if true ought to make them blush for previous neglect, and which if false, they ought not to utter, and to offer him the vacancy. If he accepts and goes, he is got out of the way, which was just what was wanted; if he falls into the trap, and refuses it, it is a ground for ignoring his claims and a continuance of neglect. In either case the manœuvre is an ingenious one, and can seldom fail of being successful. When good stations, or those offering a prospect of distinction, are open, such as India in the late disturbances, these are so much patronage to be bestowed on favourites. There was nothing in the old state of things that prevented an incompetent officer being passed over, or one of any marked capability from being selected. The principle of it was good and ought to have been retained.

The objection made to the roster of field officers and that of the companies, and the only one that in the least affected it, was that the former were frequently to be found at stations doing duty with other officers and men of different battalions to those they themselves belonged to. This objection, to the ears of an infantry officer, might sound weighty enough, but no one knowing anything of the corps of Artillery would deem it for a moment of the slightest importance. There was just as much consideration shown for the non-commissioned officers and men under this state of things, and the duty in every respect was quite as well performed as it is ever likely to be under any other established in lieu of it. A field officer of artillery, under the old system, cared for the whole regiment alike. He took just as much interest in the battalion he was serving with as if it was his own. It might indeed so happen, and frequently did occur, that from his previous service as a captain he would know the men of the former far better than those of the latter. Neither in the roster of the companies, nor in that of the field officers, was there the slightest inconvenience or difficulty whatever. The service was well performed, and each individual could anticipate, except in the case of some unusual occurrence, where and when he might be expected to go abroad, and what arrangements to make accordingly.

It should be mentioned, for it is in this respect that the most important change is made under the new arrangements, that each of the head-quarters of the 14 battalions was stationed at Woolwich. This head-quarters consisted of an Adjutant and Quarter-Master, with the usual staff of non-commissioned officers. These with the men were called the adjutant's detachments. The latter were made up principally of recruits at different stages of drill, intermingled with some old soldiers, either retained at Woolwich for the completion of their service, or of others kept from their companies for various reasons. These detachments were more or less strong according to circumstances. They were the depôts as well as the head-quarters of their respective battalions. A depôt of the line under the old system was expensive enough, and a depôt battalion upon the latest and most approved plan is still somewhat costly. The depôt or head-quarters of a battalion of Artillery (the terms are synonymous in this instance) was the cheapest affair that could possibly be contrived, and it did its work in every respect quite as well, if not a great deal better, than the same thing was or is now done in any part of the army. A single depôt battalion of the line, with the regiments of which it is composed usually kept together, has generally two field-officers, and never less than one, with an Adjutant, a Paymaster, a Quarter-Master, and an Instructor of Musketry. The whole of the depôts of the 14 battalions of Artillery, numbering between 20,000 and 30,000 officers and men, dispersed by companies all over the world, had only twenty-eight permanent officers belonging to them.

The system we have departed from in this respect was as simple as it could well be—it was efficient and it was economical. It may have required some management and a little improvement, but that

was all. The foundation was excellent. It would never have been discredited if it had been properly worked, but it was in this that the deficiency existed. The appointments of the Adjutants had been long made, as everything is now made in this country a means of abuse and jobbery. They were usually sought after to escape foreign or other disagreeable service, and zeal or competency were commonly the last qualities thought of with regard to them. The field officers who fell into the command of battalions every now and then were hardly recognized in their positions, and they consequently took little or no interest in them. The Commandant of Woolwich garrison generally did nothing except appear at his office and sign his name, while the Brigade-Major under his protection as commonly took more upon himself than he had a right to assume.

The Adjutant-General's office, until the last two or three years at Woolwich, which should have stood aloof from garrison work, was constantly taking a part in what was done. It frequently disputed the authority of the Commandant and interfered and meddled with his duties. These causes, and others in connection with them of a similar kind, were the means by which confusion and difficulty in the working of things at Woolwich were first created. There was a very lax discipline, and in fact the whole thing was conducted more with regard to individual interests or prejudices than with reference to military efficiency. There was always a tendency to mismanagement, and to jobbing and favoritism, at Woolwich, from the absence of all responsibility in those who were supreme there; and this tendency, under those who ruled subsequent to the death of Sir Alexander Dickson, was allowed to take its full swing. It is not too much to say that up to the very last moment of the late war with Russia the mass of the corps seemed to be considered of little or no importance. It was, in fact, sacrificed, if it may not and cannot be said to selfish or unworthy motives, at least to such as no one having the good of the service and nothing else at heart could readily understand.

When Sir Alexander Dickson was at the head of the corps, supported in prominent positions in connection with it by such eminent artillery officers as Williamson, Fraser, Drummond, May, and many others, the instruction of the corps, starved as the estimates were in those days, and indifferent as both the Government and the country were to our military establishments, went far beyond what it has ever been since, or, taken as a whole, what it is now. A regular and understood system prevailed in everything, and it was strictly adhered to. A judicious reformer, or one having a practical knowledge of the real wants of the Artillery service, would have left the organization of the corps and the manner of its reliefs alone, and would simply have devoted his attention to re-establishing, on a scale commensurate with the augmented numbers of the regiment, and the requirements of the times in that respect, such a careful routine of professional instruction as must be so plainly essential for the Artillery above any other portion of the army, and which is its greatest requirement at the present moment. Instead of this wise proceeding, and keeping exclusively to it, the new arrange-

ments attempt to carry out a fanciful theory, that a battalion or brigade of artillery of eight batteries or companies can be treated like a regiment of infantry; the ideas connected with which it will require a considerable time to communicate to the distant out stations, a still longer time to get into working order, and by which, even if it should ever work, which is more than doubtful, it is impossible to make out how efficiency can be promoted in any way. Surely if all our militia artillery regiments were to have their head quarters and depôts in one place, with an establishment like that at Woolwich for artillery instruction, they would be made far more useful than they now are; but, virtually, we are now applying the bad militia system to our regular force.

The new arrangements meet exactly Lord John Russell's description of the ministerial Reform Bill. They alter a great deal that was good and useful, and which ought not to have been disturbed, while they leave almost everything alone that might have been considered mischievous or defective, and which it would have been therefore better to change. Why or wherefore they should have been brought forward, especially at the present moment, when there is so much of a far more urgent matter to attend to in professional instruction, as well as in other respects, it is most difficult to understand. The new plan abolishes the terms battalion, troop, and company, which were certainly rather inappropriate terms in the artillery, though they had the convenience of making a distinction desirable in some respects, and the corps is now divided into brigades and batteries. The former are fifteen in number with the depôt brigade. One is styled the Horse Artillery Brigade, and consists as of old of ten batteries, an insufficient number now that four are in India. The head-quarters of this brigade, with two of the batteries only, is to be at Woolwich. The other eight are detached—one at Aldershott, one at Woolwich, two in Ireland, and four in India. How are the reliefs of this branch of the service to be carried on except on the old plan? There being only one brigade, it cannot, except after the fashion of the Irishman's bird, relieve itself. This does not seem to have occurred to the authors of the new measures, at least no allusion is made as if it did. One paragraph of the order distinctly states, without mentioning any exception, that the reliefs are to be carried out by entire brigades, and that it is to be arranged that each brigade before proceeding on foreign service shall, if practicable (that is a prudent proviso and shows some misgiving), be stationed at least twelve months. It certainly does not seem likely ever to be practicable to have a brigade, four of the batteries of which are always to be in India, and other batteries of which are necessarily detached at certain places at home, assembled for twelve months at Woolwich, or for any period whatever, and still less so that it can ever relieve itself by an entire brigade. The same or a similar argument applies to all the other brigades, and it is plain the whole thing must break down. The reliefs of the horse brigade can be carried out by batteries, and by batteries only, and so it will be found with regard to the rest of the regiment. The fourteen battalions lose that designation under the new arrange-

ments and become fourteen brigades instead. The change so far is merely nominal, and it would have been well if it had stopped there. Five of these brigades are to be field artillery, and the other eight garrison artillery. Of the former, three brigades or twenty-four batteries, in all 144 guns, are to be at home; and a like number of brigades, but comprising twenty-five batteries or 150 guns, are to be abroad. Of the garrison artillery four brigades are to be abroad and four at home, so that the artillery of England is divided almost exactly in equal portions between home and the colonies.

The brigades are of unequal strength, and this must complicate the difficulty, if not impossibility, of carrying out the order as to reliefs by entire brigades. Some of them are, moreover, so much dispersed in different colonies wide apart from each other, and having some of them little or no communication with each other, that the slightest adherence to the intended principle must be utterly impracticable. Of the four brigades at home, one is posted to Woolwich, one to Dover, one between Devonport and Portsmouth, and one between the last-named place and the Channel Islands. Now we should like to know how any of these places is to be relieved by brigades without the inconvenience of entirely denuding some one of the others of its garrison artillery for the purpose. Will this be done, and if it is not done, what becomes of the general order? Suppose, for instance, it is wished to bring the Channel Islands brigade to Woolwich, how is it to be done without taking away an entire brigade, for a time at least, from one or other of these places? Will two batteries be sent first to Portsmouth and two brought from Woolwich, and the same thing go on with regard to Jersey, Guernsey, and Alderney, and if so, what is this but something extremely like the old system back again?

This objection may be of little importance with regard to home reliefs when the distances are short, and when steam is available; but how is the case to be when, for instance, the brigade at the Mauritius has served its time abroad and requires to be brought home? Of this brigade one battery is to be at St. Helena, one at the Cape, two at the Mauritius, with its head-quarters, one at Ceylon, one at Sydney, and one at China. Suppose the brigade which has been its twelve months at Woolwich, in compliance with the order, and which will compose the garrison artillery of that quarter, is ordered on this duty, the place it leaves will have no garrison artillery until the brigade returns home, a portion of which is at China, and the whole of which is scattered between the latter place and half a dozen others extending to St. Helena. Moreover, how is this relief by an entire brigade to be conducted? Will the ship which leaves England begin at St. Helena, dropping one battery and taking up another; thence to the Cape in like manner, and so on to all the other stations, returning home at last from China or Sydney? or will she go to the extreme of her destination, and work homewards—in either case keeping a number of useful soldiers on board ship unnecessarily? If the brigade goes out in different ships things are not much better; in either case a greater number of batteries of artillery will be on the ocean at a time than is desirable; and in either case our home defences must suffer. In the most

speedy mode of conducting the relief, upwards of a year would elapse before the brigade would be assembled complete at home. Again, in the case of the relief of a brigade of field artillery. These last abroad are all in India. The one to be relieved will have to be collected somewhere on the coast for some time before, to the great detriment of the stations from which the batteries composing it must necessarily be withdrawn, and the endangering of the portion of the army left for a time without artillery in case of any sudden outbreak.

The country at home meanwhile, loses the services of a brigade, or 48 guns, while it is on its way out to this distant quarter, and until the one it relieves arrives in England. Moreover one of the brigades of field artillery in India has nine batteries, while not a single other one has more than eight. How can any of those of less strength relieve the one of greater? The inequality of the strength of the brigades of the garrison artillery makes a like difficulty—greater because the inequality is greater. In this latter part of the service the four brigades at home have three of 8 batteries and one of 7; while the four abroad have two of 7, one of 8, and one of 10 batteries. It will require a good deal of management to contrive and relieve the latter by means of the former without further periodical changes. The whole system is something as if the Horse Guards determined in relieving the whole of the regiment on particular stations at once.

Most likely some wise subordinate in that quarter got into his head that a company of Artillery, whether in battery or otherwise, was like a company of the Line, and that such companies would of course be no more than a regiment of infantry, and that it could be conveniently relieved and treated in every respect in the same manner. One of the field-artillery brigades muster but one short of 1900 non-commissioned officers and men; it will have on a very moderate peace establishment little short of 1,000 horses, 153 carriages, with ammunition and stores for 54 guns. It will be a satisfaction to have it explained how this brigade is to be relieved in its entirety without inconvenience, even if there was another equally as strong to relieve it, which there is not. Can the massing of 54 guns, which is the artillery of a tolerably strong army, in the most lavish proportion of guns to men, be compared to calling in the detachments of a paltry battalion or regiment of infantry, and concentrating them for the same purpose? This part of the scheme must prove a decided failure on the face of it. It is so absurdly impracticable in every part of it, that it is difficult to imagine how it could possibly have been broached at all. It is evidently the idea of an infantry officer, and the Horse Guards have made themselves exclusively responsible for it, for it is signed by the Adjutant-General of the army, and not by the Deputy Adjutant-General of Artillery, which as exclusively relating to the Artillery it should have been. The Horse Guards were too proud of it to allow any one else even the appearance of a claim to so clever and simple a contrivance. Undaunted by their failures on so many points of military legislation, and the necessity for resorting to parliamentary committees in consequence, they determined in breaking fresh ground and astonishing everyone by

their capacity in altering the organization of the Artillery. What the defects of the latter consisted in, or what necessity there was for changing it, we are entirely at a loss to discover. The only light thrown on this part of the subject by the General Order is the assertion, it is nothing more, that the staff of the regiment which was stationary at Woolwich had become unwieldy; so in order to make it less so, the singular measure is resorted to of taking away its stationary character and making it moveable. The 14 adjutants and the 14 quarter-masters for the 14 battalions of which the regimental staff was composed, and who were formerly kept always at Woolwich, being condemned as unwieldy, they are now attached to as many brigades, and made to travel about with them so as to make them less so. What possible benefit can arise from this? and yet it is solely on this account that all the change is made. The General Order is silent as to any other reason. The opening paragraph says (the exact words are quoted)—"the successive augmentation to the Royal Artillery having caused an assemblage at Woolwich of an unwieldy regimental staff, it is decided that the head-quarters of the Royal Artillery shall remain, as heretofore, at Woolwich, but that the staff of the battalions shall be distributed to the several districts and garrisons at home and abroad." After this follow the different arrangements by which a long-established system is altogether upset.

It would be idle to criticise the grammar and logic of the order. All we should like to know is, that if the regimental staff of the Artillery was unwieldy, in what the unwieldiness consisted? Surely a regimental staff, always stationed at Woolwich, no matter how large, must be more compact and manageable than the same staff dispersed from Ballincollig to Bengal. The staff complained of was at Woolwich, for the purpose of keeping the records of the several battalions, and doing many other things essential to their proper maintenance and efficiency. Each staff, distinct and separate in itself, consisted of two officers, and but two only. How, in the name of everything reasonable, could the epithet unwieldy be applied to such a staff, or to an aggregate of fourteen such, each having distinct duties, and moving in different orbits? Not one single advantage of any kind or description is asserted for the new scheme but that of dispersing the regimental staff. The claim of the Horse Guards to this change is disputed in the *Naval and Military Gazette* by a Mr. Bright, who seems to fancy himself a very clear military reformer, but whose ideas on the subject, it is to be hoped, will receive less consideration, as far as the Artillery is concerned, than he asserts they have done in this instance. If he is the real author of the new arrangements, or whoever may be, let him be made a Knight of the Bath, with an adequate pension, and a stipulation that he shall turn his attention henceforth to something he understands better. It is inconceivable that such a step should have been taken at so inappropriate a moment as the present, when there is so much in the shape of organization to attend to in other respects, as that of violently disturbing a system which, like that of the Artillery, had existed for a considerable number of years, and against which nothing could be urged but the unwieldiness of its regimental staff; this regimental staff, for

upwards of 20,000 men, being composed of fourteen distinct parts, comprising only twenty-eight officers altogether. Great stress is laid, in making the new arrangements, on keeping the head-quarters at Woolwich; but, like everything else connected with the order, this is speedily shown to be an impossibility. The paragraph of the General Order already quoted says it shall be so; but a very few lines lower down another can only venture to desire that it may be considered in that light, although the head-quarters of the majority of the brigades are removed from it. This majority being in the considerable proportion of 12 to 3. How a place is ever to be considered the head-quarters of a corps, of which the head-quarters of 12 out of the 15 brigades composing it are elsewhere cannot well be understood.

It is very desirable that the Artillery should know as speedily as possible what the new arrangements intend to do, and how they are to be carried out; and these remarks are principally meant to promote discussion, in order, if possible, to make clear what seems to be utterly incomprehensible without some explanation. If the new system is really a practicable one, the sooner it is shown to be so the better. These are not times for crude experiment in military legislation. The command of each brigade of Artillery is to be held by a Colonel or Lieutenant-Colonel, who is to have the entire control of it, and, such is the highest pinnacle to which an Artillery officer may reach, he is to be considered as holding the same relative position as an officer commanding a regiment, making his own non-commissioned officers, and communicating direct with the Adjutant-General.

As there is no Adjutant-General of Artillery, this must mean, if the order is to be read, as a military order ought to be, with strict exactness, the Adjutant-General of the Army; so that virtually the corps is taken out of the hands of its own appointed officials altogether, or the latter are made mere cyphers of, which is much the same thing. In all these late alterations they seem to be completely ignored and set aside, and it is impossible not to believe, that neither they nor any of the higher officers of Artillery have been at all consulted. It clearly indicates whence these impracticable changes have emanated when such a command as that of a brigade of Artillery, is for a moment or in any respect spoken of as on a par with the command of a regiment. The two things are as different as the command of a company and the command of a division of an army. Any one of the brigades of Artillery would furnish a fair average proportion of the arms in the field for an army of 20,000 men. It would give as many guns as were actively engaged on the part of the British Army at either of the battles of the Alma or Inkermann, and more than we had at many of the great actions in the Peninsula. An artillery officer commanding such a force, with the great responsibility attached to it, ought to take his place with the General commanding a division. To speak of him on the same terms as an officer commanding a regiment, shows either extreme ignorance, or a desire, which we should hardly suppose an official of any position capable of exhibiting, to degrade and lower a service which deserves better

treatment. If the command of some half-dozen regiments, or less, composing a brigade of Infantry requires a higher officer than a Colonel or a Lieutenant-Colonel, surely a brigade of Artillery, which even in peace time is never less than forty-eight guns, and which, as in the case of the Horse Artillery Brigade, consists of not less than sixty, with more than 2,000 horses and an immense mass of material, ought to go still higher in the scale. The comparison of the command of a brigade of Artillery with such a command as that of a regiment, if not merely meant to be insulting, shows the lamentable want of knowledge of the service generally which exists in our military administration.

There is positively no one single paragraph of the order relating to these recent changes in the Artillery that does not show the incapacity and want of knowledge of the details of the service of the arm, by those who have drawn it out. It is stated as very desirable, that every man of the regiment should be thoroughly acquainted with the whole of the duties of the Artillery soldier, and that commanding officers will be held responsible: that the drivers are instructed as far as possible as gunners, and the gunners when practicable as drivers. How can this be the case, if certain brigades are maintained exclusively as field Artillery, while others are equally confined to garrison duties. If every man in the regiment is to be thoroughly acquainted with all the duties of an Artillery soldier, a certain rotative system, such as existed a few years ago, ought to be again re-established. The designation of gunner and driver to every man in the regiment should also again be reverted to. If all the men are to learn the same duties, it is evidently a mistake to designate them differently from each other. So long as there are certain men called drivers, and others gunners, the natural tendency will be to keep each exclusively to their own duties. It was a great blunder to have disturbed the old system in any way. It had received the emphatic approval of Sir Alexander Dickson, and it was presumption in the men of modern days to condemn what he, with his great practical experience, declared to be so good. All that was required was to work it out properly with an adequate establishment of field batteries, such as we have never had until within the last few years. When every man in the regiment was a gunner and driver, a unity of feeling existed; moreover, the service was relieved of much of its irksomeness, for if a man became tired of the care of a pair of horses and the duty of driving them, another was readily substituted anxious to take them. It was easy in this way, and by the casualties of men going into hospital, or on furlough, to circulate a knowledge of all the duties of an artilleryman, but the new system makes this far more difficult. The drivers, kept exclusively as drivers, get sick of the work, and desert in crowds. It is the prevailing crime amongst these men. It has got to such an extent in some instances, that what with fresh drivers to replace the absentees, and the having so many as seventy-five drivers in each battery, very little margin is left for instructing the gunners in driver's duties. The gunner and driver system was both economical and efficient; the separation of the two duties, which the new system

amounts to, gains nothing in the latter respect, if it does not lose, and it is costly in the extreme. It entails the necessity of a number of idle men as spare drivers. These surplus men at the present moment amount to fully as many as those for whom there is work to be found. There are now seventy-five drivers in the establishment of each battery, while the battery turning out complete only employs thirty-eight. It is impossible to regulate the number of drivers so as to meet all the casualties that may arise. There is nothing but inconvenience and expense attached to the recent changes in this respect. We may depend upon it that the gunner and driver system was approved of not only by Sir Alexander Dickson, but by other artillery officers who had shared with him his Peninsula experience. The Duke of Wellington got the credit of it, but the probability is that he merited it just as little as the substitution of 9-pounders for 6-pounders at the battle of Waterloo, for which, as it now turns out, the country was indebted to an artillery officer, the late Sir Augustus Fraser. The fact has been admitted over and over again that that great battle, on which so much depended, and the successful result of which placed the British army on so high a pinnacle of glory, was won mainly by the substitution of guns of heavier calibre for the lighter ones that had been in use previously by the troops of horse artillery; but it was not known until lately that this substitution was urged by an artillery officer; and, after being opposed for some time, reluctantly acceded to by the great General who commanded. Will the present Horse Guards remember this, and look more than they seem inclined to do to artillery officers for the management and interior arrangements of their own arm? Will the War Office bear it in mind, and look about for a director-general before they involve themselves more deeply by meddling with artillery material and with other matters in connection with the arm which they do not understand? There are as able officers of high rank in the Artillery as in any other part of the army: they are not a bit more debilitated by age than their comrades equally as advanced in life in the cavalry and infantry, and they are quite as fit for employment. It is not necessary to go down the list and to drag up any one to fill the places which should exist in connection with the arm, and which it is essential to have filled by officers of the highest rank, talent, and experience that can be found. There is nothing so destructive to the proper feeling and soldierly qualities of a military body as even the appearance of neglect, or a slur upon those who, having arrived at the higher ranks of the profession, and who having performed the most faithful and valuable services in their day, seem, like those of the Artillery, to have been advanced for the sole purpose of condemning them to inactivity afterwards.

The more valuable officers of the junior ranks who reflect on what they see in the existing state of things must flag in their exertions after professional knowledge; and the apathy which will creep upon them at first will grow stronger and stronger as they approach more nearly to that high rank in which, if the system was different, the artillery officer above all others would be most useful. The Colonel Commandantship of a battalion may fairly be looked

upon as a harbour of rest. It ought to be so, for the sake of giving as much employment and encouragement to all as can possibly be afforded; but besides these there are just now twenty general officers of the artillery, nine tenths of whom are not provided for, and amongst whom some half dozen or more might have been found thoroughly competent in every respect to fill the office of Inspector General of Artillery, which has at last been instituted. Some explanation ought to be called for, why some of these were not appointed, and what made it necessary to have a Colonel of the regiment promoted to the rather novel position of a temporary General for the purpose. The officer appointed may be competent enough; it would do no good to discuss the point in that invidious manner. The question is, whether one amongst the general officers of artillery did not exist equally as capable? If the public service derived no benefit from these officers being all passed over, what were the grounds upon which a junior officer was promoted for the purpose of passing them over. There is more at stake than may be imagined in these times in this want of consideration to the claims of officers who have served well, and who in many instances still possess all their faculties unimpaired. It is such treatment of them as the veriest time server must be inclined to deprecate—nothing could be more marked. An Inspector General was to be appointed; it was necessary he should have the rank of a general officer, but all those already holding that rank, strange to say, are passed over, and an officer in his sixty-sixth or sixty-seventh year is brought from the rank of a full Colonel to fill the office, with temporary rank only.

This country ought, next to the Navy, to watch over its Artillery; we may repair a deficiency in any other part of the service, but we cannot with anything like the same readiness do so in this all-important arm. It ought to be our pride and boast, and it is one we could easily accomplish, that whether in science or anything else, our artillery is the finest in the world. We can never realize this if we are to go on as we have been doing, holding on tenaciously to a system which makes the artillery officer as he advances in the service leave his profession behind him. It is something, and every artillery officer will be grateful for it, to see Sir Fenwick Williams appointed to Canada. It is to be hoped that it is an instalment of the coming of something more hopeful and better than we have yet seen. There are some places the command of which seems to be peculiarly adapted to the professional acquirements of artillery officers. They are Malta, Gibraltar, Corfu, and Bermuda abroad, and Portsmouth and Plymouth, and perhaps some others of our naval ports at home. Whatever may be the decision eventually arrived at, with reference to this part of the subject, at least let the high appointments which the efficiency of the corps requires, and which it can never get on properly without, be given to it, and let them be filled by officers of that high rank and experience which are essential to give them the weight they ought to have, and without which they must be of little or no use.

The necessity for adopting this course is urged solely with a view to the good of the service. Individual interests connected with it are

of little or no consideration whatever. The writer is actuated by no paltry motives either for or against any one; and least of all is he stirred up by any bilious sensations against this or that authority. He has never asked a favour on his own account; and where there are so many who are always asking he feels no very strong sense of bitterness at having never received one. That which is argued for is a principle, and a principle, as he views it, on which so much depends, that having once been taken up it cannot be lightly abandoned. It is strange that any one should be annoyed or think themselves injured by its advocacy. If any one suffers, under the circumstances, it can only be the advocate himself, for it is seldom that much gratitude is shown to those who endeavour to advance improvement; and an effort after military improvement is generally the most thankless of all. The harm usually done falls on those who urge their views, no matter how sound or reasonable they may be; the good, when good arises, is always reaped by others. The Artillery in England should not be so subservient as it is made to be, and as it is more and more becoming, to Cavalry and Infantry notions. It is a complex and peculiar arm, and requires those who have been brought up to it to have charge of its details, and the management of everything connected with it. Unless the Commander-in-Chief has that assistance from those who have reached the highest rank in it, and who in most instances must needs combine the greatest experience with it, which it is absolutely requisite he should have, there may be a fair show of men in blue uniforms, of sleek horses, and well-kept harness, and all the rest that pleases the eye at reviews and makes a show, but the organization and system which are essential to the development of a good Artillery will be wanting. The Adjutant-General of the army should have little or nothing to do with this branch of the service about which his knowledge must be very slight indeed. It should be entirely governed by its own authorities, communicating directly with and receiving their orders solely from the Commander-in-Chief. Above all things the Artillery should be extricated in everything relating to it from the hands of the Minister-at-War, and the civilians, whether holding military commissions or otherwise, by whom he is generally surrounded and advised concerning it. The War Department would be the ruin of any military body, and the sooner its influence in military matters is curtailed the better it will be for the army. Instead of making crude alterations with regard to the Artillery in bad imitation of the French system, which will never work, it would have been wiser to have waited the result of Captain Vivian's committee, and to have made a thorough reform in our military departments and their relation to each other. There is a strong anxiety to be doing something, and a wonderful aptitude in mistaking what ought to be done. All our improvements only tend to multiply appointments and to do little else besides. If we generally arrive at the maximum of expenditure, we as commonly obtain only the minimum of benefit. The march of intellect has not yet done much for military legislation in this country. Our latest attempts

at it will not tide us over many difficulties. It would have been far better in many respects to have left things as they were. There will always be a party in favour of our failures, for if they do nothing else, they promote patronage. The formation of a school of artillery at Shoeburyness was a wise step, but it is marred by throwing the whole corps into confusion at the same moment in other respects.

THE TEN-POUND BOUNTY.

If the advance of social freedom has banished the pressgang, we still retain some of our old customs. The Middle Ages lurk in the curls of the judge's wig, in the Corporation mace, the Queen's sceptre, in gold stick and silver stick, pursuivants, heralds, and the other paraphernalia of buried ages. Knights of the Bath, too, still take oath to defend injured ladies. With such examples before them, why should not our sailors take their £10 down, as true knights, to defend all the ladies, aye and all the "gentlemen of England who live at home at ease," against all comers? They have a precedent for doing so, and precedent is everything. Indeed we seldom find our "higher powers" trying their hands at innovation. In cases of doubt and difficulty they use their memory first and their reason afterwards.

In truth there is often great difficulty in knowing what to do next. Most people are content to jog on from hand to mouth, without plan or forethought. Even our statesmen now-a-days wait for an impulse from abroad, or act in obedience to the pressure from without. Perhaps we have no right in ordinary peaceable times to expect to find a man capable of seeing where all matters hinge, though everybody admires the bold and ready actor, who takes occasion by the beard. But such men are as rare as mermaids, so we must needs put our faith in our old friends, routine, order, and custom, albeit they never inspire the nation with much confidence or vigour.

It is astonishing what may be done with thoroughness. It is an enthusiastic quality. We know of nothing more expressive than a direct appeal to the breeches pocket, particularly with Englishmen. Their business habits teach them to have faith in a minister who does not treat with levity a pound sterling; and they are right. See the magic there is in £10 down upon the nail, and no abatement. It has performed, or is in a fair way of performing, a miracle, in manning the channel fleet. The Royal Commissioners tried coaxing, extra rations of biscuit, beef, cocoa, onions, and plum-duff, as well as pensions seen through a hazy vista of twenty years' sea service. Their baits were useless. Jack declined them all, but he has bitten at £10 in a lump. The Queen's bounty goes straight to the heart of the man; while the nice balancing of addi-

tional pay, better rations, allotments, badge-money and pensions, were looked upon as so much bilge-water.

Raising men for the navy by means of a bounty is considered by many to have an old-fashioned look, but we remember an old adage about "a bird in the hand," &c. It is evident that our seamen remember it too, at all events they prefer having £10 at the commencement of their service to 6d. a-day at the end of twenty years, which, heaven knows, appeals to a very distant future. They remember also their treatment at the end of the Russian war, and, indeed, as far as that goes, at the *end* of almost every war. Whether there is any truth in their statements or not, they always complain of scurvy treatment at the hands of government when their services are no longer required; and perhaps this is confessing that if we had a sound principle working at the Admiralty the navy would never want good men.

It seems to be easily explained why we cannot catch seamen. Like bad fishermen we offer—bait that is out of season. If the pay and pensions are not sufficient to man the navy up to the war pitch, we must try other means. Our tars may be stupid fellows in some particular cases, but they have wisdom enough to misunderstand our benevolence, unless it comes in the shape of money down. Throw more hard coin into the monthly pay—appeal to the present, and not to the future—and the State will then get the pick of the seamen's labour market. We may talk until the end of time, about the best way of manning the navy, but Jack comprehends no logic so well as increased monthly pay or a bounty.

That this is borne out by facts, let us note events for the last few weeks. A Royal Commision sat, deliberated, and hatched a report, but we verily believe it did not man a sloop. Out comes the war in Italy and the Queen's proclamation, offering a £10 bounty, and the fleet is being rapidly manned; and this brings us to the matter in hand, viz., what sort of men are we getting for our money. We shall better understand the bargain, if we append the conditions. Here is the advertisement:—

"Wanted on board Her Majesty's Ship *Britannia*, 120 guns, Captain Robert Harris, for the Royal Navy, and for ten years continuous service, men between the age of nineteen and twenty-one, not less than 5 feet 6 inches in height without shoes, stout, healthy, and intelligent. To measure 33 inches round the chest without clothing. All men will receive on joining £3 5s. in advance.

"Boys are received between the age of 17 and 19; at 17 years they must be 5 feet 4 inches high; at 18, 5 feet 5 inches; and at 19, they must be 5 feet 6 inches without shoes.

"Boys under 18 must bring their baptismal register and consent of their parents in writing, and they all must measure 33 inches round the chest without clothing. Every boy must also bring a character; when, if accepted, he will receive £2 in advance.

"Landsmen above 20 years of age entering on board her Majesty's ships before June 16th, will receive 40s. bounty, also a bed, blanket, and clothes, to the value of £2 12s. 6d."

This plain offer is bringing men to the service in swarms, and

when the easterly wind shifts and liberates the homeward-bound ships from the chops of the Channel, we shall have an additional body of men anxious to accept the bounty.

The principal objection to the above requisition of the State is the height of the men, aye, and the boys too. Five feet six inches is a drawback, because, as we observed on the Common-hard at Portsmouth, as well as at other naval rendezvous, there are hundreds of men with a forty-inch chest but whose height is under the standard required. Height is all very well, but we prefer men with plenty of beam. We believe, however, that the order is not universally obeyed, for good stout A. B.'s, under the required height, are not objected to.

We have heard a reason assigned for fixing the standard for the Navy at five feet six inches, which, it will be remembered, is higher than is required for recruits for the Army. It is, that the spars of the huge line-of-battle ships are so large, that shorter than a five foot six inch man cannot clasp them when reefing; and that short men are so exposed during bad weather in leaning over the yard when reefing, and thereby exposing their backs, that they contract rheumatism, and by getting into the sick list are incapacitated for service. We give this statement as we heard it, not that it is sound reason to suppose that all hands are wanted for the large spars. Smaller men would even be more useful on the topgallant and royal yards. Neither are all our ships line-of-battle ships; and hundreds, nay, thousands of men under five feet six inches might be shipped on board frigates, sloops, and gun-boats, without much detriment to the public service.

The men we have seen come forward to accept the bounty from the commercial marine are fair specimens of English seamen; many of them appeared as though they had been upon short commons both in dress and food. In many instances there was no occasion to take off their shoes when about to be measured, that had been done long ago. But "slops" are forthcoming, and a few weeks of the improved diet of the navy will fill them out. For it should be borne in mind, in contrasting the navy with the merchant service, that the food is far better, the quantity greater, better cooked, and eaten with greater attention to comfort, regularity, and cleanliness on board a man-of-war than in a merchant vessel. Of course we do not include such ships as the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steam-packets, or Cunard's, in the above remark, these services being quite exceptional, and in most respects quite equal to the improved dietary arrangements of the navy.

A leading journal, remarkable for its boldness of assertion, stated the other day, when dilating upon the subject of manning the navy, "that, setting aside contingencies of a sudden demand, the navy was very well manned." But the First Lord of the Admiralty is of a different opinion, so are the Royal Commissioners, or what need was there for a commission; and so are most naval men, who, of all others, know most about the matter. Indeed, the supply of seamen, even in times of peace, has not been equal to the demand. How often of late years, up to the last six months, in fact, have we heard

that when a ship-of-war has been commissioned she has waited months at Spithead, or some other anchorage, for want of hands to complete her complement. The whole of this time the most costly part of her crew, viz., the officers, and such of the men that had joined, become a serious burden upon the nation (as they are useless), to which, of course, must be added the expense of the ship she is intended to relieve. To enumerate a few instances from memory would be by no means a difficult task; but we take the following from an official report made in the House of Commons by a Lord of the Admiralty, who was endeavouring to convince the "House" of the inadequate supply of men for the service even in time of peace. Thus, the *Ganges*, after being commissioned for service in the Pacific, remained in harbour 110 days; the *Diadem*, a crack frigate with a popular captain, 135 days; the *Renown*, a fine two-decked ship, 172 days; the *Marlborough*, three-decker, 129 days; and the *Euryalus*, the handsomest frigate in the service, and intended as the ship to initiate the Royal Prince to the duties of the Navy in a yacht voyage up the Mediterranean, remained idle at her anchor 121 days for want of hands. Where were our continuous-service men? Could none be found to meet the exigencies of such common-place occasions as these? As Sir Charles Wood justly remarked, "Could the ingenuity of our most inveterate foe devise anything more humiliating, or more calculated to impress foreign nations with the conviction of the decay of our naval power than the fact that our ships of war remain in port four, five, and six months at a stretch, unable to obtain, in times of peace, their complement of seamen?"

We may get plenty of men of some sort or other by means of the £10 bounty, and we may teach them all the duties of a man-of-war; but unless we manage to retain them by some means in the service, we shall not get much beyond their assistance in an emergency for our pains. It is just possible that we may do too much when we act as we do now, in a hurry—from instinct and impulse; and by-and-bye, when the alarm is past, we may learn that we have done wrong. For we have had two processes going on in this maritime country for some time past, beautifully adapted to counteract one another. It is difficult to determine how to surpass the absurdity of raising men, as we are at present, at a great expense, and when we have taught them every duty a seaman ought to know, it has been our practice hitherto to scatter them broadcast, to take root in any other service than our own.

Let us take a familiar example, and in a plain, straightforward statement take the shortest route to the mind. The following paragraph will furnish us with an occurrence with which every one is familiar, and illustrates one of the processes alluded to:—

"The *Nankin*, 50 guns, Commodore the Hon. Keith Stewart, has arrived in the river Thames from China. Being in a perfect state of discipline and efficiency, she is to be dismantled and paid off immediately. Vice-Admiral Harvey, the Commander-in-Chief, at Sheerness, expressed his approbation of the general order of the ship, especially her practice and efficiency in *gunnery*, stating that it was the best firing he had seen for many years. This admirable body of artil-

lerists, according to the present rules of the Navy, are to be at once dispersed, to take service where they may."

Paradoxical as it may seem, this ship and her splendid crew was paid off, and the men sent away as though they were not wanted, when the whole kingdom was agitated with pamphlets, paragraphs, and letters from various persons upon the best modes of manning the navy. One would imagine that in practical England some remedy for this absurd practice might be adopted. In truth there is something quite ludicrous in the management of our naval affairs. What can be so injudicious when a ship like the Nankin returns home with her crew perfect, officers and men working well together, and well acquainted with the properties of the vessel, as to scatter the three years' continuous labour to the winds. To say nothing about the loss of the men, it costs some £20,000, often more, and nine or ten months' downright labour, to get a new and untried crew in the same condition as the splendid frigate we have instanced as broken up in a day.

To understand how suicidal is such conduct in the navy, let us ask what would be thought of the administrative powers of the Horse Guards if, after having trapped, bought, cajoled, or obtained by any of the means known to recruiting serjeants, a fine body of recruits; and after drilling them for months and teaching them the mysteries of the "goose step," regimental duties, and target practice in all its modern destructiveness—in fact, converted them into good soldiers—what, we ask, would be thought of the capacity of the Horse Guards, if these men, when instructed how to fight any foe, were to be instantly disbanded, and told there was no further use for them? Surely if this is true with respect to the line regiments in the army, it must have equal force when applied to our line-of-battle-ships.

It is not our intention to speculate upon the manner in which the Admiralty may retain or discharge men for the future, but by way of contrasting the dismantling of the Nankin, or, indeed, any other ship, let us see what Her Majesty's Ship —— of 91 guns, may be expected to experience before she is fit for sea, even under the influence of a £10 bounty. This magnificent ship is now commissioned, and has what ward room officers call a popular commander, and what the blue jackets call a first rate sailor, so that it is very probable that a good round number of smart A. B.'s will find their way on board her. And yet what are the difficulties that beset the officers of this splendid ship before and after she goes to sea? A description of what has to be done by her officers and men before she is fit to fight another ship equal in guns to her own, will enable us to condemn what we so wantonly undo.

Let us admit that, in fitting out this ship, the officers, marines, and seamen-gunners are appointed. These seamen-gunners are distributed in the proportions of, say one in forty or forty-five, to the rest of the crew, and are readily obtained; she will have to supply the rest of her crew, petty officers, master-at-arms, ship's corporals, carpenters, blacksmiths, armourers, caulkers, signalmen, and the captains of the guns, from the heterogenous mass that come tumbling in, minus discipline, dirty and unruly. Now, when this ship

goes to sea, what follows?—drill, drill, everlasting drill; and fortunate she will be if she escape the notice of an enemy until six months' incessant labour has put everybody in good fighting condition on board.

While passing through this uncomfortable period, the men have no peace: the mess tables are constantly disarranged, no rest for the watch below; and, unless the officers are patterns of good temper, and zealous in the discharge of their duty, discontent becomes the condition of the ship. In this way it has happened, before now, that we have sent untrained men to fight the battles of the country against the trained and skilled gunners of France and America. We are satisfied our late "faithful ally" and probable future foe has taken care that his new liners are not sent to sea in any such disgraceful condition. Indeed, we happen to know from excellent authority that he has been particular in having a good captain appointed to every gun in his ships afloat—men especially skilled in hitting a target, and he has also been equally solicitous in other respects relating to the gunnery practice of his ships of war.

Now the £10 bounty may man the Channel fleet, but not as it ought to be manned, and we say this without underrating the quality of the men obtained. What we mean is, that mere sailors, men who possess sea legs and sea stomachs, are not the men required for the navy now-a-days. There is a wide difference between handling cotton bales and cannon balls. The ploughboy may be drilled into a good soldier, and the merchant seaman may be drilled into a good gunner, but the thing has to be done in one case as well as in the other, for a naval action, as now to be fought, will depend upon gunnery and not upon canvas. And gunnery, or rather "our arms of precision," require well-trained men to manage them. Future naval encounters will be trials of scientific skill; our 68-pounders require as delicate handling as the Enfield rifle; so that the mere merchantman has much to study before he is fit to take his station at quarters beside a well-trained man-o'-war's-man.

We look upon bounties, then, as exceptional means for raising men,—a confessing of being taken unawares. Besides, people seldom make good bargains when they rush into a market with a heavy demand. Fortunately, men at the present moment are rather cheap; and it is to be hoped that from the supply now being obtained, we shall, under any circumstances, war or no war, retain for the future a good naval reserve, from which we may man our reliefs in time of peace, without waiting six months for men, and also meet the sudden demands of war, without resorting to the expedient of a £10 bounty, which after all sends us men we have to train and instruct, and not men who can step on board a ship one day, and fight an enemy the next.

Lastly, it should also be remembered that we are now in a transition period, which is also a very expensive period. Our ships now require both sails and engines; we have to sustain the expenses of seamen as well as engineers, stokers, and coals: two motive powers, instead of one to pay and drill into efficiency; and this is an additional reason to the many others that might be advanced for not wrenching asunder the complicated equipment necessary for our steam ships-of-war.

R. P.

A FEW OBSERVATIONS ON THE FORMATION OF VOLUNTEER, ARTILLERY, AND RIFLE CORPS.

THE decision of her Majesty's ministers relative to the enrolment of volunteers, is one of those incidents which prove far more clearly than could possibly be done by words, that liberal institutions, based on popular principles, create in those countries where they exist, a feeling of mutual confidence and goodwill between the people and their rulers which we look for in vain where hereditary right, or the choice of the people themselves, has conferred despotic power upon an individual.

The Government has not been satisfied with a simple recognition of the right possessed by the people to come forward and combine in armed bodies for the purpose of acting against an enemy in the event of invasion; but it has invited them to do so. That such an invitation will be enthusiastically responded to there can be but little doubt, and few will be found bold enough to deny the great additional strength our military resources will receive by such a system being called into action. So much of the usefulness of our volunteer corps must, however, depend on their proper organization, that we propose devoting a few pages to the consideration of the subject, and we would preface our remarks by observing that the very enthusiasm which will induce so many spirited and patriotic individuals to offer their services, makes the exercise of a sober judgment and sound discretion more than usually necessary when carrying into execution the arrangements connected with it.

We propose briefly to glance over—

1.—The composition and organization of our volunteer corps.

2.—The manner in which they should be armed and trained.

3.—The most suitable dress for them.

The War Office Circular provides in some degree for the establishment of volunteer corps in the different counties, by placing the patronage, and to some extent the responsibility connected with their organization, in the hands of the respective lieutenants of counties. The advantages of such an arrangement are somewhat open to question in a military point of view; but be that as it may, there is one thing very certain, that all volunteer corps ought to be embodied under *one* set of regulations, and that their system of drill and interior economy ought to be uniform. In the same Circular there is a rule laid down which is of the very first importance, and from which no departure, under any pretext whatever, should be allowed; it is, "That the members of the corps undertake to provide their own arms and equipments, and to defray all expenses attending the corps, except in the event of its being assembled for actual service." Unless this rule be strictly adhered to, the clearly defined lines of demarcation which ought to separate the volunteers from the regular and militia forces would soon disappear, and instead of gaining the co-operation of those classes whose social position precludes them, except in a few solitary instances, from

volunteering for military service, we should be simply making a transfer of the services of men who would be quite, if not more, useful, serving under existing or future arrangements in the ranks of our militia. It is the more necessary to lay a considerable stress upon this point, because already in the public prints a tendency has been evinced towards urging upon the authorities the great advantages that would be derived from equipping these volunteers at the public expense; a step which, besides the many other mischiefs that it might produce, would at once destroy the very ground upon which their "esprit de corps" should be made to rest.

The personal qualifications required from a member of a volunteer corps should be such as would be necessary to ensure a proper performance of the duties required from him in his new position of a soldier. Good sight, bodily activity, and physical endurance are amongst those qualifications, without which no man can be thoroughly efficient as a soldier in the field; the first is indeed essential, and for a corps of sharp-shooters the two last are hardly less so.

Although Artillery Corps and Companies are referred to in the Proclamation, it is very certain that the great bulk of the volunteers will be composed of riflemen; we shall, therefore, more particularly direct our attention to the organization of the latter, having first briefly shewn under what special circumstances it is desirable that the volunteers should be trained to the service of heavy guns.

Experience has seldom failed to prove that whatever care may have been taken in the first instance to proportion a sufficient number of artillerymen to the guns of a fortress, or to the batteries employed against it,—that after a short time, the casualties caused from the combined effects of the enemy's fire, sickness, or fatigue, so greatly diminish their numbers, that the want of properly instructed men to work the guns, soon becomes seriously felt; for this reason, it is highly desirable, that in the immediate neighbourhood of our naval arsenals and fortified stations, the volunteer should receive the training of an artilleryman, in preference to that of a rifleman; a position for which, indeed, the inhabitant of a town is, perhaps, from his previous avocations, the best adapted.

In the formation of our volunteer corps, there are several considerations which we must not omit to take into account; belonging to a superior class to that from which the ranks of either the regular army or militia is usually recruited, we must expect, that as a body, they will possess a higher degree of intelligence, and that a juster appreciation of the character of others will, as a consequence, proceed from it; the officers should therefore be selected with more than ordinary care, so that obedience to them may be rendered, not only as a matter of necessity, but of choice; they should be second to none under their command, in either activity or intelligence, for confidence in a leader is often the true secret of success, and the want of it has often occasioned a brave man to act like a coward.

Separate and independent companies possess many decided advantages over a regimental organization, but, when embodied for active service, arrangements might be made which would permit of their being massed together in bodies of such a strength as might be found most convenient.

Let us now proceed to consider what would be the best way of arming and training these rifle companies; for with the artillery there would be no difficulty, as they might be made to assimilate in some degree to the corps with which they would have to co-operate.

In the first place, how are our rifles,—our Rifle Rangers shall we call them? it sounds better than Volunteers,—to be armed?

There are so many kinds of rifle fire-arms in the present day, each of which presents some novelty of construction and lays claim to some peculiar excellence, that even if we were at liberty to do so, it would be rather difficult to choose between them; but bound as we are to guage, to the necessities of the service which require that we should depend upon the military authorities for a supply of ammunition, and to a price that will place it within the reach of persons of small means, it does not appear that we can do better for the time being than to adopt the regulation rifle, which is, when in good hands, a truly formidable weapon, and one well adapted to our purpose. Of course this is a subject upon which a diversity of opinions will be entertained, and upon which much profitable discussion might arise, were it not that the object of the present movement is not to talk but to act, and whilst the comparative superiority or inferiority of this or that rifle was being established, much valuable time would be lost. The volunteer would, however, in all cases possess a great advantage from the rifle being his own property, for he would have the power of altering the shape and size of the stock to suit his individual taste or the form of his shoulder.

Having armed our volunteer with a rifle, the next thing to be done is to teach him how to use it. He has to begin by learning two things—the first is to find out his distance from the object he wants to hit—the second, is to hit the object when he knows how far he is from it. To begin with the first:—

If the volunteer be really in earnest he will find opportunities for judging distances constantly occurring, even though his time may be so occupied that he has little leisure for a regular course of application to it. In walking along a road, for instance, he sees an object at some distance before him, he observes its appearance narrowly, guesses the distance he may be from it, and then counts the number of paces which he takes before arriving at the spot where it stands. By doing this as often as he can, under all the varying influences of atmosphere and locality, he will soon find that he very seldom fails to arrive at a close approximation to the truth.

To become a good shot much practice is generally required, though we often meet with exceptional cases, in which it would almost seem as if there were a constitutional tendency to be one: but in neither case must the volunteer rest satisfied with a degree of proficiency which merely enables him to make sure of his mark under certain fixed conditions; he must endeavour to do so equally whether he is standing, kneeling, or laying down, and he must be able in all these positions to take aim rapidly as well as surely, for the difference of an instant is often to the soldier the difference between life and death.

Though to become what is commonly called a "dead shot" should be the first object of a rifleman's ambition, he should not neglect

those gymnastic exercises which tend to invigorate the frame and increase its muscular development, nor should he at any time fail to remember that his individual value is very much increased by his being "swift of foot and strong of limb."

Much more training he does not need. To march with a regular, quick step, to move from either flank in fours, to extend in skirmishing order, to close upon any given point, to form a rallying square, with one or two other simple manœuvres, might comprise the whole of it.

We have now armed our rifle volunteer, we have given him some slight instruction, but we have as yet neglected to clothe him, a very cruel piece of negligence which we will endeavour to rectify as quickly as possible.

We have arrived at the conclusion that our rifleman should be an active fellow, who may be often called upon to move rapidly from point to point, to jump over hedges and ditches, and to scramble through briars and brakes, with equal alacrity and goodwill; his dress, then, should be one that would enable him to do all this without inconvenience, and its colour should be chosen, more with reference to the concealment of the wearer's person than to its adornment.

It is very probable that the uniform worn by our regular rifle regiments may suggest itself to those who are endeavouring to come to some decision on this subject; but a very few lines will be quite sufficient to expose its total want of adaptation to our purpose. Take the shako, for instance; no man in his sober senses ever wears one if he can help it, it is unpleasant to walk in, it is worse than unpleasant to run in, it can hardly be said to afford shelter from either sun or rain, it is top-heavy, and from its height often points out the position of the wearer when he would be otherwise concealed from view: the undress cap is more comfortable, which is about the only thing that can be said in its favour. The tunic is tight, scanty, and inconvenient; its collar is made with a view to its being supported by the "terrible" stock, and the colour of the whole suit is the most conspicuous that can be found next to scarlet and white, if the latter may be called one.

But why attempt to model our dress upon a soldier's uniform, and make ourselves uncomfortable, and to some extent ridiculous, by the adoption of a costume that we are not accustomed to wear? Is it not better to wear a hat that our head feels at home in, than a shako which makes it ache? Such a hat, for instance, as has become of late so extremely popular with all classes of the community—a popularity which can only be attributed to its intrinsic merits, for its warmest admirers can hardly accuse it of beauty,—a low-crowned, wide-brimmed, felt hat, which, neutral in colour, with a cock's feather or two (one of which might be white to mark the officer) for decoration, would give us all we want.

A coat, with a waistcoat which might be dispensed with in summer, made of some strong material, in the fashion of the shooting jacket of the present day, would give us the free use of our limbs, and permit of our having as many pockets as we might find occasion for.

Strong cord pantaloons, or what would be better, loosely-fitting knee breeches with leather continuations, would complete the costume, and our whole kit might be composed of a flannel shirt, a pair of flannel drawers, two pair of worsted stockings, a towel, and a pair of boots, neatly packed in a small knapsack, to which a case might be attached for the purpose of carrying a light waterproof cape.

With regard to colour, we should do well to take a lesson from what is so constantly to be met with in the hunting-field, where we may see standing out from the various back-grounds of a changing landscape the scarlet coat of the well-appointed sportsman; the black or dark green of the less ambitious horseman, or the professional man; and the sober-coloured grey of the horse-dealer's man, or the small farmer. The result is always the same; our attention is immediately attracted to the whereabouts of the huntsman by the gaudy brightness of his coat, we find that his neighbour in black, if not quite so conspicuous, stands out in clear and well-defined relief, whilst the wearer of the sober suit of russet grey is only just discernible, and it often happens that we are able to make out the colour of his horse before we can clearly distinguish the outline of its rider.

Judging, then, from this and similar instances, our rifleman would make a judicious choice in selecting for the colour of his dress some neutral, unobtrusive tint, such as would be formed by any mixture between drab and grey.

Disputing every inch of ground, lining every hedge-row, swarming through every coppice, contesting the passage of every streamlet, covering the advance of an army or protecting its retreat, the value of such a force can hardly be over-estimated; but whilst we acknowledge this let us beware of falling into the erroneous supposition that by its creation we shall be able to supersede the employment of regular troops. History gives us, it is true, many remarkable instances of comparatively large and well-disciplined armies having been obliged to succumb to the attacks of bodies of men irregularly formed, who could not have contended against them for a moment in the open field; but these successes will be generally found to be as much attributable to the entanglement of the defeated army through the ignorance or negligence of its leaders in some locality favourable to such attacks, as to the prowess of the victors.

We have three very striking examples of this: in the victory gained by Arminius over the legions of Varus; in the defeat of the royal army under General Burgoyne, at Saratoga; and in the disastrous retreat from Cabul: but, in the first case, we find that the Roman army, encumbered with immense trains of baggage waggons and a large rabble of camp followers, was, at the time of the attack which ended in its destruction, slowly winding its way through a country made all but impassable for such a force by woods, marshes, and ravines. The victory, too, was made the more easy by the previous desertion of the light-armed auxiliaries. After the lapse of nearly two thousand years, we find the annihilation of a British force in India, taking place under almost precisely similar circum-

stances, if we take into account the difficulties of the ground, the encumbrances of the army, and the inferiority of the enemy.

Such are some of the most prominent points which have presented themselves to our notice, whilst examining this subject; we do not pretend to have exhausted it, or to have advanced any very new or original ideas in connection with it, but in conclusion we would observe, and we particularly wish to draw attention to the fact, that everything in this world is comparative, and although it will take much time with great zeal and attention, in addition to the qualifications we have enumerated, to make our rifle volunteers all that can be wished; no stout-hearted man, with arms in his hand, ready to lay down his life in the defence of his country, can ever be regarded as a despicable foe.

THE CHANNEL WAR-PORTS AND NAVAL STATIONS.

TALLEYRAND is credited with the saying that "Speech was given to man to enable him to conceal his thoughts." The wily diplomatist must have kept very indifferent company, for his sarcasm if true, makes everybody either a hypocrite or something worse. Having a very different estimate of the value of speech, we believe that truth is as essential as cunning even in the ways of the world, for in politics, practical power rests on national sincerity. Nevertheless we are not prone to uttering rude truths, but there are times when they must be spoken even in the lion's mouth.

In saying this, we have no desire to hoist our national ensign at a dinner table, or at a university lecture, for that would be carrying the boisterous fury of a political club into a grave or convivial circle, and yet we cannot keep saying, "Thank heaven the Machiavelian alliance with Napoleon III. is at an end." We have played the hypocrite long enough, let us in all future transactions be plain spoken. In these words we echo the sound of many voices. An alliance with forty millions of Frenchmen is another affair, but at present they have no voice in the matter.

We have an Englishman's dislike to political adventurers, and being tenacious in our belief, we cannot change our opinions to suit the hour. The value we set upon the friendship of this "remarkable man," to use a stereotyped phrase, was the same when the aristocracy and commons of London welcomed him to our shores, aye, even when we heard that he had *kissed* the cheek of our beloved Queen, as her guest at Windsor Castle, as it was, when he listened to the insolent address of his legislative assembly, and encouraged his vapouring colonels to threaten us with invasion. There was nothing hearty in our partnership with Louis Napoleon, and our connexion, we fear, will bear bitter fruit.

Even in the late Russian war, in which it was supposed we should at least go halves in the glory, as well as in the expence, there was more

jockeyship than was necessary, even in a race for fame. We forget the death struggles at the Alma and Inkerman, in the blaze of the Malakoff. The Englishman knows not how to spring a trap for the admiration of the world, he is quietly minding his own business; but French vanity is ever effervescing; our veracity and steadiness however tells in the long run, for it unites success with honesty.

A want of sympathy, and no lack of expressions of dislike have prepared us for the growing coolness, that is almost certain to succeed hollow friendships, whether between individuals or nations. We "drifted" into the last war with Russia, and who can say how long it will be before we are driven into another. Indeed a war cloud has for some time been floating over the political horizon. Not long ago it threatened to burst upon our shores. To demonstrate the hollowness, or insincerity of our intimacy with France, it is only necessary to say, that it was from the arsenals of our "faithful ally" that we were threatened with invasion. An angry dispatch, such as fear wrung from the explosion of Orsini's bombs, set us about manning the navy. The insolent vapouring of the French colonels gave us a channel fleet. The sudden completion of the aggressive port of Cherbourg, the rapid construction of forty steam line-of-battle ships, crack frigates, and iron plated ships of war, together with the secret treaty between our "faithful ally" and Russia, the late enemy of both, convinced the most incredulous, that duplicity and treachery had undermined the alliance between England and France, so that it is possible to overforge a thunderbolt. For the present the war has flown from our shores to Italy, but who knows how soon we may be drawn into the conflict, and as all the world is arming, it is necessary that we should be prepared also, and believing that in the event of a misunderstanding with our neighbours, our channel ports and naval stations, would under the altered conditions of naval warfare with steam, play a most important part, we intend to say a few words upon the subject.

The reader perhaps is aware that in the *United Service Magazine* for February, May, and December 1856, we endeavoured to show the advantages that would accrue to this country if ports of defence or aggression were established at various points on our southern shores. We instanced Dover and Alderney, and compared them with Cherbourg. Since then the political aspect of the continent has not in the least diminished the importance we attached to this subject. Our object was to draw attention to the fact, that in our naval wars with France and all other powers, we had invariably relied upon our fleets for the defence of our coast. But that in future wars, it would be necessary to have good and capacious harbours of refuge, defence, or aggression, into which steam vessels might run in or out of at a moment's notice at all times of the tide, in order to annoy or elude an enemy.

Previous to the conclusion of the war with France in 1815, the three war ports of Sheerness, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, were sufficient to secure to England the command of the channel. It is because we believe that circumstances have altered to a certain extent the condition of warfare at sea, that we think these ports do

not possess the preponderance necessary to produce similar results in a future war with France. The addition of the important "Port of Cherbourg" to the other ports on the northern shores of our late ally is the main cause of this alteration, for by means of this new marine fortress and arsenal, our versatile neighbours hope in some future struggle, to be in a condition with their screw liners to dispute successfully with England the sovereignty of the seas.

Now we are not one of those prophets that go about prophecying negatives, on the contrary we believe that the wisest naval authorities have shaken their heads at each succeeding triumph in marine architecture whether in forts or ships. Arts, discoveries, opinion, and wars go onward at their own pace. Every new age has its new hopes and desires, and we have no wish to disturb French gossip or the chatter of Parisian politics, although the hum and noise is of the embarking of Gallic regiments at Cherbourg upon a voyage of discovery in our channel.

Nevertheless we hold not our neighbours' threats too cheap. We admit that Cherbourg is a most important thong in the national whip of France; nor ought we to shut our eyes to all the advantages they anticipate to reap from the use of steam as applied to warfare upon the ocean. To give them their due, they have treated the subject with sincerity and reality. They have produced something. They promised the nation a deep-water war port of the first class. And Voilà! Cherbourg.

Now the attention of our "higher power" has been diverted rather than directed, to the necessity of counteracting the advantages that Cherbourg is to France, in a military sense, by increasing the harbours of defence on our shores. But we have been catching at clouds and vapours. Successive governments, both Whig and Tory, have laboured in a certain sort of way at Dover and Alderney, to furnish us with these necessary naval stations, but it would be sheer nonsense to suppose that the millions of sovereigns we have flung into the sea at these places, have raised the strength of our ports of aggression, to the same extent, or even a tithe, of the power that Cherbourg has done for France. By the erection of the Digue, as we have shown in previous numbers of the *United Service Magazine*, but more particularly for May 1856, an open roadstead that formerly existed at Cherbourg, and which was all but useless, being exposed to northerly winds, has been converted into a secure anchorage. In these roads thirty sail of the line besides frigates can find ample room, as well as protection not merely from the elements, but from what is of equal importance, a British fleet.

It will be at once admitted, that this is a most important fact, particularly when we remember where Cherbourg is situated, and how, from its geographical position, it threatens Portsmouth and Plymouth at the same time. We trust therefore that we have proved that this country ought to have corresponding naval stations on our own shores, to restore the equilibrium destroyed by the construction and building of the great war port of Cherbourg.

But, without alluding to the altered conditions of naval warfare since the introduction of steam as a motor in ships-of-the-line,

or noticing the growing navies of Russia, Denmark, and America, all of which may be aggressive powers ere long, the increase of the French Navy, in conjunction with the facilities afforded for the equipment and rendezvous of a large fleet, and the embarking of bodies of troops, were sufficient to authorize the people of these islands to expect that some important additions in harbours of defence would have been made on our own shores.

Now let us see what we have to show at Dover and Alderney, the latter place, by a pleasing fiction, being considered as—the scourge of Cherbourg. And first as to Dover. We fear our drowsy minds need to be roused by politics, persecution, or war, for we are a slow-moving race, and cannot read a principle or understand a difficulty, except by the light of a bombardment, burning towns, or the terrors of war. Thus, when Napoleon I. threatened us with invasion from the heights of Boulogne, a necessity was felt for a deep water harbour at Dover, and a plan was submitted to and received the approval of the then government of England for the construction of one. But the peace of 1815 banished the project from the national and even from the official mind. And it was only when Louis Philippe was expelled from the throne of France, in 1848, and all Europe was again in the full blaze of revolution, that the first stone was laid. This was upwards of 10 years ago. And we have shown in the number of this Magazine for May 1856, that even supposing the present works are ever completed, the harbour will be liable to choke up with shingle, and be rendered useless, owing to a vicious principle of construction.

Since then public attention has been drawn and parliamentary indignation has been expressed by certain members of the House of Commons at the scandalous waste of the public money at Dover. Of this "public work," to use the language of a celebrated engineer, "the only thing that can be said with certainty is that it is an expensive experiment, and when completed, it will be useless; and that to completely surround the bay of Dover with a wall of solid masonry may prove the soundness of the non-percussive force of waves in deep water, at an expense of from 6 to 8,000,000 pounds sterling, furnished by the tax-payers of this country."

Again, when this vexatious subject was before the "House," the other day, it was sarcastically mentioned that the original estimate was for £650,000, but Col. Sykes, by a brief and expeditious piece of arithmetic, explained, that according to the present rate of progress, the "works" would cost nearer £6,000,000 than £600,000 and would not be finished either during the present or next generation. But somehow facts and figures seem to have no effect upon the "House," for the money for the year was granted. The practice seems to be to get a certain sum, say £100,000, or some such trifle, for the current twelve months, and so keep the *job* on, and establish a running account with the nation, until at last the country finds itself in the same predicament, with this costly experimental stone wall, that bankers experience with a customer who has overdrawn his account, and yet are afraid to refuse to lend him any more.

Sir Charles Napier has the great merit of rousing the public mind

to the true sense of the scandalous manner in which the public treasure has been wasted here. However, bad as it is, the misfortune does not consist merely in flinging hundreds of thousands and, perhaps, millions of sovereigns into the sea. The monstrosity of our folly remains to be told. If the huge stone wall now in course of erection was of service in forming a good and efficient harbour, that would be something, but as it is admitted that it never can do that, what shall we say when we are informed that it destroys and cramps the range of the guns that would be useful in driving off the enemy from a certain point of the Dover coast? For by a stupid oversight, the pier is so run out to sea, that the fire of the strand batteries, viz., Guildford Battery, and any other that it might be desirable to raise in front of Waterloo Crescent, or the Marine Parade, would be rendered useless or inoperative against ships-of-war lying to the eastward of the pier. Indeed, this stone bastion which we have built at such an enormous expense would protect the enemy's cruisers, if anchored in a certain spot, from our shot. The only battery that could act against vessels of war, in the position indicated, would be Archcliff Fort, and, perhaps, the "Drop" redoubt, and the Castle; but as the guns in these batteries are elevated very considerably above high-water* mark, ships judiciously handled, would be only subject to a plunging fire, and would run but small risk of damage.

Again, as if to show our national recklessness to danger, and love of gain, the only spot whereon a destructive battery could have been raised has been selected by the South Eastern Railway Company for hotel purposes—thus an excellent aggressive and defensive position has been ruined for want of a little forethought. A battery upon the ground occupied by the "Lord Warden" would command the bay in every direction, and shelter the town. Nothing could land without being destroyed by the fire of the guns of a battery in this position. Therefore how long this hotel will be permitted to remain where it is, in the event of a war with France, we leave for the consideration of our own authorities and the steam cruisers of Louis Napoleon to settle between themselves.

We are merely echoing the opinions of the best practical men of our time, when we reiterate that the manner in which Dover harbour of defence is now being constructed is a pure mistake—an act of national folly; and that the House of Commons, by voting more money for the completion of this elaborate blunder, will be simply throwing good money after bad. Some of the apologies offered by the Dover advocates of these "works" are singularly funny. "Granted," they say "that our lofty stone breakwater intercepts the line of fire from the strand batteries; that it will take from fifty to eighty years to enclose the bay with massive masonry, and cost millions of money; and granted," they continue, "that, as you say, the harbour may be liable to choke up with shingle, and so be rendered useless, yet the public gets a certain amount of benefit, and the town considerable convenience and profit from the new pier, for cannot tourists and passengers land and embark at all hours of the

* The "drop" redoubt is at least 250 or 300 feet above the level of the sea.

tide ? ? ?" It has been said that a "creative economy is the fuel of magnificence"—now, much as we may admire the creative economy by which the hard-earned taxes of our laborious people are gathered, we would rather dispense with the magnificence of embarking or landing at Dover breakwater pier, even if we had to be detained a few hours for the tide.

But there is no necessity for waiting at all. Our naval and military authorities are not justified in expending hundreds of thousands of pounds for the convenience of continental tourists at Dover, while the neighbouring town of Folkestone, in every respect a better port for embarkation to France, can find means to erect piers and scoop out a good packet harbour for the benefit of passengers without extracting a shilling from the public purse. We make these remarks in no unfriendly spirit to Dover, for no right-minded man would begrudge money really expended in the defence of his country, but we certainly do object most strenuously to a drain of millions for the purpose of constructing a huge shingle trap, or monstrous continental packet berth, under the pretence of forming a harbour of defence at Dover. The money spent in this experiment, which authority after authority is found to condemn, would have furnished us with a fleet of screw steamships that might have been serviceable to the nation; while, as if to complete the picture of wasteful expenditure and jobbery, we are reminded that if we have spoilt a good position at Dover, France has completed and armed Cherbourg, and built an excellent steam navy equal to our own.

It is a pleasure to leave the subject of Dover harbour and proceed to Portsmouth, although we fear that the increased defences of this our chief naval port are not upon a scale to counterbalance the important addition made to the channel ports of France at Cherbourg. We have done much, and in a right direction, at Portsmouth, but more remains to be done, for we are apt to rely too much upon our ships to protect themselves. This is observable in the manner we leave our roadsteads unprotected by batteries. It has been observed, however, that this is characteristic of our spirit of maritime superiority, for while the French, dreading our squadrons, always protect their roads and harbours with batteries, our anchorages are generally open, and their protection is left to the ships themselves.

Nevertheless it is admitted that since the introduction of steam, the security of open roadsteads and harbours is much lessened. Ships were not so easily run in and out of shallow waters when exclusively dependant upon the wind and tides for motion; and the celerity with which powerful armaments can now dash into ports and anchorages renders some modification of the system of defence necessary. This has been partially done at Portsmouth. Still the anchorage at Spithead is capable of being much better protected if a fort, similar to that at Cronstadt, was erected in the sea at the Spit buoy. There is no great engineering difficulty in the way, and the expense would be a trifle compared with the wasteful prodigality thrown away at Dover pier, while the utility would not be doubtful. A battery at "Spit" would protect the whole roadstead, and might be particularly efficient in preventing vessels of light draught of water,

such as gun-boats, &c. crossing the "swatch," as well as hostile ships rounding into the channel entrance to the harbour. Indeed, as steam warfare, particularly with gun boats, has yet to be learnt, it is necessary to adopt every precaution to prevent surprise.

Another important addition to the coast defence of England' chief naval arsenal, would be the erection of batteries along the entire sea front of the Esplanade connecting South Sea Castle with the fortifications of the town, at the Governor's Green. To do this effectually the whole of the wooden erections, known as the Bathing Rooms and the King's Rooms, ought to be removed to a more salubrious site, and then the sea front would present an uninterrupted line of batteries, for a mile in length, to all vessels attempting to force the channel into the harbour. By the removal of the Bathing Rooms, the fire from the King's Counter-guard would be rendered effectual, whereas at present these unsightly structures completely screen the channel from the fire of the musketry. To a certain but less extent these sheds obstruct the fire from the pivot gun at the Flag-staff Battery. The whole of these impedimenta ought to be removed, as they undoubtedly would be if they were at Cherbourg, Cronstadt, or any continental port of a tithe of the importance that Portsmouth is to England. Of course the proprietor of the bathing establishment would be indemnified by the Government for any loss he might sustain by his removal.

Neither, while we are upon this subject, can we refrain from noticing two effigies, for it would be a disgrace to call them statues, that disfigure the beach at Southsea—the one is intended to represent the Duke of Wellington, and the other the immortal Nelson. The artist, who rejoices in the name of Milligan, and who has exhibited his name upon the pedestals, has, we are sure, unintentionally made these two heroes the laughing-stock of every one that looks upon the labours of his whimsical chisel. How the authorities of Portsmouth could have countenanced the erection of these absurd caricatures is the common remark of every one, and we hope that, by calling public attention to these deformities, which would almost disgrace the chisel of a New Zealander, we shall have the satisfaction of seeing them, as well as the unsightly assemblage of wooden partitions now used as bathing and reading rooms, pulled down, and the beach left open to the range of the guns for the defence of the town.

We have so repeatedly described the works at Cherbourg including the Digue, its batterries, the land forts, &c. in this Magazine, that we shall do little more in the present paper than compare its area and capabilities for aggressive war with that of Portsmouth. Placed nearly opposite to our chief naval arsenal, it challenges comparison for more reasons than one. It would be in vain, even if it were desirable, to disguise the fact, that France hopes to paralyze our efforts in the Channel by her fleet at Cherbourg. It is no part of our task to attempt to lower her pretensions; our business is to warn our own authorities of the power and completeness of this new Channel port and arsenal. To be forewarned is to be forearmed; for although landing on our spellbound island uninvited is not to be

done with impunity, yet, as Cherbourg is meant to be the starting-point for Frenchmen to make the experiment from, we must see if we cannot manage to make the air of England too tense for them; and we know of no way better adapted to meet the difficulty than by looking it boldly in the face.

In area and completeness, then, Cherbourg is certainly superior to Portsmouth. In fact it is as large as Portsmouth, Devonport, and Keyham combined. It can be used as a great naval rendezvous for fleets intended to dispute with England the command of the seas. If harbourage, docks, slips, &c., well protected with guns of the heaviest calibre, will give to France the dominion of the Channel, in Cherbourg, she possesses the means desired. In England, however, we look to ships and men, as the executive of our naval power, as most of our readers know.

With a view of comprehending the importance of Cherbourg as an aggressive port, and also of judging of its capabilities as a port of construction, we give the number of acres upon which it stands, and also the number of building slips it contains, as well as docks, as compared with Portsmouth—our great naval port—and Plymouth and Keyham, our second arsenals in the Channel:—

	Dockyard Area.	Slips.	Docks.	Docks Building.
Portsmouth	115 acres	5	9	2
Devonport	71 ,,	6	5	...
Keyham	73 ,,	...	3	...
Total	259 ,,	11	17	2
Cherbourg	256 acres	12	7	...

It will be seen, from the above, that the extent of the French port in the English Channel is only three acres less than Portsmouth, Devonport, and Keyham combined; that it contains 12 building slips, being one more than our two chief naval arsenals. On the other hand, it has only 7 docks, as compared with 17 possessed by ourselves.

The object of Cherbourg, therefore, is not so well adapted for "fitting and repairing" as our ports. It is, in short, an aggressive port; it is more offensive than defensive; and we will now at once allude to the aggressive purposes to which this vast French arsenal may be applied.

It is our duty to speak out truly and pacifically, but still to speak out; for, after all that can be said about Cherbourg—its immense docks, any of which are as big as three of ours, its basins, forts, and secure anchorage—it is not a question of comparison between it and Portsmouth that ought to interest the naval or general reader. There is no doubt about our being able to build and man ships enough to thrash any squadrons the French can send against us, if we are prepared for them. The question we have to answer is, what is meant by Cherbourg, with its ramification of railways connecting it with all the military depôts of our late "faithful ally?" When we see every facility for the concentration of troops, and their embarkation attended to in an unwonted manner, with a convenience of wharfage for cavalry and artillery unknown in England, we are

bound to ask ourselves the reasons for such a speciality; particularly when no such extensive accommodation for shipping troops exists at any other French port, or indeed in any port in the world.

In all comparisons, therefore, between the navies and naval ports of England and France, there are two important considerations that must not be overlooked. Thus, if we were to equip a fleet of 20 sail of the line at Portsmouth and Spithead, nobody would imagine that we intended to invade France. Our army is too small; so small, indeed, as to be a source of anxiety whether it is of sufficient strength to protect our own shores. Our gallant little army barely suffices us for a buckler—sword we have none. With 20 sail of English ships-of-the-line, then, in the Channel, France would be as secure from invasion from us as if our ships were lying in ordinary up the muddy lakes at Portchester or in the Medway.

But to reverse the case. Suppose 20 sail-of-the-line at Cherbourg, manned and armed, protected by the grim forts and batteries of the Digue and the forts ashore, backed by an army of 500,000 men, whose sentiments are hostile to England. Then suppose that this vast host is connected by means of railways within twelve hours' reach of Cherbourg, and Cherbourg within six hours' steam of Portsmouth, and then this new channel port becomes a "vantage ground" to France, wherefrom she can hurl a formidable force upon our shores without endangering the security of her own. Cherbourg, in a word, threatens us with an invasion of 100,000 men at the shortest possible notice, and this is the great fact we have to look to in the great business of our own national security.

Again, Frenchmen cherish the idea of an invasion of England. There is something galling to French military pride in not having forced the virgin soil of Britain and polluted it with the presence of their arms. Imperial France, gagged as she is, mutters out the traditions of the Empire. The shadow of Napoleon I. is the guide of Napoleon III.; and there are those yet living who remember the white tents upon the heights of Boulogne. Our late "faithful ally" knows full well that his uncle rehearsed in excavated basins, artificially made for the occasion at Boulogne, the embarkation of troops, until his men were perfected at this exploit, and nothing but our channel fleet prevented the actual performance of his bloody drama. And at Cherbourg, time and circumstances permitting, who knows but the nephew of the man who for months gazed wistfully at Dover cliffs, may feel inclined to re-enact the same scene. So that it is beside our purpose to institute a bare comparison of harbours, arsenals, and fleets, for the subject involves considerations touching our national security and freedom, even from the threat of invasion. It should be borne in mind that when France is in a position to send a strong fleet and a great army across the Channel in a single night, she will find French soldiers who will exhibit an alacrity beyond military obedience. And it would be idle to deny that the facility for doing this mischief has been much increased by the port of Cherbourg.

In briefly noticing the Channel ports, we cannot of course forget Plymouth, the second naval arsenal in England, if for no other

reason than to correct an erroneous impression that prevail
continent that this port is rather a station for a fleet than a
fortress. In a paper translated from the German, and which
moment commands considerable interest, as showing the
entertained by the Germans of the practicability of an inv
this country by the French, it is stated that Devonport is i
only for repairing and fitting out of ships, and not for the
of men-of-war. Nothing more absurd was ever printed,
about a week since 500 additional shipwrights were added
dockyard. For the information of our cousins-German, we
few of the ships built at Devonport, viz., Conqueror, 101 gu
Jean D'Acre, 101 guns; Donegal, 101 guns; Algiers, 9
Exmouth, 91 guns; Aboukir, 90 guns; Nile, 90 guns; St.
120 guns; Royal William, 120 guns; Britannia, 120 guns;
cent, 102 guns; Hibernia, 104 guns; Royal Adelaide, 10
Albion, 90 guns; Foudroyant, 80 guns; Hindostan, 80 gun
&c., besides many of our first-class 50-gun frigates. And
this opportunity to mention that numerous other statemen
tained in that paper are equally fallacious.

If the road at Cherbourg is of the greatest importa
France, that at Plymouth is probably of equal importance
land; as among other advantages it enables us to assemble
point the fleet destined to watch the movements of our neig
in the roads of Cherbourg and Brest, added to which the co
of the road at Plymouth with an extensive naval arsenal, ma
matter of much consequence that it should be rendered p
secure. Like Cherbourg the road is sheltered by a breakwa
sheltered portion at Cherbourg being about 2000 acres, and
Plymouth. As far as experience and analogy can guide ou
vations, the breakwater at Cherbourg is not placed far enou
at sea, for at nearly the same expense a much larger extent
tered harbour might have been attained; the openings also
wide, and admit a heavy lumping sea to roll in at times.

At Plymouth the road is sheltered from east to west round
north by the hills of Devon and Cornwall—and the config
of the shore has permitted the location of the "works" far
the entrance, and has thus procured the great advantage of
the breakwater only exposed to the winds from S.E to S.W.,
by the south. The entrance being on the eastern 900 yards wi
on the western 1500, a very secure and tranquil harbour is the

The arsenal of Plymouth, with Portsmouth, and Sheerne
latter lying at the eastern extremity, and the first at the w
extremity of the kingdom, are well placed to give this coun
command of the Channel. A combined action from these
would paralyse Cherbourg. This latter port, and Brest on the
tic, are the only ports of importance possessed by our neigh
on their northern shores; for we cannot share in the opinio
tertained by some naval strategists, that Dunkirk ought to b
sidered as a great naval port or rendezvous. Its position ca
outflanks (if we may use such a term in naval matters) the e
of the Thames, and might, if it afforded a secure asylum fo

of large draft, offer some difficulty to channel operations. But Dunkirk is a tidal harbour, and ebbs dry every six hours, so that every ship, great or small, must take the mud at these intervals of time, unless the Emperor Napoleon has constructed basins large enough to float his ships-of-war in. But even the facilities required for a fleet equal to what might be assembled at the Downs, which would possess the advantage of sailing at will, could not as far as we know be managed by any engineering skill at Dunkirk.

This last named French port is capable of being a rendezvous for gun-boats and privateers, and it possesses the same facilities, and no more, than Calais and Boulogne, for maritime operations, with respect to tides and depth of water. Indeed its position is not, in certain particulars, so well adapted as the two last-named ports for annoyance to our trade in the narrow seas and the Channel.

We have alluded to Alderney before in this Magazine on various occasions; but perhaps a rapid survey of the operations here is necessary. The necessity of strengthening the harbours of the Channel Islands was forced upon the attention of the government in the year 1842, in consequence of the defenceless state of these important possessions, and their want of refuge and places of shelter. Like Dover, the grants of money were originally obtained for a harbour of refuge, and it was only after repeated remarks made in this Magazine upon the impossibility of the works at Alderney ever being of the slightest use as a refuge harbour to ships either coming up or going down Channel, that the then First Lord of the Admiralty admitted that Alderney could not strictly be considered a harbour of refuge, and the grants were afterwards voted for a harbour of defence.

There is but little doubt of the importance of the position of Alderney for a harbour of defence, if one can be constructed there, capable of resisting a sudden attack from the neighbouring port of Cherbourg—for it lies very near that marine fortress. In the number of this Magazine for December, 1856, we have introduced a map of the northern shores of France and the southern shores of England, in which the extreme importance of a stronghold at Alderney is made evident. It is, as will be seen, the key of a position. The electric wire already connects Paris with Cherbourg and the western port of Brest, the two naval arsenals in northern France; while in England, London is connected with Portsmouth, Plymouth, Sheerness, Portland, and the Channel Islands. The importance of such a united action cannot well be over-estimated, now that steam gives its aid to the movements of ships-of-war. It will be seen, therefore, that Alderney, which is geographically placed so as to watch Cherbourg, is well situated for a *port d'aggression*, if it can be made strong enough to hold its own against attacks from France.

To do this effectually, Alderney, which is as a bare rock, or at best a smugglers' den, is now undergoing conversion into a second Gibraltar, with a harbour of defence attached to it at Braye Bay. When the works were first commenced, the harbour was too small, and, after expending a vast sum of money, the vice of the system was discovered, and a more extensive area of deep water is now being

inclosed. Our intentions at Alderney are no secret to anyone, and less to our neighbours on the other side of the Channel than to the general public in England. In Cherbourg it is considered as a good move, and an answer to their new war port, but the people there say that in the event of war it will soon change hands. We are not so sure of that, although we admit that the bait is very tempting, and lies very close (only about nine miles) from the nearest point of land on the French coast.

There is every reason to believe that Alderney will be made as strong as possible. Indeed the whole island ought to be fortified. It had better be a bare rock without a gun than half fortified. For once in possession of the French, it would be such a godsend that they would not know how to part with it. We lately visited the works at Braye Bay; and though we admit that the area of deep water is enlarged, yet people, not in the secret, wag their heads, and predict that unless something is done more than is at present known, or at least admitted by the engineers, it will not prove of that advantage to the country in case of war as to compensate for the enormous outlay expended upon it.

We abstain from publishing the particulars of the fortifications of Alderney, for reasons everyone will understand. That they are formidable is all we shall say, and well manned we hope they will be. We can, however, remark that this island is, to a certain extent, well guarded by nature, for it has very remarkable currents of great power rushing round its extremities at every tide. The "Swinge" alone would render navigation very close to Alderney difficult, but the whole sea for a considerable distance is beset with granite rocks that stick up like so many dragon's teeth even near the harbour's mouth.

If Alderney harbour can be made deep enough to float heavy ships and frigates, it will be a most important outpost or naval station to watch Cherbourg from. But it must not be a cooped-up harbour, but one large enough to contain a fleet capable of controlling Cherbourg. This will require vast sums; however, nobody begrudges money for our national defences, although, it has been remarked that it is hardly worth while to put the best of them on the other side of the Channel. To say the least it will take 5,000 men to defend Alderney successfully, and this is not desirable, considering the weakness of our land forces; and Mr. Monsell, who knows something about these matters, stated in the House of Commons, that the place might be a source of weakness to us rather than strength, so much does opinion vary upon the works at Alderney.

Now that war has been provoked by a Bonaparte with Austria, there is no saying where it may not spread to, and invasion of these realms may become an impending possibility. We treat such an idea with all the respect it deserves, putting our trust however in Providence and a Channel fleet. Common prudence and a few heavier guns at certain points upon our shores will do a good deal towards keeping our lively neighbours at home. There is also much to be learnt in all future wars, for we breathe in an age of scientific invention. The novelty of to-day so rapidly supersedes that of yesterday, that he is a safe prophet who predicts that to morrow's

discovery will supersede them all. At this moment who can say what will be the effect of the Emperor Napoleon's rifled cannon: it may settle the fate of an Empire. The same may be said of Armstrong's gun. We have expended vast sums of money upon steam-harbours, and artillery, and on some occasions our time and money have been thrown away. Dover is an instance of reckless extravagance. Whether the same may be said of Alderney remains to be proved. In the meantime, we may as well profit by events that are about to come off in Italy — some of them may be to us a warning, others an instructive example.

Portsmouth.

GREENWICH HOSPITAL AS IT IS.

BY AN ANCIENT MARINER.

"And here we tell old tales, and smoke
And laugh, while we are drinking.
Sailors, we know, will have their joke
E'en though the ship were sinking."—*Dibdin.*

With the above lines of Dibdin running in my head, and the *United Service Magazine* for March in my pocket, I availed myself during the Easter holidays of a short respite from business, and indulged in a trip to Greenwich. Not having been there for many years previously, I scarcely knew where I was, all my landmarks being removed. I disembarked at Garden Stairs, but sought in vain for the classic regions of "Poor Jack." Fisher Lane, with its low-roofed houses, had departed. The "Blue Anchor" was no more; and "the Ship" had shifted its moorings and dropped down nearly athwart hawse of the "Anti-Gallican."

It is natural somehow for an old salt to feel thirsty on landing, and having lost my old seat at the bay or bow window of the "Blue Anchor," all places were alike to me. After gazing around me, and refusing sundry kind invitations to dine, I was about to pass on, refusing sundry kind invitations to dine, I was about to pass on, half forgetting my thirst, when a large flag, with an indescribably fierce-looking monster disporting thereon, nearly deprived me of my hat, and just at that moment, an exclamation, in which my name was, as I thought, taken in vain, induced me to stop. I was not mistaken, for on a bench by the entrance to the "Buffalo's Head" sat an old pensioner, who appeared to have nothing better to do than pass remarks upon strangers.

"You don't remember me, sir?" said the white-haired veteran, "but I remember you very well. You forget when I was quarter-master of your watch on board the old ———."

"What," said I, recognising him, "are you Ben Young? Why I always thought you had married a bounty widow, and had turned publican."

"I see you have a good recollection, Mr.—I beg pardon—Captain Buntline," replied Young, "and I will tell you all about it if you will drop your anchor alongside me."

A return of thirst coming over me at this juncture, I proposed an adjournment to the interior of the "Buffalo's Head," and was soon accommodated with a comfortable arm chair by the fireside—for it was very cold last Easter—and my old shipmate being seated likewise, we made ourselves cozy, and I began to hitch back some thirty or forty years, and recall various bygone events.

"Yes, sir," sighed Benjamin, taking the pipe from his mouth, "it's quite true I did marry a bounty widder, and took to the "Pig and Whistle," in Ratcliff Highway. I can't say that they were my happiest days. My wife got very cranky, and seemed to think I took too many 'mornings,' and too many 'hot grogs;' and remarks of that kind, you know, before company, hurted my feelings; so I warn't so much grieved when it pleased Providence to seize her with a fit of 'appleplexy,' and I was left a widderer.

"Just about that time a heavy bill came in from the spirit merchant, and as I hadn't the means of paying it, I thought it best to say so, and let the law take its course."

"You went to leeward, then?" said I.

"I did, sir; but as the landlord and creditors knowed me for an honest fellow, though mayhap not the best hand at the expense book, except to issue the stores, they told me if I would give up my lease, and all I had, they would settle the business among them. Glad enough was I to take them at their word, and as I had a pension of £21 4s. a-year, and was only just sixty, I thought of taking another cruise to sea before coiling up my ropes. When I looked about for a ship, hows'ever, there was no want of men, and having no friends, and no relations, I was advised to bear up for Greenwich."

"And you made your port, and let go your anchor?" said I.

"I took in moorings in the tier, sir," said Ben, correcting me.

"I hope you are comfortable for the rest of your days?" said I.

"I hope so, too," answered Ben; but there was a curtness about his reply which made me think it was not all *couleur de rose* there.

"Take another pull at the pewter, Ben;" but observing that he had already done so, I had the pot replenished, hoping to make the old man more cheerful.

Ben Young was as fine a sailor, when I remembered him—and we were three years together in the East Indies—as I ever met in my life. He was of an even temper, quiet, and sober; but I always thought him rather proud for one in his station. He was particularly neat in his rig, and remarkable for cleanliness in person and clothes. A civil word was never thrown away upon him; but he winced under rebuke like a child. No man strove harder to do his duty correctly; and, unless a strange officer now and then put him out, he had seldom anything to complain of in the way of reprimand or fault-finding. I met him, by accident, some years after he had quitted active service, and learned from him that he had married a carpenter's widow before pensions were forfeited by marriage, and I think must have led a rather unpleasant life, and,

possibly, had become rather too prone to indulge in the use of the liquors in which he traded.

"And how do you like the college?" I asked.

"Pretty well," replied Ben, drily.

"Only pretty well?" I said; "why, I thought that you had everything a man could wish for in that place!"

A shake of the head, coupled with some muttered, indistinct words, were the only answer. This hesitation excited my curiosity; and, as I had been so much interested in the yarn about "Greenwich in the Olden Time," I thought I would endeavour to find out what the place was like now.

"What is there you don't like?" I asked.

"I am afraid I should tire you if I began to talk about the College, sir," said Ben. "To tell you the truth, I never care to talk about it. It serves my purpose; that is, I get my meat and drink there, and have a decent bed to sleep upon, and good doctors and attendance if sick; but if I had anywhere to go I would not stop there. Strangers think we are all old growls, and everybody says we ought to be very happy, and so forth; but we who wear the shoe know where it pinches."

"True," said I, "you must know best about it, but it always seems to me that the only thing you want to make you happy is employment."

"There's more than that wanted, sir. We don't like to be ordered about like a lot of boys, and called to account by a parcel of boatswains and mates, as aint fit to do more than black our shoes. Then, if we stop out after ten o'clock, and have enough grog aboard to make the tongue run, there's the peelers to stop us, and——but it's no use my talking. I don't like to speak about it. So you'll excuse me, Captain Buntline, I must go in to tea; it is almost time now, so good bye, and thankee for me."

"Stop," said I, "Ben, you're not going to slip your cable like that. Just hold on here. Never mind your tea, we will have a drop of warm rum-and-water instead."

"I'd rather not, sir. I don't want to be yellowed. Once I was before the council, and I'll never go again while my name is Ben Young."

"Yellowed," said I, "what's that?"

"Don't you know?" returned Ben, "why I thought every gentleman who ever went into the College knew: it means yellow sleeves to your coat, and yellow back to your waistcoat. 'Canaries,' some call them; and the men who are ordered to wear it, are made to sweep the thoroughfares, and clean about like convicts. I'd sooner go and put myself under the bows of that steamer," said Ben, emphatically pointing to the one just leaving the pier, "than I would put on the yellow."

"Well, but," said I, "there is no fear of *your* being punished in that way. Surely, a man of your age—you must be over three score and ten now—would never be punished in that way."

"If I was four score sir," said Ben, somewhat sharply, "it would make no odds. There is only one law there for the waister, and the

captain of the forecastle, or chief boatswain's mate, and no matter whether you are forty or eighty. Why sir, I knew a poor old fellow more than eighty who was turned out, and sent to beg his way to his native place, for carrying a drop of gin into one of the helpless wards."

"You must surely be dreaming," said I. "It is not possible that such things would be allowed."

"Well, well," said Ben, "if you don't believe me, I cannot help it, but I must go now."

"If you must go," said I, rising from my seat, "let me go with you, and I will go up to your ward with you, and we can have a yarn there."

"No, that wont do, Captain," returned Ben. "No strangers allowed in the wards after sunset, and it's nearly that now."

"But surely I can go and sit by the fire in your ward, and wait for you. There can be no harm in that?"

"Not an inch of it," said Ben, firmly. "Our boatswain is a marine, and prides himself on being very strict, and so he is thought to be, and if you was to go and sit down, he would, may be, tell you you must go out, as it was contrary to orders."

"Well then, where can I fall in with you again? Surely there is some place in the College where I can see and talk to you."

"Not now. I and my boatswain don't hit it off very well, for I can't see that a bit of lace can turn a bone-polisher into my superior officer. Our boatswain was not so much as a non-commissioned officer, he was shipmate with me once, and servant to the first Lieutenant of Marines, and I was Quarter-Master, and I can't acknowledge him as my superior officer now, for all he is a boatswain. There is no place where I can see you in the College, but I will meet you again after tea if you please, and we can then take a walk in the park."

"This arrangement suited me very well; but notwithstanding his prohibition, I followed my old shipmate into the College, and after waiting a few minutes at the door of the hall, was allowed to pass into the spacious crypt where the pensioners were having their tea. Observing only half-filled tables, and some tables wholly deserted, I ventured to ask a portly lace-bedizened individual seated at the upper end of the middle table if all the pensioners were assembled. A short answer prevented my pursuing my inquiries in that direction, and I reserved the question for Ben. Looking round at the assembled crew, I asked myself "can these men ever have been sailors?" I saw dirty, scrubby-looking fellows, and I said surely these never were seamen, and such coats as they wore were never meant to adorn the person of my once trim old shipmate Ben.

The tea was pretty good, not overloaded with milk or sugar, but perhaps enough for an ordinary palate; and I observed that a square pat of salt butter and a loaf of bread had been served out to each mess of four. But I could not understand how it was that the men were so few. Fifteen years ago I remember there was hardly room for a stranger to pass, and every table was closely packed. It had a melancholy look now. It reminded me for the moment of losing half a ship's company from yellow fever. I hate to see vacant places at a table.

On leaving the tea party, I wandered about the fine large squares, or open spaces to the westward of the College, and then I pictured to myself the site of "The Blue Anchor," and veritable "Ship Tavern," all which I found had been pulled down, and the ground laid open. Wishing I had had in my pocket a cheque on the Bank of England for a tenth part only of the cost of the improvements—which, I admit, are improvements, I walked down at the back of a most unsightly nest of buildings, among which I recognised a brew-house, and came to the entrance of a lot of stables. Hillo! thought I, Ben never told me about the horses. I must put that down in my note book.

Pursuing my course westerly, I was just on the point of going out of the gates, when Ben overtook me. To my surprise and Ben's chagrin, my old shipmate was stopped by the policeman. "What now?" asked I.

"You are not in your proper uniform," said Bobby, addressing my companion.

"How so?" demanded Ben, reddening with anger.

"You have not a College hat on!" returned he of the X division.

"Oh, never mind his hat," said I; "he's an old shipmate of mine, and we are only going for a walk."

The policeman looked truncheons at me, and I saw it was useless interposing; in fact it occurred to me that my own person would not have been secure from incarceration had I interfered with the officer in the execution of his duty, and so Ben was obliged to return to his ward for the orthodox conglomeration of cat-skin and old blanket, in lieu of the more respectable tile composed of leather, with which he had, perhaps unthinkingly, crowned his flowing white locks.

I waited patiently for my old friend's return. All these things were new to me. I recalled to mind the globe-becrowned gates some two or three hundred yards nearer the main building, and jolly-looking "white-collar men," as they were called, with rubicund faces, who once kept the gate, and who were always happy to pay respect to an old naval officer, although he might not be fortunate enough to have a berth in the place.

"Well, Ben," said I, as the *quondam* quarter-master of the old ——— again ranged up alongside, "so you have got out at last."

'You seemed to think but now, sir," said Ben, "that I was like all the other college men—an old growl, without having anything to complain of. Do you think so now? How should *you*—pardon my using the freedom—if you were like me, relish being ordered about by a pollusman, and told that your coat wasn't brushed, or your wig—for I see you wear one (I didn't thank him, I must own, for this proof of his discernment) on the wrong slue, or your hat not of the newest fashion?"

I confessed that I should feel rather indignant, and disposed to consign the "pollusman," in my old vernacular, to the shades below.

"Well, sir, and don't you think we old fellows have got a little independent spirit left? When you and I was shipmates, you nor any other officer ever found fault with my dress. My jacket was

always clean; my white frock, with the blue turn-over, respectable; but here an old sailor is rigged out like a play actor, with a white choker, and enough cloth in the tails of his coat to make a top-gallant studding-sail for a brig. I don't swear, sir, but like the boatswain of the frigate, whose captain wouldn't allow swearing, used to say to the lubbers on the foreyard—'You know what I mean.'"

We trudged up the long street leading to the park, missing the nut-stalls, and other entertainments for idle boys which were wont to be exhibited there; and as it was growing dusk, took a seat on a vacant bench, and watched the gambols of the half or whole-drunk cockneys, and their female friends. Desirous to bring back Ben to the revelation of some of the secrets of his prison-house, I asked him how it was that the tea-halls looked so empty.

"For a very good reason," he replied; "we're close hand upon a thousand short."

I could hardly believe him. "How, why," I asked—"what?"

"I'll tell you, sir, how I think it comes about. Mind, I am only one, and may be wrong; but it seems to me that in the course of ten years there wont be 500 left. It's this way. A man like me—you know what I was, sir—and though I says it as ought not—I was always respected aboard ship by officer and shipmate. When I applied to come in, I had just got rid of my 'public,' and had a very few pounds saved out of the wreck. I went up to the Admiralty, and as I had a pension, and was sixty years old, no word was said, and I passed in. But along with me was a dozen fellows, such as I never saw in any ship in my life, although I well remember the 'Lord Mayor's men' we had years ago. One looked like a wandering tinker, another was an Irish hodman, a third had not a shoe to his foot, or leastwise, not a sole to his shoe.

"We had to find our own way down to Greenwich, and as the poor devil who had no shoes couldn't walk down, and had not got any money, I paid his passage along with me. The Admiralty now find the new pensioners with an omnibus; but when I came in they did not do that. Now, sir, would you believe it, that my fellow passenger, who hadn't a shoe to his foot, was put into the same ward, and into the same cabin with me?—that is after he had been washed and cleansed of his lumber in the infirmary. He had a bed as it may be there, and I was just opposite to him here. I don't know how I stood it for a week, but I spoke to the Lieutenant one day as he was coming through the ward, and asked him if he would recommend me for a single-bedded cabin, which he was kind enough to do, and after a time I got shifted to the R——."

"You must remember," resumed Ben, "that I had given up a pension of £21 4s. to come into Greenwich, and my shoeless fellow-pensioner gave up nothing. He had served as 'Jimmy Duck's midshipman's steward, and for a short time acted as the purser's steward's mate's deputy. I saw on his card that he had nine years ten months' servitude, and I had twenty-five, yet this man was just as well off as myself."

"But you surely do not mean to tell me," said I, "that there is

no distinction drawn between an old petty officer like yourself and the scrubs you speak of?"

"There is none that I know of," replied Ben, "except that these 'scrubs,' as you call them, get situations as officers' servants, and the places of blue and white frockmen, which give them 6d. or 9d. a-day, which respectable old men wont take. I have been offered many situations, but always refused, because I did not like to clean knives and do dirty work such as I never did on board ship; and so I do my best with my shilling a-week tobacco money."

"A shilling a-week! surely you get more than that," I said.

'"Not a farthing more from the College," returned Ben, "and that is little enough, I can tell you, after paying the sinkman and the other little things. I used some years ago to earn a few shillings by attending some golfplayers on Blackheath, but I can't do the walking now, and so I have only a shilling a-week to find me in tobacco, a pint of beer now and then, and to get my shirt washed."

I looked at the old man incredulously. I felt convinced that he must be stretching, as he used to do occasionally on board the old ———; but he assured me it was all true, and that he had not told me a tenth part. Thinks I, if I only knew one-tenth, there must be something very wrong, and I began to place more reliance in him when I reflected upon the empty benches in the tea-hall.

"That, then," said I aloud, "accounts for the number of vacant benches and tables I suppose."

"Yes, sir," replied Ben, "when I first joined there was near hand 600 men in the hall you went into to-night, and I should think there is not above 350 now. I would not have stayed so long, but you know I was not brought up to labouring work. I was bred on board a man-of-war; and as to the matter of anything in that way, I consider it no disparagement, but I never was no man's servant, and never mean to be one. Sometimes I have had a job in rigging model ships, but my eyes are too dim and my fingers too stiff for that work now; and so I jog on, and now and then a stray half-crown comes in my way from an old shipmate—(I took this as rather a broad hint, but said nothing)—and I know how to do without it if it don't."

"But," said I, not yet opening my *portemonnaie*, "you told me you paid for washing your shirt, I thought that was done for you by the College."

"So it is, after a fashion; but I have a few of my old shirts left, and when I want to appear respectable, I put on one of them. It is growing dark for you to see the sort of thing I have got on now It is made of duck, as coarse though not so white as your cutter's mizen in the ———; I remember what pride you took in your cutter, sir, and how I used to steal a new log line now and then, and stow it away in the binnacle for you." (I felt that half-a-crown wouldn't be enough for this old boy.)

"Oh yes!" I answered, I recollect that well, but what has that to do with the shirts?"

"Why, just this, sir, that my college shirts are made of a sort of ship's duck with dead-eye buttons at the collar; we used to have tape

strings; and when the nurse gives them to us they are as rough and ugly as you ever saw anything in your life, no make nor shape about them, and neither ironed nor mangled. Why, you remember, sir, when we had been a long while out cruizing, and the young gentlemen had had no opportunity of getting their clothes washed ashore, some of the marines used to make shift to wash and iron their shirts, and as I was always fond of looking ship-shape, I have often given my grog for the loan of the flat iron. But here we have nothing of the sort unless we pay for it."

It had by this time grown nearly dark, and thinking I had heard growling enough for one sitting, I got up to wish my old shipmate good night.

"Good night, sir, and God bless ye," said Ben, as he closed his digits on a large round piece of silver. "We weathered many a breeze together, and I hope you have made a better port than I have. I know I might have done worse, and you must not think that I undervalue the advantages I possess. No, no," continued the old man; "it relieves me to tell my mind to an old shipmate. I am thankful to my country for providing me a home in my old age; but I think that if the sailor had his rights in the College, we should see more of them in there than we do now."

"I think you are more than half right, Ben—so, good night; but don't be surprised if I give you another hail shortly, as I feel assured I have not heard half your story."

Mounting the knife-board of a Greenwich 'bus, I returned to my suburban villa, cogitating, as I went, upon my conversation with my old shipmate. Being tired, I soon fell asleep, and Mrs. Buntline informed me on the following morning that I had been very restless during the night, and had made mention, in my broken slumbers, of the names of various important personages with whom I appeared to be holding energetic dialogues. I told her that I had dreamt I was threatening the first Lord of the Admiralty with a letter to the *Times*, or some other desperate measure, if he did not immediately take steps to improve the position of my old shipmate.

Turning to the paper which was published in the Magazine for March, I found that there had been apparently no amelioration of the pensioners' condition since Captain Baillie's immolation on the Sandwich altar. There was no complaint of "bull beef," and "sour small beer mixed with water," but still no solid benefit had been obtained, as far as I could ascertain from old Ben's yarn—only a part of which I have been able to record with exactitude—since that time. There is still the same amount of tobacco money, the same shoes, the same three-cornered scraper, and broad-tailed coat.

By the way, I forgot to mention what my old shipmate said about the costume. I remarked, when we were draining the pewter at the "Buffalo's Head," that I wondered how it was the same old rig—that in which Benbow's cowardly captains were dressed—had been kept up. I just remember now what Ben said. "Why sir," said he, "I suppose the dress is the same as it was when the College was founded, because we should be known as state paupers." I endeavoured to check him but in vain. "Yes, sir, I meant it, we are

only one ratline above that old man with the brown coat and white buttons, pointing out of the window at an old man who I presume belonged to the Greenwich Union. Our food is better, and our clothing not quite so coarse; but the boys in the street call after me 'old goose,' and don't think me a bit better than the parish pauper. I am certain sure the founders, whose health we drink every 4th of November, intended that we should be envied; and that every sailor on passing the College should take off his hat, and say that he hoped to end his days in that comfortable asylum. But they don't do so, sir. Sailors never talk of Greenwich except to make game of such and such a slack belayed fellow, and say he's only fit for a three-cornered scraper and a crutch."

Making due allowances for pewter inspiration, I thought there was something in what he said. If, instead of being attired in a style more than a century old, the dress were modernised, and of a texture befitting a better station, great things might be done. Efforts are now being made to obtain seamen, and a bounty is offered, and all sorts of advantages brought forward by way of inducement. Why, surely, if Greenwich was meant for any thing, it was designed for an encouragement to men to betake themselves to a sea life, and to attach themselves to the British flag. There must be something defective in the working of the establishment to occasion all this dissatisfaction. There must be some injurious system at work, or "moorings in Greenwich tier" would not be at such a miserable discount. I observed, some time since, that a question was asked in the House of Commons, and that Sir John Pakington stated his intention of instituting an inquiry. He is a man of his word, and will do so. But I hope he will not place the difficult and important task in the hands of those who will suffer their eyes to be blinded by the dust of ages, thrown by parties interested in the preservation of abuses.

Some people talk of "time-honoured institutions," and seem to think that what our forefathers designed and were pleased with, must be good still. A greater error cannot be indulged in. Everything sublunary wears out, and requires renewing. We must keep pace with the age. The old stage waggon has had to give place to the luggage-train. Scarlett's dashing four-in-hand has been put *hors de combat* by the rail. The screw is everywhere. No one can stand still now-a-days. "Go a-head," is the motto; and, since sailors' tastes are refined, and the schoolmaster is in every ship—since Sailors' Homes teach seamen the value of money, and the pleasures of shore enjoyment—Greenwich Hospital must follow suit, or her halls will soon be altogether deserted, and her ample revenues diverted from their intended purpose.

[P.S.—It is possible I may pay another visit to my old shipmate shortly; and if the editor of the *United Service Magazine* thinks the subject interesting to his readers, I may be tempted to return to it next month.—J. B.]

SUMMARY OF THE BRITISH NAVY.

By Theseus. Late R.N.

The momentous events that have roused the warlike feelings of the whole of Europe, and the exaggerated reports that have lately alarmed the English people, render a concise and accurate account of the present state of the British Navy an interesting document. A careful analysis of all the ships belonging to the Navy has already been given in the *United Service Magazine*, commencing in the number for October, 1858. It is purposed, on the present occasion, to give a summary of all the previous papers, and, at the same time, to make such alterations as the important information lately published in official documents renders necessary.

It is requisite, however, to state that some of the official statements put forth by Sir Baldwin Walker are not exactly correct, and have evidently been compiled in a great hurry. The Report of the Committee appointed by the Treasury to inquire into the Navy Estimates refers to an Appendix (No. 8), which purposes to give a list of the sailing ships that may be considered as effective, and which is certified to by Sir B. Walker. This list includes the names of 13 ships of the line, but omits two, which are certainly in as good condition as those named, and these are the Indus, 78, flagship, in the West Indies, and the Superb, 80, an advanced ship, at Chatham. Thus there are 15 effective sailing line-of-battle ships. As regards the frigates, the Arethusa, 50, has been stated to be effective, when she is known to be so rotten as not to be worth repairing. The Chichester, 50, is also employed as a hulk; and as four of these frigates have lately been ordered for conversion into screw ships, there remains only 7 first-class effective sailing frigates. The Havannah, 19, employed in the Pacific, and the Amazon, 26, at Devonport, have been omitted in the list of the effective second-class frigates, which therefore number 16 instead of 14.

In addition to the 22 sloops and brigs mentioned as effective, there ought to be included the Acorn, 12, employed in China; the Persian, 12, employed on the West Coast of Africa; the Daphne, 18, and Dido, 18, at Chatham; the Contest, 12, at Portsmouth; and the Pilot, 12, at Devonport. This makes 29 effective sloops instead of 23.

An official report, upon which a most important State Paper is founded, should be accurate in all its details; and that the above corrections are true can easily be proved; for surely Sir B. Walker does not intend to say that the flag ship in the West Indies is not an effective sailing ship, or that the Havannah, Acorn, and Persian, now employed on active service abroad, are mere hulks.

The mere fact, however, of certain sailing ships being considered effective, is of but little importance as regards our actual naval strength, for the Admiralty have determined that no more sailing ships shall be commissioned for active service; and therefore their present effective condition relates more to their fitness for conver-

sion into screw ships. Sir B. Walker reports that the 84-gun ships are not worth converting, owing to their age; and therefore, out of the 15 effective sailing ships of the line, only 5—the Collingwood, 80, Superb, 80, Vanguard, 80, Boscawen, 70, and Cumberland, 70—are likely to be converted into screw ships. Of the first-class frigates, only 4—the Octavia, 50, Indefatigable, 50, Leander, 50, and Nankin, 50, are worth converting, in addition to those now being converted.

There has been a great deal of discussion lately about the supposed inferiority of the English to the French in the number of their screw line-of-battle ships; and from the different statements published, there can be no doubt that, at the time the Whig Government left office, in February, 1858, France possessed as many screw liners as England. Sir John Pakington, however, has made most strenuous exertions to recover our former naval superiority; and, if he remains at the Admiralty, there is every probability of England possessing, in another year or two, a screw fleet that would be capable of meeting the combined fleets of France and Russia.

A statement showing the increase in the number of screw liners since February, 1858:

	In Commission.	In Reserve.	Building.	Converting.	Total.
February, 1858	10	15	15	3	43
May, 1859	20	19	12	5	56
Difference	10	4	3	2	13

It will be seen that there are now afloat 14 screw liners more than when Sir John Pakington became first Lord of the Admiralty.

SUMMARY OF OUR SCREW STEAM NAVY.

	In Commission.	In Ordinary.	Building.	Converting.	Total.
Three-deckers	2	4	4	—	10
Two-deckers	18	15	8	5	46
Block-ships	9	—	—	—	9
Frigates	11	8	9	4	32
Corvettes	12	8	7	—	27
Mortar-ships	—	4	—	—	4
Floating Batteries	1	7	—	—	8
Sloops	12	7	7	—	26
Gun-vessels	17	9	—	—	26
Gun-boats	50	110	—	—	160
Small Vessels	1	3	1	—	5
Troop and Store-ships	11	5	—	—	16
Yachts	1	—	—	—	1
Total	145	180	36	9	370

Screw Line-of-Battle Ships.—Three Deckers:—

In Commission.—Marlborough, 131; Royal Albert, 121.

In Ordinary.—First-class Steam Reserve.—Duke of Wellington, 131; and Royal George, 102. Second-class Steam Reserve.—Royal Sovereign, 131.

Fitting Engines.—Windsor Castle, 105.

Building.—Howe, 121; Prince of Wales, 131; Royal Frederick, 105; and Victoria, 121.

Two-Deckers:—

In Commission.—Conqueror, 101; St. Jean D'Acre, 101; Agamemnon, 91; Algiers, 91; Cæsar, 90; Exmouth, 91; Hannibal, 91; Hero, 91; James Watt, 91; London, 90; Nile, 90; Orion, 91; Princess Royal, 91; Renown, 91; Victor Emanuel, 91; Brunswick, 80; Centurion, 80; Cressy, 80.

In Ordinary.—First-class Steam Reserve.—Colossus, 80; Aboukir, 90.

Second-class Steam Reserve.—Donegal, 101; Edgar, 91; Goliath, 80; Majestic, 80; Mars, 80; Meeanee, 80.

Fitting Engines.—Neptune, 91; St. George, 91; Trafalgar, 91; Revenge, 91; Hood, 90; Queen, 86.

Requiring Repairs.—Sans Pareil, 70.

Building.—Duncan, 101; Gibraltar, 101; Anson, 91; Atlas, 91; Bulwark, 91; Defiance, 91; Repulse, 91; Irresistible, 80.

Converting.—Nelson, 91; Royal William, 91; Waterloo, 91; Rodney, 90; Lion, 80.

Screw Line-of-Battle Ships.—Afloat, 39; building, 12; converting, 5: total, 56.

Screw Block Ships.—Afloat, 9

In Commission.—Ajax, 60; Blenheim, 60; Cornwallis, 60; Edinburgh, 60; Hastings, 60; Hawke, 60; Hogue, 60; Pembroke, 60; and Russell, 60.

Screw Frigates:—

In Commission.—Chesapeake, 51; Emerald, 51; Euryalus, 51; Liffey, 51; Arrogant, 47; Mersey, 40; Diadem, 32; Doris, 32; Curaçoa, 31; Tribune, 31; Termagant, 25.

In Ordinary.—First-class Steam Reserve.—Impérieuse, 51; Melpomene, 51; Topaze, 51. Second-class Steam Reserve.—Forte, 51; Orlando, 50; Shannon, 51; Amphion, 34; Dauntless, 33.

Building.—Aurora, 51; Bacchante, 51; Bristol, 51; Immortalité, 51; Narcissus, 51; Newcastle, 51; Undaunted, 51; Ariadne, 26; Galatea, 26.

Converting.—Phæton, 50; Phœbe, 50; Severn, 50; Sutlej, 50.

Screw Frigates.—Afloat, 19; building, 9; converting, 4; total, 32.

Screw Corvettes:—

In Commission.—Cadmus, 21; Esk, 21; Highflyer, 21; Pearl, 21; Pelorus, 21; Pylades, 21; Satellite, 21; Tartar, 21; Racoon, 22; Archer, 15; Brisk, 15; Niger, 15.

In Ordinary.—First Class Steam Reserve.—Scout 21.

Second Class Steam Reserve.—Challenger 22, Clio 22, Cossack 21, Scylla 21, Encounter 15, Malacca 17, Miranda 15.

Building.—Barossa 22, Charybdis 21, Jason 21, Orestes 22, Orpheus 22, Wolverene 22, Rattlesnake 22.

Screw Corvettes.—Afloat, 20; building, 7; total, 27.

Screw Mortar Ships.—Afloat, 4.

In ordinary.—Second Class Steam Reserve.—Eurotus 12, Forth 12, Horatio 8, Seahorse 12.

Screw Floating Batteries.—Afloat, 8.

In Commission.—Terror 16.

In ordinary.—Second Class Steam Reserve.—Ætna 16, Erebus 16, Glatton 14, Meteor 14, Thunder 14, Thunderbolt 16, Trusty, 14.

Screw Sloops.—

In Commission.—Alert 17, Cruiser 17, Falcon 17, Harrier 17, Hornet 17, Conflict 8, Cordelia 11, Gannet 11, Plumper 11, Racer 11, Ariel 9, Lyra 9.

In Ordinary.—First Class Steam Reserve.—Fawn 17, Icarus 11.

Requiring Repairs.—Wasp 14, Desperate 8, Phœnix 8, Curlew 9, Swallow 9.

Building.—Camelion 17, Greyhound 17, Mutine 17, Pelican 17, Reindeer 17, Rinaldo 17, Pantaloon 10.

Screw Sloops.—Afloat, 19; building, 7; total, 26.

Screw Gun-Vessels.—Afloat, 26.

In Commission.—Flying Fish 6, Intrepid 6, Pioneer 6, Nimrod 6 Roebuck 6, Assurance 4, Coquette 4, Cormorant 4, Lapwing 4, Mohawk 4, Osprey 4, Sparrowhawk 4, Surprise 4, Vigilant 4, Wanderer 4, Lynx 4, Viper 4.

In Ordinary.—First Class Steam Reserve.—Renard 4, Beagle 4, Snake 4. Second Class Steam Reserve.—Victor 6, Alacrity 4, Foxhound 4, Ringdove 4, Arrow 4, Wrangler 4.

Screw Gun-boats.—Afloat, 160.

In Commission.—Algerine, Badger, Banterer, Biter, Boxer, Bullfinch, Bustard, Clown, Dapper, Dove, Drake, Erne, Firm, Forester, Goshawk, Growler, Haughty, Hind, Janus, Jasper, Kestrel, Lark, Lee, Leven, Leveret, Lively, Louisa, Magnet, Magpie, Nettle, Onyx, Opossum, Plover, Quail, Redwing, Ruby, Sandfly, Seagull, Shamrock, Skipjack, Slaney, Snap, Spanker, Starling, Staunch, Stork, Thistle, Violet, Watchful, Woodcock.

In Ordinary.—First Class Steam Reserve.—Beaver, Bouncer, Bullfrog, Charon, Cheerful, Chub, Clinker, Cochin, Fancy, Forward, Goldfinch, Grappler, Grasshopper, Grinder, Hardy, Havock, Jackdaw, Julia, Mayflower, Misletoe, Pelter, Pickle, Pincher, Procris Sepoy, Snapper, Spey, Swinger, Traveller, Weazel.

Second Class Steam Reserve.—Albacore, Amelia, Angler, Ant, Beacon, Blazer, Blossom, Brave, Brazen, Camel, Carnation, Caroline, Charger, Cherokee, Cockchafer, Confounder, Cracker, Crocus, Daisy, Decoy, Delight, Dwarf, Earnest, Escort, Fenella, Fervent, Fidget, Flamer, Flirt, Fly, Foam, Gadfly, Garland, Garnet, Gleaner, Gnat, Griper, Handy, Hasty, Herring, Highlander, Hunter, Hyæna, Insolent (lent), Mackarel, Manly, Mastiff, Midge, Nightingale, Parthian, Partridge, Peacock, Pert, Pet, Pheasant, Porpoise, Primrose, Prompt, Rainbow, Rambler, Raven, Ready, Redbreast, Ripple, Rocket, Rose, Savage, Sheldrake, Skylark, Spider, Surly, Swan, Thrasher, Thrush, Tickler, Tilbury, Tiny, Wave, Whiting, Wolf.

Small Screw Vessels.—

In Commission.—Sharpshooter 8.

In Ordinary.—Second Class Steam Reserve.—Rifleman 8, Minx 3, Teazer 2.

Building.—Ranger 5.

Small Screw Vessels—Afloat, 4; building, 1; total, 5.

Screw Troop and Store Ships.—Afloat, 16.

In Commission—Adventure 6, Assistance 6, Himalaya 6, Megæra 6, Perseverance 6, Simoom 6, Urgent 6, Buffalo 2, Hesper 2, Industry 2, Supply 2.

In Ordinary.—Second-Class Steam Reserve.—Vulcan 6, Fox 4, Chasseur 1, Water-rail, Wye.

Screw Yacht.—Afloat, 1.

In Commission.—Fairy.

Grand Totals of Screw Steam Ships.—Afloat, 325; Building, 36; Converting 9; Total 370.

SUMMARY OF OUR PADDLE-WHEEL STEAM NAVY.

	In Commission.	In Ordinary. Effective.	In Ordinary. Non-effective.	Total
Frigates	6	2	1	9
Corvettes	4	3	—	7
Sloops	17	13	3	33
Gun-Vessels	2	—	—	2
Small Vessels	16	2	2	20
Store Ships	3	—	—	3
Tenders	10	1	1	12
Tug Vessels	19	—	—	19
Yachts	6	—	—	6
	—	—	—	—
Total	83	21	7	111

Paddle-wheel Steam Frigates.—Afloat, 9.

In Commission.—Furious 16, Leopard 18, Magicienne 16, Retribution 28, Terrible 21, Valorous 16.

In Ordinary.—Second Class Steam Reserve.—Sidon 22, Odin 16.

Requiring Repairs.—Penelope 16.

Paddle-wheel Steam Corvettes.—Afloat, 7.

In Commission.—Firebrand 6, Sampson 6, Vulture 6, Cyclops 6.

In Ordinary.—First Class Steam Reserve.—Gladiator 6, Dragon 6.

Requiring Repairs.—Centaur 6.

Paddle-wheel Steam Sloops.—Afloat, 33.

In Commission.—Argus 6, Basilisk 6, Buzzard 6, Devastation 6, Fury 6, Gorgon 6, Inflexible 6, Scourge 6, Styx 6, Vesuvius 6, Virago 6, Vixen 6, Hermes 6, Hydra 6, Medina 4, Medusa 4, Trident 6.

In Ordinary.—Second Class Steam Reserve.—Barracouta 6, Driver 6, Sphinx 6, Spiteful 6, Stromboli 6, Medea 6, Prometheus 6.

Being Repaired and Fitted Out.—Alecto 5, Ardent 5, Hecate 6.

Requiring Repairs.—Bulldog 6, Geyser 6, Rosamond 6, Hecla 6, Merlin 4, Salamander 6.

Paddle-wheel Steam Gun Vessels.—Afloat 2.

In Commission.—Recruit 6, Weser 6.

Small Paddle-wheel Steam Vessels.—Afloat 20.

In Commission.—Antelope 3, Banshee 2, Caradoc 2, Coromandel 4, Dasher 4, Jackall 3, Lizard 1, Locust 3, Oberon 3, Pluto 4, Porcupine 4, Spitfire 5, Tartarus 4, Triton 3, Bann 1, Brune 1.

In Ordinary—Requiring Repairs.—Firefly 4, Alban 4, Bloodhound 3, Harpy 1.

Paddle-wheel Steam Store Ships.—Afloat 3.

In Commission.—Dee 4, Rhadamanthus 4, Volcano 3.

Paddle-wheel Steam Tenders.—Afloat 10.

In Commission.—Adder 1, Advice 1, Asp 1, Avon 3, Bee 1, Dover 1, Lightning 3, Sprightly 1, Wildfire 1, Princess Alice 1.

In Ordinary—Requiring repairs.—Cuckoo 3, Otter 3.

Paddle-wheel Steam Tug-vessels.—Afloat 19.

In Commission for Harbour Service.—African, Bustler, Comet, Confiance, Echo, Fearless, Hearty, Kite, Lucifer, Monkey, Myrtle, Pigmy, Pike, Prospero, Redpole, Thais, Wallace, Widgeon, Zephyr.

Paddle-wheel Steam Yachts.—Afloat 6.

In Commission.—Victoria and Albert, Osborne, Black Eagle, Elfin, Firequeen, Vivid.

SUMMARY OF OUR SAILING NAVY.

	In Commission		In Ordinary			
	Effective	Non-effective	Effective	Non-effective	Total	Hulks, &c.
Three Deckers ...	—	8	—	—	8	2
Two Deckers ...	7	7	8	8	30	21
Frigates	5	4	17	32	58	56
Corvettes	1	—	2	—	3	—
Sloops	8	—	18	10	36	14
Brigs, &c.	3	5	—	6	14	51
Store and Hospital Ships	—	14	—	6	20	—
Yachts	—	6	—	—	6	—
Tenders	—	17	—	—	17	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	24	61	45	62	192	144

Sailing Line-of-battle Ships.—Three-deckers.—

In Commission.—Non-effective ships.—Britannia 46, St. Vincent 46, Excellent 46, Hibernia 12, Impregnable 78, Victory 22, Queen Charlotte 22, Royal Adelaide 22. Hulks.—Caledonia and Camperdown.

Two-deckers.—In Commission.—Effective Ships.—Asia 84, Calcutta 84, Formidable 84, Ganges 84, Boscawen 70, Cumberland 70, Indus 78. Non-effective Ships.—Illustrious 10, Saturn 2, Wellesley 36, Wellington 24, Cambridge 48, Imaum 10, Minotaur 2.

In Ordinary.—Effective Ships.—Bombay 84, Clarence 84, Monarch 84, Powerful 84, Thunderer 84, Collingwood 80, Vanguard 80, Superb 80. Non-effective.—Albion 90, Vengeance 84, Achille 78, Foudroyant 78, Hindostan 78, Carnatic 72, Egmont 72, Implacable 72.

Hulks.—Prince Regent, Canopus, Armada, Agincourt, Bellona, Bellerophon, Benbow, Chatham, Duncan, Devonshire, Invincible, Malabar, Ocean, Pitt, Fortitude, Kent, Medway, Victorious, Vigo, Sultan, Stirling Castle.

Sailing Frigates—

In Commission.—Effective Ships.—Cambrian 40, Alarm 26, Amethyst 26, Iris 26, Havannah 19. Non-effective.—Eagle 50, Fisguard 26, Actæon 8, Herald 8.

In Ordinary.—Effective Ships.—Constance 50, Indefatigable 50, Leander 50, Nankin 50, Octavia 50, Vernon 50, Active 40, Flora

40, Pique 40, Sybille 40, Amazon 26, Diamond 28, Creole 26, Niobe 28, Eurydice 26, Juno 26, Spartan 26. Non-effective.—Arethusa 50, America 50, Vindictive 50, Warspite 50, Java 50, Lancaster 50, Portland 50, President 50, Southampton 50, Winchester 50, Worcester 50, Africaine 44, Isis 44, Leda 44, Meander 44, Stag 44, Cerberus 42, Circe 42, Hamadryad 42, Latona 42, Laurel 42, Leonidas 42, Mercury 42, Minerva 42, Proserpine 42, Castor 36, Cleopatra 26, Vestal 26, Brilliant 20, Dædalus 22, Amphitrite 24, Trincomalee 24.

Hulks.—Andromeda, Argo, Akbar, Andromache, Aigle, Alfred, Belvidere, Blanche, Blonde, Bacchus, Briton, Conquestador, Conway, Cornwall, Calliope, Clyde, Chichester, Carysfort, Dryad, Diana, Dromedary, Dublin, Endymion, Egeria, Euryalus, Grampus, Gloucester, Hussar, Jupiter, Lively, Mermaid, Menelaus, Maidstone, Lavinia, Nemesis, Owen Glendower, Nymphe, Pallas, Seringapatam, Rhin, St. Laurence, Salsette, Sapphire, Samarang, Tartar, Tees, Thames, Thistle, Thalia, Tenedos, Pyramus, Undaunted, Venus, Weymouth, Unicorn, Hebe.

Sailing Corvettes.—Effective Ships—

In Commission.—Calypso 18.

In Ordinary.—Daphne 18, Dido 18.

Sailing Sloops—

In Commission.—Effective Ships.—Arachne 18, Atalanta 16, Camilla 16, Siren 16, Acorn 12, Elk 12, Heron 12, Persian 12.

In Ordinary.—Effective Ships.—Terpsichore 18, Frolic 16, Musquito 16, Jumna 16, Rover 16, Albatross 12, Arab 12, Contest 12, Daring 12, Despatch 12, Espiegle 12, Kangaroo 12, Liberty 12, Kingfisher 12, Mariner 12, Martin 12, Pilot 12, Squirrel 12. Non-effective.—Comus 14, Electra 14, Hazard 14, Hyacinth 14, Larne 14, Racehorse 14, Childers 12, Fantome 12, Grecian 12, Helena 16.

Hulks.—Favourite, Modeste, Nimrod, Wolf, Pelican, Harlequin, Columbine, Lily, Champion, Orestes, Serpent, Fly, Bittern, Cadmus.

Sailing Brigs, &c.:—

In Commission.—Effective Ships.—Cuba 3, Kingston 3, Spy 3. Non-effective.—Ferret 8, Nautilus 6, Rolla 6, Saracen 4, Sealark 8.

In Ordinary.—Non-effective Ships.—Crane 6, Express 6, Heroine 8, Hound 8, Dolphin 3, Waterwitch 6.

Hulks, &c.—Swift, Penguin, Peterel, Star, Ranger, Philomel, Britomart, Cygnet, Linnet, Pandora, Enterprise, Columbia, Swan, Badger, Pacific, Progresso, Acute, Bathurst, Beagle, Pelter, Chanticleer, Clinker, Bonetta, Dart, Dwarf, Eclipse, Emulous, Flamer, Forester, Griper, Icarus, Partridge, Raven, Safeguard, Safety, Doterel, Shamrock, Snapper, Speedy, Seaflower, Lapwing, Spider, Royalist, Bramble, Despatch, Devonport, Savage, Carron, Hope, Tyrian, Griffin.

Store and Hospital Ships.—

In Commission.—Non-effective Ships.—Princess Charlotte 12, Belleisle 6, Atholl 4, Crocodile 8, Madagascar 4, Naiad 4, Nereus 4, Tortoise 12, Melville 6, Minden 2, Inconstant 2, Alligator 2, Africa 2, Hercules 2.

In Ordinary.—Non-effective Ships.—Æolus 2, North Star 2, Resolute 2, Talbot 2, Tyne 2, Volage 2.

Sailing Yachts.—

In Commission.—Non-effective Service.—Chatham, Fanny, Plymouth, Portsmouth, Royal George, Sylph.

Sailing Tenders.—

In Commission.—Non-effective Service.—Adelaide, Ceres, Cerus, Gossamer, Gipsey, Gulnare, Hart, Hope, Indian, Mercury, Netley, Rose, Snipe, Sparrow, Sylvia, Thames, Woodlark.

Grand Totals of all classes of Ships in the Royal Navy:

	In Commission.	In Ordinary.	Building.	Converting.	Hulks.	Total.
Screw Ships ...	145	180	36	9	—	370
Paddle-wheel Ships	83	28	—	—	—	111
Sailing Ships ...	85	107	—	—	144	336
Totals	313	315	36	9	144	817

GENERAL REMARKS.—The screw line-of-battle-ships now in commission are all fitted for active service, and are to have their war complement of men. Those screw-liners that were employed as guard-ships of the steam reserves with half complements have been replaced by sailing-ships, and have been commissioned for foreign service. We now possess 39 screw line-of-battle-ships afloat, and if Sir John Pakington carries out his intention of launching four more, the Prince of Wales, Howe, Victoria, and Duncan, and converting five sailing-ships into screw-liners, the Nelson, Royal William, Waterloo, Rodney, and Lion, the British Navy, in January, 1860, will contain 48 screw line-of-battle-ships afloat, in place of 25, which was all it possessed in February, 1858. An increase of 23 screw line-of-battle-ships in two years shows the extraordinary capabilities of our naval dockyards and artisans.

The screw block-ships have been reported as unfit for active service, but they will always be found of use in the defence of our coasts. Although these ships were found very useful in the Baltic on account of their small draught of water, their place has not been supplied by any new ships possessing their merits without their defects.

The large screw-frigates are expected to be employed in the line-of-battle, as their heavy weight of metal, it is said, will compensate for the numerical superiority in guns of an enemy's line-of-battle-ship.

The screw 80-gun ships have been denounced by Sir B. Walker as being too small; but twenty years ago, when the Surveyor belonged to the Vanguard, 80, he could hardly find glowing language enough in which to express his praises of that ship. They are good vessels however, and may still be found superior to the new frigates, 1200 tons larger, with their 40 heavy guns. At close quarters a broadside of 40 32-pounders will do more damage than 20 68-pounders, and in boarding a superiority of 200 men makes a deal of difference.

In February, 1858, when Sir Charles Wood gave over the reins of office to Sir John Pakington, we had 15 screw-frigates afloat, we now possess 19; and as five screw-frigates are to be launched, the Bacchante, Immortalité, Narcissus, Ariadne, and Galatea, and our

sailing-frigates to be converted into screw-ships, the Phæton, Phœbe, Severn, and Sutlej, the Navy will contain at the end of this year 28 screw-frigates, being an increase of 13 in two years.

The screw corvettes have not realised the amount of speed anticipated; and it would be far better to build more screw frigates instead of adding to the abortion frigates, as the Racoon and Clio, which are decided failures.

The Navy is very badly off for screw mortar ships; and as the French are known to possess some vessels built especially for this service, and which are much superior to our old converted frigates, the Admiralty should immediately take steps to supply this deficiency.

The floating batteries have not yet been fairly tried; but as the French are constructing four iron-cased ships, the Admiralty have deemed it proper to order two to be built, each to carry 30 guns, although the cost is very great, and the result very doubtful as to their efficiency.

The screw sloops are useful vessels, and as in case of a war these ships will be required to convoy our merchant vessels, it is disagreeable to know that we only possess seven of these sloops in ordinary, in addition to the twelve now in commission; a number far too small to protect our commerce all over the world. Our merchant dockyards should be at once called upon to build twenty or thirty of these screw-sloops, as our naval dockyards have already enough to do in completing the larger ships.

Of screw gun-vessels and gun-boats we possess sufficient until their utility has been fully determined. Each of our principal seaports should have one of these gun-boats attached to them, in order to protect the shipping along the coast; and they could speedily be manned by volunteers in case of a war.

The number of screw troop and store ships ought to be increased, to keep pace with the French, who are building many of these vessels.

The great utility of screw hospital-ships has been strongly commented upon in the *United Service Magazine* for January; and the Admiralty would do well to take every possible precaution in order to improve the sanitary condition of our crews.

The paddle-wheel steamers are being fast superseded by screw-ships; and the only vessels of the former description that ought to be increased are the dispatch vessels, such as the Banshee and Caradoc, which steam from seventeen to eighteen knots an hour, while our screw dispatch vessels can only travel at the rate of ten knots an hour. Speed is of the highest importance when transmitting important intelligence to or from our fleets; and we ought at once to purchase five or six fast steamers, so that each of our fleets may possess two or three of these valuable auxiliaries.

Some of the non-effective paddle-wheel steamers might be fitted up as floating factories, like the Volcano, in accordance with the recommendation of the Steam Machinery Committee.

All sailing vessels ought immediately to be recalled from foreign stations, and to be replaced by efficient screw-ships; more especially

the flag-ships—Ganges 84, Indus 78, Boscawen 70, and Cumberland 70, should be superseded by screw-frigates, as the Impérieuse 51, Forte 51, Emerald 51, Shannon 51, &c.

As there seems every probability of a naval war in a short time, we ought to make every preparation, and put ourselves in the best possible state of defence while we are yet at peace. It would be a great blow to the dignity of Old England to learn that an 84-gun-ship of the line, bearing an admiral's flag, had been captured by a French paddle-wheel steamer of 6 or 8 heavy guns; and yet our theoretical gunners say that such a thing might occur if a fit opportunity offered. Let us prevent all chance of such a catastrophe, and give our sailors the best chance of fighting the enemy, by providing them with efficient ships.

The present Government have promised to form two powerful fleets, one for the Mediterranean and the other for the Channel, in order to maintain the dignity of England, to defend our coasts, and also, at the proper time, to mediate with effect between the contending nations. Each fleet should comprise at least twelve screw line-of-battle ships, six screw frigates, a few steam sloops, a steam hospital ship, a steam floating factory, and three steam dispatch vessels.

A division, consisting of about twenty-four screw gun-vessels and gun-boats, should be attached to each fleet. In order to keep the fleet in a state of efficiency, it would also be necessary to attach some steam store ships and steam colliers to the fleet to supply the ships with stores and coals. The Admiralty should endeavour to make the fleets so complete as to be ready for immediate action; so that if unhappily this country becomes inveigled into the war, our admirals may be able at once to strike a decisive blow, and by putting a quick termination to the contest enhance the naval glory of England.

CAMPAIGN OF 1848 IN LOMBARDY.

CHAPTER I.

Street-fight in Milan—Retreat of the Austrians to the Mincio.

ONE of the most interesting episodes in the military history of Europe, since the general peace of 1815, is presented by the campaigns of Radetzky in Italy, in 1848-49. To the English military student they are of peculiar interest from their resemblance to the campaigns of Wellington, and to those which must always be carried on by the Generals of that nation. Radetzky, like the great English General, had no considerable reserve at his back to recruit his army. He was at the head of a force which, if destroyed, could not be replaced. The latter carried on the war in the Peninsula with an angry opposition at home, ready to pounce with avidity upon any misfortune, supported by a tottering ministry, and obliged to depend upon the limited resources of voluntary enlistment for men,

and upon a nearly exhausted exchequer for specie. The former had to sustain the Austrian cause in Italy when the whole empire was convulsed; when his monarch was a fugitive in the Tyrol, the capital in the hands of the insurgents, great part of the army in revolt, and the finances in the most deplorable confusion. He could look for no support for long either in men or money; on the contrary, he had to hold his troops ready at any moment to abandon the Italian plains, and strike a last blow for the Imperial cause beneath the walls of Vienna. On both, therefore, the same system of war was, by necessity, imposed. Both were obliged, above all things, to be avaricious of the blood of their soldiers, to give up many brilliant opportunities of success rather than run the risk of defeat, and to compensate, by skill in strategy, for paucity of numbers and deficiency in material resources. Campaigns of this nature have an extraordinary degree of interest; they resemble the most skillful games of chess; and none will be found to exceed those of Radetzky. His Italian ones in 1848-49 will fully stand a comparison with those of Napoleon in 1796 and 1814, of Wellington in the Peninsula, and of Marlborough in Bavaria and the Low Countries. Higher commendation than this cannot be given.

By far the best account of the struggle of 1848-49 in the Lombard plains is to be found in the work of a Swiss officer, translated by Lord Ellesmere under the title of "Military Events in Italy." In authenticity, impartiality, and clearness, it leaves nothing to be desired, and from it all succeeding writers must borrow their facts as from a quarry. Its only fault is one very common in military men, a too great *generality of detail*; in other words, a want of breadth in composition. The author relates, with exactly the same minuteness, the events of a skirmish between an Austrian company and a band of the Lombard Free-corps in the Tyrol, which exercised no sort of influence on the campaign, as he does the movements which decided the fate of Italy on the fields of St. Lucia or Custozza. This, for popularity, is a fatal defect. No one can stand a dry mass of details leading to nothing; and they also take much from the clearness of the narrative to ordinary readers; that is, they require, to follow their thread, a greater amount of attention than can from such be expected. This it is, we believe, which has led to this very valuable work having attained so little popularity; and, in the following pages, we shall endeavour to place before our readers an account of these events, derived in great part from this author, in which we have endeavoured to bring out the important and decisive movements, and to avoid a too great intricacy of detail. We believe few campaigns will more reward the trouble of investigation. To the soldier they are most interesting as a study in themselves: to the statesman they are equally so from their results. They formed the first general battle-field between the democratic and conservative parties in Europe after the explosion of the great revolutionary volcano at Paris, on the 22nd February, 1848. Had Radetzky failed in the struggle, it is probable that the Austrian empire would have perished. It was by the united efforts of this General in Lombardy, of Windischgratz at Prague, and of Jellachich

in Croatia, that the crisis was surmounted. They were to Austria what Cavaignac was to France. Upon their efforts depended both the balance of power in Europe and all its subsequent destinies. Had the Red Republic triumphed in Austria, Constantinople would now have been a Russian city.

In 1848 the population of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, amounting to 5,000,000 souls, were much divided in their feelings towards the Imperial Government. The Noblesse, as was natural, regarded it with detestation. Deprived of all chance of employment in the higher branches of government, without any prospect of acquiring either political or social distinction, it was a necessary consequence of their situation in a subject province, that they should be discontented. But their influence in general was not great; frivolous and dissipated in their habits, spending their days in the casso, and their nights at the opera and the gaming table, they were little fitted, either by their energy to organize, or their courage to direct, any great popular movement. Residing almost entirely in the great towns, they had no hold on the affections, no influence over the actions of the country population. The days were far changed since the Italian nobles were the chief power in the state. The greater amount of intellectual activity, knowledge, and energy, resided in the burgher class, and they, from the number of manufacturing and commercial cities, were a numerous and important body. They, and the whole manufacturing population, were united in one common bond of cordial detestation of the Austrian rule. Their prevailing object of desire was political power, and that was a thing which, so long as the Austrian eagle spread its wings over the land, they never could obtain. In consequence, they were generally united in, or at least subject to, the Carbonari or secret societies. The chief manufacture of Lombardy is that of silk, but the linen and woollen trade is also extensive, and in Milan the manufacture of iron is very great. The various trades furnished a body of artisans desirous of political power, impatient of the restraint of a military government, of considerable intelligence and great profligacy, and who, from the absence of realised capital, were ready at any moment to revolt. They had everything to gain and nothing to lose by revolution, for they had acquired the desires of civilization and were unfettered by the restraints of property. In the rural population, however, the feeling was very different. They were generally well affected to the Austrian rule. Scattered in small villages, or detached houses, over the country, chained down by necessity to the cultivation of their small plots of land, their ideas seldom extended beyond these narrow limits. They had no wish to acquire power in, all they demanded was good government from, the state; and that they had for the first time experienced beneath the Imperial sway. The executive was strong, consequently property was secure and all crimes against it severely punished; justice was promptly administered and with the strictest impartiality; taxation was light and equitably imposed. In a word, while totally destitute of political power, all their material interests were sedulously attended to; and that was exactly what they wanted. They lived beneath a strong

and a just government, and they had no wish to change it for the rule of an Urban democracy.

Count Joseph Radetzky was born in 1766. He was consequently in his 83rd year when the outbreak at Milan took place. His family is an ancient one of Bohemia. He entered the Austrian service in a cuirassier regiment, in which he served for fourteen years, and gained the rank of captain. During this period he was engaged in the campaigns both against the Turks and the French in the low countries. In 1797 he was appointed major, and in 1799 promoted to lieutenant-colonel, and subsequently colonel, on the staff. He served during the latter year both under Suwarroff and Melas in Italy. In 1805 he commanded, as major-general, a cavalry brigade in that country. In 1809 he was made lieutenant-general, and witnessed the terrible battles of Aspern and Wagnom. During the memorable campaigns of 1813-14, and 15, he was chief of the staff to Prince Schwarzenberg. In 1829 he was appointed general of cavalry; in 1832, commander-in-chief in Italy, which post he has held ever since; and in 1836 he received the baton of a field-marshal. It was thus his fortune to acquire the art of war from the greatest generals of modern times, under Suwarroff and the Archduke Charles, and opposed to Napoleon. How well he profited by the lessons of these great masters the campaigns of 1847-48, the fatal days of Custozza and Novarra can testify. In his 83rd year he retained all the vigour and fire of youth. Though his hair was white with age, the activity of his mind remained unquenched. He was frequently on horseback for eighteen hours at a time, and the youngest members of his staff could hardly sustain the fatigue that their aged commander went through. Of a powerfully knit frame, below the middle height, a bold horseman, frank and courteous in his manners, steady in exacting discipline, yet considerate to all beneath his command, he was the idol of his soldiers, who not only confided in him as a general, but looked up to him as a father. In reverses he was not discouraged; by victory he was not elated. Exposing his own person freely in the front rank of the skirmishers, he was always the first to enjoin mercy to the vanquished. The victorious leader of a civil strife, he yet never stained his sword with the blood of the defenceless.

General Hess was his chief of the staff during both his Italian campaigns. This very able and distinguished officer enjoyed his entire confidence, and was consulted by him upon all occasions. He was endowed with extraordinary powers of organization, and a deep and thorough knowledge of the principles of strategy. He held much the same position towards Radetzky that Gueisenau did to Blucher; and it is difficult to separate the merits of each, so completely did they always act and think in unison. No jealousy ever tarnished their friendship, no thought of rivalry disturbed their co-operation. Radetzky has always seized every opportunity of proclaiming the obligations he lay under to the assistance he had received from his able assistant and confidential adviser. His appointment to the command of the Grand Austrian Army, which occupied the Principalities, and his present position as confidential military adviser

to the Emperor, at once show the high estimationin which his military abilities are held in his native country, and will test their reality when in command.

When, on the 18th March, 1848, the revolutionary flag was unfurled in Milan, about 80,000 men were grouped round the standard of Austria, in her Lombardo-Venetian provinces. This force, considerable though it was, was 70,000 less than that stated by Marshal Radetzky, as absolutely necessary to maintain these provinces against the double storm of an internal revolt and a foreign invasion, and the campaign, the leading event of which we are about to notice, has abundantly proved the truth of the remark.

This force was divided into three corps. The first corps, that of Baron d'Aspre, held Lombardy; one of its brigades watched the Piedmontese frontier and the line of the Ticino; another scattered amidst those lovely lakes which lie where the Alps break down into the Italian plains, guarded the Swiss frontier. Three brigades (10,000 men) garrisoned Milan; the remainder were scattered over the towns of Brescia, Bergamo, and Cremona to the north, and of Parma and Piacenza to the south of the Po. The second corps (that of Count Wratislaw) held the Venetian provinces. Venice, Mantua, Padua, and Verona were each garrisoned by a brigade; the remainder were divided in single battalions through the principal towns. About 25,000 men of the Austrian army were composed of Italians. This was caused by the Austrian system of recruiting, which leaves the 3rd, or Depôt Battalion of each regiment, in its native country and district. The strength of these depôt battalions again had just been raised from four to six companies, so that including their own recruits and those they were drilling for the service battalions, fully two-thirds of these corps consisted of lads who had learned enough of soldiering to be formidable in the field, but had not acquired those habits of discipline, obedience, and attachment to their colours which in a few years lead the soldiers of every land to consider the duty they owe to their sovereign as superior alike to the claims of country and the bonds of kindred. They were in the most dangerous of all states when they had acquired the drill of soldiers, without having lost the feelings of civilians.

Milan, when the revolutionary tempest first broke out, contained 168,000 inhabitants, and though there are within the ample circuit of its boundary walls several open spaces nearly unoccupied, yet in its western quarter the population is extremely dense, the streets narrow and winding, the houses tall and massive. In those parts it was singularly well adapted for street fighting. The garrison was principally quartered in and around a square range of barracks, situated to the westward of the town, called the Castle, and slightly fortified.

In this city, as well as in all the great towns of Lombardy, the revolutionary party had for some time been in a state of violent excitement, and were kept down only by the threat of martial law. The officers and soldiers of the garrison were constantly insulted and ill-treated by the people. All things were in that critical state when a single spark will cause the mine to explode. When the revolution broke out in Paris, contrary to general expectation, no

movement followed in Milan, but an ominous silence was preserved, resembling the lull before the bursting of the storm. At last on the 18th March, the news arrived of the revolution in Vienna, and the Emperor Ferdinand's having granted a democratic constitution to the state. Immediately the flame so long smothered broke out, the whole population, headed by the town council, flocked to the residence of the civil governor, Count O'Donnell, an armed party joining in the throng, seized the government office, and put to the sword the guard; the tricolour flag was hoisted on the Broletto, or Town House, and the sullen sound of an alarm gun fired from the walls of the castle announced that the revolution had commenced and the fight begun.

The troops issuing from the castle directed their attacks upon three points. One column moved upon the Imperial Palace, in the Duomo-place; one upon the government buildings, in the Monforte-street; and one upon the Broletto, or Town House. The two first columns succeeded in storming the barricades which lay in their way, and gaining the forts assigned them; but the approaches to the Broletto, the head-quarters of the insurrection, were defended with a desperate courage. The tocsin sounded from every steeple, barricades were erected in every street, as the men advanced through the narrow winding lanes every kind of missile descended upon their heads from the roofs and windows of the lofty houses—furniture, stones, and boiling water, mingled with the more deadly weapons of modern war,—all communication between the different columns was cut, and after six hours' hard fighting, the tricolour standard still waved on the Broletto. Radetzky, however, ordered this point to be carried at any price, and the attack was again renewed. The infantry, abandoning the close column formation, advanced in files close under the houses, directing their fire upon the windows opposite to them. The barricades in general were less defended by a garrison placed upon them, than by the deadly flanking fire which issued from the buildings on each side, and frequently the soldiers were allowed to march past without a shot being fired, when a withering volley from behind would level whole sections. After four hours of this desperate strife the heads of the columns began to extricate themselves from the lanes and to issue forth upon the place of the Broletto. The pioneers, marching to the front, traversed the open space, and strove to hew down the great gate with their axes, but the attempt was vain, and they were falling fast, when a field-piece was run close up and blew it in; the building was then carried with one rush, and 250 prisoners made, many of them of the best families in Milan.

So ended the first day's strife; the troops, though with a heavy loss, had gained the three points upon which they were directed, but all communication between their different attacks was cut. Their position thus consisted of three isolated points, or heads of columns, thrown far into the centre of the insurgent city, which were united by no communication between each other, and could only communicate with their reserves in the castle by long and narrow streets which were at all moments open to flank attacks.

The night was one of rain and darkness; the troops occupied the posts they had won, but not a man dared show himself out of cover. By the insurgents it was passed in ceaseless activity; round all the points held by the Austrians, fresh barricades were thrown up, the houses flanking them were loopholed, arms were collected and cartridges filled, and all the side streets leading down upon the lines of communication between the advanced posts and the castle occupied in force. When morning broke the fight began; everywhere the insurgents pressed close upon the regulars, and hemmed in their advanced posts, until not a supply of ammunition or provisions could be conveyed, or a reinforcement marched, from one point to another without a fight. The streets leading to the Broletto, the government buildings, and the palace, from the castle, were the particular objects of attack, as these occupations would isolate entirely the heads of the Austrian column, and the advantage taken of all the side streets running into them, by the Milanese, for this purpose, showed at once the greatest skill in the conception, and daring in the execution of their plan. A desperate struggle took place in the Duomo place, where the magnificent cathedral, whose glittering marble pinnacles rise clear and sharp against the blue southern sky, was held by the stout Tyrolese Jagers; but their sure aim repulsed with great loss each charge, and when the shades of evening fell over the scene of blood, the sharp crack of their rifles still rang from every gallery and window. Though the posts were nearly all maintained, still the loss and exhaustion of the troops were so great, and the difficulty of obtaining supplies such, that Radetzky determined to withdraw his men entirely from the destructive contest in the interior, and, occupying all the entrances to the town, endeavoured to reduce it by bombardment. During the night this movement was, though not without great difficulty and considerable loss, effected, and ere morning a chain of posts was established, watching all the entrances to the town. It was a dark and dreary night for the troops engaged, who sullenly withdrew amidst torrents of rain, and beneath a ceaseless fire; a parallel to its horrors may be found in the celebrated "Noche Triste" of Spanish story, when the conquerors of Mexico were driven from the capital they had won.

During the 20th the Austrians remained on the defensive, in their chain of posts surrounding the insurgent city, and the principal effort of the Milanese was directed to seize some of the gates, and open a communication with the country. Against the Porta Ticiense (the entrance from Piedmont) a prolonged and desperate attack was kept up; but although the houses afforded cover close up to the wall and gate, no impression could be made upon General Clam's brigade, who vindicated their position by a withering fire. On the western side of the town, however, the barrack of San Francisco and the engineers' quarters were both stormed.

During these three days the position of the Austrians in the Milanese had become to the last degree critical. In all the towns on their flanks and rear the insurrection had broken out; all their garrisons and posts were surrounded; most of the depôts of the Italian regiments had either joined the insurgents or could not be trusted.

The whole communications of the army were thus interrupted; convoys could not be brought up, and with difficulty could orders even be circulated. The country population were generally well affected to the Imperial government, but, scattered as they were, their aid was purely of a negative nature; whilst the active hostility of the townsmen at once gave the revolutionary party the entire command of all the central points and roads of the country. Meanwhile reports were circulated that the Government of the Swiss canton of the Tessino had declared for the insurgents, and it was well known to Radetzky that the whole army of Piedmont would shortly cross the frontier. In these circumstances the Austrian army was overmatched, and it was now evident that a concentration of their whole force on the line of the Mincio—where either a strong defensive position could be assumed, or the best possible base for a vigorous offensive secured—was the only safe course, with a view to the ultimate preservation of the Italian provinces.

Influenced by these considerations, Radetzky determined to retreat. Orders were accordingly transmitted to the brigade on the Piedmontese frontier, and to those which watched the Swiss cantons, to abandon their positions, and march on Milan. Both brigades had to force their way through the midst of an insurgent country, and both suffered considerably; a battalion was surrounded at Como, a Croat company surrendered at Varese, but on the 22nd they joined the main army beneath the walls of Milan. The whole stood to arms on the evening of that day on the parade ground of the castle, and forming into five massy columns, commenced their retreat. The castle being on the western side of the town, and the road to Lodi leading from its eastern gate, to gain the latter a flank march had to be made round its walls. This was no easy matter for enormous trains of baggage, both of civilians and soldiers, numbers of civil servants, and many waggon loads of wounded, encumbered the march, whilst the right flank, front and rear, were exposed to attacks from the Milanese, and the left flank from the country insurgents. One column moved along the rampart, two on its right through the Corso, which lies between the wall and the body of the city, and two along the road outside the walls. Swarms of skirmishers covered the entrance and protected the flanks. To prevent their occupation by the enemy all the houses bordering the line of march were set on fire by the light troops, and when the shades of evening fell around the moving mass, it was lighted on its way by the conflagration which enveloped and secured its flank. Once only an attempt was made to interrupt its progress—a free corps threw itself in the way of the vanguard at the Porta Comasina, and the sharp flash of musketry for an instant enveloped the head of the column, but shivering to pieces the fiery chain, it pursued, in darkness and in silence, the remainder of its way.

On the 23rd, the army continued its retreat. The village of Melegnano is situated where the Lodi road crosses the Zambro stream. Its inhabitants believing, from the proclamations of the Milanese, that the Austrian army was flying in confusion, barricaded their bridge and village, seized some officers sent on to order provi-

sions, and summoned the Field-Marshal to surrender. In an instant the Austrian artillery galloped to the front, and, under cover of their fire, the vanguard rushed on with the bayonet, and stormed the place, the whole houses of which were burned and plundered. This severe example opened the eyes of the people, who, henceforth, made no attempt at resistance. On the 24th they reached Lodi, and took up a position on the banks of the Adda.

Radetzky had at first hoped that he might be able to maintain the line of this river; but the accounts which came in from all quarters soon showed that this was impossible. On the day when he retreated from Milan the King of Sardinia published a proclamation in favour of Italian unity, put his army on the war establishment, and directed its instant advance on the Ticino. Its force was about 40,000 men. The Italian troops stationed in Bergamo, Cremona, Brescia, and Rovigo, having revolted, these towns were lost. The insurrection spread along the western shores of the Lake of Guarda, where the important castle of Rocca d'Anfo fell into the hands of the democrats, as well as the steamer on the lake, and disaffection broke out in the Italian Tyrol, so that the line of communication by Trent was in danger. Meantime, far in the rear, Udine, together with the fortresses of Osopo and Pulmanuovo, were delivered up by their garrisons. In the latter were 30 guns and 15,000 stand of arms. But the most severe blow which befel the Austrian cause was the loss of Venice. This most important town, impregnable from its situation, the only great Italian seaport of Austria, was garrisoned by three German and four Italian battalions, commanded by Count Zichy. When news arrived on the 20th of the insurrection of Milan, disturbances immediately broke out, which so intimidated the commandant that he consented to a convention, and surrendered the town without striking a blow for the Imperial cause. The garrison was transported to Trieste. Meanwhile the troops in Belluno, Treviso, and Parma were surrounded and forced to capitulate; while Verona was only held by abandoning Padua, the garrison of which was marched upon the former town to reinforce the garrison of the castle, who alone could not keep down the disaffected population; and even Mantua was required to be secured from internal tumults by a brigade detached from the army on the Adda. Radetzky thus found himself, with the insurrection, supported by the whole Piedmontese army, in his front; Venice and his *terra firma*, and with it his principal line of communication with Austria, in possession of the insurgents, in his rear, and all the towns on his right flank, as well as the western shore of the lake of Guarda, in arms against him, and thus his only remaining line of communication by Trent threatened.

Mantua, Pescheira, Verona, and Zegnago, with the lines of the Mincio and the Adige—the strongest military position in Italy,—however, still remained, and thither the veteran commander now directed his steps to fight the battle of his sovereign. The small fortress of Pizzighitone was abandoned, and on the 25th the army left the banks of the Adda, and, moving by Crema, Orcinovi, and Montechiaro, crossed the Mincio on the 31st, and halted on its left bank,

leaving only a strong rear-guard at Lonato, on the right bank. Head-quarters were established at Verona.

A pause of about a week now ensued, for the Piedmontese army, which was advancing through the Milanese in two columns, one by Brescia the other by Cremona, required some time to gather head on the Mincio, as from the suddenness of the declaration of war, and their desire to occupy at once the ground vacated by the Austrians, they had pushed on in a very straggling manner, with long intervals between their divisions and brigades. Besides, it was now necessary for Charles Albert to arrange something like a plan of operations for the numerous and varied force under his orders, and to organise the levies of the Milanese. That monarch had been urged into this war, not less by ambition, and a desire to extend his own territories, than by necessity, for to such a height had the revolutionary ferment reached in Piedmont, that it was evident he must to preserve his crown, either combat it by force, or put himself at its head, and turn it aside from domestic to foreign war, by leading in person the ardent democrats of his own dominions, and of all Italy, to a crusade against the Austrians, the armed representatives of the monarchical principle. He chose the latter course. The portion of his army ready for active service consisted of about 40,000, but he could not calculate upon bringing into line on the Mincio at the opening of the campaign above 25,000. Large levies however were ordered, and he would before long be able to bring up great reinforcements. The Piedmontese troops are the best in Italy. Well officered and organised, the men are steady under fire, and enduring on the march. The corps of riflemen, called Bersaglieri, were a magnificent and highly trained body of light troops.

Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Papal States have been utterly swept away by the revolutionary torrent, and placed their whole forces at his disposal. Their forces were nearly all directed to the line of the Po, and were intended partly to cross that river and support the right of the Piedmontese on the Mincio, but mainly to occupy the Venetian main land, and thus entirely surround the rear of the Radetzky's army, and oppose any attempt to send reinforcements to him from the side of Carinthia and Carniola. They amounted in all to about 19,000 men. Amongst them was 4,400 Swiss in the Pope's service, troops unsurpassed by any in Europe, but the remainder being mostly ill officered, could not be depended on to contend with the Austrians in the open field. The King of Naples, too, yielding to the democratic party, dispatched 20,000 of his troops towards the Po; but circumstances arose which prevented their taking an active part in the fight, — a matter of no importance, as, except the guards, riflemen, and Swiss, the Neapolitan troops, well dressed and capitally drilled, are wholly unable to stand fire. Attempts were also being made to organise regular regiments in the Milanese and the Venetian territory, but, with the exception of the revolted battalions, they had not yet acquired any consistency. In addition to these, the regular forces, there came, however, large bands of volunteers, organised in free corps, from all parts of Italy.

To estimate their force was not easy, but in general they proved of little use, with the exception of a few student corps composed of young men of good family. They generally were unruly in quarters, but yet melted away the moment they were exposed to fire, and did more damage to their own countrymen by their depredations than the Austrians by their arms.

The position held by Radetzky consisted of two lines, that of the Mincio and that of the Adige. The line of the Mincio, leaning its right flank on the lake of Guarda and its left on the Po, with the fort of Peschiera and the strong fortress of Mantua supporting its front, is one of great strength, but is liable to be turned by an enemy in possession of the right bank of the Po. The line of the Adige in its rear, however, in this respect is much stronger, flowing down through a deep and narrow valley, overhung by rocks and precipices as far as Montebaldo and the plateau of Rivoli; it enters the plains of Italy beneath the ramparts of Verona, and flows on in a deep and rapid channel parallel to the Mincio, as far as the fort of Zegnago, there it turns to the east, and continues its course to the Adriatic, parallel with, and at a short distance from, the Po. It thus forms an interior line of defence, supported by two fortresses, to the lines both of the Mincio and the Po, and is equally strong against an enemy coming from the west and the south. Much of its value, however, was lost to Radetzky from the fall of Venice, and the revolt of all its continental possessions. This, at one blow, placed the lower lines of the Po and the Adige, and the whole towns and fortresses in his rear, with his main line of communication, in the hands of his opponents. He was thus driven to depend for his sole communication with Germany on the road which ascends the valley of the Adige from Verona by Trent through the Tyrol, consequently should he be driven from the line of the Mincio, it was necessary for him at all hazards to maintain himself at Verona, and to hold the valley of the Adige above that place. Once driven from that (so long as the territory of Venice was unsubdued), he must abandon for ever the Italian plains, and retire into the Tyrolese mountains. His line of retreat was not perpendicular to the front of his position, but parallel to his right flank. This was his weak point, and consequently his first and greatest object was to secure his communication with the Tyrol, for on that depended entirely his being able to remain in his present position.

It was, however, at present in considerable danger; for not only had the insurrection spread through great part of the Italian Tyrol up the western side of the lake of Guarda, and through the Guarda valley, but even on the eastern side of that lake disturbances had broken out, and his convoys were harassed by attacks from armed bands in the Montebaldo, whilst the town of Trent was in all but open insurrection. The only troops in the province, consisting of weak brigades, were scattered over the western and the northern frontier, watching the passes leading to Switzerland and Swabia. Few of these could be spared, but such as could were directed on Botzen and the Franzen's fortress, to secure those important points, whilst Radetzky detached Baron Zobel with a brigade from his own

army to get possession of the all-important town of Trent, and secure his flank. That gallant officer, pushing on with the utmost rapidity, occupied the castle without resistance; and though he could only spare 800 men and three guns to garrison it, yet, by threatening to fire on the town at its feet, he forced the citizens to submit and give up their arms. Meanwhile, the whole militia of the province were called out by Imperial proclamation, and nobly and gallantly, as in days of yore, did the mountaineers respond to the appeal. From every cottage, down every valley, they poured to the appointed places of muster. Old rifles that had not seen service since the days of Hofer were brought forth. Prince Holspengir, with his red beard, now silver white, appeared at their head. The Tyrolese students at Vienna left the university to join the patriot bands in their native hills. Wherever the German tongue was spoken, loyalty to their emperor went forth, and soon sixty companies of riflemen were organised, ready and eager to resist the forces of the Italians, as they had done those of the French democracy.

(To be continued.)

IMPORTANT ADMIRALTY CIRCULAR.

THE following Circular, relative to the treatment of volunteers from the Merchant service to the Royal Navy, has just been issued by the Admiralty.

"Sir,—Her Majesty having been graciously pleased to invite the sailors of the merchant service to join her Majesty's Navy, in order that this country and its commerce may be adequately protected under the varying circumstances of a war in Europe, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that the men who loyally accept the invitation deserve a cordial reception from the profession that has sought them.

"It must be borne in mind that men, on first joining the Royal Navy, will have to renounce many old customs, and to adopt others, which will at first be irksome to them, but they will learn to appreciate the order that is indispensable for the comfort and efficiency of large bodies of men, if the change in their habits be effected by the officers with temper and judgment. If, on the contrary, an expectation prevail that these men will be able suddenly to accommodate themselves to the necessary restraints of a ship of war, and if a harsh attempt be made to compel their immediate conformity to these restraints, they will feel they have been unfairly and unwisely treated. Such a feeling would be most unfortunate.

"These considerations alone would seem sufficient to secure to such seamen a proper solicitude for their contentment; but the impression produced upon the merchant seamen upon the present occasion, must have a very important influence in times to come. If they be not now cordially received and kindly treated, the unfortunate repugnance for the Navy that has so long prevailed will be strengthened and perpetuated, to the irreparable injury of the national interests.

"The presence of these merchant seamen in her Majesty's ships should not only be a source of present strength, but by securing their regard for the service, it should be the means of spreading a similar feeling among the whole seafaring population of our islands.

"Those whose duty it may be to instruct the men should be firm, but they should also be patient and forbearing. The men should be taught the necessity for their exercises, and to take an interest in them accordingly. Steadiness at quarters and precise firing are the first steps towards efficiency, and the next is a silent and seamanlike performance of other duties, without aiming at great rapidity.

"The newly-raised men are to be at once properly clad, and informed of the regulations about clothing, and that they are responsible to the officers of their divisions for the condition of their kits. Each man is to be at once shown his mess-place and his sleeping berth, and where he is to stow his bag; and a hammock, clews, and lashing are to be given him. The usages of a lower deck, the customs and routine of the service, and the pay, pensions, and badges to which seamen are entitled, must be explained to him. He is to be told to whom he should apply in the event of his requiring advice or information, and that if he should have a complaint to make, he must represent it to the officer of the watch, and if necessary, through him to the captain of the ship.

"He should be shown how to sling and lash up his hammock, to wash and dress himself for quarters, to wash his clothes, and to scrub his hammock, so that they may be thoroughly cleaned; also how to stop them on the girt lines so they may not be lost.

"These things, and others of the same character, are to be taught without delay to men on first entry, in order that they may adapt themselves readily and with satisfaction to a ship of war.

"It must be understood, however, that the foregoing instructions give no sanction to a relaxation of that discipline which should prevail at all times, and which is essential to the efficiency of the service, and the comfort and well being of the men.

"Having pointed out the spirit in which men who for the first time join the Royal Navy are to be treated, and having called attention to some details in illustration of the manner in which they should be initiated, my Lords rely upon the officers of the fleet to turn to good account the opportunity that has been afforded for dispelling the aversion for the Navy which the merchant seamen have conceived from traditional misrepresentations of the Queen's service.

"Their Lordships desire that you will direct the commanding officers of the ships under your orders to make known the foregoing instructions to the executive commissioned officers and officers in charge of decks, and the commanding officers are to take care that all the warrant and subordinate officers conform themselves thereto.

"I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

"W. G. ROMAINE."

THE ARMSTRONG GUN.

War, like everything else, is entering on a new era. The great conflict now opening will present phases and exhibit results different from any recorded by history. It will be a struggle with rifles and artillery, and leave comparatively little to the bayonet, which we now learn, for the first time, is the special weapon of the French. The arms that are "only dangerous at a distance" may decide a battle before attacking columns can form for the charge.

They will, as at Inkermann, tell with fatal effect on advancing masses, when their gleaming bayonets will be useless, and serve but as sights to the expert sharpshooter. But, in a still greater degree, operations in the field will be influenced by artillery, which has undergone such changes as must revolutionise the whole art of war. On every side we hear of new descriptions of cannon. Each of the great military powers of the continent boasts a mysterious armament which is to do wonders in the coming struggle. Hitherto men have put their faith in *great* guns. Not only in war, but in civil life, these adjuncts have been always expected to carry the day. Like Runjeet Singh's Sikhs, we have worshipped great guns. Nor is this traditionary faith likely to be changed in England. A great gun, whether a simple Lord or a 68-pounder, here still commands respect. But a new creed has been broached on the other side of the channel. France has suddenly given her adhesion to a *little* gun. She intends to make a clean sweep of Italy with a 5-pounder. Let us live and learn. On the other hand, Austria laughs at the weak invention of her enemy, and the rumoured devices of other powers. They were all known to her, and by her tried and found wanting, a quarter of a century ago. She is as old in such notions as China is in magnetism. Trifles of this sort are not for her book, but she just intimates that she has got a rifled cannon that may be backed against all creation. In short, it is pretty well understood that the predominance which Napoleon assigned to artillery is about to be asserted in a very signal manner. We become, then, seriously interested to know whether we are in a position to take part in this great combat of guns—whether our armament is as good as our neighbours, and whether we have at last given our artillery that efficiency and power which it has so long notoriously wanted.

The first to call attention to our wretched deficiency in gunnery was Sir Howard Douglas. This great artillerist so powerfully pointed out to the Government the danger we were incurring by our negligence, that it was impossible to ignore his representations; and, at his suggestion, the *Excellent* was commissioned for gunnery practice, and encouragements held out for proficiency. Still further to advance the object, Sir Howard produced his celebrated treatise on *Naval Gunnery*, giving to the service the benefit of all his great knowledge and experience; and he is at this moment a member of a Commission designed to introduce the utmost efficiency. We believe it is under the consideration of the Commission whether we shall equip our ships with an entirely new arm—one that, indeed, is now familiar by name in every English household—ay, in every corner of Europe; and there is reason to think that England, too, has a gun, compared with which the inventions of France and Austria are but toys, and before which their armies must flee and be discomfited.

If we have hitherto forborne from giving more than a few cursory hints respecting the Armstrong gun—designed only to correct the fallacious descriptions of the *Edinburgh Review*, the *Mechanics' Magazine*, and other publications—it has not been from any fear

that our revelations would betray the secret to a foreign power, but because the time had not arrived when we were at liberty to communicate fuller particulars. From this restriction we are now relieved. Sir William Armstrong himself has intimated that, for some time to come, the foundries of the continent will be unable to fabricate his gun, even with all the information that drawings and descriptions can give. As there could assuredly be no secret in such a matter, it is a satisfaction to know that the invention can't be pirated. All the workers in brass and iron that France or Austria possess, will here—at least, for a time be baffled. It is only in our own mighty foundries, and by our own Cyclops, that these thunderbolts of Jove can be forged. They are the invention of a civilian, a man of peace—one, we believe, who never saw a field of battle. It is a strange fact that the two greatest, the two most destructive munitions of war should have had a similar origin. An English friar was the discoverer of gunpowder; an English artificer has given us the Armstrong gun. The alchemist at his crucible, and the philosophic engineer at his foundry, may have each caught the first dim suggestion from accident. Archimedes solved the problem of Hiero's crown in a bath; Newton saw in the fall of an apple the secret mechanism of the universe; the steam of a tea-kettle taught a wonderous lesson to Watt; and, in the same observant watchfulness of natural phenomena, Sir William Armstrong was arrested by the mountain stream that, in turning the wheel of a mill, unveiled to his reflecting mind the mysteries of water power, and led him to construct those hydraulic hoists and cranes, which are now seen at every commercial *entrepôt*. But what happy incident led Sir William to dream of petards?—nay, to construct them, and of such a kind as makes the wildest dreamer open his eyes, and say "can such things be?" We know not, but here we have the result, a result that was reached after indomitable perseverance and incredible exertions. To trace its gradual development we must follow a lonely man to the sea-shore, at three o'clock in the morning, for the summer round; we must accompany him, at midnight, to the steeps of a Northumbrian mountain, and watch the gradual advancement of his marvellous labours. There are many weary watches and many sad failures to be braved, and it was not till after three years of such efforts that this mighty gun was matured. But the end compensates for the toil. It ranks the successful artificer with the great masters of science—with Stephenson, Watt, and Archimedes, and it enables him to claim a price which none but himself can limit. Whatever he had asked, the country, we are told by the Minister for War, must have paid; and we may add that whatever the country had paid, it would have had a bargain. But the patriotic Northumbrian asked nothing—would receive nothing, except his own actual outlay and daily wages; and, a with generosity that exalts his genius, he has made over his invention as a free gift to the Government.

The material of the Armstrong gun is iron, forged in separate pieces, of such dimensions as render flaw impossible, and united together, or, to borrow Sir William's own phrase, "built up." And

this peculiar construction gives the gun that combination of strength and lightness which forms one of its characteristics. A large screw in the breech end of the piece closes the bore, by pressing against the stopper, and through this screw, which is hollow, the charge is introduced, and the gun sponged. The stopper, being small, and consequently liable to be lost, is secured by a chain, and its whole arrangement is very complete. In a ship or battery the gun will be mounted on a peculiar carriage, fitted with a slide, on which it will be driven back by the recoil, and again carried forward by its own gravity,—a contrivance that, as the charge is introduced at the breech, will have the effect of greatly reducing the complement of men for each gun. The range of this deadly engine is not precisely stated, but its performances in this respect may be conjectured from the fact of its having struck five times in ten a target nine-feet square, and scarcely visible from the firing point, at a distance of 3000 yards, or upwards of a mile and three-quarters; at 600 yards it will drive a shot into the muzzle of an enemy's gun. The projectiles are of cast-iron, and receive a leaden coat, which makes them larger than the bore of the gun, so that the lead may be compressed into the rifle grooves, and the projectile thus obtain the proper rotation. This, at the same time, prevents shake and windage, giving incredible precision to the fire. In the field the projectile has a triple capacity, and may be used as a solid shot, one good charge of cast-iron, or as a shell or common case. Nine feet of oak gives a clear passage to this visitor directly he knocks at the door, and he glides through unfractured as perfect as when he fell from the mould. This mass is composed of a number of pieces firmly packed together, as if they were one integral shot; and though it comes out entire, bursts into fragments when used as a shell, scattering death and destruction at 150 different points. Sir William Armstrong mentions an experiment in the presence of the Duke of Cambridge, when seven shells, fired at two targets nine-feet square, at a distance of 1500 yards, struck the targets with 596 fragments. The combination of the principle of the percussion and the shrapnel shell has been effected with such success that, to quote Sir William's words, the shell "may be made to explode either as it approaches the object or as it strikes it. Amongst friends it is so safe that it may be thrown off the top of a house without exploding, but amongst enemies it is so sensitive and mischievous that it bursts with a touch." The difference lies in its being thrown with the hand, or set in motion by casualty, and its being launched from the gun. Once passed through those fearful grooves, it goes on its message of death with unerring precision. The percussion arrangement receives its full cock by the act of discharge, and, at the will of the gunner, operating on a time-fuse, the shell may be made to burst at a distance, or directly it quits the gun, in either case breaking into a shower of grape. These are the field projectiles; and those used for battering a ship, blowing up buildings, or breaching a wall, are, as regards their destructive effects, like unto them, though somewhat different in structure. The most prominent characteristic of these shells are the provision they make for a large charge of powder, being for a 32-pounder nearly

double that afforded by the shell of the ordinary 32-pounder, and, consequently, rendering the projectile so much the more effective; at the same time, the hole it makes in penetrating a ship is so small, that the explosion, which occurs at the moment of lodgement, is extremely confined, and hence the result more terribly destructive. In the case of the larger guns now preparing, it may be expected to exceed anything hitherto accomplished.

Such are some of the attributes of the new ordnance. Is it destined to prove a scourge of the human race, or its common protector? —an incitement to aggression, or a pledge of peace? In whatever way it may be first employed, it can only eventually operate in the last light; for, by its decisive action, it renders war too destructive to be pursued; and we may recognise the providence of the Almighty Disposer in the bestowal of this engine on a nation which, above all others, is interested in universal peace, and most desirous to maintain it.

S. W. F.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

Now nearly one year has elapsed since first a Commission was appointed to inquire into the best means for reorganizing the Indian army, and the result of their labours is before us, in a somewhat bulky volume, extending over five hundred pages of closely printed paper. The labour taken by the officers composing the committee has certainly been great, and each fact or suggestion as brought to their notice by the cloud of witnesses examined, thoroughly tested and considered; but the decision arrived at, if the opinion given can be considered in the light of a decision, is most unsatisfactory, and scarcely worth putting the country and individuals to so much expense and delay in its attainment. For nearly twelve long months have the result of the Commission's deliberation been looked forward to by every one connected with India, and by none so anxiously as the officers of the Honourable East India Company's service, and now this is all they will receive. This meagre report, with its unsatisfactory conclusions, to be the return for so much anxious expectation. To the officers of the Bengal Native Army, scattered as they now are all over India, doing duty in one part perhaps with regiments not requiring their services; in another, drilling Seikh recruits, or broiling under canvass in Oudh, raising police battalions from the same men that were not improbably under their command two years before, this report will be a bitter disappointment. To such as these officers, without regiments, without homes or certain employ, we repeat that the report will be a bitter disappointment. The long delay since the transfer of India and its services to the

crown, had prepared all connected with that land to hear something final. The anxious wish of all was for some definite arrangement to be made, and thus all could know how they stood. Had such been the case, many an officer now in India too high in rank to do duty with an European corps, and not perhaps considered fit by the Government for command, might have thought about retiring instead of dragging on a life of uselessness to those employing him, and unsatisfactory to himself. To those now in England on sick leave who have purchased steps, and either through sickness or other inability cannot return to India, further delay is a serious matter. The value of their steps might be represented as nil, and the retiring pensions are so small that none would accept them unless the addition of a bonus from the regiment made it possible for an officer to exist on the same.

The following twelve questions appear to have been especially called to the notice of the Commission, and their opinion is given at some length in the report. The recommendations are nine in number, and the whole report is signed by the ten gentlemen composing the Commission, Colonel Burlton adding a note that he only signs the report as a matter of duty, but generally concurs in its recommendations.

1. The terms on which the army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown.

2. The permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian provinces respectively, after the restoration of tranquillity.

3. The proportion which European should bear to native troops in infantry, cavalry, and artillery respectively.

4. How far the European portion of the army should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service, and how far troops raised for service in India only.

5. The best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter.

6. Whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company.

7. Whether there should be any admixture of European and native forces, either regimentally or by brigade.

8. Whether the local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain.

9. Whether it would be possible to raise any regiments in the colonies, either for temporary or permanent service in India.

10. Whether the native forces should be regular, or irregular, or both; and if so, in what proportion.

11. Whether any native artillery corps should be sanctioned.

12. Whether cadets sent out for service with native troops should, in the first instance, be attached to European regiments to secure uniformity of drill and discipline.

The observations of the Commission are far too lengthy to be quoted in this paper, but its recommendation runs thus :—

1. That the native army should be composed of different nationalities and castes, and as a general rule mixed promiscuously through each regiment.

2. That all men of the regular native army in your Majesty's eastern possessions should be enlisted for general service.

3. That a modification should be made in the uniform of the native troops, assimilating it more to the dress of the country, and making it more suitable to the climate.

4. That Europeans should, as far as possible, be employed in the scientific branches of the service; but that corps of pioneers be formed for the purpose of relieving the European sappers from those duties which entail exposure to the climate.

5. That the articles of war which govern the native army be revised, and that the power of commanding officers be increased.

6. That the promotion of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers be regulated on the principle of efficiency, rather than seniority; and that commanding officers of regiments have the same power to promote non-commissioned officers as is vested in officers commanding regiments of the line.

7. That whereas the pay and allowances of officers and men are now issued under the various heads; the attention of her Majesty's government be drawn to the expediency of simplifying the pay codes, and of adopting, if practicable, fixed scales of allowances for the troops in garrison, or cantonments, and in the field.

8. That the commander-in-chief in Bengal be styled the commander-in-chief in India; and that the general officers commanding the armies of the minor presidencies be commanders of the forces, with the power and advantages which they have hitherto enjoyed.

9. Your Commissioners observe, that the efficiency of the Indian army has hitherto been injuriously affected by the small number of officers usually doing duty with the regiments to which they belong. This evil has arisen from the number withdrawn for staff and other duties, and civil employment. All the evidence before your Commissioners points out the necessity of improving the position of officers serving regimentally. For the attainment of this object, and for the remedy of the evil complained of, various schemes have been suggested, viz :—

1. The formation of a staff corps.

2. The system of seconding officers who are on detached employ, which exists to a certain extent in the line army.

3. Placing the European officers of each Presidency on general lists for promotion.

The Commissioners not being able to come to any conclusion on this point, leave its solution to the authorities in India, and conclude their report with observing that details must ultimately be decided by these same authorities.

Colonel Burlton is at issue with his colleagues on two points, as to the proportion which European should bear to native troops, and

looks with much apprehension to the number of the latter, which is contemplated by the terms of the fifth paragraph of the report.

"Your Majesty's Commissioners are of opinion that the amount of native force should not, under present circumstances, bear a greater proportion to the European, in cavalry and infantry, than two to one for Bengal, and three to one for Madras and Bombay respectively."

He is also of opinion that the proposed measure of requiring all men of the regular Native Army, without exception, to be enlisted for "general service" (including embarkation on board ship), is one not only of very doubtful expediency, but, in the case of the Bengal Presidency, especially calculated to produce serious detriment and difficulties, with comparatively small advantages to the public service.

These objections Colonel Burlton supports by observation in his minute, No. 79, page 245, in the appendix.

To attempt to analyze the evidence given by even the principal witnesses before the Commission would occupy more time than can now be afforded, nor could we in the short space allowed even refer to one quarter that is told. The report of the Commissioners is before us, and it is on that which we must comment.

The reply to the first question is satisfactory to those likely to suffer by an adverse decision, for to offer them any other terms than those made with their former masters would be unfair. Promotion by seniority is rightly recommended not to be disturbed.

The second question is not so easily answered, for, as the Commissioners observe, the amount and distribution of the force must always be affected by political exigencies. 80,000 men appear to be the number considered necessary—distributed in Bengal, 50,000; Madras, 15,000; and Bombay, 15,000. These certainly would be enough to crush any attempt at rebellion, and were all the people disarmed would be more than sufficient; but according to the size of the native army, so must be the European, for India will ever have more to fear from mutiny than rebellion. Let the native army be regulars or irregulars, well disciplined, or mere police, they will not for ever be contented to act as auxiliaries to the white soldier, and when strong enough, either by numbers or discipline, would do as they have done before—mutiny and murder.

The third question is so mixed up with its predecessor that the same reply holds good, but the Commissioners rightly determine that the artillery should be mainly an European force. We say entirely. Natives only being employed in it as labourers. In such places as are detrimental to European constitutions, it would be better to have no artillery stationed, than to keep trained native artillerists for their defence.

In connection with this question, the Commission recommend that great caution be used in not giving the military police corps, now raising, "a stricter military training than may be required for the maintenance of discipline," as in it are the elements of future danger. How is the amount of discipline to be regulated? Are the police corps to be commanded by officers either from the line or

local corps, and carelessly taught to be left to degenerate into the old Burkundaz? Are officers who have studied their profession and have been selected for the staff, to unlearn the art of war; and, when put in command of a police corps, to remain satisfied with seeing their men awkward, ignorant, and useless? Certainly a police corps, drilled and commanded under the system recommended by this Commission, would be an ornament to the service and a credit to the officers attached.

The fourth question is entered into at great length, and is the one on which the Commission disagree. As far as we can discover, the majority are for having no local corps, but for making all European regiments in India become part of the line. The minority think just the contrary, and have, in our opinion, the best of the argument and certainly, as regards support in their judgment, the names of Lord Ellenborough, Sir Partrick Grant, Sir John Lawrence, Sir James Outram, Generals Vivian, Abbott, Birch, Tucker, &c., &c., are a host in themselves.

The majority have their views also well supported, as the names of Lord Elphinstone, Sir Edward Lugard, Sir George Clerk, Sir Charles Trevelyan, Sir Sydney Cotton, Generals Franks and Tulloch, will shew; but on carefully reading over the evidence given by these last mentioned gentlemen, comparing their knowledge of India, and its acquirements, and the position they held, either in the army or civil service in India, any unprejudiced person must allow that their opinion is not so trustworthy as that of the minority.

As the minority observe, it will scarcely fail to be remarked, that, "with two or three exceptions, they are of much more limited Indian experience than those who concur in the views of the minority of the Commission, and comprise only three officers—Sir George Clerk, Sir A. Wilson, and Sir Charles Trevelyan, of the late East India Company's service. The remainder, with the single exception of the Governor of Bombay, being all officers of her Majesty's army of the line."

The minority conclude their argument by recommending that a portion of the European force to be maintained in India should be supplied by the army of the line, to the extent of one fourth, or even a third of the whole.

The arguments used by the majority will, in some instances, scarcely bear close inspection. For instance, "that the resources of the state, as regards Imperial purposes, would be crippled by having a large portion of its troops placed solely under the control of the government of India." Surely England, except in the very last gasp, would not wish to bring destruction on her Indian Empire by withdrawing more troops than the authorities in India could dispense with. Moreover, the government in India will always be subordinate to that at home.

That local forces deteriorate we allow, when left without any infusion of fresh European notions or feelings; but this can hardly be the case with regiments receiving continually from England a fresh supply both of officers and men. The European regiments of the late East India Company may not have come up in point of dis-

cipline to the ideas of certain martinets, whose evidence is recorded, but that they were not one whit inferior to their brethren of the line on the battle field has been often proved. There is no necessity for drawing comparisons between the services,—all did their duty. The bloody fields of Ferozeshah and Sobraon saw the Company's European regiment vie with her Majesty's forces in discipline and valour. Chillianwallah again, and latterly Delhi—Benares, and Allahabad were relieved by a Company's European regiment—the Madras fusiliers, and the steady discipline and good behaviour of the Bombay fusiliers at Mooltan and Lahore, need no panegyric at our pen.

None of these regiments have deteriorated as local corps, or, to the best of our belief, has the recruiting for them been detrimental to the interests of her Majesty's line. They would deteriorate fast enough if continued as local, and only have the complement of men kept up by volunteers from her Majesty's regiments serving in India. A twelve years' residence in a tropical climate is not likely to improve any European regiment, and the volunteers from that, on its recall home, would neither possess health nor stamina to be acceptable soldiers. Neither would their presence infuse fresh European notions and feelings. If local corps are to be continued—and such appears to be advised by many fully competent to give an opinion—let them be independent of the line, and recruit as they have hitherto done.

The majority appear almost to forget the recorded opinion, that it would not be advisable to disturb the system of promotion by seniority as affecting officers now in the service, or to interfere with any of their existing privileges. They quote the opinion of Major-General Sir F. Franks (her Majesty's 10th Foot), and of fifteen years' experience in India. In turning to that officer's evidence (page 160), we discover that he not only strongly advocates the whole of the army, whether European or native, lately belonging to the East India Company, being transferred to her Majesty's line, but treats the matter of breaking faith with the officers composing that force as nothing, if absolutely necessary. To interfere with the previous arrangements he owns would be considered an injustice; but he "is strongly of opinion that the interests of the State should always be considered paramount to the interests of any body of individuals."

To the question put by Colonel Burlton, 4293—"Can it be good for the State to break faith?" he replies, "I consider that I have already given an opinion on that subject." This opinion we cannot discover, except it be in his answer to question 4291, in which the gallant officer says—"I should be very averse to recommend any thing of the kind."

The majority recommend that regulations should be drawn up for retaining in India officers of the line army whose services might be required by the local government, and that officers of the line would, undoubtedly, qualify themselves for employment in India, if such employment, and all the advantages attending it, were open to them.

The appointments of all sorts are open to the officers of her Majesty's line army, as a reference to the *Army List* will prove. Many of the new Seikh police corps are commanded by officers of the line, and the department of Public Works shows them to be there also. In civil employ they are to be found, and in the irregular cavalry. These appointments were formerly given almost entirely to Company's officers, after they had passed either the interpreters or second examination in the native languages. This rule has been broken through with regard to the employ of the line officers, and few of these now holding appointments are passed. Their services can be retained by the government on their regiments being relieved, by the individual benefitting in a staff appointment, applying for an exchange into a regiment in India.

It would hardly be fair that the man forced to stay at least twenty years in India, expatriated, and with no prospect of getting on elsewhere, should have no advantage in that country. The officer in the line can, in the event of sickness, throw up his staff appointment and go home on leave, recruit his health, and have the time spent on leave count as service, or he can exchange into the colonies, in most of which he can live on his pay; whereas the officer of the local corps is equally liable to fall sick, but has to make up in India every day spent on leave in England. The Governor-General's resources are not curtailed, and by the present regulations he can select able and useful officers from the whole army in India. If the army is to be local, and every advantage now possessed by local officers shared by those of the line, it would be but fair that these mutual arrangements extended elsewhere, and a few of the colonial and home appointments, now enjoyed exclusively by her Majesty's line, be shared by the officers attached to local regiments in India. It would give the home authorities a "*much larger field for selection*," &c., &c.

The fifth question is well answered, for most certainly regiments should not remain longer in India than twelve years. The recommendation of keeping at home depôt battalions of one company from each of the local corps, would be rather an expensive arrangement, but would be advantageous towards efficiency, both of officers and men. Officers on sick leave might do duty with these depôts; the command not to be given to only that portion of the local army called European.

As to the establishment of a convalescent depôt at the Cape of Good Hope, it would be of doubtful benefit. To a really sick man England appears to be the only country in which complete restoration to health is obtained. The distance to the Cape is great, and probably a long land journey, with afterwards a sea voyage, would entail great expense to the State. Moreover, the convalescents would not be within calling distance if any sudden demand for their services should arise. The sites for barracks in the hills of India have not, certainly as regards the Bengal presidency, been hitherto well selected; but that in those vast mountain ranges there are spots sufficiently elevated to give a bracing climate, and sufficiently level to afford space for exercising grounds, no one acquainted with

the mountains will deny. Let railroads, tramways, and good trunk roads be made to the Hymalayah; let the ground round the barracks be sufficiently level to allow of the men taking plenty of out-door exercise, and convalescent depôts can be established, and effect as much good in the mountains of India as at the Cape of Good Hope.

With reference to the sixth question, the obstacles to an exchange between the European forces appear to us almost insurmountable. Even with the junior officers, second-lieutenants, cornets, and ensigns, it would be a difficult matter, as the cadet has his commission a free gift, and in the line it is to be purchased; but, putting this aside, the funds would be a stumbling block. As the Commissioners observe, it could only be done by the government taking upon itself the management of the funds, and guaranteeing all their liabilities, past, present, and future. Perhaps this being done might be the saving of the Bengal fund, but it would be a serious loss to the government. Faith must be kept with widows and orphans; they can hardly be expected to yield up their interests to the supposed necessities of the State.

On the seventh question the Commission consider the admixture of European and native forces regimentally as detrimental to both, and so we think also. That they should always be brigaded together required no great amount of acumen to discover. The experience of the past two years proved the utter folly of leaving whole districts without an European force to protect it. Had Europeans been brigaded with the native regiments at Delhi, the Meerut mutineers would never have entered the city. Had the worst district in India, Rohilcund had two European regiments stationed in it, there never would have occurred rebellion and murder to such an extent. When the Sepoy army revolted, anarchy reigned supreme.

The eighth question is replied to in a recommendation, that if the force in India is to be local, the strength is to be kept up by recruiting in England—as is done now—and partially by volunteers from regiments of the line returning to England. The last plan is, as we pointed out elsewhere, not good in theory or practice. Men after twelve years service in India are not, generally speaking, improved either in health or ideas. The discipline of a purely local, and of a regiment of the line, must vary, and the soldier received from one would be unsuited to the other. His friends and affections would be with the corps he had left, and regrets would eventually arise for the steps he had taken. Convalescent depôts and hospitals might be full, but local regiments would be weak, ill-disciplined, and looked upon as a resort for all the lazy and worthless.

As to the ninth question the Commissioners do not consider it advisable to raise regiments composed of men of colour for either temporary or permanent service. Perhaps it might be as well not to do so; still it would teach the natives of India that we have more black troops than themselves, and a regiment or two of true African negroes would be as powerful to check insurrection as an European corps, and besides costing much less, would stand the climate better. None other than the true African negro would instil fear. A regi-

ment of Seikhs would despise such corps as the Ceylon rifles, and take a pleasure in drubbing them.

On the tenth point, the Commissioners consider that the native infantry should be mainly regular, and the cavalry irregular. As regular native infantry is still in existence in Bombay and Madras, with one or two regiments in Bengal, it is, we suppose, necessary to keep up the same; but native regulars are, at the best, only an absurd imitation of their European brethren. They, perhaps, on a brigade field-day manœuvre a little better than irregulars, but are no better in absolute warfare. The system of having so many masters, and so many European officers to receive orders from, does not make the native a better soldier. It would be impossible to have a regular native army maintained and organised on the irregular system. In irregulars the commanding officer is all-powerful; there are no officers commanding companies to require their authority upheld, and yet the system pursued in irregular regiments is recommended for adoption. Let the cavalry most certainly be irregular, and let the allowance paid to troopers be such as will enable them to keep good horses and arms. Do away with the Honourable East India Company's plaything—the regular cavalry. Let India see no more of the blue uniform with silver lace, sitting uncomfortably on over-fed horses, and costing nearly as much as British dragoons.

The eleventh question has been replied to in the third; but the Commissioners recommend that every consideration should be shown to such native artillery as have proved loyal.

In the twelfth, the Commissioners recommend that cadets sent out for service with native troops should be attached to European regiments in the first instance, and thoroughly drilled and instructed in military duties in this country. If cadets are to be posted to regiments of regular native infantry, drilled and managed on the irregular system, we fear that they will find all the thorough drilling and instruction received in this country quite thrown away. If it is intended to keep a regular native army at all, it would be well that the system pursued towards it was nearly similar to that practised with the European force. Let young officers first learn their drill in the line or depôts; but if it is intended they should hereafter join the regular native army do not require that all they have learnt is to be unlearnt. It is for the good of the service that officers intended for native infantry should join such regiments at an early period of life. By remaining for a length of time with an European corps they become prejudiced against native regular regiments, and they find a difficulty in assimilating themselves to the ways of the "black fellows." A knowledge of the peculiarities and habits of the natives is as necessary in the good native infantry officer as is a knowledge of their language, and neither of these things can be obtained by continuing to do duty with an European regiment.

Let all native regiments be irregular, and the command, or doing duty with them, be staff appointments. This would be fairer to all the local officers. If exchanges are allowed between the line and local Europeans, it is hard that the same advantage should not be given to the officer serving in the native infantry. No man, after

what has occurred, would like to find his regiment only feared by the government, and brigaded with Europeans as much to teach it fear as drill. No man, having *esprit de corps* would like to find a veto put upon his making his regiment perfect for fear of their using their knowledge against the government. Native regular infantry never can even approach to regular European infantry, and the officers attached to the first-named corps will always be subject to taunting remarks, unfair comparisons, and feel every effort at making their regiments efficient and soldierly as a not improbable source of future danger to the government they serve.

The Commissioners having thus disposed of the questions referred for their inquiry, submit the nine recommendations on what they term "important points which, in the course of examination, have come under their notice." We, having mentioned them before, will not reinflict their perusal on our readers.

These, with some remarks regarding improving the position of officers serving regimentally, either by forming a staff corps, seconding, or placing on general lists for promotion, are the recommendations of the Commission! Ten gentlemen of acknowledged ability have been entrusted with devising some plan for the re-organization of the Indian army, and after deliberating for nearly twelve months, examining forty-seven witnesses, and asking seven or eight thousand questions, have only been able to recommend the adoption of the above mentioned nine points. The evidence given was certainly most conflicting, and to extract an opinion from such, was doubtless a difficult matter; still, something more necessary for the re-organization of the Indian army might have been recommended than we find here. Surely it hardly required so much deliberation to decide that the native army should be composed of mixed races; that they should be enlisted for general service, and their dress better adapted for the climate of India. That the scientific branches of the service should be European. Promotion of non-commissioned officers left to the commanding officer; and the pay code simplified. Or that the head of the army in Bengal should be termed Commander-in-Chief in India, and lastly, native regiments not be denuded of officers.

Even the little difficulty of improving the position of regimental officers cannot be settled. The Commissioners own they are not prepared to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion on this point, and that further reference be made to the authorities in the several presidencies in India. Hence more delay.

From the constitution of the Commission, anything very definite in the way of a recommendation was hardly to be expected. Each member appears to have a plan of his own, and at the end of hearing all the evidence adduced, sees no reason for supposing his particular view of the case wrong.

It might have been as well had the evidence of a few captains and subalterns been asked. There are some eighteen hundred of these attached to the Bengal army alone, and nearly as many to the two other presidencies. Out of this number *two* or *three* might have been found capable of throwing a little light on the inquiry.

In carefully looking over the evidence adduced before the Commission, and again reading their remarks and recommendations, we see no good that can result from a continuation of the inquiry. Something must be done, and done quickly, and the sooner the government fix on some plan for the reorganization of their Indian army, the better for all concerned.

The officers of the Bengal presidency have been so long hoping and expecting, that they would consider any change better than continuing as they now are. To the sick and worn out, it is cruel; and to all, further delay and reference is objectionable. Let the government make what they can of the conflicting evidence given before the Commission, and act decisively. Many of the recommendations of the Commission will not bear twice looking at, and probably, the best reorganization of the Indian army will be that which is least deliberated over.

Let the government bear in mind that so long as they preserve the system of caste in the army, so long will they give Jack Sepoy a peg to hang his discontent upon. With high caste men, crossing seas and certain rivers is pollution. In caste there is a freemasonry dangerous to the state. A priest-ridden soldier is not worth the price of the powder that it would take to shoot him.

Insist on the whole of India being disarmed, and then there can be no danger of rebellion. The only use then, of a large European force would be to oppose invasion and to overawe the native army. According to the size and knowledge of this latter force, must be the former. For, however much at peace the country may be, it would be dangerous at any time to reduce the European army. The Seikhs have learnt their power. The Kabulee remembers 1841, and the Oudh and Bodjpoor Sepoy, 1857. A generation passing away will not wipe out the remembrance of these, our disasters, and a large native regular army, well equipped and drilled, will, at the first favourable opportunity, repeat the scenes of two years back.

The native army proposed for the three presidencies appears enormous, far more than there is occasion for. Indeed, from reading the report, one would imagine that a large native army was more a source of safety than danger. Reduce it one half and have it entirely irregular. Let its duties be confined almost exclusively to aiding the police, escorting treasure and prisoners, and give them plenty of work. There would be little for a regular native army to perform; the mere machine work of escort and parade, allows too much time for brooding over the past. Natives in the regular army, taught an irregular system, would not be long in discovering that they are doubted, that the large European army is to keep them in check, not to repel invasion or quell rebellion in the people, and from want of employment, would first brood over their new position, and perhaps again try mutiny and murder.

Before the mutinies, the European force in India was certainly too small; but India is even now, with Oudh disarmed, and the Bengal army smashed, more firmly secured to the British crown than at any former period. If so, the larger force of 80,000 Europeans is

uncalled for, and its proportionate native army more than is safe or necessary. 190,000 soldiers, exclusive of police, might indeed, to use the words of Colonel Burlton, be looked upon "with much apprehension."

With good communication, such as railroads, tramways, and high roads, troops could be easily moved from any part of India to the other; and this without much detriment to health. Let these be made, and there will be no necessity for keeping up a sufficiently large European force to watch regular or irregular native regiments in the out stations, and having barracks built all over the country.

In conclusion, we entreat there may be no further unnecessary delay; no longer let us hear of every difficult question being passed between England and India for solution. The Commission appear to dislike responsibility, and, therefore, trouble them no more with temptation. No good can arise from further prolonging the inquiry, or in listening to the opinion of men who appear wedded to the system pursued in the service they have been placed in. According as the witness comes from the presidency of Madras or Bombay, so does he recommend the plan pursued in his presidency being adopted in Bengal. Bengal, having acquired wisdom by misfortune, advocates the old system modified. Officers of her Majesty's line advise an extension of the line and its discipline to the whole Indian army. India is now fast settling down. The rebellion is all but crushed, and both officers and men of the late Company's army are prepared to welcome any change. Let the Government cease from seeking an opinion from men who appear to be incapable of expressing themselves explicitly on what must have been uppermost in their minds for the past two years; act firmly, honestly, and quickly, and bear in mind that a large native regular or irregular army requires a proportionately large force of European soldiers to overawe it, and that the finances of India are not flourishing.

The expense of living in India is nearly double what it used to be; the keep of the English soldier is certainly more costly, and the finances of the country are by no means elastic. Already has the burden of paying for a war caused by the mutiny of a native army fallen on the consumers of European articles, and reason and justice forbid that our countrymen should be taxed, and penury added to expatriation, simply to find the means of supporting a sure source of future sorrow.

ROMANCE OF THE RANKS.

THE nation is making inquiries about the Ranks. A good deal of information has been lately furnished on the subject, but it is buried in blue-books, overlaid with verbiage, and smothered in twaddle. The public have a horror of blue-books; and for our part, we never see one without reading on the cover the familiar notification, "Rubbish may be shot here." Still, from the recent inquisitions into

military affairs, some facts respecting the Ranks have crept out. Are they such as inspire confidence and create satisfaction? Do they indicate that our soldiers are all we could wish? Alas! we might use the despairing exclamation of Eli—"Nay, my, sons, for it is no good report I hear." When official returns announce that the mortality in the army may be compared with the ravages of a standing pestilence—that the ruling habit of our troops is drunkenness, and that every year, nearly 30,000 soldiers desert their colours—in presence of such facts, we say, every humane and patriotic mind must yield to a feeling of despondency. It has been our province to contend that the case is not so bad as it seems. If there be much to dismay, much to bewilder—and this must assuredly be allowed—there is also room for the operation of good influences, and a field inviting culture. The difficulty is how to bring the truth to the national cognizance, by presenting it in a light that will attract, and a form that will be understood. It is not enough to cry—"rear rank take open order:" when the movement has been carried out, when the Ranks are open, how shall we induce the public to walk in and make a complete inspection? We have an answer to the question in a work now before us. What Royal Commissions and Parliamentary Committees have been unable to effect, is here most successfully accomplished, not in a ponderous blue, but in two light *red* books, bearing the title of "Romance of the Ranks, or, Anecdotes, Episodes, and Social Incidents of Military Life," from the pen of Quartermaster Connolly, of the Royal Engineers. It will be remembered that Mr. Connolly's former work, "History of the Royal Sappers and Miners," obtained the unusual distinction of a leading article in the *Times;* and Charles Dickens remarked that he was "proud of being the countryman of the author of that book." In his present publication, Mr. Connolly has entered on ground that will lay him more open to criticism; for he has unveiled the inner life of the Ranks, presented the British soldier in his natural, and, we were going to say, domestic character, as well in barrack as in action; and if in all his winning, all his nobler qualities, still with all his imperfections on his head. In short, he has given to the English nation that very portraiture of its soldiery which was so much desired, and which we despaired ever to see supplied. It was a task that could only be undertaken by one who had himself sprung from the Ranks, and served in their every grade—who knew them rather by personal experience than observation, and its execution called also for great literary ability, and no ordinary knowledge of human character. But it also demanded courage, a resolution to carry out the object without flinching, and in a manner that would give it a practical aim. The author must prepare to tell some disagreeable things, which would neither be flattering to our national vanity nor to military *amour propre*. To be effective, moreover—to have a purpose and work out a result—the subject must receive a peculiar treatment. On the one hand, it must address the great public; on the other it must interest the soldier himself. A soldier won't read homilies: he can only be won by something

spirited, hearty, and jocular. If you wish to do him good, to point out his faults, to show him his capabilities, to lead him to improvement, it must be done in his own way, by sentiments that he appreciates and understands—by the life around him, and of which he is part. We took up the work before us with little expectation that it would embrace such perceptions, but a few pages revealed that the gallant writer knew his office. He has, indeed, caught the very inspiration required. "The Romance of the Ranks" is written both for the English people and the English army, and will make a deep impression on each. Why it is called "Romance" we are unable to divine; for it is all real, circumstantial, and true. Indeed, the author tells us in the preface that he is relating only facts, and, though some of the episodes have a romantic interest, every page bears the stamp of truthfulness. Were we disposed to be captious, we might find a few petty faults; but if, here and there, a word is not so happy as it might be, we are not looking for leather and prunella. We take the measure of literary ability from the whole work, and pronounce it unique. As a popular view of the Ranks, the book stands alone. It presents the British soldier in all phases, from heavy marching order to furlough; in all situations, from the post of honour to the black hole. It sets forth his conquests in love as well as war—his personal traits, aspirations, and escapades. The gallant author deals tenderly, some might even think lightly, with the soldier's habit of intemperance; but we soon discover that this is a device to catch the peculiar audience he is addressing, and that almost invariably the evil consequences of drunkenness are brought out in strong relief. A civilian may smile at the minute colouring of some of the portraitures, as ministering to foppism and vanity, but a professional reader will recognise their value, as inducing a pride in personal appearance, so useful and so important to a soldier. By the character of the facts related, the soldier is constantly kept mindful of the advantages of his position, and what a loss is entailed by their forfeiture, at the same time that there is no attempt to lecture, but rather an appeal from actual results. As an example of this mode of moralizing we may instance a narrative entitled "The Letter D." Duncan M'Fechan has been discharged from his corps under circumstances of disgrace, and is met by Sergeant Scobell in a very forlorn condition. The Sergeant—and here we have a little trait of the military character very effectively brought out—highly disapproves of Duncan's conduct, and feels shy of being seen to speak to him, yet can't resist the attraction to an old comrade in distress—one who had been nobody's enemy but his own. Accordingly, as they are again thrown together on board a Glasgow steamer, he takes an opportunity to steal a gossip with the poor outcast, and talk over his prospects with him. These are bad enough, and the canny Sergeant predicts they will be worse, but Duncan is on his mettle, and will heed neither counsel nor warning. Of course, the Sergeant's prophecies are realised, and hunger and a scowling world soon begin to work on poor Duncan, bringing down both his pride and his stomach. Every now and then the Sergeant gives him a meal, and warms his pocket

with a few coppers; but both know this can't go on for ever, and if it could, such a living would hardly be life. In this dilemma, the Sergeant hits on a happy idea, which is nothing less than to make Duncan a soldier again. But the pear is not yet ripe. Duncan's stubborn spirit, indeed, has been almost starved out; but at the proposal of a surrender, he shows all the old leaven, and bids the Sergeant defiance. Harder and harder grow the times, and leaner and leaner Duncan. No doubt independence is a fine thing; it is an Englishman's birthright; but when it has to be sustained on an air diet, too many of us prefer a mess of pottage. Duncan began to remember his warm barrack, his merry companions, his good mess, and in contrast with his present rags, the appearance he made in his dashing uniform. After all, soldiering was not such a bad thing. He had discovered that every condition of life has its yoke, and the restraints of discipline, which he once thought so odious, began to appear perfectly reasonable. In short, Duncan presented himself before Sergeant Scobell, and took the shilling. But now the oracle had to be worked. Of course Duncan had done for himself in her Majesty's service, and that door to a provision was closed. But Sergeant Scobell, though not an aged man, was a very old soldier, and, besides, was possessed of some interest. We have lately heard what can be done by interest, but it has also been shown that even interest requires management. So it was in the case of Sergeant Scobell and his friend Duncan. As there was no admission into the royal army, he was taken to the East India Company, and Scobell's interest secured the good offices of the Company's recruiting sergeant, who, as he surveyed Duncan's fine proportions, guaranteed success. But we should never count our chickens till they are fairly cooped. To the confusion of the confederates and his own disgust, Duncan was rejected. What could be the reason?—such a fine fellow, with such thews and sinews, and such a *physique!* Alas! the reason was too plain. Under Duncan's arm the inspecting doctor had found the fatal letter D. Here was a fix. Even interest—the interest of Sergeant Scobell—might halt at such a stile. But the sergeant was a genius, and, moreover, determined to provide for his old comrade, and give him another chance in the game of life. The letter D was transformed into a ship in full sail; poor Duncan was cicatrised with dolphins and initials to keep the ship in countenance; and, not to dwell on details, we will add that he was brought again before the same doctor, and passed in triumph. There is a high moral in this narrative—in its facts, stamping it indelibly on the mind of the soldier. It first shows the penalty to which misconduct will lead him—an ignominious discharge, and perhaps an infamous brand, and then places before him the misery that awaits him in the world, with the uses of which he has become unfamiliar, and which will give him neither work nor bread. And comparing this condition of things with his lot in the ranks, it indicates the absurdity of that visionary independence for which so many sigh, and shows how really enviable to a poor man is the soldier's life. There is scarcely one of the manifold episodes that has not a similar bearing. Two or three, perhaps, had been better omitted, but this is a con-

sideration for future editions. The design of the author has clearly been to hold the mirror up to the Ranks, and show them their form and pressure. In this he has succeeded, and has produced a book as remarkable for its *vraisemblance* as for its literary ability. He possesses a fund of dry humour, great originality of thought, and a concise and animated diction. Some of his similes may be far-fetched, but they are worth the carriage; and the whole composition is marked by freshness and vigour. We are glad to welcome from a military pen, a work so creditable to the army, and which will open to the public and to the army itself, a store of information relating to what was hitherto unknown—the habits, instincts, and character, the personal life and qualities of the British soldier. "Romance of the Ranks" is an attractive title; but this work might be more justly called "The Natural History of the Ranks," for such is the mission it fulfils. We regret that the extraordinary demands on our space prevent us from making a few extracts; but this is of the less consequence, as the book, we feel assured, will soon follow these pages to every part of the world. It turns a new leaf in military literature, which cannot be too diligently studied, and, happily for England, the subject is beginning to attract special attention. Let us try to raise the moral character of the soldier, as well as to improve his condition; and if we would see how to go to work, we are here shown the way. There is much to be done, but opportunity is in our favour, and a few timely arrangements may effect what, if delayed, may hereafter baffle correction.

S.W.F.

FROM CAMP TO QUARTERS;

OR, LIFE IN AN INDIAN CANTONMENT AFTER FIELD SERVICE.

PART II.

An Unmarketable Commodity—Visits—What "Durwasa bund" means—Gall and Bitterness—One Exception—A Contrast—Mrs. Spence—A Paradox—Seikhs withdraw themselves—Favourable Intelligence—The Reverse—The Siege—The Relief—Barbarism.

"I say, old feller, come, hang it all; do let us go and call on the people."

Thus was I accosted by one of the marketable officers of the regiment a few days after the Onety-Oneth had marched into Dandgunge—his particular reason for addressing the request to me being the fact that among my worldly property I owned a buggy; the advantages of which means of progression during an Indian hot season, render themselves agreeably evident to the meanest capacity, as well as to the most economical disposition.

I myself had ceased to be a marketable commodity for several years, and this fact, although highly satisfactory in every other respect, was rendered somewhat disagreeably evident in one parti-

cular, and it was this:—Mormonism had not yet been fully adopted by the English officers in India, and, however much some may have admired one at least of the tenets of Mahomedanism, that creed was not openly recognised, nor was the tone of the great majority of "society" guided according to it.

Had matters been otherwise—had, in fact, plurality of wives been legally permissible at Dandgunge—I have little doubt that, possessing, as I have just said, a buggy, being the owner of what is considered in India the second essential wherewith to commence wedded life, to wit, a silver teapot; and being, moreover, in receipt of by no means a despicable monthly income—I say, with all these advantages, I might still have been honoured by the smiles of manœuvring mothers, aunts, and guardians; but, as it was, and since circumstances over which I had evidently not the slightest control, had reduced me to the sobered condition of a Benedick—of what use was I in society, forsooth? My wife was not with me; I couldn't marry anybody's daughter; I couldn't give nice parties, at which other matches could be made up; or, still more objectionable, flirtations carried on; and the result was, just what might have been expected, a distant bow, perhaps a mere nod, perhaps not even so much as that, was all that I had the previous year received in return for what I had considered the politeness of making my round of calls.

These recollections, instead of being effaced from my memory during the six months I had been away, came back more vividly than ever, now that I had returned to the place again. I had, as every person does, formed one or two friendships in the station, and now longed to renew them; but my reception on a former occasion by the mess having been what I have mentioned, I had little desire or intention to visit any others of the residents than the very, very few whose society I had before found agreeable, and whose acquaintance I now wished to renew.

I was therefore little inclined to accede to my friend's request, and replied abruptly, "Bother the thing, I don't want to make more than one or two calls, but you may have the buggy if you like to make the round of the station."

"What's the use in being grumpy?" responded the disposable gent., whom I shall call Captain Shorten; "come along with me. I want to see the women, but don't see the fun of going alone."

I still objected; related how unsociable, stiff, nay, ill-natured, I had already found them to be, but here was immediately silenced by Shorten, who offered a very plausible apology for the residents.

"That's not fair," he continued. "Of course they were all put out last year. How could it have been otherwise? Consider what they went through; but now, just look at the reception they gave us. Of course they mean to be civil!"

I saw the force of the argument. "Well," said I, "very likely; after all, it may have been so. At all events, I will do the civil, and then they can please themselves.

"Very good, then, let us go to-day at noon. From that hour till two the ladies are 'at home,' so order the trap."

Captain Shorten had previously prepared, from various sources a list of all the ladies, married and single, in the station; and now our only difficulty was so to arrange our manner of proceeding so that we should not have to drive twice in the same direction, a proceeding by which much time would be necessarily lost, and much unnecessary exposure to heat and dust and glare incurred.

Beginning, therefore, at one end of the station, we gradually and steadily prosecuted what could not as yet be called, even as regarded my companion, a labour of love! first dropping our pasteboard at one house, where, in reply to our inquiry whether the mem sahib was at home, we were informed by the sable attendant that "durwasa bund;" then passing on to another, where we were more fortunate, or unfortunate, as the case might have been.

Here there were one or two spinsters, or, it may be, a married lady, quite disengaged, at least for the time being. The servant to whom we had on driving up to the door intrusted our cards, on returning, salaams to the ground. With both hands joined, he indicates that we are permitted to enter. We proceed accordingly, and, in the stillness of a more than half-darkened room, find ourselves incontinently knocking our shins against corners of chairs, settees, and stools, our heads against the low-swung punkah that moves sleepily from side to side; and making ineffectual endeavours all at the same time to bow gracefully to the masses of crinoline and muslin before which we fear we are making ourselves somewhat ridiculous.

Ere our list is half finished the dull sound of the main guard gong tells us that it is two o'clock. Our visits cease for this day, to be renewed to-morrow. We return to our tiffin, and discuss the results and the impressions left upon us by our first day's duty.

As we enjoy this mid-day and very favourite meal, we naturally wonder why at some two or three places we had received the message we did, namely, that "durwasa bund," or, in other words, the door is shut against the present visitors! We knew from past experience what meaning is usually conveyed by this expression, but in case you, most gentle reader, do not, I will tell you,

An excellent expression is that, "durwasa bund," and one to which several meanings are attached. In some instances it implies that the lady of the house is lazy, and has not dressed to receive visitors; in others, that baby is ill, or perhaps otherwise occupied, and that she is attending on it; on some occasions, that she is suffering from one or other of the numerous forms of indisposition that afflict the sex in India. All these are valid excuses in their way; but how comes it that at such and such a house where we received this message we saw, standing in the cow-pound, a buggy and horse extremely like those of Captain Snooks, of one of the native regiments that after four years' residence at the station mutinied and dissolved themselves? How can we reconcile this little fact with the message we have just received? The interpretation is, however, easy. It signifies that the lady is more agreeably occupied than she would be if receiving us. And so it will ever be in India as elsewhere; we have had our turn, let others have theirs, and "*Honi soi*," &c.

The morrow arrives. Determined to finish off our by no means

agreeable task, for we did not thoroughly enjoy the whole of yesterday's visits, we resume our labours. The same ordeals are again gone through; we have most presumingly run down our list from head to foot, and as we mark off the last name, simultaneously exclaim, "Well, I hope this is the very last time I shall ever have to do this sort of thing! Thank goodness, that's over!"

"Well, now," asked Captain Shorten, at the termination of our second day's exertions, "are you not glad that you did as I told you, and called upon the people."

"I am, indeed," said I, "and almost begin to think their stiffness last year must have been through some mistake."

"It must, indeed, have been so," my companion continued; "for I am certain nothing could have exceeded the civility and friendliness of everybody to us."

And indeed nothing could. To judge from the conversation of the inmates of the houses into which we were permitted to enter, the only thing wanting to complete the measure of their happiness had been the return of the dear Onety-Oneth, and now that this consummation had been realised, they had scarcely another object in life worth protracting their existence for. The sly little creatures who were the principal, in fact, the only speakers in this strain, would have given—I don't know how many kisses, to have belonged to the Onety-Oneth, nor did they seem to care that we divined their meaning just as plainly as if they had spoken the sentence in so many plain words.

But while every expression that bore reference in even the most distant degree to our regiment was indeed composed of honeyed words, oh! how bitter, what gall and wormwood made up the sum of conversation in each succeeding house, regarding the occupants, and especially the lady occupants, of every other house in the station; we had indeed heard enough, during these two days, to make us look with suspicion upon every lady in Dandgunge.

Was there no exception to this sweeping condemnation? Yes, there was one! So it is in all stations that I have seen in India—jealousies, uncharitableness, back-biting and slander rule pre-eminent, and I grieve to be obliged to say, that in some instances, at least some of the ladies who, from the peculiar position and sacred calling of their husbands, ought to endeavour by every possible means to cast oil upon the troubled waters, seem to live for no other purpose than to keep the apple of discord in continual movement, and to heap fuel on the fire that already burns too fiercely.

Fortunate it is that in all stations there are one or two good spirits—guardian angels, as it were—who not only keep aloof from scenes of strife and jealousy such as I have alluded to, but are ever ready, should opportunity offer, to palliate short comings in others, and to restore, as far as in them lies, the understandings that have unfortunately been shaken or broken.

Ladies of this description—alas! that in India their numbers are so few!—conscious of their own integrity, are the more inclined to give others credit for similar uprightness of sentiment. Viewing, as they do, the favourable side of human nature, and fully aware

that no undue freedom can be taken by any man where dignity and true feminine delicacy exist, manifest little or none of that prudishness of behaviour in public that those of an opposite description take so much pains to display. They are invariably agreeable in conversation, the more so that they are utterly free from the spleen and venom that form the staple conversation among the mass. But what, think you, is usually the consequence? It is inconceivable; yet the fact is indisputable, that in nine cases out of ten such a lady has no chance whatever against the mass who array themselves in the opposition ranks. There, for instance, is the very lady at whose house we the other day saw what seemed to be Captain Snooks's buggy, when the door was closed to us, and where, if we have not been misinformed, the same buggy might have been seen any or every day during the past six months—ever, indeed, since it ceased to be seen in the same way at the house two cow-pounds off—well, there is the lady in question, actually having the cool impertinence to bow her stiffest bow to really the one of her sex to whom, above all others in the station, deference and respect are due; while she recognises, with the utmost cordiality, that other lady, who not more than a month ago was found flirting in the shrubbery very late in the evening with young Tomkins of the Cavalry, who had landed for a day from the steamer by which he was proceeding on sick leave.

If, then, our opinion of the fair sex generally at Dandgunge was what has now been recorded, there was one who was, and I hope will ever be, an exception. I have already said that the number of such in India is small; permit me, therefore, my dear reader, to describe her, so that should you ever meet her, you may not pass in the crowd without recognising her sylph-like figure. But harkee—one word in your ear—when you do meet, say that Mr. Alexander presents his kind regards, and wishes her health and happiness.

Mrs. Spence was one of those ladies who, although rarely, yet do sometimes cross our path—whom to see is to wish to know, and once to know is to like and esteem. Slight, delicate, and fragile in figure, gentle and retiring in manners, she looks, as she really is, too etherial a being to be appreciated by the viper-tongued sisterhood of Dandgunge. Her finely-chiselled, yet somewhat decided features—the light hazel eye, the expressive mouth, at once beaming with intelligence and kindness towards the person who seeks her conversation, whether that person be gentleman or lady—while the clear, but alas! delicate complexion, brightens with an increased colour, that gives rise to painful apprehensions lest the rapid succession of pink and paleness do not indeed indicate too great a degree of constitutional delicacy to long withstand the terribly trying effects of an Indian climate.

Pre-eminently, and above all others, she was the lady to whom most universal attention was paid; and why? For this simple reason, that she, more than any other among them, possessed those good qualities that always command admiration and respect. But could her own sex see this? No; blinded as they were by jealousy, they could not, no more than they could realise the fact that they them-

selves were utterly wanting in those qualities of mind or body that usually constitute the great attractions of their sex.

I have seen at other Indian stations—nay, I have met with at Peddlington's, in our own beloved country, a few ladies of the type represented here by Mrs. Spence; and yet, oddly enough, they were, to speak the word plainly, unpopular among their own sex. How is this? Answer ye who can. I confess my powers of analysis are inadequate to the task.

The little we had already seen of the greater number of the residents led us to believe that the more we should know of them the less were we likely to enjoy their society. We already began to consider that the apologies we had started by making for any want of cordiality with which we were likely to meet were altogether unnecessary, and far beside the mark. It was therefore with no small degree of gratification we contemplated the occurrence of circumstances that, for the time being, diverted our attention from the pettifogging doings of the station, which, after all, scarcely deserve the amount of notice I find I have been gradually led on to give them. It is therefore with considerable pleasure I turn for a little to general subjects, although it will be my duty again to revert, in this narrative, to some of the doings as well as misdoings at Dandgunge.

Although, with a view to avoid being unnecessarily personal in my remarks, I have deemed it advisable to give fictitious names to some people as well as to places, and shall continue to do so when I think it necessary, the detail of the public occurrences about to be narrated would lose much if not the whole of its interest were not real names of localities to be indicated in relating them. In the latter respect, therefore, I shall, with one or two exceptions, mention the names of the precise places alluded to.

For six weeks prior to marching into quarters, the Onety-Oneth constituted part of a force that, after much arduous service, succeeded in expelling from the jungles near Jugdespore a rebel horde that had for some time concealed themselves there. On the final expulsion of the rebels from the district, it was deemed only necessary that a party of Seikh troops should garrison the principal town, a British regiment being detained at Arrah in case of any emergency arising to require its services; such a contingency, however, being deemed highly improbable, so long as our Punjabee allies—whose prowess was highly vaunted—should remain in occupation of the capital town of the district.

But all Asiatics are much alike, at least in one respect—their want of self-reliance. This is a quality which neither Seikh nor Sepoy ever did possess, else the British would not now be in possession of India; and however much it may have suited the purposes of *policy*, during the late terrible crisis, to have extolled whatever military qualities the Seikhs did possess, and attributed to them very many to which they had, in justice, not the slightest pretension, the fact is unquestionable, that, except when supported by English soldiers, or, as the Irish would say, "convanient" to them, they cease to act with resolution or decision; except, to be sure, in cases where they

cannot help themselves; so, in the absurdly-lauded affair called the defence of Arrah House, where they were run to earth, and resisted the enemies from without much as a badger would a dog that attempted to "draw him."

In the present instance, no sooner had the British portion of the force marched a few miles from Jugdespore, than the Seikh garrison left there began to manifest symptoms of uneasiness. It did not seem to enter into their calculation that, even in the event—a very improbable one—of their being attacked by the rebel Sepoys, there was such a thing as beating them off. All that they considered was, apparently, the necessity of their own annihilation. Need we wonder, then, that the ludicrous termination that has to be related crowned our operations against the rebels?

Scarcely had the rear of our force got out of sight of the place than the Seikhs evacuated it in a body, leaving the town that, after much trouble in capturing, we had held for a month and a half, at the mercy of the rebels, who quietly walked in as they marched out, forthwith commencing a series of atrocities and cruelties upon all throughout the district who were believed to have been friendly to us.

Revenue was being collected by the rebels; police-stations established along the lines of communication, by authority of Ummur Singh, their ostensible leader; the property of natives who had assisted the English or sold supplies to them destroyed; the people themselves murdered, and their families insulted in some of the various ways most in accordance with Oriental beastliness;—these circumstances tended to give us subject for thought. It was probable we should, notwithstanding that the rains had set in, have to take the field again, and we made preparations accordingly.

Meantime the intelligence from elsewhere was generally favourable. Gwalior had been recaptured by Sir Hugh Rose; the Ranee of Jhansi, one of our most inveterate as well as able foes, killed. In Oude, Sir Hope Grant had surprised the rebel force at night, killing upwards of six hundred; the famous Moulvie, of Lucknow, beheaded,—his head, it was said, having been sent in and identified; and even in our own neighbourhood a body of rebels, who had attacked a police force, had by them been repulsed.

There was one circumstance, however, that although in itself trifling, could not be looked upon otherwise than as indicating that the spread of disaffection among the armed levies in the service of Government, still continued.

A small body of convicted rebels were being sent under escort of some "Nujeebs," or jail-guards, towards Calcutta, in view to undergo transportation, to which they had been sentenced, when at a place called Gyah there must have undoubtedly been a collusion between them, for the guards quietly permitted them to escape. About the same time other bodies of these armed native policemen showed themselves to be not trustworthy; and it was resolved by the civil authorities, under whose direct jurisdiction they are, that they should be disarmed.

From all these circumstances we scarcely expected that our sojourn

at Dandgunge should be a protracted one, nor were we particularly sorry at the prospect, considering the impressions we had been led to form of some of the people there. We had almost already forgotten the terrible heat and the discomfort with which we had had to bear during the preceding three months, the temperature on some occasions actually reaching 116 degrees F. Now that the rains had fairly set in, we were enabled to sit with comfort in rooms without punkahs and with open doors, the thermometer marking 86 degrees, which although oppressive in England, felt agreeably cool to us here.

The continual receipt of unsatisfactory intelligence from the districts where bodies of the rebels were known to be, and the almost daily reports that reached the station of their existence in greater or less force in parts where their presence had not been anticipated, decided the military authorities to take steps accordingly.

The difficulty of moving any considerable body of British troops along cross roads in pursuit of natives, who knew every spot of the country, and the serious results to the men themselves that were anticipated, from exposure to continued wet at this station, formed obstacles of no slight magnitude against any expedition that might have been contemplated. The question, therefore, came to be whether, under the circumstances, it was the more advisable plan to leave the rebels for the time being in possession of the parts of the districts where they had established themselves, taking it for granted that with the return of dry weather they would be easily expelled, or that small bodies of troops should now be put in movement, with a view both to harass the rebels, and to produce a certain moral effect upon any of the people who might still be favourable to us, but whose allegiance could not be reckoned upon one instant longer than they saw that we still possessed the power of resistance. The latter proceeding was accordingly resolved upon, and Brigadier Douglas of the 79th, appointed to take command of the troops that were to be employed in the disturbed districts.

Although we had but so lately come into quarters from field service, one half the regiment was now held in readiness to proceed any where at a moment's notice. A few days afterwards intimation was received that a body of rebels were besieging a civil officer and some Seikh allies, in a small fort at a little distance on the opposite side of the river. As is always the case when members of the Bengal civil service find themselves hard pressed, so in the present instance the difficulties of the moment were described as insurmountable; unless reinforcements were instantly sent, the consequences would be disastrous to our hold of India. Mr. Frost and his magnificent body of men would be annihilated; the news of the anticipated victory over the English would spread like wildfire far and near; the population of the neighbouring provinces would rise as one man, and with the destruction of this energetic civilian and his black garrison would inevitably sound the death knell of British rule in India.

So at least one would have supposed from the urgent nature of the messages that hourly inundated Dandgunge. It was clear, therefore, that if two such terrible catastrophes were to be averted

at all, this could only be effected by immediate and decisive action. Observe, then, the result. Four companies of the Onety-Oneth, fully equipped for the serious and important service on which they were about to be engaged, embarked on board a river steamer, and thus proceeded to the relief of their besieged countrymen.

In the hurry and anxiety of the commander of the vessel to reach his destination, and calculating on the rise that had taken place in the river, he steered along a shorter course than the one he would otherwise have followed. But alas! alas! for human calculations! The depth of water in the channel was not so great as he anticipated, —a heavy dull grating feeling was experienced by the living mass that crowded the decks; suddenly the whole received an impetus forward—they jumbled against each other in the most helpless but unpleasant manner. Something surely was wrong,—they had stuck fast and firm in the mud, and there they contrived to stick for more than the whole day.

But the object of the expedition had been achieved, notwithstanding this small mishap. The Sepoys love not the near proximity of British soldiers, especially when the latter are on war intent; and perhaps of all soldiers in India, those of the Onety-Oneth were of all others their greatest horror. When, therefore, the news reached the rebel camp that half this regiment had actually started, panic transferred itself from besieged to besiegers, neither of whom had ever calculated on the chances of the whole proceedings being stuck on a sand bank in the river Ganges. Had they done so indeed, matters might still have worn a different aspect than they did; but, fortune ever favours the brave.

At last the steamer was got off—proceeded on its course, and in due time reached the place appointed for the disembarkation of the living cargo. A note was put into the hand of the commanding officer. He reads; and lo! no sooner had the troops under him left their station, than the rebel hordes raised their siege. Mr. Frost still existed, and the annihilation of British power in India was still an event of the future. Here, then, was what is called "moral" effect with a vengeance.

Shortly after this occurrence, the arrival of a regiment new to the country was an event that gave rise to some degree of interest in Dandgunge, albeit the interest to some of us was painful.

No where on the face of the earth can the circumstances attending the arrivals of a regiment for the first time in a country be more disagreeable to the individuals concerned than they are in India. Everything strikes them with unpleasant distinctness as being so extremely different from what they had been accustomed to. There is a thoroughly un-English look and style about everything—the half naked black creatures who swarm everywhere, twisting their lithe forms into strange and inelegant attitude, grinning, chattering unintelligible sounds, or sitting monkey-like on their haunches, looking on with stoical indifference—cannot do otherwise than strike the new arrival with surprise and bewilderment.

Then come the awkward means and ways of doing everything, even the most simple operation. The boats, the carts, the very

manner of the natives in lifting and conveying an ordinary parcel, are all uncouth, if not ridiculous; and it is impossible for a person who has become accustomed to this state of things to observe, without being highly amused, the first conflict that on arrival of a fresh regiment takes place between the customs of the two races—between, in fact, civilisation and barbarism.

At this, the very threshold of their service in India, the new arrivals learn, and are convinced, as they will be the longer they remain, that barbarism has the best of it, and the sooner they make up their minds to accommodate their ideas and guide their conduct accordingly, the better will it be for their own mental quietude—and the better in all likelihood for their worldly prospects; but of this subject more hereafter.

After many hours of hardwork in a stifling atmosphere, and under an intensely powerful sun, the heavy baggage of the regiment is landed and packed upon that most ricketty and awkward of all wheeled conveyance, an Indian bullock hackery, for the corps is not to remain here, but at once march on towards the disturbed part of the district. Everything is in readiness to commence their march on the morrow; and we, old campaigners in India, cannot help mentally exclaiming "poor fellows! how many of you who now manifest such glee at getting on shore will ever leave the land that has formed the graves of so many of your countrymen."

The heavy rain that some days previously had fallen had now ceased, the upper sky was once more blue and cloudless, although dark streaks or large white masses of vapour still hung about the horizon; not a breath of air agitated the still damp atmosphere; the sun poured down his heat and glare with an intensity that no written description can express, only personal experience fully realize, and the heavy offensive exhalations from the pestiferous earth produced for the time being a sensation of nausea and sickness among all who were exposed to them, even those who in common language were the most acclimatised.

Under such circumstances, what, think you, was the style of costume worn by the men who were now undergoing their initiation? None [other than the heavy thick woollen dress of a soldier in a British winter.

Strange, however, that the senses of the men themselves were apparently so blunted, that they were seemingly unconscious of the torment they were thus made to undergo, or perhaps it may have been that as good or bad are merely known by contrast, they were in that happy condition of ignorance in which, not having yet learnt the comfort attending a lighter style of costume, they had no standard of comparison whereby to judge their then condition. So it was also with the men of the military train who, during the intensity of the hot dry weather, continued on field service to wear their woollen dress, and so far as could be then observed, with no other immediate effect than in one respect at least to render themselves extremely offensive to each other, and most remarkably, and especially so, to any "outsider" who happened to approach their vicinity.

No amount of experience would seem to awaken our military

authorities to the necessity of issuing the most stringent orders to commanding officers bringing troops to India, that under no circumstances whatever should the men wear other than the prescribed dress for the particular season in which they may arrive.

What was the result in the present instance? The regiment marched out of the station at four o'clock the following morning—their first camp ground was only eight miles distant, yet by the time they reached it, three of their numbers lay dead, and a great many prostrated and helpless by sunstrokes.

THE FIRST BRITISH TROOPS IN LISBON.

BY PORTFIRE.

THE Buffs were not always the smart regiment they are now. In the early part of the Peninsular War, they decidedly would not have cut so good a figure at a review, or on a palace guard, as the seventh Fusiliers, or the Forty-third light Bobs, or the Fifty-second, or the Eighty-fifth, or any other crack corps in his Majesty's service. In fact, not to mince the matter, their appearance was so slovenly at the period I allude to, that they were universally known in the British army in Portugal by the *sobriquet* of the dirty Buffs. Perhaps their colonel was a descendant of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu's, so celebrated for her negligence in all matters connected with the toilette; or, perhaps he sympathized with hazy Bob Bouchier of ours, who always coupled the words, "comfortable and dirty;" or what is still more probable, he might have agreed with his illustrious chief himself, that provided a soldier did his duty, it very little mattered what his appearance was, and it must be confessed to their credit, that the third Buffs were always well up to their work, and that better or braver soldiers never took the field.

Now, every one who is old enough, rememembers the Convention of Cintra, which was signed by Sir Hugh Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and, much against the grain, by Wellington himself, then only Sir Arthur Wellesly, and which, among other *jeux d'esprit* at the time, called forth the following:—

> Sir Arthur and Sir Harry, Sir Harry and Sir Hugh;
> Sing cock-a-doodle, cock-a-doodle, cock-a-doodle doo!
> Sir Arthur is a brave knight, but for the other two,
> Sing cock-a-doodle, cock-a-doodle, cock-a-doodle doo!

And certainly, as far as Sir Arthur was concerned, it must be allowed that there was ample cause for crowing, seeing what a right down, regular game cock he afterwards turned out. Well, soon after this said Convention of Cintra was signed, a detachment of the third Buffs was ordered to relieve the garrison of Peniche, which was to be given up to us. The company selected for this duty was

old C——'s, notoriously the dirtiest and most slovenly in the whole regiment.

"Well," continued P——, who was a subaltern at the time in C——'s company, and from whom I had the relation, "when we got to Peniche, after a previous dirty fatiguing march, we found the Frenchmen all ready to set off to Lisbon, and a remarkably smart clean set of fellows they all were, I must say, quite in apple-pie order, and splendidly equipped; forming about just as great a contrast to us rough and rum ones as you can possibly imagine. And didn't we envy 'em, lucky rogues! going back to Lisbon, which none of us had ever seen; where all the good wine and pretty girls were, that's all—for, queer customers as we were, we had no sort of objection, I can tell you, to the amusements and creature comforts of the capital. Well, old C——, who had as little objection to 'em himself, as either of us young ones, called us both to the front, and when we were out of earshot of the men,—'Boys,' says he, 'how should you like to go to Lisbon?' I needn't tell you what our answer was. 'Then we'll go, boys!' says he. 'It is but misunderstanding our orders. As soon as ever these French fellows are off, we'll follow 'em!' which we did, all ragged, and soiled, and footsore, as we were. Well, when we got to the grand parade at Lisbon, by Jove, sir! we found Junot and Laborde, and that terrible tearing fellow, Loison, with his one arm, mounted on his white English charger, together with the whole staff and garrison of Lisbon, assembled all in full fig; and I just leave you to imagine what sort of a figure we cut, tailing these splendid Frenchmen, with our one fife and drum, playing "The girl I left behind me," and fat, pudgey, smouchey old C—— marching in front, doing grand, and looking for all the world like some strolling actor, hired to play Bombastes Furioso, or Chrononhotonthologas in the burlesque. By Jove, sir! the whole parade were in a roar; and Junot, who was himself dying with laughter, sent Loison to know what the deuce we wanted there. C—— pretended that it was his orders, and Loison, not knowing how to deal with the matter, and seeing we were but one company, told C—— that as we were there we might stay there. C—— thanked him, and told Loison in return that he had seen him at Vimeira, mounted on the very white horse he then rode, adding 'and when you began to retreat, *my eye! how you did go it!*'

PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE.

Probably before this is in the press the scourge of war will have devastated some of the fairest provinces in the world, and thousands have felt the bitterness of death. All around is the clang of arms, and nations preparing to meet nation. At present the cry is the freedom of Italy and the reduction of Austria's pride; but how long will this unpaying war last? How long will money-borrowing, much-taxed France, Crimean-crippled Russia, and indebted Sardinia,

be contented with defeating poverty-stricken Austria? Will Lombardy be sufficient recompense for the expense and carnage that must ensue? Will press-gagged, spy-ridden France, or the Autocracy of Russia be satisfied with making Italy free? Will the power that ten years ago crushed Italy's struggle for freedom allow it now? Will the two great despotisms be contented with wresting a province from a brother despot? No—never. Russia and France have not joined hands, have not entered into an alliance offensive and defensive for the mere punishment of Austria, or the giving freedom to Italy. They are too poor for revenge only, too cold-blooded for philanthropy.

The game is deep, and has been well thought over. Long before the insult offered to the Austrian on the 1st January, had a campaign against Austria been determined upon by France, and Sardinia was to make the first move. How long before this was the first treaty entered into between France and Russia? Months probably; the friendship between these despotisms has not been of mushroom growth. It will not prove to have been cemented and resolved upon in a day. It will date back from the time of the patched-up peace after the Crimea, and it has been since then daily increasing.

Would France alone have dared to treat England with contempt, and have run the risk of war by permitting the publication of certain bombastic, insulting addresses from over-valiant colonels? Would France and Sardinia combined dare to infringe treaties and rouse in Europe the spirit of discord, spreading misery all around, had they not known that the great northern power would help them?

Was France ever willing for the affair to be amicably settled? Was she not encouraging Sardinia to give offence, and thus neutralising our every effort at peace-making? How about Lord Cowley's mission, and during his absence, the congress proposed by Russia? How about refusing now to agree to our last arrangement, and doing as Austria has agreed to do? Does not all this prove her anxiety for war, and a degree of certainty in gaining her end, which would not have existed had she believed that Russia, Prussia, and England were averse to the course she would eventually pursue?

Those great armies and navies are collected for other purposes than revenge or philanthropy. They are for plunder. The maxim of "My Uncle" will be strictly followed, and the war carried into the enemy's country. "Feed on the enemy;" and that enemy, when Austria is crushed, and Prussia surrounded and helpless, will be England.

Waterloo must be avenged and the Crimea wiped out. England was victorious at both places, and her pride must be humbled. It is a stake worth playing for. To checkmate, erase from the map of nations—aye, even to make Great Britain sue for terms—would amply compensate for My Uncle's detention and death at St. Helena, or for Alma, Inkerman, or Sebastopol. Let our navy be crippled, let our army be occupied in defending our coasts, colonies, and fortified ports in the Mediterranean, and Russia can repay herself for the expenses of crushing Austria and freeing Italy by taking a slice of the long-cove'ed land of Turkey. The man there is still sick. As

a solitary power, far weaker than when assailed five years ago, and with Europe in a blaze, her ally, England, hard pressed, and the Gaul no longer a friend, she would fall an easy prey to her old enemy.

With such views of the past, present, and future, it behoves us here to be prepared. The past has shown how treacherous is our ally, France; the present proves the good understanding that exists between two of the most powerful despotisms in Europe; and the future looms dark and dangerous. We shall do well to be ready for contingencies. How can this best be done? There are no two ways; and so, notwithstanding the cheese-paring of Cobden, Bright, and Co., this country must submit to an additional taxation for the increase both of her naval forces and army.

In the first, sufficient inducement must be held out to make men enter themselves, and our navy thus be properly manned. The same plan that answers in the merchant navy would surely succeed in ours; and the adoption of their method might be followed with advantage. If it is *tyranny*, if it is bad pay, or whatever the cause may be that prevents men taking to the navy, let it be sought after and removed. There is no time to lose. Ships cannot now remain on an average four months after being commissioned, waiting for crews; and the time, thank heaven, has passed, that would permit fathers and sons to be torn from their homes, and forced to serve on board a ship, leaving wives, sisters, and daughters to fall on the streets, or perish.

Increase the marines and increase the army.

To do this last is certainly by no means an easy task; and it is with a wish to show where disciplined and good soldiers are to be obtained that has led to this article.

There is no doubt but that on the mere rumour of war, volunteers would rush to the British standard, and within a short time a fine army would appear on paper; but these are not the men to bring into action, or to lead against continental armies flushed with victory. Volunteers are good in their way, but take long, very long, to make into soldiers. The habit of implicit obedience is hard to acquire by men that have long known independence. Moreover, volunteers diminish in number and spirit as the enthusiasm of a war wears off, and those employed are apt to sigh for a restoration of the comforts which patriotism made them surrender. Foreign legions are worse than useless; they own no authority, owe no allegiance, and are at the call of the highest bidder. Commanded by officers foreign by birth, speaking a different language, jealous of, and disliking our system and perhaps ourselves; such regiments are not likely to repay the country that employs them.

Men must be had. Soldiers such as have seen war, and have proved themselves trustworthy and brave. These can be found in Goorkhas and Seikhs; and, however dangerous it may appear employing such, it is to be hoped that before the idea is pooh-poohed and treated as a dream, the plan may be well considered. Remember the Seikh and Goorkha are no effeminate men, inhabitants of warm climates, and unused to war and discipline. Far from it; they are, in a manner, born to arms, and in physical strength are

a match for us islanders. In courage they have few equals, excepting in the British soldier; and their capabilities of enduring exposure to cold is proved by old campaigns. Of their trustworthiness there can be but little doubt. The men that stood our friends when the enemy opposed to them and us were rich enough to bribe, and sufficiently victorious to make any but the most sanguine almost despair of success, are not likely to fail now. They fought well at Delhi, Lucknow, Bareilly, and Oudh. They are trusted with prisoners, forts, and treasure, in a country where the British power has once been lost, and yet are true to their salt. They are in perfect discipline, commanded by British officers, and use our words of command, and obey our regulations. They have no scruples about crossing seas, eating pork, or rations. (Eating beef is, however, forbidden.) They have no caste, and like the British soldier.

Surely such men as these are too good to be overlooked. Whole regiments would volunteer for a war in Welayut, and, once away from India, they would learn more of our power and success. That as a race they are restless is not to be denied, but most warlike races are; and if employment can be found for such so much the better for the country that is relieved of their company. To India, a few of these Punjaub levies being sent to do duty in the colonies, relieving English regiments required for home service, would be a blessing financially considered; and it would also be a good method of reducing the present too powerful and numerous native army.

Away from their homes they could find no inducement to rebel, no sympathy, no reason for treachery. Their wives and families in our hands in India would be a sufficient guarantee for their keeping faith. Away from their homes, away from India, they would see how great is the power of that Queen now proclaimed Empress of India. In our ships and forts would they see our strength, and on their return be able to show to their untravelled comrades the utter foolishness of rebellion. Let them, side by side, as they have fought before with British soldiers, engage the common enemy, and the certain victory will give them more wonders to relate. Let these men, that have stood our friends in the hour of need, not find themselves suddenly sent to the right-about, and told to return to the more peaceful but less pleasing mode of existence to be found in agriculture. Dissatisfied at present they are, not, neither have they yet found out that a large force of white soldiers must be kept in India to overawe them. Trust them; let them see a fellow soldier in the white man, not a guard; let them know that the Empress of Hindostan is Empress of other lands, and keeps no purely local troops, and then the Seikh and Goorkha will be trustworthy and valuable.

One word in conclusion, be careful in the selection of officers commanding and doing duty. On their conduct, on their capabilities of command, and on their understanding those under them, depend the discipline and management of Asiatic irregulars. Let there be no favouritism shown in the selection of officers, and above all, let the men see that they are not *feared* or doubted, but implicitly trusted.

ANGLO-INDIAN.

[*Note.*—This arrived too late for publication last month.]

NOTES ON MILITARY SCIENCE.

Lecture XXIII.

We now approach the period from whence the history of England is no longer obscured by doubts, or subject to cavils and objections, as to the relation of facts themselves, though of course in the report of these very facts many differences, and possibly discrepancies, will appear, arising, as I have previously mentioned, from the personal or party views of the writers. A soldier ought, however, to be of no party, neither Whig, Tory, Conservative, nor Radical; his path is plain—to do his duty, to the best of his ability, to his sovereign, and his country, heeding not the party that may for the time be the advisers of Majesty, and who, by the sanction of the sovereign, may hold the offices of government. Shackled, and too much interfered with by the administration of the day, many of our best commanders have unfortunately been, and many desirable operations have been retarded, or prevented from want of supplies, &c.; the blame of which must attach to our erring legislators, to whose dictum a commander is forced to submit. I shall not enter into the causes that have, in many instances, led to disappointment, confining my views of military history and military science, to the record of the achievements of our gallant soldiers in every country, every clime. Where reached not the fame of Greece? Where was not, subsequently, the grandeur, the military pre-eminence of Rome, "the mistress of the world?" echoed from mouth to mouth; and yet are all the boasted conquests of these ancient nations to be compared to the sovereign power of Great Britain? Alexander sighed for new worlds to conquer. New worlds have, as it were, been created for Britons to possess, either by discovery, or by conquest; witness the immense extent of subjugated India, our possessions in America, the West Indies, the almost a world in itself, Australia, &c., &c.; and be it remembered, that with the exception of some unavoidable wars in India, these, and other valuable territories of the British dominions, have not been obtained by the slaughter of the peaceably disposed inhabitants of these countries; but by holding out to them the hand of brotherhood, by reciprocating kindly feeling, and by developing to them the advantages to be derived from science, wealth, and commerce. Several centuries intervene between the last recorded battle of King Arthur, and the battle of Hastings; but, during that period, in the relation of the various engagements that took place, there is not matter of sufficient importance to be detailed; and we will, therefore, at once proceed to the eventful battle of Hastings, which terminated the Saxon monarchy, and placed the crown of Britain on the head of William of Normandy, A. D. 1066. Harold having refused to surrender his right to the sovereignty of England, William resolved by an appeal to arms to take possession of a country, all claims to which had been relinquished to him by his rival; and his just claims to which had been admitted by the Pope, who, moreover, presented to William a

consecrated banner, as an evidence of his rightful pretensions, and as an emblematic sign of success. Prepared for the approaching contest, Harold appealed to the affection of his subjects for support and assistance, and the appeal was not made in vain, for large numbers flocked to his standard, firmly resolved to defend Harold, who had been proclaimed king immediately on the death of Edward the Confessor. William also soon found himself at the head of a formidable army; soldiers of fortune from all countries of Christendom enrolling themselves under his command, and anticipating the conquest of a country which to them would become the source of wealth and honor. Adverse winds for some time retarded the naval operations of William, but at last he embarked his forces, and landed without opposition on the coast of Sussex, near Pevensey castle. Placing himself at the head of 30,000 of the best warriors in Europe, consisting of archers, spearmen, and men at arms, William marched rapidly to Hastings, and there pitched his camp, pending the transportation from the fleet of the stores, provisions, &c. Not long was he allowed to remain inactive, for the army of his antagonist approached; and, learning this, the gallant William of Normandy challenged his rival to personal combat, thereby to avoid the unnecessary effusion of the blood of their followers. The duel was declined by Harold; who, anticipating a victory over his opponents, manned a fleet of 700 vessels, which were ordered to cut off the retreat of the invading army.

Battle of Hastings.—October 13th, 1066.

The dawn of day exhibited two gallant armies preparing for a conflict, on which depended the future destinies of thousands of British subjects. It is recorded that the Saxons, perhaps too confident in their might, had passed the previous night in carousing and mirth, while, on the contrary, the Normans addressed solemn prayers to God, and took the rest that was necessary to prepare them for the arduous duties of the eventful day of battle. Short was the space of time before the desperate strife commenced; on each side was displayed high courage, and a perfect knowledge of the use of the weapons employed; and well balanced appeared the blood be-stained scales of victory. Now, the fortune of the day was apparently against the Normans, who in vain strove to resist the solid bodies of Saxon infantry, and wearied with their fruitless exertions, the disheartened soldiers were already beginning to lose ground. Now—were they gallantly rallied, and led to a fresh attack by the heroic William himself; again, and again, did the tide of battle ebb and flow; but vainly did the impetuous valour of the knights, and the skill of the archers attempt to resist, or to put to confusion, the unflinching bravery of the Saxon bill-men. Science at length affected what courage alone could not accomplish. William selected 1000 well-disciplined horsemen, and directed them to make a feint of charging the firm battalions; but, on their near approach to them, by a pretended retreat, to endeavour to induce the enemy to break their compact formation. Completely deceived by this manœuvre, the Saxons too readily gave way to their anticipations of obtaining a speedy victory; and, tumultuously dispersing themselves, burst

from their ranks in pursuit of their flying enemies. The Norman men-at-arms lost no time in taking advantage of the successful stratagem, and a body of them dashed through and through the broken files, cutting them down by hundreds, and driving the remainder in wild confusion to the neighbouring heights.

There did the intrepid, though sadly diminished fugitives, again rally in detached bodies, and gallantly did they maintain the conflict until the approach of night, when, learning that their king had been slain in the battle, and that his courageous brothers had also shared the same fate, the intrepid Saxons yielded to the destiny which they had resolutely striven to avert, and quitted the field of strife grievously dejected at the termination of their monarchy, which for more than six centuries had been established, and had contributed to the advancement of the civilization and glory of Britain.

Discreditable to the English army as was the battle of Bannockburn, I am unwilling to pass it over unnoticed, as the result of it fully manifested the success which is obtainable by the knowledge of military science.

Battle of Bannockburn, June 23, 1314.

We learn that Bruce, being well aware of his inferiority in numerical strength, resolved to make amends for this by turning to advantage the nature of the ground on the site where the engagement was about to take place, and also by strengthening the position by military art. Resting the right of his army on the bed of the Bannock, in front of his left he caused *trous-de-loup* to be dug three feet deep, fixing stakes in the centre, and covering them lightly with turf. His spearmen, selected from the infantry, were posted in the front line, and Bruce himself held in reserve 400 well-disciplined cavalry. The archers availed themselves of the cover of the thickets, and were supported by billmen. Contrary to these judicious arrangements, the English trusted too much to the power and might of their heavy horse, and blindly rushed to the encounter; spearmen and billmen mixed together, opposed themselves to the front of the enemy, and in an inextricable mass set at defiance all manœuvres. The charge of the heavy cavalry terminated, as expected by Bruce, the portion of the discomfited horsemen who were not disabled in the *trous-de-loup*, joined the infantry, but in so irregular a manner that instead of affording them support, they did but add to their previous state of confusion. At this momentous crisis the overwhelming charge of the commander of the Scots, with the selected body of horsemen, turned the flank of the English combatants, and decided the fate of the battle, followed up as it was by an instantaneous order from Bruce for the whole line to charge, and complete the victory,—a victory that afforded full proof of the superiority of science in a commander, combined with discipline in his troops, over a deficiency of military attributes in a general and his followers, however numerous the latter may be.

It is naturally far more gratifying for me to recount battles in which our opponents were foreign troops, than engagements with, as it were, almost our own flesh and blood; and I therefore gladly

pass from the unsatisfactory battle of Bannockburn to that of Cressy. You will in all probability have perused the account of this engagement in the works of modern historians, but I prefer the quaint style, and the less imaginary description of events, of the ancient authors to these more erudite compositions; let us, therefore, refer to "*Chronicles of England, Scotland, aad Ireland*," by Raphael Holinshed, who thus terminates his preface:—"And thus I cease further to trouble thy patience, wishing to thee, gentle reader, so much profit as by reading may be had, and as great comfort as God's holie spirit may endue thee with."

Battle of Cressy.

In the "Chronicles" it is stated that, after the passage of the Somme, and the destruction of the town of Crotois, the king of England having learnt that the French monarch was approaching with the intention of offering battle, resolved to encounter him, and "commanded his marshalls to choose a plot of ground somewhat to his advantage, that he might there abide his adversaries."

On the morning of the 26th of August, 1346, Philip of France quitted the town of Abbeville, and, placing himself at the head of his forces, marched towards his enemies. "The king of England rose betimes in the morning, and commanded every man first to call upon God for his aid, and then to be armed, and to draw with speed into the field, that in the place before appointed they might be set in order of battle.

"Beginning his enterprise by invocation, or calling upon God, he was the more fortunate in his affairs, and sped the better in the progress of his actions, as the issue of the war sheweth. A notable example to every private man to remember to call upon God when he purposeth anything."

Edward then directed a park to be formed for the security of his carriages, baggage, &c., as well as for the whole of the horses of the army. The order of battle consisted of three lines, the 1st composed of 800 men at arms, 2000 archers, and 1000 other soldiers with the Welchmen. These troops were under the command of the Prince of Wales, the Earls of Warwick, Oxford, and other lords and knights; the second line was led by the Earls of Northampton and Arundel, and other noblemen, and its numerical strength is stated to have been 800 men at arms, and 1200 archers; the king commanded the third line, consisting of 700 men at arms, and 2000 archers. Edward's demeanour before the battle is thus described by Froissart:—"When every man was gotten into order of battle, the king leaped upon a white hobby, and rode from rank to rank to view them, the one marshal on his right hand and the other on his left, desiring every man that day to have regard to his right and honour. He spake it so courteously, and with so good a countenance, that even they which were before discomforted took courage in hearing him speak such sweet and loving words amongst them. It was nine of the clock e'er ever he had thus visited all his battles, and thereupon he caused every man to eat and drink a little, which they did at their leisure."

The good dispositions of the English king having been made known to Philip, he considered it advisable to postpone the engagement for that day, in order to consider and decide on the most judicious plan of attack. In vain were orders given for this purpose by the French king and his marshals to the advanced troops, who in themselves were unruly, and whose numbers were momentarily increased by those in their rear, the roads between Abbeville and Cressy being thronged, and the excited soldiery drawing their swords, and exclaiming "Down with them, let us slay them all." The English troops, observing the tumultuous approach of their enemies, steadily prepared for the conflict, the archers in front of the first line were covered by the men at arms, the second line being in readiness to afford support when required. Delay and confusion attended the assemblage of the French leaders, and when the Genoese cross-bowmen, consisting of 12,000 or 15,000 men, were ordered to the front in order to begin the battle, they declined doing so on account of having marched six leagues that morning, adding "We be not well used, in that we are commanded to fight this day, for we be not in case to do any great feat of arms; we have more need of rest."

At this time there was an eclipse, heavy rain, and terrible thunder; and when the storm abated the sun shone full upon the faces of the French, thus giving a manifest advantage to the English troops. The Genoese soldiers were subsequently "assembled together, and began to approach; they made a great leap and cry to abash the Englishmen, but they stood still, and stirred not at all for that noise. Then the Genoese, the second time, made another leap, and huge cry, and stepped forward a little, and the Englishmen removed not a foot. The third time again the Genoese leapt and yelled, and went forth till they came within shot, and fiercely therewith discharged their cross-bows. Then the English archers stepped forth one pace and let fly their arrows so wholly and so thick together that it seemed to snow. When the Genoese felt the arrows piercing their heads, arms, and breasts, many of them cast down their cross-bows and cut the strings, and returned discomforted, When the French king saw them flee away he said, "Slay these rascals, for they will let (hinder) and trouble us without reason."

Fiercely did the men at arms assault their opponents, slaying them in great numbers, and showers of arrows were poured in amongst them, adding to their panic and discomfiture. To add to their destruction "footmen with great knives killed many of them as they lay on the ground, both earls, barons, knights, and esquires." The struggle for victory still continued, French and German soldiers pressed forward, and in desperation opened a pasage through the English archers, and fought hand to hand with the men at arms. Then did the second line of Edward's army steadily advance to the succour of the Prince's troops, who were so sorely pressed by their fierce antagonists, that the Earl of Northampton sent to the king, requiring further aid for the two lines at that time suffering severely from the attacks of their opponents. "The king hereupon demanded if his son was slain, hurt, or felled to the earth. No (said the knight that brought the message), but he is sore matched. Well (said the

king) return to him, and them that sent you, and say to them that they send no more to me for any adventure that falleth, so long as my son is alive, for I will that this journey be his, with the honour thereof."

This answer having been carried to the gallant men, who were resolutely contending with their numerous assailants, every combatant was encouraged by the confidence manifested by their king, and nobly did they do their duty to their country. Eventually, perfect success attended the operations of the army of King Edward; and, towards evening, the battle was terminated by the entire route of the troops of Philip, who, by the advice of Lord John of Heinault, when all hope of success by further resistance was lost, quitted the field; with but a retinue of sixty persons for his body guard. The slaughter of the French troops was very great, for the English maintained their firm array, and dealt destruction around them over enemies whose ranks were broken, and whose hearts began to fail them in finding that their opponents' assaults were irresistible The battle having terminated, and the field being clear of the French troops, the King embraced the Prince, saying, "Fair son, God send you good perseverance in this your prosperous beginning; you have nobly accquitted yourself, you are well worthy to have the governance of a realm committed to your hands for your valiant doings."

It is quite evident that the success in this battle was attributed to the good dispositions and discipline of the English troops, which enabled them to withstand, and, eventually, to conquer enemies who individually strove manfully for victory, but whose power, collectively, availed them but little, when opposed to a well organized army.

REMINISCENCES OF A VETERAN.

BEING A NARRATIVE OF PERSONAL ADVENTURES DURING A PERIOD OF FORTY-THREE YEARS IN PORTUGAL, SPAIN, FRANCE, MALTA, NEW SOUTH WALES, NORFOLK ISLAND, NEW ZEALAND, ANDAMAN ISLAND, AND INDIA.

(Continued from page 115.)

The Colonel and myself lived in a house attached to the villa where a blacksmith's family was residing. The old man always made the servant girl get up to light me a fire, and Annette did not at all approve of the arrangement. She was as fond of her bed as the Colonel, and used to revenge herself on my going to breakfast in the adjoining house with Captain Dobbs, by strutting into the room with mock solemnity to enquire after my health. She was too much afraid of her master and mistress to play these tricks, in their house.

There was another defect in our quarters. We could not stir across the gravel walk, without being shot at, for this evil, I soon found a palliative. I got a quantity of green boughs, and stuck them rather thickly across the path at which the enemy's fire was directed. They could not under this arrangement tell whether any one was passing or not, and it ceased to be worth while for them to keep up an incessant fire. The Major General came while I was collecting the materials, and when he saw how well the cover answered, he said it ought to be called "*The Bunburian Breastwork.*" Luckily the enemy never attempted to destroy the house, or fire at it. If they had done so, it would have occasioned us a deal of mischief.

I was now perfectly recovered, when an order arrived for me to do duty, and take the command of the 6th Caçadores, in the 2nd Division; so taking leave of my former comrades I proceeded on my journey. I had a short time before received the arrears of my pay as Major of Brigade, so I had lots of money. I also escaped from the sortie the garrison made afterwards, and I can conceive from their proximity, that the Caçadores must have been rather roughly handled. Poor Dobbs, after boasting that he had remained uninjured, the whole of the war, received on this occasion a wound in the heel, which laid him up for several months.

I joined my new appointment, I think, at Tarbes; Lieut.-Colonel Fearon, my predecessor, had been killed at Orthes. The 6th Caçadores were then commanded by the senior captain, who had two brothers in the battalion. I soon found that I should again have to undergo the ordeal of being tested, but this time it was the officers, not the men.

The officers having assembled to meet me, Captain Antonio Vas, the officer in command, handed me a letter, which he said he had received for me some days before; it was addressed, in English, to the officer who may be appointed to command the 6th Caçadores, and I found on opening it that it contained an order that I should not recommend for promotion four named officers, until I had personally witnessed their conduct in the field under fire. It had hitherto been bad, and they were to redeem their credit before they were promoted.

I desired the four officers to remain with me, having dismissed the others, and I communicated to them the purport of the letter, thinking it best to do so; at the same time I told them that I was sure the Marshal must have been either mistaken or misinformed, and that it would give me great pleasure to report their gallant conduct on the next opportunity, being certain that they would not then be wanting in their duty as officers and brave men. I directed the Adjutant to manage his roster in such a manner that none of these officers should be on the baggage-guard when it was probable the battalion would be engaged, that thereby an opprtunity of wiping off the stigma might be afforded.

As I only held the rank of Major, and did not belong to the corps, the senior captain did not seem at all to relish my superseding him

in the command, although I tried hard to conciliate him, it was evident that he and his brothers were seeking to organize a party against me.

I was of course anxious to take the battalion into action as effective as possible, for as yet I was only a lieutenant in the British service, and thought the first time we were engaged I might gain my company. To do this it was necessary that as few men should be in employ as possible. But I found the officers were all horse dealers, and in consequence a great number of men were exempted from duty, to act as bât-men in charge of their horses.

Lord Wellington's orders were very stringent on this head. The captain of a company was entitled to only one bât-man, and the subalterns one to each company; and in calling the attention of the officers to this order, I permitted the subalterns to have one each for a limited period, until they could dispose of some of their horses; after that was effected I should expect the general order would be complied with. On the issue of my battalion order, I desired the adjutant to go to Captain Antonio Vas, with my compliments to request that he would not consider the order as applying to him, for I was aware from the position he held in the regiment, that he necessarily had more horses than he otherwise required, and was therefore left to dispose of them at his leisure. He sent back word to tell me he wanted no favours, or more indulgence than he was entitled to. There was no English officer excepting myself with the battalion. Captains Brunton and Temple, of the 43rd regiment, were absent on leave. These officers were also captains in the British army, and consequently my seniors in that service, but not in the Portuguese. They neither of them rejoined the corps. Brunton afterwards commanded a regiment of Dragoons in India; I don't know what became of Temple.

The officer in command of the Brigade was Colonel Hardinge, afterwards Governor General of India. On the occasion of my issuing the battalion order regarding the bât-men, he sent for me, and told me he highly approved of the order which he had seen. The late Lieutenant Colonel Fearon had noticed the same evil. Had he lived one of the first things he intended doing was the issue of a similar order. Colonel Hardinge added, "Don't you think it would have been as well to have made an exception in favour of Captain Antonio Vas, who has been in command of the battalion before you? You will find that you have a difficult card to play, and you will have to use great tact with these people." I replied, I was so fully aware of the justice of this, that I sent the adjutant to him with a message to the very purport he had just recommended. He added, "Well this is very extraordinary, and I must tell you that Vas himself is the person who put your orders into my hands, but he said nothing about the verbal message; you had better, I think then, not let him know that we have had any conversation on the subject, and act in the matter as you think best."

The next morning the battalion having assembled to commence its march, I went to the rear of the column in order to count the

number of bât-men; I found one man more than I had permitted in orders, and on enquiring whose bât man it was, Captain Vas left the ranks, and said he was his, with the permission of the officer commanding the Brigade; I enquired why he had not communicated the permission he had received to me, his commanding officer; he replied, It seemed difficult to tell who was the commanding officer, you, or the Brigadier! "To shew you that I am," I replied, "you will forthwith rejoin your company, and take the man with you."

On the other hand, whenever he complained, which was frequently, that the Quartermaster had given him a very inferior billet, and not corresponding with his position in the corps, I ordered that officer to give him mine, and in future to give me the second best. This answered a double purpose, the Quartermaster hated the Captain and his brothers, and would have been too apt, in consequence, to make my quarrel his own; but now the Captain could no longer complain of my dealing unfairly towards him.

The Caçadore Battalion was a great favourite with Sir William Stewart who commanded the division. He sometimes called them his Body Guard, at other times his Harriers. They were short muscular fellows, and made capital riflemen. From the undue partiality shewn them by Sir William, who always placed them in quarters with his staff, whilst the other Portuguese Infantry Regiments remained in bivouac, a little jealousy was created; I believe, however, the reason to have been that in small towns after the Division and Brigade staffs are accommodated, there are always a number of houses wherein a small battalion might be quartered, the officers being inadequately, but the men very comfortably provided, and the Caçadore Battalions were little more than one third of the strength of the Infantry Regiments.

On one occasion I was thus quartered after a very wet and late march, and was forced to bring my cattle into the dwelling house for the night, expecting to march early the following morning. My quarter had been told off by the Assistant Quartermaster General of the division and the door marked accordingly, but I was scarcely seated by the fire, when the Provost Marshal entered and claimed the quarter for himself. I referred him to the mark on the door, but it had been rubbed out and his own substituted. As we had only a few hours to remain, I told him he might share it with me, but with this he was not satisfied and wanted me to leave the house altogether. On my declining to do so he went to report the circumstance to the Assistant Quartermaster General, who sent me a verbal order to give it up. It was against a positive divisional order that any change of quarters should take place after the troops had once taken possession. Moreover the order adverted rather severely on the Quartermaster General's department for irregularity and consequent complaints, which its contravention had occasioned. I took my stand and told him that I would not move at that late hour of the night without an express order from the General, desiring the Provost Marshal to leave the house immediately; he was obliged with his guard to pass the night in the open market house. I was in a rage, for I told him that I would not allow a single individual

of the battalion to be moved any more than myself. The next morning on the line of march I met the Assistant Quartermaster General, who was very indignant at my conduct, asking me if I was not aware that the staff, without reference to rank, always took the choice of quarters before regimental officers.

This officer was no other than the person formerly mentioned from the Military College, who, as a youngster, I had assisted in tormenting, and he urged old friendship and former service together as a further reason why I should have acted differently.

I replied, if custom was to constitute law, I acknowledged that the staff always took care of themselves first, but I could see no other assignable reason, and that old friendship and former service together I did not anticipate would have permitted him to pass over the claims of a Field Officer in command of a corps, in favour of one who only a few weeks before had not even His Majesty's commission. He replied that he might probably yet have an opportunity of convincing me that he was right; but we never afterwards met in any official relation to each other.

CHAPTER VIII.

Battle of Toulouse, 10th of April, 1814—Rival Lovers—My French Cook—Roguery of a Restaurateur at Toulouse—Return of the Anglo Portuguese Army to Portugal—Amusements *en route*—Appointed to the 3rd Battalion of Caçadores—Quartered at Villa Real, Tras dos Montes—Tea Making, alias Flirtation—Life in a Nunnery—Portuguese Wine Company—Excursion and Amusements.

About an hour before daylight, on the morning preceding the battle of Toulouse, General Stewart sent for me. I found him on the table land which overlooks Toulouse; the city being on the opposite side of the river Garonne. He said, "I suppose you have noticed the field works, which the enemy have erected below us?" I replied, I had. "Then, I wish you," was his reply, "with the Caçadores to drive the enemy from them, so go and make your arrangements immediately, and be ready to commence your attack when day breaks. My friend, the senior Lieut. (one of the four officers named in the letter) had contrived to be away, on the baggage guard, but I was assured by the Adjutant, that it had been quite a mistake; possibly it was so.

We did not find the job a very difficult one; the enemy withdrew their men as we advanced, and as I had orders not to go beyond a particular point, I halted the party. The enemy now began pelting us with round shot, but having made the skirmishers lie down, they did us no injury beyond covering us with mud. When the fire slackened, I thought it better to advance a little further in order to gain possession of some houses, whence they were beginning to annoy us with musketry; these we easily carried, and I then obtained better cover. In posting the men I took the other brother, the senior ensign, with me, and I never saw a poor devil in such a fright, bobbing his head every instant, when a musket ball from the enemy passed near him. I continued with him until he became somewhat cool and collected, so as to understand what I was saying

to him. I had observed the enemy making preparations to withdraw a howitzer and some guns, from a battery near us. I could easily have prevented the removal, but it was beyond the limit assigned me, so I rode back to Sir William and pointed out to him what the enemy were doing, and requested permission to prevent them; as it could be done with great ease. He told me that he also had observed them, but that our attack was meant to be a mere demonstration, to call the enemy's attention to that point, and that he would feel the loss of any of his Cacadores more than he prized the capture of one or two guns, which in the pending operations might be of little value to the enemy.

I returned to my advanced party, and here we remained until it was dark, in a large house which they told me had been Soult's quarters. We found dinner ready, but no one to put it on the table, the occupants had fled, but our people soon arranged the matter for us. The house was splendidly furnished, plenty of beautifully cut glass and Sévre's porcelain; and if there had been any plate on the table which was laid, it must have disappeared before I entered. I immediately posted sentries to prevent any damage being done to the property, eatables excepted, which I allowed the men to take whenever they could find them, as they had till then been without their dinner.

We had been in this château about two hours, enjoying ourselves, while the enemy every now and then fired a few shots of musketry from a large building on the opposite side of the river, which I took to be an hospital, from its having the black flag displayed from one of the windows.

The enjoyment of our "*otium cum dignitate*" was at length disturbed by a party of riflemen joining us; I think they belonged to the regiment of the Brunswick Œls They took post in the house, and commenced gutting it forthwith, the officers setting the example. In this stage of the proceedings I thought I might as well have my share too, so I desired my servant to collect different articles to complete my canteen for six persons. I was rather late, as some of the most handsome things were gone; but, besides tea-cups and articles of that kind, I got a set of the most beautiful dessert plates I ever saw, each plate being ornamented with a different landscape. On my march afterwards through Spain, to Portugal, they were the admiration of all the landladies where I was billeted: some of them were broken, others stolen, many were given away as presents, and very few of them reached Portugal.

At night-fall we were relieved by a party from the 31st regiment. I remained a little behind, talking to Bolton, the adjutant of that corps, on the Causeway, leading from the bridge, when a round shot fell between us. I afterwards served in India under him, when he reminded me of the circumstance. Colonel Bolton was afterwards killed at Moodkee. Although the battle of Toulouse took place the following day, I was only a distant spectator. I had taken care of my men while they were engaged in a feigned attack, by placing them, whenever it was possible, under cover. By this means none were either killed or wounded; and not only John Bull himself, but

it would seem the higher authorities also, can never conceive that a military service is well executed unless accompanied by a butcher's bill, representing great loss of life and limb. The brigadier was from this cause refused the command medal, which he might otherwise have received, as my battalion formed part of his brigade.

Colonel Hardinge wrote to me many months afterwards, forwarding a copy of a letter from the Horse Guards. He had applied to obtain the medal for the Battle of Toulouse, as my battalion was engaged; but the application was refused, the second division having been reported by Lord Wellington not to have been engaged. After the action at Toulouse, the battalion was cantoned in a village on the road leading from that city to Villa Franca, where the enemy had established outposts.

The entry of the allies into Paris having been made known, Colonel Hardinge left the army, and was succeeded in the command of the brigade by Colonel Pym, until the arrival of Major-General Ashworth.

Sir William Stewart did not approve of the cantonment which had been assigned to me; he wanted us farther in advance, and desired me to follow him with the battalion. We wandered about the country till it was quite late in the day, the General all the time expatiating on the advantages and disadvantages, as military posts, of each village we reached; at length we ventured to point out to him that the men were getting tired, and beginning to feel the want of their dinners; and, as a village was at hand, I begged he would let us remain there for the night. To this he assented, having quite forgotten that the men were marching at his heels. The following morning we received orders to march back to our former cantonments.

Colonel Pym had left his quarters in the cantonments of his own regiment, and, instead of taking those previously occupied by Col. Hardinge, he fixed his abode in the cantonments of the Caçadores, at a château where a very pretty French woman, who was divorced from her husband, resided with two beautiful children. Dr. Clarence, the staff surgeon of the brigade, Captain Davenport of Pym's own regiments, and myself, were inseparables, and we voted Pym's arrangements a great bore.

The Doctor was half mad, the Captain was an amorous Irishman, with a good voice, could sing well, and we were determined to teaze the poor Colonel to the utmost. He gave us divers hints that it was not necessary that we should visit him so often. We told him that now he was a Brigadier, politeness required it, and when this excuse was worn threadbare, we said we had come to see Madame, who, unlike him, was always happy to receive us. She soon perceived the drift of our visits, and entered into the fun with all the ardour of a lively Frenchwoman. Davenport, although he could not speak a word of French, was the most noticed by the lady, as he also had an agreeable voice and played the guitar; Pym accordingly sent him for a few days to enquire about some windmills which had been burnt down; but in fact to get him out of the way. When he returned, he and the mad Doctor dined with me, and I requested

Madame Banse Riviéll to bring her guitar and come and join us. I had prepared her before hand, and consequently all Pym's representations on the impropriety of her coming to my quarters were thrown away. I never laughed so much in my life, the doctor and the lady began a game of romps and made so much noise that mine host and his wife (tenants of the lady) came up to see what was the matter. The amorous Irishman became sentimental and jealous, and altogether the contrast was most ludicrous.

Having such good materials to work upon, the Doctor and myself, the following day, set about composing a mock heroic poem, in three cantos, describing the intrusion of the Colonel, the banishment and sufferings of the lover, the lady's feelings when the doctor attempted to supersede him during his absence, and a lot of other nonsense, which this mad fellow had the impudence standing on a chair, to recite in Pym's presence, with an account of the presents the Captain had given her prior to his being sent in search of the windmills!! The old fellow could not help laughing, although we sometimes, as the ditty proceeded, hit him very hard; and I lost caste with the lady; and from having made her figure in our doggrel rhymes, she was pleased to call me a dangerous person.

I went sometimes to Toulouse, particularly on our first arrival, and generally took two or three Portuguese officers with me to dine at the restaurant near the square, where we used to get capital Languedoc wine (Moussé) very cheap. On one occasion, when I went there with a small party as usual, I stopt to gaze at a distance at some showman (for anything approaching Mr. Punch had to me always great attractions), when I observed one of this party, a trumpeter, had caught my eye. Down went his instrument, and in a moment, over the head of the crowd, he was at my side; it turned out to be my late cook, poor Auguste, whom I had been obliged to discharge for over zeal in my service, in never paying any of his countrymen, or charging me anything for my living. He told me he had been to Paris, where they had given him a pension of one franc per diem. I said, "Well, Auguste, you deserved it, if it was only for your services at the battle of *Celerico*." "Parbleau," he replied, "we were in great danger, and if you, Monsieur Mon Majeur," (glancing his eyes at the cuff of my jacket, where my present rank was visible) "would only have let me, at those *Coquins de Juifs*, the following morning, when I had obtained a good stick, would I not have made mince meat of them?" He wanted me greatly to go up to the show with him, where I was to see all for nothing, and be introduced to the manager, who, he said, was a brave garçon; but as the crowd were collecting around us, I told him I would see him again another time. With my party, we then went to the old restaurant, and I ordered dinner for three officers and myself. I had always given the garçon a few sous, and, in consequence, he was very civil. I desired him to bring the same wine that we had always taken. This house had now become a place of great resort, and there were a number of officers of our cavalry dining there. These gentlemen generally contrived to spoil the market wherever they went; and they had done the same here. On calling for the

bill, I found we were charged sixteen dollars for what we formerly paid three or four. On enquiring the reason, I was told we had been drinking champagne. Sending for the master, and telling him that I had never before been charged more than a franc a bottle, and that I had not ordered champagne, he said, he hoped we would not oblige him to make the garçon pay for his mistake; which he would certainly do, if we disputed payment. I paid the amount, and ordered another bottle; the fellow was very civil, and waited to draw the cork, but I told him it was not necessary. As he still loitered about, anxious that the cork should be drawn, I bid him let the bottle alone, as I intended taking it, as it was, to the préfect, being desirous of ascertaining whether that functionary was a better judge of wine than myself. To my taste, the wine was the wine of the country called Blanquette (Moussé), sold at a franc a bottle. The fellow then got much alarmed, and said that, rather than have the credit of his establishment called in question, we might pay whatever we liked. I gave him back his bill, which he returned with the proper charges only, saying, there was such a demand for that wine in the house that in future he would be obliged to charge us two or three sous more than he hitherto had done. One of our party had noticed a placard in the streets, announcing that it had come to the préfect's knowledge that gross imposition had been practised on the British troops, and inviting the officers to make their complaints when they had any, with a view to the punishment of the offenders. I frequently dined at the house afterwards, and remarked that our cavalry officers drank the same wine, and paid for it at five francs a bottle, as champagne; I never thought it worth my while to put them right. They, in the first instance, caused the price of everything to be raised, and I considered it expedient that they should continue to be cheated for their folly.

The period at length arrived for breaking up the Anglo-Portuguese army, and the Oporto brigade, to which I belonged, marched through part of France, Spain, and Portugal, to the destination assigned the different regiments. Some time before we commenced our march I received a letter from Messrs. Hibbert and Hume, Army Clothiers, London, begging that I would interest myself to recover the amount of their bill for appointments they had sent for the battalion, at the request of the late Lieut.-Col. Hearor, and which, if not paid by the corps, would oblige them to sue his aged mother for the amount, a step they would be very unwilling to take. I assembled the officers to enquire how they proposed to liquidate the debt, which it was very evident they were not desirous of paying at all; nor were they anxious to receive the articles, which by this time had arrived at Passages. A debt contracted at the request of the officers by my predecessor I considered just as incumbent on me to recover as if the things had been ordered by myself; I therefore told them that they were not assembled to give them option of taking the articles for which they had all signed a requisition, but to study their convenience in the amount of stoppages they desired to leave monthly for the information and guidance of the person who had supplied them. Seeing that I was inflexible, I succeeded before we

separated in obtaining from each officer a written authority for the Paymaster to stop a certain portion of pay monthly, and was thus enabled to make one remittance, and collect funds nearly sufficient for another, before leaving the battalion.

Our march was one scene of gaiety, particularly in France, for either the Brigade, or the Caçadores, or the Major-General, conjointly with myself, gave a ball at every large town we came to, and the expense was very trifling. I was generally sent in advance to make the arrangements.

Frequently young Frenchmen have come to me in the room, and said, "How is it you have picked up so many pretty girls? We are natives of the town, and have never met so much beauty before." I told them it was a particular instinct—a tact which the Chasseurs had to discover a pretty girl wherever she was to be found! But the real mode of proceeding was this,—at the Prefecture I usually got the names of all the respectable people of the place, with a particular request that no young ladies' names should be omitted, even if they had no papa or mamma to bring them. I then enquired what ladies were pretty from some other person, and what ladies were otherwise.

The most respectable family was invited to give a tone to the party, with such tabbies only as were necessary to accompany the girls selected, and a sprinkling of young Frenchmen (dancers); all the rest were excluded. Some people were surprised at not having been invited; it was deemed an oversight, and we were off the next day; in fact, we were more desirous of amusing ourselves than in paying the great families a compliment.

Our damoiseaux and the demoiselles seemed to enjoy themselves most heartily. There is, I believe, contagion in such hilarity, at least I thought so myself, and on one occasion fell in love with the only daughter of mine host. She had a brother commanding a regiment of French Cuirassiers; they were a very old and respectable family, but certainly the young lady was kept too secluded and watched, at least she thought so, for she lost no time in making me aware of her desire to elope from the house of her parents.

Young and pretty as the lady was, how could I resist the temptation? and all the happiness she depicted as being in store for us; I say *she* depicted, for I verily believe that I should never have dreamed of proposing such a sapient arrangement. I was possessed unfortunately of a small phaeton, and without either of us reflecting for a moment on the consequences, our project would have been carried out, provided the lady could manage to escape through the bed-room of her parents and that of her duenna. Very few words had sufficed to bring about our anticipated happiness. Dancing with her the first quadrille, she remarked, "How much I admire your Chasseurs." "We want some recruits," was my reply; "would mademoiselle like to join us?" "Oh, yes!" she said, "but you won't take me with you?" "Certainly we will; but what will papa say?" "Oh, if you will let me go with you, never mind that, he will soon forget it, *voilà l'affair finit*." I received several notes from her the following day, when we were halted, reminding me of my pro-

mise, with her plans; and, I was so infatuated that I had not courage to resist being thus dragged by a child into an imprudent step, by at once undeceiving her. But fortune and my associates befriended me. Captain Devenport and the staff-surgeon used frequently to dine with me without any previous intimation, and they would also sometimes bring a friend with them; and it so happened that the day of our halt they came, accompanied by a young chaplain of the army, whom they had met with; he was an exceedingly gentlemanlike person. After dinner the conversation turned upon the party we had the previous evening. The clergyman, after apologizing for the liberty he was about to take, and which he said was justifiable from one of his cloth, told me he had heard of my intended project from my two friends; and to rescue me if possible from the disgrace attached to it, and to point out the evil effects it would have upon my future prospects in my profession, was the occasion of his present visit, and he trusted we should not separate without his obtaining from me a promise not to proceed further in the matter.

This advice, coming from a person I had never seen before, and given in so kind and friendly a manner, had one good effect. It made me reflect, which I had not done before, and I at once perceived that a young giddy French wife was not calculated to add to my happiness, while my habits, pursuits, and way of thinking satisfied me that the young lady would be much better without me as her liege lord and master. I had, however, no opportunity of explaining myself, or taking leave of the lady, and not daring to stay for the appointed hour, I moved off in advance. I never heard afterwards from her, but am inclined to believe she did not break her heart; and if she really wished for a husband, she might succeed perhaps better with the next brigade which followed us. The young clergyman who rendered me this kind service I never met with or heard of afterwards.

Our march continued to be a very pleasant one; we amused ourselves occasionally with mock tournaments, armed with long pieces of bamboo; in breaking a lance with each other one of the party frequently got unhorsed. An unfortunate lieutenant, whose pony had a trick of getting the bit out of his mouth, afforded us great amusement. He generally stuck close to the column, surrounded by the men; but at times when he was off his guard, we would give a yell, and away would go the pony and the officers after him. His rider, without a bridle, contrived generally to sit him well, but in a dreadful fright. Although he sometimes got a fall, he was never hurt. This was not a very military proceeding; the men, however, seemed to enjoy the fun as much as their officers.

We had also some little disagreements. Devenport was the most silly fellow I ever met, where women were concerned, and in the house where he was billeted he was as jealous of Clarence and myself talking to them as if they were his undivided property. He could not speak one word of French, and we laughed and joked him on his sentimentality, in having so soon forgotten the Lady of the Chateau. He could not bear being rallied on the subject, saying that we engrossed the conversation of all the women; we had made

him particularly angry, and, to pacify him, we promised not again to approach the ladies where he was billeted. I scarcely could persuade myself that he was serious in making this foolish proposition. However, I found he was determined to abide by it; for, a few days afterwards, I went out to walk and see the town where we were quartered with the master of the house, who took me also to the *maille*, and introduced me to a family who were assembled under the shade of the trees. A walk was proposed by the party, and I gave my arm to one of the two young ladies who were there; we were soon followed by Devenport, whose hostess it seems I was walking with, when he tendered his arm, which she declined, saying one was enough. He then offered his arm to the other young lady, which she also declined, as she was about entering a convent to take the veil as a nun. He could not understand the reason of her not walking with him, and he became very angry, conceiving that I had so arranged it, and I was afraid that my fair friend would perceive what he was saying. He wanted me to pass her over to him, which I could not do, where I ever so much disposed; and, as he made use of some expressions of which I did not exactly approve, I told him I would not be bullied into a compliance with his nonsense.

He left the party and sent a friend to call me out, or to bring him an apology; the latter I declined giving, as I conceived that I was the person who had most reason to feel offended. A friend was sent for on my account, and I told them both the story, just as it occurred, at which they laughed immoderately, and yet they passed nearly the whole night in trying to dissuade the silly fellow from shooting me. I suspect that most of the duels which take place arise from causes even more trivial. Poor Devenport was, a year or two afterwards, drowned on his passage between Holyhead and Dublin. He had previously left the Portuguese service.

When we were about to enter Portugal I was appointed Major of the 3rd battalion of the Caçadores, with orders to join that corps at Villa Reale, Tras dos Montes. Before taking leave of the Oporto brigade, I had an opportunity of seeing my successor, Lieut.-Col. Peter Adamson. He told me he had applied to have the command of the Caçadores battalion immediately after the battle of Orthes, when Lieutenant-Colonel Fearon was killed, and again on his seeing me attached to take the temporary command of it. The Marshal had, however, declined appointing him until now, telling him always that I had been placed there under very peculiar circumstances. He did not seem satisfied at my retaining the command so long, to his prejudice, and when I introduced the officers to him, and handed over the command, I gave him also the papers and money referable to the accounts of Messrs. Hibbert and Hume, expressing a hope that he would see that account settled and paid.

Comparatively speaking, few British officers were now retained in the Portuguese service. Most of them rejoined their regiments; I was, however, one of those authorized to remain, and all the subalterns so authorized, obtained companies in the British service without purchase. Mine was dated 23rd of October, 1814. Twelve

months afterwards we were all placed on the half pay list of the British army. The 3rd battalion of Caçadores, to which I had been newly appointed, had been organised and commanded in the first years of the Peninsular War by the late Sir George Elder. The officer in command when I joined, was Lieutenant-Colonel Luiz de Cerqueira. He was a married man, but divorced from his wife, and had some property in the neighbourhood of Villa Reale. He was a very agreeable companion, but rather too much infected with the Philosophy of Voltaire, Rousseau, Volney, and other of the French school. He seldom remained long with the battalion, and in consequence, the command frequently devolved upon me.

The General Officer commanding the Provence (the Conde de Amarante), had his head-quarters at Villa Reale, and I was on very intimate terms with the principal magistrate, Maraes Sarmento, afterwards Ambassador to our Court. We had subsequently with the battalion, a married officer, Captain Dobson, a most eccentric character.

The chaplain of the army was a blustering Franciscan friar; he had made himself very useful to Sir G. Elder, who employed him to bully the people at the arsenal at Lisbon, by which means his corps was equipped and appointed sooner and better than any other. The Priest was a coarse sensualist; but he was, shortly after my arrival, sent out to Rio Janeiro, and became the tutor and spiritual adviser to the Prince Don Miguel!! There was also a Captain of the name of Cassamiro, who had been a Dominican friar, but in the breaking out of the revolution he turned soldier and married. He could not have remained in the country, and less so at Villa Reale, where there was a Dominican convent. After the war was terminated, he was, therefore, sent to the Brazils, where he also became military tutor to Don Miguel. With such teachers and preceptors, we need not be surprised that the Prince became what he was.

Several of the officers had small incomes, exclusive of their military pay, and some of them (as the Lieut.-Colonel and myself) resided during the summer months in small villas outside the town. We formed a sort of mess, a very jolly one, but on principles drawn up by our Lieut.-Colonel, quite different from the mess rules in our service. We dined with each other in rotation, and were at liberty to bring a friend if we liked. This plan had its evils, for we began to vie with each other, and the price of game and other articles in the market rose in proportion. To check extravagance the Lieut.-Colonel proposed a bye law, that our table was not to groan with more than a certain number of dishes. The penalty was rather a humorous one, the offender being punished by our dining with him again the following day, and every consecutive day until his courage abated to the proper level. The Lieut.-Colonel was himself the first to infringe his own regulation, and he was also the first to suffer punishment, he then became more reasonable. If I rightly recollect, ladies dined with us on one or two occasions, when the evening was generally spent playing volterette (a game at cards), played by three persons, and the ladies singing, accompanied themselves on the Portuguese guitar, or, as *they* termed it, the English guitar.

(To be continued.)

EDITOR'S PORTFOLIO;

OR,

NAVAL AND MILITARY REGISTER.

THE APPROACHING WAR.—Although the report of a secret alliance between France and Russia is not confirmed, and, indeed, is even partially contradicted, the opinions expressed in the postcript of our last number on the present conflict have gained ground, and the very advocates of peace are beginning to look forward to our early participation in the war. No reasonable mind can regard the complications thickening around us as leading to any other result. In the first place it is contrary to all our traditions, inimical to our interests, and destructive to our prestige, to leave another power in command of the seas; and that the French are not likely to reconcile us to such a novelty, is, we conceive, shown by their search of an English mail steamer, under circumstances wholly unwarrantable. The Dutch flag has also been insulted, and we may soon expect to hear of other outrages. Secondly, it is clearly intended that the blockade of the Adriatic, which has already proved injurious to our commerce, shall be extended to Trieste, as soon as the French squadron is reinforced; and we shall thus be deprived of the first link in our communication with India. This will also be a violation of the federal territory of Germany, and, by extending the quarrel to the German States, will draw down a federal army on the Rhine, leading, we cannot doubt, to immediate hostilities. Such a General as PELISSIER is not likely to suffer all the laurels to be gathered in Italy, while he is at the head of an army in this quarter; and we may believe that the infraction of the neutrality of Belgium, which is to call England to the field, will not be a remote event. Nor can Her MAJESTY'S Government be blind to the designs of France on Naples and Egypt, in neither of which countries can she be permitted with safety to our possessions, to establish a footing. Whatever her engagements with France, Russia is pursuing her own projects of aggrandizement, in such a manner as certainly favour those of the French Emperor. Her agents are at work on the Danube, in Hungary, Greece, and Turkey. Like KOSSUTH and LOUIS NAPOLEON, she has become enamoured of nationalities, and,

under this cry, is raising the Slave populations of Eastern Europe. In short, in whatever direction we look, and wherever we turn, troubled waters are ahead, and there is no saying at what moment we may not "drift" into them. Let us, if possible, avert hostilities for three months, and we shall then enter the lists prepared.

THE ADMIRALTY AND THE NAVY.—The friends of Captain CARNEGIE must acknowledge that his expulsion from the Admiralty has not proved a national loss. The Board at Whitehall is acting with a vigour unparalleled in these degenerate days, just as if this martyr had never pertained to it. We can even assure his Whig godfather, Sir BENJAMIN HALL, that, despite his consummate abilities, he was found to be rather a hindrance to the public service than an aid, and it was not intended, under any circumstances, to retain him at the Admiralty. The gallant Captain has effected a wise retreat, and, in the shades of private life, will solace himself with the recognition his services have received in "the order of the millstone." Meanwhile, the Admiralty has been proceeding energetically with the task intrusted to it; and in such a spirit, and on such a scale, as justifies the assertion that Sir JOHN PAKINGTON is reconstructing the navy. The dockyards are rife with an endless din of preparation, and every week either adds to the number of our ships afloat, or sees new vessels advancing towards completion. The QUEEN'S proclamation for the enlistment of seamen has been attended with the best effect. Numbers have come forward at every port, in answer to the appeals of Captains BROWN and PYM, to avail themselves of the proffered terms, and there seems to be no doubt that the required complement will shortly be raised. But it has been unmistakeably manifested that there is still great distaste among the maritime class to the national service, and, at the meetings held at various places, the grounds of this repugnance were not left unstated. Some of the objections were successfully combated by Captain BROWN in the West, and by Captain PYM in the North; and too much praise cannot be awarded to these officers for the zeal and ability with which they carried out their mission. Notwithstanding all that has been done for the sailor, however, it is unfortunately too true that there remains some room for complaint. The feeling everywhere evinced on the subject of corporal punishment points to a grievance of the first magnitude. It was argued, indeed, that the practice had very much abated, and was now under severe restrictions; but, in both respects, there is still room for improvement. Corporal punishment can hardly be altogether abolished, but the Commander of a vessel ought to understand that its infliction will always involve responsibility, and may lead to investigation. We no longer give a man three dozen for being last up at quarters; but, even inour day, there are officers who would not be the worse for having in their composition a larger share of the milk of human kindness. It is to meet such cases that the Admiralty, in a wise spirit of conciliation, have issued a circular on the reception that is to be given to volun-

teers, and the treatment they are to receive. We cannot too highly commend this admirable letter, which is at once an admonition to officers, and a charter of rights to the seaman. It enjoins, on the part of the officer, the exercise of a generous forbearance, a provident care for the present wants and future career of the sailor, and temper and patience in training him to his duties. The sailor will be initiated in the whole routine of discipline directly he enters the ship, but allowance is to be made for the novelty of his situation, and neither every little infraction of orders nor backwardness in drill is to be hastily noted. An injunction is laid on "the officers of the fleet to turn to good account the opportunity that has been afforded for dispelling the aversion for the navy which the merchant seamen have received from traditional misrepresentations of the QUEEN's service," and, with such instructions emanating from the Admiralty, and committed to British officers, we may believe that the difficulties in the way of manning the navy will soon be removed, and that the service will become as attractive and popular as it once was odious.

THE OPERATIONS IN ITALY.—If we may draw any conclusions as to the design of LOUIS NAPOLEON, from the affairs at Montebello and Vercelli, appearances indicate that the demonstrations hitherto made of an intention to effect the passage of the Po by open brute force opposite to Valenza, are a mere feint. It was not to be expected, indeed, that so diligent a student of history as the French Emperor, and particularly one who treads so closely in the steps of the great NAPOLEON, would commit so fatal an error, when, on this very ground, the military genius of his uncle followed a strategy exactly the reverse. It was at this point of Valenza that General BUONAPARTE threatened to pass the river in 1796, but, while his movement gave this impression to the Austrians, he accomplished a forced march to Castel San Giovanni, and, throwing forward a body of dragoons, seized some boats near Piacenza, where his column arrived in the morning, and encountered little opposition in the passage of the river. It was an instruction of FREDERICK the Great to his Generals that no attempt should be made to force the passage of a river without having recourse to stratagem. In the interesting remarks on the seat of war in our last number, General MACINTOSH has pointed out the course followed in 1848 by Radetzky, who threw the Sardinian army into confusion, by crossing the Ticino at Pavia, instead of by the bridge of Buffalora, where they had prepared for his reception. At the present moment, the professional student will do well to turn to Sir HOWARD DOUGLAS's work on *The Construction of Military Bridges and the Passage of Rivers in Military Operations*, which furnishes a key to the movements of both armies, as they are shadowed forth by the telegrams. The admirable review of river operations in the third edition of this work, from p. 147 to p. 163, and again from p. 198 to p. 222, has an application to the passing manœuvres that at once makes them comprehensible. LOUIS NAPOLEON may be a close copy of his uncle, but he has hitherto shown no originality. The second battle of Montebello is, at best, but a feeble repeat of the first, and the feint at Valenza is not effective on a second performance. He seems to intend a passage of

the Po at much the same point as BUONAPARTE—certainly, from present appearances, below the confluence of the Ticino; for the French are extending in great force in that direction. At the same time, the affair of General Cialdini opens a double strategical movement, by passing the Sesia near Vercelli, and pushing the Austrians towards Novara. The effect of these flank movements may compel the Austrians to abandon the whole of the Upper Po, though they have now fixed their head-quarters at Garlasco, and strengthened their outposts. Meanwhile GARIBALDI has penetrated the Milanese, and, according to the latest telegram, is approaching Como; but he can give the Austrians no serious trouble, unless supported by a general insurrection. A rising, indeed, is reported, but at what point or to what extent we are left to conjecture. Should it be at Como, GARIBALDI, though without artillery, may be able to maintain himself, and the separate corps of Prince NAPOLEON will probably push over the Appenines, and draw off the Austrians. But this operation will not be unopposed, and the French columns will have to force their way through Modena, where the Duke is preparing for a vigorous defence. In our next number we may have to show the result of these various movements.

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN NORTH AMERICA.—Woolwich has lost the most popular Commandant that it has had for many years. The hero of Kars is no longer among us, and not a few will miss that genial frankness, and considerate thought for all, which he never failed to exhibit. In Sir W. FENWICK WILLIAMS, the Artillery has parted with one of its best officers; but we can hardly regret the separation, since it advances him to the important command of North America, for which he is, on every ground, specially fitted. Before the gallant General's departure, the Artillery entertained him at a ball, at which nearly 800 persons were present, and Sir FENWICK may be assured he carries with him across the Atlantic the good wishes of the whole garrison. The gallant General has appointed his personal staff in a manner very characteristic, having formed it of the three officers standing first on the list of the Staff College, without ever having seen them. This is a great blow to the system of nephew and jackass.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

WOODLEIGH. By the Author of "The House of Elmore," &c. 3 vols.

THIS is essentially a domestic story, written with great spirit and a high purpose. It is one of those books that may be put in the hands of the young, and read by the old with equal advantage, while it inspires in both a corresponding interest. The narrative is animated, without ever being

improbable; for the incidents are all of a kind that happen in ordinary life, and which any of us may experience. Hence they are not always new, and one or two have a familiar air; but this is small ground for cavil, and when the plot is cleverly worked out, as it is here, we are not disposed to look for faults. The story is laid among the middle classes, which afford such a variety of characters and the widest range of conditions; at one extreme bordering on the aristocracy, and at the other on the poor. We are first introduced to a widow of a certain age, who is charmingly described; and, like all such widows, she soon attracts a suitor, and contracts a second marriage. This is not so agreeable to her son, a spirited youth, who has enjoyed considerable liberty under the old régime, and finds himself curbed by the new one. After some struggling, he determines to run away, and, accordingly, takes refuge with his paternal uncle, who receives him kindly, and procures him employment. He now becomes acquainted with his cousins, and the family group are severally introduced, and at once awaken interest. Robert is quickly fascinated by Constance; but, on avowing his attachment, is mortified to find that she prefers an earlier admirer, one Heberdin; and his disappointment and impetuosity lead him into a series of adventures which threaten to bring misery on all three. At the critical moment, Robert's generosity is aroused, and, by a frank explanation, he vindicates the conduct of Constance, and reconciles her to Heberdin. A timely discovery, which is very effectively brought out, secures a happy destiny to himself, and the story ends in a manner as satisfactory to the reader as to the parties concerned.

NEWTON DOGVANE.—3 Vols.

Trade has its adherents and its deserters, and while it exercises a fascination over some, excites disgust in others. We can never understand the feeling that induces men with colossal fortunes to embark in business; but this is an incident of every-day occurrence. Just as frequently those who are born and reared at the counter, with all its traditions in their mind, leap over it, and aspire to higher things. The hero of the story before us is of this stamp; and his career is related in a dashing style, and with infinite humour. As aristocratic instincts are contagious, he easily persuades his father to forsake the path of commerce, and set up for a country gentleman, which opens to him the very sphere he desires. We have an amusing account of his introduction to the turf, and initiation to field sports, presenting him, at first, as a sort of Peter Simple; but his natural shrewdness carries him through all mistakes, and soon wins a *prestige*. This portion of the tale is related with great vivacity. The author is a thorough sportsman, enthusiastic in the mysteries of his craft, which he knows how to describe in an effective manner. The main interest of the narrative depends on this proficiency, for, although there is no lack of incident, the plot is slight. But the course of the story is not confined to the sporting world; and we suspect the author has had experiences in another vocation, for, as the plot expands, he gives some good glimpses of military life. One of the characters proceeds to the Crimea, and takes part in the campaign, affording an opportunity, in the incidents that follow, for some artistic effects. Of course there are the usual crosses in love, but all comes right in the end, so far as regards the favourite characters; but one unlucky wight, who becomes the prey of a certain Madame Petrovich, a Greek adventuress, is made to point the moral, and set up as a warning. As a whole, the book gives a graphic picture of life, and possessing a certain amount of novelty, is likely to be read with curiosity as well as interest. The sketches of sporting sharpers will attract particular attention.

NATHALIE. By Julia Kavanagh.

THIS is the new volume of the series of popular works, forming Hurst and Blackett's library, which we have before noticed in terms of commendation. Such a series has long been a desideratum, particularly for regimental collections, and, judging from the works already published, it will meet every requirement. "Nathalie" is a charming tale, and has achieved a reputation so wide, that any encomium upon it may now seem superfluous. But for the information of those who have not read it, we may state that it is a story of French life, altogether domestic in character, and delineates the provincial society of France in the most picturesque manner. The narrative is very pleasing; and the dialogue, by which the story is principally carried on, fresh and dramatic, without ever ceasing to be natural. The heroine is acknowledged to be one of the most beautiful creations of modern fiction. As the work is now published at five shillings, in a handsome volume, the reputation it acquired on its first appearance will no doubt be greatly extended.

THE JEWS IN THE EAST.

THE interest that attaches to "The Jews in the East," seems to grow with our years; and neither the course of events, nor their own conduct, can change or diminish it. On that ground which is still their country, they touch our dearest sensibilities, and we are never weary of reading all that travellers can tell us of their social condition. In this age of movements it is strange that no one has taken advantage of this feeling to get up a case for the Jews. Talk of Italy and Hungary, here is a nationality that had been carried away to Babylon before the foundation of Rome. Why does no some French Quixote, swelling with benignant aspirations, collect the scattered tribes, and revive the monarchy of David? He might summon volunteers from the four winds, and there could be no difficulty in the matter of loans. But, perhaps, the French have discovered it would be difficult so to blind the Jews. They do not look for liberation at the hands of Pharoah, or any other despot. Their present condition, as described in these volumes, their habits, and their dispersion over the world, confirm, indeed, what the Scriptures declare, that their restoration can be accomplished by no earthly power, though everything indicates that they are reserved for a great destiny. The work before us is from the pen of a distinguished member of their own persuasion, who made a pilgrimage to the land of his fathers with the view of investigating their social state; and a more interesting narrative we have seldom read. No one but a Jew could have given such particulars; for they are the result of familiar communion and a knowledge of the whole Hebraic economy. The author, however, is free from sectarian prejudice, animated by kindly sentiments to all creeds, and alive to the shortcomings of his own race. He especially complains of the early marriages of the Eastern Jews, which he mentions as one cause of their enervation; and when we are told of boys of fourteen marrying girls of twelve, the solution is not difficult of belief. It would seem, indeed, that the misery of the Eastern Jews is chiefly of their own creation. Their Western brethren have given both wealth and influence to improve their condition, but all their benevolence is defeated by local supineness; and they find in Palestine what they might have learnt nearer home, that it is impossible to help a people who are determined not to help themselves.

PORTRAIT OF PRINCE ALFRED.—Mr. Mitchell has just published a beautiful portrait of H.R.H. Prince Alfred, exquisitely executed. All who desire a faithful likeness of our sailor-prince should immediately provide themselves with this picture. The peculiarly frank expression of the Prince's features is admirably preserved.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE.

[With a view of promoting the interests of the Service, this department of the Magazine is open to all authentic communications, and, therefore, the Editor cannot hold himself responsible for the opinions expressed.—Ed. U. S. Mag.]

MESSES AND MESMEN.

To the Editor of the United Service Magazine.

The late order of H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief, with respect to messmen, has created quite an excitement with those individuals, but is received as a great boon by the various tradesmen who supply them.

The system of messes and messmen has long wanted revision, and it required a powerful hand to do it. It is, we know, a difficult task, more especially for those not acquainted with housekeeping, as is the case with the majority of our officers.

The many failures that have latterly occurred amongst the messmen, the ease with which they get "*white washed*," whether they be English, Belgian, or French, has thrown such a discredit on the service that no trust is given by a London tradesman to any but those who have been known for years, thus rendering the position of a messman anything but honourable.

The desire on the part of the mess committees to curtail the profits, throwing the situation open to competition, and giving it to the lowest bidder, have been the cause of it. Of course somebody must suffer; where the messman has had to supply spirits and cigars, he has perhaps furnished British at foreign price, to make up for the loss on the dinner; if that privilege is removed, he, in order to compete with perhaps his next neighbour in the camp, or barrack, and to retain his place, furnishes dinners by which he loses; and in the end not only the tradesman but the officer suffers. We can fully understand it is not the duty of the officers to look after the interest of the tradesman, but it is their duty to keep up their "*esprit de corps*," for respectability and fair dealing of their servants, and not to allow the stigma to remain that no credit can be given to messmen in the camps. By engaging him they have thrown around him a cloak of respectability and credit; it is on their judgment the tradesman relies, and he makes no further enquiries.

It should be a subject of enquiry, what is a fair dinner at a fair price? At the present moment the dinners of our infantry regiments vary from 2s. to 3s. per head; similar dinners could not be obtained at the Thatched House, Albion, or London Tavern, at 10s. 6d. per head, and at the clubs it would be nearly the ame price. As an example, the following is the bill of fare given on the 20th of April, to a regiment of foot at 2s. 3d. per head for thirty persons:—2 soups, 2 fish, sauces, &c., 2 roasts, 4 hams, 8 entrées, and vegetables, 12 entremets; ices and biscuits after dinner.

Can the messman know how to go to market better than the tavern-keeper? Can he who often does not speak English, or read or write, purchase provisions cheaper? It often happens that he has left a place in some nobleman's establishment to become his own master for the first time in his life, and at the end of the month he finds himself possessed of more money than he has ever before had at one time, the result of which is that he launches out into some extravagance at the expense of the tradesmen, whom he hopes at some future day to pay, but only gets more in arrear.

To avoid this a regular scale of bills of fare; that would give a reasonable profit to the messman, might be adopted. The President of the Mess Com-

mittee to have the power to demand on the 7th of each month, the tradesmen's accounts, properly receipted, so that he may see that they are paid, and report accordingly to the mess. The tradesman would then know that if not paid the Mess Committee would know it, or that it is not regular, and on him would rest the onus of the loss, if any. And if it should be found that any messman has acted unfairly, his name should be circulated through all the messes as unfit to hold a similar situation. By this means the service would be better served in every way; the messmen, as a body, would be more respectable, and the tradesmen better satisfied, and only too anxious to secure the custom of the regiment. Perhaps a register of messmen kept at the Horse Guards would be the most effectual way of preserving honourable men amongst them. It is only those regiments that arrive from the Colonies that obtain men whose antecedents throw discredit on the body. And if it should be found that the profits are not sufficient for men of a certain position to undertake the duties, then have a contractor messman like the Messrs. Staples in the City, and Gunter's at the West End, who would undertake to furnish cooks, servants, &c., by which plan the messes would be better served, greater luxuries obtained, such as early vegetables, fish, game, cream, ice, &c., &c.; the contractor buying largely instead of in small quantities, the difference in the price would be the source of his profit, and any fault in cookery would be easily remedied by changing the cook, without the trouble of changing the messman.

These are some of the means by which the present bad system may be altered; and that it is required, is recognized by all Mess Committees and Messmen.

Trusting these observations will meet with your approval, I sign myself—

HIC ET UBIQUE.

To the Editor of the United Service Magazine.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, PORTSMOUTH, 5th MAY, 1859.

SIR.—In the February (1859) number of the "United Service Magazine," (page 232) in an article describing the taking of Canton, appears as follows:—

"The first man on the walls was a soldier of the 59th Regiment."

I beg to inform you that this statement is incorrect. I had myself the good fortune to be the first man on the walls of Canton, although I had not the honour to belong to the 59th Regiment.

I shall be glad if your correspondent, the author of the article in question, will favour me with his name, so that I may convince him of his error.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient Servant,

R. G. A. LUARD, Brigade Lieut.-Col., Unattached.

NAVAL AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

INVESTITURE OF THE BATH.

Her Majesty held an investiture of the Bath on Thursday, when Sir John Lawrence received the insignia of a G.C.B.; and Major General Franks, Colonel John Jones, Rear Admiral Milne, Sir John Young, and Rear Admiral Sir T. Hastings, the insignia of K.C.B., and the following officers were severally introduced, and received from the Sovereign their decorations of the military division of the third class of the order, viz.:—Lieut. Col. R. H. Gall, 14th Light Dragoons; Lieut. Col. E. Steele, 83rd Foot: Major J. R. Gibbon, Royal Artillery; Col. T. W. Hicks, Bombay Artillery; Lieut. Col. G. H. Robertson, 25th Regiment Bombay Native Light Infantry; Major Thomas F. Wilson, 13th Bengal Native Infantry; and Major M. D. Woolcombe, Bombay Artillery.

BOUNTY FOR SEAMEN.

By the Queen.—A Proclamation for encouraging Seamen and Landsmen to enter themselves on board Her Majesty's ships of war.

Victoria R.—Whereas it is our royal intention to give all due encouragement to all such seamen and landsmen who shall voluntarily enter themselves in our service: We have thought fit, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, to publish this, our Royal Proclamation, and we do hereby promise and declare, that all such able seamen fit for our service, not above the age of forty-five, nor under the age of twenty years, who shall, on or before the fifteenth day of June next, voluntarily enter themselves to serve in our royal navy, either with the Captains or Lieutenants of our ships, or officers employed in tenders, or at rendezvous on shore, for raising for the service of our navy, shall receive, as our royal bounty, the sum of ten pounds each man; and all such ordinary seamen fit for our service who shall so enter themselves as aforesaid, shall receive the sum of five pounds each man; and all such able-bodied landsmen, not above the age of twenty-five, nor under the age of twenty years, who shall so enter themselves as aforesaid, shall receive the sum of forty shillings each man as our royal bounty; such respective sums to be paid them by the respective paymasters of the ships on board which they may be serving immediately after the expiration of twenty-one days from the date of such entry.

And we do declare, that the qualification of the seamen and landsmen so entering themselves as aforesaid shall be certified by the Captain, Lieutenant, or Master, and Boatswain, or other warrant officer of the ship or vessel where they shall enter.

And for preventing any abuses by any persons leaving the vessels to which they shall belong, and entering themselves on board any other of our ships and vessels in order to obtain the said bounty money, we do hereby declare and command, that such seamen and landsmen belonging to any of our ships or vessels as shall absent themselves from any of the said ships or vessels to which they shall belong, and shall enter themselves on board any other of our said ships or vessels in order to obtain the said bounty, shall not only lose the wages due to them in the ships or vessels they shall leave, but also be severely punished according to their demerits.

Given at our Court at Windsor, this thirtieth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-nine, and in the twenty-second year of our reign.

God Save the Queen.

EXPEDITION UP THE SCARCIES.

We hear from Sierra Leone, west coast of Africa, that the tribe of Loosoos have been again encroaching on our frontier, and have had the temerity to burn the next largest town to Sierra Leone, on the very river on which that colony stands. It was absolutely necessary to check the daring of this warlike tribe, as property was no longer safe on the river, and mercantile confidence was shaken. The mild administration of British rule is imputed by these savages to weakness, they considering themselves safe in their muddy rivers, where the pestilential fevers of Africa protect them more surely from the white man than all the guns they could bring into the field against us. An expedition was fitted out at Sierra Leone to attack the Loosoo stronghold up the Great Scarcies river, where they arrived on the 21st of March. The force consisted of her Majesty's steamers Vesuvius, Trident, and Spitfire, having on board his Excellency Colonel Hill, Governor of Sierra Leone, with the 1st West India Regiment, and Commodore C. Wise, aide-de-camp. The following account of the expedition is given by a correspondent:—

"The steamers not being able to enter the river, the ascent was made in boats, as follows:—24 troops boats, in four divisions, under the charge of—first divisions, Commodore C Wise, with boats of her Majesty's ship Vesuvius; second, Commander F. A. Close, with boats of her Majesty's ship Trident; third, Commander Truscott, with boats of Heron; fourth, Lieutenant Chapman, with boats of her Majesty's ship Spitfire. Grand total, 52 boats—including six boats carrying guns and seven rocket boats. The ascent of the river was most difficult, and it required the energy of every naval officer to keep the troop boats off the rocks and in their places. On the third day we found ourselves only a few miles from our destination—viz., the stockades and mud forts of Kambia Town; but the most difficult part had now to be passed. Before us lay the river, rushing through a bed of rocks, the points of which were so numerous and so near together that it seemed impossible to pass. Never shall I forget the scene that then ensued as the cloud of boats, freighted with their living cargoes, were swept into the rapid; the noise of the waters nearly drowned the shouts of the officers. Pilots were useless; before they could speak you were driven past, or on to the danger. It reminded me very much of a large hunting field charging a dangerous and difficult leap—some are pounded, some are still flying along taking warning from these in difficulties; some are trying to stop, not liking the look of the leap. How they all get through is a mystery, but at last it is accomplished; the danger is past, the stockades are in sight, and the boats anchor to reform the broken line of battle, while Commodore Wise goes ahead to reconnoitre the enemy. Once more the bugle sounds the advance. In ten minutes we open fire, and under a storm of shell and rockets the 1st West India Regiment and Marines land with a battery of mountain howitzers; the boats now turn their fire upon the main stockade, and the troops advance; the second division of boats pass higher up the river and pound away at a stockade on the extreme left, while a storming party, under Commander Close, makes a rush for the wall; but the Loosoos now think they have had enough, and run so fast that nothing but a rifle-ball can catch them. The day was nearly a bloodless one, but, like the work in India, the sun is more to be feared than gun-shot wounds in latitude 9 deg. north. The heat was frightful, and after the last skirmish we had in chase of the Loosoos, I saw his Excellency Colonel Hill, who commanded the troops, being brought to life again by means of bottles of water poured over his head. The attack had been made at the top of high tide, and as it was impossible to perform the service in one tide thoroughly, the boats had of necessity grounded in the mud under a cliff on which the stockades and mud fort were built. Our fleet of boats had certainly rather a helpless appearance, but as the troops

occupied the mud forts they were safe; nevertheless, the enemy were not blind to the advantage they had, for after dark they peppered the boats with musketry from the opposite bank. On the 24th the troops were re-embarked, and in course of time got back to the steamers. Kambia was left in the hands of our neighbours and allies, and Timnees, from whom the ever-oppressing Loosoos had wrested the town by treachery. The expedition has had the happiest effect on the country, for which government deserve every credit, and I am glad to say that as yet the troops have not suffered from fever, which might have been expected after their exposure to the sun and malaria in open boats."

NAVAL AND MILITARY ORDERS AND CIRCULARS.

SEAMEN GUNNERS' PAY AND PENSION.

As an additional inducement for the best and most intelligent Petty Officers and Able Seamen of the Fleet to join the Gunnery Ships, and to qualify themselves as Seamen Gunners, the Admiralty have given directions, by Circular dated the 13th ult., that the Extra Pay of Seamen Gunners be increased from that date as follows, viz.:—Extra Pay to Seamen Gunners of the First Class to be increased from 2d. to 4d. per diem. Extra Pay to Seamen Gunners of the Second Class to be increased from 1d. to 2d. per diem. Their Lordships further direct, that all men who, after the above date, qualify themselves for Seamen Gunners, or abroad, as Active Seamen Gunners, shall be allowed to reckon (from the date of such qualification, and whilst serving as Seamen Gunners or Acting Seamen Gunners), time in the proportion of six years for every five they have served towards a long service pension. Fractional parts to be allowed for broken time in the same proportion. The same advantage to be allowed from this date to Seamen Gunners or Acting Seamen Gunners now serving; provided in the case of Acting Seamen Gunners that they are confirmed as Seamen Gunners on their return to England.

SECOND MASTERS, R.N.

The following Circular, dated the 2nd inst., has been issued:—The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty being desirous of increasing the numbers of Second Masters in the Royal Navy, the following qualifications will be required of each candidate:—

1. Six years' service at sea, three of which as Midshipman or Master's Assistant in the Royal Navy.
2. Or six years at sea in the merchant service; of which one year or more must have been served in the capacity of Master, or two years as Chief Mate, or three years as Inferior Mate.
3. Or six years at sea, including combined service as follows:—Eighteen months as Master and Chief Mate; or two years and a half as Master, Chief, and Inferior Mate, or as Chief and Inferior Mate
4. Each Officer to produce certificates of diligence, sobriety, and good conduct, and to pass such examination as the Admiralty may from time to time direct; but no candidate will be examined before he shall have attained the age of nineteen years nor after the age of thirty-five.

The above qualifications cannot be dispensed with; and all applications must be accompanied by certificates of service, and good conduct in one or more of the capacities above-mentioned, and for the period specified.

Candidates should apply by letter to the Secretary ofthe Admiralty.

MONTHLY ALLOWANCE MONEY.

THE Admiralty having had under consideration the existing regulations under which monthly allowance money is paid to the crews of Her Majestys ships, and being desirous of giving to all men who enter Her Majesty's Navy an earlier opportunity of receiving a portion of their wages, so as to enable them to provide themselves with necessaries, and to contribute to the support of their families and relatives without incurring debts; have signified their direction, that henceforth every man newly entered from the shore, who does not prefer to wait the payment of advance of wages, may receive the proportion of monthly allowance money to which his rating entitles him, immediately after the expiration of the first month from the date of his entry, instead of being obliged to wait six months, as required by the instructions now in force, and that a similar payment be made to him at the end of every succeeding month. In cases of men incurring heavy charges for desertion or straggling, the Captain of the ship may withhold the payment of this monthly allowance money until the state of the men's accounts will admit of their receiving it, without bringing them two months' pay into debt. As the men will thus early be placed in possession of a portion of their wages, which will probably amount to as much or more than the sum they would be entitled to as advance before the ship they belong to proceeds to sea, their Lordships have further directed that such men as may receive *this prompt payment* of monthly allowance money shall not be paid advance, but they may elect either to be paid the monthly allowance money, or to forego it in consideration of their being paid the usual advance *before* the ship proceeds to sea.

NAVAL OFFICERS' MESSES.

The subjoined important Circular, No. 362, dated the 21st ult., has just been promulgated, cancelling article 6, p. 94, of the "Admiralty Instructions," and the Circulars 242, 282, and 357:—The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having had under their consideration the several regulations now in force respecting Officers' Messes in her Majesty's ships and vessels, are pleased to direct as follows:—

The Commanding Officer is to take measures to prevent the officers from indulging in an extravagant mode of living in their messes, as the prevalence of such a practice is detrimental to the discipline of the service, and must, moreover, press hardly on those individuals who have little or no means beyond their pay, and he is, therefore, to give such orders as will effectually carry out the following regulations; and Commanders-in-Chief, or senior officers, on their inspections, are to make special inquiry, with a view to ascertain whether the said regulations have been properly observed:—

I.—In Ward-room Messes the entrance is not to exceed £12, and the monthly subscriptions, £3 for each member.

II.—In Gun-room Messes the entrance is not to exceed £8, and the monthly subscriptions, including all extras, £1 10s. for each member.

III.—Messmen are not to be allowed in her Majesty's ships, and Stewards and others are to be prohibited from selling provisions, wine, spirits, &c. either to messes or to individuals.

IV.—The internal economy of each mess is to be conducted by a Caterer, or a Committee, as the Officers may elect; any irregularity on the part of a member is to be checked by the senior Officer present, or, if necessary, reported to the Captain or Commanding Officer.

V.—Wine, spirits, and beer are not to be received on board any of her Majesty's ships without the written approval of the Officer in command.

VI.—At the expiration of every quarter a statement, in duplicate, is to be prepared by the Committee or Caterer, showing the liabilities of the mess, the money in hand to meet those liabilities, the amount of entrance and monthly subscription required, and the sum owing by each member; one copy of this statement is to be retained in the mess, for the information of the members, and the other is to be delivered to the Captain by the senior Officer. In Gun-room messes the statement referred to is to be audited by a Lieutenant, the Paymaster, and Naval Instructor, under the directions of the Commanding Officer. Should the Commanding Officer, on receiving these mess statements, or at any other time, observe any irregularity or extravagance, which it may not be within his province to remedy or check, he is to report the same to his Commander-in-Chief, if he be serving under one, and if not, to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

VII.—The Engineers' messes are to be conducted on the same principles, and the accounts are to be prepared quarterly, audited, and submitted to the Commanding Officer, as enjoined in the case of Gun-room Officers' messes; but Engineers may, with the written sanction of the Commanding Officer, be allowed to take on board, as mess stock, a very moderate quantity of spirits for their own use, in addition to the ship's allowance: should this privilege be abused by any member of the mess, the Commanding Officer will prohibit any future supplies in addition to the ship's allowance.

VIII.—Officers must remember that their mess debts have, equitably, a prior consideration for settlement to any other debts they may have incurred; such debts should, as an ordinary rule, be settled once a month, but in no case should they be allowed to remain unliquidated beyond the end of the quarter.

IX.—No Officer should leave his ship in debt to the mess; but, when he is obliged to do so, it is his duty to enter into some satisfactory arrangement for paying what he may owe within a given time.

X.—All Officers belonging to and doing duty in the ship, are to be required to join the mess to which by their rank they belong. Supernumerary officers doing duty, taking passage, and living on board, are to join their proper mess; and, when they do not pay a mess entrance, they may, in addition to the subscription of the regular members, computed at a daily rate, be charged not more than 6d. a day in Ward room messes, and 3d. a day in Gun-room and Engineers' messes.

XI.—If it be necessary to lay in a larger mess stock than usual, to meet the requirements of a long voyage, such stock is to be paid for by monthly subscription in advance; and officers in command, as well as others, are to take care that, before the ship leaves the port, all the mess debts, for stock and furniture, have been duly discharged.

By observing the foregoing rules, and carrying them out in a proper and becoming spirit, my Lords anticipate that the comfort of the Officers will be increased, while, at the same time, the public service will be benefitted by the avoidance of irregularities in mess transactions.

By command of their Lordships,
H. Corry.

Improved Mode of Cooking for the Army.—A preliminary trial of Radley's Patent Rotary Cooking Apparatus, took place at Woolwich a few days since, in presence of Captain Freeth and other officers of the garrison. The apparatus at Woolwich measures ten feet by three, and will cook food sufficient for a thousand men, with a very moderate consumption of fuel, requiring only three attendants. By an ingenious contrivance, a rotary motion is given to the cradle used in the roasting department, and the meat

being entirely enclosed from external air, and surrounded by heat, the waste is said to be twenty per cent. less than in the mode of cooking before an open fire, and is free from the unpleasant flavour imparted to baked meat. There are also boiling, steaming, and frying departments; and after dinner, water is provided for tea and cleansing purposes, without any additional consumption of fuel. The apparatus is stated to be suitable for the army, either in garrison or in the field, ships of war, large merchantmen, hospitals, or any large establishments where economy of space, time, and fuel, is of importance. We are informed that a model may be seen at the Museum of the Society of Arts.

NAVAL PRIZE MONEY.

The *London Gazette* of last night announces that the following shares of prize-money will be payable at the Prize Department of the Admiralty, on Monday, the 23rd inst.

"VESUVIUS."—For salvage services rendered by the Vesuvius to the Brothers, of Wexford, on the 21st Sept., 1856, viz.:—

	£.	s.	d.		£.	s.	d.
Commander	24	8	9	Seventh class	1	9	9
Third class	6	18	4	Eighth class	0	14	10
Fourth class	4	8	11	Ninth class	0	9	11
Fifth class	2	9	5	Tenth class	0	4	11
Sixth class	2	4	5				

"ANTELOPE."—For the slave schooner, name unknown (supposed to be the Jupiter), captured 29th June, 1857, by the Antelope.

	£.	s.	d.		£.	s.	d.
Flag share	85	5	9	Seventh class	13	6	9
Lieut. Commanding	138	8	10	Eighth class	6	13	4
Fourth class	40	0	3	Ninth class	4	8	11
Fifth class	22	4	7	Tenth class	2	4	5
Sixth class	20	0	1				

"ALECTO."—For the schooner, Lewis McLane, captured 15th October, 1857, by the Alecto.

	£.	s.	d.		£.	s.	d.
Flag share	49	9	11	Sixth class	11	11	10
Commander	117	11	0	Seventh class	7	14	7
Third class	36	1	2	Eighth class	3	17	3
Fourth class	23	3	7	Ninth class	2	11	6
Fifth class	12	17	7	Tenth class	1	5	8

STAFF COLLEGE.

A GENERAL Order, dated the 12th inst., fixes the first of August as the date of the examination of candidates desirous of entering the Staff College. All applications from officers at home are to be sent in before the 1st of July. The terms of the Order do not essentially differ from that published in June of last year, excepting that the fourth paper, on Military History, is dispensed with, and the first part of the voluntary portion of mathematics is taken on the first, instead of the second day. This arrangement allows of the whole of the sixth day being devoted to Fortification, and of the seventh day of the examination to Military Drawing.

STAFF OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY.

Horse Guards.—"The successive augmentations to the Royal Artillery having caused an assemblage at Woolwich of an unwieldy Regimental Staff, her Majesty's Government, on the recommendation of his Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief, has decided that the Staff shall be distributed to the several stations at home and abroad, but the Head Quarters will remain, as heretofore, at Woolwich.

"In making this distribution, his Royal Highness wishes to impress upon the minds of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the Royal Artillery, that in removing the head quarters of the majority of the brigades from Woolwich, he is desirous that this station, which has been during so many years the seat of scientific knowledge and professional instruction, shall still continue to be so considered, and that his earnest desire is to make this time-honoured depôt of the Royal Artillery still more efficient as the great centre of instruction for the whole corps of Royal Artillery. Although the regiment has been formed into brigades, it must be distinctly borne in mind that the General Commanding-in-Chief will, from time to time, cause such alterations as his Royal Highness may deem advisable—as changing the batteries or brigade from field to garrison duty, and vice versa; and changing the head quarters or stations as may be required. It being very desirable that every man in the regiment should be thoroughly acquainted with the whole of the duties of the artillery soldier, commanding officers will be held responsible that the drivers are instructed, as far as possible, as gunners, and the gunners in driving drill. The reliefs will be carried on by entire brigades, and it will be arranged that each brigade, before proceeding on foreign service, shall, if practicable, be stationed at least twelve months at Woolwich. The Depôt Brigade at Woolwich will consist of all permanently employed non-commissioned officers and men, and of recruits for brigades or Indian or colonial service, as well as of men returned from abroad. It will be composed of eight divisions of gunners or drivers, in such proportions as the commanding officers may think best. Artificers, and men under instruction as such, for foreign brigades, will also belong to the depôt; but those under instruction at the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich will be attached to the depôt of Horse Artillery, or to the field battery at Woolwich. The hospital will be on the same footing as a General Hospital, each brigade having certain portions allotted to it, and the commanding officer will hold his own medical officers responsible. The principal medical officer, when requiring officers for medical boards, &c., will apply to the commandant, who will detail them in garrison order for that duty. The regimental schools will continue as at present, under the commandant, who will give such orders as he may think necessary to commanding officers of brigades. The band of the regiment will be attached to the Depôt Brigade, every officer in the regiment subscribing annually two days' pay, as at present, towards its support."

By command, George Wetherall, Adjutant General.

SCHOOL OF GUNNERY.

Horse Guards, April, 1859.

"His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief has much pleasure in promulgating to the Royal Regiment of Artillery the consent of her Majesty to the establishment of a School of Gunnery at Shoeburyness, to take effect from the 1st of April, 1859.

"His Royal Highness avails himself of this opportunity of impressing upon the whole regiment of artillery a sense of the great benefit which ought to be derived by the corps from the advantages which a School of Gunnery presents

to all who shall enjoy the facilities which such an establishment will afford for individual improvement, as well as for the advancement of artillery science in general.

"As some little time must necessarily elapse before the details of a first-rate system of artillery instruction can be arranged, his Royal Highness will on the present occasion content himself with indicating the general principles which will guide those officers of the corps whom he has intrusted with the preparations of that system, and, although time and experience may suggest improvements in the details, the broad outline of the system will doubtless undergo little or no change.

"An artilleryman should unite, with proficiency in his own branch of the service, many of the qualifications of a cavalry or infantry soldier, and it is therefore hoped that, while officers will naturally use their utmost endeavours to train efficient gunners, they will not lose sight of the great advantages to be derived from a thorough knowledge of the drills and manœuvres of both services, in enabling them to conform with confidence and judgment to combined movements of all arms. For the furthering of this object the directions contained in the recognized manuals are to be strictly adhered to, and it will be hereafter pointed out in a 'course of instruction' what portion of the infantry manœuvres may be dispensed with by the Royal Artillery. As an infantry soldier is not considered fit for the rank as a duty man until he is well versed in the proper management of his weapons, so an artilleryman is to be considered a recruit until he is properly instructed in the essential requisites of an artillery soldier Commanding officers of artillery will therefore bear in mind that gunners are not to be detailed by them for 'duty' until dismissed gun drill. Thus, if attached to a brigade liable to coast duty, a course of garrison gun drill must be completed. With a view to rendering this period of probation as short as possible, 'system' is absolutely necessary, and this system will be the subject of mature consideration by the staff of the School of Gunnery.

"At all artillery stations opportunities are afforded for instruction in those mechanical operations (commonly called the repository course) which form such an essential portion of an artilleryman's training, and commanding officers must adhere strictly to the distribution of time as allotted to the various departments of instruction, in order that uniformity of system may be maintained.

"The instruction in the management of rifled ordnance will form the subject of special arrangements, and will, in the first instance, be carried on under the immediate superintendence of the staff of the School of Gunnery, and be gradually disseminated throughout the corps. It would now be premature to enlarge on this portion of the subject. With regard to the theoretical instruction of the non-commissioned officers and men of the artillery, his Royal Highness would remind officers of the numerous opportunities which offer of impressing upon those under their command how inseparable artillery practice is from the deductions of theory, and how a knowledge of the general rules of mechanical science will facilitate all operations, whether as regards the acquirement of good gunnery, or the management of heavy ordnance and military machines. Such opportunities should not be thrown away, and his Royal Highness trusts to the officers of the corps to impart to all under their instruction as much as possible of that theory which is the ground work of all gunnery. Difficulties will, doubtless, present themselves, but his Royal Highness is convinced that a determination and cheerful co-operation on the part of the officers of the Royal Artillery will tend to obviate such difficulties, and that such assistance will be afforded him his previous acquaintance with the artillery service leaves him no room to doubt.

"On the formation of the School of Gunnery the Repository at Woolwich will be placed entirely under the Commandant, with an officer of the school

to carry on, under his orders, the gunnery instruction of the garrison; and should the Commandant find it necessary, he will detail subaltern officers to assist this officer in his duties.

"The following is the detail of the staff of the School, viz.:—one Commandant and Superintendent, one Field Officer and Chief Instructor, three Instructors in Gunnery, one Brigade Major, one Adjutant and Quartermaster, one Captain Instructor (carbine), one Schoolmaster, one Serjeant Major, one Quartermaster Serjeant, six Serjeant Instructors, one Serjeant Conductor of Stores, two Orderly-room Clerks, and two Storemen.

"And his Royal Highness has appointed the following officers to the School of Gunnery, viz.:—

"Commandant and Superintendent—Colonel Mitchell.

"Chief Instructor—Brevet Colonel Gardner.

"Brigade Major—Brevet Lieut.-Colonel S. E. Gordon.

"Instructors in Gunnery—Major Ward (Woolwich), Captain Hay, and Major Taddy.

"Carbine Instructor—Captain T. Brown.

"Adjutant and Quartermaster—Captain Alderson.

"By command of his Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief,

"G. A. Wetherall, Adjutant General."

VOLUNTEER CORPS.

The following notice was issued from the War Office, on Thursday, May 12th:—

"War Office, Pall Mall, May 12, 1859.

"Her Majesty's Government having had under consideration the propriety of permitting the formation of Volunteer Rifle Corps, under the provisions of the Act of 44 George III., cap. 54, as well as of Artillery Corps and Companies in maritime towns in which there may be forts and batteries, I have the honour to inform you that I shall be prepared to receive through you, and consider any proposal with that object, which may emanate from the county under your charge.

"The principal and most important provisions of the Act are—

"That the Corps be formed under Officers bearing the commission of the Lieutenant of the county.

"That its members must take the Oath of Allegiance before a Deputy Lieutenant or Justice of the Peace, or a Commissioned Officer of the Corps.

"That it be liable to be called out in case of actual invasion, or appearance of an enemy in force on the coast, or in case of rebellion arising out of either of those emergencies.

"That while thus under arms its members are subject to military law, and entitled to be billeted, and to receive pay in like manner as the Regular Army.

"That all Commissioned Officers, disabled in actual service, are entitled to half-pay, and Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates to the benefit of Chelsea Hospital, and widows of Commissioned Officers killed in Service to such pensions for life as are given to widows of Officers of Her Majesty's Regular Forces.

"That members cannot quit the Corps when on actual Service, but may do so at any other time by giving fourteen day's notice.

"That members who have attended eight days in each four months, or a total of twenty-four days' drill and exercise in the year, are entitled to be returned as effectives.

"That members so returned are exempt from Militia ballot, or from being called upon to serve in any other levy.

"That all property of the Corps is legally vested in the Commanding Officer, and subscriptions and fines under the rules and regulations are recoverable by him before a magistrate.

"The conditions on which Her Majesty's Government will recommend to Her Majesty the acceptance of any proposal are—

"That the formation of the Corps be recommended by the Lord Lieutenant of the county.

"That the Corps be subject to the provisions of the act already quoted.

"That its members undertake to provide their own arms and equipments, and to defray all expenses attending the Corps, except in the event of its being assembled for actual Service.

"That the rules and regulations which may be thought necessary be submitted to me, in accordance with the 56th section of the Act.

"The uniform and equipments of the Corps may be settled by the members, subject to your approval; but the arms, though provided at the expense of the members, must be furnished under the superintendence and according to the regulations of this department, in order to secure a perfect uniformity of guage.

"The establishment of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers will be fixed by me, and recorded in the books of this Office; and in order that I may be enabled to determine the proportion, you will be pleased to specify the precise number of Private men which you will recommend, and into how many Companies you propose to divide them.

"I have only to add that I shall look to you, as Her Majesty's Lieutenant, for the nomination of proper persons to be appointed Officers, subject to the Queen's approval.

"I have the honour to be, &c., your most obedient servant, "J. PEEL.

"Her Majesty's Lieutenant for the county of ———."

RECRUITING PARTIES.

The following General Orders have recently been issued:—

"His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief desires that commanding Officers whose Regiments are below their establishments, will send their bands and drums to one of the nearest towns on all market-days, or on such other occasions as may lead to a concourse of people, for the purpose of raising recruits.

"By command,
"W. F. FOSTER, Deputy-Adjt.-Gen."

"Commanding Officers do not seem to be aware of the consequences attending the employment of music on the recruiting service; yet the uniform and repeated representations from all quarters, clearly establish the importance of attaching a drum and fife to every recruiting party, where such an arrangement is practicable.

"His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief now desires that you will detail one drummer and one fifer to join one of your parties employed on the recruiting service, and you will at once submit the station of the party you may select for this addition, when the necessary authority will be sent to you.

"By command,
"W. F. FOSTER, Deputy-Adjt.-Gen."

NAVAL PRIZE MONEY.—The *Gazette* announces that preparations are being made for the distribution of proceeds received and tonnage bounty awarded for the schooner Joseph C. Record, captured on the 3rd September, 857 by the Antelope; and for the distribution of slave and tonnage boun-

ties awarded for two launches with slaves, captured on October 14, 1857, by the Vesuvius, for the distribution of proceeds received and tonnage bounty awarded for the barque Clara B. Williams, captured on the 26th October, 1857, by the Alecto.

Harbours of Refuge.—The bulky blue-book, containing the supplementary report of the Royal Commission on Harbours of Refuge, has just been issued, accompanied by another blue-book, almost too heavy to be lifted, containing the minutes of evidence adduced before the Commission. Some idea may be formed of the volumnious nature of this evidence when we state that the alphabetical list of witnesses alone fills five pages.

Survey of the Straits of Belleisle.—Commander Orlebar, who has charge of the survey of the St. Lawrence, has been directed by the Admiralty to attend to the survey of the Straits of Belleisle, and as soon as the season opens he will embark in a steamer hired for the purpose.

The French Navy.—Admiral Hamelin, Minister of Marine, has appointed Captain Garnault, of the Imperial Navy, to be Chief Secretary, and has commanded that the Imperial yacht Aigle, lately built at Cherbourg, shall be sent to Genoa, to be placed at the service of the Emperor, instead of the Reine Hortense. Madame Hoche, widow of the celebrated Republican General, the "pacificator" of La Vendée, and who attempted a descent in Bantry Bay in 1796, died lately at Versailles, at an advanced age.

Target Experiments.—The experiments at Portsmouth from the screw gunboat Stork, tender to the gunnery ship, have resulted in the fact that the iron target filled with compressed cotton is next to worthless. The Undaunted, 42, sailing frigate, was moored up the Porchester Lake, having had the iron target affixed amidships, below her main-deck ports. The Stork was placed about 400 yards distant, and in the course of half-a-dozen rounds the target was riddled and knocked to pieces.

Dockyards.—Nearly the whole of the extra shipwrights, smiths, joiners, and other mechanics and labourers ordered to be hired at Chatham Dockyard have been entered, with the exception of the shipwrights, several more of whom are still required. It was officially announced on Wednesday, that 30 more spinners were required to be entered, in addition to those already hired. Great activity prevails in all the establishments, the workmen connected with which are working until a late hour in the evening at increased wages.

Royal Naval School.—The annual general meeting of the friends and supporters of this institution was recently held in the theatre of the United Service Institution, Whitehall-yard; Admiral Bowles, C.B., the president, took the chair. The report of the Council stated that negociations had been entered into with the Commissioners of the Patriotic Fund, which had resulted in an arrangement by which, on the payment of 8,000*l.* to the funds of the school, the Commissioners should have the right of nominating in perpetuity seven pupils, on payment of the annual sum of 7*l.* to the school by the parents or guardians of each of the pupils so nominated, who were to be the sons of naval or marine officers of ward-room rank. As the arrangement, however, cannot be carried out without the authority of an Act of Parliament, the Council, therefore, asked the authority of the meeting to apply for an act during the session. During the year the building had undergone several improvements and alterations, including the erection of a gymnasium, and the construction of a swimming-bath, at a cost of 1,172*l.* 4s., notwithstanding which large expenditure the general fund had only been reduced by 169*l.* 10s. The Council also stated that the Queen had graciously permitted the name of His Royal Highness Prince Alfred to be enrolled as a patron of the school, and at the same time presented a donation of 50*l.* on behalf of His Royal Highness. Admiral Sir John West (the Admiral of the Fleet) had been elected a vice-patron in the room

the late Admiral Sir Charles Ogle. The number of pupils at present in the school was stated to be 230, of whom 56 were the sons of civilians paying 50*l.* per annum, the remainder, 174, being the sons of naval and marine officers, 61 of whom pay 30*l.* a-year, 74 24*l.* a-year, 25 pay 15*l.* per year, and 14 were educated gratuitously. It appeared from the balance-sheet that the ordinary and extraordinary receipts during the year amounted to 10,691*l.* 2s., and the ordinary expenditure amounted to 8,464*l.* 6s. 10d. The balance, 1,172*l.*, had been expended on improving the building, and the remainder stood as balances on various accounts. An objection was raised by Lieutenant Gardiner relative to the charge of 62*l.* 11s. 6d. funeral expenses incurred, as it appeared contrary to the laws of the Institution, but this objection was overruled and the report was adopted. The Chairman then moved a resolution authorising the Council to proceed with an Act of Parliament during the ensuing session, to enable the corporation to carry into effect the proposed arrangement with the Commissioners of the Patriotic Fund.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE BOMBAY ARMY.

The following is the distribution of the Bombay Army, corrected to the 1st February.

HER MAJESTY'S HOME TROOPS.

3rd (The Prince of Wales') Dragoon Guards	Ahmednuggur
Squadron Field Service	Field Service
Detachment	Sattara
Detachment	Sholapore
6th Inniskilling Dragoons	Kirkee
8th Hussars	Seepree
Left Wing	Nusserabad
14th Light Dragoons	Gwalior
Detachment	Field Service
Depot	Kirkee
17th Lancers	Mhow

ROYAL REGIMENT OF BRITISH ARTILLERY.

D Troop Horse Artillery	Mhow
8th Company, 1st Battalion	Rajpootana
2nd Company, 3rd Battalion	Poona
3rd Company, 4th Battalion	Neemuch
2nd Company, 11th Battalion	Aden
7th Company, 11th Battalion	Mhow
2nd Company, 13th Battalion	Baroda
5th Company, 14th Battalion	Calpee
8th Company, 14th Battalion	Kulladghee and Dharwar

ROYAL CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

11th Company	Rajpootana Field Force
21st Company	Gwalior

ROYAL REGIMENTS OF BRITISH INFANTRY.

4th (The King's own Regt.)	Ahmedabad
18th Royal Irish 1st Battalion	Field Service
28th (North Gloucestershire) Regiment	Bombay
Detachment	Nassick
31st Huntingdonshire Regiment	Poona
33rd (The Duke of Wellington's Regiment)	Baroda
46th (South Devonshire) Regiment	Kurrachee
51st Regiment	Mooltan
56th West Essex Regiment	Belgaum
Detachment	Kulladghee
Detachment	Sholapore
Detachment	Sattara
57th Regiment	Field Service Khandeish
Detachment	Malligaum and Dhoolia
Wing	Aden
64th Regiment Foot	Futteghur
Depot	Belgaum
71st Highlanders	Gwalior
72nd Highlanders	Field Service, Rajpootana
74th Highlanders Detachment	Dharwar
78th Highlanders	Bareilly
Depot	Poona
83rd Regiment Foot	Rajpootana
Depot	Deesa
86th Regiment Foot	Gwalior, under orders to Poona
Depot	Poona
89th Regiment	Rajpootana Field Force
92nd Highlanders	Mhow
Detachment	Indore
95th Regiment Wing	Seepree
Depot	Deesa
German Legion	Poona

HER MAJESTY'S INDIAN BRITISH TROOPS

REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY.

Horse Brigade, Head quarters	Poona
1st (or Leslie's) Troop, Head Quarters	Jhansi
2nd Troop	Rajpootana
3rd Troop	Central India
4th Troop	Booranpor
1st Battalion, Head-quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Ahmedabad
2nd Company	Belgaum
3rd Company	Hydrabad
4th Company	Bombay
2nd Battalion, Head-quarters	Bombay
1st Company	Rajpootana
2nd Do.	Sattara

3rd Do.	Sholapore
4th Do.	Gwalior
Reserve Artillery.	
1st Company	Shikarpoor
2nd Do.	Gwalior
Detachment	Jaulna
3rd Company	Kolapoor
4th Do.	Kurrachee
Corps of Engineers.	
Head Quarters	Poona
Infantry.	
1st European Regiment (Fusiliers) Head Quarters	Mooltan
Detachment	Umritsaer
Depot	Kurrachee
2nd European Regiment L. I.	Belgaum
Wing	Kolapore
Detachment	Sanglee
3rd European Regiment	Jhansi
Depot	Ahmednuggur
HER MAJESTY'S NATIVE TROOPS.	
Artillery.	
3rd Battalion, Head-quarters	Ahmedabad
1st Company	Ahmedabad and Rajcote
2nd Do.	Ahmedabad
3rd Do.	Deesa
Detachment	Field Service
4th Company	Rajpootana Field Force
5th Do.	Ahmedabad
6th Do.	Aden
4th Battalion, Head Quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Booranpoor
Detachment	Chopra
2nd Company	Ahmednuggur
4th Do.	Mhow
6th Do.	Booranpore
Corps of Sappers and Miners.	
Head Quarters (Bombay)	Poona
1st Company	Poona
2nd Do.	Aden
Detachment	Jhansi
3rd Company	Rajpootana
4th Do.	Poona
5th Do.	Poona
Detachment	Jhansi
Light Cavalry.	
2nd Regiment Madras Light Cavalry	Sholapore
1st Regiment (Lancers)	Gwalior
Wing	Nusserabad
2nd Regiment Light Cavalry	Rajpootana
Detachment	Deesa
3rd Regiment Light Cavalry	Jhansi
Infantry.	
1st Regiment N I. (Grenadiers)	Bombay
2nd do. do	Ahmedabad
3rd Regiment N. I.	Sholapore, under orders to Mhow
Detachment	Malligaum
4th do. do. (Rifles)-	Sehore
5th do. N. L. I. -	Ahmednuggur
6th do. N. I.	Poona
Detachment	Jaulna
7th do. do.	Bombay
8th do. do.	Baroda
9th do. do.	Central India
10th do. do.	Gwalior
11th do. do.	Ahmedabad
12th do. do.	Nusserabad
13th do. do.	Rajpootana
14th do. do	Kurrachee
Detachment	Ahmedabad
15th do. do.	Kolapore
Left Wing	Kulludghee
16h do. do.	Surat
Detachment	Broach
17th do. do.	Rajkote
18th do. do.	Belgaum
Detachment	North Canara
19th do. do.	Malwa Division
20th do. do.	Dharwar
22nd do. do.	Settara
Detachment	Mahableshwur
Detachment	Punderpore
23rd do. N. L. I.	Mhow
24th Regiment N. I.	Jhansi
Depot	Mhow
25th do. do.	Gwalior under orders to Poona
Depot	Poona
26th do. do.	Khundera
28th do. do.	Sholapore
29th do. do.	Aden
30th do. do.	Dholia
Detachment	Asseerghur
31st do. do.	Deesa
1st Extra Battalion	Kurrachee
2nd Extra Battalion	Baroda
3rd Extra Battalion	Belgaum
1st Belooch Extra Battalion	Allahabad
Depot	Hydrabad
2nd Belooch Extra Battalion	Deera Ghazee Khan
Depot	Shikarpoor
Enrolled Pensioners.	
Detachment	Tanna
Do.	Poona
Detachment	Doolapee
Do.	Malwan
Do.	Ahmednuggur
Irregular and Local Corps.	
Military.	
Poona Irregular Horse	Field Service Khandeish
1st Regiment Scinde Irregular Horse	Jacobabad
2nd Regiment Do.	Jacobabad
3rd Regiment Do.	Jacobabad
1st Regiment Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse	Kulladghee
Detachment	Beejapore
2nd Regiment Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse	Kulladghee
Detachment	Special Service Malwa Field Force
Marine Battalion	Bombay
1st Regiment Jacobs Rifles	Jacobabad
2nd Regiment Jacobs Rifles	Jacobabad
Native Veteran Battalion	Dapoolie
Civil	
Guzerat Irregular Horse	Ahmedabad
Kutch Irregular Horse	Bhooj
Kutch Legion	Kutch
Guzerat Police Corps	Kaira
1st Khandeish Bheel Corps	Dhurrumgaum
2nd Khandeish Bheel Corps	Dhurrumgaum
Ghaut Police Corps	Tanna
Sawunt Waree Local Corps	Sawunt Waree
Kolapore Infantry Corps	Kolapore
Rutnagherry Rangers	Rutnagherry
Guzerat Coolly Police Corps	Ahmedabad
Aden Police Troop	Special Service Malwa Field Force
Sind Extra Battalion	En route to Deesa

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

The following is the Distribution List of the Madras Army, corrected up to October, 1858.

CAVALRY.

Right Hon the Governor's Body Guard.....Madras
H. M. 1st Dragoon Guards ....Bangalore
H. M. 12th Royal Lancers Head quarters and Rt. Wing .....Secunderabad
Left Wing—Field Service—Gen. Whitlock's Division
1st Regt. Native Light Cavalry..Trichinopoly
2nd do. do.....Sholapore
(under orders to Secunderabad.
3rd Regt. Native Light Cavalry, Head quarters. Left Wing.....Bangalore
Right Wing .....Bellary
th Regt. Native Light Cavalry..Bengal Field Force
5th do. do.....Bellary
6th do. do.....Bengal Field Service
7th do. do.....Kamptee
1 squadron Secunderabad

ARTILLERY.

H Troops Royal Horse Artillery. St.Thos.' Mount
Head quarters Madras Horse Artillery .....Bangalore
A. Troop, Field Service Gen. White'ock's Division
B. Troop .....Secunderabad
C. Troop .....Bangalore
D. Troop .....Kamptee
E. Troop.....Bengal Field Service
F. Troop .....Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
No. 5. Comp.1st Bat. Royal Artillery, and No. 1 Field Battery...St.Thos.' Mount
No. 3 Comp. 3rd Bat. Royal Artil. lery, and No. 9 Field Battery...Bellary
No. 5 Comp. 14th Bat. Royal Artillery, & No. 8 Field Battery..Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
No. 6 Cpy.9th Bat. Ryl. Artillery.Secunderabad

FIRST BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters ..... St.Thos.'Mount
A Company { Head quarters & 2-thirds Co. ..Singapore; Half Company ...Penang; Detachment .....Masulipatan
B. Company .....Moulmein
C. Co (No. 7 Horse Battery).....Bellary
D. Com. (No. 3 Horse Battery)...Rangoon

SECOND BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters .....Kamptee
A. Cop. (No 8 Bullock Battery) Trichinopoly
B. Co. Head quarters and ½ Co...Tonghoo
Half Company ...Shuaygheen
C. Comp. (No. 5 Horse Battery) Bangalore
D. Copy. (No. 4 Bullock Battery) Head quarters and half .....Kamptee
Half Company.....Seetabuldee

THIRD BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters .....Rangoon
A Company (No. 2 Horse Bat.) Bengal Service
B. Company (No. 4 Horse Bat.) Tongho
C. Company (No. 2 Bullock Bat.) Thayetmew
D. Company (No. 5 Bullock Bat.) Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division

FOURTH BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters.....Secunderabad
A. Company (No. 1 Horse Bat)...Field Service Gen. Whitelock
B. Company (No. 10 Bulk. Bat.) Ditto
C. Company (No. 3 Bulk. Bat.)...Secunderabad
... Company Head quarters and two-thirds.....Rangoon
One-third .....Bassein

FIFTH OR GOLUNDAUZE (NATIVE) BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters..... St,Thos.' Mount
A. Company Head quarters and two-thirds Company .....Penang
One-third Company .....Malacca
B. Company.....Singapore
C. Company (No. 1 Bulk. Bat.) Bengal Service
D. Company (No. 7 Bulk. Bat.)...Cannanore and Mangalore
E. Company (No. 9 Bulk Bat.)...Cuttack and Sumbulpore
F. Company .....Meeaday
1st Supplemental Company .....St.Thos.' Mount
2d do. do. .....Vizianagram
Details of several Companies ...Labuan

MADRAS ENGINEERS.

Head quarters .. ..Fort St. George

MADRAS SAPPERS AND MINERS—NATIVE.

Head quarters .....Dowlaishweram
A. Company.....Ditto
One Section with Gen. Whitlock's Field Service
B. Company .....Nerbudda (Bombay) Field Service
C. Company .....Bengal Service
D. Company .....Rangoon
E. Company ... .Dowlaishweram
One Section with Gen. Whitelock's Division
F. Company .....Secunderabad
One Section ... .Paumbum
G. Company .....Padoungmyo
H. Company .....Thayetmew
I .Company .....Tongho
K. Company .....Dowlaishweram
L. Company .....Field Division Gen. Whitelock
M, Company .....Dowlaishweram

INFANTRY.

EUROPEAN.

H.M. 1st Royal Regt. (1st Bat.),.Secunderabad
H.M. 43rd Light Infantry .....Gen.Whitelock's Division Field Service
H.M. 44th Regiment . ..... Fort St. George
H.M. 60th Royal Rifles (3d. Bat.) Bangalore
3 Companies..... .....Bellary
1 do. .....Mysore
1 do. .....Hurryhur
H.M. 66th Regiment .....Cannanore
1 Company .....Mangalore
1 do. .....Sircee
H.M. 68th Regiment .....Rangoon
H.M. 69th Regiment .....Tonghoo
H.M. 74th Highlanders .....Berhampore
1 Company .....Sholapore
3 Companies.....Field Service Southern Mahratta Country
The Madras Fusiliers .....Bengal on Field Service
2nd European Light Infantry . Trichinopoly
3rd Madras European Regiment. Field Division under Gen. Whitlock

NATIVE INFANTRY.

1st Regiment N.I. (Rifle Comp.) Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
2nd Regiment N. I.....Quilon
3rd N. I. or Palamcottah Light Infantry.....Cannanore
4th N. I. .....Thayetmew
5th N. I. (Rifle Company) Head quarters Right Wing.....Mangalore

Left Wing .....Sumbulpore
6th N. I. .....Rangoon
7th N. I. .....Secunderabad
8th N. I. .....Tonghoo
9th N. I. .....Secunderabad
10th N. I. .....Secunderabad
11th N. I. .....Bellary
12th N. I. .....Rangoon
13th N. I. .....Maulmein
14th N. I. .....Singapore
15th N. I. .....Thayetmew
16th N. I. (Rifle Company).....Mangalore
17th N. I. .....Bengal Field Service
18th N. I. .....Bellary
19th N. I. .....Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
20th N. I. .....Bangalore
21st N. I. .....Trichinopoly
22nd N. I. .....Penang
23rd N. I. (or Walajahbad Light Infantry) .....Rangoon
24th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Henzedah
25th N. I. .....Madras
26th N. I. .....Kamptee
27th N. I. .....Bengal, on Service
28th N. I. .....Hoosingabad
29th N. I. .....Masulipatam
30th N. I. .....Bellary
31st N. I., or Trichinopoly Light Infantry.....Vizianagram
32nd N. I. .....Kamptee
33rd N. I. .....Kamptee
34th or (Chicacale Lt. Infantry) Trichinopoly
35th N. I. .....Hurryhur
36th (Rifle Company) .....Kurnool
37th N. I., (Grenadiers) Head quarters .....Shuaygheen
Left Wing .....Tonghoo
38th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Vizagapatam
39th N. I. .....Thayetmew
40th N. I. .....Cuttack
41st N. I. .....Burmah
42nd N. I. .....Raichoor Field Service
43rd N. I. .....Russelcondah
44th N. I. .....Thayetmew
45th N. I. .....Madras
46th N. I. .....Vizagapatam
47th N. I. .....Bellary
48th N. I. .....Moulmein
49th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Secunderabad
50th N. I. .....Service Gen. Whitlock's Divisi
51st N. I. .....Palamcottah
52nd N. I. .....Mercara
Left Wing .....French Rocks
1st Extra Regiment N. I. .....Samulcottah
2nd Extra N. I. .....Trichinopoly
3rd Extra N. I. .....Cuddapah
Sappers' Militia .....Madras
Madras Rifles, temporarily formed for Service in Bengal by the Rifle Companies of the 1st, 5th, 16th, 24th, 36th, 49th, Regiments N. I., and 2 Companies 34th N. I.—Service Bengal.

VETERANS' ESTABLISHMENT.

EUROPEAN VETERANS.

Artillery Company .....Palaveram
Infantry Company .....Vizagapatam

NATIVE VETERANS

1st or Madras Native Vet. Bat. .Madras
2nd or Arnu Native Vet. Bat. .Arcot

DEPÔTS.

For H.M Regiments .....Poonamallee
European Infantry .....Arcot
Native Infantry .....Palaveram

NATIVE INFANTRY RECRUITING DEPOTS.

No. 1 Recruiting Depot.....Dindigul
No. 2 do. .....Arcot
No. 3 do. .....Chicacole
No. 4 do .....Ellore

STATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

(Corrected up to 26th May, 1859, inclusive.)

[Where two places are mentioned, the last-named is that at which the Depot is stationed.]

1st Life Guards—Hyde Park.
2nd do.—Windsor.
Royal Horse Guards—Regent's Park.
1st Dragoon Guards—Madras: Canterbury.
2nd do.—Bengal: Canterbury.
3rd do.—Bombay: Canterbury.
4th do.—Aldershott.
5th do.—Manchester.
6th do.—Bengal: Maidstone.
7th do.—Bengal: Canterbury.
1st Dragoons—Dublin.
2nd do.—Dublin.
3rd do.—Newbridge.
4th do.—Birmingham.
5th do.—Newbridge.
6th do.—Bombay: Maidstone.
7th Hussars—Bengal: Canterbury.
8th do.—Bombay: Canterbury.
9th Lancers—Bengal: Maidstone.
10th Hussars—Aldershott.
11th Hussars—Brighton.
12th Lancers—Madras: Maidstone.
13th Light Dragoons—Dublin.
14th do.—Bombay: Maidstone.
15th Hussars—Hounslow.
16th Lancers—Edinburgh.
17th do.—Bombay: Canterbury.
18th Dragoons—York.
Military Train [1st bat.]—Shorncliffe.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal. } Depot at Bristol.
Do. [3rd Bat.]—Woolwich
Do. [4th bat.]—Aldershott.
Do. [5th bat.]—Curragh.
Do. [6th bat.] | Woolwich.
Grenadier Guards [1st bat.]—Windsor.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Wellington Barracks.
Do. [3rd bat.]—Portman-st. barracks.
Coldstream Guards [1st bat.]—St. George's bar
Do. [2nd bat.]—Wellington Barracks.
Scots Fus. Guards [1st bat.]—Tower
Fus. [2nd bat.]—Dublin.
1st Foot [1st.] —Madras: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—China: Birr.
2nd do. 1st [bat.]—C. of G. Hope: Walmer.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Corfu: Walmer.
3rd 1st [bat.]—Bengal: Limerick.
Do. do. Malta: Limerick.
4th. do. [1st bat]—Bombay: Chichester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Corfu.
5th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Mauritius, Pembroke.
6th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Cork.
7th do. [1st. bat.]—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Walmer.
8th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Chatham.

Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Templemore.
9th do. [1st. bat.]—Aldershott: Limerick.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Corfu: Limerick.
10th do. [1st bat.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
11th do. [1st bat.]—Aldershot: Fermoy.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershott.
12th do. [1st bat.]—N. S. Wales: Walmer.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Glasgow.
13th do [1st bat.]—Bengal: Fermoy.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Portsmouth, for the Cape
14th do. [1st bat.]—Cephalonia: Fermoy
Do. [2nd bat.]—Dublin
15th do.—Jersey: Pembroke
Do. [2nd bat.]—Malta, Pembroke.
16th do.— Dublin: Templemore.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh
17th do.—Canada: Limerick.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Plymouth.
18th do.—Bombay: Buttevant.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
19th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Shorncliffe.
20th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Clonmel.
21st do.—Malta: Birr.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Newport.
22nd do.—Manchester: Parkhurst.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Malta.
23rd do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Depot at Deal; Malta.
24th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Sheffield.
25th do.—Gibraltar: Pembroke.
26th do.—[bat.]—Bermuda: Belfast.
27th do.—Bengal: Buttevant.
28th do.—Bombay: Fermoy.
29th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
30th do.—Dublin: Parkhurst.
31st do —Bombay: Pembroke.
32nd do.—Bengal.
33rd do.—Bombay: Fermoy.
34th do.—Bengal: Colchester.
35th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
36th do.—Aldershott: Athlone.
37th do.—Bengal: Colchhster.
38th do.—Bengal: Colchester.
39th do.—Canada: Templemore.
40th do.—N. S. Wales: Birr.
41st do.—Jamaica: Jersey.
42nd do.—Bengal: Sterling.
43rd do.—Madras: Chatham.
44th do.—Madras: Colchester.
45th do.—Cape of Good Hope: Parkhurst.
46th do.—Bengal: Templemore.
47th do.—Aldershott: Cork.
48th do.—Bengal: Cork.
49th do.—Barbadoes: Belfast.
50th do.—Ceylon: Parkhurst
51st do.—Bombay: Chichester.
52nd do,—Bengal: Chatham
53rd do,—ditto: ditto
54th do.—Bengal: Colchester
55th do.—Dublin: Jersey
56th do.—Bombay: Colchester
57th do.—Bombay: Cork.
58th do.—Shorncliffe: Curragh.
59th do.—Cape: Athlone
60th do.—[1st bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal. Winchester
Do. [3rd bat.]—Madras: Winchester
Do. [4th bat.]—Aldershot.
61st do.—Bengal: Chatham
62nd do.—Nova Scotia: Belfast
63rd do.—ditto: Belfast
64th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
65th do.—New Zealand: Birr.
66th do.—Madras: Colchester
67th do.—Bengal: Athlone
68th do.—Madras: Fermoy
69th do.—Madras: Fermoy
70th do.—Bengal; Canterbury
71st do.—Bombay; Stirling
73nd do.—Bombay; Aberdeen
73rd do.—Bengal: Jersey
74th do.—Madras: Aberdeen
75th do.—Bengal: Chatham
76th do.—Curragh: Belfast
77th do.—Bengal: Jersey
78th do.—Bengal: Aberdeen
79th do.—ditto: Perth,
80th do.—ditto: Buttevant.
81st do.—Bengal: Chatham
82nd do.—Bengal: Canterbury
83rd do.—Bombay: Chichester.
84th do.—On passage home: Chatham
85th do.—Cape: Pembroke
86th do.—Bombay: Buttevant.
87th do.—Bengal: Buttevant.
88th do.—Bengal: Colchester
89th do.—Bombay: Fermoy
90th do.—Bengal; Canterbury
91st do.—Bombay: Pembroke
92nd do.—Bombay; Stirling
93rd do.—Bengal; Aberdeen
94th do.—ditto: Chatham
95th do.—Bombay: Fermoy
96th do.—Plymouth: Parkhurst
97th do.—Bengal: Colchester
98th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
99th do.—Bengal: Cork
100th do.—Gibraltar [Winchester.
Rifle Brigade [1st bat.]—Portsmouth.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [3rd bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [4th bat.]—Malta, Winchester
1st West India Regiment—Bahamas
2nd do—Jamaica
3rd do.—Barbadoes
Ceylon Rifle Regiment—Ceylon
Cape Mounted Rifles—Cape of Good Hope
Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment—Canada
St. Helena Regiment—St. Helena
Royal Newfoundland Corps—Newfoundland
Royal Malta Fencibles—Malta
Gold Coast Corps—Cape Coast Castle

STATIONS OF THE EMBODIED MILITIA.

ENGLAND (18).

Bedford—Dover	Norfolk Artillery—Sheerness.	Suffolk Artillery—Portsmouth
2nd Cheshire—Tipner	North Lincoln—Waterford	Sussex—Edinburgh
	5th Middlesex—Curragh	1st Tower Hamlets—Cork
	Northumberland Artillery—Hesham.	
Hampshire Artillery—Plymouth	Nottingham—Newark	2nd Warwick—Plymouth
East Kent—Aldershott	Oxford—Aldershott	Wilts—Portsmouth
Lancashire Artillery—Dover	1st Stafford—Aldershott	1st York, (W. R.)—Aldershott
4th Lancashire—Warrington	2nd Stafford—Curragh.	3rd York—Carlisle

SCOTLAND (3).

Forfar Artillery—Sheerness	2nd Lanark—Dublin	Stirling—Aldershott

IRELAND (12).

Antrim Rifles—Aldershot	Dublin (city)—Shorncliffe	Louth (Rifles)—Yarmouth
Antrim Artillery—Kinsale.	Dublin City Artillery—Colchester.	
North Cork—Aldershot	Fermanagh—Bradford & Burnley	Tipperary Artil.—Portsmouth
Donegal—Dover	Kerry—Chester	Waterford Artillery—Gosport
North Down—Belfast	Limerick (County) Portsmouth	Wexford—Waterford

STATIONS OF THE ROYAL NAVY IN COMMISSION.

(Corrected to 27th May.)

With the Dates of Commission of the Officers in Command.

Aboukir, 90, sc., Capt. C. F. Schomberg, 1851, Devonport.
Acorn, 12, Com. R. B. Pearse, 1856, East Indies.
Actæon, 26, Com. J. Ward (b), 1858, East Indies.
Adventure, sc. troop-ship, Com. E. Lacy, 1856, East Indies.
Ajax, 60, screw, Captain J. McNeil, Boyd, 1846, Coast Guard.
Alarm, 26, Capt. D. Curry, 1846, Pacific.
Alert, 17, screw, Com. W. A. R. Pearse, 1855, Pacific.
Algerine, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. Arthur, 1854, East Indies.
Algiers, 91, screw, Capt. G. W D. O'Callaghan, 1846, Channel Squadron.
Amethyst, 26, Capt. S. Grenfell, 1850, Pacific.
Antelope, 3, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. J. W. Pike, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Arachne, 18, Com. J. E. Montgomerie, 1855, North America and West Indies.
Archer, 13, screw, Capt. J. Sanderson, 1855, Coast of Africa.
Ardent, 5, steam-vessel, Com. J. H. Cave, 1855, Woolwich.
Argus, 6, st.-vessel, Com. H. F. W. Ingram, 1856, Mediterranean.
Ariel, 9, sc., Com. C. Bromley, 1856, Mediterranean.
Arrogant, 47, screw, Capt. L. G. Heath, C.B., 1854, Coast Guard.
Assistance, screw troop-ship, Com. W. A. J. Heath, 1856, East Indies.
Assurance, 4, screw, Com. C. M. Aynsley, 1856, Portsmouth.
Atalanta, 16, Com. T. M. S. Pasley, 1855, North America and West Indies.
Athol, 4, Com. E. Wilson, 1845, Greenock.
Banshee, 2, st.-vessel, Com. C. A. Campbell, 1858, Portsmouth.
Banterer, sc.-gunbt., Lieut.-Com. J. Jenkins. 1853, East Indies.
Basilisk, 6, st.-vessel, Com. G. A. Phayre, 1854, North America and West Indies.
Belleisle, hospital ship, Com. H. M. Bingham, East Indies.
Bittern, tender to Calcutta, East Indies.
Black Eagle, st.-yacht, Mast.-Com. J. E. Petley, 1844, Woolwich.
Blenheim, 60, screw, Capt. F. Scott, C.B., 1848, Coast Guard.
Boscawen, 70, Rear Admiral the Hon. Sir F. W. Grey, K.C.B., Capt. R. A. Powell, C.B., 1855, Cape of Good Hope.
Brisk, 16, sc., Capt. A. F. R. D'Horsey, 1857, Devonport.
Britannia, Training Ship, Capt. R. Harris, 1849, Portsmouth.
Brune, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. E. F. Lodder, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Brunswick, 80, sc., Captain E. Ommanney, 1846, Mediterranean.
Buffalo, screw, Mas.-Com.—particular service.
Bustard, 2, sc.-gunbt., Lt.-Com. F. W. Hallowes 1856, East Indies.
Buzzard, 6, st.-vessel, Com. F. Peel, 1855, S.E. Coast of America.
Cadmus, 21, sc., Capt. H. S. Hillyar, C.B., 1854, Chatham.
Cæsar, 90, screw, Capt. C. Frederick, 1842, North America and W. Indies.
Calcutta, 84, Rear-Adm. Sir M. Seymour, K.C.B., Capt. W. K. Hall, C.B., 1853, East Indies.
Calypso, 18, Capt. F. B. Montresor, 1851, Pacific.
Cambrian, 40, Captain J. J. M'Cleverty, C.B. 1848 East Indies.
Cambridge, Gunnery Ship, Capt. A. W. Jerningham, 1851, Devonport.
Camilla, 16, Com. G. T. Colville, 1855, East Indies.
Caradoc, 2, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. C. M. Buckle 1847, Mediterranean.
Centurion, 80, sc., Capt. C. G. E. Patey, 1846, Mediterranean.
Chesapeake, 51, screw, Rear-Adm. J. Hope, C.B. Com. R. Gibson, 1858, East Indies.
Clown, sc.-gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. F. Lee, 1855 1842, East Indies.
Conflict, 8, sc., Com. R. W. Courtenay, 1854 Coast of Africa.
Conqueror, 101, screw, Capt. H. R. Yelverton, C.B., 1843, Mediterranean.
Coquette, 4, sc., Com. the Hon. F. A. Foley, 1855, Mediterranean.
Cordelia, 11, sc., Com. C. E. H. Vernon, 1855, Australia.
Cormorant, 4, sc., Com. A. Wodehouse, 1856, East Indies.
Cornwallis, 60, Captain G. G. Randolph, C.B., 1854, Coast Guard.
Coromandel, st.-vessel, Second Master W. H. Vine (acting, East Indies.
Cressy, 80, screw, Capt. the Hon. C. G. J. B. Elliot, C.B., 1841, Portsmouth.
Crocodile, 8, rec.-ship, Com W. Greet, 1854, off the Tower,
Cruiser, 17, sc., Com. J. Bythesea, 1856 Coast of America.
Cumberland, 70, Rear Adm. Sir Lushington K. C.B. Captain H D. Rogers, C. B. 1854, South America
Curaçoa, 31, screw, Capt. T H. Mason, 1849, particular service.
Cyclops, 6, st.-v., Capt. W. J. S. Pullen, 1856, East Indies.
Dasher, 2, st.-vessel, Com. E. G. Hore, 1854, Portsmouth.
Dee, 4, troop-ship, Mast-Com. T C. Pullen, 1844, particular service.
Devastation, 6, st.-ves, Com. C. Wake, 1855, North America, and West Indies.
Diadem, 32, sc., Capt. P. W. Moorsom, C.B., 1857, North America and W. Indies.
Doris, 32, screw, Capt. E. Heathcote, 1852, Portsmouth.
Dove, screw gunbt., Lieut. C. J. Bullock, 1855, East Indies.
Drake, sc. gunbt., Lieut-Com. A. H. Blane, 1856, East Indies.
Eagle, 50, Capt. E. Tatham, 1854, Coast Guard.
Edinburgh, 58, screw, Capt. E. C. T. D'Eyncourt, 1849, Coast Guard.
Elk, 12, Com. H. Campion, 1855, East Indies.
Emerald, 51, sc. Capt. A. Cumming, 1854, Sheerness.
Esk, 20, sc., Capt. Sir R. J. Le M. M'Clure, 1850, East Indies.
Euryalus, 51, sc., Capt. J. W. Tarleton, C.B., 1852, Mediterranean.
Excellent, 46, gunnery ship, Capt. R. S. Hewlett C.B., 1850, Portsmouth.
Exmouth, 90, sc., Capt. J. J. Stopford, 1841 Devonport.
Fairy, sc. yacht, tender to Victoria and Albert yacht, Portsmouth.
Falcon, 17, sc., Com. A. G. Fitzroy, 1857, Portsmouth.

Ferret, 8, Com. W. E. Fisher, 1856, particular service.
Firebrand, 6, st.-vessel, Com. J. Dayman, 1858, particular service.
Firm, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. R. Boulton, 1854, East Indies.
Fisguard, 42, Commodore the Hon. J. R. Drummond, C.B., Woolwich
Flying Fish, 6, c., Com. C. W. Hope, 1851, Portsmouth.
Forester, 2, sc. gunbt, Lieut.-Com. A. J. Innes, 1853, East Indies.
Formidable, 84, J C. Fitzgerald, 1840, Sheerness
Furious, 16, st.-ves., Capt. O. J. Jones, C.B., 1855, East Indies.
Fury, 6, st.-ves., Com. J.E. Commerell, 1855, E.I.
Ganges, 84, Rear-Adm. R. L. Baynes, C.B., Capt. J. Fulford, 1848, Pacific.
Gannett, 11, Com. E. H. G. Lambert, 1854, Mediterranean.
Gorgon, 6, st.-ves. Com. B. C. T. Pim, 1858, Tyne,
Growler, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. H. E. Crozier, 1854, Mediterranean.
Hannibal, 91, sc., Rear-Admiral G. R. Mundy, Capt. M. Connolly, 1858, Mediterranean.
Harrier, 17, screw, Com. Sir M. McGregor, Bart., (1856), 1857, South America.
Hastings, 60, screw, Captain W. R. Mends, C.B., 1852, Coast Guard.
Haughty, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. G. D. Broad, 1851, East Indies.
Havannah, 19, Capt. T. Harvey, 1848, Pacific.
Hawke, 60, sc., Capt. W. Crispin 1852, Coast Guard.
Herald, 8, surv.-ves., Capt. H. M. Denham, 1846, South Seas.
Hermes, 6, st.-v., Com. W. E. A. Gordon, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Hero, 91, screw, Capt. Sir G. N. Broke, Bart, C.B, 1845, Portland.
Heron, 12, Commander W. H. Truscott, 1855, Coast of Africa.
Hesper, sc st.-ship, Mast.-Com. J. Loane, 1846, East Indies.
Hibernia, rec.-ship, Rear-Admiral H. J. Codrington, C.B., Captain F. Warden, C.B., 1845, Malta.
Highflyer, 21, sc., Capt. C. F. A. Shadwell, C.B., 1853, East Indies.
Himalaya, sc. store-ship, Com. J. Seccombe, 1855, particular service.
Hogue, 60, screw, Capt. J. Moore, C.B., 1848, Coast Guard.
Hornet, 17, sc., Com. Viscount Gilford, 1858, East Indies.
Hydra, 6, st.-vessel, Com. R. V. Hamilton, 1857, Coast of Africa.
Imaum, 72, Commodore H. Kellett, C.B., Com. H. J. Grant, 1855, rec.-ship, Jamaica.
Impregnable, 104, Vice-Adm. Sir B. Reynolds, K.C.B., Capt. W. H. Stewart, C.B., 1854, Devonport.
Indus, 78, Rear-Admiral Sir H. Stewart, K.C.B., Capt. J. C. D. Hay, 1850, North Americ, and West Indies.
Industry, st.-ves., 2, st.-ship, Mast.-Com. G. J. Hodges, 1841 particular service.
Inflexible, 6, st.-ves., Com. G. A. C. Brooker, 1856, East Indies.
Intrepid, 6, screw, Com. J. H. Marryat, 1855, Devonport.
Iris, 26, Capt. W. Loring, C.B., 1848, Australia.
James Watt, 91, screw, Capt. E. Codd, 1851, Portland.
Janus, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. H. P. Knevitt, 1855, East Indies.
Jascur, sc. gunboat Lieut.-Com. J. B. Scott 1846, W. Indies.,
Jasper, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. H. Pym, 1849, W. Indies.
Kestrel, sc. gunboat. Lieut.-Com. G. D Bevan, 1853, East Indies.
Lapwing, 4, screw, Com. M. F. O. Reilly, 1856, Mediterranean.
Lee, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. H. Jones, 1852, East Indies.
Leopard 18, st.-ves., Capt. J. F. B. Wainwright, 1856, North America and West Indies.
Leven, 3, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. S. Hudson, 1854, East Indies.
Liffey, 51, screw, Capt. G. W. Preedy, CB., 1855, Mersey.
Locust, 3, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. J. B. Field, 1846, particular service.
London, 90, screw, Capt. H. Chads, 1848, Devonport.
Lynx, 4, screw, Lieut.-Com. H. Berkeley, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Lyra, 9, sc. Com. R. B. Oldfield, 1855, Cape of Good Hope.
Madagascar, receiving ship, Commander E. M. Leycester, 1856, Rio Janeiro.
Magicienne, 16, st.-vessel, Capt. N. Vansittart, C.B., 1854, E. Indies.
Marlborough, 131, sc., Vice Adm. A. Fanshawe, C.B., Capt. the Rt. Hon. Lord F. H. Kerr, 1852, Mediterranean.
Medina, st.-ves., 4, Capt. T. A. B. Spratt, C.B., 1855, Mediterranean
Medusa, 4, steam-vessel, Com. W. Bowden, 1854, Coast of Africa
Megæra, 6, sc., Com. G. T. M. Purvis (b), 1852, particular service
Mersey, 40, screw, Capt. H. Caldwell, C.B., 1853, particular service.
Mohawk, 4, screw. Com. P. C. C. McDougall, 1856, East Indies.
Monkey, steam tug, Sec. Mas. G. Syndercombe, (acting), Woolwich.
Naiad, 42, store-ship, Mast.-Com. W. W. Dillon, 1843, Callao
Nautilus, 6, Lieut.-Com. W. B. Grant, 1852, apprentice ship, Devonport
Nereus, 42, store-depôt, Mast.-Com. J. C. Barlow, 1835, Valparaiso
Niger, 14, sc., Capt. P. Cracroft, 1854, East Indies.
Nile, 90, sc., Rear-Adm. C. Talbot, Capt. A. P. E. Wilmot, C.B., 1854, Devonport.
Nimrod, 6, sc., Com. ———————— East Indies.
Oberon, 3, st.-vessel, Lieut-Com. F. G. C. Paget, 1852, South America.
Opossum, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. C. J. Balfour, 1850, East Indies.
Orion, 91, screw, Capt. W. Houstoun, 1847, Mediterranean.
Osprey, 4, screw, Com. H. J. Blomfield, 1855, Mediterranean
Pearl 20, sc., Capt. E. S. Sotheby, C.B., 1852, East Indies.
Pelorus, 21, sc., Capt. F. B. P. Seymour, 1854, East Indies.
Pembroke, 60, Capt. E. P. Charlewood, 1855, Coast Guard.
Perseverance, 2 troop ship, Com. E. R. Power, 1850, particular service
Persian, 12, Commander E. Hardinge 1856, Coast of Africa.
Pioneer, 6, screw, Com. C. H. May, 1854, Portsmouth.
Plover, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. H. Rason, 1855, East Indies
Plumper, 9, screw, Capt. G. H. Richards, 1854, Pacific.
Pluto, 4, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. C. H. Simpson, 1848, Coast of Africa

Porcupine, 3, st.-ves. Capt. H. C. Otter, 1854, Devonport.
Princess Charlotte, 104 Mast.-Com. H. G. Thomsett, 1854, Hong Kong.
Princess Royal, 91, sc., Capt. T. Baillie, 1845, Mediterranean
Pylades, screw, 21, Capt. M. de Courcy, 1852, Pacific
Qua'l, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. N Osborn 1856, Mediterranean.
Queen Charlotte, 104, Vice-Adm. E. Harvey, Capt. H. Harvey, 1852, Sheerness.
Racer, 11, screw, Com the Hon. T.A. Pakenham 1856, North America and West Indies.
Racoon, 21, screw, Captain J. A. Paynter, 1854, Mediterranean.
Recruit, 6, st.-v., Com. D. Spain, 1856, Mediterranean.
Renown, 91, screw, Capt. A. Forbes, 1846 Mediterranean.
Retribution, 28, st.-vessel, Commodore H. E. Edgell, East Indias.
Rhadamanthus, 4, st. ves., Master-Com. F. R Stardee, 1843, particular service.
Roebuck, 6, sc., Com. E. C. Symons, acting, E.I
Rolla, 6, Lieut.-Com. C. G. Nelson, 1854, Portsmouth.
Royal Albert, 121, sc., Rear-Admiral Sir C. H. Freemantle. K.C.B., Capt. E. B. Rice (1855), Channel Squadron.
Royal Adelaide, 104, Rr.-Ad. Sir T. S. Pasley, Bt.; Capt. W. J. Williams, 1841, Devonport.
Russell, 60, sc., Capt. G. Wodehouse, 1854, Coast Guard.
St. Jean D'Acre, 101, screw, Capt. T. P. Thompson, 1847, Mediterranean.
St Vincent, Capt. T. Wilson, 1853, Portsmouth, training ship.
Sampson, 6, st.-v., Capt. G. S. Hand, 1852, S.E. Coast of America.
Saracen, 4, Mast.-Com. W. Stanton, 1852, East Indies.
Satellite, sc., 21, Capt. J. C. Prevost, 1856, Pacific.
Satarn, 72, Capt. G. Ramsay, C.B., 1843, Pembroke.
Scourge, 6, sc, Com. Prince of Langenberg, 1857, Mediterranean.
Seagull, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. Chimmo, 1850, particular service.
Sharpshooter, 8, screw, Lieut.-Com. C. Gibbons, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Shamrock, sc. surveying ves., Com. Edye, Coast of Ireland.
Simoom, 8, sc., Com. J. M. Cooke, 1852, E. Indies.
Siren, 16, Com. G. M. Balfour, 1856, South America.
Skipjack, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. J. Murray, 1848, Channel Squadron.
Slaney, 2, sc. gunbt., Lt.-Com. R. J. Wynniatt, 1850, East Indies.
Sparrowhawk, 4, sc., Com. J. C. Byng, 1856, East Indies.
Spitfire, 5, st.-v., Lieut.-Com. W. C. Chapman, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Spy, 3, Lieut.-Com. T. B. Collinson, 1850, South America.
Starling, sc.-gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. A. Whitahed, 1854, East Indies.
Staunch, 2, sc.-gunboat, Lt.-Com. E. J. Pollard, 1855, East Indies.
Styx, 6, st.ves., Com. C. Vesey, 1854 N. America and W. Indies.
Supply, st.-sh., Mast.-Com. W. H. Balliston, 1845, Woolwich
Surprise, 4, sc., Com. Lord E. H. Cecil, 1857, C. of Africa.
Tartar, 20, sc., Capt. H. Dunlop, 1850, W. Indies and N. America.
Tartarus, 4, st., Com. A. L. Mansell, 1855, Mediterranean.
Termagant, 25, screw, Capt. R. Hall, 1855, Portland.
Terrible, 21, st.-vessel, Capt. F. H. H. Glasse, C. B., 1846, Mediterranean.
Terror, 16, Capt. F. Hutton, 1844, Bermuda.
Tortoise, 12, store-ship, Capt. W. F. Burnett, C.B., 1854, Ascension.
Tribune, 30, screw, Captain G. T. P. Hornby, 1846, East Indies.
Trident, 6, st.-v. Com. F. A. Close, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Triton, 3, st.-ves. Lieut.-Com. R. H. Burton, 1849, Coast of Africa
Urgent, sc. troop ship, Com. H. W. Hire, 1854, particular service.
Valorous, 19, st.-ves., Capt. W. C. Aldham, C.B., 1853, particular service.
Vesuvius, 6, steam-vessel, Commodore C. Wise, Coast of Africa.
Victoria and Albert, 2, steam yacht, Captain the Hon. J Denman, 1841, Portsmouth.
Victor Emanuel, 91, sc., Capt. J. Willcox, C.B., 1850, Mediterranean.
Victory, 101, Admiral W. Bowles, C.B.; Capt. A. Farquhar, 1849, Portsmouth.
Vigilant, 4, sc., Com. W. Armytage, 1855, Mediterranean.
Viper, 4, screw, Com W. N. W. Hewett, V.C. L.H., 1858, Devonport.
Virago, 6, st.-ves., Com. M. B. Dunn, 1856 particular service.
Vixen, 6, st.-ves., Com. L. Lambert, 1858. Pacific.
Vulture, 6, st.-v., Captain F. A. Campbell, 1856, Mediterranean.
Wanderer, 4, screw, Com. M. R. Pechell, 1854, Mediterranean.
Watchful, 2, sc.-gunbt. st. Com. F. W. Inglefield, 1857, East Indies.
Wellesley, 72, Captain Superintendent G. Goldsmith, C.B., 1842, Chatham.
Weser, st. v., 6., Com. A. H. J. Johnstone, 1859, Chatham.
Woodcock, 2, sc., gunbt., Lt.-Com. G. S. Bousanquet, 1855, East Indies.

STATIONS OF THE INDIAN NAVY IN COMMISSION.

(Corrected to the 26th April, 1859.)

With the dates of Commission of the Officers in command

Acbar, 22, Flag-ship of Commodore G. G. Wellesley, C.B., Com. H. A. Drought, 1851, Com. H. W. Grounds, 1856, Gunnery Officer, Bombay.
Assaye, 10, paddle, Commander G. N. Adams, 1858, Zanzibar.
Auckland, 8, paddle, Com. J. Stephens. 1848,
Assyria, 2, paddle, Master-Com. E. Davies, 1858, Aden.
Augusta. 6, yacht, Bombay.

Australian, screw troop ship, Master-Com. Boon, Bay of Bengal.
Berenice, 2, paddle troop ship, Lieut.-Com. A. W. Chitty, 1847, Malabar Coast.
Bheemah, 4, surveying vessel, Lieut.-Com. A. D. Taylor, 1847, Malabar Coast.
Becas, 2, flat, Master-Com. E. Nash, 1850, River Indus.
Clive, 18, Lieut.-Com. J. Sedley, 1847, school ship, on a Cruize.
Cursetjee, Flat, Master-Com. ———, Indus.
Charlotte, 4, Lieut.-Com. T. N. ck, 1857, Andaman Islands.
Constance, 3, Lieut.-Com. C. H. Walker, 1847, Aden.
Comet, 5, paddle gunboat, Com. W. B. Selby, 1830, Mesopotamia.
Coromandel, screw troop ship, Lieut.-Com. S. B. Hellard, 1847, Bay of Bengal.
Chenaub, 2, paddle, Master-Com. T. Gourley, 1858, River Indus.
Conqueror, 2, paddle, Master-Commander T. K. Linton, 1849, River Indus.
Dalhousie, screw troop ship, Lieut.-Com. T. W. Hopkins, 1858, Bay of Bengal.
Dromedary, Flat, Master-Com. ———, River Indus.
Elphinstone, 18, Lieut.-Com. H. A. Fraser, 1859, Bombay.
Euphrates, Flat, Master-Com. W. Walton, 1858, River Indus.
Ethersey, Flat, Master-Com. T. O. Jones, 1858, River Indus.
Emily, 2, Lieut.-Com. P. W. Tendal, 1857, Persian Gulf.
Falkland, 12, Commodore G. Jenkins, C.B., 1855, Persian Gulf.
Ferooz, 10, paddle, Commander C. J. Cruttenden, 1830, Bombay.
Freere, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J. McNeil, 1852, River Indus.
Goolanair, paddle yacht, Master-Commander J. D. Kennelly, 1850, Bombay
Georgiana, 2, Lieut.-Com. W. Collingwood, 1857, Persian Gulf.
Indus, 2, paddle, Master-Commander E. S. H. Neale, 1856, River Indus.
Jhellum, 2, paddle, Master-Com. R. L. Lawson, 1856, River Indus.
Keddywarree, receiving ship, Master-Com. J. S. Amos, 1856, Kurrache.
Lady Falkland, 2, paddle, Mast.-Com. W. Barras, 1859, Kurrache.
Lady Canning, 4, paddle, Lieut.-Com. E. Peevor, 1846, Red Sea.
Mahi, 3, Lieut.-Com. R. W. Whish, 1849, Bombay.
Marié, 3, Lieut.-Com. C. G. Constable, 1839, Surveying Ship, Malabar Coast.
Mootvee, 1, pendant ves., Capt. E. W. Daniell, 1857, Kotree.
Napier, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J. Forster, 51, River Indus.
Nerbudda, 2, Lieut.-Com. C. Forster, 1856, Malabar Coast.
Nimrod, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J. B. Butter, 1856, River Indus.
Nitocris, Flat, Master-Com. A. Harrison, 1856, River Indus.
Outram, 4, paddle, Mast.-Com. W. Fivey, 1858, River Indus.
Punjaub, 10, paddle, Commander A. Foulerton, 1857, Calcutta
Planet, 2, paddle, Master-Com. T. K. Fletcher, 1853, River Indus.
Prince Arthur, screw troop-ship, Com. J. Tronson, 1858, *en route* Timor Islands.
Pleiad, 2, screw, Lieut.-Com. J. G. Nixon, 1847, Persian Gulf.
Ravee, Flat, Master-Com. ———, River Indus.
Semiramis, 8 paddle, Com. W. Balfour, 1858, Bombay.
Sutledge, Flat, Master-Com., River Indus.
Satellite, 2, paddle, Master-Com. A. Wilkins, 1852, River Indus.
Snake, paddle, tender to Acbar, Bombay.
Sir H. Havelock, 2, paddle, Master-Com. D. Morrison, 1858, River Indus.
Sir H. Lawrence, 2, paddle, Master-Com. C. Tickel, 1845, River Indus.
Sydney, screw troop ship, Master-Com. J. Nibblet, Bay of Bengal
Tigris, 5, Lieut.-Com. G. T. Robinson, 1847, Persian Gulf.
Victoria, 4, paddle, Lieut.-Com. T. S. W. Twynham, 1845, Bombay.
Zenobia, 10, paddle, Com. F. E. Manners, 1857, Murat.

NAVAL BRIGADE.

1st Brigade, Bombay, 1st Company, Surat, Lieut.-Com. J. B. Bewsher, 1856, commanding.
2nd Brigade, Bengal, Capt. C. D. Campbell, 1857.
1st Company, Fort William, Lieut.-Com. C. B. Templer, 1857.
2nd Company, Guyah, Lieut.-Com. T. H. B. Banon, 1854.
3rd do. Dacca, Lieut.-Com. H. W. Etheridge, 1847.
4th do. Andaman Islands, Lieut.-Com. F. Warden, 1857.
5th Company Sasseram, Lieut.-Com. G. O. B. Carew, 1855.
6th do. Patna, Lieut.-Com. D. S. Duval, 1854.
7th do. Chybassa, Lieut.-Com. T. E. Lewis, 1848.
8th do. Barackpore, Lieut.-Com. W. H. M. Davis, 1849.
9th do. Jepore, Lieut.-Com. A. T. Winder 1851.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

NAVY.

ADMIRALTY, May 16.

Vice Admiral of the White William James Mingaye has been appointed to receive a pension of £150 a year as provided by her Majesty's Order in Council of 25th June, 1851, vacant by the death of Vice Admiral Peter John Douglas, and the name of Vice Admiral Mingaye has been removed to the Reserved Half Pay List accordingly; and, in consequence of this removal the following Promotions, to date from Dec. 18, 1858, have this day taken place:—

Vice Admiral of the Blue Sir Thomas Herbert, K.C.B., to be Vice Admiral of the White. Rear Admiral of the Red Sir George Robert Lambert, K.C.B., to be Vice Admiral of the Blue. Retired Rear Admiral John Gore to be Vice Admiral on the Retired List. Rear Admiral of the White Charles Ramsay Drinkwater Bethune, C.B., to be Rear Admiral of the Red. Red Admiral of the Blue George Rodney Muddy to be Rear Admiral of the White.

Capt. Thomas Henderson to be Rear Admiral of the Blue.

The undernamed Officers on the Retired List have also been promoted to Retired Rear Admirals, on the terms proposed in the *London Grzette* of the 1st September, 1846, but without increase of pay:—Captains William Shepheard and William Luckraft.

ADMIRALTY, May 7.

ROYAL MARINES.—*First Lieutenants to be Captains.*—Archibald Alexander Douglas, Charles Loftus Tottenham Usher, George Lascelles Blake, Osborne Frederick Charles Fraser, (Adjutant), Wm. Henry Worthy Bennett, George Leslie, Wm. Penn Burton, Nicholas Bennett Dalby, Enbule Daysh Thelwall, Richard Pentland Henry.

Second Lieutenants to be First Lieutenants.—Henry Sturt Lewis, William Henry Smith, John Straghan, William Henry Poyntz, T. Linley Grant, Augustine Evans, R. R. A. Woolforde, James A. Godfrey, Langham Rokeby, William Armstrong, Charles William Fothergill, Robert James Pascoe, Henry Cawley Bowker, Henry Ives de Kantzow, Sidney Thomas Bridgford, John Wm. Waller O'Grady, Graham Hewett, Henry Monckton Kay, Nowell FitzUpton Way, Ernest Augustus Macy, George Majendie Vivian, Charles Edward Servante, Edward O'Donovan Powell, James Anderson Morice, Daniel Thomas Woodriff, William Younghusband.

PROMOTION.

Surgeon to be Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals and Fleets.—R. McCormack.

APPOINTMENTS.

Rear Admiral of the Blue—George Rodney Mundy to be Second in Command in the Mediterranean, and to hoist his flag on board H. M's ship *Hannibal*.

Commanders—Charles H. May, 1854, to *Pioneer*; Charles W. Hope, 1854, to *Flying Fish*; Joseph H. Marryat, 1855, to *Intrepid*; Arthur G. Fitz-Roy, 1857, to *Falcon*; Edward F. Dent, 1857, to *Cressy*; John L. Perry, 185[illegible], to *Hannibal*; Samuel B. Dolling, 1856, to *Nile*; Colin A. Campbell, 1858, to *Banshee*; William E. Fisher, 1856, to *Ferret*; Edmund Wilson, 1845, to *Atholl*; Thos. H. Lysaght, 1849, to *Formidable*; James M. Bruce, 1855, to *Fisgard*, for special service; Joseph Dayman, 1858, to *Firebrand*, for special service, vice Bruce. James M. Bruce, 1855, *Firebrand*; Bedford C. T. Pim, to *Gorgon*; Arthur Barrow, 1856, to *Exmouth*.

Captains—James J. Stopford, 1841, to *Exmouth*; Hon. C. G. J. B. Elliot, C.B., 1841, to *Cressy*; George H. Seymour, C.B., 1844, to *Hero*, vice Sir George N. Broke, Bart., C.B., superseded on account of ill-heath; Mathew Conolly, 1858, to *Hannibal*, as Flag Captain to Rear Admiral Mundy, Henry S. Hillyar, C.B., 1854, to *Cadmus*; Henry Chads, 1848, to *London*, Thomas Hope, 1852, to *Agamemnon*; Arthur Cumming, 1854, to *Emerald*; Oliver J. Jones, 1855, to *Furious*, vice Osborn, superseded at his own request. A. F. R. De Horsey, 1856, to *Brisk*.

Arthur Wilmshurst, 1854, to *London*; Hugh M. Elliot, 1856, to *Agamemnon*.

Lieutenants—J. G. Robins, 1841, to be Harbour Master at Falmouth; R. B. Foster, 1854, to *St. Vincent*; W. S. De Cantzow, 1854, to *Cadmus*; Edward Denny, 1857, to *Agamemnon*. Godfrey Taylor, 1850, and Thomas H. Greer, 1851, to *Minotaur*; W. T. F. Jackson, 1846, George V. Philipps, 1853, W. J. H. Grubbe, 1854, Charles D. Lucas, V.C., 1854, and Hon. H. Baillie Hamilton, to *Cressy*; C. T. W. G. Cerjat, 1846, and William F. Gregory, 1853, to *Asia*; Arthur Wing, 1854, Henry J. Challis, 1854, G. A. W. Welch, 1851, and George W. Strong, 1855, to *Hannibal*; John Burgess, 1848, and H. T. Gammell, 1852, to *Wellington*; C. A. P. V. Robinson, 1849, George L. Sullivan, 1853, William Spratt, 1854, and G. Y. R. Raitrey,

1858, to *Exmouth*; George Robinson, 1855, to *St. Vincent*; John A. F. Luttrell, 1855, to *Excellent*; H. R. E. Grey, 1857, to *Firebrand*; Robert Ross, to *Gorgon*; William Spratt, 1854, to *Gorgon*; F. H. S. Webber, 1858, to *Exmouth*; John B. Barnett, 1855, to *Firebrand*; Henry N. Knox, 1853, to *Royal Adelaide*; N. D. F. Lillingston, 1856, P. J. Hankin, 1858, and W. E. De C. Cookson, 1857, to *Cadmus*; R. S. Chisholme, 1855, to *Banshee*; Grey, O. Twiss, 1856, and G. W. Gregorie, 1857, to *Excellent*; A. A. Hanson, 1856, and E. M. Dayrell, 1858, to *Hannibal*; George W. Strong, 1855, to *Falcon*. St. John Coventry, 1850, J. T. Pringle, 1854, E. W. Manthorp, 1854, and W. M. Wright, 1856, to *London*; Richard Carter, 1853, E. H. Verney, 1858, and C. H. Williams, 1856, to *Emerald*; A. R. Wright, 1854, and H. H. M. Magrath. 1854, to *Edinburgh*; J. B. Michell, 1854, to *Flying Fish*; W. F. Johnson, 1855, to *Pioneer*; Thomas Borrett, 1854, to *Russell*; A. H. Webb, 1855, to *Hastings*; F. T. Hamilton, 1848, H. B. Johnstone, 1851, W. Menzies, 1854, and H. Mc C. Alexander, 1856, to *Agamemnon*; Edward Wilmot, 1853, to *Hannibal*, as Flag Lieutenant to Rear Admiral George R. Mundy; Edward J. Lawson, 1850, to *James Watt*; George H. Mansell, 1855, to *Medina*; A. F. M. Meyer, 1858, to *Pioneer*; C. F. Walker, 1857, to *Flying Fish*; E. W. Hereford, 1858, to *Excellent*; R. H. Thompson, 1858, and C. D. J. Odevaine, 1851, to *Intrepid*; H. S. Bagge, 1858, to *Falcon*; S. Adeane, 1858, H. St. J. De Robeck, 1855, and A. Bagley, 1853, to *Brisk*.

Masters—H. N. Thomas, 1835, (additional) to *Fisgard*; G. H. Blakey, 1849 (additional) to *Wellington*, for service in *Aboukir*; Edwin Wise, 1855, to *Cadmus*; W. G. Aldrich, 1855, to *Vesuvius*; John Jarvis, 1841 A. M. P. Mackey, 1825, Thomas J. Whillier, 1846, R. T. Saunders, 1846, and G. Wright, 1838 (additional), to *Fisgard*. J. G. Mugford, 1841 (additional) to *Fisgard*; W. H. Drysdale, 1852, to *Emerald*; W. W. Kiddle, 1853, to *Agamemnon*; G. L. Carr, 1849, to *London*; James S. Wells, 1841, additional to *Fisgard*, for service in *Bann*; James S. Hill, 1845, additional to *Fisgard*; J. J. Ball, 1843, to *Asia*; J. H. Allard, 1851, to *Exmouth*; W. Byford, 1848, to *Cressy*; John P. P. Warren, 1843, to *Hannibal*; J. C. Hutchins, 1838, to *Minotaur*; J. Tucker (b), 1841, to *Wellington*; J. E. Scudamore, 1858, to *m*; Valentine F. Johnson, 1856, to *Fireband*; R. J. C. Grant, 1858, to *Intrepid*; H. B. Hunt, 1858, to *Falcon*; C. Parkinson, 1855, to *Brisk*; and F. Inglis, 1854, to *Flying Fish*; Henry T. Ellis, 1848 (additional), to *Minotaur*; Timothy W. Sulivan, 1849, to *Hero*; Vincent Williams, 1841, to *Hastings*; W. W. Kiddle, 1853 (additional), to *Asia*, for service in *Agamemnon*.

Mates—C. R. Macdonnell, 1859, to *Hero*; C. R. Bucle, 1857, to the Royal yatch *Victoria and Albert* for special service. J. G. J. Hammer, 1859, to *Cressy*; Hon. F. Crofton, to *Hero*.

Chief Engineers—James Brown, 1847, to *Agamemnon*; Friend Stow, 1851, to *London*; J. Coope to *Brisk*.

Second Masters—George Patterson, 1856, to *Hannibal*; A. G. Whichelo, 1848, additional, to *Fisgard*, for service in *Black Eagle*; J. R. N. Moss, 1856, to *Pioneer*; Erasmus C. Roberts, 1854, to *Exmouth*; T. Pounds, 1854, to *Banshee*; Alexander Gray, 1856; to *Hannibal*; Selwyn S. Sugden (acting) to *Rhadamanthus*.

Surgeons—W. Robertson, M.D., 1843, to *Hero*; E. Davies, M.D., 1841, to *Asia*; H. Trevan, M.D., 1846, to *Exmouth*; T. H. Keown, 1841, and C. S. Lester, M.D., 1855, additional to *Cressy*; S. W. Webb, 1845, to *Hannibal*; Howard R. Banks, 1843, to *Minotaur*; Ahmuty Irwin, 1855, additional to *Eagle*; W. F. Noott, M.D. 1855, to *Fireband*; J. McE. Wallace 1859, to *Gorgon*; C. R. Brien, M.D., 1842, to *Wellington*; John R. Holman, 1856 (additional) to *Fisgard*; L. J. Monteith, 1854, to *Falcon*; W. T. Billings, 1855, to *Brisk*; T. B. Purchas, M.D., 1857, to *Flying Fish*; R. J. Squire, 1857, to *Intrepid*; W. F. McClinton, B.A., M.B., 1858, to *Pioneer*; R. Picken, M.D., 1858, to *Banshee*; J. M'Swiney, 1853, to *Emerald*; Andrew Graham, M.D., 1847, and William S. Roche, M.B., B.A., 1859 (additional), to *Agamemnon*; George A. Nicolls, M.D., 1848 and Joseph Sloss, M.D., 1857 (additional) to *London*; A. W. W. Babington, 1841, to *Cdmus*.; *Asistant Surgeon Acting*) —Samuel Grose, 1859, to *Cadmus*.

Assistant Surgeons—Alexander Collins, M.B., 1854, additional to *Nile*; James Wyse, 1856, and Alexander Minnoch, (acting) to *Exmouth*; Francis H. Moore, 1856, to *Cressy*; Richard P. Hifferman, 1854, and Robert Walker, (acting) to *Hannibal*; Constantine Keenan, 1854, to *Minotaur*; Anthony H. Woodifield, M.D., 1854, to *Wellington*; Robert Creighton, 1850, to *Asia*; Thomas Craig, 1856, to *Firebrand*; David

Campbell, 1855, to *Gorgon*; John Caldwell, 1853, to *Emerald*; B. R. Murphy, 1855, to *Brisk*; John W. Belcher, (acting) to *Agamemnon*; William Roche, (B.) (acting) to *Falcon*.

Paymasters.– Chas. A. Thorne, 1847, to *Exmouth*; John Doyle, 1851, to *Cambrian*; H. H. Shanks, 1857, to be Secretary to Rear Admiral Mundy; J. B. M'Avoy, 1854, additional to *Royal Adelaide*; T. W. Haverfield, 1853, additional to *Queen Charlotte*; F. T. Robins, 1851, additional to *Ajax*; W. H. De Carteret, 1855, to *Falcon*; and W. F. Huyghue, 1854, to *Brisk*; William G. Parmeter, 1845, and Robert W. Warwick, 1854 (additional) to *Wellington*; William B. Pearce, 1846, William J. Stevens, 1857 (additional), and Henry J. R. Miall, 1855 (additional) to *Asia*; Alexander Robinson, 1842, to *Exmouth*; George G. Nelson, 1848, to *Cressy*; William Morgan, 1841, to *Hannibal*; Charles S. Giles, 1846, and Henry Callaway, 1856 (additional) to *Minotaur*; Frederick Lucas, 1854, to *Firebrand*; Adderley W. Chimmo, 1856, (additional) to *Russell*; William H. Ozzard, 1854, (additional) to *Hogue*; Henry Sewell, 1857, to *Gorgon*; Thomas S. Vinall, 1855 (additional) to *Fisgard*; Frederick C. Flenley, 1859, (additional) to *Pembroke*; Thomas W. Wells, 1855, (additional) to *Arrogant*; W. H. M. Arnold, 1858 (additional), to *Hannibal*; Fred. Brady, 1842, to *Marlborough*; Timothy T. Jennings, 1854, to *Cadmus*; C. W. McDermott, 1859, to *Falcon*; R. G. Webber, 1851, to *Emerald*; J. J. Rutter, 1850, (additional) to *Formidable*; James B. Hay, 1846, to *London*; Joseph Lewis, 1848, to *Agamemnon*; Samuel Smyth, 1856 (additional) to *Hawke*; Thomas Pidcock, 1846, to *London*; Robert E. Malone, 1857, to *London*.

Assistant Paymasters (in Charge)—W. Evans, 1853, to *Intrepid*; W. H. Fitzpatrick, 1852, to *Flying Fish*; and R. H. Lowcay, 1852, to *Pioneer*.

Assistant Paymasters—W. H. Whichelo, to *Brisk*; James C. Meagher, 1851, and Thomas M. Jenkins, 1855, to *Cressy*; Charles P. Fielon, 1851, to *Hannibal*; John P. Pasco, 1857, and Henry T. West, 1855, to *Minotaur*; Edward H. Stanton, 1846, and Frederick O. L. Patch, 1857, to *Wellington*; William Noble, 1855, to *Asia*; Adolphus D. Albertanson, to *Firebrand*; William P. Burdwood, 1852 (in charge) to *Banshee*; Joseph F. Allen, 1858, to *Exmouth*; E. S. M. Power, to *Agamemnon*; Frederick Bunn, 1853, to *Emerald*; E. T. Reffell, 1855, to *London*; W. S. Mould, 1858, and Thomas S. Giles, 1857, to *Agamemnon*; C. P. Fielon, 1851, to *Victory*; James Moore, 1853, to *Cadmus*.

Assistant Engineers—J. Hareley, C. Symons, and E. Morris, to *Brisk*; J. Churcher, 1st class, T. Huard, 2nd class, H. Benbow and T. Murray, 3rd class, to *Intrepid*; J. Hawkins, additional, to *Hawke*; W. E. Campion, 1st class, and J. Sales, 2nd class, to *Firebrand*; E. Clements, 1st class, to *Banshee*; T. Foster, 1st class, to *Fisgard*; J. Bully, W. B. Harvey, J. Ferguson, W. Murray, R. Swanson, and T. Carline, to *Agamemnon*; W. Lewis, J. Diprose, S. Harrison, W. Brinifield, and John Grant, to *London*.

Naval Instructor—William Roy, 1846, to *Hannibal*.

Midshipman—G. S. Brown, to *Hannibal*.

Masters Assistants—Edwd. K. Barnes, to *Cressy*; S. C. Tracey, to *Dasher*.

Clerks—Alfred P. Cox and G. V. Gruzelier, to *Exmouth*; Nicholas J. Aaron, to *Cressy*; William A. Haverfield, to *Hannibal*; W. C. Devereux, to *Gorgon*; Richard Drury, to *Blenheim*; F. A. Pountney, to *Hannibal*; W. H. Aitken, to *Emerald*; W. E. P. Saer, to *London*; E. Theakston, to *Hannibal*; G. T. Cheyney, to *Falcon*.

Assistant Clerks—A. L. B. Corrie, to *Edinburgh*; A. T. D. Nettleton, to *Exmouth*; E. B. Nettleton, to *Cressy*; Edward W. Iago, to *Hannibal*; W. H. E. W. Roberts, to *Firebrand*; John W. Backwell, to *Impregnable*.

Naval Cadets—H. J. Robiliard, A. F. Gardner, and W. A. Eubank, to *James Watt*; S. C. Darwin, R. H. Byron, and C. Caffin, to *Mersey*; L. J. P. Goodwich, to *Royal Albert*; F. C. N. Hall, J. C. Wilkinson, and H. C. Hammil, to *Doris*; W. F. Russell, T. W. Harris, A. Kinsman, and L. A. Roberts, to *Hannibal*; R. A. Smith, V. E. Donop, and Hon. A. R. Hewett, to *Nile*; F. Romily, to *Marlborough*; W. T. Down, R. C. Towshend, E. W. F. Boxer, and C. H. Taylor, to *Hero*; C. G. P. Hicks, D. M. Smith, and S. A. D. Shafto, to *Algiers*; W. H. Lewin, W. M. F. Castle, H. A. Street, and C. I. Hives, to *Exmouth*; J. L. Wilson. F. A. Gardner, and G. V. Story, to *Cressy*; H. N. Alleyne, and R. C. Jolliffe, to *St. Jean d'Acre*.

ARMY.

WAR OFFICE, APRIL 26.

To be Colonels in the Army—Lieut. Col. B. Hale, C.B., 82nd Foot; Lieut. Col. H. E. Longden, C.B., 10th Foot.

To be Lieut. Cols. in the Army—Brevet Major W. W. Barry, Royal Artillery, March 24, 1858; Major A. C. Robertson, 8th Foot, July 20, 1858; Brevet Major H. P. Yates, Royal Artillery, April 26; Major W. H. Kirby, 9th Foot, April 26; Major C. R. Butler, 20th Foot, April 26; Brevet Maj. the Hon. D. M'Dowall Fraser, Royal Artillery, April 26; Brevet Major J. E. Michell, Royal Artillery, April 26; Major E. G. Maynard, 88th Foot, April 26; Major the Hon. J. J. Bourke, 88th Foot, April 26; Major J. M. Macdonald, Ceylon Rifle Regiment, April 26; Bt. Major C. H. Smith, Royal Artillery, April 26; Major C. V. Oxenden, Rifle Brigade, April 26; Major W. T. Tinling, 90th Foot, April 26th; Major H. D'Oyly Torrens, 23rd Foot, April 26; Major T. B. Butt, 79th Foot, April 26; Major G. H. Tyler, 13th Foot, April 26; Brevet Major J. H. Cox, 75th Foot, April 26; Brevet Major Sir H. M. Havelock, Bart., 18th Foot, April 26; Major E. G. Bulwer, 23rd Foot, April 26; Brevet Major W. A. Middleton, C.B., Royal Artillery, April 26; Major T. Lightfoot, 84th Foot, April 26; Brevet Major F. A. Willis, C.B., 84th Foot, April 26; Brevet Major G. T. Wolsely, 90th Foot, April 26th; Brevet Major W. O. Lennox, Royal Engineers, April 26; Major C.S. Hutchinson, 2nd Dragoon Guards, April 26; Major H. R. Norman, 10th Foot, April 26; Major W. D. Bushe, 7th Light Dragoons, April 26.

To be Majors in the Army.—Capt. A. J. Macpherson, 24th Foot, Jan 19, 1858; Capt. R. Freer, 27th Foot, Jan. 19, 1858; Capt. R. Mockler, 64th Foot, March 24, 1858; Capt. W. Goode, 64th Foot, March 24, 1858; Capt. B. Drew, 75th Foot, March 24th, 1858; Capt. G. Rotton, Royal Artillery, April 13, 1858; Capt. Hon. L. W. Milles, Rifle Brigade, July 20, 1858; Second Capt. A. Leahy, Royal Engineers, Sept. 23, 1858; Capt. J. B. Thelwall, 24th Foot, April 26; Capt. G. S. Young, 80th Foot, April 26; Capt. F. Van Straubenzee, 13th Foot, April 26; Capt. G. M. Miller, 79th Foot, April 26; Second Capt. C. F. Young, Royal Artillery, April 26; Capt. R.S. Colls, 32nd Foot, April 26; Captain B. Granville, 22nd Foot, April 26; Second Capt. F. E. Cox, Royal Engineers, April 26; Second Capt. J. McC. Campbell, Royal Artillery, April 26; Capt. E. C. D. Radcliffe, 88th Foot, April 26; Capt. G. H. J. Heigham, 23rd Foot, April 26; Capt. T. C. Lyons, 20th Foot, April 26; Capt. J. H Wyatt, Military Train, April 26; Capt. C. Jones, 60th Foot, April 26; Second Capt. A. C. Johnson, Royal Artillery, April 26; Capt. T. H. Stisted, 7th Light Dragoons, April 26; Capt. J. A. Dalzell, 53rd Foot, April 26; Capt. J. T. N. O'Brien, 20th Foot, April 26; Capt. F. M. Alison, 19th Foot, April 26; Capt. W. D. Harris, 2nd Bengal Fusiliers; Jan. 19, 1858; Capt. J. C. Hay, 60th Bengal N. I., Jan. 19. 1858; Capt. E. Brown, 1st Bengal Fusiliers, Jan. 18, 1858; Capt. G. W. M. Hall, 25th Bengal N. I., Jan. 18, 1858; Capt. H. F. M. Boisragon, 1st Bengal Fusiliers, Jan. 19, 1858; Capt. D. Kemp, 5th Bengal European Infantry, Jan. 19, 1858; Capt. H. Lane, 5th Bengal Light Cavalry, March 24th, 1858; Second Capt. J. St. John Hovenden, B.E. Aug. 28, 1858.

WAR OFFICE, APRIL 26.

Hospital Staff.—Surgeon Major G. Clerihew, M.D., to be Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, vice A.S. Macdonell, who retires upon Half Pay, April 26.

CHAPLAINS' DEPARTMENT.—The Commission of the Rev. T. Unsworth, as Chaplain of the Fourth Class, has been antedated to July 10, 1855.

UNATTACHED.—Major and Brevet Col. E. R. Wetherall C.B., Half Pay Unattached, and Deputy Quartermaster General in Dublin, to be Lieut. Col., without purchase.

BREVET.—Lieut. Col. J. A. Ewart, C.B., 93rd Foot, to be Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, with the rank of Colonel in the Army; Lieut. Col. W. Parke, C.B., 72nd Foot, to be Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, with the rank of Colonel in the Army.

WAR OFFICE, April 26.

GENERAL ORDER.

Horse Guards, S.W., April 26.—In consequence of the services rendered by Major and Brevet Col. Edward Robert Wetherall, C.B., Unattached, as Chief of the Staff with the Force under Major General Sir H. Rose, G.C.B., during the latter part of the operations of that column in Central India, in the year 1858, and subsequently in the command of a column in the late campaign in Oude, which attacked and captured the Fort of Rampoor, Her Majesty has been pleased to promote this Officer to the Substantive Rank of Lieutenant Colonel Unattached.

By order of his Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief.

(Signed) G. A. Wetherall,
Adj. General.

WAR OFFICE, April 29.

16th Regiment of Light Dragoons—Major General the Hon. Sir E. Cust to be Colonel, vice Lieut. General Sir J. Thackwell, G.C.B., deceased, April 9.

Memorandum.—Major General the Hon. Sir E. Cust has paid the difference between the full price of a Cavalry and Infantry Lieut. Colonelcy, he having been upon Half Pay of Infantry when promoted to the rank of Maj. General.

WAR OFFICE, April 29.

(The following Commissioners bear date April 29, 1859.

2nd Regiment of Dragoon Guards—Captain W. H. Horne, from the 15th Light Dragoons, to be Captain, vice Carnegy, who exchanges.

3rd Dragoon Guards—Lieut. R. Norwood to be Captain, by purchase, vice Chaplain promoted.

5th Light Dragoons—Lieut. T. W. Vallance to be Capt., by purchase, vice Timson, who retires.

13th Light Dragoons—Lieut. F. J. King, from the 17th Light Dragoons, to be Lieut., vice Billing, who exchanges.

14th Light Dragoons—Captain P. A. W. Carnegy, from the 2nd Dragoon Guards, to be Captain, vice Horne, who exchanges.

17th Light Dragoons—Lieut. A. J. Billing, from the 13th Light Dragoons, to be Lieut., vice King, who exchanges.

Military Train—Lieut. H. Clarke, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps, to be Lieut., vice Willans, who reverts to Half Pay of his former rank of Captain in that Corps, from 1st April, 1857. Lieut. R. Neville, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps, to be Lieut., vice Harris, promted to an Unattached Company, without purchase; Cornet J. Baird, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps, to be Ensign, vice Macleod, whose appointment has been cancelled.

21st Regiment of Foot—Lieut. T. B. Hollway to be Capt., by purchase, vice Miller, who reverts to the Half Pay of Captain of the late Land Transport Corps from 1st April, 1857.

29th.—Lieut. N. P. Ledgard, to be Captain by purchase, vice Phipps, who retires. Ensign A. B. Shadwell, to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Kent, promoted in the 24th Foot.

30th—V. B. Brownlow, Gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Green, promoted.

34th—Assistant Surgeon F. Pennington, from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Worthingson, appointed to the 58th Foot. Assistant Surgeon E. Masterton, from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Paliologus, appointed to the Staff.

37th—Surgeon James William Fleming, from the Staff, to be Surgeon, vice Surgeon Major Cameron, appointed to the Staff.

40th—Ensign J. V. H. Rees to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Bolton, promoted.

41st—Ensign G. W. Barnes, from the 2nd Royal Cheshire Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Sadler, promoted.

45th—Lieutenant G. W. Cosens, from the 80th Foot, to be Lieutenant, vice Christian B. Steward, who exchanges.

47th—Lieut. C. Atty, from the 2nd Warwick Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice J. J. Scott, cashiered by sentence of a General Court-Martial.

48th—Ensign Pembroke O'M. H. Marshall to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice de Montmorency Prior, deceased, March 15.

53rd—Lieutenant R. A. Eyre to be Instructor of Musketry, Feb. 6.

58th Foot—Assistant Surgeon R. J. Worthington, from the 34th Foot, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Tydd, promoted on the Staff.

60th—Brevet Lieutenant Colonel W. Pretyman to be Lieutenant Colonel, by purchase, vice Brown, who retires. Captain P. B. Roe to be Major, by purchase, vice Pretyman.

70th—Surgeon George Cunningham Meikleham, M.D., from the Staff, to be Surgeon, vice Dowse, deceased.

80th—Lieutenant C. B. Steward, from the 45th Foot, to be Lieutenant, vice G. W. Cosens, who exchanges.

88th Foot—Ensign James Buchanan Whitla to be Lieutenant, by purchase vice Hall, promoted. The surname of Lieutenant Mallet is de Carteret in addition to that of Mallet.

1st West India Regiment—Surgeon John Hendley, from the Staff, to be Surgeon, vice W. R. Thompson, M.D., whose appointment, which appeared in the *Gazette* of the 31st December, 1858, has been cancelled.

HOSPITAL STAFF.—Surgeon Major J. C. Cameron, M.D., from the 37th Foot, to be Surgeon Major, vice Surgeon Fleming, appointed to the 37th Foot.

Assistant Surgeon M. T. Paliolgous, from the 34th Foot, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Stuart, appointed to the 13th Foot.

Assistant Surgeon L. C. Tonnere has been cashiered by the sentence of a General Court Martial from the 25th February, 1859.

UNATTACHED.—The undermentioned Officers having been appointed Captains in the Land Transport Corps by General Orders in the Crimea, pending Her Majesty's pleasure, to be Captains, without purchase:—Lieut. J. Harris, from the Military Train. Dated 1st April, 1857. Lieut. A. Grey, from the 63rd Foot. Dated 1st April, 1857.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Tower Hamlets—J. R. Riddell, Esq., to be Deputy Lieutenant, April 17.

Royal East Kent Mounted Rifle Yeomanry Cavalry—The Earl of Mount Charles, Captain 1st Life Guards, to be Captain, vice D'Aeth, resigned, April 20. Lieut. W. Knight to be Captain, vice Dering, resigned, April 21. Cornet Lenne to be Lieut., vice Hammond, resigned, April 14. Cornet Sir C. Honywood, Bart., to be Lieut., vice Knight, promoted, April 21. Lieut. Sir C. Honywood, Bart., to be Captain, vice Bell, resigned, April 22.

2nd Somerset—Ensign J. H. Brereton, to be Lieut., vice Ricketts, promoted; W. V. Andrews, Gent., to be Ensign, vice Marker, promoted, April 19. J. G. Wilson, Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons in England, to be Surgeon, vice Schroeder, appointed to the Army; Ensign W. Jillord, to be Lieut., vice Wilkinson, appointed to the Tower Hamlets Militia; H. M. Sproule, Gent., to be Ensign, vice Fox, promoted, April 20. R. T. Woodman, late Lieut., 14th Light Dragoons, to be Lieut., vice Parkes, resigned, April 21.

Stirlingshire Highland Borderers Light Infantry—J. Dunbar, Esq., to be Ensign, vice W. J. B. Junor, Esq., promoted to be Lieut., April 17.

Royal Wilts.—Lieut. Col. Lord Methuen to bear the title of Lieut. Col. Commandant from the 9th of Jan., 1859.

Nottinghamshire Yeomanry Cavalry.—Lieut. Col. R. Holden to be Lieut Col. Commandant, April 26. Major J. S. Sherwin to be Lieut. Col. April 26. Captain T. B. Charlton, to be Major, vice Sherwin, promoted, April 26. Lieut. G. Rawson to be Captain, vice Charlton, promoted, April 26. Cornet F. Bradshaw, the younger, to be Lieut. vice Rawson, promoted, April 26.

Royal Surrey.—P. G. Chapman, Gent., to be Ensign, April 21.

Royal Sussex.—O. Vandeleur, Gent., to be Lieutenant, vice F. P. Matthews, promoted, April 18th. J. A. Byrne, Gent., to be Lieutenant, vice Augustus G. Morgan, promoted, April 18th. Ensign S. S. Hire to be Lieutenant, April 18th—Ensign C. H. Bell to be Lieutenant, vice P. M. Dickenson, promoted, April 18.

Fifeshire Artillery.—T. W. Webb, to be Second Lieutenant, vice George James Williams, promoted, April 8th and 13th April. S. R. Lumsdaine, gent., to be Second Lieutenant, vice Thomas Jarvis, promoted, April 8th and 13th. W. Inglis, gent., to be Second Lieutenant, vice Rennie, resigned, April 8th and 13th.

The Galloway Rifles.—J. W. Stuart, Esq., to be Lieutenant, vice Hay, deceased, April 18th.

[The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* of the 7th of January last.]

The Galloway Rifles.—J. W. Heuston, gent., to be Ensign, vice A. Heuston, resigned, December 23rd.

WAR OFFICE, MAY 6.

The Queen has been pleased to appoint Lieut. General Sir William John Codrington, K.C.B., to be Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over the City and Garrison of Gibraltar.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to signify her intention to confer the decoration of the Victoria Cross on the

undermentioned Officer of Her Majesty's Army, whose claim to the same has been submitted for Her Majesty's approval, on account of an act of bravery performed by him in the Crimea, during the late war, viz. :—Royal Artillery, Major Frederick Miller.

Her Majesty has also been graciously pleased to confirm the grant of the decoration of the Victoria Cross to the undermentioned Officer of Her Majesty's Indian Military Forces, which decoration has been provisionally conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief in India, for distinguished gallantry displayed by him in that country, when serving under his immediate command, viz. :—1st Bengal European Fusiliers, Lieutenant Thomas Adair Butler.

(*The following Commissions bear date May* 6, 1859.)

1st Regiment of Dragoons—Lieut. R. Clarke to be Capt., by purchase, vice FitzGerald, who retires.

5th Light Dragoons—Cornet R. J. W. Birch to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Vallance, promoted.

10th Light Dragoons—Lieut. Lord R. D. Kerr to be Adjutant, vice Fife, promoted.

Military Train—Lieut. J. Briggs to be Adjutant, vice J. Harris, promoted to an Unattached Company, without purchase.

Coldstream Guards — Ensign and Lieut. A. W. Adair to be Lieut. and Captain, by purchase, vice St. Vincent B. H. Whitshed, who retires ; D. H. Baring, gent., to be Ensign and Lieut., by purchase, vice Adair.

9th Foot—Ensign J. C. F. Grier, from the 2nd Royal Lanark Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Eppes, who resigns.

17th—Lieut. J. O. Travers to be Captain, by purchase, vice the Hon. S. R. H. Ward, appointed Adjutant of a Depôt Battalion; Ensign T. Braddell to be Lieut., by purchase, vice J. O. Travers.

21st—Ensign F. G. Jackson to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Hollway, promoted.

37th—Lieut. E. R. B. Barnes to be Captain, by purchase, vice Jackson, who retires ; Ensign A. Jones to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Barnes.

47th — Captain R. Ficklin, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Captain, repaying the difference, vice Finnerty, who exchanges ; Lieut. B. N. Garnier to be Captain, by purchase, vice Ficklin, who retires.

49th—Captain G. R. J. Marshall, from Half Pay 57th Foot, to be Captain, vice E. Le Marchant, who exchanges ; Lieut. C. J. C. Roberts to be Captain by purchase, vice Marshall who retires ; Ensign G. Donovan to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Roberts.

55th—Ensign F. Barnston, from the 51st Foot, to be Ensign, vice Frobisher, promoted.

74th—Lieut. C. W. Sherlock to be Captain, by purchase, vice Ross King, promoted to an Unattached Majority, by purchase.

75th—Ensign A. Rowband, from the 61st Foot, to be Ensign, vice Gledstanes, promoted.

80th—Serjeant Major S. Harrison to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Cosens promoted.

95th—Lieut. J. N. Crealock to be Captain, by purchase, vice Alcock, who retires.

96th—Lieut. W. B. Pugh to be Adjt., vice J. H Thompson, who resigns the Adjutancy only.

Rifle Brigade—Ensign T. R. Parr to be Lieut., without purchase, vice H. D. Baillie, deceased.

School of Musketry (at Hythe),—Lieut. J. McKay, from the 41st Foot, to be Captain, without purchase.

Unattached. — Captain W. Ross King, from the 74th Foot, to be Major, by purchase ; Captain W. G. D. Stewart, from the 93rd Foot, to be Major, by purchase.

Brevet.—Major General Sir W. F. Williams, Bart., and K.C.B., to have the local rank of Lieut. General in North America.

Captain R. Ficklin, 47th Foot, to be Major in the Army. Dated 23rd Nov., 1841.

Brevet Major R. Ficklin, 57th Foot, to be Lieutenant Colonel in the Army. Dated Nov. 11th, 1851.

Lieut. C. J. Nicholson, of the 54th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry (doing duty at the East India Depot at Warley, vice Gordon resigned), to have the rank of Lieut. in the Army while so employed.

Memorandum —Brevet Colonel C.R. Raitt and Brevet Lieut. Colonel D. Stewart, upon Half Pay as Majors Unattached, have been permitted to retire from the Service by the sale of their Com-

missions, for the purpose of becoming settlers in Canada. Dated 6th May, 1859.

MEMORANDUM.—Lieut. W. G. Stack, having obtained a First Class Certificate at the School of Musketry at Hythe, has been appointed by the General Commanding-in-Chief, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War, to act as Instructor of Musketry to the 5th Middlesex Regiment of Militia. Dated 15th April 1859.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Renfrew—F. W. A. Parsons, late of the 24th Regt., to be Adjutant, and to serve with the rank of Captain, vice Price, resigned, April 24.

Royal Wilts Yeomanry Cavalry—E. Coote, gent., to be Cornet, vice Morrison, resigned, May 2.

Westmorland and Cumberland Yeomanry Cavalry—Sir H. Fletcher, Bart., to be Cornet, vice Brisco, promoted. Cornet M. H. Brisco to be Lieut., vice M. B. Harrison, promoted, April 20.

Royal Mid-Lothian or Edinburgh Yeomanry Cavalry.—D. Wedderburn, gent., to be Cornet, vice B. Callender, resigned, April 20.

3rd West York—Ensign G. J. Douglas to be Lieut., vice Armit, removed from the Regiment; J. R. Bottomley, gent., to be Ensign, vice Mangin, resigned, April, 26.

Hussar Yorkshire Yeomanry Cavalry—Cornet G. A. Cayley to be Lieutenant, vice Middleton, resigned; G. S. F. L. Fox, gent., to be Cornet, vice Cayley, promoted, April 27.

Royal Lancashire Artillery—C. Collins, gent., to be Second Lieut., vice D. G. Atchison, promoted, April 26.

2nd Warwickshire—Ensign W. T. Miller to be Lieut., vice H. Hawkins, promoted, April 20.

2nd Lanarkshire—F. Gourlay, Esq. M.D., to be Surgeon, vice Gairdney, resigned, April 28.

Royal South Lincoln—C. E. H. Alpe, gent., to be Ensign, April, 29.

Norfolk Artillery—Second Lieut. the Hon. H. Harbord to be First Lieut., vice Thierens, resigned, April 8; H. H. Molyneux Seel, gent., to be Second Lieut., vice Harbord, promoted, April 26.

West Somerset Yeomanry Cavalry—B. De Courcy Nixon, gent., to be Cornet, vice Sewell, resigned, May 3.

Bedfordshire—E. R. Ives, gent., to be Ensign, April 5.

WAR OFFICE, MAY 10.

Royal Artillery—The names of the Quartermaster who lately retired with the honorary rank of Captain, under the Royal Warrant of 17th December, 1855, are George Alexander Clark, and not George Clarke, or George Clak, as stated in the *Gazettes* of the 21st Nov., 1848, and 9th Nov. 1858.

WAR OFFICE, MAY 13.

(The following Commissions bear date May 13, 1859.)

1st Life Guards—The Hon. R. A. J. Talbot to be Cornet and Sub-Lieutenant by purchase, vice the Hon. W. H. J. North, promoted.

4th Dragoon Guards—R. R. Luscombe, gent., to be Cornet without purchase, vice Beaumont, who has resigned.

3rd Light Dragoons—J. Webb, gent., to be Cornet by purchase, vice Phibbs, promoted.

4th Light Dragoons—C. M. Calderon, gent., to be Cornet without purchase, vice Doherty, appointed to the 3rd Light Dragoons.

6th Light Dragoons—Captain A. E. Brown, from the 31st Foot, paying the difference between Infantry and Cavalry, vice A. E. McGregor, who exchanges, receiving the same.

5th Dragoons—Cornet J. Hardy to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Cosby, who retires.

7th Light Dragoons—Lieut. Colonel T. P. Touzel, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Lieutenant Colonel, paying the difference between Cavalry and Infantry, vice Brevet Colonel C. Hagart, C.B., who exchanges, receiving the same; Major W. Babington to be Lieut. Col. by purchase, vice Touzel, who retires; Brevet Major C. Crawford Fraser to be Major by purchase, vice Babington; Lieut. R. S. W. Bulkeley to be Captain by purchase, vice Fraser.

8th Light Dragoons—Lieut. P. C. G. Webster to be Captain by purchase, vice Hodgson, who retires; Cornet R. W. Palliser to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Webster.

12th Light Dragoons—Cornet J. H. B. Vaughan to be Lieutenant without purchase, vice C. White, deceased; Serjeant Major J. Sefton to be Cornet without purchase, vice Vaughan.

13th Light Dragoons—Captain H. White, from the 68th Foot, to be Capt., paying the difference between Infantry and Cavalry, vice R. A. Clement, who exchanges, receiving the same.

15th Light Dragoons—D. Ricardo, gent., to be Cornet by purchase, vice Nullings, promoted.

Royal Artillery—Staff Serjeant J. Murphy to be Quartermaster, vice Henry, who reverts to the Half Pay of his former rank of Captain in the late Land Transport Corps.

Royal Engineers—Second Capt C. S. Akers to be Captain, vice Koe, deceased, April 26 ; Lieutenant C. L. A. O'Grady to be Second Captain, vice Akers. April 26 ; Second Capt. C. G. Gordon to be Adjutant, vice Nugent, promoted, May 2.

Coldstream Guards—Ensign and Lieut. W. F. E. Seymour to be Lieut. and Captain by purchase, vice Brevet Major Thelluson, who retires ; the Hon. F. C. Howard to be Ensign and Lieut. by pnrchase, vice Seymour.

1st Foot—Ensign H. G. Thomson to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Caton, deceased, May 1 ; Lieut. H. Akerman, from the 1st Stafford Militia, to be Ensign without purchase, vice Thomson.

7th—Capt. G. W. W. Carpenter to be Major by purchase, vice Inglis, who retires.

10th—Assist. Surg. W. L. Baker, from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon.

12th—R. B. Reed, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Breere, appointed to the 74th Foot.

16th—Assistant Surgeon W. A. Gardiner, from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon.

29th—Captain H. Wilkie, from the 97th Foot, to be Capt., vice Ferris, who exchanges, March 18 ; Ensign W. M. Cochrane to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Ledgard, promoted.

31st—Captain A. E. McGregor, from the 5th Light Dragoons, to be Captain, vice A. E. Brown, who exchanges.

34th—Lieut. F. Peel to be Captain, by purchase, vice Best, promoted to an Unattached Majority, by purchase.

44th—C. H. Walsh, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Briggs, promoted in the 18th Foot ; Lieut. E. C. P. Pigott to be Adjutant, vice Ingham, promoted, March 8.

50th—Ensign R. O. Richmond, from the 65th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Fernley, who exchanges.

51st—Surgeon A. Smith, M.D., from the Staff, to be Surg., vice Webb, appointed to the 95th Foot.

65th—Ensign T. H. Fernley, from the 50th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Richmond, who exchanges.

68th—Captain R. A. Clement, from the 13th Light Dragoons, to be Capt., vice H. White, who exchanges.

74th—Ensign F. Pavy to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Sherlock, promoted ; Roger Sheehy, Esq., to be Paymaster, vice Tuke, deceased.

77th—Surgeon T. Rhys, from the Staff, to be Surgeon, vice McDonald, appointed to the Staff.

80th—Surgeon J. A. W. Thompson, M.D., from the Staff, to be Surgeon vice Irwin, appointed to the Staff.

82nd—The second Christian name of Ensign Brock is Mourant and not Maurant, as hitherto stated

84th—Major T. Lightfoot to be Lieut. Col., without purchase, vice Seymour, deceased ; Brevet Major F. A. Willis, C.B., to be Major, without purchase, vice Lightfoot ; Lieut. G. J. A. Oakley to be Captain, without purchase, vice Willis ; Ensign T. Griffin to be Lieut., without purchase, vice Oakley, April 4.

86th—Lieut. J. H. Waterfall, from the 95th Foot, to be Lieut., vice Brockman, who exchanges, March 10.

93rd—Lieut. E. H. D. Macpherson to be Captain, by purchase, vice W. G D. Stewart, promoted by purchase, to an Unattached Majority ; Ensign F. R. Macnamara to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Macpherson.

95th—Lieut. J. D. Brockman, from the 86th Foot, to be Lieutenant, vice Waterfall, March 10 ; Surgeon H. M. Webb, M.B., from the 51st Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Ewing, appointed to the Staff.

97th—Captain G. A. Ferris, from the 29th Foot, to be Captain, vice Wilkie, who exchanges, March 18.

1st West India Regiment—T. A. Cary, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice O'Callaghan, promoted ; A. T. Wilkinson, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Panter, promoted, May 14.

2nd West India Regiment—W. B. Drinan, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Corrie, promoted.

3rd West India Regiment—T. C. McCormick, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Farrar, appointed to the 94th Foot. The services of Paymaster J. Wilson have been dispensed with.

Cape Mounted Rifle.—Hen. Wm Salis, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Hodges, whose appointment as stated in the *Gazette* of the 11th January, 1859, has been cancelled.

UNATTACHED.—Brevet Major M. G.

Best, from the 34th Foot, to be Major by purchase; Lieut. the Hon. F. Le Poer Trench, from the 52nd Foot, to be Captain by purchase; Lieut. J. G. Dartnell, from the 86th Foot, to be Captain without purchase.

HOSPITAL STAFF.—Surgeon D. D McCay McDonald, from the 77th Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Smith, appointed to the 51st Foot; Surgeon J. Ewing, from the 95th Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Thompson, appointed to the 80th Foot; Surgeon W. N. Irwin, from the 80th Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Rhys, appointed to the 77th Foot.

To be Assistant Surgeons to the Forces —Acting Assistant Surgeon G. Palatiano, M.D., Aug. 18; G. C. Gribbon, M.B., April 20; W. Ligertwood, M.D., April 20; G. Cardell, gent., April 20; J. Land, M.D., April 20; M. S. Grace, M.D., vice Saunders, appointed to the 8th Foot. April 20; C. E. Smith, M.D. vice Mc. Tavish, appointed to 60th Foot, April 20; J. H. T. King, gent., vice Allan, appointed to the 17th Foot, April 20; A Jennings, M.D., vice Lane, appointed to the 4th Foot; C. W. Watling, gent., vice Everet, appointed to the 11th Foot, April 20.

The undermentioned promotions to take place consequent on the death of Major General H. Despard, C.B., on 30th April: Brevet Colonel H. N. Vigors of the St. Helena Regiment, to be Major General, May 1; Brevet Lieut. Colonel W. T. B. Mountsteven, Captain Half Pay the 79th Foot, Staff Officer of Pensioners, to be Colonel, May 1; Brevet Major E. O. Vaughan, Captain Half Pay 57th Foot, to be Lieut. Colonel, May 1; Captain C. W. Grange, Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment, to be Major, May 1.

Colonel J. Bloomfield, of the Royal Artillery, to have the temporary rank of Major General while holding the appointment of Inspector General of Artillery; Captain B. P. Lloyd, of the 11th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, to be Major in the Army, March 24; Capt. H. E. Delacombe, retired Full Pay Royal Marines, to be Major in the Army, the rank being honorary only, May 13; Quartermaster G. Grant, of the Royal Artillery, to be Captain, the rank being honorary only, May 6.

MEMORANDA.—Major C. Murray has repaid the difference which he received on exchanging to Half Pay Unattached in 1850, and has been permitted to retire from the Service by the sale of his Commission, he being about to become a settler in Ceylon.

Captain C. R. Storey, upon Half Pay Unattached, has been permitted to retire from the Service by the sale of his commission, for the purpose of becoming a settler in Canada.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Shropshire—Capt. S. C. Price, late Adjutant Renfrew, Militia, to be Adjutant, vice Murchison, resigned, April 24.

Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry Cavalry —Cornet H. Eyre to be Lieut.; H. Hurt, gent., to be Cornet, vice Eyre promoted, May 6.

Royal Gloucestershire Hussar Yeomany.—Col. F. W. F. Berkeley to be Sup. Lieut. Col; Cornet H. D. Owen to be Lieut., vice the Hon. F. G. Calthorpe, resigned; H. C. W. Miles; gent., to be Cornet, vice Owen, promoted, May 5; J. E. Dorington, the younger gent., to be Sup. Cornet, May 7.

Shropshire—Adj. S. C. Price to serve with the rank of Capt., April 24.

Forfar and Kincardine Artillery—Warham St. Leger, Durdin, gent., to be Second Lieut., vice C. Walker, resigned, May 4.

City of Edinburgh—First Lieut. T. A. Hill to be Capt., vice Roland, resigned; G. W. H. Knight, gent., to be Second Lieut., vice Maxton, resigned, May 3.

MEMORANDA—The Christian names of First Lieutenant Finlay and Second Lieut. Bowman, who were appointed to the City of Edinburgh Corps of Artillery Militia, on 1st March, 1859, are George Charles respectively, and not George only, as previously stated. The Christian names of Second Lieut. Davidson, who was appointed to the said Corps, on 1st March, 1859, are John Gordon, and not James, as previously stated.

THE ORDER OF THE BATH.

We publish the following with very great pleasure, because it contains a recognition of the services of several Generals and Colonels, and Officers of the Navy, who had been, we thought, improperly passed over. The Medical Service is not, we are truly glad to perceive, ignored in the distribution of honours.

WAR OFFICE, MAY 16.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to make and ordain a Special Statute of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath

authorising the following appointments to the said Order :—

To the Extra Members of the Military Division of the Second Class, or Knights Commanders viz :— Colonels, Robert Walpole, C. B.., Rifle Brigade ; George Robert Barker, C.B. Royal Artillery ; John Douglas, C. B., 79th Regiment ; Major Generals, Henry G. Roberts, Bombay Army, and George C. Whitlock, Madras Army.

To be Extra Members of the Military Divisions of the Third Class, or Companions, viz. ; Colonels Maurice Griffin Cox, 13th Regiment ; Lothian Nicholson, Royal Engineers ; Sir William Russell, Bart., 7th Hussars ; Thos. Lightfoot, 84th Regiment ; and Edward G. Bulwer, 23rd Regiment : Major John B. Thelwall, 24th Regiment ; Lieut. Colonel T. J. W. Hungerford, Bengal Artillery ; John Chas. G. Tice, Esq., M.D. ; Francis Wm. Innes, Esq., M.D. ; and John Fraser, Esq., M.D., Deputy Inspectors General of Hospitals ; Chas. A. Gordon, Esq., M.D., Surgeon, 10th Regiment ; James G. Inglis, Esq., M.D. ; Surgeon. 64th Regiment ; and Joseph Jee, Esq., Surgeon, 78th Regiment.

MEMORANDUM. --Lieut. Col. C. F. Seymour, 84th Regiment, would have been recommended to Her Majesty for the dignity of Companion of the Order of the Bath had he survived.

WAR-OFFICE, MAY 20.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to give orders for the appointment of Rear-Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, K.C.B., late Commander-rin-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the East Indies and China, to be an Ordinary Member of the Military Division of the First Class, or Knights Grand Cross, of the Most Hon. Order of the Bath, and of Captains the Hon. K. Stewart, Sir F. W. E. Nicholson, Bart., H. E. Edgell, Sir R. J. Le Mesurier M'Clure, Knt., and G. S. Hann, R.N., and Colonel T. Lemon, and Lieut. Colonel A. S. S. Walsh, and Lieut. Colonel E. Hocker, Royal Marines, to be Ordinary Members of the Military Division of the Third Class, or Companions of the said Most Honourable Order

MEMORANDA.—Lieut. Edwin Thomas having obtained a First Class Certificate at the School of Musketry at Hythe, has been appointed by the General Commanding-in-Chief, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War, to act as Instructor of Musketry to the Tipperary Artillery Militia, April 19.

Lieutenant William Henry Greer, having obtained a First Class Certificate at the School of Musketry at Hythe, has been appointed by the General Commanding-in-Chief, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War, to act as Instructor of Musketry to the Waterford Artillery Militia, April 27.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Queen's Own Oxfordshire Yeomanry Cavalry—The Hon. W. H. J. North to be Lieut. vice Tawney, resigned, May 6.

Lanarkshire Yeomanry Cavalry—J. Farie, gent., to be Cornet, vice McLean, promoted, May 6 ; A. Stein, gent., tobe Cornet, vice Woddrop, promoted, May 7.

Queen's Own Royal Lanarkshire Yeomanry Cavalry—Cornet J. H. Paterson, to be Lieut., vice Bruce, deceased, May 7 ; G. Coats, gent., to be Cornet, vice Paterson, promoted, May 9.

Royal Anglesey—H. O. Williams, gent., to be Lieut., vice J. T. Roberts, promoted, March 26 ; W. H. Copeland, gent., to be Ensign, vice W. A. Marshall, resigned, March 26 ; A. T. Williams, gent., to be Ensign, vice W. McKee promoted, April 11.

Ferfar and Kincardine Artillery—Lieut. J. A. Allen to be Capt., vice Campbell, promoted, March 18.

West York Rifles—Ensign C. N. Wyld to be Lieut., vice Monckton, resigned, April 28 ; J. B. Smyth, gent., to be Ens., vice Wyld, promoted, April 28.

5th West York—W. S. Gilbert, gent., to be Ensign, March 16.

MEMORANDUM. — Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the commission held by Captain Sir Molyneax Hyde Nepean, Bart., in the West York Riffe Regiment of Militia.

Derbyshire Yeomanry Cavalry—J. R. Barnes, gent., to be Cornet, vice N. J. B. Uniacke, promoted, May 12.

2nd Royal Bucks Yeomanry Cavalry —H. W. Kiallmark, gent., to be Assist. Surgeon.

WAR OFFICE, MAY 24.

(*The following Commissions bear date May* 24.)

2nd Regiment of Dragoon Guards—Acting Regimental Serjeant Major A. Deane to be Cornet, without purchase, and Adjutant in succession to Lieut. Calvert, promoted.

1st Dragoons—Cornet H. St. G. Osborne to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Clarke, promoted.

4th Light Dragoons—Lieut. E. W. Blackett to be Captain, by purchase, vice Goodrich, who retires ; Cornet J.

Kennedy to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Blackett.

6th Dragoons—Paymaster T. Smales, from the 9th Light Dragoons, to be Paymaster, vide Mahon, who exchanges.

9th Light Dragoons—Paymaster M. H. Mahon, from the 6th Dragoons, to be Paymaster, vice Smales, who exchanges.

11th Light Dragoons—Cornet Swaine has been permitted to retire from the Service by the sale of his Commission.

7th Foot—Lieut. J. K. M'Adam to be Capt., by purchase, vice Carpenter, promoted; Ensign Douglas Flood, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice M'Adam.

7th—Major and Brevet Lieut.-Col. A. C. Robertson's promotion, without purchase, to bear date 23rd July, 1858, instead of 24th of August, 1858, as previously stated.

13th—Major H. V. Mundell, from the 96th Foot, to be Major, vice Brevet Lieut.-Col. the Honourable A. M. Cathcart, who exchanges.

14th—Ensign C. Curtis, from the Royal Limerick Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase.

15th—Surgeon U. W. Evans, M.D., from the Staff, to be Surgeon.

16th—Capt. C. L. de Winton, to be Major, without purchase, vice Lucas, who retires upon Full Pay; Capt. J. G. Dartnell, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Capt., vice De Winton; Lieut. R. C. Healy, to be Capt., by purchase, vice O'Callaghan, seconded, being appointed Permanent Instructor at the School of Musketry, vice Capt. Johnstone, appointed District Inspector of Musketry of the South Western District, in the room of Brevet Major Lutyens, 20th Foot, who retires from the Service.

19th—Lieut. G. Forbes to be Capt., by purchase, vice Sheaffe, who retires; Ensign R. Biscoe to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Forbes.

20th—Capt. C. Lutyens has been permitted to retire from the Service by the sale of his Commission. Lieut. E. A. Patrickson to be Capt., without purchase, vice Davies, deceased; Ensign W. Unwin to be Lieut., without purchase, vice Patrickson, May 5.

37th—Assistant Surgeon I. Hoysted, from the 80th Foot, to be Assistant Surg. vice Inkson, who exchanges, March 12.

47th—Ensign G. V. Boyd to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Garnier, promoted.

50th—Surgeon, J. Fraser, M.D., from the Staff, to be Surgeon, vice Crerar, appointed to the Staff.

52nd—Ensign C. M. Prendergast to be Lieut., by purchase, vice the Hon. F. Le Poer Trench, promoted to an Unattached Company.

54th—Surgeon W. M. Dowding, from the Staff, to be Surgeon, vice Grant, appointed to the 84th Foot, April 15.

59th — Assistant Surgeon, W. B. Ramsbotham, M.B., from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Knaggs, appointed to the Cape Mounted Riflemen.

70th.—Ensign A. S. Gilbert, to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Hilton; Serjeant J. M'Pherson, from the 93rd Regiment, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Gilbert.

80th.—Lieutenant E. Borrowes to be Captain, by purchase, vice H. Morris, who retires. Assistant Surgeon J. Inkson, M.D., from the 37th Foot, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Hoysted, who exchanges, March 12.

84th.—Surgeon J. M'Grigor, Grant, M.D., from the 54th Foot, to be Surgeon, vice La Presle, whose appointment has been cancelled, April 15.

92nd.—Lieutenant P. F. Gooch to be Captain, by purchase, vice Elphinstone, who retires.

95th — Ensign E. Chapple to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Crealock, promoted.

96th—Brevet Lieut.-Col. the Hon. A. Cathcart, from the 13th Foot to be Major vice H. F. Mundell, who exchanges.

Rifle Brigade—Ensign J. Hook to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Richards, died of his wounds, December 9.

Cape Mounted Rifles—Assistant Surgeon H. Knaggs, from the 59th Foot, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Boutflower, deceased.

St. Helena Regiment—Major W. F. Macbean, to be Lieut. Col. without purchase, vice Brevet Col. H. N. Vigors, promoted to the rank of Major General; Brevet Lieut.-Col. H. Gahan, to be Major, without purchase, vice Macbean; Lieut. J. B. H. Raimer to be Captain, without purchase, vice Gahan; Eosign J. L. Hewson to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Rainier, May 1.

UNATTACHED. — Capt. and Brevet Lieut. Col. C. H. Morris, C.B., of the Royal Artillery, to have the substantive rank of Major, under the provisions of the Royal Warrant of 3rd Nov. 1854.

HOSPITAL STAFF.—Surgeon J. Crerar, from the 50th Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Evans. appointed to the 15th Foot.

BREVET.—Major F. Lucas, retired Full Pay 16th Foot, to be Lieut.-Col. in the Army, the rank being honorary only.

MILITARY REFORM AND MILITARY EFFICIENCY.

The morbid activity—it can hardly be described in any other terms—displayed by our military authorities of late years, in altering and deranging everything connected with the army, about which any public agitation could be created, while far more serious evils, not thus supported or brought forward, though they affect our military efficiency far more, have passed unheeded, and are suffered to remain, is pursuing its course, even now, when no clamour exists, with such reckless rapidity—a mass of new measures being perpetually started before previous ones are even half completed—and such an apparent disregard of the confusion and mischief which are being daily accumulated in consequence, that no reflecting person, with the best interest of the country and the well-being and reputation of the service at heart, particularly at such a critical moment as the present, when the influence of well-ordered military establishments is of so much importance to us, can feel otherwise than uneasy at what is going on, or contemplate quite calmly what it can all come to.

War upon any great scale is not an easy matter to conduct under the best of circumstances; it is sure to tax the very highest administrative ability, even with the best understood institutions with regard to it; but to be likely to have it on our hands, as must be the case if it comes within the next few years, with an entirely new and untried system in so many of our departments, and in a large and important portion of our army generally—with so much of the old state of things in ruins, and the débris encumbering the ground; and so much of the new that no one is able to make head or tail of, in the confusion of a crowd of officials connected with it—with new machinery hourly increasing, complex, extravagant, and ill considered, as a great portion of it is, the state of things in our military affairs is anything but satisfactory or assuring. We have given ourselves up, as we always do in such matters, when once aroused, to a mania for military reform, and while the subjects to which to direct it have been urged forward by the public in the most senseless and indiscriminate manner, there is a good deal which shows it to have been yielded, in most cases, by those in authority, with anything but real honesty of purpose. Theory has ruled the press in all its outcry, while the creation of mere patronage seems to have been the guiding influence in those who gave way. With a rotten foundation to our military system in the divided authority which governs it, which gives little or nothing to hope for from any reform or improvement while it continues, and which some fanciful treason to the constitution seems to forbid us to touch; with little or no practical knowledge amongst our troops of those duties which save an army on service, and go so far in every way to ensure success in campaigning; with a great deal so wrong and unsuitable to the times that the men whom we enlist desert again, not merely by thousands but by tens of thousands; with

such a wide field for useful and practical reform as these things and many others afford us, we do nothing, or do it ill and without earnestness, while our attention is almost entirely absorbed in educational or other schemes which cannot possibly help us in the least on the points in which we are most deficient, or be in any way of the slightest benefit when the day of trial comes. Where we might act with the best effect we do nothing; where we might safely leave things as they are we are morbidly active in working out some change. We perpetrate in this way so much that is entirely uncalled for by any necessity of the case, so much more that is questionable as to whether it does not do more harm than good, and so very little that can be commended in anything like unqualified terms, or from the adoption of which any real or valuable increase of efficiency is discernable, that it is no easy matter, in such times as these, when one would think we had enough to make us anxious, and when it might be supposed that none but the most essential and evidently necessary changes would be brought forward, to understand what it all means, or what our authorities can be thinking of in thus blindly and foolishly upsetting and confusing so much when we may be called upon to act at a moment's notice, and when it is of such vital importance to us to be thoroughly prepared.

Even if the new measures were all of them good this is hardly the most suitable or convenient time for introducing so many of them. It is rather one in which the utmost caution should be used in introducing any change at all. Of what use, may we ask, is the new organization of the Royal Artillery, which has been so wantonly brought forward without, as it is said, consulting a single officer of any rank or experience in that part of the service with regard to it? What difficulties or anything else of an unbearable nature does the new system remove which existed in the old? Does it improve or facilitate the working of that part of the service in the least? If it does not do anything of these things what can be the meaning or intention of it at all? Again, in the financial part of the same service the corps is now placed under a legion of paymasters instead of being left as it had so long been, to the satisfaction of every one, under Messrs. Cox and Co., who conducted it with far greater economy besides than can ever be the case again. What are these changes but making change for change sake, or can there be any object whatever in them in which the good of the service or the public interests can be intended? If improvements in our military system and the departments connected with it are not more constantly attended to, and far more gradually conducted than they have been for a great number of years past, or than is now the case, if every change we make can only be carried out as a kind of revolution or something very nearly approaching it, how is it possible ever to have things as they ought to be? The best institutions require to be constantly attended to. They should never be left entirely to the effects of time, until at last they become so bad that little else can be done but to efface them altogether. This is very much the character of our proceedings hitherto. Nothing is easier than to throw dust in the eyes of the public generally, or to make

them believe by a few show parades and reviews that everything is perfect; but, as in other cases, when they find out their error, they are apt to rush into the other extreme, and to demand a great deal that is useless or mischievous. Just as we are boasting ourselves fit to do anything, as at the outbreak of the late war with Russia, we find after a little that we can do nothing; the national vanity is considerably wounded at the failure; there is a burst of indignation alarming at first to the lazy people we employ and pay so highly. They bend to the storm while it rages, but no sooner does it lull than they recover themselves. Every institution which favours their peculiar views is preserved in spite of everything, and the only real result as far as the public is concerned is that there is greater expenditure. The tactics of the authorities always ensures this whatever else they fail in. The end of all our military reform is not greater efficiency in the army but another pull on the exchequer. That object is always steadily pursued and has never failed yet in its attainment. Surely this way of doing things has been carried on long enough, and we may adopt a little prudent foresight now and stop it for awhile, until we see what turn things may take, or whether we can with due regard to our own rights, keep ourselves out of the tempest that is raging on the continent. There is more danger perhaps than may be imagined by every one not only in the political horizon abroad, but in that at home also, and it will run hard with those who from any cause mismanage our next war for us. These surely are times when we may forget a little of the craving after more loaves and fishes, considering the haul our military authorities have had since the Crimean war in that respect. Common decency might induce them to try their skill upon some really useful measure with as little patronage as possible.

They should attack evils only of an undoubted nature and of the most practical demonstration. If all they have been doing of late has really been honestly intended, and if it has had no other object but the good of the service, the question forces itself, what kind of officials must we have had for a great many years past to legislate in these matters for us, and what kind of responsibility can possibly have attached to them, when no one has suffered, and yet things are so bad, that everything has to be altered just now? Either there must have been continued and gross neglect up to 1855, or a great deal that has had to be done since, and is now doing, is considerably overshooting the mark, and more likely to cause confusion than the contrary. For our own part we consider there is a mixture of both, that there was very great neglect at one time, and that there is quite as mischievous activity in doing too much now. If there are such risks, as so many people seem to think are before us, it would surely have been wiser to bear with some evils, for the sake of the good that was certain, than to rush into all manner of changes as we have been doing, nearly every one of which is entirely speculative in its results, except in the one item, that it is sure to cost more money. If anything could open the eyes of the country as to where our real deficiencies lie in military affairs, it would be found in the wretched and worn-out condition into which every one of our military institutions is allowed to get before

it is altered, and then, when change can be staved off no longer, the large amount of additional patronage which is sure to be voted necessary for patching it up again. The principal object at the present moment would seem to be by perpetual changes, no matter what they may be, whether good, bad, or indifferent, to gull the public and to keep them quiet upon those great questions of military reform, which affect the aristocratic constitution of the army. The country may be, and probably is, under the impression that it has gained a great deal in this last respect, but those who have good opportunities of knowing the real state of things are aware that it is not so. They know that if a poor man gets into the army that the expenses heaped upon him, and which are carefully maintained, are such that it is impossible for him to live in it. It is, by this means, made as exclusively as ever the *appanage* of the wealthier classes; there is simply a little more trouble entailed on the latter to get into it. The authorities are sure to have their own way, in this and every other point, in the end; and if substantial and useful reforms are wanted they are the parties to be attacked. Sidney Smith used to say that until a bishop was sacrificed certain railway regulations, which affected the safety of the public, would not be altered. It is just the same amongst our officials; something dreadful must happen before the Horse Guards and the War Office on their present footing are much improved.

It is plain to those who are at all behind the scenes that we don't get on, but the public generally take no note of the matter in ordinary times. They require the drunken excitement of some great disaster to stir them up; the effects of the Crimean war have been nearly all slept off and forgotten already. What a roar they made while they lasted, and now all is quiet as if the right men, and everything else, were all in the right place; and blundering and mistakes were quite impossible in future. The present is a millenium of military incapacity and jobbing; there is the excitement of war without war. The spirit to give in the House of Commons, when the open Sesame of the natural defences is talked of, is strong and popular: the spirit of enquiry as to what it all comes to is not heard even in the feeblest whisper. It will be well if it all lasts, but we would ourselves far rather sweep a crossing than stand in the shoes of those who may be at the head of affairs, when things do not go on so smoothly. No reasonable man can see how or why we should ever be mixed up in the hostilities that are now raging, but if we should be, heaven help those who may have the working of our military departments. They will dream they are sleeping on the points of bayonets every night of their lives, and the cares and troubles of their waking hours will not enable them to feel one bit more comfortable. If pen, ink, and paper, and Parliamentary and other enquiries, wasting their time in examination upon well-known facts, the legislation for which should be done by those who are paid for it at the Horse Guards and the War Office, upon what they must know, if they are worth their salaries, of the state of the case without such enquiries at all. If all these and bulky blue books, with such a multiplicity of orders and counter orders, following one upon the other on every

conceivable subject, and in such rapid succession as to be quite bewildering to every one concerned, could make an army perfect, that of England would long since have been immeasurably in advance of every other. Nothing can go beyond the advantages, if advantages they can be called, that it has had in this respect. The materials for doing something are abundant enough, but somehow or other there seems to be no one capable of making much of them; and no sooner is one blue book issued than the preliminaries of another are sure to make their appearance: there are blue books on the militia, on the recruiting, and on Captain Vivian's committee, if the latter is ever revivified now that the originator of it has lost his seat, have yet to come.

The military code, which is being daily issued, if anything so confused and unstable as our regulations are can be called by such a name, upon which so many hands (it is as well to say nothing of brains) are employed, about which almost every one from the peer to the peasant has a suggestion to make; and which, if he make it, he is sure sooner or later to find embodied in some shape or other, seems to have no end. The whole thing is an attempt at organization, which disorganizes everthing; a sort of unhealthy action in legislation, which leaves hardly anything untouched, and which can do nothing as it ought to be done. It goes to destroy a great deal that was good and useful, or that might be made so with slight alteration, and it tends to make that which is bad worse than it was before. It is perpetually building up little reforms, while it steadily upholds the great abuses. It is either working out class or individual interest, or it is doing something. That is exactly what we have to depend upon in our military affairs.

Just now, as something must be done for the sake of appearance, and to hide the rottenness that exists, the work of senseless and unmeaning demolition, and of still more crazy invention and reconstruction goes on unceasingly. The Warrants and Orders issued one month on many subjects become obsolete the next. The changes in the Queen's Regulations have become almost a volume in themselves. Even where the circumstances are favourable to improvement, the way in which it is set about, or the manner in which it is left after awhile to get on or stagnate as it best may, is sure to mar the attempt; and to make it worthless, if not even absolutely injurious. We do not wish to go into particulars, and it is unnecessary to do so. It is well known, and the knowledge will in time extend, that what is here said on the subject is no exaggarated statement. As a specimen of the way in which we sometimes do things, for the sake of removing a simple anomaly with regard to the authority of the Commander-in-Chief at the time, not extending to the artillery or engineers in the old ordnance department, which might so easily have been rectified, we abolished that department altogether; an act which has opened the flood gates to many of the changes which have been instituted since, and which have brought us little else but national disgrace. We threw away a great deal that should have been maintained by that measure; what we have gained or are likely to gain by it, has been pretty well indicated by the Weedon disclosures. Ever

since the late war with Russia every military institution we have has been called in question; endless changes have been made, principally resulting in a host of new appointments; and with so many and such palpable failures in detail with regard to everything else, that nothing but the most dire confusion is springing up in all directions. The departments are becoming one conglomerate mass without heads, and without any definite boundaries as to their duties. Letters are signed by one person to-day, by another to-morrow, and by a third person the next day. A demand is sent in to the war department; there is a long delay, and it is repeated. An answer comes back refusing it, and in a few days after another grants it. The two demands, the original and the duplicate, went to different parties, one of which takes one view of it, the other another, and it is thus the duties are carried on. A regiment of militia artillery begs for some guns, and after awhile they get an elevating screw and a set of drag ropes, and nothing else. An order is sent to another to enlist men of five feet high, who are no use for artillery purposes; it is obeyed, and after a while it is found out to be all a mistake. It is for all this, and a great deal more like it, that we have made new departments and abolished old ones that could not do such things so well; it is for this that we have made crowds of new offices and appointments of every kind and description, such as were never heard of amongst us before, and many of which we ransacked the continental establishments to find out; and above all, it is for this that we have added hundreds of thousands to our estimates. The latter have been enormously increasing as we know for some years past; will any one who is acquainted with the subject, who has to do with the army, and who can draw a fair comparison between what it is now and what it was in former times, say that the advance it has made in efficiency, in that real, substantial, soldierly efficiency which is of the greatest, if not alone of any importance, is of such a nature as to warrant the belief that we could do better now than we have ever done; or, as regards our departments, whether the improvements which are professed to have been made in them would ensure us in the least from those disasters of mismanagement, and that confusion and waste which have always been characteristic of our military operations. If it can be honestly said that we have progressed in any of these respects, the money has not been thrown away, but we doubt whether it can be said at all, even by those who would be anxious to do so without much regard for the accuracy of the statement. If we had a war to-morrow, what is there in the gross blunders that are every day going on around us, and which are the subjects of so many jokes with the unthinking, to make us in the slightest degree confident that it would be carried on differently from what it has always been, or by any other means than the sheer force of a lavish expenditure and the enduring courage of officers and men? The failure to make things better in this respect has been so complete, and the errors which were the cause of so much dire disaster in the Crimea, are so patent in their existence still, that it is impossible to avoid one or the other conclusion, either that the officials charged

with making our military reforms, were the very last who should have been entrusted with them, or that they cared for nothing with regard to them but the increased patronage they threw into their hands. If all that we have done is critically examined and enquired into, it will be proved that this last is the only thing gained. The country has been completely duped; it is impossible to use any other term. Its wishes have been abundantly acceded to, as far as increased expenditure recommended them, but this concession has never yielded one point that the authorities desired to retain. If anything was given away to the pressure in front for the moment, it was sure to be recovered by some dexterous flank movement at the next. In the one case there was a shout of triumph; in the other, nothing was said, but the triumph was quietly blotted out. There was a great clamour to make admission to the army more open, and it is found to have been opened with a vengeance, and that fraud and bribery are by no means the worst keys to get into it. Money has enabled candidates to pass the educational test by proxy, and just the same application of "palm oil" elevates a tailor to all the powers of a commander-in-chief, and ensures commissions to all who can offer him sufficient inducement. What a manifest improvement this is on the old system, how completely hum drum the latter is in comparison with it. How many other things have we improved in like manner? There used to be a great deal said about corruption in Russia; were Russian revelations ever exceeded by what we have seen and heard in some of our departments during the last few years? Perhaps it was the Russian war that did it all. We got inoculated with some bad matter, and took the disease. One can't try a fall with a sweep and not expect to be blacked. One thing, we may wrestle with anyone however dirty now without much danger. When such things are known as have occurred lately, can we possibly believe that we are making improvements, or that the right men are in the right places a bit more than they ever were. Our education schemes, which were to liberalize the army or to make commissions in it only attainable by worth and talent, first provide for a host of new officials, and when these can go no further we find the education examinations successfully evaded, and such dark and mysterious doings with regard to all the rest, such wonderful influence in the possession of parties who might reasonably be supposed to possess no influence at all, and who can have none of a legitimate nature, such trafficking and dealing in every way, that the only wonder is some more serious notice is not taken of it, and that every one seems to pass unscathed and uncensured through such transactions. It is not for one moment to be supposed that any but subordinates are culpable, but even a subaltern gibbeted on such an occasion would give satisfaction. The great defect of our military reforms from the first, has been, that they have never taken the right direction. The relation between cause and effect would seem to be altogether lost in them. The origin of the call for them was the disasters in the Crimea, and because no road was made, and things in general were extremely badly managed out there, by which clothing, provisions, and other stores were never found when they

were wanted or where they ought to have been; because the men cooked badly, and made little or nothing of their rations, when they got them; because they and their officers knew nothing of camp life, and were utterly ignorant of campaigning; because of, and to meet these deficiencies, and some others of a like kind, and to prevent the recurrence of the disasters which attended them, we have been trying to discover remedies ever since, and the remedies we have principally preferred are not those of giving more practical instruction to officers and men; or of going at the foundation of our military system and establishing a proper responsibility with regard to it, and getting rid of the divided authority by which it is administered, and which is manifesting itself more and more every day in the grossest jobs, and in increasing absurdity and blundering, not in altering any of these things, as wisdom and common sense, if such things are to be found in military official regions, would have prompted us, but in others which an ignorant public opinion, laughed at in their sleeves by those who rule, has puffed into inflated importance, and which principally consists in more geography and mathematics in candidates for commissions; and a better knowledge in subalterns desirous of promotion in such abstruse and intellect-expanding subjects as are to be found in works like the War Office Regulations, the Articles of War, and the Orders which relate to barrack damages. Surely the defects and shortcomings in the Crimea were one and all of a practical nature; and the probability of their recurrence in some shape or other on some future occasion, could only have been lessened if not removed by the application of practical remedies such as we have mentioned, and which have not, at least to any extent, or with any earnestness of purpose, been tried or carried out. The great experiences afforded in so many ways by the eastern campaign, might, and ought to have given us the material for the establishment of a system at home, on no costly or extravagant scale, in which the intelligence of officers and men on the most valuable and essential professional subjects would have been excited, and which, watched over, and improved on gradually as circumstances prompted, by adequate administrative ability, would have carried the army forward step by step, and without lagging by the way, to the highest efficiency on those points in which, especially at the commencement of a war and for some time after, it is so often found to be so lamentably and fatally deficient. Every one has something to say on this subject, and every one has his plan to offer; even ours for the obtaining of greater efficiency, and for something better than we have now, would be the extrication, as much as possible, of our military departments from political influences; the reverse of this will be the ruin of our army, if we do not mind. A reasonable educational test, a staff college of a "bona fide" nature, not a sham, for entrance to which any officer from any part of the service might compete, and except from which, after a certain time, no officer whatever of the staff, personal or otherwise, should be taken. For the mass of the army, the mere food for powder and ball, the greatest attention should be paid to physical qualities and dexterity with their weapons. They should have a good sound instruction in camp

life and everything connected with it, almost unlimited target practice, be accustomed to running, leaping, fencing, boxing, and every kind of athletic games, the practice in which would give them self-confidence. We may depend upon it, if we wish to make our men smart, active, and intelligent, if we desire to improve them morally, and to rid them of that look of beer and sluggishness which is rather the characteristic of the British soldier trained as he is, these are not the least of the means to do it. Beginning with savings' banks, libraries, and schools, until we give the means of bodily exercise and bodily development, is only putting the cart before the horse. If the bodily energies of a man are roused and called into play by frequent and not too fatiguing exercises, he soon becomes alert in his movements; he acquires a quickness of eye and hand, and if with these he is compelled to look after his own comforts, as he must do in camp, and not be accustomed to have everything done for him as is the case now, the faculties of the mind would soon be developed as well as those of the body. If the latter be neglected or not attended to first, the former will as likely as not remain hidden, do what we will.

On all the points which have been indicated, and which are the essence of the instruction of armies abroad, the English soldier is sadly deficient. We have bestowed little or no attention with regard to them; such as has been given has always halted in its progress, and the results have never been worth much. There is such a thing, we believe, as a gymnasium at Woolwich or some other place, but nothing of the kind has ever been reorganized on anything like a liberal scale, or as if the advantages it afforded were at all appreciated or understood. All our money, or nearly all, is given to the support of theories. Practical and really useful measures seldom or never get any of it. Our efforts generally forget what the soldier is for, and go principally to making him a good boy in a very stupid manner, and in a way the most disagreeable to himself to become so. There is no judicious preparation of the raw material beforehand. We are constantly exclaiming against his drunken propensities, but we don't try to keep him from them by giving him a cheerful place or two where he can work off some portion of the superabundance of his animal spirits in healthy exercise; all we give him is the canteen or the more alluring tap-room of the public house. Even our legislation here is defective, for if he wants a glass of "hot with" or "cold without" at the legitimate establishment, which, taken in moderation can do him no harm, he cannot get it, he is compelled to quit his barracks and to go outside for it, where he has no one to controul him, or any one whose interest in, or good feeling towards him will induce them to try and restrain him from going further when he has had enough. These are the little mistakes we are always making, great ones they are in the long run. The canteen man should, so far from being restricted, be encouraged to have anything and everything the soldier can possibly call for. His store should be like that of the West India merchant, where, whatever is asked for, is sure to be forthcoming.

The canteen is certainly the place above all others in which a man

should find any drink he fancies or which he is in the habit of taking, and which if he fails to get within the barrack walls he is sure to go to some other and worse place for. It is absurd to have a Maine Liquor law, or something like it, for the soldier in barracks, when he and every one can have as much spirits as they like outside. It was a legislative blunder to banish spirits from the canteen, or rather it was done by the authorities with their eyes open. They knew its foolishness. It was not done for the sake of the soldier who was injured by it, but to catch a little popularity, and to please a party not commonly very practical or tolerant in their ways of thinking, and who thought this restriction a wonderful moral improvement. We should like to see a canteen, library, and reading room, gymnasium, and, when practicable, an exercise ground (we do not bargain for any very extensive limits to the latter) to every barracks. The first named might be under the same roof, forming almost one establishment, and the fewer restrictions applied to any of them the better. There should be none, in fact, not immediately connected with the preservation of order and propriety. Five or six months' good hard work in camp in summer, and comparative rest in barracks for the rest of the year, with the places above-mentioned attached to them, would make the soldier's life something very different from the monotonous, rusty sort of affair which it is at present, and the man himself in every respect would soon be improved by it. What it would all cost would soon be saved in less disease and death, in less desertion, and in the realization of an army which might be depended upon under circumstances, not merely for actual conquest but for the overcoming of difficulties in whatever position it might be placed. As long as we neglect the physical education of the soldier we may as well leave aside trying to make him much better in other respects. A great deal too much has been said of the improvements we have made in the army and things connected with it. The authorities have reaped far more credit than they have at all deserved in the matter. The condition of the soldier has especially been thought to have advanced considerably. If it has, we should very much like to know in what it has progressed. There is no better or fairer test of measures than the results. The army, as a service to go into, even with limited enlistment in its favour, has not become more popular than it has ever been, nor has a better class of men been induced to join it. On the contrary, in both these respects it has decidedly, and in the most marked manner, fallen off. It is no easy matter, if any pressure prevails, to get a sufficiency of men to enlist at all, and every one who knows anything about it will say that our soldiers are, far more than they ever were, the very scum and dregs of the population. Ticket-of-leave men abound amongst them. One half of the recruits raised are practised rogues and vagabonds; they only enlist for the purpose of getting the bounty, and deserting immediately after. The numbers who are said to have done so upon the authority of official documents during the past year were no less than between 20 and 30,000.

If all this is true, and it is impossible to contradict it, what are all our improvements worth? It is plain that we must have gone

the wrong way to work, and that the money we have lavished has been thrown away. The enormous number of desertions, which increase daily rather than diminish, must show more than anything that we enlist only a fraudulent and degraded class, or if there are any respectable men amongst them, that they find our army is on such a footing, they cannot, even with the penalties and disgrace of desertion before them, stay in it. Theoretically, our soldier has improved greatly; practically, he has hardly improved at all. We have talked so much about the matter, that we have at last come to fancy we have done a great deal, when, in fact, we have done little or nothing. In every practically useful point of view our measures have failed, or they have scarcely been put forth at all; but in those which admitted of clap-trap sentimental nonsense being talked we have dealt largely. It is true, for all that may be said to the contrary, that the soldier evidently is not one whit more happy or comfortable or better off in his barrack room than ever he was; where he is so, it is the exception and not the rule. He sleeps just as much crowded as ever, and breathes the same tainted atmosphere, fraught with destruction to his constitution, and premature decay and death, that he has always done; he has just the same scanty convenience for cooking his food, and quite as little means of cleanliness; he has none at all for active amusements. The only real advance made with regard to him, and it is something as far as it goes, is, that if he wishes to read he has the means of doing so, and if he wishes to save there is a savings' bank. Such institutions as those of a savings' bank and library are not provisions for the men generally, they are only for a comparative few, whose tastes or economical habits prompt them to make use of them. Many men who can read don't care much about it, others cannot do so even if they wished. What have we done in any one respect for these two classes, who form, for the most part, the bulk of the army? literally nothing. The main object of maintaining an army at all is with reference to its professional qualities, but military efficiency, in the plain meaning of the term, seems never to be thought of in any of our measures at all. We seem to look upon our army, whenever we legislate for it, as if it was a reformatory establishment and very little else. We recruit it by the foulest and most degrading means at first, and then, with the coarse and indifferent material thus obtained, we think we do enough in a dull routine of drill, and a library with nice and improving books to read, and an encouragement to save out of a shilling a-day in a savings' bank. We should like to see the same kind of reformation applied to any other class in the kingdom as that of which we boast so much in its application to the soldier, perhaps a better estimate would then be formed of it. We seem to expect that when a man enlists, he is to come into our ways at once. That, no matter what his antecedents may have been, he is to have the highest appreciation of a life which only helps him to read or to save, and which gives very little care for his tastes or to his wishes in any other respect. We are involving ourselves in no slight mess, and we will find so by and bye if anything happens, by the way we are going on. We are going mad after organization, and we are disorganizing in all direc-

tions. We are neglecting almost everything except musketry practice in the education of the soldier in his professional duties, and we are giving him rather an excess than otherwise of the means of book instruction. As to the recruiting of the army, we let that go to the dogs, or get on how it can. We have too many men of pleasure, too many gay philanderers, in official positions to trouble their minds on this or any other subject. Their principal care is to look after class or individual interests, and it must be admitted that as far as these go, their abilities are considerable. We have arrived at a pinnacle of jobbing from which we can hardly ascend higher. It will be a pity if some of those who feel at present so secure in their selfish doings are always allowed to prosper in them. We wish that a real interest, and a real and intelligent enquiry would be promoted on the subject. It is something to be ashamed of to see the public money wasted as it is, while the national insecurity is only used, like the pistol of the highwayman, to frighten the country into giving more. There may be anger brewing on this subject, for certainly England does not stand so high in foreign estimation as might be wished, and as it is best for her interests to do. Perhaps troublesome people by and bye may, as was prompted by Sir James Graham on some former occasion, be induced to inquire into the reason why; and how it is that with army estimates alone, amounting to upwards of eleven millions and a half, we do not feel ourselves secure without calling for something like a national arming; that with all our anxiety to have it otherwise men will not enlist, that when they do so it is in every way to their own detriment, that desertions abound, that our barracks are a scandal, and that in no direction can we show the symptoms of a well-organized, well-arranged establishment, such as the amount of money ought to afford if we had sufficient ability at the head of our military affairs to know how to expend it.

ON NAVAL DISCIPLINE.

By THESEUS, LATE R.N.

IN the Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the best means of manning the navy, will be found the following paragraph:—

"The disinclination to enter the navy in the minds of a large portion of the merchant seamen is to be traced, chiefly to ignorance of the usages of the service, and of the advantages which it offers to seamen, for we find that the better the service is known, the more its privileges are appreciated, and the greater is the willingness to join it. We have satisfied ourselves that there is no undue severity in your Majesty's service; on the contrary, the witnesses place a high value on the strict observance of discipline, and consider that

crews are exposed to injury and injustice whenever, from weakness in the commander of a ship, discipline is relaxed."

If the above statement was true there would have been no occasion to appoint a Manning Commission at all, but, as it contains a decided perversion of facts, we propose to grapple with it and expose to view the real state of the case

Firstly—The prejudice against Her Majesty's service is said to arise chiefly from ignorance. If this be correct, how are we to account for the following facts? In April, 1856, there was a fleet at Spithead of 25 sail of the line, and 200 other classes of ships, manned by about 26,000 seamen; but within two months afterwards, more than half of these ships were paid off, and 15,000 seamen sent adrift. In August, 1856, the Princess Royal, a screw liner of 91 guns, was re-commissioned; she was three months in completing her crew, and the men were found to be such a bad lot as (according to the Parliamentary Return of Flogging in the Navy) to require more flogging than the crew of any other ship in commission. How was it that the best seamen did not volunteer for this ship? In 1857, a great many more ships were put out of commission, and yet the Ganges, Boscawen, and Cumberland took from four to five months in completing their crews, and were then reported on as indifferently manned. The Orion, 91, was paid off at Devonport in October, 1857, and the Renown, 91, commissioned at Sheerness in November, 1857, yet the latter ship was six months before she had filled up her complement, and not one of the seamen belonging to the Orion volunteered for the Renown. The Monarch, 84, was paid off in the summer of 1858, when several fine ships were being fitted out, yet the large majority of her seamen refused to re-enter the navy, and many of the continuous service men bought their discharge.

Now all these sailors must have known of the advantages belonging to the naval service, and, therefore, it could not have been ignorance that induced these trained seamen voluntarily to fling away several years' servitude sooner than re-enter on board a man-of-war. A trained seaman is of much more value to the navy than a raw sailor, enticed out of the merchant service, and the enquiry should have been directed more into the causes that lead many of our best seamen to leave the navy, than into the prejudices the merchant sailor has against it. We think the above facts have conclusively proved that ignorance is not the sole cause of the prejudice that exists against Her Majesty's service.

Secondly—The Commissioners state that the prejudice against the naval service is not due to harsh treatment. We beg to differ with the honourable Commissioners, and say, that the prejudice existing in the minds of merchant sailors against Her Majesty's service, is mainly owing to the accounts of harsh treatment and injustice that have been spread abroad by seamen who have previously served in the navy. We further believe that these tales of punishments and tyranny do more to deter sailors joining the navy than the mere increase of wages, supply of clothing, and an improved diet will influence them to enter the service. There are other causes of dislike to the naval service, of which we may enumerate the nume-

rous promises broken by the Admiralty, the want of prize-money for the late war, and the thankless manner in which they were turned adrift at the conclusion of the war, when their services were no longer needed.

The man-of-war trained seaman is not a mere brute now-a-days, as many captains and government officials have supposed, but he is an educated man, he can read and write, and, what is more, he can think, and if he finds himself treated like a dog or a horse, petted at one time and kicked at another, his spirit rises against such treatment, and he prefers leaving the navy and joining the merchant service, where he is more independent, as he can choose his own ship, and captain, and destination, and has, besides, more frequent intervals on shore.

But to return to the immediate question before us. Is a system of harsh treatment still pursued in the Royal Navy? We emphatically declare that there is. We have seen it carried on; we have frequently heard of cases of naval tyranny, and, what is more, we ourselves have felt it, and possess in writing the acknowledgment of a late First Lord, that we were harshly treated.

Does a year go by without the public newspapers containing accounts of one, if not several, cases of harsh treatment on board men-of-war? No. For we can point to the well-known cases of the Childers, Lily, Star, Juno, Russell, &c., and yet these instances were only brought to light by a court-martial, whereas, in numerous other cases that we could name, the Admiralty has thought it best, for the welfare of the service, to pay off the ship, and so avoid all disclosures. The question may, however, be asked, "How is it if the cases of harsh treatment in the navy are so numerous as you state, that the Admiralty do not interfere and adopt some new regulations to put a stop to it?" We will tell you. It is the custom of a smart captain on board a man-of-war to support his first lieutenant or commanding officer in everything, no matter whether or not the officer or man accused can prove himself not guilty. So likewise, the Board of Admiralty, chiefly composed of officers of the same rank, support the captain, and pay but little attention to the complaints of his subordinates. If the public become at all noisy in their declarations against naval tyranny, they are at once silenced with the answer, "It is necessary to keep up the discipline of the naval service that all insubordination should be suppressed." This bit of humbug will not, however, serve to shut us up, for we have belonged to a ship termed by her crew a hell afloat; and we have served in another vessel where the captain, officers, and men all pulled well together, and yet she was always so smart as to resemble a yacht more than a steam-ship of war.

It is perhaps right that we should explain our meaning of "harsh treatment," and we therefore beg to say that in using that term we do not mean that any such brutal violence is carried on in a man-of-war, as is occasionally heard of in the merchant service. A systematic course of injustice towards the sailor explains, in our opinion, the term harsh treatment. We will give instances of it that occurred under our own observation, that will more fully express our meaning.

The crew of a steam frigate were one day being exercised in reefing sails, and, as is the custom, the first lieutenant was superintending the men belonging to the maintop, when, through some negligence of those on deck, the main-topsail was the last hoisted. This circumstance so annoyed the lieutenant that he completely lost his temper, and calling one of the men, who he thought was in fault, from aloft, he abused him in good strong language for his negligence, and when the man beginning to explain had got as far as "Please sir, it was not my fault," the lieutenant interrupted him by saying, "You dare contradict me! Mutiny! by ——. Serjeant, put this man in irons." The man, after attempting to remonstrate, was taken below and put in irons. The first lieutenant, after walking the quarter-deck for a few minutes, went down to his cabin. As the captain was on shore at the time, the other officers, after enquiring thoroughly into the case, consulted together, and deputed the second lieutenant to explain the facts to the commanding officer. His passion having cooled down a little, he listened to the explanation, and sent orders that the man should be released immediately, but never in any way acknowledged to the man that he was sorry for his hasty conduct. Now, this seaman was one of the best and most active young sailors in the ship, but the disgrace of being put in irons, though entirely undeserved, so affected him, that at the conclusion of the war, shortly afterwards, he managed to obtain his discharge from the ship, and swore never to enter a man-of-war again. As regards the lieutenant, we feel bound to state that his conduct on this occasion was exceptional, and that it was very seldom we had any complaint to make of his general behaviour; but we could not persuade him that it was his duty personally to acknowledge his injustice on this occasion. He could not believe that a sailor had as sensitive feelings as we imagined. He is now in command of a fine ship on a foreign station, and has proved himself a very brave officer. The sailor has no doubt joined the merchant service, and spread far and wide his account of naval injustice.

Another occurrence that we witnessed, and which comes vividly before our memory, pourtrays in a still greater degree the system of naval injustice. A seaman was brought on the quarter-deck of a line-of-battle ship, and reported by the master-at-arms for using bad language. The commander approached the man, asked if it was true, but without waiting for an answer, began abusing the man for his filthy conduct, and shaking his fist in the man's face, swore at him some most awful oaths, when the man, unable to restrain himself, rushed at the commander, and was about to strike him, but was seized by the master-at-arms and a sentry, and by order of the officer he was immediately taken below and kept in irons for several days. The above is perfectly true, and is only one out of numerous instances of harsh treatment that we saw pursued by the same officer. The captain frequently remonstrated with the commander about the profane language he used, but as often as the captain went on shore or was off deck, so did the commanding officer launch out his oaths, careless whether they were spoken to a subordinate officer or only to a seaman. It was curious to observe, however,

that he was always most severe in punishing any of the men that swore, as if quite forgetful of the shameful example he himself set them.

The foregoing cases need not much comment, especially the latter, which will doubtless cause as much indignation in the minds of our readers as it did in ourselves at the time we witnessed it. It will perhaps be asked, "How is it that a man does not appeal to the captain if he believes himself unjustly punished by the commanding officer?" It is because all complaints to the captain must be made through the commanding officer, who very frequently refuses to report a complaint made against himself; and, even if he does come before the captain, the latter, as a rule, nearly always sides with the commanding officer.

An instance will now be given, and, as it relates to an officer who appealed to the captain, it only shows more fully the great power that belongs to the post of commanding officer. The commander of a line-of-battle ship and an assistant-surgeon had some disagreement regarding the fitness of a seaman that had been entered on board the ship, and the former, losing his temper, told the doctor he did not know his duty, and this in the presence of the officer of the watch, the master-at-arms, and the sentry at the ward-room door. The next morning the assistant-surgeon wrote a letter on service to the captain, requesting him to inquire into the truth of the commander's charge, and gave the letter to the commander for him to present it to the captain, but the commander flatly refused to do it, and flung the letter down on the deck. As the assistant-surgeon would not pick it up, a quartermaster was ordered to do so and give it back to him. The assistant-surgeon then requested the surgeon to present the letter to the captain, which he did, but the captain sent back a message by him, hoping that the assistant-surgeon would withdraw the letter, as he did not like complaints being made against his commanding officer. The doctor however was firm, and declared that he would have the charge against him cleared up. Four or five days elapsed, when the captain found that the letter would not be withdrawn, he one morning sent for the commander and assistant-surgeon into his cabin, and again fruitlessly requested the latter to withdraw the complaint.

The captain then asked the commander what answer he had to make to the complaint, when the latter said that he did not recollect having used the words imputed to him. The lieutenant, who was officer of the watch, was sent for, and he had a convenient memory, as he could not recollect that the commander had made that charge against the doctor. At the request of the assistant-surgeon, the master-at-arms, and the sentry, who had also heard the dispute, were sent for, but both were reported to be on shore. The commander then stated that the assistant-surgeon had always done his duty to his satisfaction, and the captain acquiescing in the same, the doctor consented to withdraw the letter. When the master-at-arms and the marine got on board the next day the assistant-surgeon had them examined by some of his brother officers, when they confirmed the evidence of the doctor as to the language used by the commander,

and further stated that they had been sent on shore by the commanding officer, no doubt purposely to keep them out of the way. As regards the matter in dispute, it may be stated that both the captain and surgeon considered that the assistant-surgeon had acted rightly.

For two or three months after the dispute the commander vented his spleen in all kinds of annoyance upon the assistant-surgeon, who after vainly attempting to exchange from the ship, determined upon resigning his commission. Accordingly, he wrote a letter requesting that his resignation might be accepted, without stating his reasons for doing so, and gave it to the captain to send to the Admiralty. The captain decidedly refused to forward it, and, therefore, writing another letter, containing a full account of his reasons for resigning, the assistant-surgeon sent them both to the secretary of the Admiralty through the post. Three days afterwards, on returning on board from hospital duty, the captain sent for the doctor into his cabin and used this remarkable language, "How dare you, sir, send your resignation to the Admiralty when I had refused to forward it?" "What do you mean by making all these charges against your superior officers?"

The assistant-surgeon, in answer, stated that he came into the service expecting that he would be treated as a gentleman; that sooner than submit to the harsh treatment pursued towards him during the last few months, he had determined to resign his commission, and that, as the captain refused to send it, he considered that he had a perfect right to forward it himself. Whereupon the captain said, it was very plain he would not get on in any service, and asked if he occupied the cabin allotted to the assistant-surgeon. Receiving an answer in the affirmative, the captain added, "then I have a great mind to turn you out of it for your insubordinate conduct." The termination of this unpleasant affair was different to what many naval officers may have supposed. It so happened that the assistant-surgeon had a friend in a certain M. P., who was very intimate with the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the latter, on being made acquainted with the circumstances, telegraphed for the captain to come to London, gave both him and the commander a severe reprimand, and removed the assistant-surgeon to another ship. Another remarkable circumstance attending this case was, that the captain called shortly afterwards on the assistant-surgeon, said that he was unaware of all the circumstances attending his resignation, and that he was sorry he had been made uncomfortable in his ship.

Now this case shows that if an assistant-surgeon, who on shore ranks on an equality with the commander, both being gentlemen, found it so very hard to put up with harsh treatment, that the case of a poor sailor who is tyrannized over must be fifty times harder. The conduct of the captain of this ship was very remarkable. His annoyance at finding that one of his officers had sufficient spirit to resign, notwithstanding he had refused to sanction it, and his surprise that a subordinate had actually had the presumption to make complaints of the discipline of his ship, then his threat of turning

the assistant-surgeon out of his cabin, which had been allotted to him by the Admiralty, only points to what he would have done if he had been on a foreign station, out of reach of the Admiralty telegraph.

As it is not every officer who has an M.P. to back him up, and call the attention of the First Lord to his case, it is plain that there ought to be some new regulations issued, whereby all complaints made to the Admiralty, whether they come through the captain or without his approval, should be strictly inquired into. We do not hesitate to say that the whole system of punishment, as at present exercised in the navy, beginning at the court-martial on an officer, to the caning of a second-class boy, is decidedly bad, and is a mere cloak for injustice. Sentences of the greatest possible difference in their amount of punishment are delivered by different courts-martial. In many instances the only guide seems to be severity to the poor sailor, and those who have no friends, and a simple reprimand to those who have Admiralty or aristocratic support. The same unfair kind of system is carried on in many of our ships of war, as the amount of punishment depends entirely on the caprice of the captain.

We have but little doubt that what we have already written, and what we are about to state, will meet with the decided opposition of many naval officers of the superior ranks. But they are the despots whose power we want to curb in such a way as to prevent their abusing it. At the present time the captain of a man-of-war is a despotic king of very great power, possessing authority over some hundred men, who are bound to obey his command, whether it be right or wrong; who may be punished, whether guilty or not, according as he thinks fit; who have no appeal except with the sanction of the same despot who sentenced them; and who are sometimes obliged to submit without murmuring to annoyances, against which their spirit rebels, for four or five years at a time. Some, and we hope the majority of naval captains at the present day, exercise their authority judiciously, and endeavour to obtain the good will of their men. But, as we have already declared, there are others who do not care one straw for the comfort of their officers and men, and the present regulations allow these captains full scope for the indulgence of their fancies. Surely the account of the courts-martial on the officers of the Juno cannot have escaped the recollections of our readers? This case will prove our assertions to be correct. The captain of the Juno, in 1853, commanded the Arrogant, a fine screw frigate; but, in consequence of numerous complaints, the Admiralty directed an inquiry to be made into the discipline of this ship, and the Admiral at Portsmouth recommended that the captain should be superseded. Accordingly the captain was removed, although not to luxuriate on half pay, but to command another frigate, the Juno, which was sent to the other side of the globe, out of reach of the Admiralty, away from all admirals, and where he could carry on the discipline of his ship according as he chose. Is it surprising therefore to learn that the officers, one after the other, as soon as they could, left the ship, and that the Admiralty were obliged to recal

her before her time was up, on account of the constant complaints that were made? The Admiralty, presided over by Sir James Graham, were alone to blame, and ought to have been most strongly censured by the House of Commons.

At the commencement of the Russian war a line-of-battle ship was commissioned at Devonport, and after lying for some months in Plymouth Sound, fruitlessly endeavouring to complete her crew, she was ordered to Falmouth to enter seamen. A month's anchorage at Falmouth produced the following results: men entered, six; men deserted, thirty-four. So disgusted were the inhabitants of Falmouth at the tales they heard of the discipline carried on in this ship that they petitioned the Admiralty to withdraw the —— from their port, and she was ordered back again to Plymouth Sound. After another long sojourn at Plymouth she was sent to Portsmouth, and then up the Baltic, although all the time she was three hundred men short of her full complement. On her return to Portsmouth she was ordered to get ready to go to the West Indies, but when all was ready, and she was about to weigh anchor, an Admiralty message came down by telegraph, ordering all her men to be turned over to another ship, and that the —— was to be laid up in Portsmouth harbour. Every officer that joined this ship tried all he could to get out of her. Three assistant-surgeons resigned their commissions solely on account of the treatment they were subjected to on board this ship. Several midshipmen were dismissed the service, and upwards of one hundred men deserted from her.

What was the cause of this ship becoming so uncomfortable for her crew, and so useless for the service of the country, that the Admiralty could not trust her out of reach of the electric telegraph? It was owing to the captain and commander being both strict disciplinarians, and carrying out their views to the discomfort of their subordinates.

In one of the most important and best compiled naval works lately published, "The Navies of the World," there is an account of an act of injustice performed by the Admiralty towards Dr. Williams, formerly a surgeon in the Royal Navy. This gentleman was dismissed from the navy without being asked for his defence, and, although the accusation against him has been proved to be false, and the accuser has even acknowledged it, yet for thirty years the Admiralty have refused to reinstate him in his rank. We ourselves are acquainted with a hard case that happened to a physician, who is now practising in one of the most fashionable watering places. This gentleman, after serving on a foreign station for more than five years, returned home, and after being on half-pay about a month, was ordered to join a ship going abroad immediately. He wrote to the Admiralty, stating his long servitude abroad, and asking for an extension of leave; but the only answer he got was that, as he had not taken up his commission as ordered, he was dismissed from her Majesty's service.

Many more cases of naval injustice might be cited, but will be deferred to some future occasion, with the hope that those already

given may draw the attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty to the subject. By referring to the Admiralty records he will doubtless find proofs of all we have stated.

Let us entreat the Admiralty to take into their careful consideration the whole subject of naval punishments, and, if possible, draw up a new code, that will render courts-martial fair and impartial, and prevent superior officers treating their subordinates with harshness and injustice.

Englishmen talk about the wrongs of the Italians, and the cruel tyranny of the late King of Naples in throwing his rebellious subjects into dungeons! Let them remove the beam from their own eyes before they see a mote in those of another nation. A seaman lately belonging to the Orion has given me the following particulars. Some of the crew of this ship originally belonged to the Albion and Vengeance, which ships had served five years in the Mediterranean, when they returned home and were paid off; but their men were immediately drafted to ships going to the Baltic, and some 150 of them joined the Orion. At the conclusion of the war, the Orion was ordered to the West Indies; but before sailing these men requested the captain to give them their discharge, as they had served much beyond their proper time. The captain promised to do so, but nevertheless took them out with him to the West Indies, when they again spoke to the commander, asking him to intercede with the captain, that they might be discharged; but he refused to do so, and then, after several similar requests, they refused to do duty. Six of them were put in irons, and kept so for six months in that hot climate. At last a court-martial was held, the captain of the ship, who had broken his promise, presiding whilst the commander prosecuted. They were all sentenced to severe punishments, but as Parliament was then sitting, the Admiralty, to hush up the matter, pardoned and discharged nearly all the men. The ship was soon afterwards paid off, and none but the continuous service men reentered the navy.

The captain of this ship has since become an admiral, and has lately been appointed to an important command. The sailor told us many other stories of this ship, which, as we belonged for a short time to her, we can well believe, but we will not mention them without more sufficient authority. If the account of the treatment of the seamen is incorrect, we are extremely sorry, but as the newspapers contained at the time a somewhat similar narrative, and as the sailor declared on his oath that the men were kept in irons for six months, we have thought it right to state the whole facts.

Some persons will perhaps blame us for raking up all these unpleasant stories, and may say that it is not wise to publish them at a time when we are trying hard to get the navy well manned. Our answer is that if we believe the system to be bad, and injurious to the future interests of the navy, it is our duty to expose and endeavour to get rid of the vicious parts of that system. These statements are not likely to be read by the common sailor, but by

educated thinking men, who will, we hope, aid us in our endeavour to obtain justice for the poor sailor, as well as for the aristocratic officer.

Is there any reason why a court should not be formed on board each ship, composed of commissioned officers and petty officers, to try all serious offences, and, according as a verdict is given, to allow the captain to award a punishment regulated by Admiralty orders? The captains in the navy will perhaps say that such a proceeding would do away with all discipline, and that a man-of-war would soon become a bear garden. We do not agree with this objection, but on the contrary believing that it would be the most likely way of obtaining justice, we think that if it was tried it would be found to work well.

Next, could we not have some eminent lawyer to preside over our courts-martial, to see that the law was rightly administered? At the present time, one judge advocate rules one way, and another quite the opposite. This gives rise to frequent complaints of injustice and partiality, which ought never to happen when the character of a man is at stake.

It has also often been suggested that a court-martial should be composed of different classes of officers, and not all of the same rank. The court-martial on the Captain of Marines of the President frigate, fully illustrates the necessity of some such alteration being made. At least two of the court should be officers of the same class as the prisoner. Thus, if a paymaster, assistant-surgeon, or lieutenant of marines be the accused, we would suggest that two paymasters, two surgeons, or two colonels or captains of marines, as the case may be, form a part of the court. There is an Admiralty Order at present in existence, directing that all punishments inflicted on board each ship should be reported to them, but we know that this is not always carried out correctly, many of the minor punishments being omitted in order that the report may escape censure; and we therefore call the attention of the Admiralty to this fact, which requires a stern remedy. We would also suggest that orders be issued that no officer be allowed to kick or strike men in the performance of their duty. We know one ship where the commander had thick soles to his boots, and his great delight was to kick the men in order to make them smart.

All officers should be treated as gentlemen. The men should be regarded as fellow-beings, who by kindness and good example may be made happy and contented, and will then cheerfully obey their officers. If this be done the navy will soon become popular, and England will long retain her supremacy on the seas.

CAMPAIGN OF 1848 IN LOMBARDY.

CHAPTER II.

Forcing of the line of the Mincio—Invasion of the Italian Tyrol—Battle of Santa Lucia.

Meanwhile the two armies had come into collision on the banks of the Mincio. Radetzky never intended, with his small force, to maintain the line of that river permanently, but he resolved to hold it temporarily, to gain time to provision Mantua and Peschiera, and complete their preparations for defence. This was a matter of absolute necessity, for, owing to the negligence of the Austrian central government, neither had been properly supplied. It took Charles Albert fully a week to concentrate a sufficient force to be able to assail his opponent, and this time was made good use of by the Austrian commander. Into Peschiera a garrison of 1,500 picked men, most Croats, under Baron Rorth, was thrown. Around Mantua the utmost activity prevailed. The garrison of that fortress was commanded by the aged Count Gorzakowski, who collected cattle and corn from the surrounding country with such vigour, that in a few days he had secured a supply for four months; whilst the glacis, which during the long peace, had been covered by villas, was completely cleared, and the whole fortress converted into an island by the erection of dams and opening of sluices. On the 7th of April a skirmish took place between some Hussars from Mantua and a patrol of the Genoese dragoons, and on the 8th Charles Albert, having got his army well in hand, directed it in several columns on the Mincio. General Bava, with the right column, consisting of 4,000 men and sixteen guns, first reached the river at Goito. This town is situated on the right bank and was held by a company of Tyrolese Riflemen, as a *tête de pont* to cover the bridge of the same name, they were supported on the left bank by a line and rifle battalion, two squadrons of Hussars, and four guns. The morning had just broke when the Piedmontese skirmishers approached the enclosures of the town; but the Tyrolese opened a fire so sure and sharp that they were three times driven back in disorder, whilst a battalion, which endeavoured to ford the river higher up, was repulsed by the reserve. Bava now brought up his sixteen guns, and by their overwhelming fire occasioned such a loss to the Austrians that General Wolgemuth ordered the town to be evacuated and the bridge blown up. The mine partially failed, so that a portion of the parapet of the latter still remained, along which the Piedmontese, covered by the fire of their infantry from the neighbouring houses, which silenced the four guns of their opponents, clambered with the utmost gallantry, and soon gathering head attacked, and finally forced them to retreat on Mantua with the loss of three guns, 6 officers, and 120 men; amongst the officers killed were the two nephews of Hofer, who fell at the head of the riflemen in the blood-stained streets of Goito. The heroism of the Tyrolese in this engagement, and their long defence of the

town against an enormous superiority of numbers, was deserving of all praise. Radetzky wrote to their countrymen in allusion to it: "The regiment, your children, which you have sent me, is worthy of your country." The loss of the Piedmontese was equally severe.

Upon hearing of the passage of the river being forced, Radeztky concentrated his whole disposable force, amounting to about 19,000 men, at Villa Franca, between Goito and Verona, to fall upon General Bava, should he attempt to advance further. That officer, however, contented himself with securing the position he had won. The following day the centre and left of the Piedmontese advanced upon the Mincio at Valeggio and Monzambano; at the former town the passage was won, and the brigade thrown across; at the latter the attack failed. The line of the Mincio being thus broken through at two points, Radetzky must either give battle in the open field, or retire to the position of Verona. The high grounds of the Monte Vento, lying between Peschiera and Verona, offered a strong flanking position on which to await the attack; but he, considering that his army was now the sole stay of the Austrian cause, and could look for no immediate reinforcements (for the Hungarians had given directions that none of their troops should proceed to Italy, and Verona was on the edge of insurrection), whilst that of Charles Albert was but the vanguard of the Italian forces, and could consequently afford to lose thousands where he could not spare one, on the 10th withdrew to Verona, keeping open with his light troops, however, his communication both with Peschiera and Mantua.

So far Charles Albert had been successful, but the strength of the position taken up by Radetzky now became apparent. Three courses of action lay before him. (1) To advance direct on Verona and attack the Austrian army under the walls of that place; (2) or to turn its right flank and cut off its communication by a wide sweep round the western shore of the lake of Guarda, on Trent and the valley of the upper Adige; (3) or to follow the same plan on a more contracted scale, by ascending its eastern shore and seizing Montebaldo and plateau of Rivoli. The first plan could not be attempted with his present force (25,000) as to advance into the dangerous triangle formed by Verona, Peschiera, and Mantua, leaving the two last fortresses and a rapid river in his rear, would have been to expose himself to almost certain defeat, the troops necessarily detached to observe Mantua and Peschiera, reducing his active army to a numerical inferiority in the field. The second plan, though presenting the greater strategical advantages, could not be hazarded, as to execute it, it would have been necessary to divide his army into two parts, separated by the lake of Guarda, in presence of a concentrated adversary, the right wing holding the line of the Mincio, the left moving by the vallies of the Chiese and Sarca on Trent. This would have been to repeat the fault of Wurmser in 1796, with, probably, the same result—for Radetzky was certain to break with his whole force through the weakened centre, on the Mincio, and then wheeling to his right, assail the rear of the Sardinian left when engaged in the Alpine vallies. The third, though the easiest of execution, was equally impracticable until

reinforcements came up, and Peschiera was either closely invested or taken, for it would be necessary, to execute it, to file his left wing into the narrow space between the lake of Guarda and the Adige, with Peschiera and the lake on their left, Verona and the main body of the Austrian army on their right, and the rocks of the Montebaldo and Rivoli in their front. Under these circumstances, Charles Albert wisely determined to await the arrival of reinforcements before undertaking any offensive movement, and in the meantime he held his army concentrated on the right bank of the Mincio, with merely strong advanced posts to secure the bridge on the left, while Peschiera was nominally invested, but only on the right bank. To disturb the Austrian communications with that fortress, a few hundred men of a Milanese free corps were transported across the lake of Guarda to Bardolino, where they landed, and descending its eastern shore, surprised at L'Assize, a small Austrian post at a powder mill, and continuing their course, finally occupied the village of Castelnuovo, on the high road between Verona and Peschiera, and where it is intersected at right angles by that from Mantua to Trent. This important strategic point however, they were not allowed to retain, a moveable column from Verona stormed the village which the free corps had barricaded, and drove them back at the point of the bayonet on L'Assize, thus reopening the communication with Peschiera.

Whilst the main armies thus remained facing each other on the Mincio, Charles Albert determined to dispatch the whole of the Milanese free corps under General Allemandi, up the western shore of the lake of Guarda into the Italian Tyrol. These might amount to between 4,000 and 5,000 men, unfit for action with regular troops in the open field, discontented and unruly in quarters, and inflated with an extravagant idea of their own power and courage, and the utmost contempt for the enemy; they were no loss to him as far as the real strength of his army was concerned; whilst if they were fit to do anything, they ought to succeed against the Tyrolese militia, who, with a few regular troops were their only opponents. Their success would to the last degree embarrass the Austrians, as it would lay bare their only line of communications. Their defeat, it is probable, Charles Albert would little lament, and in fact would rather regard as a good riddance. That he expected no good from their diversion is proved by his refusing their leader's request to be reinforced by two regular battalions and 4 guns. Allemandi's troops were divided into a number of independent columns of about 500 men in each. The right wing set out from Brescia on the 9th of April, and moved by Condino on the Sarca valley, whilst the left advanced from the upper part of the valley of the Oglio across the Monte Tonal on the Val di Sole. Their progress was at first most rapid, for no enemy appeared in their path, and the Italian tricolour was carried, amidst songs of triumph, from peak to peak, until it floated over a large portion of the Italian Tyrol. On the 17th the whole country from the Cles in the Val di Sole to the Guarda lake was in their possession, with all the roads leading on Trent, and their left wing was preparing to descend by the Val di

Sole and the Monte Mendola on the valley of the Adige, between Botzen and Trent, and thence down the course of that stream; whilst the right wing, ascending the rugged mountains which separate the vallies of the Sarca and the Adige, was to pour from their summit on Trent, and unite beneath its walls with the left.

But these dreams of conquest were now about to be shattered with a rude and a strong hand. Lieut. General Welden, who commanded in the Tyrol, had not only improved the defences of Trent, but having drawn together therefrom the Voralberg frontier, (where, from the Swiss declaration of neutrality, they were no longer required) two regular battalions, to reinforce his small garrison, prepared to anticipate the attack of the Italians by becoming their assistant. He was encouraged to do this by accounts received from the fortified port of Riva, on the lake of Guarda. The small garrison of which consisting of but two companies, had sallied out upon and totally defeated one of Allemandi's columns 600 strong. Welden divided his small force into two columns—they were both to advance from the valley of the Adige; one from Trent across the intervening ridge into the valley of the Sarca against Allemandi's right, the other against Cles in the Val di Sole against his left. Both were entirely successful—the first column utterly defeated the free corps at the village of Silemo, the second put them to flight with a mere skirmish in the neighbourhood of Cles. Utterly discouraged by these defeats, the whole fled with the utmost precipitation from the Tyrol, and with the exception of a few posts near the frontier, before three days were over, had entirely evacuated the Tyrolese soil. Welden wisely refrained from dividing his little force by any distant pursuit, but retaining as fortified posts to secure his flank, only Riva, Stenico, and Male, withdrew the remainder of his men to Roveredo, where he occupied a central position, equally adapted to reinforce either the above posts or Radetsky's extreme left on the Montebaldo. The free corps had covered themselves with such ridicule in this expedition, that the Milanese government ordered them to be disbanded and reincorporated with the regular troops.

Meanwhile the main armies lay idle on the Mincio—one of the outworks of Peschiera was indeed cannonaded by Charles Albert on the 18th, but without effect. On the 19th however, a heavy column consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, was pushed forward to the neighbourhood of Mantua, and after a smart skirmish with the garrison established and entrenched themselves on the edge of the lake, so as to blockade the fortress on one side at least. During these events two inconsiderable actions had taken place in rear of the Adige. A moveable column detached from Verona towards Vicenza, fell in with a Venetian free corps, consisting of 1000 men and 4 guns, who had entrenched themselves in the village of Soria (April 8th), stormed the entrenchments, captured 2 guns, and drove them in disorder on Vicenza. Some days afterwards the same column descending the left bank of the Adige, attacked and defeated at Bevilacqua, another free corps from the south of the Po, which had, by occupying the village, cut off the communication between the fortress of Legnago and Verona,

(April 21). On the 20th the army of Charles Albert was reinforced by a Tuscan division of 5,000 infantry, 200 cavalry, and 8 guns, whilst intelligence arrived that General Durando with the papal troops was advancing with rapid strides towards the lower Po, where he was to cross over into, and occupy the Venetian main land.

Considerable reinforcements having now come up and more being at hand, Charles Albert prepared to commence the plan of operations he had formed for the expulsion of the Austrians in Italy. This was (1) by the occupation in force of the Venetian main land to isolate entirely Radetzky's army from the new Austrian army of Reserve, the formation of which on the frontier of the Isonzo had slowly commenced; and (2) by throwing forward his own left along the eastern shore of the lake of Guarda, to seize upon Rivoli and thus, by gaining his extreme right flank, and obtaining the command of his sole line of communication, to compel Radetzky either to retire from Verona into the Tyrol, or surround him in that town. To effect the first object he sent General de la Marmora, one of the best officers of his army, to Venice, to hasten the organisation of the forces in, and direct the defence of that town, and its continental possessions, whilst General Durando, who with the whole of the Papal troops, was to occupy Friuli (as above mentioned), and unite with the insurgent levies and the free corps from the south of the Po, would, it was hoped, be able to collect a force sufficient to prevent the advances of the Austrian army of Reserve on the one hand, and hem in the rear of Radetzky on the side of Vicenza on the other. To effect the second object was the business of the Piedmontese army on the Mincio. The steps necessary to attaining it were *first* to invest Peschiera closely on both banks of the Mincio, *secondly*, to take up a position with the main body of the covering force, between Verona and that fortress which should at once cover the siege, and protect the left wing destined to assail Rivoli and the Montebaldo, from an attack on its flank and rear, and *thirdly*, to expel the Austrians from the last named positions, thereby gaining the command of their only line of communications—for though the road from Verona to Trent ascends the left bank of the Adige, it is entirely commanded within half cannon shot by guns on the plateau of Rivoli on the other side of the river.

With a view to carry out these movements on the 23rd of April, Charles Albert in person made a reconnoissance in great force on the left of the Mincio as far as Villa Franca on the Verona road, whilst on the 25th, the Duke of Savoy did the same in the direction of Mantua. From the information thus obtained it was discovered that the Austrians remained shut up in Mantua, and beneath the ramparts of Verona. A secure bridge having been now completed at Goito, on the 26th the general advance across the Mincio began, on the 28th Peschiera was closely invested on both banks by the brigade Pignerol; whilst the main body of the army advanced beyond that fortress on the Verona road, the extreme left made an attack on the heights of Pacengo and Cola, which were occupied by the Austrian brigade, Wolgemuth, but was repulsed with loss, and the advance of the left wing was thus arrested. Meanwhile the

advance guard of the centre column had a smart skirmish with some Hussars and Croats at Somma Campagna. The Piedmontese army was organised in two corps and a reserve, and on the evening of the 28th it stretched from near Pacengo on the lake of Guarda, over fhe high grounds of Sandra, San Georgio, and Somma Campagna, into the plain near Villa Franca. The second corps, forming the left wing, lay between the lake and the high road from Peschiera to Verona, the first, forming the right wing, continued the line to Villa Franca, where its extreme right occupied the main road from Mantua to Verona, the reserve and head quarters were established at Somma Campagna in rear of the centre, the light troops were pushed on to within cannon shot of Verona.

The maintenance of his position about Verona by Radetzky depended upon his holding the plateau of Rivoli, as already repeatedly mentioned, but it was so far on his right that to garrison it in force with his right wing, would have disseminated his force too much, he therefore now ordered General Welden, (whom we left with his forces at Roveredo) to descend upon, and occupy that post with all possible expedition. Till he could arrive however, it was necessary to hold possession of Pastrengo; this village is strongly situated on some height on the right bank of the Adige, three leagues above Verona, at the point where the road from Mantua to the Tyrol reaches that river, and is a strategical point of great importance. For an army advancing on Verona could be attacked from it on their flank and rear, whilst any corps moving on Rivoli must gain possession of the direct road leading through it. Into this position Radetzky threw the brigade Sigismund, and to connect it with Verona, and threaten the right of any corps assailing it, he posted the brigade Taxis at Busselengo. Early on the 29th Broglia's Piedmontese division assailed Pastrengo, but they were received with such vigor by Sigismund's Austrians, that they were not only repulsed in disorder, but pursued for a considerable distance, and the latter even attempted to carry a ridge called the hill of Romaldola, which is the key to all operations in this part of the country. This inconsiderate advance, however, caused their ruin, for the Piedmontese rallied, and being far superior in numbers, out flanked the isolated Austrian brigade, and after a severe combat drove them back on their original position. In it they were not assailed as the brigade Taxis from Busselengo threatened the right flank of their pursuers. During the night the post was reinforced by a brigade under General Lieut. Wocher, and on the morning of the 30th the whole Piedmontese left wing, consisting of two divisions under General Sonnaz, renewed the attack. On this occasion they endeavoured to turn the position by its right, the left division moving round so as to gain the side of Ponton, the right division attacking in front, whilst the Piedmontese reserve and centre made a forward movement in the direction of Busselengo, and Santa Lucia, to prevent any assistance from that quarter—for Radetzky was there in person, and had concentrated four brigades which he held well in hand. From 10 in the morning till 3 in the afternoon the fight continued with unabated vigor around Pastrengo, every garden,

every hedge, every detached house was maintained with the utmost obstinacy by the Austrian riflemen, whilst the rapid fire of their artillery for long arrested the assailants. Column after column were brought up, but in vain; the riflemen of the Tyrol, and the Bersaglieri of Turin rivalled each other in skill and in valour; at last nearly 30,000 men were engaged in the attack, whilst the whole force of the defenders did not amount to 6,700. Nor was this gallant struggle made in vain, whilst Austrian and Piedmontese toiled and died in that deadly fight around the wooded heights of Pastrengo, time was given for the columns of Welden to arive from the Tyrol on the summit of the Montebaldo, and he even pushed forward a battalion of riflemen with two guns to the bridge of Ponton, to cover the retreat of the now worn out defenders of Pastrengo. Wocher's task was now accomplished, the further defence of his position would have been but a useful waste of gallant lives, and he drew off his troops and abandoning the village, fell back on Ponton where he passed the Adige. This retreat was not effected without severe loss; so interlaced had the skirmishers got that many of them could not be recalled, and were cut off, whilst the rear and flank of the main body was assailed by a withering fire. He lost that day not less than 900 men including about 300 prisoners. Radetzky, true to his defensive system, made no attack in the centre. The object for which he had fought was gained, and he would not unnecessarily waste the life of a single soldier. In the night he withdrew the brigade in Busselengo to the left bank of the Adige. When the victorious Piedmontese sunk down to rest amidst the ball-riddled houses of Pastrengo, they beheld the northern sky red with the watchfires of Welden, which covered as with a crest of fire the rugged cliffs of the Montebaldo and Rivoli.

When this engagement was being fought the garrison of Peschiera made a sally which was, however, soon repulsed. As by the occupation of Pastrengo and retreat of the Austrians from thence, and Busselengo across the river, the position of Charles Albert's left wing was left comparatively strong and secure, he was enabled to draw closer the investment of Peschiera, and, as its supply of provisions was known to be but scanty, he had considerable hopes of being able to reduce it ere long by famine, even if he could not succeed in destroying its magazines (which were situated in very imperfect casemates) by a bombardment. Having thus secured his left he prepared to complete his investment of Mantua on his right; but this was no easy matter, from the great extent of the line of circumvallation. The great strength of Mantua consists in the lake and impassable morasses by which it is surrounded, which are traversed only by five dikes on which the roads leading to the town are conducted, and the entrance to each of which is protected by a strong detached fort. This gives the garrison the power of concentrating their whole force for a sally upon any of the five chausseés, all of which being so distant from each other as to be incapable to give mutual support, the besiegers are under the necessity to render the blockade effective, of erecting works, opposite each, of strength sufficient

and manning them with defenders enough to resist alone the whole force of the garrison directed to that one point, and these have to be maintained in the midst of the pestilential exhalations from the marshes, more destructive of human life than exposure to the fire of the best directed batteries. Charles Albert determined to employ the Tuscan division which had come up to his support to complete the investment of Mantua on the south east when its communication with Legnago was still open. General Ferrari, who commanded them, in consequence, crossed the lower Mincio at Governolo on the 21st April, where he entrenched himself, and sent forward a detachment to Castellaro, on the road from Mantua to Legnago, which cut the communication between those places. On the 23rd, however, the Austrian garrison made sally, and drove the Italians, not only out of their post, but back upon Governolo, which they were rash enough to assail, but were beaten off with the loss of a howitzer, and a few men killed and wounded. This check, however, prevented the Tuscans from attempting to interrupt the communication with Legnago, and they, in the meantime, confined their attention to blockading Mantua from the right bank of the Mincio on its south and west side. Meanwhile the last lingerers of the Free Corps in the Italian Tyrol were attacked at Storo, on the 27th, by a detachment sent by General Welden, who drove them headlong from the Austrian territory.

Charles Albert now made an attempt to win the heights of Rivoli, but the blow was a feeble one and but feebly delivered. On the 4th of May the remains of the Free Corps were shipped at Salo and transported across the Lake of Guarda to L'Assize, where they were joined by a strong Piedmontese regiment and half battery of Artillery, detached from the left of the main army. The whole, numbering about 5,000 men, advanced on the following day across the rugged country, which lies between the lake and the Adige to the village of Affi, and about two o'clock in the afternoon, crossed the Tassio rivulet, and began to ascend the rugged flanks of the Montebaldo. The Austrian outposts fell back before them, but the rolling fire of their main body, posted securely amidst the overhanging rocks, and the destructive discharge of some rockets, speedily arrested their progress, and they fell back in disorder to the other side of the rivulet.

The result of the attack convinced Charles Albert that no impression could be made upon the position of the Rivoli by a mere detachment. On the other hand, to assail it with the main body of his forces, while the Austrian army lay concentrated in front of Verona, was impossible, as the attacking force would speedily find itself, while engaged with Welden in his strong position in front, overwhelmed by the army of Radetzky in its right and rear. It was therefore, necessary, before anything could be done, to drive Radetzky from his position in front of Verona back upon the town, and if possible across the Adige. The position occupied by the Austrians was however in many respects a strong one. From the heights of Sona and Somma Campagna, where the Piedmontese lay, a level plain extends for about a league and a half like a terrace towards Verona; about half a league from that town, it begins to descend by a gentle

glacis-like slope towards the Adige. On the upper edge of this slope, just at its commencement, lie in a straggling line and near together, the village of Chievo, Croce Bianca, San Massimo, and Santa Lucia. These were strongly occupied by the first line of the Austrian army, the remainder of which was encamped in the rear, on the descent between the villages and the ramparts of Verona. Could Charles Albert win these villages and the upper edge of the descent, it would be impossible for the Austrians to remain in front of the town, for the whole of the slope is commanded by guns from thence; and with howitzers, and mortars, Verona itself could with ease be bombarded. The villages, although not regularly entrenched, were yet occupied in force, several abattis had been constructed, and the number of detached houses of which they were composed, with intervening walls and hedgerows, presented great facilities for defence.

The day after the repulse at Rivoli, Charles Albert assailed this position with his whole force. His plan of attack was to concentrate the mass of his troops upon Santa Lucia and the Austrian left, whilst their attention was distracted by a general attack along the whole line; for this purpose General Bava was entrusted with the command of the right wing. His first line was composed of the two brigades (Queen and Aosta), with the brigade of guards, the flower of the Piedmontese army, in support. He was to attack Santa Lucia and the Austrian left with the utmost possible vigor, and to throw his troops frankly into action, and decisive success was expected, as Strassoldo with one weak brigade was alone opposed to him. In the centre Lieut. General D'Arvillars was to lead on his division and endeavour to win the edge of the descent, while on the left General Broglia was to direct his own division, and the volunteers of Parma against the Austrian right, and the village of Croce Bianca and San Massimo, so as to divert their attention from the decisive point on their left.

By seven o'clock on the morning of the 6th of May, the whole Piedmontese army, numbering 45,000 men, with 66 guns, was in motion across the plain. The different divisions moved swiftly on preceded by their guns, and with their flanks well covered by infantry skirmishers and light cavalry. Bava first brought his men into action on the right; with the Aosta brigade he fiercely assailed the village of Santa Lucia, whilst with the Queen brigade he supported and covered its right flank. Long and stern was the fight in the village, for there Strassoldo had inspired his weak battalions with his own heroic spirit. In vain trusting to their superior numbers, the Piedmontese repeatedly tried to carry it with a rush; in vain their artillery coming to the front tore its streets and riddled its houses with vollies of grape, nothing could move its undaunted defenders. Into the church and church-yard two rifle companies had been thrown, and before their deadly fire the assailing masses withered away, while the detached houses and enclosures were defended one by one with the utmost obstinacy; for three hours this terrible contest continued unabated, and at last it was yielded only to overwhelming numbers, when the ammunition of Strassoldo's men had

failed. Believing the victory now secure in this quarter, the Piedmontese, marching through the village, were beginning to debouch on the other side, when the head of their column was suddenly shivered to pieces by a volley from a battalion of Italian Grenadiers, followed by a vigorous charge with the bayonet, which threw them back in disorder into the village. For three hours they in vain endeavoured to gain more ground; the head of every formation was swept away by the Austrian fire. The brigade of Guards was now brought up, and Charles Albert, placing himself at their head, led them on with the greatest courage, but meanwhile, General Clam brought his brigade to support Strassoldo's wearied men, and met the onset of the Piedmontese by a vigorous counter attack. There one of the most desperate actions of this war took place, between the Piedmontese endeavouring to debouch from the village, and the Austrians to regain it. From the nature of the country, which is composed of a succession of gardens, separated from each other by stone walls, and overshadowed with trees, neither party could move in close order, but both had to break into lines of skirmishers and small detachments, which strove in almost single combat, without either giving an inch of ground. So alarming did the onset of Clam's men become, however, that Charles Albert ordered General D'Arvillars to bring his division in all haste from the centre to support the now exhausted right. The latter had during this time advanced to the edge of the descent, driving the Austrian light troops rapidly before him. On coming near the main position however, his left flank became exposed to the fire of a battery, which raked it with such severity that its advance was stopped. He therefore contented himself with bringing all his guns to the front, and engaging in a heavy cannonade with his opponents. From this fortunate circumstance he was able to move with the greater part of his division to the support of the king on the right. Meanwhile, General Broglia, with the Piedmontese left, had assailed the villages of Croce Bianca and San Massimo on the Austrian right. They were defended with three brigades by Field Marshal D'Aspre, and so successfully, that he not only repulsed Broglia's men, but compelled them to draw off out of cannon shot.

It was now four o'clock; Charles Albert had not only failed in his main object of overwhelming the Austrian left, although the flower of his army had there been brought into action, but so vigorous a counter-attack had been made, that he was obliged to summon up every disposable man from his centre to hold the ground he had won in Santa Lucia, while his left wing was overmatched and could make no progress. In these circumstances, Radetzky, seeing that there was no need for anxiety on his centre, now almost denuded of opponents, or on his right where the assailants were falling back, directed his reserve, consisting of a 12-pounder battery, and two battalions, to his left and ordered them to retake the village with the bayonet. But as they advanced, the Piedmontese retired, for the king had become convinced that with his present forces he was unable to win the Austrian position, and had ordered a general retreat, which had now commenced. The brigade Coni acted as a rear guard, and

covered the movement. In drawing off the battalions engaged around Santa Lucia, great difficulty and considerable loss were experienced from the broken and detached state into which they had fallen, the counterpart of what befel their opponent at Pastrengo, but with this exception, the ground being too broken for the action of cavalry, no serious molestation took place, and by six o'clock in the evening, the Piedmontese army had fallen back across the plain at all points, and had regained its old position on the heights of Sona and Somma Campagna. Its loss amounted to about 800 killed and wounded, and some hundred prisoners, and was almost entirely sustained by the three brigades of the right wing and the guards, the remainder of the army not having come seriously into action. The Austrian loss was nearly as great, and was heaviest in the brigade of Strassoldo. No guns were won or lost on either side.

This action concludes the first part of the campaign; a pause, caused by mutual weakness, ensued. Both parties had tried their strength, and both had failed in their object. The result of the battle convinced Charles Albert that with his present force he was unable to storm the Austrian position in front of Verona, and till that was done he could not venture to assail the decisive point of Rivoli. On the other hand, the forces developed by the Piedmontese, and the vigorous way with which they had fought, convinced Radetzky that his army was not equal to the task of driving them from their position covering the siege of Peschiera, and that therefore he must wait until reinforcements came up, even should that fortress fall in the interval. Here for a time we must leave the contending generals, Charles Albert with his attention fixed on the siege of Peschiera, and observing Mantua with his right; Radetzky counting the moments when the arrival of reinforcements would enable him to exchange a painful defensive for a vigorous offensive. The point of importance and interest now becomes the movements of the Austrian army of reserve and the Italian corps opposed to it in the Friuli—upon the success of either party there the fate of the campaign depended; were the Austrians driven back, Radetzky could receive no succour, while a victorious army would become at liberty to assail his rear; then overmatched and surrounded he must have withdrawn for ever into the Tyrol. Were they victorious, then reinforced, and with his communications secured, he might with safety lead forth his troops to contend for the sovereignty of Italy in a general and decisive action on the shores of the Mincio.

CHAPTER III.

Operations in Friuli—Junction of the army of reserve—First offensive movement of Radetzky.

So early as the beginning of April the Austrian government had commenced the formation of an army of reserve on the Isonzo, destined to reinforce the main army of Radetzky, but its organization went on but slowly, for while all the corps ordered from Hungary to compose it were kept back by the national party there, who had acquired practical independence, others were delayed by threatened

disturbances in different parts of the empire, and the approach of others was retarded by the spread of insurrection into the Alpine regions, on the roads leading to Carinthia and Trieste. When the whole force put in motion was concentrated, it would amount to about 20,000 men, and 70 guns, and of whom 1,800 were cavalry; but about 8,000 were still so far in the rear, that this support could not be calculated on, and the force ready to advance consisted only of about 13,000 men, and these were composed of three very different elements:—(1) Troops ordered up from the interior. (2) Reinforcements forwarded to the regiments now serving in Lombardy. (3) Some battalions belonging to the second corps, cut off from their comrades by the revolt of Venice and its territories. The first were almost entirely composed of Croat battalions, forwarded in the most disinterested way by the Ban of Croatia, who, although he had the dagger at his own throat in the shape of the revolutionary government of Hungary, resolutely bent on subduing the Slavonic border provinces, yet seeing the imminent danger of Italy, despatched every disposable man to the Isonzo, though by doing so, he deprived himself of a force which would have planted his banners in triumph on the walls of Buda. Count Nugent, a respectable veteran of seventy, was appointed to command this force, an unfortunate choice, for though a distinguished officer in the last French war, he was, from age and infirmities, without the activity and vigour necessary to organize and conduct with rapidity and success, an army in the utmost state of weakness as to organization and equipment, more particularly with regard to its artillery and commissariat departments. So much time was occupied in the preparations, that it was not until the 15th of April, that Nugent crossed the Isonzo, and opened the campaign with his little corps of 13,000 men.

To oppose him (as Durando had not yet come up from the Po), General Zucchi had only 3,000 soldiers of the revolted Italian regiments, and 8,000 volunteers and national guards; with these he felt himself unable to contend with the Austrian regulars in the open field, and wisely determined to confine himself to the defence of towns and a guerilla war in the country. He accordingly threw himself with 4,000 men into Palma Novo, while he garrisoned Udine with 1,000 in addition to its own national guard, some thousands strong. Against the latter town Nugent first moved, and he commenced a bombardment of it on the evening of the 21st, which so intimidated the inhabitants, that they compelled the military commandant to capitulate on the 23rd, the troops in it retiring, in virtue of the capitulation with three guns to Osopo. The following day the Austrian advanced guard reached Codroipo, but the Tagliamento being in flood, and the bridge of Valvasone having been destroyed by the insurgents, it was not until the 27th that a pontoon bridge was completed and that river passed. A halt of two days here took place, during which General Culoz joined the main army with his brigade, which had come from Carinthia by the Col di Tarwis, and had overthrown near Osopo, a column of the insurgents who attempted to oppose its progress. This delay was a most unfortunate one, as it gave time to General Durando to arrive with the first division of the Papal troops on the

Piave, and to occupy the line of that river, so that when, on the 30th, the Austrian main body reached Pordenone, and their light troops pushed through the Sacile to its banks, they found the wooden bridge which leads over it burned down, and the Papal troops posted on the other side. So slowly did Nugent move that he only reached Cornegliano on the 3rd of May, from whence he detached some Croats, who were subsequently reinforced by General Culoz with his brigade, to Belluno on the upper part of the stream where it issues from the mountains into the plain. This was a point of considerable importance, as it possessed a stone bridge over the river. It surrendered without firing a shot to Culoz.

The force of the Italians, consisting principally of Papal troops, which were stationed on the line of the Piave were organised in three divisions, commanded by Durando, Ferrari, and La Marmora, and amounted to about 15,000 men. Durando had the nominal command of the whole, and when he heard of the capture of Belluno moved with his division 5,000 strong (including the Swiss brigade in the Pope's service, the best troops in the whole army), with eight guns and 700 horse, to Montebelluno on his left, where he took up a position facing Feltre and the road which descends the stream from Belluno. The other two divisions were left in front of Treviso to defend the course of the Piave, about the burned bridge, where the main road which Nugent was following crosses. That commander however, finding his opponents strongly posted, and his pontoon bridge too short to cross the river, determined not to force a passage on the direct road, but to make a flank movement with the bulk of his army on Belluno, and crossing there by the bridge Culoz had won, descend its right bank on, and regain the main road at Treviso. Leaving therefore his whole baggage under the guard of two brigades, commanded by Count Schaffogotz at Susigana, on the main road, he set out on the 6th, with the remainder of his army for Belluno, which town he reached on the 7th, whilst Culoz pushed on with his brigade to Feltre, which Durando's advanced posts abandoned. On hearing of his advance that General retired, not on his other two divisions towards Treviso, but far to their left and rear on Bassano, a movement which entirely separated him from them, and allowed the Austrians to interpose between the two portions into which the Italian army was now divided, and drive them both to eccentric and disastrous retreats. The only reason which can be assigned for this absurd measure was his dread of the Austrians advancing along the foot of the mountains direct on Vicenza by the upper Brenta; on the 8th a slight skirmish took place, and on the 9th the Austrian main body, which was slowly descending the right bank of the Piave towards Treviso, encountered Ferrari, who with the forces which remained under his command had gallantly assumed the offensive. The action was begun by a gallant though unfortunate charge of the Papal dragoons, but the advance of an Austrian brigade against his left flank soon compelled him to retire to Montebelluno. This position however he was obliged soon to abandon, as intelligence arrived that Schaffogotz had succeeded in throwing a bridge over, and forcing the passage of the Piave on the main

road, from whence he might cut off his retreat on Treviso. On the night of the 10th accordingly, he fell back to that town; during the retreat 2,000 volunteers disbanded. Durando, who had on his side advanced towards the Austrians, again fell back on Bassano.

On the 11th the Austrians advanced against Treviso on two sides, on the north Nugent led the main body to Visnadello, and his light troops pushed on to the gates of the town, while from the east Count Schaffogotz approached along the great road, intending by a flank march to unite himself with Nugent at Visnadello. Ferrari taking advantage of his central position fell, with a Papal brigade and battery, upon one of Schaffogotz's brigades whilst on the march to unite with Nugent. Forming his men into close columns he led them with great gallantry against the Austrians, but they, opening out to right and left, allowed the head of the column to come direct upon their artillery, who tore it from front to rear with a volley of grape, whilst the infantry plied its flanks with musketry, when the whole fled in confusion, leaving a gun behind, and Schaffogotz effected his junction without further hindrance. On the 12th, Ferrari leaving the whole of the free corps to reinforce the garrison of Treviso, retired to Mestre, in the direction of Venice, intending ultimately to unite with the Neapolitan corps which was now approaching the Po in its advance from the south. Durando also (after a fruitless advance on the 11th to Arolo), was now moving down the Brenta in the same direction. The Austrian army remained for six days immoveable at Visnadello; the arrival of messengers pressing their instant advance to his support, from Radetzky, combined with a vigorous sally from the garrison, determined their commander to attempt nothing against Treviso, but to advance by the shortest route on Verona. To maintain the communications, a garrison of Croats was thrown into Belluno, and a *tête de pont* to cover the new bridge over the Piave was constructed, to garrison which Lieutenant-General Sturmer was ordered up with four battalions who had arrived at Gorz from the interior. In these measures six days were with true Austrian tardiness consumed. One fortunate event however occurred—Count Nugent, weighed down with age and sickness, resigned the command, to which Lieutenant-General Thurn succeeded. That officer at last set out on the evening of the 18th, for Verona, with 19,000 men.

Meanwhile Durando had ordered Ferrari's men to join him, and hearing of the march of the Austrians, advanced by Padua towards Vicenza with the utmost expedition. On the afternoon of the 20th the Austrian advanced guard reached that place. Vicenza, situated at the foot of the Monti Berici, and containing 30,000 inhabitants, was a town of great importance to the Austrians, commanding as it did the main road to Verona. It is not regularly fortified, but being built of very massive houses and well barricaded, and containing a garrison of free corps, and 2,000 Papal national guards, it could not be carried without a regular assault, which would have given time for Durando to overtake his rear; under these circumstances, Thurn determined to make a flank march round the place to the

Verona road on the other side, merely covering the movement with a false attack and cannonade. Towards evening this was accomplished, and continuing his advance the next day, Thurn fell in with the outposts of Radetzky's army at San Bonifacio, so that thus the much wished for junction of the army of reserve and the main body was accomplished. Radetzky however, was anxious not to leave Vicenza in his rear in the hands of the enemy, and therefore transmitted orders to Thurn to retrace his steps to that town and endeavour to take it by assault. On the 23rd he accordingly a second time appeared before it, but meanwhile the favourable moment had passed by, for on the 21st Durando arrived with his whole forces. He occupied the town with his main body, and posted a Swiss battalion with eight guns on a ridge of the Monti Berici which overhangs the town. It was late at night when the Austrians came in sight; they immediately opened a fire with all their guns and howitzers, which was kept up for two hours without effect. In the morning it was renewed, but the heavy rain during the night had so saturated the ground, that the 12-pounder batteries stuck fast in the mud, and the lighter field guns, which could alone be brought up, made no impression on the massive walls of the houses. In a short time the well directed fire of the Swiss guns, of a heavier weight of metal, dismounted many of the Austrian pieces. An attempt to storm the most advanced barricades, though at first successful, failed, from the Croats being driven out of the works they had won by a Swiss grenadier battalion, who pursued them at the point of the bayonet until a discharge of grape shot arrested their advance. Thurn became convinced that to continue the attack was hopeless, and at 11 o'clock drew off his men, and set out again for Verona, which town he reached on the 25th.

Meanwhile, events of great importance to the contending parties had occurred, both to the north of the Alps and the south of the Po. In Austria the symptoms of disaffection became so strong, particularly in the capital, that the Emperor no longer thought himself in safety there, fled to the Tyrol, and took up his habitation at Inspruck. His reception by the mountaineers was worthy of the descendants of Hofer. He came without pomp or state, a fugitive, without troops or guards, but the whole country rose as one man for his defence, and the peasants on the roads leading to the capital, organized themselves into bands who kept strict watch around the town. It was not in his numerous army or in the strength of the nobles of the land that the fugitive monarch found protection and support, but in the courage and fidelity of the peasants of the Alps. The Tyrol has always been the La Vendée of Austria.

At Naples a revolution of a different character had taken place. On the 14th of May, the day before that appointed for the meeting of the new Constitutional Chambers, the ultra-democratic party broke out into insurrection. This most inopportune event was eagerly laid hold of by the king, who was only too anxious to free himself from the trammels of a constitutional monarchy. The Royal Guard and the Swiss received orders to storm the barricades, and a severe and bloody street fight took place. The crisis of the battle was in the

Santa Brigitta street. There the Swiss regiment of Berne was ordered to storm the principal barricade; twice formed in close column it rushed up the narrow street, twice overwhelmed by the fire from the windows and balconies on each side, it recoiled, leaving a long train of killed and wounded behind. At last, taught by experience, a different formation was adopted, the soldiers advanced in file close under the walls of the houses on each side, and two guns were brought up and placed in the centre of the street between them; these last opened their fire with grape and round shot on the barricade, the infantry directing theirs entirely against the windows and balconies on the side opposite them; this gradually subdued the flanking fire of the republicans, then the barricade was stormed and one of the houses adjoining forced and all its defenders put to the sword. In other parts of the town the royal troops, always headed by the Swiss, were equally successful; when night fell, the contest was over, and the republicans overthrown, but the four Swiss regiments engaged lost three field officers, thirteen other officers, and 202 men killed and wounded—more than half of these fell in the single regiment of Berne. This revolution led to important consequences, the king, having now triumphed over the democratic party, completely changed his foreign policy, and the Neopolitan contingent, 20,000 strong, under the command of General Pepe, which, towards the end of May had arrived upon the Po, received orders, when just about to cross that river, to return to Naples. Pepe endeavoured to prevail on his men to abandon their king and march to the support of the Venetian insurgents, but in vain, the whole regulars either set out on their return or disbanded, and he could only lead across the river a few bands of volunteers. At the same time, the Neapolitan fleet and land troops at Venice, set sail for the south. The sudden and unexpected loss of this, in numbers at least, powerful auxiliary army was a severe blow to Charles Albert and the Lombard party, particularly in a moral point of view, and a corresponding gain to Radetzky.

We must now return to Verona and the banks of the Mincio. The interval which elapsed between the battle of Santa Lucia and the arrival of the army of reserve on the 25th May, was occupied by Radetzky in turning his position in front of Verona into a great entrenched camp. The whole villages forming its first line, were fortified with the greatest care, with barricades in the streets and loop-holes in all the houses and walls facing the enemy, whilst a second line, consisting of seven redoubts armed with 12 and 18-pounders, was constructed on the edge of the declivity in their rear. Charles Albert on the other hand, threw up field works to strengthen the position of his covering army, and pushed the siege of Peschiera with vigour. This army was, during the interval, considerably strengthened by the coming up of Sardinian reinforcements, but the organization of the Milanese troops went on so slowly, that not above 5 or 6,000 of them were in line, and even the volunteers and national guards hardly amounted to a greater number. The Milanese were enthusiastic and ardent in all their declarations, and the mobs in the great towns shouted for the unity and liberty of Italy

from morning to night, but their energy was exhausted in empty demonstrations, and with difficulty could any of these glowing democrats be induced to shoulder the musket and join the armies in the field. Such also were the jealousies of the popular party in the different states of Upper Italy of the king and of each other, that though all were convinced that only by being united under his rule, could the unity of action necessary for independance be obtained, yet they could only be brought to submit to it with such absurd limitations and restrictions as would have rendered nugatory his supreme authority, and he therefore wisely declined to assume at present the title of King of Upper Italy. The democratic party in Venice, Milan, and the small states on the right bank of the Po had reason, ere six months passed away, to look back with vain regret on the golden opportunity which they allowed to glide by, and which was not destined for ten long years to return.

As already mentioned, the garrison of Peschiera consisted of about 1,600 men. The fortress itself is situated where the Mincio flows out of the lake of Guarda. It is surrounded by the river, which not only traverses the body of the place, but fills the ditches on both sides. Its ramparts form a pentagon with regular bastions and ravelins; but they are constructed upon an old, and, as opposed to the increased power of modern artillery, weak-system—its greatest defect however, is, that on both banks of the river it is commanded by heights at a distance of little more than 1,000 yards. To remedy this as far as possible, two outworks have been constructed on the declivities forming these heights. They are both detached works, closed at the gorge, and connected by covered ways with the fortress. The one on the right bank, which commands the road to Brescia, is called Fort Salvi, that on the left bank, which commands the Verona road, La Mandella There are many hollows amongst the uneven ground, which, not being commanded by any guns from the works, enabled the besiegers to use them as cover, and to open their trenches as close as 500 yards to the forts. On the 18th of May, the first of the batteries opened its fire at that distance on Fort Mandella; by the 21st, one gun only remained unsilenced in it, whilst by the 25th, with such vigour were the works pushed, Fort Salvi was in ruins, and the body of the place much injured by a heavy vertical fire. Both outworks being now overpowered, approaches were carried on with vigor against the fortress itself, the principal attack being directed against the main rampart near the Verona gate. The King in person was constantly present in the trenches. On the 26th, the place was summoned, but the terms proposed by the governor being found inadmissible, the attack was renewed on the 27th, and on the 28th the breaching batteries were commenced. It was evident that the fortress could not hold out long—provisions were rapidly failing, and the vertical fire had done great injury to the interior of the works. Under these circumstances, if not relieved in a few days, it must surrender.

Radetzky, now that the reserve had come up, determined to make an effort for its relief, but a front attack upon the fortified position

of Charles Albert was too hazardous to be undertaken. Other reasons also rendered it almost necessary to shift the quarters of the army. The supplies of provisions, which could be drawn from the Tyrol were but small, whilst the only district which could be foraged consisted of the small triangle between the Adige, its tributary the Aplon, and the Alps, and this had become, after two months occupation by the army, utterly exhausted. It was to remedy this defect, by extending his quarters to the rear, that had induced Radetzky to direct the unsuccessful attack on Vicenza already noticed. That commander had therefore a double object in view, first, to relieve Peschiera, secondly, to gain fresh quarters for his army. This he proposed to do by a difficult but most able manœuvre. His plan was to leave in the entrenched camp of Verona a force just sufficient to man the works, whilst with the whole remainder of his army he was to march by his own left on Mantua, raise the blockade of that fortress, and then continuing his advance, sweep round the right flank into the rear of Charles Albert's position on the upper Mincio, and force him if possible to abandon the siege of Peschiera, in order to preserve his communications; whilst he was not without hope that in doing so the King would make some false movement, which would give him an opportunity of engaging with advantage in a battle, when his opponent would run the risk, if defeated, of being cut off from his base of operations, and thrown back on the now exhausted shores of the Guarda lake.

On the evening of the 27th, he set out from Verona to execute this plan. In the entrenched camp Count Thurn remained with the greater part of the army of reserve—the young soldiers of which it was composed being much exhausted with their long march. The army which he led forth with him, consisted of about 35,000 men, 5,000 of whom were cavalry, with 151 guns. It was divided into three army corps, commanded by Count Wratislau, Baron D'Aspré, and General Wocher, and moved on Mantua in three columns, on parallel line. The right column, consisting of the 1st corps (Wratislau), was that next the enemy, and was ordered to move by Vigasio, Trevenzuola, and Castelbelforte. It was flanked on its right by strong bodies of Croats and hussars. The centre column, consisting of the 2nd corps (D'Aspré), with the infantry and artillery of the 3rd, or reserved corps (Wocher), was to march by Isola de la Scala, Sorga and Castellaro, whilst the left column consisting of the cavalry of the 3rd corps, was to move by Bovolone and Nogara. The whole were to advance left in front, so that by a simple wheel of companies they could form a line of battle to the right in three lines, each column becoming a line. Then commenced one of the finest tactical displays which have been seen in modern Europe. The movement which was being performed by Radetzky was one of the greatest difficulty in execution, it was that, though executed with a wider sweep, which had proved fatal to Marmont at Salamanca, and to the allies at Austerlitz. Charles Albert held his army concentrated in massive columns, on the summit of Somma Campagna, and the heights above Villa Franca, ready to fall on

the long flank of the Austrian array as it wound in the plain, along the front and round the right of his position. But well and ably did the old man on that day hold his army together, and wonderful military discipline and skill did it display. Each column marched so well closed up, that from front to rear it never extended over more than a league and a half. No yawning gap, like that between Thomiere's and Clausel's division, no important height unoccupied, like the hill of Pratzen, gave opportunity to the Piedmontese battalions to sweep down on the unguarded spot, but closed up and dense as one man, Radetzky carried the whole with a strong firm hand round the King's position, and brought them to the glacis of Mantua, where they slept on the night of the 28th. It was a similar movement, and similarly executed to that of Wellington, round the left flank of Soult's position at Mozambares, close to Salamanca, and to find its parallel we must read in the glowing description of Napier, the narrative of that, the greatest of all the English general's campaigns.

On the morning of the 29th Radetzky continued his advance from Mantua. His line of march lay on the right bank of the Mincio, along the southern shore of the lake on which the fortress stands:—this brought his advanced guards upon the Tuscan division, (6000 strong with 8 guns), who, as formerly mentioned, observed and blockaded the fortress on that side. This division whilst unsupported, yet having received no orders to retreat, prepared like good soldiers to make good their post, and gallantly threw themselves in the way of the whole Austrian army. The position which they occupied was a strong one, it consisted of the line of a canal called the Ossone. This canal derives its waters from the Mincio and winds in a southern direction towards the Po, thus traversing at right angles the roads which the Austrians were following. The road nearest the lake of Mantua crosses it at the village of Curtatone, which is situated in the edge of the inundations; here about half of the division lay, the streets were all barricaded strongly, the houses loopholed and occupied, and redans thrown up. Half a league lower down the canal the other or more southern road from Mantua crosses at Montanara; here the remainder of the division was posted. This village was occupied in the same way as the former, in front of it several redans were thrown up, in rear of which, and serving as a defence to their gorges, stood some well-built detached villas, which were barricaded and garrisoned; against this strong line of defence the Austrians moved in three columns. The right column, consisting of two brigades under Prince F. Schwarzenberg, marched along the northern road against Curtatone, the centre column, also two brigades, under Prince C. Schwarzenberg, along the southern road against Montanara, the left column of the same force, under Prince Liechtenstein, still further to the south against the bridge of Buscoldo lower down on the canal. The country through which the troops marched was a very difficult one, the ground on each side of the high roads being almost impracticable from the number of deep ditches filled with water, high hedges and rows of trees united by festoons of

vines. When the leading brigade, (Benedeck's) of the column moving on Curtatone reached that place they were unable, from the severity of the fire of musketry and artillery with which they were received, to make any progress on the high road, and it was not until midday that the pioneers were able to bridge the ditches on each side of the road so as to enable its artillery to get into position. A brisk cannonade now ensued, under cover of which the infantry rushed in with fixed bayonets, but were twice repulsed with heavy loss; the second brigade now came up and was immediately led on to the charge, they succeeded in penetrating at one point and maintained their ground, whilst the first brigade having rallied returned a third time to the charge and carried some of the works on the left; at this decisive moment the ammunition of the Tuscans ran out, and they abandoned the position and fell back towards Gazzaldo, while the second brigade pursued them, Colonel Benedeck with the first turned to his left and marched down the canal in the direction of Montanara, attracted by the heavy cannonade from that quarter. There the leading brigade of the centre column under Count Clam could for long make no way. His artillery kept up a vigorous fire, but the order of the infantry was broken in forcing their way through the entangled country on each side of the road, and consequently for some time the attacks were made by battalions independently and with little concert. At last one of the houses on the edge of the village was after a desperate conflict, in which it was defended from floor to floor, carried, and a position thus secured from which a rocket battery was able to open on the interior of the place. At this instant Prince Liechtenstein with the left column, (who had crossed at the bridge of Boscoldo without opposition, and then turning to his right had marched with all speed on Montanara) appeared in the rear of the Tuscan position, on their only line of retreat. They then withdrew from the village, and uniting with their reserves, the whole threw themselves into the strong detached villas in the rear of the postion, where, surrounded by the Austrians, they made a most gallant and desperate resistance. The contest was now too unequal; one by one the villas were stormed and their defenders obliged to throw down their arms. The loss of the Tuscans on this fatal day was 450 killed and wounded, 2,000 prisoners, and 5 guns taken. The loss of the Austrians was also very severe, amounting to 35 officers and 638 men killed and wounded. The remnant of the Tuscan division fell back on the King's army on the upper Mincio. By the evening of the 29th the 1st and 3rd corps of the Austrians were established with their advanced guard at Rivalta on the Goito road, whilst the 2nd corps moving towards the Oglio had reached Ospitaletto with its leading brigade.

(To be continued.)

THE TRADE OF NEUTRALS.

If history is philosophy teaching by example, then in anticipating the future it is wise to overhaul the past, so that in navigating the unknown sea of futurity, we must keep a bright look out, not ahead, but astern. To be sure, this is reversing the practice of ordinary sailing, but we have to deal with mental instead of physical science. The simple fact is, we are going on a voyage of discovery in search of a precedent, but we have no doubt, that after we have gravely shaken our heads, we shall come to the conclusion that what has happened before is very likely to happen again.

This may not appear to be in the highest spirit of prophecy, but we do not profess to read the future by any other light than the past; so that in answering the question, "will free ships cover free cargoes in future wars," we refer to the great revolutionary struggle with the elder Napoleon for information.

The cost of war is enormous. It is difficult to form correct conclusions of the expenditure of nations during periods of strife, even by the aid of figures. The huge totals only bewilder instead of instructing the mind. At present our national debt, funded and unfunded, amounts in round numbers to £807,000,000, and this sum is entirely owing to war expenditure. From 1793 to 1800, we spent in war £196,500,000, and from 1800 to 1815, the amount rose to £830,134,614. This we believe is an under-estimate. We have seen the cost of our Napoleonic contests valued at £900,000,000. During the whole of the above-mentioned period, the commerce of England struggled against loans, taxes, and financial embarrassments incident to war; every sea swarmed with cruisers and privateers, the country too, was not only heavily taxed, but the people were called upon to subsidise Europe against France. Our national debt, as we have shown, increased to an enormous amount, yet so elastic was British commerce, and so well was it protected on the ocean by our gallant navy, that notwithstanding our gigantic expenditure for war purposes, the nation increased in riches from year to year, and that at a pace no nation ever equalled before. This remarkable fact has grown into a maxim, inasmuch as it proves that the weight of taxes must be calculated, not by what is taken, but by what is left. France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia were crippled and worn out in that desperate struggle, while England came out of the war the richest nation in the world. Our indebtedness was as nothing compared with our power to pay. It is true we had given away thousands upon thousands in bounty to soldiers and sailors, and squandered about eight hundred millions of pounds sterling in guns, drums, cartridges, and other fireworks, but after all it turns out to be, as Mr. D'Israeli said the other day, only a fleabite, for it is not one year's income of the people, and surely no energetic and sensible man would consider himself ruined, or in danger of the "Bench," if his obligations amounted to only one twelve months' revenue of his paternal acres.

However, the effect of the wars of the elder Napoleon was long and grievously felt by all the continental powers engaged in them, and it required a good deal of tender nursing before any of them could indulge in a war whoop again. But the elastic nature of English commerce soon put this country in ready cash, and notwithstanding the interest of our national debt, the usual mismanagement of our expensive governments, our Caffre and other colonial troubles, the late war with Russia, and the great sacrifices we have been called upon to bear in the Indian mutiny, England is at this moment the most solvent nation in the world. Our Three-per-Cents hover round 91, while those of France vibrate between 59 and 62. Thirty per cent. difference in the value of public securities are fearful odds, when it comes to borrowing, and tells well for English credit and stability. A nation need not button its breeches pocket overtight with a floating capital of a thousand millions of pounds sterling, or when it can apply £300,000,000 without inconvenience, in railways. We might continue to amaze the mind by throwing huge totals before the reader's eye, but we refrain, except in one instance more, as that is perhaps the most astonishing proof that can be advanced of the riches of England, viz., that the people possess sufficient loose cash to support the entire population in idleness for an entire year.

Now this creation of capital in England during the last half century, in spite of the heavy drains of war, is one of the main facts of modern history. It has given to Englishmen a passion for independence, and the sacredness of property has reached an ideal perfection. We reduce this feeling to practice when living according to our means, and it is a point of honour in commercial circles, not to consider an undertaking honest unless it pays. When a people acknowledge these precepts as part of their commercial code, property becomes, as it were, their national life-blood, which nothing but treason or felony ought to over-ride.

However, we are reminded that during the last war with France and also with America, private property was not safe upon the high seas. It was at the mercy of the enemy's cruisers as well as his privateers, which latter profession is now acknowledged to have been piracy in disguise. Probably the great mass of the people are now too much occupied by the events of the war in Italy, to pay much attention to this business, but our merchants and shipowners, who are more interested in the affair, are pondering in their minds what effect hostilities will have upon the commerce of this country. That it will be injurious even if confined to Italy, is evident, but should it extend to England, will the doctrine accepted during the Russian war, and subsequently confirmed by the Paris Congress, that "free ships cover free cargoes," be acknowledged by all the nations that may be involved in the expected war.

Should this be the case, it would be a great boon to mankind in general, and great trading communities in particular. For if we are to read the future by the light of the past, we may feel pretty certain that so long as the profits of our enormous trade remain undisturbed, we shall stand a fair chance of wearing out our opponents,

whoever they may be. But should the doctrine of the Paris Congress not be acted upon, can we reckon with certainty upon being able to protect our merchant navy and their monstrous values against all comers. Modern cargoes, particularly since the discovery of the gold fields of California and Australia, are more tempting than those of old, or say forty years since. We all know what the consequence would have been in the great struggle maintained by England against the elder Napoleon, if our maritime supremacy had been suspended for ever so short a time. The great aim of France was to seal our ruin by any means, and none appeared equal in Frenchmen's eyes to crippling our commerce. Napoleon's Berlin and Milan decrees were only his last efforts to exclude our merchandise from every European port after his fleets and privateers had been swept off the seas by our gallant sailors.

These facts are all matters of history now and warn us of a future, for if ruin would have followed the loss of our supremacy at sea in those days of comparatively small imports and exports, what will be the consequence to us in a commercial point of view, if a combined French and Russian fleet were to muzzle our ports and shut up our merchant ships in Liverpool, London, Bristol, Hull, Glasgow, &c., &c. The gigantic strides of British commercial enterprise is one of the most remarkable facts of civilization; the wealth of London determines the prices all over the globe; all things, precious, useful, and amusing, are sucked into this surprising stream of commerce, and floated to England. Since the peace of 1815, the nation has become a huge manufacturing corporation, and every house a "mill,"—steam, electricity, machinery and capital are working day and night in raising to a fabulous amount the wealth of England. The monstrous values that Englishmen draw out of the raw materials of the earth evoke every kind of ability; no talent is idle in its napkin; the power of production by steam machinery in "mills" alone, has been estimated to equal the labours of 600,000,000 of men. This modern giant (which, be it remembered, is the production of English genius alone) now enables one man to perform the work that required 250 to accomplish fifty years ago. The goblin steam, with his million of arms and hands, has been, and is now amassing property for Englishmen that has outrun figures, and most of this wealth finds its way, either before or after its manufacture, in some vessel upon the ocean. Forty thousand ships are entered in "Lloyd's list," as necessary appendages to this vast centre of manufacturing industry, and give employment to half a million of seamen of all nations. Last April we sent away by sea no less than £11,330,730 of valuable merchandise, while the total value declared of British exports for 1857 reached the huge sum of £122,066,107, which was, we believe, the largest amount ever exported by any nation in one year. But the first three months of the present year bid fair to surpass even this great total, they have indeed exceeded in value the corresponding monthly exports of 1858 by £5,265,350.

We beg in all humanity to offer these few facts and eloquent figures to the consideration of those economic "statesmen" of the

Cobden, Bright, and Manchester school, who have done their best to reduce the armaments of this country to the low standard it had reached a short time since. We may be in error, but it seems nevertheless apparent to our commonplace understanding that if these gentlemen wish to see our national prosperity checked—the progress of our colonies arrested, the influx of tons of gold and silver, to say nothing of the millions of exports and imports seized by some enemy's cruisers in a not very distant war, they had better continue to preach their absurd doctrines, and cut down the navy estimates and reduce our defences to "invasion point."

That there are grave considerations connected with this subject few persons will deny. Not long since we were startled with the intelligence that a secret treaty had been concluded between our late "faithful ally" and Russia. And although the public mind is now somewhat calmed by the repeated assurances from ministers, that the treaty is only a written understanding between these two aggressive and despotic powers, yet we confess we are not comforted by these ministerial explanations. Suppose, it is only a written understanding. A treaty is no more. But even if we admit that a written understanding is not a formal treaty, yet no one denies that the understanding is a secret one. And why is it secret?

Again, when the inclination of two individuals (and the Russian and French despots are the sole exponents of will in their respective dominions) run in the same direction, and are desirous of accomplishing certain ends, they do not require either a written understanding or formal treaty to keep them to their work. It is only when a man has some disagreeable task to perform that we bind him by a solemn bond, duly signed, sealed, and delivered, to perform his duty. The idea is conveyed in the old adage, of "where there is a will there is a way." And we have no doubt, that most Englishmen on hearing that France and Russia had secretly combined, shaped their thoughts somewhat after the following manner. They concluded, that whatever other items there might be in the secret treaty, or understanding, a combination of French and Russian ships of war, to keep in check, or control the fleets of Britain was, or rather is, one of them.

Looking at the fact therefore, that the French fleet now absolutely afloat is, in number of ships of the line and guns, rather superior to our own, and moreover is a compact fleet and not scattered over the globe like our own, and further, contemplating the possibility of its being united to that of Russia, we are disposed to entertain certain misgivings with respect to the treaty of Paris, upon the international system of maritime laws. Or in other words, would these despotic powers, the one with a reputation of wishing to despoil Turkey and the other suspected of sinister designs upon Italy, supposing they possessed an overwhelming force at sea, respect the doctrine accepted so recently. "That free ships make free cargoes"—particularly when the bait assumes the tempting form of Australian gold ships.

We know that it has been said that under no imaginable circumstances of temporary or even prolonged defeats at sea, that

our general traffic upon the ocean could now be interfered with. There are those who are sanguine enough to admit, that the utmost annoyance that our merchants and ship owners could experience, under the altered conditions of maritime law, would be the loss of our carrying trade. The supposition is that we should get the shipmasters of the United States to conduct our sea going duties for us. We should employ American bottoms, and under the American flag our interchange of goods and merchandise would go on with the same regularity, but of course with diminished profits, as ever, although every maritime power in Europe might be arranged against us. All the raw products of the earth, cotton, corn, and the other staples, would duly arrive at our ports under the protection of the star-spangled banner, and again under the same flag and in the same ships our manufactures and raw exports would be distributed over the whole earth. This would be carrying out the doctrine of free ships and free cargoes, and certainly under these circumstances we might go on buying and selling, while our opponents not having the same enormous trade, would in all likelihood suffer exhaustion under the effects of financial mismanagement, and the wasteful expenditure of war.

This no doubt would be a most humiliating position for England to be placed in, but let us suppose an almost impossibility, or at least a state of things few Englishmen will think it necessary to discuss,—viz. that our navy had been swept off the seas by the combined squadrons of France and Russia, and that our commercial ports were under a strict blockade. Under such circumstances even the American shipowners could not render us much assistance. This untoward state is however not likely to happen, but if it should assume even this desperate shape, we anticipate anything but fatal results to the cause of freedom or commerce. For it would bring together the only two real maritime powers on earth, and unite in the close bonds of interest the only two free nations in the world. For although the people of the United States might perhaps stand aloof from the quarrel which somehow seems to be foreshadowed between England on the one side and France and Russia on the other, as long as the enormous profits of our carrying trade were diverted from our pockets to their own, yet the cute Yankees would not fail to discover, as soon as their gain was taken from them, that their interest in the doctrine of free ships and free cargoes was identical with our own. They would soon recognize that every blow struck at liberty in England by European despots, was indirectly aimed at America also, and this would soon make our cousins a party in the quarrel.

Regarding the subject, therefore, in its worst light, viz., that the despotic powers might set aside the new principle of international law, and disclaim its provisoes with as little hesitation as they did lately their decisions respecting the Danubian principalities; yet, if they do, it must be done at the risk of war with the United States. Jonathan wont stand trifling with in this matter. The government of Washington is as touchy as we are in all affairs of this sort, and the first American ship that is boarded by a French or a Russian, would

be followed by an instant demand for satisfaction. That this would be the case we have every reason to believe, from the numerous precedents of our own cruisers, particularly the affair of the Cuban slavers not long ago.

Perhaps we may say, therefore, that in future wars, the bearings of the case will be independent of the wishes of even the most powerful combination of despotic powers. It certainly will be so if the people of free America and England so will it. Whatever other articles may be contemplated in the secret treaty between France and her co-despot; and however much the Emperor Napoleon may wish to carry out the desires of his uncle, (the destruction of British commerce) his efforts will be unavailing, for the progress of civilization is too powerful to be resisted.

Some of our readers may consider that we have taken an extreme view of the case, and we admit we have done so purposely. Others may fancy we are premature in our remarks. But, we incline to a different opinion. Europe is fast getting into a fighting attitude, and in the dance of death, which we believe will speedily be universal, no man can predict for a certainty who will be partners. There will be plenty of coquetting before the ball is over. In the meantime we must be prepared. The club of Cain is again blossoming with new fruit in the shape of Armstrong's gun and Napoleon's rifled cannon. Steady going Germany is lashing itself up to the war point, and talks about marching to Paris. Russia is doing nobody knows what. The main fact is however, that Napoleon the Third has called for the grey coat, three-cornered hat, and boots of Napoleon the First, and has started on a campaign in Italy. He is gone too with the great warrior's camp equipage, including the very spoons, knife and fork—even his carriage is said to be exactly similar to the one we captured at Waterloo, and which we so kindly preserved, we believe, at Madame Tussaud's exhibition, as it seems, for his use.

We are not like the present ruler of France, firm believers in what is commonly called destiny, nor have we much faith in our "Star." Indeed we confess we do not know what the phrase means. However, we cannot but express our wonder that Napoleon the Third should carry his imitative art to the extent he does, particularly in attaching importance to the last-named vehicle, which must at least remind him of one of his uncle's unlucky days. We could afford to smile at all this theatrical thunder if it was not so disastrous to mankind. The misfortune is, that all this clap trap succeeds in France, and is ridiculously real and costly. The people there do not seem to know that the halo of glory now gathering round Napoleon's brow, is purchased at the expense of the conscript. The cheapness of man is every day's tragedy just now. Let us, therefore, hope, that we may escape with honor from this whirlpool of human folly and passion. But in saying this, we know we have our duties to perform. We must insist at all cost, for the sake of a humanizing principle, that the treaty of Paris be carried out in all its integrity, particularly with respect to these conditions, viz.—

That the neutral flag covers enemies' goods, with the exception of contraband of war, &c.

That neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemies' flag.

That blockades to be binding must be effective.

These regulations are at present binding on all the states engaged in war, and it is our interest as well as our duty to see that they are enforced.

Portsmouth.

CONTINUATION OF REMARKS ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

In the last number of this periodical, on the same subject as the one before us, viz., the reorganization of the Indian Army, we pointed out how useless had been the labours of the commission—how absurd its continuation, how imbecile the opinion eliminated, and how dangerous was further delay. We shewed how little resulted from the time and money spent, and likewise how the dread of responsibility made this commission shift every difficult question from England to India for solution. We will now, after first giving an epitome of the evidence of some of the leading men examined by the commission, proceed to review the evidence collected in India, and we hope to prove that from the plan of inquiry adopted in that country, nothing satisfactory could have resulted, and that to delay further for the purpose of receiving Lord Canning's opinion, either on the improvement of the position of regimental officers, or to report upon "important points which, in the course of examination, have come under their notice," is unfair to the country at large. The scheme of inquiry, as adopted in India, was the conception of the Governor-General, and carried out contrary to the advice of his council and the orders of the home authorities. The result of such an ill-digested plan was to be expected, and the remarks on it by Major-General Outram, page 52 in the Appendix to the Blue Book, are fully verified.

To give an analysis of the evidence of each witness examined would occupy more space than can be afforded, and would prove tedious to our readers; but the remarks and ideas of such men as Sir George Pollock, Sir George Clerk, Sir Charles Trevelyan, General Ashburnham, General Franks, &c., &c., are worthy of more than passing notice; but we regret this is all we can give them. From the following hasty sketch our readers will be able to judge for themselves of the conflicting evidence before the commission, and the uselessness of waiting for any further report from them. Then let the Government act for themselves, adopting or modifying such individual plan as may appear best adapted to the requirements of Hindostan, and give orders accordingly.

Sir George Pollock is the first witness examined, and, after stating that he has been fifty-six years in the service, is subject to rather a sharp questioning. Years of absence from India have evidently impaired his memory, and probably the information gained by the commission was not excessive. General Pollock considers one European to four native soldiers as sufficient. 27,000 European soldiers being sufficient for the Bengal Presidency. Approves of native soldiers being on both regular and irregular system. Irregulars are easier fed, having no bazaars, but take care of themselves, and are entirely independent of the commissariat. Does not consider this system as leading to plunder. Irregulars feed like camp followers; in the bazaars, *i.e.*, purchase in regimental bazaars; however, remembers that camp followers and all his force drew rations from the commissariat, when beyond the Indus. Advocates the enlistment and mingling in native regiments of half-castes, Hottentots, Negroes, &c. The flank companies of native regiments to be European, and to have the same proportion of officers attached as in the other companies, viz.—three. The native companies to be armed with an inferior weapon. Considers that he would be justified in expecting men so armed to perform the same service as the European flank companies, better armed, and thinks European officers would lead them under such circumstances. Approves of the Brahmin, when enlisted, being treated as a Brahmin, and would not ask him to do anything that might be objectionable to his caste. Approves also of seniority being applied for promotion in the native commissioned and non-commissioned grades. In fact, "seniority to be the rule, selection the exception."

Major-General Low considers promotion should go by merit and fitness. Would not on any account cut up Europeans into small companies; but would rather attach a couple of native companies to an European regiment to do the work which destroys Europeans in the hot weather. Would arm the native soldier well; observing that good service cannot be got out of a man not well armed.

Colonel Beecher, Quarter-Master-General of the Bengal Army, is examined. Considers the proportion of European to native force should be as one to three; that much of the duty now done by the regular army could be better performed by properly organized police; the employment of which would reduce the necessity for a large native army. Prefers irregular cavalry to regulars, though both draw upon the commissariat for food. Does not entirely approve of promotion by selection, instead of seniority; but thinks it lucky for us we had the seniority system, as the native officers have not been able to do much as leaders. The present number of officers with regiments sufficient. If all attached to the regiment were to join, there would be more than enough. Officers are apt to neglect regimental duties and look forward to getting on the staff. A staff corps desirable. Would not recognize caste, but put a veto on the enlistment of Brahmins; beyond that exclude no caste. Would not trust Mussulman or Hindoo, but entertain both. Advocates the Commander-in-Chief not being tied to place, and recommends the enlistment of Hottentots, Kaffirs, and Negroes; but would not

under any circumstances consider the feelings and ideas of the native soldiery of India on the subject.

Sir George Clerk, resident twenty-seven years in India, was Governor of Bombay, advocates the proportion of one European to four native soldiers, exclusive of police. Would entertain native artillery, allowing the European portion to preponderate, as it could then at any time annihilate the native. Not having native artillery shows little confidence in ourselves; not has any danger hitherto resulted from employing native artillery, but which could have been prevented by ordinary precaution. When provocation is at an end there will be an end of the rebellion. The religious fanaticism has arisen from our interference with their religion. Would arm the native troops with Enfield rifles. Natives are indifferent marksmen, and the European will always be superior to him. 50,000 Europeans to 200,000 native soldiers, exclusive of police, would be the proportion suited to Bengal. Would entertain all castes. Brahmins are good soldiers. Would recognize caste, but would not allow it to be pleaded in obvious matters of duty. Would not depend on Goorkhas or Seikhs. Goorkhas cannot be obtained. The 66th Native Infantry—a Goorkha regiment—has not a Goorkha in it. Eight or nine officers are sufficient to be present with a regular native regiment. There should be some means of getting rid of an incompetent commanding officer. Would do away with extra batta, only allowing extra pay to regiments moving beyond sea. In promotion, seniority should be the rule; selection the exception. Does not advocate the introduction of Kaffirs, Negroes, Hottentots, &c.

Lieutenant-Colonel Harington, 5th Bengal Cavalry, thirty-one years' service, advocates the proportion of one European to three native soldiers. No native artillery; regular regiments superior. Regular cavalry ride and manage their horses better than irregular; irregular cavalry spoiled by aping dragoons. Would not reduce the number of European officers in a native regiment. Staff system bad. Officers are selected—interest the rule—merit the exception. Does not object to enlisting Brahmins, their misconduct is not always reported by those over them. A native officer is afraid to report a Brahmin; duty is, and has been, carried on thus. Does not recommend selection for promotion.

Major Merewether, Scindh Horse, advocates 32,000 European troops for Bengal Presidency, *i. e.* Bengal, Scindh, and Punjaub, with same proportion of natives as before the outbreak. Would divide Bengal into two presidencies. Irregular system to be adopted in all native regiments. Promotion by selection, and sufficient native artillery kept up to save the Europeans in unhealthy places. Five European officers quite sufficient to be present with a regular native regiment.

Sir Scudamore Steel, Major-General Madras Infantry, seen and served with Bengal armies, fifty years' uninterrupted service in India. Proportion should be one European to three native soldiers. No native to have Enfield rifles, or improved fire arms, and no native artillery. Caste objectionable; has known it in Madras greatly to interfere with duty. Constantly high caste men refuse to go on

ship-board. It is optional for them to go. Excepting on board ship Madras Sepoys are forced to go wherever ordered. There should at least be one European officer to a company, exclusive of the staff.

Major-General Alexander, Adjutant-General Madras army.—European troops as one to three. Artillery in the same proportion. The regular army to be as it always has been, both cavalry and infantry, giving them the best arms that can be procured. Madras regiments, when ordered on foreign service, are told that any who choose to remain may do so if they please. Government does not pay sufficient attention to the natives. Officers have lost sight of conciliating the native opinions. Would not divide the Bengal army. Promotion to be by selection. The discipline of the Bengal army very bad, but the officers evidently were attached to their men, making themselves acquainted thoroughly with the native languages. Has had no particular opportunities of forming an opinion upon the Bengal army, and has never served with them.

Colonel Willoughby, Bombay Artillery, thirty-seven years in the service. Advocates the proportion of European to native troops as one to three. Would do away with native regular cavalry. Would have a small portion of native artillery, and arm all the native troops in the same way as Europeans. Promotion to be by selection. There is already quite a sufficiency of European officers for native regiments. Would divide the Bengal presidency.

Sir Charles E. Trevelyan.—Was twelve years in India, chiefly Bengal, but has travelled in and studied the other presidencies. Advocates an European reserve of 40,000 men, with twice that number of native auxiliaries, as sufficient for Bengal proper, north-west provinces and Punjaub, railroads being made and the population disarmed. Police corps to have a quasi-military formation. The pedantry of European discipline to be avoided; the army to be modelled more upon what is called the irregular than regular system. To dress native fashion. Arms and equipments to be of the best. Officers (European) to be few in number, and promotion from the ranks to be by merit. A staff corps advantageous, and officers for the Indian army to be selected with great care. Promotion among European officers must mainly depend upon seniority. Cases of admitted deficiency to be passed over. In every case of superior good service an officer to be promoted out of his turn. Such a system would not lead to partiality, favour and affection. Exchange into the Royal Army not desirable, as the successful management of the natives of India, whether in a civil or military capacity, is the business of a life, and requires an early and entire appropriation to the duty. Would have no native artillery. The army to be composed of every caste, and caste not to be considered as an excuse for the non-performance of duty. Does not advocate the division of the Bengal army. The Commander-in-Chief to reside at Agra, or some central station. His duties as member of council yielding to those of commanding the army. Would keep the European and native army separate. It is undesirable that natives should be dressed like Europeans.

Major-General Ashburnham, Her Majesty's service.—Was about twelve years in India. If Seikhs are employed, the proportion should

be one European to two native soldiers. Would not arm the native with the best weapons. Troops to be regular and irregular—that is, 80,000 regular native infantry, but cavalry irregular. No native artillery. The dress of the regular native infantry to be similar to the European. Would enlist all castes, and it is not necessary to have difficulties about caste. Would not divide the Bengal army. Would do away with native officers, their places to be supplied by two European sergeants to each company. Does not think those native regiments best having present the larger number of officers. Quality not quantity the chief requisite. Would attach a battalion of natives to an European battalion. Would not go into action with the wings of his European battalion dotted like a chess-board, but make the best arrangements according to circumstances. Does not think it would make any difference, the European soldier having a Minié rifle carrying eight hundred yards, and the Sepoy with a weapon effective only at one hundred and fifty yards. "He would fire away in the same way." The old musket is good enough for them. Native troops, when armed with a weapon effective at 1,400 yards, are likely to keep 1,400 yards away.

Major-General Vivian, Madras establishment, thirty years in India. Five years Adjutant-General of the Army. Considers that a large portion of the European force should be local. The present local force is not in any way inferior to troops of the line. Would introduce half-castes into local European regiments. Good feeding and proper care would tend to raise them. Eventually they must increase, and as pensioners in India would be a beneficial element. Their interests are ours. Exchange from local to line not desirable. It would be ruin to the funds and of no benefit to the public. Does not advocate officers being in the first instance attached to European battalions. They are from that early teaching apt to look down upon natives.

Sir Edward Lugard, Major-General in Her Majesty's service, twenty-six years in India. Advocates the whole of the European force belonging to the line. Would not increase the local European force. They do not mix more with the natives than non-locals. Officers of Her Majesty's service learn the native languages when they see advantage to be gained. Latterly many soldiers of the Queen's regiments speak the language as well as the natives. Officers for the native army to do duty first with the European. It would not make them look down upon the natives.

Major-General Franks, fifteen years in India. Would have all the European portion of the army of the line. Local forces as far as fighting goes nothing inferior, but are not equal in discipline. Officers on the staff from local corps nothing inferior, from receiving encouragement to qualify themselves, they may be superior. Exchange between the services no doubt advantageous. Under the present system the army never can be efficient. It would be well if exchanges could be effected, but to interfere with present arrangements would be considered an injustice, though the interests of the state should be always considered paramount to the interests of any body of individuals.

Sir Willoughby Cotton, sixteen years in India. Would have no local army, though the Company's artillery and infantry were no way inferior to the Royal. Never saw better staff officers than the Indian army possessed. Exchange between officers desirable, if certain obstacles could be overcome.

Brevet-Major Ramsay, served a good deal on the staff in India. Recommends the European army being entirely line. The officers of the two services do not get on. Exchange advisable. Native army to be armed as well as European. Appointments of all sorts being thrown open to the Queen's service have acted as a bond of union between the two services. Discipline of local European regiments far inferior. Native artillery not advisable. Native troops to be armed as well as European. Seikhs and Punjaub levies to be depended upon when kept away from local influences. There is a change in the bearing of natives, more especially in servants, and demeanour of Sepoys. In the Madras European regiments there was the usual amount of drunkenness, but the staff of Calcutta, the sole officer of Her Majesty's service, was not well supported.

Colonel Durand, Bengal Engineers, twenty-eight years in India, deputed from India by the Governor-General, to give his lordship's general views on the question before the commission. His own opinions are the same as those of the Governor-General. Would leave forty-five battalions for Bengal, and twenty-four for Madras and Bombay—two-thirds to be local, and one line. Local forces not inferior to the line. The discipline of the local European regiments was much the same in all three presidencies. Exchange advisable, and its arrangement a mere personal matter. Local officers have shewn a disposition to defend their own interests. There would be no danger if all—both line and local—were treated alike. The preponderance of the Punjaub element in the native army a great source of danger. Would retain the native commissioned grades. Promotion to be a combination of merit and seniority. Would divide the Bengal army. Would not train police as highly as regular or irregular infantry. The native troops to have the same training as European, but not equally well armed. Their weapon should be good, but inferior to those in the hands of the European. Would do away with native courts-martial.

The Earl of Ellenborough, G.C.B., considers it also absolutely necessary that there should be two armies in India, having, to a certain degree, distinct and separate interests. Royal as also local artillery. No advantages to be gained by dividing the Bengal army. Considers the army the best school for the civil service. The Queen's service, as regards pensions to the soldiers, is the best. Would alter arrangements as little as possible in Madras and Bombay, but would have an entirely new system in Bengal—the old one having gone. With the large European force now necessary for India, two native regiments to one European are sufficient. Police to be armed with old flint muskets. Formerly they were as numerous as the military, utterly useless, plundered the people, and did no good. Staff officers and Company's officers not inferior. They have had advantages in acquiring knowledge which have enlarged their minds.

Thinks that other armies have equalled and come near the Peninsular army. The armies in India certainly not inferior to it.

We imagine the synopsis of the evidence of these eighteen leading witnesses will be sufficient for our readers. "*Ex uno disce omnes.*" The analysis proves how impossible it would be for any commission, however constituted, to come to any definite conclusion as to the most effective way to reorganize the Indian Army. Further inquiry can only further complicate matters, and further delay will not, most certainly, lead to the difficult problem being solved.

The commission have examined some of the best men the country could produce, and have had the benefit of perusing the opinions of others equally well qualified, resident in India, and yet nothing more decided have they determined upon, than the nine recommendations referred to by us last month. Conflicting as the evidence was, still something more might have been gleaned from it than there has been. It certainly does appear strange how little capable of assisting the commission many of the witnesses are. One officer, after fifty odd years' service, is apparently ignorant of the constitution of the army to which he has so long been attached. Would mingle European and native soldiers in one regiment; giving the native an inferior weapon, and expect these, as also the officers attached, to do the same duty as their better armed brethren. Then, notwithstanding the awful mutiny and want of discipline, would proceed to reorganize a native army on exactly the same principles as formerly. Another officer of less service, but more experience, would do nothing of the sort, and not consider the feelings of the natives in any way. The regular native cavalry officer thinks that branch of the service useful and superior to the irregular; making severe remarks upon the latter's imitation of dragoons; whilst the irregular cavalry officer thinks "there is nothing like leather," and recommends the irregular system being adopted. Caste, we are told by one officer, never interferes with duty in Madras or Bombay; whilst another affirms that it does so constantly, and that a certain amount of option is given to these armies regarding the performance of disagreeable duties. Officers of Her Majesty's service do not spare the unfortunate Bengal army for its want of discipline, but generally speaking, have a good word to say for the officers of which it is composed. This is more than their brother officers in the other presidencies afford—presidential jealousy blinds the judgment. It would, perhaps, have been better had some of the officers of Her Majesty's service avoided giving cause to heartburnings, and withheld opinions which they could not support from knowledge gained either by themselves or others. To tell the public of England that the native soldier with any weapon would only "fire away," and "when armed with a weapon effective at 1,400 yards are likely to keep 1,400 yards away," is contrary not only to reason, but fact. Wanting in discipline as the old Bengal army was, cowardice was not its fault; and though nothing to approach in pluck the European, still for Asiatics, when well led, they fought by no means badly. Seikhs and Goorkhas can fight, and have not in the late battles kept out of danger. An army of mixed races

would with a weapon effective at 1,400 yards not keep that distance away. The Seikhs in that army would at any rate fight; they are not of a fearful nature, as the witness must know, with *his experience* of their prowess at the battles of Ferozeshah and Sobraon.

With the further examination of Colonel Durand the evidence before the Commissioners is concluded, and in the Appendix are shown the various papers placed before the Commission. The information contained in these is most valuable, and includes answers to questions submitted by the Commission to Lord Ellenborough, Major-General Tucker, Colonel Baker, Mr. Elliot, &c., &c. The thorough knowledge of India and its requisites, shown by the Earl of Ellenborough and Colonel Tucker, is evident, and it would be well for that country were the opinions given here more attended to. The remark made by the late Adjutant-General should be borne in mind by all having authority. In commenting on the present system of raising a civil army without proper rules or discipline to guide it, he sees a source of future danger. His description of this civil army runs thus: "any man that can collect 100 sweepers together, put them into a coloured tunic and a 'fancy puggree' is called a 'commandant,' and entrusted with their charge."

We must now leave the Commissioners in England, and refer, as briefly as possible, to proceedings in India, the report of which is included in the Appendix under the heading of "Papers received from India."

The first thing we come to is a letter dated 25th November, 1857, from the Court of Directors to their Governor-General, directing that officer to appoint a Commission "composed of military officers of the armies of the three Presidencies, (with whom should be associated officers of the Queen's army who have had experience of Indian service,) on whose knowledge, experience, and judgment you can rely: together with one or more civil servants, &c., &c." This Commission, the letter goes on to say, are to aid the Government in reorganizing the Indian army—referring the views of the Commission for the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief.

How far the orders were carried out, and what the results have been through their disobedience, a few more pages will show.

Letter No. 369, dated Allahabad, 22nd May, 1858, written by Colonel Birch, Secretary, for the information of the Honourable the President in Council, says, it is impracticable to constitute a Commission, and so the Governor-General will take into his own hands the direction of the inquiries necessary to be made. The President of the Council is then informed that Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Durand, of the Bengal Engineers, an officer of great ability and experience, has been selected to communicate, under his Lordship's immediate instructions, with the several personages and officers whom it will be necessary to consult in furtherance of the great object in view. The twelve heads of inquiry which the Court required are then given over to Colonel Durand, with an intimation that it will be his duty to frame certain questions thereon, and a copy of the letter from the Secretary to Colonel Durand forwarded

for the information of the Council. They being told that it is the Governor-General's intention to solicit their assistance in ultimately determining on the report to be made, and the measure to be proposed for the consideration of the home authorities. Meanwhile, the questions which are to be submitted to the various witnesses whose evidence will be called for, is promised to be sent to each member of council for such replies as each may desire to give.

The first to object to these proceedings is Major-General Sir James Outram, who, after referring to the date of the Court's despatch, 25th of November, 1857, and no action up to the 23rd of April, 1858, having taken place in the matter, goes on to say, that the council were anxious to know whether the Governor-General is desirous himself to dispose of the question, and wrote accordingly; receiving at the end of a month a printed circular, giving cover to a series of queries. By this circular the council learnt "that the Governor-General had seen fit to entrust to a single officer those momentous duties which the Honorable Court wished to have confided to a board of 'select officers of experience.'"

General Outram wishes not to disparage the merits of the very able officer on whom the Governor-General's choice has fallen, but cannot recognise any single individual as competent to discharge the onerous and important duties of inquiry. The gallant officer can see no insuperable difficulty in the adoption of the Court's recommendation, and considers its non-adoption as greatly to be regretted.

The sample of questions sent are freely commented upon in this minute, and the Governor-General is told that from the way the inquiry is likely to be conducted, the writer has serious apprehensions for the results. As a sample of the unreasonable style of interrogatories issued to each of the scores of public, civil and military, he mentions ten, which we condense: "Information regarding the number and distribution of European troops of each arm now serving in the Bengal presidency. Distribution of native troops of each arm serving within the same area. Proportion which the regular, irregular, and police divisions of the native Bengal army bear to each other, or their ethnological affinities, or the adequacy of the existing barrack accommodation for the European troops now serving in the Bengal presidency, or whether an alteration in the number of troops would require an augmentation of barrack accommodation."

As the Major-General truly observes, a commission would have at once ascertained these and many other *matters of fact* from the Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, and that no commission would have issued some of the questions. Nor does he think that any officer whose opinion is worth having would answer some of them, except in a very round-about manner. The circular letter which gives transmission to the queries, states that there is "no necessity for touching on the many important particulars to which the letter of the Honorable Court adverts."

Another member of council, the Honorable J. P. Grant, is milder in his objection at being thrown overboard; not being in possession of information which will enable him to form a judgment worthy

of his own or any other person's attention on the question of present practicability. He considers the matter as settled, and is unwilling to discuss the point. The questions are then answered after a short preface, in which it is said that there has been as much delay as prudent in regard to the whole of the subject.

The honorable councillor thinks pounds, shillings, and pence must rule the entire subject, whatever system of organization is adopted. Would therefore at once raise European regiments, and officer them with the officers of the late native infantry regimetns of Regular native cavalry abolished; European dragoons taking their places. Native army to be irregular, and enlisted from untainted tribes.

The Honorable H. Ricketts agrees with both Mr. Grant and Sir James Outram; but does not approve of the plan proposed for gaining information, as each person consulted will send a plan of his own, and it must lead to great delay. Does not see any advantage from the members of council now recording opinions; but agrees with the President, Mr. J. P. Grant, that practically, the inquiry must be limited to a very narrow range.

The Honorable B. Peacock would prefer a commission, such as suggested by the Court, and recommends energetic measures being adopted for providing an increase to the European troops.

Sir James Outram adds a second minute, dated 12th June, 1858, reiterating his former opinion regarding the necessity of a commission, and acquiesces in the opinion of the President, "that measures of the most energetic nature be immediately instituted in respect of additional European troops."

Whatever effect the remarks of Sir James Outram and the Council generally, may have had on the judgment of the Governor-General, does not appear. There was, however, no commission appointed, and in a memorandum by Viscount Canning, placed in the hands of Colonel Durand, dated 9th August, 1858, we learn, that his lordship is induced to send this officer immediately to England, so that he may lay before Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, not only the opinions which have been given in India in answer to questions circulated by the Governor-General, but also show that officer's own views on some of the principal heads of inquiry. The memorandum states, that for the present the writer must abstain from entering into details, as time will not admit of it; moreover, that he is not yet in possession of the opinions of some of those to whom the questions were referred. Views, and suggestions of others of high authority have been received too recently to allow of the consideration which they deserve being given, and that it has not yet been possible to submit the papers to the consideration of the Council.

His lordship is of opinion, that for Bengal, at least forty-five European regiments would be necessary; thirty to be local. Fifty native infantry regiments; twenty of these to be regular. No regular native cavalry. Native artillery in a very small proportion. Exchange between the local and the line forces apparently impossible; but some arrangement should be made, by which the local army

should be made to feel that it is composed of the same stuff, and is in all respects in an equally honorable position with the line. The system of seconding to be adopted for staff or civil employ. Civil employ in no way impairs an officer for military service. Admixture of the native army with the European to be by brigade, not regimentally. It is no advantage to either party "that the European and the native soldier should be forced into habitual juxtaposition." Does not advocate the introduction of Malays, Africans, or foreign Asiatic troops. Cadets come out too young, and should in England first learn their duties. Hindostani troops must be raised, to provide a counterpoise to the present preponderance of the Punjaubee and Seikh soldier. Lord Clyde's replies to the queries follow, but they are without date; so whether they accompanied the minute of the Governor-General we are unable to discover. They (the questions) only extend over the first, second, third, and fourth series; from recruiting and composition of corps of native infantry to native cavalry, and yet there are upwards of three hundred. The brevity with which many of these are answered would be amusing, could the reader divest himself of the idea of their frivolity and the almost crime to occupy the Commander-in-Chief's valuable time at such a period with having to reply to such questions as these: "Has the Bengal Presidency any marine corps?" "Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bengal Presidency, of seafaring habits?" "Under what code are police corps?" "What portion of golundaz, drivers, and gun lascars can read?" "What is the charge upon the finances of the State, on account of military pensions to the irregular troops of the Bombay army?" and so on for several pages. The Commander-in-Chief advocates all castes being admitted. European troops kept separate from natives. The European arm to be superior to that given to native soldiers. No advantage gained by dressing the native like the European. Promotion of native soldiers to be generally by seniority. The grade of native officer must be continued. It would be inexpedient to substitute an European sergeant and corporal. If native regular infantry be maintained, then one officer per company, exclusive of staff, absolutely necessary. European officers to learn their duties with European regiments. No native artillery. Cavalry to be irregular, and the selection of officers to do duty should depend on a man being a good horseman, linguist, and showing a taste for the branch, adding, "Not one officer in ten is really suited for irregular cavalry."

Avoiding much minor matter, we come to a letter from Lieut.-Colonel Durand to the Governor-General, dated Allahabad, 4th September, 1858, in which he has the honour to submit a *précis* of the replies to the series of questions having reference to the reorganization of the native infantry of the Bengal army. The Governor-General's attention is at the same time called to the postcript appended to the replies of the Punjaub committee, Sir J. Lawrence, Brigadier-General Chamberlain, and Colonel Edwards, which runs thus:—"That unless the European soldier be placed on a footing more consonant with the advancing civilization of the English people, difficulty will be felt in maintaining a largely increased force of

British troops in India." Restrictions upon the number of married soldiers, as far as practicable, to be removed, changes with respect to spirits, rations, and an increase in the ecclesiastical establishment proportionate to the large number of troops.

The answers of the Punjaub committee are then given, and the independent opinions of other authorities consulted, grouped together, the officers' names given in the margin. The opinions as recorded we cannot refer to, although many a good name catches our eye. We must hasten to a conclusion, and cannot do so better than in epitomising the recommendations of the Punjaub committee. European troops necessary for Bengal, 54,000, including Pegu, Central India, and Punjaub. Native troops as five natives to two Europeans, that is, three Native infantry, two police, making a total for Bengal of 136,500. The proportion of three local to one of Her Majesty's regular troops. Thus, artillery:—Her Majesty's ¼ to local ¾, cavalry ½ to local ½, infantry ½ to local ½, sappers all local. The new local European army to be officered from the officers of the old Native army; but in justice to those officers whose regiments have not mutinied or murdered half their officers, as well as in justice to the officers of European regiments employed in suppressing the revolt, the committee recommend that the whole of the Bengal officers, cavalry and infantry, be thrown into two general lists for the two branches, and be placed according to seniority from their status on the 10th May, 1857; officers notorious for their inefficiency to be then struck out and pensioned; and the really efficient posted to the new army, according to seniority. All castes taken, but great care observed in employing them in the same regiment. Natives to be kept as much as possible in the districts from which they are enlisted. Foreign coloured races not to be admitted. Europeans to be kept in distinct and separate regiments. Native infantry to have inferior weapons, dress of native soldiers not be an imitation of the European, but with the dress of the latter there is great room for improvement in adapting it to a hot climate. Commanding officers' powers to be greatly increased. Native courts-martial do not work satisfactorily. Native officers to be continued on a better system. An European sergeant and corporal in their room not desirable. Promotion to be by merit. The discipline of the army bad, attributable to a sense of weakness. 800 privates the maximum for a native infantry corps. Cadets to thoroughly learn their duties in European regiments. Officers taken from their regiments for staff not the cause of ruin. The bad system, not paucity of officers, ruined regiments. Officers taken nothing superior to those left, they usually became so by more active employment. To cut off hopes of staff employ would be depressing and injurious, and would cut off the inducements for officers to study. The committee would apply the same principles to irregular cavalry as infantry. They would not attach a body of irregulars to each European corps of cavalry. It would revive in a new phase, the old system of regular native cavalry, so costly and useless.

With this statement we conclude our epitome of the opinions of

the Punjaub Committee. Mixed up with their replies to the various questions put by Lieut.-Col. Durand, are the opinions and answers of officers of more or less note, such as Major-Gen. Birch. Oudh Committee :—Sir Hope Grant, Sir J. Hearsay, Sir S. Cotton, Brig. Troup, Col. Burn, Brig. Coke, &c., &c., &c. Each and all of these differ on various points, and as we said at the commencement of this article, the remarks by Major-Gen. Outram on the ill-digested plan of interrogation are fully verified. On the subject before them, viz., The Reorganization of the Indian Army, the officers interrogated, are as much disagreed as are those examined by the commission in England, but there is this difference resulting from the systems adopted. The evidence by the Commisioners is capable of being understood and worked upon, whereas, that received from India is confused and unintelligible.

We hope our readers will see that no good can result from further delay, and that it were better for the Government to act independently, and not wait for the report upon "important points which, in the course of examination have come under their (the Commissioners') notice."

FROM CAMP TO QUARTERS.

OR, LIFE IN AN INDIAN CANTONMENT AFTER FIELD SERVICE.

PART III.

The daily news—Oppression defeats itself—Life in India—A Friendship—Church going — Government Religious "Neutrality" — An extract from a Newspaper—The present state of transition—Two sides of the question—The old and new "Schools"—An unrecognised civilizing influence—The Soldier in India as he is supposed to be, and as he is.

IT was the matutinal custom of the senior military residents of Dandgunge, to assemble for the mutual communication of the morning news at the principal places. One of these was the Brigade Office, for be it observed, the brigadier, albeit an excellent soldier and thorough man of the world, was no stuck-up red tapist, neither was he a man who considered it essential to the efficient performance of duty, that mystery and darkness should enshroud proceedings that under any circumstances would become possibly known within a very few hours.

The other was the Post-office, where military and non-military,—white, black, and half and half, usually formed one motley group around the native who at seven o'clock assorted the letters. When, early in 1857, the much discussed measure of a censorship on the English press in India was first established—when the state of public affairs was such as to make the boldest hearts quake, when each succeeding day brought accounts of horrors and atrocities, that for the time made all stand aghast, and when the first shock of bereavement of those whose relatives had fallen in the outbreak

of Sepoy fury was scarcely more painful and difficult to bear than the terrible uncertainty that hung over the fate of the many, regarding whom no tidings had as yet been received,—then was the time chosen by the supreme government to suppress the channel by which the public naturally looked to be informed, regarding the events that were at the time occurring.

In vain they now scanned the columns of the local papers for information, that to them was of such all absorbing interest. In only one or two exceptional cases could even the fact be gathered from them that rapine, murder and bloodshed were stalking rampart throughout thousands of square miles of territory—and even in these few exceptional cases, but for a brief period. A short paragraph told that the editor had received "a warning," and from thenceforward all was silence upon the only one topic that then engrossed, as it might indeed well do, the attention of every Englishman and every European in India.

But oppression and want of consideration to feelings and opinions invariably work their own defeat, whether as regards merely an individual, or when practised towards an entire community,—and this was fully exemplified in the present instance—subjects, that under other circumstances would have been only found in the public prints, were now freely descanted on in private correspondence. Each felt that for information regarding the terrible events of the period, he was dependent on his friends,—and each, uncertain as they were of the fate of the other, were anxious to make solicitous inquiries regarding it, and to offer their congratulations where property or life was saved.

In this way the amount of private correspondence among the English residents underwent a great increase, at least at stations, where, as at Dandgunge, they held their own. Morning after morning all whose avocations permitted, assembled at the post-office as just mentioned, and there, as letters from various parts of India were received, whatever news regarding the mutineers they contained was freely communicated from one to the other, so that virtually the residents were kept better informed of what was being effected both by the rebels and our own authorities, than they had been before the press was "gagged," while the amount of bitter feeling towards, and want of confidence in, these authorities created by the very arbitrary—and as was generally considered, impolitic measure for establishing a censorship, tended much to counteract the only valid reason that ever was attempted to be adduced in its favor, namely, that the plans of the leaders and the weakness of our resources were thus communicated to the rebels.

It was at this time a matter of almost daily occurrence to learn that robberies had been committed at different places on the mail. These occurrences became so much matters of every-day life, that they soon ceased to create surprise. Fortunately, however, the bags containing the home letters were only on one or two occasions destroyed, and while we continued with tolerable regularity to hear from those most dear to us whom we had left in happy England, we could bear with the greater patience the occasional disappoint-

ment of not receiving communications from our friends in India, who like ourselves lived from day to day, ready to act in any emergency that might arise.

It was when on one occasion a group such as I have described, stood assembled at this emporium of news, that what had been but a slight acquaintance, first received the impetus that speedily matured it into a friendship. Similar occurrences happen every day in India, where perhaps more than anywhere else, one wide spread brotherhood runs more or less through the mass of English residents—discovering to each other where least expected, persons who, if not actually linked to each other by blood-relationship, are so by the still more binding one of mutual obligations for favors, it may be, conferred upon mutual friends or connexions.

This happens in consequence of the peculiar circumstances of our life in this country, which, for the sake of the uninitiated I may briefly describe.

The entire British population here is more or less migratory, only a very small portion are at all stationary, to wit, the merchants, tradespeople, and those engaged in the cultivation of indigo,—and even they are only in a certain degree so. The means of inland conveyance, although now much improved from what they were some years ago, are still very imperfect in arrangement and inconvenient in construction. Hotels are still next to unknown,—the houses of temporary accommodation, called *Dâk* bungalows, only exist, or rather did exist along the principal lines of road, so that travellers had often to solicit the hospitality of whatever Englishman he first met,—nor was this hospitality ever refused. No one knew when he, or it might be, his own wife and children should in like manner stand in need of similar hospitality. Thus it was that some years ago almost every house was open, and often did it happen that people thus accidentally thrown together found friendships that lasted through life. It must also be observed that establishments in India are always upon such a scale as to place it in the power of any person holding the position of a gentleman to entertain a moderate number of guests without the slightest inconvenience to himself, being in this respect very different from what happens in England, where few families indeed, be their means what it may, can afford to entertain promiscuously in a similar manner.

It was some such piece of hospitality as this that remotely led to the circumstances about to be related.

I have already said we used to congregate at the post office. On the present occasion, standing close to me was Captain Spence, the husband of the lady whom I have in a previous chapter had occasion to mention as singularly deficient in mind and manners from the vulgar herd at Dandgunge. The English letters had just been distributed, and all who were fortunate enough to receive any were absorbed in their silent perusal.

My glance was suddenly arrested by the mention of the very gentleman who stood beside me as being a most intimate friend of a near connexion of mine. "Look here, Spence," I said, as I showed him the paragraph. Full of generous impulse as he was, his face bright-

ened up, his eye dilated and beamed again with pleasure. "You don't mean to say that's Ashton, do you?" was his first exclamation. "Yes, I do," was the simple response.

"Ashton, of Calcutta?"

"The same."

"The Broker of Hastings-street?"

"Precisely."

"Then I can only say a more honest fellow does not exist, nor have I a greater friend on earth."

"Thank you, very much indeed," was my natural reply. "That same Ashton is my brother-in-law."

"My good fellow," continued he, "I wish I had known this before. But come, never mind, we shall make up for it."

And make up for it he did. This short colloquy, originating as it did in an accidental circumstance, laid the foundation of one of the most agreeable friendships I have formed, and I hope I may be pardoned for thus directly alluding to it. It is one of many no doubt unexpectedly formed by other people similarly situated as myself.

I will now proceed to detail some matters of quite a different nature.

As a general rule, nowhere, at home or abroad, so far as my experience goes, is Divine service more punctually and generally attended than it is in India. This is certainly as it should be, for in no part of Her Majesty's dominions is human life more uncertain than here. But, I regret to say, there are some exceptions to this rule, and amongst these exceptions not the least notable is Dandgunge, where it was no uncommon sight during afternoon service to see numbers of seats, belonging to the residents, vacant, and their proper occupants either driving in the mall or walking on the public promenades on the river bank.

But although, as a general rule, the English residents in India are most regular church goers, there is, alas! nothing whatever in the appearance of a military station there on a Sunday at all calculated to remind one of the same sacred day at home, or to recal early associations, consecrated now as they are or ought to be to us—of early days spent under the gentle influence of a mother, ere yet we had learnt to battle against life's trials and temptations. No, i India our service would seem to be performed by stealth; the ordinary avocations of native every-day life proceed as usual, and the notes of praise and thanksgiving within the sacred edifice are often, very often, drowned amidst the din of altercation and loathsome abuse, that are passing between the lowest of a low and degraded race, as they pass by the doors in filthy crowds.

We had indeed daily and weekly evidence of what is called the "neutrality" of government officials, in all that concerns the so-named "religious feelings" of the people. Here, before our very eyes, were the natives not only permitted to prosecute their own avocations, even within the barrack square upon Sundays, but they were by "authority" employed on the government works, at the time in progress of being built. Native processions, even of a religious nature, were permitted to traverse the station, with their

symbolical flags, images and devices displayed, and their music playing, without the slightest prohibition, whether the occasion was on a week day or on a Sunday. Nor were the hours of Divine service safe from the desecration. But while these things were permitted towards the natives, did we in like manner exhibit "neutrality" as regarded their rights? Far from it. Scarcely a week passed that the station order-book did not contain such a paragraph as the following:—

"The Commissariat office," or "the Collectorate will be closed to-morrow, on account of a native holiday."

Nor did it matter whether these holidays were in celebration of Hindoo or Mussulman festivals, they were alike kept sacred by the representatives of an English and a Christian government, even although their avowed purpose was, in some instances at least, to indulge in rites and debauchery, so abominable that their very mention is better avoided.

The local authorities at Dandgunge did not personally countenance these processions, holidays, and celebrations of unclean rites! That is, they did not take part in them themselves. In this respect, therefore, they contrasted favourably with some representatives of government elsewhere. For instance, let me commend to the reader's notice, a communication from Broach, dated 28th of September, 1858, that appeared in the "Bombay Times" of the 4th of the following month.

The writer of that communication says, "I have learnt from Baroda, that the Guicowar got up a splendid procession on the Gunputtee day. The resident, with the European officers and a body of soldiers, paid a visit to his highness, and the god was drowned in one of the tanks with a salute from the British artillery." Well, indeed, may the writer of that communication add as he does, "Under the royal government idolatry is fostered, nay, honored by Europeans in power."

The consideration is, indeed, a most melancholy one, and yet it needs but short experience in India to convince any person, however ill-prepared he may be to accept such a picture, as representing the actual condition of things, that the countenance and the support given by government to idolatry, other native rites and prejudices, are more direct and material than what I have now found it convenient to mention.

While upon this subject, I may probably be expected by whoever does me the honour to peruse this paper, to say a few words more upon a matter at all times interesting, but especially so now at this present time, when a state of transition has but just been inaugurated in India, that must inevitably before long produce one of two definite results. Either unquestionable good to the temporal and spiritual condition of the natives, or as unquestionably evil. There can be no middle state of matters, no remaining in the condition in which our government has for a hundred years permitted and countenanced their remaining, if, indeed, it did not actively encourage them in their downward progress in debasement.

The possibility and feasibility of now breaking through the pecu-

liar institution of caste, of introducing among the people of India European habits, religion, arts, sciences, and literature, in a word, of forcing them into civilization on subjects of very great interest, but presenting phases that admit of two very opposite lines of argument.

The old residents, half natives as they themselves are, from long association with natives, are loud in condemnation of any attempt being made to destroy the prejudices of class and "religion," which they have come to rather admire and respect than otherwise. They moreover argue with much plausibility that all history proves the fact that religious intolerance or oppression upon one side, invariably produces fanaticism on the other, and that any attempt to put down by force the peculiar ceremonies of the people of India would inevitably raise the population en masse against us, and that through sheer force of numbers we should inevitably be destroyed or expelled the country.

But another class of Englishmen think very differently from this, and among them Colonel Edwardes, of Mooltan notoriety. They can see no such impossibility! They would in the first place, render the teaching of the Holy Scriptures compulsory to the native children who chose to attend Government schools; they would establish foundling hospitals for the hundreds and thousands of outcast and deserted children who are to be found among the villages and cities of this vast continent, educating them in our own faith and thus gradually forming a class whose interests and feelings would be at complete variance with those of their countrymen. They would moreover prohibit, at least within cantonment limits, the processions and other public demonstrations of these idolaters and unbelievers; would strike boldly at some of their social customs that in themselves are so debasing as to completely enslave their subjects, as for instance, polygamy and prostitution; would openly encourage and countenance converted natives, as Sir John Lawrence has lately done, by admitting them on equal terms with their still pagan brethren to Government employ, and utterly and completely discountenance in all public offices the recognition of all other stated holidays than those observed in England.

Both these "schools" have many powerful disciples. It would seem, however, that from the mere nature of things the former must gradually but inevitably give way, while the latter will as certainly increase in numbers and influence, and for these reasons:—

The blind confidence in and admiration of the natives entertained by old officers, received so terrible a shock, and was so unequivocally shown by late events to have been powerless and undeserved, that now the impressions of the best part of many an Englishman's life have been scattered to the winds by the terrible transactions of one short year. Some, it must be confessed, and their numbers not by any means so insignificant as might be supposed, still cling with marvellous tenacity to the dreams of the past, even yet admire the bygone state of affairs, and grieve at its sepulture.

It must be difficult indeed, if not altogether hopeless, to remove from their eyes the film that thus obscures their moral vision after

the ordeal of death and desolation through which they have passed; but in progress of time, even should this not happen, their relative influence must become swamped in the flood of English ideas and feelings that the continued influx of British troops will convey. Many already feel that tenets of belief, or if you will "religions" that could not only tolerate but dictate the fearful atrocities that were enacted in '57, must not only be false in themselves, but in their nature fitted only for demons, and not a few are already prepared to admit that the sooner such horrible creeds are rooted out the better it must be for those who are thus made to renounce their present superstitions; many more, whose opinions are not so decided as these, must, under the present state of affairs, soon vacate their appointments either by death or retirement, to be succeeded by men whose early associations are entirely English and Christian, and who consequently entertain no sympathy with either the obscene rites of Hindooism or the cruel and bloody creed of Mahomedanism.

If, therefore, the authorities who must ere long obtain possession of the reins of government in this country, be permitted to act upon their own judgment formed upon the spot, it is clear that the public acknowledgment of both Hindooism and Mahomedanism will speedily be doomed, whereas on the other hand, and God forbid it should be so, if the same description of orders continues under the new order of things to be transmitted to this country, that were in the days of the bygone company of merchants; if the representatives of power in India are to continue by order to pander to the vices, prejudices, and rites of the natives, then indeed may we anticipate a condition of things that must end in what would in that case be a righteous judgment—our final expulsion fromIndia.

But there is even now at work a civilizing influence among a large class of natives, the very existence of which is not suspected by many, and whose effects on it must be confessed at present not much to be admired or applauded, although from every indication we have reason to anticipate that before long there will arise from this source a stream which, increasing in size and purifying itself as it rolls along, will ultimately penetrate and carry civilisation and religion into the most hidden and and remote parts of this immense continent.

It is impossible that the numerous native followers and hangers on of one description or another about British regiments can avoid learning the habits and manners of those among whom they mix. Hitherto the numbers of these followers have been comparatively small because the number of regiments in India was so. On returning to their homes, therefore, they speedily reverted back to their original habits; their individuality, as it were, was but in the mass, and they even tried as much as possible to throw off any trace that might still cling to them of association with the Feringhee.

Now, however, matters are rapidly becoming very different. These followers form of themselves no inconsiderable portion of the population, and when in course of time they become superannuated through age and infirmity, and return to their native villages, the

impressions and manners they carry with them, not being as they are mere solitary items in an adverse community, will be entertained by several persons in each society; they will thus take a recognised position, and their habits be inevitably, although slowly, adopted by others, if for no other reason than as conducing to their personal convenience or comfort.

A readiness to receive civilization, arts, and religion being thus established among the different races of India, the reign of their present superstitions, caste, and other domestic and social institutions of a baneful nature is at once doomed. Years will assuredly be required to effect so great a change, but yet it must sooner or later take place, unless the further conduct of government towards the natives be a continuation of what the "Calcutta Review" may well call the factory feeling, in which case—and may Heaven protect our countrymen in India—the experience gained by the natives in 1857 will most assuredly be ere long turned to terrible account.

But, it may be thought I have dwelt too long upon this subject, interesting and important although it be. Let us therefore away from it, and as in the previous pages I have endeavoured to convey to the reader a few impressions of our return to the society of Dandgunge, I may now be permitted to say a few words on the barrack life of a soldier, not only at this station, but at every station in India, for the routine is alike in all.

I would premise however, that certain popular impressions are entertained to the effect that the life of a soldier in India is one of unalloyed luxury and ease, that he there leads more than the life of a gentleman, because he has not the cares and anxieties of one, and that in fact his lot in life is rather to be envied than otherwise; I will then, if you please, dear reader, first present to you the British soldier in India as he is often said to be, and by very many persons at home and abroad, believed to be.

From the moment he lands in India he ceases to be the drudge he unquestionably is in England. Thenceforward his knapsack need never be worn unless he should be ordered to carry it for a short time as a punishment. Servants are in attendance to clean up his barrack room. Cooks prepare his victuals according to his own particular tastes and fancies, placing before each such savoury viands as they may themselves order. Other servants there are, whose only business is to carry water for them to use, while in barracks, or to quench their thirst upon the line of march. Instead of being only in bed every second night, or at most two in every three as at home, the soldier may now enjoy uninterrupted sleep for seven and eight consecutively. His parades are few, occurring only for half an hour morning and evening, and in the interim he may, if he is lazy, sleep; if studious, read some of the many excellent works provided for him by an ever solicitous government, or he may, if he choose, betake himself to school, where a well selected and able teacher chosen for his especial fitness for the particular duty, is ever ready to impart to him instruction.

Should he be a married man, his wife obtains a liberal pecuniary

allowance from the state, and in the event of his having a family an additional grant is given for each child. If sick he finds accommodation in a spacious hospital, where he is provided with every comfort in the shape of food, wines, and bedding that his necessities may demand; when convalescence happily sets in, he is taken out morning and evening in a dhooly carried on the shoulders of four men, or on an elephant, so that he may inhale the fresh breeze, and should his state require change of climate, he is sent away either to one of the local sanitaria in the hills, or to his own native English air, being in the latter case provided with a passage on board the finest ship that can be obtained for the purpose.

But even in the few instances where he succumbs to a fatal illness, or dies the death of a soldier in the field, his last moments are soothed by the knowledge that should he be leaving a widow, he does not leave her destitute! No! The same paternal government that supported her during his life, continues to maintain her after his death, until such time as she finds it convenient to obtain for herself another protector, and even then, does the same annuity regularly come in, to add additional comfort to her already comfortable home, and to provide those little luxuries that enhance the enjoyment of wedded life even in the gorgeous east.

Such is a picture of Eden as it is said to be. Proceed we now to present a comparison picture. Eden as it really is in an Indian Barrack; selecting Dandgunge merely because the thread of the present narrative twines round that station.

The newly-arrived soldier, or recruit, in nine cases out of ten marches from the point of disembarkation on the Bengal side of India to his first barracks, whether they be at Fort William, Dum Dum, or Chinsurah, buttoned to the throat in a dress oppressive even in England at all seasons except winter. He is in addition strapped by belts and borne down by his knapsack, so that in all likelihood he falls down in a state of half suffocation, or complete apoplexy before he has completed half his necessary distance; the stifling atmosphere of the shore being to him utterly exhausting and oppressive.

Once in barracks, it is true that he finds hosts of natives around him, but their ways, manners, language and appearance all strange to him. He finds himself in a spacious, but a dreary-looking building, utterly separated as he for the time believes from all the world beside. His own allotted space is that which his sleeping cot covers. A large box stands at the foot into which he is required to place his kit for safety as well as order, and at the head are two or three pegs upon which to suspend his accoutrements. Here he has to remain until his services are required elsewhere, and until then, let us see how he is to occupy his time.

An utter want of useful employment must be the first feeling that comes over him. To arrange and re-arrange his belts and accoutrements according to the fancies and freaks of a capricious sergeant, is his only employment during the day. If he become, as he is tolerably certain to do, tired and exhausted during the long hot and monotonous day, and wishes to take an hour's rest, he is liable to be "reported" and taken to the orderly room for having his cot

irregular—if he wish to visit the reading room he must do so in full uniform, and in the days I now speak of, half choked by stiff leather stock.

It is true that if he happen to be a married man his wife obtains a pecuniary allowance, but let us examine a little into its nature and the conditions attached to it.

The nature of the climate totally unfits her for earning her own livelihood by manual labour as at home. The class of women from which soldiers' wives are as a body drawn, have not sufficient education to enable them to earn a living by intellectual employment, and the very fact of their obtaining Government pay leads them to consider employment in the capacity of servants as derogatory to their elevated social position. The small pittance of ten shillings per month which they receive, even when added to the trifle they receive from the most economical and prudent of husbands, is insufficient to maintain them, and what is the result? Soldiers' wives in India are in fact almost driven to adopt a mode of life that is sad to think of.

That there are some honorable exceptions is a fact most highly creditable to the individuals, but unfortunately their number is small, who bear up with unblemished character against the privations as well as the temptations that beset them.

In the instances where these women become widows, and which, alas, are of very frequent occurrence, they know that the Government allowance will only be continued to them for six months after their husband's death, and that at the expiration of that period one of two alternatives awaits them—either to be left utterly without the means of obtaining even the barest necessities of life, or to marry. Under such circumstances, love or regard for the object of their choice is considered to be by no means necessary; in fact there is too good reason to believe that when soldiers are affected with tedious illness, which from its nature appears likely to terminate fatally, the affectionate wife of their bosom is even then taking steps calculated to render her possible period of mourning and widowhood as short as circumstances will permit.

True, also, children obtain a pecuniary allowance from Government, but its conditions deserve a few remarks. Small as it is, they only receive it until they reach the mature age of fourteen years, when the boys have no alternative but to enlist, unless, as sometimes happens, they obtain apprenticeships in the subordinate medical department. The girls, however, less fortunate than they, have only one of three alternatives—namely, to become wives, and in due time mothers, at an age when neither their bodily formation nor their mental development fit them for the functions, duties, and responsibilities they are called upon to perform; secondly, they have the alternative of starving and dying of want—and thirdly, that sad and terrible resort of the abandoned of their sex, to minister to the depraved passions of the debauchee.

There are many other respects in which the position of the soldier and those dependent upon him, are in India not quite what they are generally supposed to be, but further remarks upon them must be reserved for another paper.

GREENWICH HOSPITAL AS IT IS.

BY AN ANCIENT MARINER.

II.

THERE is something about "the merry month of May" which induces people to try to shake off the business which has engrossed their attention during the winter months, and I suppose it was a feeling of this kind which led me to make the following proposal to Mrs. Buntline.

Laying aside a rather perplexing account which had been sent for my perusal by the secretary of a very promising society, of which I am one of the directors, from which I expect to at least double my present income, and taking off my spectacles I thus addressed my affectionate rib,—"My dear, I am thinking of taking you with me to Greenwich to-morrow."

Incontinently dropping her knitting, she exclaimed, "you don't mean it surely, Jimmy!" (She has always called me by that familiar name, and it is too late now to chide her.) "You know you never take me anywhere," (she forgot the Oratorio only a week ago. A woman's memory in such matters never goes beyond a week.) "And I should so like to go to Greenwich."

"Agreed then," said I; "and as to-morrow is the Queen's birthday you will be much interested with the sight of the veteran officers, men, and boys going in procession to the chapel. I remember going once to see the son of an old messmate who was in the higher school, and just happened to hit upon one of these interesting exhibitions. The officers had all assembled in the grand square, together with several hundreds of the school boys. The drummer and fifer in their grotesque dresses, and the boy's band, the boatswains with their halberds, the head boys carrying nautical instruments, and the officers in full uniform, followed by a large posse of pensioners, marched into the chapel to hear prayers. From thence they proceeded to the Painted Hall, and the officers standing round a table at the upper part of the noble apartment, a gaily dressed old man, mounted on a stool, gave out a number of toasts. Such responses were never heard. A boatswain's mate with a call gave a shrill whistle, at which the hundreds of boys gave three hearty cheers. The 'Queen,' the 'Royal Family,' the 'Lords of the Hadmirality,' &c., &c., were given by the veteran O'Toole in rapid succession, and each time the shrill voices resounded from the youthful throats. This finished, the party reformed, proceeded round the square, and the officers entered the house of the governor."

"What an interesting display," chimed in Mrs. B., who had been listening most attentively to my description, "and shall we see all this?"

"Certainly," I replied, "there are several of these festivals as they are called, during the year."

For a wonder, I had not to wait long on the eventful morning for

Mrs. B. to stick in her pins, and we started soon after breakfast for Greenwich.

It was a lovely day, and we reached the College in good time, as I thought, for the cheering in the Painted Hall, if for nothing more. It was nearly twelve o'clock as we approached the gates. I noticed the royal standard flying over the governor's house, and expected to see some signs of the procession; but not observing anything unusual, I proposed going straight to the Painted Hall. It was open as at other times, and a fee of "fourpence" was demanded as the price of admission.

"Is not this festival day?" I asked in bewilderment at this change.

"Yes sir," replied the money taker.

"When does the procession begin to form then?" I demanded.

"Procession sir!" repeated the man with some surprise. "I don't know what you mean sir.

"Why don't all the officers and men come here on festival days?"

"Oh no," replied the man, "that has been done away with some years."

"But do not the men get double allowance of strong beer and that?" I enquired.

"Yes, the men get their ale and a pound of meat, but there is no 'walking-day' like there used to be."

"Pretty fellow you!" said my wife aside tormentingly, "to bring me all the way down here for nothing!"

I certainly felt rather "riled," as Sam Slick would say, but as the day was fine, and I had heard that there was good wine, and nice white bait at Quartermaine's, I hoped to make my peace in that way.

We sauntered up and down the hall admiring the pictures of battles and old naval heroes, and after in vain endeavouring to get a good view of the most interesting of the collection, "the Death of Nelson," we ascended the broad flight of steps to the upper hall. Next to the blood-stained coat and waistcoat worn by the hero of Trafalgar when he received his death wound, presented by the Prince Consort, the case containing the relics of poor Franklin's party excited our attention. No one can look upon the pieces of money, the silver forks and spoons, the mutilated portions of watches, the sailor's certificate case, surgeon's knife, and the leaves of a book marked in blood or red ink, most likely the former, which seemed to have belonged to Mr. Goodsir the assistant surgeon, without a feeling of anguish. Fancy conjures up the once owners, and depicts them famished and despairing, perhaps surrounded by hostile natives coveting the trifling articles saved from the wreck, and watching for the moment when death should render the acquisition undisputed. Mournful relics, indeed, of some of the noblest fellows who ever wore the British uniform!

I remarked on first entering the hall a miserable attempt at a monument, which had been raised in memory of the lost crews of the Erebus and Terror. In bleak desolateness it assuredly typifies the service on which they were engaged, and the death they died, but it is wholly deficient in taste, and the sculpture is of very questionable execution.

"The Nelson room," as the boatswain called it, occupied a quarter of an hour. I cannot say that I admire the stiffly starched portrait by Abbott, or the unearthly figures of Westall; still, anything which tends to keep alive Nelson and his daring exploits demands respect.

Finding that the fourpenny ticket was available for the chapel, we crossed over and were received into that sacred edifice. The light and elegant marble columns supporting the organ gallery; the elaborate carving and decoration of the galleries and arched roof, the scagliola pillars, and well-proportioned pulpit and reading desk, in turn excited our admiration. *The preservation of St. Paul from shipwreck on the Island of Malta*, which is a fine collection of colossal figures grouped most unnaturally, took my wife's attention. She was particularly struck with the figure of the "Roman lady of distinction," as the guide used to tell people, "clasping with an affection the *hurn* containing the *hashes* of her deceased husband, who had fallen in the wars of Judæa." The tesselated pavement in imitation of a first-rate's hempen cable and mariner's compass, in black and white marble, were duly pointed out by the guide, and we observed that great care was taken to preserve it from the slightest scratch, by means of canvas cloths, &c.

"Surely," said I to my wife, "they who built this superb place, and fitted it up without regard to expense, must have wished that those who were to use it should be in comfortable circumstances. It never could have been intended that such a gorgeous place of worship should be used by poor old men worn down by penury, and full of anxiety for the future. Such a place, palace I might say, was meant to give an impulse to gratitude for past mercies, and not for men who rarely ever speak of the institution without a 'growl.'"

Leaving the chapel, we descended into the dining hall, where the pensioners were regaling themselves with a smoking hot dinner. The sight of these old men at dinner is a very interesting one to the stranger. It is pleasant to see hundreds of those whom we are accustomed to look upon as our veteran defenders thus cared for in their old age, and provided each day with what seems to be a plentiful supply of savoury viands. The sight was one which for the time banished from my mind the complaints made by my old shipmate and other of the pensioners. The dinner on this day was roast meat—mutton, I think, with a large baked pudding, and potatoes. I expected, as this was the Queen's birthday, to have seen a few plums in their puddings, but was told that that delicacy was confined to Christmas day.

"We passed leisurely up and down the hall in the hope, in part, of discovering old Ben, but he was nowhere to be found. My wife was much charmed with the order and regularity, and felt surprised when I told her that there was still evidently something wanting to constitute happiness and contentment.

On leaving the hall I took Mrs. B. to a bench fronting the river, and determined to go in pursuit of my old shipmate, who I hoped to find in his ward. But here I felt rather at a loss; yet

under the impression that he told me he was in the "South East quarter," I consulted the compass and shaped my course accordingly. I found the opening of the large stone building, and on going up the steps observed on the ground floor an apartment with "Bath Room" painted over the entrance. The door being open I entered and was agreeably surprised to find a large space fitted up with capacious baths, each having curtains sufficiently broad to be drawn round the bath, so as completely to inclose the bather and exclude cold air. A very civil old man answered all my questions, and told me that the men could have a warm bath as often as they pleased, and that he sometimes had as many as five hundred in a week to provide for In an upper part was a bath for feet washing, each foot bath being supplied with hot and cold water, and soap, but not towels, each man bringing his own. My informant also exhibited some remarkable proofs of his skill a chiropodist. I found that this most perfect department, as it seemed to me, was of recent date, and the old man told me it was due to the benevolent exertions of the late Admiral Sir Charles Adam.

On the opposite side was the Barber's shop, which was also conveniently arranged; and here I was told men might be shaved "twice a week" gratuitously.

Feeling my own chin I thought two days' growth of beard would not improve my appearance, or contribute to my personal comfort, and I hinted to one of the shavers that I should like to be shaved oftener than twice a week, to which he replied that by paying a half-penny each time a pensioner could be shaved as often as he pleased. "Thank ye for nothing," thought I.

Although I asked several men, no one seemed to know Ben Young, and I began to think he must have had an *alias* under which he had taken his pension.

Leaving the barber's shop, I ascended a rather dirty stone staircase, the walls of which gave convincing proofs of the sailor's love for pig-tail, and reached the next storey. I found that it had a stone floor, running the whole length to the northward, and that the cabins were also flagged. The passage was about six or eight feet in width, and the cabins branched off at right angles to the right and left, each containing eight beds, four of a side, abutting one on the other, a thin partition dividing them at the head and foot. There was a space of about eight feet between the two tiers of bed-places. The ward seemed deserted, although the men had returned from dinner, but at length I met a jolly old fellow, whom I took to be a boatswain, to whom I propounded the question, "Do you know a man by the name of Ben Young?"

"Young? Ben Young? can't say as I do, sir, I had a shipmate of that name in the old ——, in the year nine."

"Then, perhaps, you had another by the name of Buntline," said I.

"Bless my heart alive, sure enough I had, and ought to know him, I was coxswain of his boat, and if I aint mistaken, you are the same gentleman."

A pleasant recognition took place. Forty years is a long time in prospect, but when past, seems but a day. Here, after the lapse of

so many years, was my old shipmate, Charley Johnson, the same in speech and look, barring the grey hairs, portly figure, and lame leg.

"You wear well, sir, your hair don't seem changed a bit," (he was not so clear-sighted as old Ben,) "and I hope you have been able to coil up your ropes all snug, for a full due."

I thanked him for his kind wishes, and we forthwith retired to his little berth to have a yarn about old times, and imperceptibly he was drawn to speak of his present abode.

"You're getting old now, Charley," said I; "how long have you been here?"

"Twenty-two years, sir, and most part of that time I have been a boatswain, but I am getting old and past work now; I am a good deal older than you, sir."

"You must be; you were 'old Charley' when you were coxswain of the Blue Cutter, and must now be nearly eighty."

"I shall be seventy-six next birthday," said Charley, "but I can't afford to give up yet, though I suffer very much at times from rheumatics in this cold ward, and feel the old wound in the leg, which I got when we were cutting out that convoy, you remember, sir, in Rosas Bay."

"But why cannot you afford to give up?" I enquired.

"I have got a poor old woman at home, and I don't want that she should go to the union. We've been together now for thirty years, and I will try to keep her afloat for a few years, leastways, as long as I live. She can't live long, sir, she is very ailing, and it is as much as I can do to attend upon her, and I cannot afford to pay any one to look after her."

"But after so many years as you have been boatswain, there must be some allowance on retiring," I said.

"Not a penny, sir. As soon as I give up my lace, or go sick to the infirmary, everything stops but a shilling a-week. I'm on 'the Butler's list' now, (this he explained was a list on which men were paid the contract price in lieu of their provisions,) and with that and my 3s. 6d. a-week, we can just manage to pay rent for the room, and get a bit of firing in winter, besides what we get now and then from charity funds, and a bit of victuals to eat. But it's hard times, very hard, now and then."

"Then you mean to say that all you have to live upon and keep your old woman in meat, lodging, clothes, and firing, is 3s. 6d. a-week, and 'the butler's list' money allowance; and how much does the 'butler's list' give you?"

"The butler's list is 5s. 10d. a-week, sir, now, so we have just 9s. 4d a-week for the pair of us."

"And when you go sick, you say that stops?"

"All except the shilling a-week. Another man is put in my place, and my poor old woman would starve quite, if it wasn't for the main guard—that is, for a share in the broken victuals."

"Have you any pension?"

"Eighteen pounds, four, sir—a shilling a day; but when I came in here my pension ceased."

"Then according to that account you only gain two shillings and *fourpence a week by* being in the college."

"That's all, barring my clothes and shoes; and there is the Boatswain of the floor not far from me, who has no pension, and yet gets the same money. That don't seem fair, sir, does it?"

"And so you say that you have been twenty years a boatswain, and when you are no longer able to do the duty you lose your lace."

"Yes, if I give up I must fall back to a private pensioner upon a shilling a-week."

After listening with deep attention to the plain, straightforward replies of my old shipmate, I proposed that he should take me through the ward, to which he readily assented.

"This ward," said I, as I entered one after another of the nearly tenantless cabins, with the beds rolled up, "is very different from the ward which is exhibited to the public."

"You mean 'the Royal Charles' I suppose," answered the Boatswain. "Ah! that is a different affair—that is what is called 'the show ward,' and very few of the cabins are ever slept in, most of the men are outlyers."

"Out*liars*," I replied, mistaking the word, "what are they? Are they so bad as that? I know they are out and out chaps at a yarn; but I did not believe they had earned the name of "out*liars*."

"No, no, you misunderstand me, they have outlying tickets—they *sleep* out. They are men holding situations, such as Boatswain of the Halls and Chapel, and other such good places, and their cabins are fitted up with pictures, and crockery, and all that for show. The ward keeping is always worth a shilling or two, and some of the men pay for the turn of ward keeping because of the presents they receive from visitors. That used to be so I know."

"Then," said I, "the Royal Charles is a sham."

"To be sure, sir, why when gentlefolks come down here, they only go into the Painted Hall and Chapel, and into the Dining Halls, and then to the Royal Charles, and they see so many beautiful places they go away wondering and saying what a noble, fine institution it is,and surprised that any one belonging to it should grumble. They don't know that we poor old pensioners are not allowed to go into the Painted Hall, unless on free days, and that all the finery they see is mostly for show."

"They do not come up to this ward, I suppose."

"Not a bit of it, sir, they only see the bright side. I should like for some of the gentlefolks to come up here on a cold November day, and see the cold stone walls all streaming with wet, and the floor as damp as if the rain had come down through the ceiling upon it. We keep up a good fire in the winter, but that is at one end of the ward, and it is enough to give any man his death at the lower end, to get out of bed of a night when the fire is out, and only cold wet stones to walk upon."

"I observe a strip of matting," said I.

"Yes, but that don't go all the way over, and an old man sometimes gets out, and having no slippers to put on, gets cold in all his limbs."

"But are all the wards like this?"

"No, only this, and the floors above and below. But the new men are often sent in here, and the wards when full hold about 200 men."

"Why is it kept so?"

"They say that this part was burnt many years ago, and that it has had stone floors ever since."

"That must have been the fire in 1778," said I.

"I suppose it must, but I cannot say, as I am not much of a reader.

"But surely that is not a good reason; if it was burnt once, it is most likely it will not be again."

"I only know," said Charley, "that it is very cold here, and it is my opinion many a poor fellow has been taken off sooner than he would have been, if he had had good wooden boards to walk upon."

On approaching the fireplace I observed a painted bench with a high back to it, and an attempt to screen the fire side from the cutting winds my old shipmate complained of. "Then here," said I, "I suppose you all sit of a winter's night and smoke."

"Smoke!" exclaimed the Boatswain, horror stricken. "Smoke in the wards, sir! Why that is death by the law. Any man found smoking in the wards," added the Boatswain, "is to be expelled forthwith."

"How is that?"

"Impossible to say, sir, but my warrant would not be worth a halfpenny if a man was caught smoking here."

"I suppose you smoke."

"Yes, I like my pipe—it is the next thing to my dinner, and sometimes I think I would sooner go without dinner than my pipe. In the warm weather we have got a fine place over by the Brew-house—a very great comfort and enjoyment it is to us old fellows; but in the winter we cannot stand the cold."

"What do you do then?." I enquired.

"We go into the chalk walk, down under the colonnade, but the draught is too much for my old bones; and I generally go over to my old woman and smoke in her room."

"Could not a place be found in your ward for a smoking room? We have a smoking room in all our clubs in London, without being afraid of burning down the building, or of offending those who don't smoke."

"We poor fellows are made of another kind of stuff to you gentle-folks," said Charley, not in a tone of reproach, but as if he really thought so. "I dare say we *could* part off a cabin, and fit it up for smoking, and for men to sit in during the day; and I have often thought to myself that if this *could* be done, there would be less custom for the publicans. To my mind it is the want of comfort and sociableness in the wards, that drives men out to the public houses, where all the mischief happens."

"I should think," said I, "that if you had a sort of galley, where you could smoke, or play cribbage, or drafts, or read the paper or a book, that you would feel it a kind of home."

"To be sure we should, and that is what always struck me; but then, you see, I am only a poor old man, and a boatswain, and no

one listens to what the likes of me has to say, or asks me what I think. Best part of the men that used to be in this ward—we have thirty or forty vacancies here now—would have stopped in it from morning to night, only they have no place to sit down in, except where you saw just now, and it's dull work sitting there all day looking at one-another."

"Is it not a great drawback to men of a serious turn of mind to have no place where they can say their prayers without the chance of being jeered at?" I enquired. "I notice in these cabins that they are quite open, and that one man can see all that his opposite cabin-mate is doing. He has not so much as a curtain to screen him from observation."

"No doubt, sir, it is as you say; but the men get used to it after a time."

"And," I added, "used to going prayerless to bed, rather than kneel down in the presence of some mocker. It must be a great comfort to a decent man to have a cabin to himself."

"You are right, sir, I have heard many respectable men make their remarks about it. They have a sleeping place they say, but no cabin. They have only two shelves to put their bottle, plate, basin, and spoon upon, and a wooden stool to sit upon. They have a chest with a lock to it, and that is all."

"Certainly there is not much regard to comfort or privacy in these arrangements," I remarked, "but I suppose that there are not many wards so bad as yours."

"I can tell you," replied Charley, with some degree of pride "that, barring the stone floors, my ward is a very capital one to some of them. There are some in other quarters where there is scarcely any light of the day, and in the summer time the men can hardly breathe in them, and then, what with vermin, the men don't know what to do with themselves; they are doing something to better those wards now. I don't wonder why we have so many men going out, I only wonder at any man with a decentish pension, and able to do anything for himself, remaining in. There is one thing, sir, I should like to speak to you about—for that glass of ale I had just now seems to have hauled my jawing tacks aboard—you seem to take some concern about us, not like a common visitor. We old blue jackets should like to be by ourselves."

"How do you mean, you are by yourselves now, are you not?"

"Bless you, no," said old Charley, "we are all mixed up together like a flock of sheep in a pen. Here we have marines, and blue jackets, and servants, and all sorts, and no difference made atwixt petty officers and sweepers. Now, if the marines was by themselves, and the lower order of fellows by themselves, and the petty officers by themselves, we should know what we were all about. Here is a marine made boatswain over blue jackets, and blue jackets over marines, and we have marines for Regulators. You know we never used for to live together when we was on board ship, and why should we be all put up together here? I have seen more disturbances in the ward between sailors and marines, than among all the sailors put together. 'You *blessed* sodger,' calls out a half

drunken fellow, perhaps no sailor, nor half so good as a marine himself, and then a row gets up, and captain of the month, and counsel, and yellow backs and sleeves, and all that follows. If we could have wards for marines, and wards for sailors, the place would be quite of another sort."

"There is much in what you say, no doubt, Charley, but how is this to be done? Won't some of your officers take it up?"

"They have not got any power, sir, they are good kind gentlemen, and ready enough to listen to us, but they are too old when they come here to be able to do much. 'We have gone on like we do now for the last hundred years,' some of them say, 'and why should we change?'"

"I suppose you can get leave?" said I, changing the subject.

"Yes, as much as we like to ask for, but we can't afford to take it."

"Why not?"

"Why, because, when we go away, we have nothing to live upon."

"How so? surely you have some allowance, the Chelsea pensioners have."

"Oh, that's very likely, sir, the Chelsea men are much better off than we are. They get sixpence a-day when they go on furlough, and their money, may be 2s. or 3s. a-week, when they return; but we don't get a farthing while we are away on leave, unless the doctor orders it, and only one shilling a-week when we come back. It is very hard upon us; I have known men almost starve themselves by selling their provisions and beer, so that they could have a few shillings in the summer to pay their passage down into the country to see their wife or children."

"But the men with pensions are allowed something, surely?"

"Not a penny more than any other man; and it seems hard that I who have given up a shilling a-day to come here, should have everything stopped if I get leave for a week."

"I dare say," I remarked, "they don't stop the governor's pay when he goes."

"No, I don't suppose they do, sir," said Charley, with a significant broad grin.

Just then the idea occurred to me that I had left Mrs. Buntline alone, and that she would not know what construction to put upon my long absence. "You said just now you had a wife, Charley, and that she was sick. Where does she live? Perhaps my wife would like to go and see her."

"Poor old soul," sighed Charley, "she is nearly blind, and very infirm; but it *would* be a kindness if you was to go to her little place, only ——"

"Only what?" seeing that he was in doubt.

"Only, sir, I was going to say that it is a miserable place for the likes of you or your lady to go to. I shouldn't like her to go to such a dirty place."

"Oh," said I, "if that is all, make yourself easy about it, my wife belongs to a visiting society, and I know she does not mind where she goes to if she can do good."

"Bless her," muttered the old man, "I wish we had some of her sort here, but our lodgings are so bad that the most of the ladies are afraid to venture near them, and no blame to them."

"Come with me," said I. The old man accordingly took his laced hat, and his crutch-handled stick, and hobbled after me down stairs.

I was prepared for a chiding salutation on rejoining my wife, but to my agreeable surprise, found her very busily engaged in conversation with a clean, nice-looking old man, so that her time, like mine, had been pleasingly spent. I told her of the proposal I had made to the boatswain, and introduced her to my old shipmate.

"Why Jimmy," said she, "you must have had a great many shipmates in your time, for the old man I have been talking to says he very well remembers a Mr. Buntline many years ago. It is rather an odd name, like the owner," said my wife in her joking manner, "I don't suppose there are many of the same kind of name."

True enough, this was another old shipmate, though for a short time only. The fact is that I served in several line-of-battle ships during the war—I had been with some thousands of men, and it was not surprising, though rather odd, that I should have found them there so quickly.

We got underway at once, and, preceded by old Charley, went out at the fine newly-gilt gates—"Bobby" looking rather hard at me as much as to ask where I could be going to, and whom I could be that was making so free with a boatswain.

We followed our conductor through several narrow filthy streets, which were redolent of everything but rosemary, and at length turned into a paved court with a gutter in the middle, on both sides of which were small houses. It was somebody's court, but whose I forget. Dirty, ragged, half-naked children were rolling about on the flags and in the gutter, and a half-drunken costermonger was seated on his basket by the side of a doorway smoking his pipe. Within the adjoining house I could observe through the half-open window a woman of the lowest class venting her Billingsgate upon another of the same order, while a blear-eyed old woman was either fomenting the quarrel between, or endeavouring to pacify—I could not tell which—the disputants. We passed quickly on to the next tenement, and here our guide stopped, and, apologising for the wretchedness of the abode, lifted the latch and invited us to enter.

"I will go before you, Ma'am" said Charley," and open the door to give you light on the staircase." He hobbled up the creaking, winding, narrow ascent, and, on reaching the top, opened the door, sending down a glimmer of light sufficient to save our shins from abrasion. On entering the room we found a poor old woman, wrapped round with a tattered shawl, reclining on a miserable truckle bed, which had nothing to recommend it but its cleanliness.

"I have brought an old shipmate and his lady to see you, Goody," said Charley, tenderly.

"God bless you, sir and ma'am," said the old woman, addressing us and endeavouring to get up.

"Sit still," said my wife, "you must not get up. We only wanted

to see how you were, and whether there was anything we could do for you."

"Bless the Lord," said Goody, "there's not much more to be done for me, but to take me away. I am nearly blind, and quite helpless, and my poor old man is almost as bad, and I pray night and day that HE will take me to Himself, for what should I do," she mournfully added, "if my poor Charley was to die?"

Seating my wife on the solitary wooden-bottomed chair, placed for her by old Charley, we tried to turn the poor old woman from this gloomy train of thought, and partially succeeded. We told her that she was the prop of her husband's life, and that so far from being a burden to him she was his comfort.

"You are very good, sir and ma'am, to come and talk to me so. I am very ungrateful to God for his blessings in giving me such an affectionate husband, and while I could work I was happy, and so long as I could help buy the loaf it was well; but now it is very hard upon us."

"Now how much do you pay for this little room?" I asked.

"Two shillings a week, sir, and the landlord sends every Saturday for the rent, and tells us if we cannot pay, we must turn out. Twice when poor Charley was sick in the Infirmary I had to sell some of the few things I had left to pay the rent, so as to keep a decent room to be in, but what I shall do next I don't know, for I have only this poor straw mattrass to sleep on, and I should die if I had not that. All I think about is going to the Union. I am sure I could never do that."

"Quiet, Goody," said Charley, "don't break my heart quite."

Thinking this painful scene should draw to a close, I got my wife to administer that sweet consolation which women best know how to suggest. The poor old woman was neither ignorant nor destitute of religious faith, but she had been sorely tried in the furnace of affliction. One after another her children had been taken from her, and she was left, with the exception of her husband, alone in the world, and he, poor man, was necessarily away from her most part of the day, sometimes all day, on duty. She had no connection with her disreputable neighbours, and rarely had anyone to speak to her except when her kind-hearted Charley came home.

She told us that for many years while she was able to work she had been "a helper" in one of the invalid wards, and earning a shilling a-day she was able to pay her part of the expenses; but that, on the introduction of a new system the helpers had been displaced by marines, and she and others had been discharged. By washing and charing she afterwards earned enough to pay the rent of the room, and so eked out her husband's small pay; but since her blindness and lameness she had been entirely a burden upon him. The parish refused her assistance because her husband was a boatswain, and in the receipt of an income of 3s. 6d. a-week; and thus cut off from the world this poor creature existed from one week to another, praying for deliverance from the burden of life, and not knowing how soon the main-stay of her existence would be removed.

We did not leave the chamber of poverty and its inmate more

wretched than we found it—I hope the contrary; but I could not avoid reflecting upon the apparent want of consideration shown by the governing authorities of so fine an institution as Greenwich Hospital, in leaving the wives of the pensioners in so sad a plight. Connected with all large establishments are cottages or alms-houses for the reception of infirm members, and for the wives and children of the workmen employed; but here, in Greenwich, with an enormous income, and so many thousands available for external improvements, it seemed to me sad to find poor old sailors' wives—and Goody Johnson's case was very much less distressing, so I was told, than many others—driven to the Union, or lingering out a pitiful existence with the certainty of a pauper's death staring them in the face should they survive their husbands.

"I think," said I, addressing Mrs. B., after my most affectionate manner, "that we have learned much to-day, and that we should do well, having stored our minds with incidents which, if made public, may, I hope, be turned to good account, to try what sort of white bait and sherry we can get at 'the Ship.'"

Before bidding adieu to my old shipmate, I requested him to make enquiries for Ben Young, and to ascertain his present name, so that when I pay another visit to Greenwich I may be able to find him.

THE FRENCH AND AUSTRIAN ARMIES IN THE LAST WAR.

At the present moment, when the French and Austrian armies are again measuring their strength in Italy, and may soon be expected to be in conflict on the Rhine, great interest will attach to the following original account of the battle of Wagram, which was drawn up at the time for the information of the Saxon Government, by Captain Becker, of the Saxon Army.

The Island of Sobais, situated two leagues below Vienna, not generally known before the battle of Gross-Asparn, and called by the French Isle Napoleon, had been fortified and formed into a *place d' armes* of the first importance; while the victors of Gross-Asparn were concentrating immense reinforcements on the vast Marchfeld (situated on the other side of the above Island), to oppose the Emperor Napoleon in a battle which he had publicly announced.

The Archduke Charles, Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian army, had reason to believe in these threats, and conceived the French army would very probably pass from the Island of Lobau to the left bank of the Danube. He therefore ordered intrenchments to be constructed from Gross-Asparn as far as the other side of Enzersdorf, and to be sufficiently occupied with troops and artillery, in order to render it difficult for the enemy to pass the river, and to gain time, either to advance against him as far as the different places of his

passage (encamping the army some leagues in the rear), and there to give a second battle like that of Gross-Asparn; or, in case the French should still effect a passage at other places, as announced by them, to be enabled to attack them with force and energy on a larger field.

Although some stronger works had been constructed before Essling and Enzersdorf, near that branch of the Danube not yet passed by the French, against their batteries formed on the opposite bank, those works were not so strong as the small islands opposite, situated on the same branch, and could not prevent their communication with the Island of Lobau. The Mühleninsel, situated more to the left, was likewise fortified, and connected, as well as that opposite to Essling, by bridges with the left bank. The redoubts built on the left bank in front of the two bridges, of which that opposite to Asparn was called Petite Redoute, protected them against every attack, and were capable of making, with their artillery, the most effective fire against the Austrian intrenchments. A division of the corps of Rivoli, which established itself in the wood there, had constructed a *tête de pont* in the angle formed by the Danube, and fortified it with outworks and *abatis*.

Several boats completely armed and equipped, which had partly protected the construction of these works, were to cruise between the islands, to oppose the attempts of the Austrians by water, and were destined, as will be shown hereafter, to favour as much as possible the first passage of the troops.

Six bridges, well constructed and secured against disasters, similar to those of the battle of Gross-Asparn, by double ranges of piles, insured the communication with the right bank of the river. Two of them, an arched bridge and a pontoon-bridge, laid before the fall of the Schegat into the Danube, conducted to an island situated in the principal arm of the river, which island, connected by a short bridge with a smaller one, served for an abutment (Hauptfeiler), from whence one passed over two arched bridges and a pontoon-bridge into the principal works of the Lobau, within which were kept in magazines, specially constructed for that purpose, immense quantities of ammunition and provisions. The approaches to these bridges were covered and defended against every unforeseen attack on the right bank of the Danube by redoubts on both sides of the junction of the Schegat.

The main works of the Lobau, as well as the fortifications and batteries constructed on the islands and on both sides of the branch of the Danube flowing towards Enzersdorf, were mostly mounted with heavy artillery taken from the walls of Vienna.

The French bulletin gives the following account of the armament of some works constructed in the salient angle towards Enzersdorf.

"The islands of Montebello and d'Espagne, as also the batteries constructed between them on the right bank of the river, destined to destroy Enzersdorf and its intrenchments, were armed in two hours, the first with ten mortars and twenty eighteen-pounders, the second with four mortars and six twelve-pounders, the batteries with ten mortars and twenty eighteen-pounders."

As to the island of Alexander, situated to the right, which was to

command the plain before it, and was destined to cover the passage over the bridges which were still to be completed there, it was armed with four mortars, ten twelve-pounders, and twelve six-pounders.

The Emperor Napoleon having on the 1st of July his head-quarters on the Lobau, which was put in the best state of defence by the works which were now nearly finished, and having concentrated there on the 4th of July the whole army, including the Italian forces posted till then near Wolfsthal and before Presburg, and the corps of the Duke of Auerstaedt, the Archduke Charles became quite certain of being attacked the following day by the united forces of the enemy; wherefore he sent, on the evening of the 4th, an order to the Archduke John, who occupied Presburg with a considerable corps, to proceed with the same by Marcheck to join the grand army, in order to operate on the left, according to circumstances.

The Austrian army had the following position on the Marchfeld on the night of the 4th:—

The 4th, the 2nd, and the 1st corps, under the commands of Field Marshal Lieutenant Prince Rosenberg, Field Marshal Lieutenant Prince Hohenzollern, and General Count Bellegarde, occupied the ground from the heights behind Markgrafenneusiedel to Deutsch-Wagram, along a ravine which leads to that place.

The 3d corps, under the orders of the Great Master of Ordnance Kollowrath, near Hagenbrunn.

The 5th corps, under the Great Master of Ordnance Prince Reuss, near the Bisamberg, in order to prevent the French from crossing the river above Vienna.

The 6th corps, under Field Marshal Lieutenant Count Klenau, behind the intrenchments between Enzersdorf and Gross-Asparn, had to keep up the communication with the 5th corps along the Danube.

The advanced guard, commanded by Field Marshal Lieutenant Nordmann, behind the road from Enzersdorf to Wittau, observed the left bank of the Danube, as far as the other side of the village of Ord.

The corps of reserve of cavalry and grenadiers, commanded by General Prince Lichtenstein and Field Marshal Lieutenant d'Aspré, between Deutsch-Wagram and Gerasdorf. The greater part of the reserve of cavalry was on the 5th, at the commencement of the battle, near the village of Raschdorf, which was occupied with infantry; the grenadier reserve was posted before Saeuring.

The attack of the Austrian army was fixed for the 5th of July, and announced by the Emperor to all the troops. The success as well as the passage of the river, partly intended in the night of the 4th to the 5th, was anticipated at 10 o'clock at night by a dreadful cannonade from the works of the Lobau facing Enzersdorf and Esslingen; which, however sharply it was answered by the numerous artillery placed in the Austrian intrenchments, was continued till Enzersdorf was set on fire and all the intrenchments there entirely destroyed. During the cannonade, 1,500 voltigeurs of the corps of Oudinot embarked on the Danube, landed, protected by the armed boats, on the left bank of the river, opposite to the lower end of the Island of

Lobau, drove the Austrian advanced posts out of the Mühlleuten Wood, and occupied the village of Mühlleuten. 2,500 men of the corps of the Duke of Rivoli crossed the river near the Alexander Island in several boats and secured their position, taken at 500 paces from the river, by two redoubts constructed the same night.

After this bold and well-executed enterprise of the before-mentioned divisions, it became possible to construct bridges with the materials lying in the smaller branches of the river. Two pontoon-bridges, one at the lower part of the Lobau, and the other at the Alexander Island, were in a short time finished. The corps of Oudinot passed the first at two o'clock in the morning of the 5th, and marched to Mühlleuten; at the same time, the corps of the Dukes of Rivoli and Auerstaedt crossed the river: the first (Oudinot) took a position before daybreak in front of the Mühlleuten Wood in the direction of the Castle of Sachsengang. At day-break the corps of Oudinot formed to attack near Mühlleuten, moved forward against the Austrian advanced guard which was drawn up between Enzersdorf and Wittau, and forced it to retreat to Rutzendorf, while the castle of Sachsensang, defended by an Austrian detachment, was taken and the troops made prisoners. The Duke of Auerstaedt had, at the same time, his corps formed on line on both sides of Wittau.

In proportion as Oudinot advanced, the Duke of Rivoli moved by Enzersdorf, which at 8 o'clock in the morning he caused to be taken by a detachment of his corps, and by bringing forward his right wing, forced the Austrian 6th corps, of which the left wing was threatened, to take a position behind its intrenchments. The Duke of Auerstaedt contributed, by his march to Kummerleinsdorf, to force the Austrian advanced guard back to Rutzendorf.

It was about mid-day on the 5th, when a hot engagement took place between the Austrian advanced guard, which had posted itself near Rutzendorf, and the corps of Oudinot; and when the 6th Austrian corps retired in the direction of Breitenlee, the Prince of Ponte-Corvo passed the before-mentioned branch of the Danube with the Saxons; and advanced towards Raschdorf, in the space rendered vacant by the extended movements of Oudinot and the Duke of Rivoli. But before this corps arrived at the appointed place, the Austrian advanced guard was forced to abandon its position near Rutzendorf, and to retire to Markgrafenneusiedel by a manœuvre of the Duke of Auerstaedt, which turned its left wing, and by the impetuous attacks of Oudinot and the division of Dupas in its front and right flank.

While the Duke of Auerstaedt moved forward in a direction towards the left wing of the Austrian army, pointed out to him by Napoleon, Oudinot, drawing to the left, followed the division of Dupas, which was moving towards Baumersdorf—the Saxon corps arrived about 3 o'clock in the afternoon before Raschdorf, which was occupied by infantry and covered in the flank by a strong division of cavalry. The infantry of the most advanced division took this place with the bayonet, and the whole cavalry of this corps, formed in one line, charged and overthrew the Austrian cavalry.

The 6th Austrian corps was in full retreat to Stammersdorf, where

it arrived towards dark, took a position, and observed by its advanced posts the ground towards Gerasdorf and Leopoldau. The Duke of Rivoli, ceasing to pursue this corps, held the ground between Gross-Asparn and Breitenlee

The Duke of Auerstaedt arrived late in the afternoon near Grasshofen and Glinzendorf, and, having taken the latter village occupied by the Austrians, was forced, after several unsuccessful attacks upon Markgrafenneusiedel and the Austrian left wing, to take a position till the next day, behind the above villages, which he also occupied.

The division of Dupas, the march of which was continued to Baumersdorf after the attacks near Rutzendorf, advanced at the same time that Markgrafenneusiedel was attacked by the corps of Auerstaedt, against this village (Baumersdorf), which was strongly occupied by the Austrians, and protected with lines. A hot engagement commenced for the possession of Baumersdorf, which the Austrians supported by the artillery posted there, when the first division of the corps of Oudinot arrived and formed a line to the right of the division of Dupas, after which two columns of attack, favoured by Baumersdorf being set on fire, advanced on both sides of that place in order to force the Austrian position. The grenadiers of Oudinot advancing against the corps of Hohenzollern, assaulting with the greatest impetuosity the left wing of the same, and overthrowing whatever attempted to oppose them, had already entered the position, when the cavalry, brought up by Field-Marshal Lieutenant Prince Hohenzollern, was enabled to break into this column, which was not supported by cavalry, and to force it, conjointly with the infantry, again rallied back to the other side of the Russbach, where it was exposed to the continual cannonade of the Austrians, and soon forced to join, in the rear, the last arrived divisions of the corps of Oudinot, and to take in the night a position on this side of Baumersdorf in the line of Aderklaa and Glinzendorf, to the left of the corps of the Duke of Auerstaedt. The other column formed by the Saxon infantry attached to the division of Dupas, crossed the Russbach above Baumersdorf, under a heavy fire of grape, ascended the heights on the other side, took a battery of 18 guns, broke through the infantry of the first line with the bayonet, passed the camp behind it, and had already broken some squares of the second line, when the Archduke Charles rendered this attack unsuccessful, by a speedy assault at the head of the troops again rallied. The Prince of Hohenzollern, the danger on his left wing being over, hastened to help the Archduke with the same regiment which had cut up the grenadiers of Oudinot, attacked at the head of this regiment and two divisions of hussars, the cavalry of the enemy then coming on with such success, that the advancing column was obliged to give up the advantages obtained, and could only by a quick retreat avoid its total defeat.

Nearly at the same time that these columns penetrated the Austrian line behind Baumersdorf, the first column of the Saxon corps had advanced to the other side of Aderklaa. Although Napoleon's chief design in this battle was to cut off the Austrian army from Hungary, by turning and throwing back its left wing and to force it to a disadvantageous retreat to Bohemia, Prince Ponte-Corvo con-

ceived it more conformable to circumstances to attack the Austrian centre near Deutsch-Wagram, and to break through it if possible. Convinced of thereby attaining the most decisive victory and of finishing the battle altogether on the 5th with less sacrifice, he ordered the attack on Deutsch-Wagram, sent word of it to the Emperor, and begged him to support him with from 20 to 30,000 men. Accordingly the first Saxon column which had passed Aderklaa had formed for an attack, protected by its batteries, which began a cannonade against Deutsch-Wagram and set it on fire; the Saxon cavalry posted to cover it opposed the Austrian, which formed a new line to the left of the village after having been forced to retreat. When the second column, which followed the first, had nearly arrived on the height of Aderklaa, it undertook to storm Deutsch-Wagram under a most heavy fire of shells and grape from the batteries which were placed on the height to the right behind Deutsch-Wagram. At about 100 or 150 paces from this place it was received by the fire of the infantry defending the village, which was covered by several natural obstacles. However, the Saxon infantry succeeded in taking that part of the village to the left of the entrance from Aderklaa, when the second column advanced more to the right and forced the above entrance with the bayonet. But the result of this successful attack was not more fortunate than those of Markgrafenneusiedel and Baumersdorf, from not being supported by fresh troops. The Saxon infantry was forced, after a hot engagement in the village, to abandon it in the dark, and having formed in close columns, took a position between Deutsch-Wagram and Aderklaa quite close in front of the Austrian centre.

Those were the movements of the corps of the Duke of Auerstaedt, Oudinot, the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, and the Duke of Rivoli, which advanced on the 5th of July. The Duke of Rivoli was ordered in the night of the 5th to abandon his position near Gross-Asparn, and to place his corps between Aderklaa and Sussenbrunn, with the exception of a division which he should leave at Gross-Asparn.

The passage of the Italian army had been made immediately after that of the Saxon corps; it entered the line at the beginning of the night, to the left of the corps of Oudinot; there arrived also near Raschdorf, during the night, the guards, the reserve of cavalry, and the corps of the Duke of Ragusa; the quick passage of which had been furthered by the completion of two new bridges.

The night passed more tranquilly than might have been expected after the events which had happened the day before. The corps which had been engaged, remained in the last appointed positions. The Emperor Napoleon, who remained in the centre of his army near Raschdorf, profited by the night in bringing up the beforenamed corps, and ordered them to form several lines behind the corps of Oudinot, that they might be ready, at break of day, to be best employed according to the Austrian positions and movements.

The Archduke Charles made, during the short night in his head-quarters at Deutsch-Wagram, the following disposition of attack for the next day.

"The 6th, the 3rd, and the grenadier corps, are destined to attack the left wing of the enemy; Field Marshal Lieutenant Count Klenau is to lean his right upon the Danube and to keep up the communication with the Great Master of Ordnance, Kollowrath, who is to direct his march by Leopoldau towards Brietenlee; the latter will join the grenadier corps, which is to direct its march to Sussenbrunn. These three corps are to continue a brisk attack in the before-mentioned directions.

"The corps of reserve under General Prince Lichtenstein, is to move forward between Aderklaa and Sussenbrunn, to watch the communication to the right, with the grenadier corps, and to the left with the 1st corps under General Count Bellegarde.

"The 1st corps is to move to Aderklaa, to keep up the communication with the cavalry corps, and to lean its left upon the Russbach. But Count Bellegarde is to hold the height behind Deutsch-Wagram, with a part of his corps, which also is to cross the Russbach in proportion as the right wing succeeds in advancing on the right bank of this rivulet. Field Marshal Lieutenant Prince Hohenzollern is to hold with the 2nd corps, to the last extremity, the position behind the Russbach, and crossing it, will advance in proportion as the 1st corps moves forward.

"Field Marshal Lieutenant Prince Rosenberg is to advance with the 4th corps against the right wing of the enemy, against which the Archduke John is already in march.

"The Great Master of Ordnance, Prince Reuss, is to hold the Spitz, the Schwarze Lache, and the other posts on the Upper Danube.

"The Great Master of Ordnance, Count Kollowrath, is to leave behind a brigade with a battery on the height of Stammersdorf.

"The 3rd and 6th corps will set out at one o'clock in the morning; Field Marshal Lieutenant d'Aspré with the grenadiers at three in the morning. Prince Lichtenstein is to advance with the cavalry in proportion as the head of the grenadiers comes on. The 1st corps is to attack Aderklaa at four o'clock in the morning, and Count Bellegarde will hasten his attack according as Prince Lichtenstein arrives near enough to be able to co-operate in it.

"Prince Rosenberg will move at four o'clock in the morning, in order to attack the right wing of the enemy, and is to watch the communication with the Archduke John, near Siebenbrunn.

"The order of battle of the infantry is in columns or squares, with some skirmishers in front. Quietness is particularly recommended, and the useless firing at too great distances forbidden.

"The order of march as well as the formation of the advanced guards, is left to every commander of corps. Prince Lichtenstein, is to give a regiment of cavalry to the column of grenadiers for its advanced guard.

"The Archduke, Generalissimo, will be with the corps of Count Bellegarde.

"The first reserve of ammunition remains at Gross-Engersdorf, the second at Wolkersdorf. The ammunition for the infantry is near the Helmhof."

The different corps of the French army were still, in the morning of the 6th, in the positions they had taken during the night, when the corps of the right and left Austrian wings moved according to the disposition they had also received during the night. The Prince Ponte-Corvo was now obliged to abandon the position he had taken in the night, and formed a line on this side of Aderklaa to the left of the Italian army. The Duke of Rivoli followed him and placed his corps behind his left wing in such a manner that it extended to Breitenlee. This retrograde movement induced General Bellegarde, who was advancing, to send a detachment of cavalry to reconnoitre. Several wounded lying in Aderklaa, and the soldiers who had carried them there, were made prisoners by this detachment, which occupied the village until the advanced guard of the first Austrian corps came to take possession of it, and this corps formed a line between Aderklaa and the Russbach, having Deutsch-Wagram in its rear.

Prince Rosenberg marched at the same time, in three columns, against the Duke of Auerstaedt, and these two corps became first engaged. Grosshofen and Glinzendorf, the points on which the right wing of the French leaned, were to be taken before the intended attack from the Austrian left wing could be made with success, but the Austrians were always repulsed with the same valour with which they repeatedly attacked these villages. The whole corps of Auerstaedt was engaged, by degrees, with the enemy. A battery of twelve 12-pounders advanced and fired with grape, in the flanks of the Austrians; and Napoleon, who was present there, ordered a division of cuirassieurs of the reserve to be sent towards Kümmerleinsdorf, which manœuvre made the enemy fear for his left flank, and forced Prince Rosenberg to retreat to the other side of the Russbach. However, he could but a short time defend this position against the contiuual attacks of the French right wing, and was ordered by the Archduke Charles to retire to his former position behind Markgrafenneusiedel.

After these dispositions made on the right wing, Napoleon passed the front of the corps of Oudinot and of the Italian and Saxon corps, and went to the left wing of his army in order to observe from thence the movements of the Austrian right wing, which, according to the dispositions of the Archduke Charles, was in full march towards the French left wing. Several batteries of Italian and Saxon corps, which were some hundred paces before the line, had begun a cannonade with those of the corps of Bellegarde, and had set Aderklaa on fire by shells, when the Austrian General-in-Chief expecting the arrival of the corps of Kollowrath, and of the Grenadier corps, ordered the reserve corps of cavalry to be posted to the right of Aderklaa in the line to Sussenbrunn. Napoleon, intending to check the movements of the Austrian right wing, so that it might not be able to attempt anything decisive against the rear of the left wing, while his right moved in the left flank of the enemy, ordered several regiments of Italian and Saxon cavalry to be sent against the Austrian reserve of cavalry, which moved forward near Aderklaa, and resolved an attack on the Austrian centre near this place.

The Prince of Ponte-Corvo and the Duke of Rivoli were ordered to advance towards Aderklaa. After a hot engagement of all kinds of arms, they succeeded in taking this village, and in repulsing the troops opposed to them; but the General, Count Bellegarde, and the generals under him, soon rallied and formed their troops to attack, which was executed with success conjointly with the corps of grenadiers then arrived, and which forced the advanced French corps to retire to their village after a determined defence. The continual attacks on Aderklaa, as well as the success of the grenadiers near Sussenbrunn, towards the left flank of the Duke of Rivoli, at last forced these corps to retire in the direction of Raschdorf protected by the batteries which followed them.

During this warm engagement near Aderklaa the corps of Kollowrath and Klenau of the Austrian right wing had advanced in such a manner, that the division of the corps of Rivoli which had remained at Asparn, was forced to give ground to the attacks of Klenau, and to abandon to them the villages of Gross-Asparn and Essling. Gross-Asparn was strongly occupied by the Austrians, who began a brisk cannonade with the batteries on the Lobau. The corps of Klenau, which was formed in a line between Gross-Asparn and Breitenlee, was in communication with the corps of Kollowrath. This corps held the latter village, and was also in communication on the left with the reserve corps of cavalry and grenadiers, which had pursued the corps both of the Prince Ponte-Corvo and of the Duke of Rivoli.

The Emperor, in order to oppose this movement which threatened the left wing and the centre of the French army, ordered some divisions of the guards to march from the reserve against the corps of Kollowrath advancing from Breitenlee towards Raschdorf, by which divisions this corps was forced to give way, after a short resistance, and to retire to its first position to the left of Breitenlee.

In the meantime, the Duke of Auerstaedt had also kept up a continual cannonade with the Austrian left wing, which, reinforced by several squadrons and battalions of the corps of Hohenzollern, endeavoured to have a greater extension against the movements of the French right wing, which was turning it. The continual attacks of the French on the heights of Markgrafenneusiedel, which were of the greatest importance for the Austrian position, had always been repulsed by the dispositions of the Archduke Charles, who was present there, but the French artillery had caused great damage to the Austrians, and dismounted a great number of their pieces. The division of cuirassieurs, which had moved in the morning (when Prince Rosenberg attacked the French), in order to secure the French right wing, and to turn the Austrian left, had already arrived by Ober Siebenbrunn, (where the Austrian General, Frohlich, was forced to give way to it), at the extreme right, just as the Austrian centre and its right were advancing, and at the same moment that the Duke of Auerstaedt formed his corps again under the strongest fire of artillery, to attack Markgrafenneusiedel

with its heights. The corps of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo and of the Duke of Rivoli were, for want of ammunition, and on account of their great loss of men and dismounted artillery, no longer in a situation to make head against the pursuing enemy, and retired to the position of the columns of Macdonald and of the Bavarian division of Wrede, just arrived on the field of battle, in order to continue their retreat towards Raschdorf, and that in rear of the divisions of the guards advancing against the corps of Kollowrath. Arrived near the before-mentioned village they were ordered to change the direction of their march and to advance towards the Austrian right wing, on account of a successful attack upon Aderklaa made by General Lauriston with 100 pieces of artillery, as also by the columns of Macdonald, Wrede, and the divisions of the guards (which had previously formed a line against the corps of Kollowrath), and thereby forced the Austrians to abandon the village of Aderklaa, and to retire. At the same time the Duke of Auerstaedt had succeeded, after several unsuccessful attacks, in carrying Markgrafenneusiedel with its heights by assault, and all the attempts of Prince Rosenberg to retake those heights, were rendered fruitless by the superior force of the enemy, and by his own left flank being quite turned.

Oudinot, who was ordered to assault Baumersdorf after the success of this attack, and to move, when it was taken, towards Deutsch-Wagram with the corps of Auerstaedt, could execute this assault much quicker and more easily, as the Archduke Charles was forced, by the Archduke John's not arriving, and by the disasters of the centre and of the right wing, to order the retreat; and as the corps of Hohenzollern posted behind Baumersdorf was so much weakened by the troops detached to the left wing, that the position was occupied with only one line. Baumersdorf was abandoned about two o'clock in the afternoon without great resistance, and the Duke of Auerstaedt, who followed the march of Oudinot with a division of his left wing against Deutsch-Wagram, ordered the corps of Rosenberg and the advanced guard which were retiring to Bockfluss and to the Hohen Laithen Wood, to be briskly pursued by his other troops.

The Archduke Charles hastened to the centre, which had given way, oppressed by so many attacks, and which was the most dangerous point, because the breaking of the centre by the repeated attacks of the French would have exposed the army to an inevitable defeat. He animated the troops by his presence, and ordered the difficult retreat by the Bisamberg to Kornnenburg with great prudence.

In consequence, the corps of Bellegarde, which was the most exposed, retired the first, and was followed by the corps of cavalry and grenadiers, and afterwards by those of Kollowrath and of the Count Klenau, which latter had manœuvred in the morning with much success against the left flank and the rear of the French army, but was then briskly attacked and pursued by the corps of the Duke of Rivoli, which had arrived by way of Raschdorf.

In order to press, as much as possible, the general retreat of the

Austrian army, the corps of the Duke of Ragusa, which was in the reserve, was ordered to follow that of Oudinot, and the remaining divisions of the Italian army were to advance between Deutsch-Wagram and Aderklaa.

The Saxon corps which followed, near Raschdorf, that of Rivoli, advanced, upon its right flank, along the road by Breitenlee to Leopoldau.

At the close of the day, the whole French army, with the exception of the guards, which were left near Raschdorf, was in a line from Jedelsel through Gerasdorf to the heights on this side of Bockfluss and Auersthal; the advanced posts of the centre were established near Obersdorf, and those of the right wing at Schön-Kirchen.

Notwithstanding the excellent manner in which the retreat of the Austrian army, after so sanguinary a battle, was executed, it suffered a great loss, more by the effective fire of the artillery, by which the principal part of the army was pursued as far as the hills situated behind Stammersdorf and Gerasdorf, than by the cavalry which covered the batteries. Almost all their wounded and a considerable number of stragglers fell into the hands of the French. About nine o'clock in the evening, when only the last divisions of the army were disquieted by some shots, the corps of Bellegarde had, by its earlier retreat through Gerasdorf to Hagenbrunn, crossed the road to Moravia and taken a position behind this road with the right wing close to the Stammersdorf-Wood, in order to await there the arrival of the corps of grenadiers and cavalry which were likewise retiring by Gerasdorf. When these were formed in order of battle on the heights between Stammersdorf and Sauring before the corps Bellegarde, the right wing of the latter was extended by the corps of Kollowrath, which followed it as far as behind Stammersdorf; while the corps of Hohenzollern, which had, by order of the Archduke Charles, separated itself between Baumersdorf and Bockfluss from the corps of Rosenberg, formed a line upon the left flank of the latter corps. The corps of Klenau, the last which arrived near Stammersdorf, had taken a position in the night on this side of the above place, in order to cover the further retreat of those corps by Hagenbrunn and Engersdorf to Kornnenberg; and followed at the break of the next day the corps of Prince Reuss to Kornnenberg, which had remained during the night near the Bisamberg, to cover the Bohemian road.

At the same time that the above-mentioned corps, which had been posted on the heghts behind Stammersdorf and Gerasdorf, retired, Prince Hohenzollern also abandoned his position on the road to Moravia, and waited for daybreak in a new position before Enzesfeld, in order to continue his retreat by Stetten under the protection of a detachment of cavalry of General Nootitz, which had separated itself from the corps of Rosenberg, near Bockfluss, and which had passed the night before at Hebertsbrunn.

Prince Rosenberg, who had, the day before, continued his retreat to the Hohe-Laitha, and had sent a detachment to the defiles of Schweinwarth and Hohen-Rupersdorf, in order to cover his left

flank, took a position during the night on the other side of Volkersdorf on the skirt of the wood of Hohenlaitha.

The Archduke John, who could no longer hope after the loss of the battle, to effect anything decisive in the rear of the victorious army, had ordered his corps to repass the Marchfeld.

The French bulletin states that the total forces of the two armies in the battle, consisted of between 3 and 400,000 men and between 12 and 1300 pieces of artillery, of which the Austrian army had 200,000 men and 900 guns. But if we compare the account published in the Austrian bulletins (according to which the Austrian army had consisted, at the beginning of the battle, with the exception of the corps of Prince Reuss, only of 100,000 men and 410 guns, and had lost 30,000 men) with the French account, which states the Austrian army had been reduced to 60,000 men, with the loss of 10 stand of colours, 40 guns, and 20,000 men; the Austrian account appears to be more exact, from which the French army is estimated to have consisted of between 140 and 180,000 men with 584 guns. In the same manner, the French make no mention of prisoners, but state the loss to have been 1500 dead and between 3 and 4000 wounded, and according to the Austrian account they had lost 12 eagles, 11 guns, and 7000 prisoners.

THE GREAT GUN AT SOUTHSEA CASTLE.

THERE are individuals whose business appears to be the performance of useless labours. You are sure to find them cracking nuts that contain no kernels, putting blisters on wooden legs, and other acts of doubtful utility. Sometimes national efforts take the same direction. We suppose it has always been so, from the building of the Pyramids downwards; however, it is not our intention to wander over the dusty centuries to the period of misspent labour when these enormous structures were raised, in order to prove our case, for we are reminded that we live in a land where it is quite necessary to ask questions respecting the utility of many of the tasks we set ourselves. It must be admitted indeed, that our wasted labour sometimes assumes tolerable dimensions, particularly when we do it officially, for then we come out in grand style. We could instance a few cases, if we felt disposed, but as we do not happen to be in a grumbling humour just now, we refrain, nevertheless we cannot avoid noticing a little specimen recently exhibited at Portsmouth, which in a small way reflects much credit upon the genius of bungling.

We are, as everybody knows, upon the eve of important events in gunnery. It is quite impossible to say what may not be expected from Armstrong's gun and other cannons, breach loading and otherwise. We remember the astonishment with which we listened to the formal announcement made by General Peel in the House of

Commons of this approved invention, which, even in the guarded language of official information, he described as about to supersede the entire armaments of ships and forts throughout these realms. And he was not jesting, for immediately afterwards the talented inventor received honourable distinction from the Queen as a reward for his genius and skill.

We are not about to dilate upon the merits of this marvellous weapon, neither is it our intention to gratify public curiosity with any supposed authentic accounts of its powers, but as there really is no delusion about the efficiency of this gun, we propose to state a few of its good qualities for reasons that will presently appear.

In extent of range, destructive effect, and precision, this gun possesses, so says official report, a combination of advantages truly astounding. In the first place, its weight, which is one third less than that of an ordinary cannon of the same calibre, renders it so manageable that it can be handled by less than half the number of men required for an ordinary piece. Secondly, it is remarkable for its durability, for 1300 discharges produced not the least injury on the specimen gun.

The lightness of Armstrong's weapon renders it vastly superior to the ordnance used at Sweborg and Sebastopol, all of which were clogged with the great drawback of immovability. But these are only a tithe of the benefits likely to be derived from the extensive use of this gun. In addition to the advantages enumerated above, it throws shot as well as shell with the most deadly accuracy, and to a distance that staggers belief. If we may credit official statements, and no one else is permitted to know anything about the matter, a 32-pounder Armstrong will project a ball more than five miles and a quarter with only five pounds of powder. At 3000 yards, or nearly two miles, its precision is as great as that of an ordinary 32-pounder at 1000 yards, while at 1000 yards it hits an object fifty-seven times in succession, while the guns now mounted in all our forts and ships will hit it only once in that number of times. To state our meaning plainly, the destructiveness of artillery has been by this efficient gun, multiplied more than fifty-fold.

By means of this piece, an enemy's ship, it is confidently stated, may be sent to the bottom at a distance of a couple of miles; Armstrong says three, but we will take the lesser range as the safest. And further, the most deadly aim may be calculated upon, even at the long range, both with shot and shell. It must be mentioned also, that the shell fired is more destructive than any yet used or known, as it does not explode until after striking its object, so that the missile will pass through a ship's side and explode between decks, scattering destruction, &c.

We have not exhausted the good qualities belonging to this splendid invention. It is as superior to Napoleon's rifled cannon as his imperial gun is to a pea-shooter; but we have said enough to put the reader in possession of a fact, which in all likelihood he knew before, viz.—that Armstrong's invention is, without dispute, the most killing gun known.

Well, now to our story. There has been lately—very lately—a

gun—a huge, monstrous gun, mounted on the beach at Southsea, close to the Castle. And as most of our readers, whether Naval or Military, know, Southsea Castle is placed at that part of the shore, opposite to the head of the "Spit," round which, ships "pivot," in order to enter the channel, leading to Portsmouth Harbour. In this spot much engineering skill and science has been expended from the days of Henry VIII. to the present. It is a critical position. It is, in fact, just the spot where a hostile ship, intending to force an entrance into Portsmouth Harbour, ought to be taken at the greatest disadvantage by the batteries ashore.

The advance made in modern artillery, particularly with ships' guns, has reduced the castle defences considerably, and consequently it was found necessary, about twelve months since, to strengthen this position, by a couple of earth-work batteries, one being placed on each flank of the old Castle. These earthen batteries would stand a considerable deal of hammering, but it is to be feared that the Castle would not. Recently, a monster gun has been placed between the Western battery and the Castle, to add its fire to the many others that can be directed against a hostile ship or fleet that might attempt to round the Spit buoy, and enter Portsmouth Harbour.

It is against this overgrown piece of ordnance that we propose to fire a shot or two with the intention of drawing down upon us the fire of a rejoinder from somebody or other. Should such be the case, we anticipate to hear a satisfactory reason assigned why this huge blunderbuss has been placed in a commanding position, where none but the handiest and most efficient guns ought to be found.

We have no intention of saying anything in disparagement of the gun as a gun. It may be well adapted for service in some positions, but we conceive that at the important point at Southsea Castle it is out of its proper sphere. As evidence of our meaning we apprehend that a gun at this place ought to possess the following esentials. It ought to allow of rapidity of firing, and we subjoin the dimensions and weight of the weapon above mentioned, to show that rapid firing is not likely to be attained.

	ft.	in.
Length from breech-loop to muzzle . .	16	6
Length from base ring to muzzle . .	13	8
Base ring circumference . . .	11	4
Muzzle circumference	7	1¼
Bore diameter	1	1
Thickness of metal at breech . . .	1	10
Ditto ditto at muzzle . . .	0	7¼

Weight of gun, 22 tons; weight of carriage, 3 tons 2 cwt; weight of platform, 4 tons; weight of shot, 3 cwt; weight of service charge of powder, 78 lbs. It is evident that this enormous mass of wood and iron weighing upwards of 30 tons, is too ponderous to be handled with much rapidity. Indeed we have heard that when efficiently manned, it could not be fired quicker than once in two minutes.

The disadvantage, therefore, of a gun of this weight in such a position is that it could not be fired often at a ship endeavouring to

force the entrance of Portsmouth Harbour. For a ship under full steam would not be many minutes rounding the Bell buoy at Spithead, and she would be subject to the fire of this gun, and the Castle and battery guns only while she was passing them, and for this reason we conceive that a ponderous weapon, such as we have described, is not the best calculated, notwithstanding its enormous weight of shot, to dispute the passage of a hostile ship at this point. Of course any vessel attempting the hazardous exploit of forcing an entrance into our chief arsenal, would have to deal with many other batteries near the throat of the harbour, but we abstain from entering into that question, to avoid perplexity, as the subject is confined to the best description of gun necessary for the vicinity of Southsea Castle.

We have heard, but we cannot vouch for the truth of such a statement, that the gun is useless in consequence of a flaw in the chamber, and that it is placed where it is for the sake of ornament. If so, all we can say upon the subject, is—the sooner it is removed the better, and its place supplied with one of Armstrong's 32-pounders, which has the peculiar merit of throwing a ball with precision a couple of miles with 5lbs. of powder only, and also admits of great rapidity of firing. Such an arrangement would not only add an ornament to the Southsea beach—but afford protection at a most important point of our coast in the bargain.

With respect to the ornamental characteristics attributed to this monstrous mass of metal, we cannot avoid remarking, that it is in keeping with the ridiculous statues of two of England's greatest heroes, Nelson and Wellington, also erected on a conspicuous part of the open beach at Southsea. These caricatures are the laughing stock of every passer by. They were placed there doubtless, with the best intentions, but it reflects no credit and considerable blame upon the taste of the officials at our chief naval arsenal, thus to gibbet our two great naval and military worthies. Neither does it dispose one to place much reliance upon the skill of the engineer, who cumbers the *striking* point of a line of fortifications, with a useless instead of an efficient weapon.

PEEPS FROM THE LOOP-HOLES OF RETREAT.

By Retired Major Marksman.

"Riflemen, riflemen, riflemen, form!"

The earnest exhortations of Pietro l'Eremita, the respectable old monk of Picardy, the fiery arrow of the belligerous highlander, the tocsin in the depth of night, could not have created a more terrible tempest in the bosoms of templars, clansmen, and old women, than has been aroused in the hearts of the people of England, Ireland, and Scotland by the four words which lately formed the burthen of Mr. Alfred Tennyson's appeal. From the Land's End to John O'Groat's there has been nothing for the last month or six weeks but meetings of burghers, and meetings of deputy lieutenants,

clusterings of rustics, proclamations in market places, newspaper fillips, publications on national defences, and hints on the art of shooting with the rifle. The gunmakers are at their wit's end, the tailors and accoutrement makers are in despair, and half a million of gentlemen and their followers are dying to die for their country, and they cannot get organised, drilled, clothed, and equipped half fast enough. All is hurry, skurry, and confusion. Sober old soldiers, accustomed to do everything calmly and *en regle*, can neither understand nor relish such pell mell havoc, used as they are to "form" without a fuss.

And why all this excitement at the present juncture? Why, at this moment, more than three years, or seven years, or eleven years since? Is an enemy equipping at Cherbourg and Boulogne? Has the gauntlet been thrown down and taken up? Have the very pugnacious French colonels who sent fulsome, adulatory, preposterous addresses to the Emperor, when Orsini was found to have been casting his bullets in England, with regicidal purposes, been allowed to have their own way, and come over to *perfide Albion*? You will say 'No, but the course of events in Lombardy *may* bring England sooner or later into collision with her ancient enemy, and it is, therefore, right to be prepared for the worst." I grant all that; it is, as you, most excellent editor, have just insinuated, "right to be prepared." But, let me ask, is it not right to be *always* prepared? Are we not so circumstanced that something very much less than a political entanglement may, at any moment, embroil us with the peppery people over the way? Are we ever safe from sudden insult? Have not all the naval armaments which have been preparing in the French harbours for years past demonstrated that the expectation of a misunderstanding, to be settled by an invasion, is cherished in a certain Imperial bosom, to which it would hardly be polite more directly to allude? Believe me, I love old England too well to object to see her children arming for the protection of the *natale solum*. I should like to see them "forming" and fluttering every day of my existence, bedight in grey and drab, or any other sensible hue. But I do protest against all these spasmodic movements, this doing, under a feverish excitement, what ought to be accomplished with deliberation and due premeditation. "What's the good of it?" as my old landlady says about everything, the urgent necessity for which is not immediately apparent to her obfuscated intellects.

A country like Great Britain, whose political and commercial relations are so ramified that war, or expectation of war, is her normal condition, ought always to be fortified against every possible contingency; and it is not to be denied that if any body above the condition of a day labourer knew the use of a rifle, and would cheerfully submit to be gathered with his fellows at the bugle-sound to acquire a few lessons in defensive warfare—which involves, as you and I know, rather more than shooting at a mark—we should not only feel and be more secure, but a great moral effect would be produced abroad. I am old enough to remember the patriotic irritation of 1803, when the famous *armée* at Boulogne was being drilled by

Soult to embark in, and disembark from, the flotilla in *ten minutes*. We had then a regular army 130,000 strong, and a militia 80,000 strong. The House of Commons frantically voted first a conscription of 50,000, and then a levy *en masse* of all the men in the United Kingdom between the ages of 17 and 55, so that, according to Sir Francis Head, there were 300,000 *volunteers* (a curious abuse of the term) "enrolled, armed, and *disciplined*." Well, what came of it all? What was the national profit of this frenzied movement which put us to many hundreds of thousands of pounds of expense, disturbed trade, frightened families, and gave a false direction to men's minds? It did not alter Napoleon's plans, nor render our shores permanently safe. The abandonment by the French consul of the projected invasion was caused by the destruction of the fleet he had calculated upon as an escort, and the moment he turned his attention to Germany, England relapsed into her usual supineness. The consequence has been that she has exposed herself to the recurrence of those absurd panics, temporarily profitable to rifle manufacturers and *schneiders*, and injurious to every body else. We were seized with a "National Defence" mania when De Joinville's pamphlet came out; a similar fever afflicted us when Russia began to be very disagreeable about Turkey, and we are now in for it again. You shall see a reaction as rapid and as silly as its precursors, the moment the French Emperor returns from Italy to be hailed by Marseilles, Lyons, and Paris with *vivas* and fireworks.

Hotspur—Shakspeare's *Hotspur*—talked of plucking the flower "safety" out of the nettle "danger." The Ministry might profit by the hint. We shall not see many Volunteer Associations formed—certainly they will not prove formidable in their numbers. The whole thing, as far as the late sluggish and incompetent War Minister, Peel, lent it encouragement, was a premeditated failure. With a paltry show of interest in the matter he had the cool impudence to promise pay to the volunteers when actually *in the field*, and pensions to the *wounded and the widows of the slain*; thus trying to obtain credit for an outlay that might never have been demanded in order to save a few thousand pounds of immediate necessity! True, he afterwards engaged to supply ammunition to the several corps for purposes of rifle practice; but why? simply that, as the cartridges were only adapted to a certain class of musket, the volunteers might be obliged to purchase that particular musket of the Government at its own price! A beautiful dodge. It would be curious to hear whence those same muskets were to come. It is notorious that the army and the militia are not by any means fully supplied with the article; it cannot be made with the requisite rapidity either at Birmingham or in the Government factory. True there are, or were, 50,000 weapons lying in the Tower Ditch, and as they are pronounced useless by one of the War Office officials, it might have been in General Peel's contemplation to offer them to the volunteers after they had been rifled. But I can hardly believe this, much as I saw reason to despise the feebleness and chicanery of the late Secretary for War. Be that as it may—to return to what I said—the new Government might, if it chose, take advantage

of the present popular favour to turn it to permanent advantage. The "flower" is in its grasp. Instead of allowing the Associations to go on as they are now doing, wildly and without system, filling their ranks from all sources, they might sanction the formation of *Companies* of the educated classes, granting them the aid of competent instructors until some of the volunteers themselves were fitted for the task, and prohibiting the employment of all of the humbler classes who were not actually engaged in some trade or calling. This would prevent interference with the enlisting for the militia and the line.

The operations of the Emperor Napoleon III. and their possible bearing on the interests of England, naturally carry the mind back to the proceedings of Napoleon I., and from him the transition is easy to our own great Wellington.

It is not a very commendable habit to read two books at the same moment, but sometimes it is dictated by the opportunity of contrast. By accident, the correspondence of Napoleon I. with his brother Joseph, and the four supplementary volumes of the *Wellington Despatches* have reached me together, and their perusal has been a mighty banquet. The rich material emanating from the brains of two such extraordinary chiefs, would in itself have furnished innumerable feasts, but to the Englishman an additional enjoyment is provided, in contrasting the savage policy and reckless inhumanity of the French Consul and Emperor, to the great and generous measures of the British Major General.

How it happened that COLONEL GURWOOD left such an immense number as nearly 2,000 of the Duke's Indian letters and memoranda untouched, when at work at his remarkable compilations, is not quite comprehensible. Did he overlook them, or were they never in his way? Assuredly they are more valuable in every respect than all the documents having relation to the same subject, which appeared in the previous volumes. They come to us like a *bonne bouche*, after a dinner of ordinary meats.

It is very well put in a late number of the "Edinburgh Review," treating of historical writings and authorities, that letters and despatches, like journals entered day by day, exhibit faithfully the impressions of the moment. They are, therefore, more trustworthy than any narrative composed after the whole series of events has been worked out; the weaknesses and minor defects of the writer are disclosed, many transient feelings or thoughts will appear which his deliberate judgment would have rejected; "*but where there is genuine ability and true integrity these qualities will be more apparent from their evidence being undesigned.*" It is this last fact which imparts so singular a value to the Wellington Despatches; there *was* "great ability and true integrity" in their author, and those qualities are evident at every page. Now, take a few examples of his humanity, as contrasted with that of the first Napoleon. He is marching against the famous Scindiah to begin that campaign which was to close triumphantly with Assaye, Argaum, and Gawilghur. He addresses his army on the 11th of March, 1803, and these are his words:—

"The troops will enter the Mahratta country to-morrow morning, but they are *not* to consider it an enemy's country. The strictest order and discipline must be observed, and everything that is required from the country must be paid for. Major-General Wellesley will certainly punish any person who may be found guilty of a breach of this order."

He is aware of the importance of forage for his dragoons, but he will not have it taken by force. "A careful non-commissioned officer must accompany the cavalry followers to see that the forage be paid for." Still the men did plunder the natives, and most soundly were they flogged for helping themselves as Napoleon allowed his men to help themselves in Italy. Ahmednugghur was taken on the 12th of August, 1803. The temptation to plunder the town was great. The camp followers clustered in its vicinity to lay their hands on the property of the garrison. How does General Wellesley treat their cupidity?

"General Order.—A troop of native cavalry to be sent immediately to drive all the camp followers who are down near the fort of Ahmednugghur back into camp. The troop is to *cut down* any follower who does not instantly retire to camp. * * * One of the terms on which the killadar (governor of the fort) capitulated was, that he and his garrison should have their private property. Major-General Wellesley is convinced that there is no good soldier in this detachment who would infringe this capitulation, and he is determined that it shall not be infringed, and he will punish with the utmost severity any person who may be found plundering in the fort of Ahmednugghur."

These orders arose from no mawkish sensibility; they were the offspring of a lofty sense of justice, which led him to discriminate between the innocent inhabitants of a town or village and the active enemy. General Wellesley was not so sparing of hostile marauders. On his march to Assaye, the Pindarees, in the service of the enemy, attacked his supplies, and set the village people a-going. So he writes to Sir John (then Captain) Malcolm: "A gallows or two will remedy the evil."

As a further proof of his humanity and consideration for his suffering soldiers, read his Morning Order of the 8th October, 1803, dated at Adjuntee:—

"Major-General Wellesley *requests* the officers, excepting those commanding corps, or those whose duty it may be, will not go into hospital, as the crowds that go there only tend to disturb the wounded men. * * The wounded men are much distressed by the sun in the buildings which they occupy, and Major-General Wellesley will be *much obliged* to commanding officers of corps if they will order as many shades as possible to be made by the men of their corps with the boughs of trees, &c., &c." And then he goes on to desire that the Sepoy boys of each regiment be sent to the hospital to attend upon and take care of the wounded.

Mark the gentlemanly tone in which the orders are couched. There is nothing of the insolence of the successful chief in this form of instruction. Wellesley was as much above the forgetfulness of

courtesy which marked the bearing of his great European rival, Napoleon, as he was superior to exultation in the hour of victory. He fulfilled his duties calmly and steadily, and he gave his troops credit for the same indifference to extravagance of laudation, and the same independence of all verbal stimulus to action as he himself invariably manifested. After the triumph at Assaye, he simply "returns his thanks to the troops for their conduct in the action, the result of which was so honourable to them, and likely to be so advantageous to the public interest;" and says, "he has every reason to applaud the conduct of the cavalry, particularly that of the 9th Dragoons," the loss of whose Lieut.-Colonel he "deeply regrets."

General Wellesley was in much peril at Assaye; but he makes no other mention of it than is contained in the following three lines of a letter to Sir John Malcolm:—

"The bay horse was *shot under me*, and Diomed was *piked*, so that I am not now sufficiently mounted. Will you let me have the grey Arab?"

As the General advanced into Scindia's country, the soldiers took to plundering the villages, in spite of his repeated orders. This angered him exceedingly. He was determined to make examples of men who forgot at once their military obedience and the duties of humanity. Accordingly, on the 7th of November, he issued an order for the rolls of the Artillery, the 74th and 78th Highlanders, to be called every hour. Four drummers of the 78th were directed to attend immediately with their cats at the provost-serjeant's tent, to inflict two hundred lashes on a man of the 78th, with whom one of the cattle had been found, and he gives notice that he will punish *with death* any one found guilty of plundering.

Admirable Wellesley! While he was thus dignifying the profession of the soldier by his rigid sense of honour and discipline and kindly feeling towards the unfortunate and inoffensive, the mighty enslaver of Europe, who in aftertimes affected to despise the Sepoy General, was travelling between Paris and Boulogne to visit the armament which he had prepared for a descent on England—on that little island whose Wellesley was afterwards to take a distinguished part in baffling his policy and crushing his ambition.

To turn from books to the business of current life; from the history of the past to the activity of the present; I must record the gratification of an old soldier at the efforts which, under the auspices of Colonel Lefroy, appear to be making for the intellectual advancement of the soldiery. The labours and anxieties of commanders are so much assuaged by their having to deal with an educated rather than an ignorant soldiery, that every officer at the head of a regiment, and every officer who even hopes to be placed in that position of honour and responsibility, has a deep and direct interest in the cultivation of the men. Thirty thousand is a large proportion of ignorance in an army of a hundred and twenty thousand men, and in that thirty thousand there are not included twenty-seven thousand more who can read but not write. My old comrades who have held command, agree with me that a man cannot be too well educated. If a "little learning" *be* a dangerous thing, *no* learning is

fifty times more perilous. The difficulties of teaching adults are evidently great. They have ideas immensely in advance of the simplest words we use to express ideas. You cannot raise monosyllables to the standard of knowledge acquired in the public house and the market place; consequently there is an immense bridge of rudimental learning, beginning at the alphabet and going up to polysyllables, to be crossed before the language in which ordinary facts are stated can be read. He would be a mighty benefactor to the army who should solve the problem which embarrasses Colonel Lefroy, and all who honourably labour under his inspection. I have, ere now, lectured to soldiers, and used in the process the simplest and most familiar terms I could possibly think of, to impart a few items of knowledge; but very much of the effort has been thrown away. "If the Major would only throw all that into small change!" has been the remark of many of the most illiterate. Hundreds of the north country soldiers use a dialect and a vocabulary as little like pure Saxon as the Hindostanee or Mahratta tongues, so that one has to reduce everything to an ultra simplicity, almost incompatible with the communication of advanced ideas. However, in this marvellous age of intellectual resource the greatest obstacles to knowledge are overcome; and one cannot help hoping, with Colonel Lefroy, that some of the ingenious men who devote themselves to the mental culture of their species will discover a method of preparing books that will be intelligible to the veriest clown that ever accepted the shilling.

GENERAL SHAW KENNEDY ON ORDER OF BATTLE AND THE CONVOY OF TROOPS.

THE following interesting remarks on subjects which are now engaging a large share of attention in the military world have been forwarded to us by General Shaw Kennedy.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

The question has been raised by some military men whether it is not altogether an exaggeration to say that twenty thousand men are required for each mile of front of an army when formed in order of battle.

I have stated in the "Notes on the Defences of Great Britain and Ireland," that twenty thousand men are required for each mile of the front of a line of battle.

This, to the unprofessional reader, requires explanation.

Judging from the opinions of the greatest masters on the higher parts of war, the composition of an army in the field should be in the following proportions:—

Supposing the number of infantry to be defined, the remainder of the army should consist of $\frac{1}{5\frac{1}{2}}$ of Cavalry, $\frac{1}{8}$ of Artillery, $\frac{1}{30}$ of Engineers, and $\frac{1}{60}$ of Train.

Now this calculation is made by different authorities in two different ways, which bring out somewhat different results, and which may depend partly on the country in which the army is to operate.

By one of these modes of calculations the fractions, as above, are taken as parts of the whole army; by the other, they are taken as parts of the infantry of the army.

By the first of these modes of calculation the proportions of Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers will be greater in reference to the infantry than by the second method.

I shall, therefore, give both methods of calculation.

This calculation is facilitated, and made quite certain, by the perfect accuracy with which it can be ascertained how many infantry are required for occupying the front of a mile in a line of battle.

The following being the indisputable data on which that calculation proceeds—First, that every soldier occupies a front of 21 inches—second, that the intervals between battalions, when in line of battle, is five paces—third, that every order of battle has two lines of infantry two deep, the rear line being about 300 yards behind the first; and that, in addition to these lines, a fourth of the whole of the infantry is always held in reserve.

The battalions may be considered as 700 men strong each, the officers in front ten, and the colours as occupying the space equal to the front of three men; from these data we arrive at the result that eleven thousand two hundred infantry are required to occupy the two front lines of an order of battle.

Now calculating by the two methods as explained in the last paragraph, and stating the second method as being the simplest mode of calculation, first, we have

11,000 Infantry = $\frac{3}{4}$ of the whole infantry, consequently

3,666 $\frac{2}{3}$ ditto = the reserve—that is to $\frac{1}{4}$ of the whole infantry.

14,667 = to the whole infantry required for one mile.

2,667 = $\frac{2}{11}$ of the infantry, being the whole cavalry on an average required for each mile of front.

1833 = $\frac{1}{8}$ of the infantry, being the artillery required on an average for each mile of front.

490 = $\frac{1}{30}$ of the infantry being the number of engineers.

212 = $\frac{1}{69}$ of the infantry being the number of train.

19869 = Total by this mode of calculation for one mile.

And the other mode of calculation is as follows.

Let x represent the whole force for one mile of front, then we have

$$x = 14667 + \frac{1}{5\frac{1}{4}}x + \frac{1}{8}x + \frac{1}{30}x + \frac{1}{69}x$$

$$\text{or, } x = 14667 + \frac{64602}{182160} \text{ (or) } \cdot 35464.$$

But if the decimal ·35464 represents one fraction of x the decimal ·64536 must represent the other.

To obtain the value of ·35464, we have—

·64536 : 14667 : : ·35464 : 8059.

Consequently the number of men for each mile of a field of battle, according to this mode of calculation, is 22,726.

As instances in practice as to the number of troops, occupying on an average a mile of front in a line of battle, it will be found from Mitchell's plans, and from the numbers given by Napier, that on the main lines of battle, independent of the detached forces, at Vittoria and Salamanca, there were more than 20,000 men on each mile of front.

At Waterloo, the front of the Duke of Wellington's line of battle was two miles, and his force actually on that field of battle was 67,655 men, consequently 33,827 to each mile of front; and Napoleon formed his line opposite to Wellington on a front of 2¼ English miles, with a force of 71,974 men; consequently Napoleon had—say—32,000 men for each mile of front of his line of battle.

It is thus proved both theoretically and practically, that as a general principle 20,000 men is not too great a force to assign, of an army, for occupying each mile of its front as a line of battle.

But this must be varied of course, according to the skill of the commander.

An army may occupy ground of great natural strength, or ground part of which is occupied by strong works; or may occupy ground not presenting any strength, opposite to which the enemy displays very great depth of his masses of attack: in the first two cases less than 20,000 men per mile may be required, in the last more.

Convoy of Troops.

Having stated in my Notes on the National Defences that sixty frigates can convey, for a passage of ten or twelve hours, 120,000 men, it seems proper to show on what grounds that statement is made.

My first instructor on the embarkation of troops was the late Admiral Sir John Hill, who, I believe, had more experience than any other person in the kingdom in the embarkation and disembarkation of troops.

I acted with him for three years in the constant embarkation and disembarkation of troops, and we embarked the whole British army of occupation, and part of the Russian army of occupation.

Hill's general opinion as to the tonnage required for the conveyance of troops, was, that for passages of a few hours, one ton for one man was required; two tons for one man in medium voyages—such as to Lisbon or the Mediterranean; and three tons per man for voyages to the East and West Indies.

I was in communication with Hill in 1853—after he had seen the perfection to which steam navigation had arrived—on the subject of the probability of the French attempting a landing in this country; for I was then preparing Notes on the Defences.

I have now the very great advantage of the opinions of Admiral Dacres, who has had much experience in the embarkation and disembarkation of troops; his experience has extended up to the latest

period, and to witnessing the embarkations and disembarkations of the French troops in the operations against the Crimea.

It is not alone respecting the capabilities of vessels for conveying troops that I have profited by the general intelligence, and great experience and knowledge of naval affairs of Admiral Dacres.

The following two most important and perfectly conclusive instances are given by him, showing the number of troops, in addition to their crews, that can be conveyed by steam vessels, for short passages, in proportion to their tonnage.

The Radamanthus, a paddle steam vessel of 880 tons, under Commander Duffil, conveyed from Oviedo to St. Sebastian, 1,100 troops at one time.

Length between perps.	164·7
Breadth extreme	32·10

The Salamander, a paddle steam vessel of 880 tons, under the command of Captain (now Admiral) Dacres, carried repeatedly 1,000 soldiers, and on one occasion 1,100, from St. Andre to Passages.

Length between perps.	175·5
Breadth extreme	32.2

The distance from the port of Oviedo (Gijon), is, by Lopez, reduced map, 180 geographical miles; and from Passages to St. Andre, 110 geographical miles.

The distance from Cherbourg to Torbay is ninety geographical miles.

Those two cases prove, to demonstration, that for the conveyance of troops such distances by sea as from 100 to 200 geographical miles, not more than one ton of shipping is required for each man; it will be observed that in the above two instances, only four-fifths of a ton was allowed to each man.

This, therefore, bears out completely the assertion in the "Notes on the Defences of Great Britain and Ireland," that sixty frigates will convey 120,000 men on such a voyage as that from Cherbourg to Torbay, for the average size of frigates will now exceed that tonnage, as may be seen by the tonnage of the following screw steam frigates:—

FRIGATES.

GUNS	NAMES	TONS	GUNS	NAMES	TONS
51	Imperieuse	2358	18	Leopard	1406
51	Euryalus	2371	16	Tiger	1221
51	Chesapeake	2377	16	Magicienne	1258
51	Shannon	2667	16	Furious	1287
51	Liffey	2654	16	Valorous	1257
51	Emerald	2913	50	Phæton	1942
51	Melpomene	2861	50	Indefatigable	2047
51	Forte	2364	50	Arethusa	2127
51	Topaze	2659	50	Octavia	2127
50	Orlando	3740	50	Nankin	2049
40	Mersey	3733	50	Phœbe	2044
47	Arrogant	1872	50	Sutlej	2067
32	Diadem	2483	50	Severn	1935
32	Doris	2483	28	Diamond	1055
31	Tribune	1570	28	Niobe	1052
31	Curacoa	1571			

It is to be calculated upon by those who are not determined to shut their eyes upon the subject, that not only is it proved that sixty frigates will convey even more than 120,000 men for a short passage, but it clearly follows from the ease with which vessels of from 1,000 to 3,000 tons are now built, that vessels of a coarse construction and of inferior timber, for such short passages as that of merely crossing from Cherbourg to the English coast, may be easily and very rapidly constructed, that would either steam, or, if sailing vessels, would be towed by the steamers. This view is strongly borne out by the facts stated in the "Navies of the World," that fir is chiefly used in the construction of the Russian navy, and that "many merchant vessels built at New York almost exclusively of yellow pine, cut but a few months before it was used, were found to have their deck beams in a perfectly sound state after the lapse of more than a quarter of a century." Transports may be constructed of iron, of hard wood, or of soft wood; and may be flat bottomed or otherwise, to suit the depth of water of the harbour for which each vessel is intended.

This is a view of the subject that has by no means been sufficiently attended to, and which a vast number of people in this country seem determined not fairly to allow themselves to consider.

The perfect ease with which very large flat-bottomed boats may be prepared for rapidly landing an army is another most important matter hitherto overlooked in this country.

Those observations are not made at hazard; they are supported by very high naval authority, and are so directly deducible from the actual products of naval construction, as now existing, that the obvious inference can only be obstructed by the very prevalent feeling in this country that her shores are sacred against all hostile approach.

It is stated in my Notes on the National Defences, with the expression of some doubt as to its absolute accuracy, that a steam vessel of 1800 tons is capable of conveying for a passage of a few hours, such as that of crossing the Channel, 1000 men and 400 horses.

This statement was arrived at as follows:—

A friend of mine, Dr. Kennedy, was returning to India by the passage round the Cape, in a steam vessel of 1800 tons.

This I thought a good opportunity for ascertaining what number of men and horses a vessel of that size could convey.

Dr. Kennedy stated my object to the captain of the vessel, who very readily undertook to deliberately consider the question, and in due time to give him the answer.

This answer he gave after having been for some time at sea, and having taken the dimensions of the vessel, and all the circumstances into full consideration; and the answer was, as will be seen by the following copy of his letter, which was transmitted to me from Teneriffe.

My dear Sir,

In answer to your queries, which I have much pleasure in furnishing, I shall commence by giving you the dimensions of our lower deck, the part most eligible for carrying horses.

	ft.	in.
Extreme length of main deck	192	0
Breadth, average	34	0
Length over all on deck	285	0
Breadth	38	6
Height of 'tween decks...	8	0
Depth of hold	23	0

Horse power...	300
1800 tons	
Knots	10
Screw propeller	
Horses	400
Men	1000

Say for twenty-four hours. Having ample space for provisions and water.

You are quite at liberty to make use of this in any way you please. If there is any further information I can provide you with, pray do not scurple to command me.

With best regards, I am, my dear Sir,
Yours faithfully,
(Signed.) J. SCEALES.

Dr. Kennedy, R.M.S.S. "Calcutta." At Sea, 23rd May, 1853.

As to the far more than ample means which exist for easily constructing in the ports of France any quantity of steam transports that could possibly be wanted for the conveyance of an army of 200,000 men, with the whole of its stores and every necessary equipment, reference is made to the account of the French Ports and Naval Arsenals as given in the "Navies of the World."

J. S. KENNEDY, Lieut.-General.

Bath, June 21, 1859.

THE SANITARY COMMISSION FOR INDIA.

ANOTHER Commission having reference to India, not for further consideration on the reorganization of that country's army, but one to take into consideration the best method for preserving the European force in health; in fact, a Sanitary Commission.

With reference to this work can be said, "better late than never;" but even at this late hour it is well the authorities should have discovered that it is worth while investigating the causes of sickness and mortality in the British soldier, and, by appointing a commission, show how anxious they are that the cause, if removable, should be removed. Had this been done long years ago, how many a valuable life might have been saved, how many a lost one—humanly speaking—still be found. But we do not intend crying over spilled milk. We wish not to remind those that obstructed progress of how much they have to answer. We know, as all connected or taking an in-

terest in the welfare of the British soldier in India know, that thousands of our countrymen have lost their lives in India through the Governments (for we excuse neither the home nor Indian) not taking the commonest precautions against the useless exposure of European troops. Indeed we may say, that through the want of a code of directions regarding the treatment of British soldiers, from the time of their arrival until their departure, many a fellow creature has perished, and that valuable lives have been sacrificed to ignorance and want of arrangement. It was no man's business—there were two governments, and they worked not together. It does not require an old man—no, not even an ensign of long standing—to remember when troops were landed in India in the grilling month of May, and left to manage for themselves, either at Calcutta, Madras, or Bombay, until, the cool weather coming on, they were forwarded in batches to their respective destinations. Before November, or the commencement of the cool weather, how many of the Honourable Company's recruits had fallen a victim to neglect and grog shops there are no statistics to show; but we know they died fearfully quick. With new arrivals, either recruits or line of Her Majesty's service, under such arrangements, the death was only longer delayed. Discipline for a time preserved the man, but climate would tell, and eventually Her Majesty's soldier sank, and added one more to the victims of a double government.

It took one hundred years for the authorities to discover that beer was more wholesome for European soldiers than arrack, and, in their substitution of the former for the latter, common sense told them that it should not be brought to India before October. The same awakened intellect found out that as with beer so with the drinker, and that it were well that both arrived at a fitting season. Even yet the true value of the English soldier was unknown, though judged as costing one hundred pounds before arriving in India; still he was not fully appreciated. It required a massacre and mutiny to do this. It required England to put forth her utmost energies before she could know how precious was even one of her sons in that distant clime. After an empire had been gained and lost—after the best, bravest, aye, and some of the fairest, had been slain—after it was discovered that on the white face alone we could rely, then, and not until then, did the authorities deem there was a necessity for inquiring into the best means for preserving the health of the British soldier in India.

It is now done, and, as we before said, "better late than never." But whether the members of the Commission are such as will thoroughly investigate the question remains to be proved. In surgeon J. R. Martin, the Government have selected a most capable man, and one whose previous investigations into the subject will aid the Commission, and lighten its labours. A sanitary, not a political Commission, was the requirement of India; but with men wedded to old systems, and so entangled in political strife as are some of the other members, we fear the result of this inquiry will be unsatisfactory. In Mr. Sidney Herbert we have no confidence, and not a little satisfied shall we be to find that the onerous duties of Secretary at War require his removal from the list of members.

We trust that before the Commission put the country to the expense of summoning witnesses, they will ascertain, as far as lays in their power, the quality of the evidence they are likely to obtain, and how far the views and opinions or experience of the witness to be summoned would throw light on the matter under investigation. The Commission will find that men, whether of longer or shorter service in India, are full of crotchets, and that length of service is no criterion of knowledge. Whatever evidence may be given, or however varying the opinions of the witnesses may be, we beg that the members of this will—unlike their predecessors in the Army Re-organization Commission—not delay in coming to a decision. Let them once begin to dread responsibility, or pass an unusually difficult question from themselves to India for solution, and all hope of improvement through anything they may propose will have fled. Indeed, they will prove more of an incumbrance than a benefit.

By acting speedily, and at once determining what, in a sanitary point of view, are the necessities of the British soldier in India, they will not only save life, but enable the Indian Government to commence action; but if delays and references are allowed, not only will many a valuable life be sacrificed, but the Government be too tied to be able to step in and check it.

The subject before them is not a very difficult one, and can be probably easier determined by statistics than by hearing witnesses. Witnesses have crotchets, and often see no cure for an evil but one of their own choosing; whereas in statistics there are more of these things, so they can be better depended upon. The jealousy existing between the Presidencies will blind the eyes to faults, and each witness will advocate the adoption of such measures as he has been accustomed to see. Even the very hill climates will be advocated as superior, according as the witness is attached to the Hymalayah-Mahabaleswur or Neilgherry districts.

Each of these mountainous districts are doubtless excellent, both in scenery and climate, and we believe that were an European on his first landing sent to any of the cantonments, and kept there for the remaining portion of his life, no injurious effect would have resulted, nor his term of life in any way shortened; but that any of them have the restorative powers of Europe we think will never be proved. In the magnificent scenery the diseased mind may find joy; in the cool breezes the diseased body may find relief. Refreshing sleep can be obtained, and disease may be checked; but where absolute disease exists, the Commission will learn that "Home" alone can find the cure.

No man born and bred in latitudes extending not farther south than 48°, will be as capable of undergoing fatigue in places however elevated, but where the latitude is not above 34°. The liver, enlarged and diseased by exposure to the burning plains of India, can never recover its action and healthy state under the blazing sun of latitude 34°. Our possessions in India extend from 8°. to 34°. N.

In no part of India is there a temperate zone. Malte-Brun in commenting on a remark made by Montesquieu on the astonishing fact, "that political revolutions in Asia owed their rapidity to the

physical geography of that part of the world, as weak nations were opposed to strong; people, warlike, brave, and active, border on those who are effeminate, idle, and timid," says: "It is necessary to combine this just remark with another truth proved by physical geography, namely, that Asia has no temperate zone, no intermediate region between very cold and very hot climates.

Then, to avoid the European becoming effeminate, idle, and timid, he should be placed where the climate in some degree approaches his own, extremes being avoided.

Perhaps of all the elevated regions extending from north to south of the peninsular of India, the Neilgherries are the best adapted for European sanitaria. Their elevation is considerable, and they are easy of access; moreover in the vast amount of level surface, sites for barracks, cricket grounds, and gardens can be found. The climate, too, is less liable to variation than the other hills, and appears to be altogether better adapted for the European constitution than the Hymalayah or Mahabaleswur. Labour, too, is cheap and abundant, and besides being capable of growing tea, coffee, oats, potatoes, and all European fruits and vegetables flourish.

To quote the words of Captain Ouchterlony, "The climate of the Neilgherries is most magnificent; in fact, you have half a dozen climates here. There are four distinct English settlements there, every one of which has a different climate. It is the greatest blessing to us that we have this district of the Neilgherries—it has never been half appreciated."

The Mahabaleswur, though not presenting so much table land, still is a blessing also, and can, in its beautiful scenery and climate, help to restore the diseased body and mind of the European soldier.

The Hymalayah, though far colder, is, perhaps, the least of all beneficial. The grand scenery may help to cure the mind, but the fatigue incurred in moving but one hundred yards injures the already weak body. Here the debilitated European finds no table land. Nothing but a chaos of rugged mountains, on the scarped sides of which a barrack or house is built. Here, in the sites hitherto selected for sanitaria, is no level ground adapted for games and gardens. Around the barracks—perched one above another—are, perhaps, a few feet of stony soil; the huge rocks formerly protruding high above the surface now reduced by the agency of gunpowder to the level of the knee. In this sterile soil no spade can penetrate, no garden be made. The sites for barracks have been badly selected; elevation was the chief consideration. In the Hymalayah the sites for barracks were chosen before it was known that out-door recreation, such as cricket and gardening, contributed greatly to preserving the soldier's health. It is only within the last few years that the soldier has been known to possess a mind, and that by keeping that healthy the body was preserved also.

We believe that statistics will prove that great elevation is not conducive to health, and the more moderate height of the barracks at Subathoo shew a less per centage of sickness than elsewhere; but whether at this low elevation, some 4,000 feet above the sea, the cure

is as speedy and permanent, remains to be shewn. There is more room for exercise at Subathoo, and this may be the cause. Certainly at any other of the hill stations in the Hymalayah there is not room for the men to play any out-door game; and the bare, sterile soil is unfit for gardens. This could have been avoided, and must be for the future. The Hymalayah are certainly massed together in frightful confusion, presenting little else than dense jungle, and steep precipices; still elevated plateau are to be found, having in them every advantage that can be required—wood, water, stone, and in many places a clay sufficiently tenacious to form the best bricks. All these things have been pointed out over and over again, but everything has been sacrificed to routine and preconceived notions. Such elevated plateau, as we now mention, has been described in this magazine more than once, but more particularly in our December number, where two sites, both in Kemaon—a district, by the bye, but little known—had their advantages brought prominently forward.

Climate is not the only, nor do we believe, the great destroyer of European life in India. The destructive element is for the soldier, partly bad barrack accommodation and "ennui," and for his officer "ennui" only. The Italians tell us that it is "dolce far niente," but that may answer in their beautiful country and climate—not so in the burning plains or grilling sun of the hills in India. The climate induces thirst, and makes the European listless. It is the duty of the Government to endeavour to overcome this vis inertia—not with everlasting parades, not with finding the men amusement during the long hot days in which they are necessarily confined to barracks, in cleaning belts and pouch covers; but in improving the mind and strengthening the body. Large covered buildings might be built underneath which the men could find room for some games. Swimming baths, too, on a large scale, should be everywhere introduced, and the access to them should be protected from exposure. Libraries made a place of ease and instruction, and every encouragement given to induce the men to pass their time under its roof.

Barracks not only to be large and fully ventilated, but built with more regard to the sense of decency of some of the soldiers' wives. Make indeed the barrack so comfortable, that its inhabitant shall not desire to wander away into the bazaar for amusement.

With the present rules on marriage, health will never be preserved. The per centage must be increased of married men, and a little more attention paid to the sense of decency inherent in every woman. The present system of cramming some dozens of married soldiers with their wives into one great barrack must be given up, and a more expensive but more suitable accommodation given. With a better class of women for the soldier's wife there will be a superior man; but few modest women, however much they may love a man, like to be exposed to the heterogeneous pigging of a barrack in India.

It is too far advanced now in the nineteenth century to say that the soldier should not be married, and that a married soldier is not

worth his salt. They are married, that is sufficient for the Government, and the common law of the land considers such to be an honourable state, and worthy of encouragement. A good man is none the worse, but rather the better, for having a good wife, and with such, is less likely to neglect his duties than he who has none. Let a certain per centage be fixed, as has always been, but let that per centage be increased, and the Government will find that the increased expense for barrack accommodation and allowance is counterbalanced by the improved health and usefulness of the soldier.

The soldier is no longer a machine. He is a thinking, reasoning being. All classes in England have advanced, and with them such as yield soldiers. The same rules for their guidance, even in civil life, no longer apply, and the military machine must move on. Not only to preserve them in health must their bodily comforts be attended to, but so must their mental and spiritual. The religious instruction should be in proportion. The chaplain's influence in a regiment would almost always be for good, and everything that is for good must contribute towards preserving health.

The commission are empowered to say what have been the chief causes of the great mortality among British troops in India, and let them speak fearlessly. Not improbably much of this mortality they will find to have resulted from the want of some distinct orders regarding the treatment of the soldier at all times, and in all places. Commanding officers should not have it in their power to put all sanitary measures at defiance, and carry out their own whims and vagaries. No longer let us hear of soldiers being marched across the Midan at Fort William at midday in the month of May; no longer let it be in the power of any commanding officer to order stocks to be worn, or red cloth coats to be buttoned up tight to the throat during long, hot marches. No longer let us hear that, in spite of the warning of surgeons, commanding officers direct punishment drill to be carried out at eight o'clock in the morning in the month of June, probably on the shady side of the barrack, but even here with the thermometer at 99 deg.

Reward and punishment certainly have, but let a code of regulations be drawn up, and insist on these being implicitly obeyed. The European in India is too valuable an article to be neglected. Find him airy and well-drained barracks, good beer, amusement, and employ, and the per centage of sickness will wonderfully diminish. Climate will work wonders, but a sound mind makes the body sound also.

REMINISCENCES OF A VETERAN.

BEING A NARRATIVE OF PERSONAL ADVENTURES DURING A PERIOD OF FORTY-THREE YEARS IN PORTUGAL, SPAIN, FRANCE, MALTA, NEW SOUTH WALES, NORFOLK ISLAND, NEW ZEALAND, ANDAMAN ISLAND, AND INDIA.

(Continued from page 276.)

These parties were very pleasant, but also very expensive, and when we took up our quarters in town, they gradually ceased altogether. We had, however, in the town two or three opulent

families, who were very hospitable when we met at their evening parties. The elderly people generally looked over the news of the day, or played at cards, and the younger either danced, sung, or played at games of forfeits, formerly so much in vogue in England, and still so in France; but the grand scene of all was the tea table. It was the particular privilege of the young lady of the house to make the tea, pour out the coffee, &c. At the moment the tea urn made its appearance, all the young ladies assembled at her court, and with them also the young gentlemen, on the plea and pretence of assisting them; but in reality to talk nonsense and amuse themselves with a little flirtation. The noise and hubbub was sometimes awful, and the spilling of hot water, and upsetting of tea-cups no less so, and tea making would never have had an end if the mammas had not interfered to declare that no more was wanted, and to disperse the rioters; on these occasions they had always some complaint to make against their swains, a little pouting, &c., but the same scene was sure to be renewed at the next evening party by the same people, and these love quarrels were as essential a part of the entertainment, as cream and sugar to the tea and coffee. A lady, the widow of a Major Feijo, had three daughters, who were very nice girls. With this family, when I first arrived at Villa Reale, I frequently went to visit the nunnery of Sta. Clara. On one occasion the nuns gave a breakfast to these and other ladies, and requested them to bring the officers of the battalion. The convent put me very much in mind of a menagerie at feeding time reversed; not that we were very ravenous, but the spectators were encaged behind strong iron gratings. The imprisoned nuns crowded the gratings to see us eat; when we had finished they ordered the things to be cleared away for dancing, as they were anxious to hear the fine band of our battalion, and to see us tread the light fantastic toe. The principle Padre of the town, a great friend of mine, being with us, and perhaps the instigator of our pleasures, had not much difficulty in allaying their scruples. The nuns expressed their approbation in their tiny voices, saying, "Why should we not feel happy at the return of our soldiers to Portugal, God having blessed them with victory?" They even went further, and permitted one or two of their lay sisters, who were there, I suppose, for education, to join us. Most of the nuns in the convent appeared young women, and a few of them were very pretty. They appeared very curious to know all about my religion, of which they had formed the most absurd notions, particularly as they had heard I was an Englishman, and termed a heretic.

They were more compassionate than charitable, saying, what a pity that I should perish and go to perdition; and, appealing to the Padre, asked him if there was no remedy. The good man shook his head with affected gravity, saying, that he was afraid not. A Captain of the battalion, who was also a bit of a wag, looking towards the Miss Fijos, said, that he knew that ladies had more power over me than priests, and if the holy sisterhood would join in their endeavours, possibly they might succeed in saving me. When we took leave, they requested I would call occasionally and see them; which

I promised to do, with the permission of the Abbess, who seemed a very kind old lady. I did call sometimes, and was introduced by the porteress to the Parlatoria. They were very anxious that I should bring the battalion on Sundays to hear mass at their church, which would scarcely hold them, in addition to the public. Besides, the Dominicans objected, and the men being quartered in their convent they thought they had a prior claim.

Whenever they had a request of this kind to make, an unusual number of nuns would come to the grating to receive me, and they were so vehement, talking all together, and so angry with the friars, that precisely as the Captain had told them, they carried the day, and I promised to accede to their wishes.

Both convents were situated in a large square, which was our parade and occasional drill ground. The fashionable hour for attending mass was when the battalion went with the band. Sunday was our drill day, and it was necessary to exclude a portion of the public who were waiting in the square. But not having the power to place a sentry at the doorway, I was obliged so to adopt my movements as to get the battalion in first, at a concerted hour. This was effected by throwing the corps unexpectedly across the doorway, by which the rabble were deprived of all entrance until I had filed the whole battalion into *the Church*.

The order of Sta. Clara is poor in point of wealth, and I found, whenever I had a party to dine with me, that my servant got the pastry made at the convent at a very moderate charge. This factotum of mine (a soldier) was quite an original in his way. He was an excellent cook and a capital caterer. Although I was never in debt to any amount, I seldom had any ready cash, and it frequently happened, as there was no inn in the town deserving the name, that I had unexpected guests to dine with me. Coelho (the cook) would remonstrate with me, saying, that he had nothing in the house. Well, then "get it," was my reply, and I could soon see by a mysterious look which he assumed, that my coffers (of which he had the custody) were empty. On telling him that dinner must be made ready, he never failed to place a good meal before me. I suspect he used to visit the larders of the families of my acquaintance, and borrow on these occasions whatever he required, as he was well known to all of them. I spoke the language well, and being considered by the Portuguese as one of themselves, I did not find them so jealous of their women as my experience, when wandering about, had led me to suppose. At the small hamlet of Ruvoes an old retired officer and his wife resided. I had formed the old gentleman's acquaintance by seeing him one day at market, and at a loss where to put up his horse. I sent it to the stable, and requested that he would in future always place it there, as I had one or two vacant stalls. Calling upon me afterwards, he told me his name was Silveira, and that he was a Major in the same regiment with Senhora, the widow Feijo's husband. Since his retirement he had seen little of the widow or her daughters, as they had no means of visiting him, owing to the roads being very bad, but if I, who he understood was a great friend of theirs, would undertake to get them over to spend a day with him and his wife, they would

be delighted to receive us. Major S. had the finest fruits in the country; he was a large wine grower, and was considered very rich. His wife was much younger than himself, and had been very handsome. Many were the pleasant days I spent in his house; and nothing gratified the old gentleman more than my sending to say that we had made up a party to spend the day with him. By naming a day or two in advance, he generally had some of the neighbouring families to meet us. His house was distant about five miles from Villa Reale. The ladies generally remained until the following day, but we returned to our quarters, as his house would not accommodate a very large party. This worthy couple had no children. I was acquainted with them in the year 1815 or 1816, and, singular as it may appear, I had two letters from him in the year 1821 or 1822, when I was at home on half pay, bewailing the effects of the revolution, and begging me to come and live with him. In his last letter he plainly told me if I would reside with them they would adopt me, and he would make me his heir.

Several members of the family of his name, Silveira and the Count of Armarante, were very turbulent characters during the period of the revolution, and these, with some young men of his neighbourhood who were like-minded, must have sadly worried the old couple. He used to regret the good olden times down to that period, and I am not surprised, for the Portuguese were a happy, contented people before the revolution, enjoying a cheap government, the machinery of which, although arbitrary, was particularly simple. If the generality of the country people were uninformed, their ignorance led them to believe their government and institutions, civil and religious, were far better than those of any other nation. They were, therefore, contented, and desired no change. Such was the condition of the Portuguese peasantry at the time of which I am writing. The exceptions generally arose from super-legislation and delegating extraordinary powers with the best intentions to persons, who in the end invariably perverted them to their own selfish purposes. A whole district was governed in all ordinary legal matters, and judged by a juez-de-fora. This functionary was required to be a stranger to the district, and to prevent undue partiality, he was removed every three years. His decisions might be appealed against in the supreme courts of Lisbon. The decima, or tenth, seemed to me to be the only tax levied; and even the convents were so reduced in number and inmates, that these idlers pressed very lightly on the community. I am told that Portugal is now advanced, and much improved; national comfort, or rather prosperity, may be the result, but I question whether there is more real happiness for the peasant than before, and whether he has not been made discontented and turbulent.

The revolutions in Spain and Portugal were purely military. The bulk of the inhabitants of these countries had nothing to do with it at the commencement, and were mere passive observers of the event. Out of the great cities they did not even applaud; they had yet to learn the evils of continued political agitation, with its fruits —discontent, political rivalry, idleness, and distrust.

(To be continued).

EDITOR'S PORTFOLIO;

OR,

NAVAL AND MILITARY REGISTER.

THE BATTLE OF SOLFERINO.—At the moment of going to press, we receive some particulars of another French victory in Italy, of the same indecisive character as its predecessors, but which appears to have been even more dearly bought; for, after the action, the French were too disabled to molest the Austrians, as they retired across the Mincio. There is no official statement of the loss on either side, but we have seen a letter from Paris which states that of the French in killed and wounded at 13,500, and that of the Austrians at 16,000. The Austrian prisoners, at first estimated at 15,000, are now put at 6,000. The Emperor FRANCIS JOSEPH has wisely returned to Vienna, leaving the command to General HESS; and the Austrians are preparing for another battle, on their own side of the Mincio.

INSTALLATION OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.—The ejection from office of Lord DERBY'S Cabinet by a narrow majority of 13, in the fullest House on record, has led to the installation of a Provisional Government, composed of elements as discordant as the faction that raised it to power. Did we believe that the destinies of England would long be confided to these men, we should indeed fear for our country, for Europe, and for mankind. Of course, their first act is to discontinue those defensive preparations which were so wisely set on foot by the late Government, with the approval of the nation; and, on which our existence as a power depend. We could expect nothing else from a Ministry which has Lord PALMERSTON, the creature of LOUIS NAPOLEON, for its chief, and MR. SIDNEY HERBERT, the kinsman of WORONZOW and patron saint of Odessa, for its Minister for War. Here are the very trio who sacrificed our army in the Crimea—GLADSTONE, NEWCASTLE, and HERBERT, and who were more desirous to convert our soldiers to Popery than to take Sebastopol. It is said the new Minister for War hopes to remove the "prejudices" his past career has inspired by being "propitiatory." He will not, as on a former occasion, signalise his accession to office by a crusade against the military press; for some little time, he does not intend to resume his old practice of always thwarting the Horse Guards; and, finally, he will be more guarded in his projects of conversion. This is the present programme. It remains

to be seen how far Mr. HERBERT will be permitted to carry it out. The session is just expiring, so that it may be possible to tide over a few weeks, and thus retain power till Parliament again assembles; but if we look at the composition of the Ministry, at the character of its supports, and the manifold difficulties ahead, we may surely anticipate a more speedy deliverance. Entering office without the confidence of the SOVEREIGN, how can it be retained, when all the base tricks of faction could muster only a majority of 13? It thus requires but 7 votes to turn the scale on the other side; and as the elections now in progress will bring the Conservatives a gain of at least 3, we may consider that 4 votes, which the first debate may attract from a distracted party, will reinstate the DERBY administration. The affront of his exclusion is deeply resented by BRIGHT, who, after setting up the Ministry, finds the door of the Cabinet shut in his face; there is no certainty of its being joined by COBDEN, the only potential name on its roll; and already we hear rumours of a difference between Lord John RUSSELL and Lord PALMERSTON on the subject of Italy. Some attempt will probably be made to gain strength by a modification of structure; but even if it were possible to avert a "revolt of the sections," and fuse all this broken faction into one whole, what can be done by a nominal majority of 7 in the face of a compact opposition? The four casting votes will be won on election petitions; and we may believe, therefore, that at the very utmost, and with every possible abatement in his favour, Lord PALMERSTON can only prolong his usurpation till February. For our part, we confidently rely that he will take his departure on the budget, and in that case, we shall accept cheerfully even a double Income Tax.

THE WAR.—The accession to office of the Franco-Russian party in England has immediately given a new turn to the war, It is felt on the continent that the neutrality of England will now be on the side of aggression, and, consequently, that the only safety for central Europe is in prompt action. We confess that we share these misgivings, and our conviction is that Lord PALMERSTON and Lord JOHN RUSSELL will play into the hands of LOUIS NAPOLEON, placing implicit faith in his professions, and regarding every other potentate with distrust. Of course, as the man of the 2nd of December, and the breaker of every promise and every oath by which he was ever pledged, NAPOLEON may claim to be considered the impersonation of good faith, while we should be careful not to put our confidence in FRANCIS JOSEPH, or the REGENT of Prussia, by whom it has never been abused. But, if we may credit general report, the REGENT of Prussia is taking the right steps for bringing the question to issue; and for the sake of Prussia and the whole German people—for the sake of England—we hope the rumour is true. The Mincio is indisputably an outlying boundary of Germany, a boundary she must never allow a French army, under any pretence whatever, to overstep; and Prussia is right to notify to the French filibusters that

she will regard their infringement of this line as a declaration of war. Whether, therefore, the Austrians retrieve their laurels in this region, or the French win another dearly-bought victory—whether LOUIS NAPOLEON advance, or is obliged to recede, his position becomes extremely critical; and now, when he can retire from the contest with honour—now clearly is the moment for our Government to interpose, and, by supporting the propositions of Prussia, endeavour to effect an arrangement. Should the Mincio still be crossed, Germany has no alternative but to stand on her defence; and, whatever politicians may say, let her be assured that, by the time her armies are in motion, England will be her ally. This is an inevitable consequence. It may be the folly of the moment to talk of the French alliance; but this alliance, obnoxious to our traditions and feelings, and adverse to our interests, has never had, and never can have, a real existence. Our own safety demands that there should be two great powers in Central Europe; and these, not France, are our natural allies. We cannot be parties to the dismemberment of Austria; still less shall we permit a French irruption into Germany. France will not be allowed to appropriate either the Adriatic or the Rhine. Let Prussia, then, draw the sword, and fling away the scabbard. It is time to face this coalition of a recreant constitutional monarch and a perjured despot with revolutionary propagandists and bankrupt political adventurers. At present, the French command of the seas is not felt by England, inasmuch as it is asserted only in the Adriatic, and hence entails little inconvenience; but the case will be different when it is extended to the German ocean, when it is paraded in the English Channel, and when all the ports in Europe are under blockade. Believing that it is for the interest of England to engage in the war without delay, we rejoice that this crisis is approaching; for as soon as our commerce feels the pinch, the English people will understand how much they are concerned with Germany in the common quarrel of Europe.

The Austrian army has much to do to recover its prestige, or rather, to raise itself from contempt. That the solders are brave, has been proved in every encounter; but, somehow or other, they have always had to retreat. We know not who is responsible for the tactics of the campaign, whether GYLUAI or the EMPEROR, but assuredly the right man is not in the right place. There is no ground for expecting any improvement in SCHLIECK. Austria, however, possesses a General who, if the EMPEROR could bring himself to break through routine, and nominate him to the chief command, would do the state some service. BENEDEK is only a Major-General, but he stands high in military repute, and, with full liberty of action, would speedily lead the Austrians to victory, and the French to the right about.

THE LAST INDIAN TROUBLE.—The alleged mutiny of the Company's European troops in India turns out, on further information, to have been nothing more than a demonstration, which has been met in a

very proper spirit by Lord CLYDE. We must regret that any portion of such a force should be led into acts of insubordination, after it had so recently signalised its fidelity in the face of overwhelming odds, and at a moment when it was entering a new epoch of service, as a part of the Royal army. Following so close on the late revolt, the accident is likely to exercise a pernicious effect on the native levies, and to bring insubordination into fashion. Our position in India has been shaken, and anything that tends to exhibit dissension in our own ranks, will, of course, impair the tradition of our invincibility. We have not only to be on our guard against the smouldering hatred of baffled fanatics, Brahmins and Mollahs, and all the adherents of a Hindoo *régime*, but it is, above all things, necessary to restore the prestige of military discipline, and make its violation appear impossible. In accepting such conclusions, the authorities should be careful to secure the allegiance of the troops, by removing every shadow of a grievance. Let one side, as well as the other, be guided by justice and good faith, not claim a grovelling submission, whatever system it enforces. Obedience is the first duty of a soldier, but the obligation implies a corresponding duty in the executive, and, therefore, is not unconditional. Had the Indian Government taken such a view of its relations we should have heard nothing of this alienation of the Company's European troops; but it is difficult to bring Might to recognise the superiority of Right. The authorities possessed the power, and they resolved to carry things with a high hand, and for the sake of a miserable saving, commit a flagrant wrong. On the transfer of their service to the Crown, the European soldiers of the Company were at least entitled to the usual bounty, and to withhold it was as unjust as it was impolitic. All the arguments that have been urged in excuse are mere leather and prunella. The quibble that the transfer is only nominal, inasmuch as the Company was but the trustee of the SOVEREIGN, is simply absurd; for it was not with such an understanding that the troops were enlisted, nor can it now be sustained. But whatever may be the strict letter of the law, expounded by partial administrators, no one can pervert its spirit, which is written on its face. According to all the traditions of military practice, a change in the tenure of servitude involves the option of a free discharge or a re-enlistment. Hence the Company's European troops were undoubtedly entitled to a bounty on their transfer to the CROWN. Their case is wholly distinct from that of the native troops, who are enlisted in their own country, and under different conditions. Had the question been really debateable, they surely deserve that any doubt should be given in their favour, when they have just contributed so materially to preserve our Indian empire, and the sum at stake is only £60,000. But, in point of fact, their right is above dispute, and we trust that the Court of Inquiry appointed by Lord CLYDE will report to this effect, and so set the matter at rest. It is false economy to save the public money by cheating the soldier.

MONUMENT TO THE LATE LORD HARDINGE.—We thought the scheme for a monument to the late Lord HARDINGE, which was canvassed in this journal some time ago, had received its *quietus*, but an obscure paragraph has appeared in some of the morning papers announcing that its promoters are again at work, and that their design is to embellish the metropolis with a copy of the equestrian statue set up at Calcutta. It is not in very good taste of the HARDINGE family to revive this project when it is notorious that directly after the publication of our article Lady HARDINGE wrote to an illustrious Duke, who had been induced to lend a sort of countenance to the movement, requesting that it might be dropped. We have already shown that the erection in London of an equestrian statue of Lord HARDINGE—an honour which has not even been granted to MARLBOROUGH, or, indeed to any commander or any subject but WELLINGTON—would be a gross absurdity. We have also shown that Lord HARDINGE has no claim to any memorial at all. Why will not his kindred, for whom he did so much, let him rest in his grave? Are we to be forced to go again through the whole story of his life, and his corrupt reign at the Horse Guards, after CHARON has conveyed him over the Nile? Should we hear any more of this conspiracy, we shall not shrink from the task, however willingly we would avoid it.

SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS'S SCREW PROPELLER.—In our notice of SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS'S *Naval Warfare by Steam*, we called attention to his admirable suggestions for the improvement of the screw-propeller, as calculated to render it so much more efficient, and correct those defects it has exhibited in vessels of war. As we were the first to insist on the importance of these suggestions, it affords us satisfaction to announce that their value has been practically demonstrated; and a screw-propeller invented by Sir HOWARD, has, after repeated experiments, been found not only to give increased speed, but to improve greatly the steerage of the ship, and to diminish vibration. The following able remarks on the subject from the *Mechanics' Magazine*, though recently quoted by the *Times*, may not have met the eye of all our readers:—

In his recent work on "Naval Warfare with Steam," Sir Howard Douglas, in the clearest and most forcible manner, urged the adoption of what he conceived would be a great improvement in the form of the screw propeller. This improvement consisted in removing the leading corners of the blades, and breaking the leading edge of each blade into its circumference by an easy curve.* The first object sought by Sir Howard in making this change was that of reducing the "shake," or vibration of the screw, and the consequent injury to the stern of the ship. These are produced, he argued, by the sudden and violent reactions of the disturbed water against the blades as they enter and emerge from the space between the two stern-posts; the rectilinear edges of the ordinary screws being, in this respect, highly disadvantageous, since the whole of an edge enters and leaves at once the water on each side of the aperture. "But if the leading edges of a screw-blade were curved, they would slide obliquely and continuously through the water, like a screw formed with an entire feather, so that, at

*See the illustration on page 14 of the MECHANICS' MAGAZINE, No. 1, New Series, for December 31, 1858.

no moment, would there be any shock or discontinuity of action." Further advantages which Sir Howard considered the curved edges would possess were, that they would readily throw off any floating materials that might come in contact with them—that they would not be so liable to be broken by their oblique collision with large spars as straight edges are by their direct blow—that their rounded extremities would be less liable to be hitched by ropes than the angular extremities of the common screw—and, finally, that if the curved parts could be furnished with incorrodible sharp knife-edges they would divide, and disentangle the screw from any rope, spar, or other floating matter with which it might become fouled. "The author would not," said Sir Howard, "at the sacrifice of speed, revert to a continuous feather-screw; but the form here recommended would, to a considerable extent, gain the proposed ends." Now, in justice to an able and veteran officer—an officer who, by his incomparable writings on naval and military science, has commanded the profound admiration and respect of both services—we revive the passages of his latest work, and couple with them a reference to those remarkable experiments the results of which were recorded in our last week's impression. Those experiments show—if the report which is before us can be trusted—that the improvement recommended by Sir Howard does actually accomplish his first and principal object by reducing the vibration or shake of the screw as he predicted. They also show that it has the further important effect of improving both the speed and the steerage of the ship. The reporter tells us that "the first trial with the Admiralty screw was with a diameter of 18 feet, her speed being 11,823 knots. On the second trial with the diameter increased to 20 feet, the speed realised was 11,826 knots, with a great increase of vibration. On the third trial the leading corner of each blade was cut off, and in this form the screw attained its greatest speed, giving a result of 12,032 knots. On the fourth trial both the corners of each blade were cut off, when, with a greater number of revolutions, less speed was made, being 12,012 knots. Its last trial, with the 'following' corner of each blade cut off, but the screw restored to its perfect form in every other respect, gave a result of 11,815 knots." The reporter also says, "the leading edge of the screw is the part that mostly affects the steerage of the ship, and also causes the greater part of the vibration."

We direct attention to these facts solely from the desire to aid in reflecting upon the gallant author of "Naval Warfare with Steam" the credit that is justly his due. This may seem to some a romantic thing to give ourselves any trouble about; but romantic or not it affords us much pleasure. For we confess to feeling a peculiar interest in the reputation of a man like Sir Howard Douglas. Those of us who have to wade through the many volumes which mere pirates and charlatans compile and publish, acquire a reverence, aye, an affection for works like "Naval Gunnery," "Military Bridges," and others of Sir Howard's, in which care, patience, industry, intelligence, masterly skill, and many other virtues and endowments, are stamped upon every page. There is something almost sacred to us in these fruits of human power and excellence, and still more so in the men by whom such fruits are produced.

WALPOLE REDIVIVUS.—It is rumoured that Captain The Honourable S. T. CARNEGIE, whose election charges against his colleague Sir JOHN PAKINGTON, were so serviceable to the Whigs on the hustings, has been appointed for his meritorious service to the post of Comptroller General and Commodore of the Coast Guard. We believe this will prove to be a hoax. It is not generally known that Captain CARNEGIE, while in command of the Tribune was compelled by ill health to come home from the Black Sea, at a critical period of the late war.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

MIRIAM COPLEY.—By J. C. Jeaffreson. 3 vols.

There are some elements of French romance in this story, which takes society on its dark side, and leads us through the labyrinth. Late occurrences prove, indeed, that such incidents are by no means peculiar to France, but are as familiar to English soil. Our social fabric has recesses which are never mentioned in blue books, and do not come under the cognizance of Parliamentary Commissioners, or Registrar-Generals. Hence we are in the habit of limiting crime to the poor, and ascribing it to ignorance, and the neglect of mental culture; but this is too sweeping a conclusion. Occasionally some case in the middle ranks comes to life and takes us a step higher; but it is rare that, by any criminal procedure, we are apprised of the backslidings of the great. Here power draws a veil, and only by chance is it ever raised. In the work before us, the different classes of society are contrasted with great effect, and we soon discover that the author is a man of no ordinary ability, and well acquainted with the world. He adopts the popular notion that crime is the offspring of ignorance or of dispositions envenomed by hard usage. Miriam Copley, the supposed narrator of the story, is the daughter of a swineherd, and by the death of her father in a poaching expedition, is early left to provide for herself, and to make her own way in life. The hardships of her childhood are forcibly related, and as the narrative proceeds the interest becomes more engrossing. Much pains are bestowed on the delineation of her character, which is boldly conceived, and cleverly worked out; but it is the action rather than the portraiture that enchains the reader. The incidents are not very novel; but they are telling, and introduced with great adroitness. Jack Haggart and Mr. Muscut are sketches by the way, dexterously thrown off, and contributing by their joint malignity, to the perversion of the heroine. We shall not trace the steps by which Miriam is led into criminal acts, proceeding further and further until she becomes a sort of Lucretia, seeming, however, to be more the victim of circumstances than of passion. From the course of the story, and the artistic power of the narrator, this impression is maintained to the last, and she still engages our sympathy and pity. A tale so vigorous and dramatic is sure to become a favourite.

THROUGH THE SHADOWS. By the author of Sidney Grey. 3 vols.

There are few whose way is not, at some time or other, through the shadows, and hence the title of this story addresses all. The book, however, does not profess to be of the missionary character, its chief object is to amuse, and this it fulfils. At the same time, there is an undercurrent of religious sentiment, which is not without effect. The author, who is evidently a lady, combats the prevalent opinion that the sex should look only to marriage for a provision, and claims for women a field of employment. This is a theory which is becoming more popular, and in some parts of the kingdom is being practically carried out. Our author illustrates its working in several of her characters, who, for a certain period, maintain themselves by their own exertions. But, after all, it comes to marriage in the end, and these industrious spinsters scorn celibacy. We know not how the problem will be solved in real life, but we hope that it will be much in the same way. Here we have a charming story, which is always animated, and always natural. Sebastian Earle is a dashing young sailor, though not one of the Maryatt stamp, and is warmly attached to Alice, by whom his affection is returned. Alice is the friend of two sisters, Caroline and Ruth, and the latter one morning informs her that her brother, in a moment of temptation, has embezzled from his employer, and entreats her to save him from ruin. This can only be done by replacing the money, for which purpose Alice yields up her diamonds, present from Sebastian, and promises not to reveal the secret. As a consequence she is involved in continual embarrassments, which eventually estrange

her lover, and, despairing of reconciliation, he joins the expedition under Captain McClure, and proceeds to the Polar Seas. Caroline lives under the domination of a maiden aunt, and notwithstanding her independent character, accepts the first proposal of marriage, which secures her a wealthy though not an agreeable husband. Nor does the hard treatment she receives in this position disgust her with married life; hardly has she become a widow when with a generous oblivion of the past, she renews the nuptial bond. Ruth, makes a more deliberate choice, in which she is influenced by affection, but seems quite unconscious of the misery she has brought on Alice. The fortunes of the three girls are skilfully interwoven, and form a story of surpassing interest, remarkable for its simplicity and truthfulness.

SIXTEEN YEARS OF AN ARTIST'S LIFE IN MOROCCO, SPAIN, AND THE CANARY ISLANDS. By Mrs. Elizabeth Murray. 2 vols. Coloured Illustrations.

The regions described in this book are of peculiar interest at the present moment, particularly Morocco, which has more than once been threatened by the French, and may be made a troublesome neighbour to Algeria. The Canary Islands are a *terra incognita*. Far out of the beaten track, they are rarely visited by tourists, and we have come to consider them a sort of Japan. Nowhere is the jealous exclusive system of the Portuguese more rigorously enforced, or the Jesuits more intolerant. As for Spain, she is as much out of the pale of Europe as in the days of the Cid. Gil Blas might wake up after his three centuries' sleep, and imagine he was still under the rule of the Duke of Lerma. Cervantes deprived Spain of her chivalry, but her arrogance, bigotry, and poverty remain, and at this moment she is believed to have formed a secret league with Louis Napoleon, the nephew of her enslaver, against England, to whom she owes her independence Mrs. Murray gives us some lively and interesting sketches of Spanish society, which she had peculiar opportunities of studying, and has hit off with great vivacity. Our lady tourists seem to possess all the energy of the national character, and go wherever fortune leads them, regardless of danger or difficulties. As an artist, Mrs. Murray, with her sketch-book in hand, is ready to go any distance, or to face any peril, in search of the picturesque; and from specimens given in the book, we can affirm that her pencil is as graceful in its touch as her pen. The book is not only amusing, but it gives a fund of information in an agreeable form, and is rendered doubly attractive by the illustrations. As its appearance is most opportune, we cannot doubt that it will be very favourably received.

A MOTHER'S TRIAL; by the Author of "The Discipline of Life."

This is one of those simple and touching stories which are almost peculiar to Lady Emily Ponsonby, treating on subjects she has made her own. Self-discipline, as taught in the practical lessons of life, is the object she keeps steadily in view, and enforces by beautiful examples. In none of her productions has she been so successful as in the volume before us. The triumph of purpose over inclination is here admirably delineated, carrying us through all its phases with never-flagging interest, till it is finally consummated. The glimpses of rural life in a pleasant and sequestered village, and the lights and little shades of the bright side of human character, which the author so diligently observes, impart to the story a grace truly captivating. The 'Mother's Trial' is of long duration, but it is rather one of suspense than actual pain, and it has the happiest termination. She obtains the first wish of her heart, and sees the object of its purest affection follow his destined course, and realise her fondest hopes. The story, though resting on incidents of the simplest cast, is very animated, and makes no pause in its development. Like all the productions of its author, it leaves on the mind an impression that survives the perusal, and may conduce to future advantage.

NAVAL AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

INDIA.

Court-Martial in India.—Lieut. William Allen, of the 82nd Regiment of Foot, was tried by court-martial in April, for wilfully murdering a native named Bidassee. After a trial of some length the court sentenced the prisoner to four years' imprisonment without hard labour. Lord Clyde has since confirmed the sentence which is to be carried out at Agra.

Resignation of Major Jacobs.—The Commander-in-Chief of Madras, who has the discretion to appoint majors to the command of regiments other than their own, has appointed Captain J. T. Tenant, of the Bengal Engineers, to succeed Major Jacobs, the astronomer, of Madras, who has resigned his appointment.

Extra Staff Appointments.—The Commander-in-Chief of the Madras army has recommended to Government that all extra staff appointments be abolished, such as the Assistant Adjutant General H.M.'s forces, and the Deputy Quarter Master General H.M.'s forces, also the second aide-de-camp to the Lieutenant General commanding the Mysore division.

Whenever a captain in the army in command of a regiment may be embarked on board a vessel of the Indian navy, he is to have the privileges of a field officer in regard to messing.

Major C. Abthorpe, 41st Bengal N.I., and Captain J. Battye, 31st Bombay N.I., have been permitted to retire from the service.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE VICTORIA CROSS.

The Queen distributed the Victoria Cross on Wednesday morning within the quadrangle of Buckingham Palace.

A detachment of six companies of the Grenadier and Coldstream regiments of Foot Guards lined three sides of the quadrangle, and were commanded by Colonel Lewis, Field Officer in Brigade Waiting. The band of the Coldstream Guards was on duty. The Queen and Prince Consort entered the space formed by the troops. The Duke of Cambridge, General Commanding-in-Chief, and Major General Peel, Secretary of State for War, stood on Her Majesty's right. Lieutenant General Sir George Wetherall, Adjutant General to the Forces, Major General Lord Rokeby, Sir Edward Lugard, K.C.B., Secretary for Military Correspondence, War Department, were also in attendance upon Her Majesty, together with the Equerries in Waiting.

The following had the honour of being presented to the Queen to receive the Cross:—

Commander Thomas James Young, Royal Navy; Commander Nowell Salmon; Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry Marsham Havelock, Bart.; Major James Leith, late 14th Dragoons, now 2nd Dragoons; Major Frederick Miller, Royal Artillery; Staff Surgeon Anthony Dickson Home, late of 90th regiment, now of a Depot Battalion; Assistant-Surgeon W. Bradshaw, late 90th regiment, now of 32nd Foot; Thomas Hancock, late Private of 9th Lancers; Lance Corporal Abraham Boulger, 84th regiment; Private David Mackay, 93rd regiment; Captain Frederick Robertson Aikman, Bengal Native Infantry; Lieutenant F. S. Roberts, Bengal Artillery; Lieutenant Hastings Edward Harrington, Bengal Artillery; Lieutenant John Watson, 28th Bombay Native Infantry; Lieutenant Thomas Adair Butler, 1st Bengal European Fusiliers.

The Queen placed the Victoria Cross suspended from a red ribbon on the left breast of each officer and soldier.

Prince Arthur, Prince Leopold, the Princess Alice, Helena, Louisa, and Beatrice, with the ladies of the Court, witnessed the ceremony.

After the investiture the Queen and Prince Consort accompanied by the Duke of Cambridge, passed to the middle of the south side of the quadrangle, the band occupying the centre of the square. The troops then marched past slow and quick time, and afterwards quitted the palace, the band playing "See the conquering hero comes."

LOSS OF THE "HERON."

The following is a copy of the official report relative to the loss of the Heron:—

"Her Majesty's Ship, Victory, Portsmouth. June 10.

"SIR—Being the only surviving officer from the wreck of Her Majesty's brig Heron, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, my proceedings immediately before the wreck, and until my arrival on board this ship.

"On Sunday, the 8th of May, I had the first watch (from 8 to 12 p.m.) At nine o'clock the captain left his order-book with me; it ran as follows;—'Course N.E. by N. Shorten sail on any appearance of a squall, and call me.' At midnight I was relieved by Lieutenant Porter, of the Trident, who was taking passage and doing duty. The ship at the time was under top-gallant sails, single-reefed top-sails, courses, boom mainsail and jibs; going 1.8; a fine starlight night.

"At 5 the following morning of the 9th, I was thrown out of my bed against the main ladder. I rushed on deck, caught a rope, which had fallen to leeward, and succeeded in getting on the ship's bottom, where I found a number of men. I immediately called for a knife, when Samuel Handsford, captain forecastle, cut away the foremost fall of the weather whale boat. The ship then sunk, leaving the boat afloat, the after-fall having been cut or separated, but not known by whom. Twenty-three men and myself got into the whaleboat. After being in the boat about four minutes I saw a white speck on the water making towards us. I then gave orders to keep every one off the boat, as she was already overcrowded. When the white speck was within a few feet of the boat, I found by the voice that it was the captain, and instantly took him in; the weather at this time was very dark, and raining heavily. The captain was so much exhausted, that I kept charge of the boat, for about forty minutes, when he, being partially recovered, and his wounds bound up, took charge.

"When daylight appeared we found the boat's crutches, and commenced pulling, keeping head to sea. After about an hour, John Waldren, ordinary, said he saw a sail ahead, which was not visible to any one else, but we all saw her about a quarter of an hour afterwards, and reached her at 2 p.m. We were then taken on board the Irlam, a bark of Liverpool, from Calabar to Sierra Leone, where we arrived at noon on the 16th. Captain Truscott went on board Her Majesty's ship Trident, and reported himself; the Trident's cutter then took us out of the bark. On the 19th of May we went on board the Ethiope, African mail steamer, for passage to Liverpool.

"On the 29th of May, James Kettle, private Royal Marines, died; on the 30th. Mr. George Haydon, boatswain, died; and on the 3rd of June Captain Truscott died—all of whom were buried at sea. I annex a list of all the survivors who have arrived with me· viz.: Alexander Allan, gunner's mate; James White, quartermaster; George Pinhorn, quartermaster; Samuel Handsford, captain forecastle, James Bartlett, captain afterguard; James Waldren, ordinary; William Windover, ordinary; George Gedge, ordinary; John H. Kemp, ordinary; James Gifford, ordinary seaman; Richard Hicks,

ordinary seaman; William Becket, ordinary; Nicholas Harvey, painter Richard Gorey, boy, first class; William Miller, Drummer; Henry Anderson, private, R.M.

I have, &c.,

"ROBERT MINDRY, Gunner, 3rd Class."

"List of Prize Crew belonging to Her Majesty's late brig Heron, left at Sierra Leone, on board Her Majesty's ship Trident:—

"Lieutenant Chapman, in charge; Charles Horsepool, captain, maintop; William Rogers, boatswain's mate (dead); John Spencer, leading seamen; Thomas Bowsey, A.B.; John Osborne, ordinary; John Germain, ordinary; William Young, ordinary; George Beaver, ordinary; Reginald Andrews, ordinary; Alfred Dibden, ordinary; John Treves, boy, second class; William Hurst, private, Royal Marines; William Bridgeman, private, Royal Marines.

GENERAL ORDERS AND CIRCULARS.

RATES OF FURLOUGH PAY—ARTILLERY AND ENGINEERS.

In order to assimilate the Indian army to Her Majesty's other forces, as regards the Artillery and Engineers, the grades of major and second lieutenant oave been abolished in those corps, and that the new grade of second captain has been introduced from August, 1858. This, of course, necessitated certain changes of pay and allowances, the nature of which will be seen from the subjoined notification. Although the modifications of rank took place at the time above-mentioned, those of pay have only now been finally settled.

RATES OF FURLOUGH PAY, FROM THE 27TH AUGUST, 1858, TO OFFICERS OF HER MAJESTY'S CORPS OF INDIAN ARTILLERY AND ENGINEERS.

BENGAL *Artillery.*	MADRAS *Artillery.*	BOMBAY *Artillery.*
18 Lieut. Cols.	11 Lieut. Cols.	8 Lieut. Cols. will receive Lieut Colonel's pay.
6 Lieut. Cols. ...	3 Lieut. Cols. ...	2 Lieut. Cols. will receive Major's pay.
112 Lieutenants	65 Lieutenants ...	47 Lieutenants will receive Lieutenant's pay.
56 Lieutenants ...	33 Lieutenants ...	23 Lieutenants will receive Ensign's pay.

BENGAL *Engineers.*	MADRAS *Engineers.*	BOMBAY *Engineers.*
8 Lieut. Cols. ...	5 Lieut. Cols. ...	5 Lieut. Cols. will receive Lieut. Colonel's pay.
2 Lieut. Cols. ...	1 Lieut. Col. ...	1 Lieut. Col. will receive Major's pay.

Captains in the Horse Artillery and Engineers, of all the presidencies, will be entitled to furlough pay at the rate of 11s. 1d. per day.

Captains of the Foot Artillery of all the presidencies, will be allowed furlough pay at the rate of 10s. per day.

The furlough pay of the lieutenants of Engineers of the several presidencies will be as follows:—Two-thirds of the lieutenants will be entitled to lieutenant's pay; one-third of the lieutenants will be allowed ensign's pay.

As the adjustment of furlough pay at the India Office will only take effect from the date that allowances may have been received in England, Officers having previous arrears to claim should procure a certificate for transmission to their agents in India to recover the same from the presidency paymasters.

VOLUNTEERS.

The following Circular has been issued from the War Office :—

"War Office, Pall Mall, May 25.

"With reference to the Circular of May 12, sanctioning, under certain conditions, the enrolment of Volunteers, it seems essential, in order that the patriotic exertions of those who come forward may contribute most effectively to that which they have at heart—namely, the defence and security of their country, that they should not be left in ignorance of the nature and character of the service to which they are thus binding themselves; but that the objects which such bodies of Volunteers should have in view should be clearly explained to them, as well as the peculiar duties expected from them, together with the best means of qualifying themselves for their effective discharge.

"Premising that these Volunteers may be of two classes, one comprising those who may be instructed to act as riflemen or sharpshooters in the field; the other, those whose services may be rendered most valuable in our seaports, and other coast towns, in manning the batteries constructed for their defence, it must be borne in mind that—

"1. The first essential, without which no body of Volunteers, however composed or organised, can hope to render available or really useful service, is that it should be amenable, when called upon to act, either in garrison or in the field, to military discipline; for without such discipline no general or other officer under whom they may have to act, will be able to place much dependence on their assistance or co-operation in the hour of need.

"2. In the second place, the conditions of service should be such as, while securing and enforcing the above necessary discipline, to induce those classes to come forward for service for Volunteers who do not, under our present system, enter either into the regular army or the militia.

"3. In the above view the system of drill and instruction for bodies of Volunteers should not be such as to render the service unnecessarily irksome, or as to make demands upon the time of the members that would interfere injuriously with their ordinary avocations; thus either indisposing to the service, in the first instance, those who might otherwise have gladly joined it, or driving them again out of it, after a short experience of the inconveniences to which they have been exposed.

"4. It should not be attempted, therefore, as regards rifle volunteers, to drill or organize them as soldiers expected to take their place in line, which would take time for instruction that could ill be spared; but it should be rather sought to give each individual volunteer a thorough knowledge of the use of his weapon, and so to qualify the force to act efficiently as an auxiliary to the regular army and militia, the only character to which it should aspire.

"5. It is evident that this object will be best attained by the enrolment of volunteers in small bodies in companies, consisting of an establishment of one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, and 100 men of all ranks, as a maximum, or in subdivisions, and even sections of companies, with the due proportion of officers, and composed of individuals having a knowledge of, and thorough dependence upon, each other personally; and it should rarely, if ever, be sought to form them into larger corps, entailing the necessity of a lengthened and complicated system of drill instruction.

"6. The nature of our country, with its numerous enclosures and other impediments to the operations of troops in line, gives peculiar importance to the services of volunteer riflemen, in which bodies each man, deriving confidence from his own skill in the use of his arm, and from his reliance on the support of his comrades—men whom he has known, and with whom he has lived from his youth up, intimately acquainted, besides, with the country in which he would be called upon to act—would hang with the most telling effect upon the flanks and communications of a hostile army.

"7. The instruction, therefore, that is most requisite is practice in the use

and handling of the rifle; and with a view to this sites for firing at a target should be established, if possible, in every locality where companies or bodies of volunteer riflemen are formed, and every encouragement given to the men to avail themselves of them, leaving it to themselves to select their own hours for practice; or for further instructions, as sharpshooters, as it may appear desirable to give them—namely, how to extend and avail themselves of cover, to fire advancing or retiring, to protect themselves from cavalry, or other simple movements, which, while leaving every man his independent action, would enable them to act together with more effect. Interested as the more wealthy classes throughout the country will be in the efficiency of such bodies of volunteers formed in their own neighbourhood, they will doubtless co-operate heartily with the lords lieutenants of counties in endeavouring to find such sites for practice, and in whatever else may tend to further the object in view.

"8. Her Majesty's Government will authorise the issue from the public magazines, at the cost price, of targets and of the regulated annual allowance of practice and exercise ammunition for each trained volunteer—viz., ninety founds of ball and sixty of blank cartridge, and 165 percussion caps; and for the training of each recruit 110 ball and twenty blank cartridges, 143 percussion caps, and twenty ditto for snapping practice. Requisitions for the same to be made to the Secretary of State for War, upon forms which will be supplied on demand from this office.

"With a view to the supply of ammunition from the Government stores for the use of Volunteers, it is a primary and indispensable condition of their formation that the rifles with which they are armed should be perfectly uniform in gauge with those in use by the Regular Army, and that there should be a similar uniformity in the size of the nipple, in order to suit the Government percussion cap.

"9. The apparatus for testing the gauge consists of two plugs, one of ·577-inch, and another ·580-inch. Each rifle to be serviceable must admit the former and exclude the latter.

"All the barrel-makers in Birmingham, and the 'setters-up' in that town, as well as in London, are provided with similar plugs to those which are used in the 'view-rooms' at those places; and as the arms of each Corps will be subject to an examination by competent viewers from the Government Small Arms Department, under the directions of Lieutenant Colonel Dixon, R.A., Superintendent of the Royal Small Arms Factory (for which purpose application must be made to the War-Office), Commanding Officers of corps, and all who purchase arms, should hold the manufacturers responsible for the correctness of the gauge of the barrels and the nipples.

"10. It may further be a question whether it would not be found advantageous, with a view to the better preservation of the arms and accoutrements of the Company, to provide, if possible, in the neighbourhood of the practice range or parade-ground of each Company, a dry and airy building, or room as a store, where they could be deposited and properly cleaned and attended to at the expiration of each day's drill.

"11. It is also very desirable that the uniform adopted should be as simple as possible, and that that of the different Companies serving in each county should be assimilated, and though this point is left to the decision of the volunteers subject to the approval of the Lords Lieutenant, it is considered that recommendation on the subject would be of advantage.

"12. As regards Artillery Volunteers, their primary object will be to aid in the most efficient manner in the manning of the batteries erected for the protection of our coast towns, so that the Royal Artillery and Militia may be, to as great an extent as possible, disposable for other services.

"13. These Volunteers may consist of a different class from that which will come forward for the more active duties of riflemen in the field. Married men resident on the spot, and such as either could not absent themselves,

even for a day, from their usual business, or might be physically unfit for field duties, might yet find ample time for learning how to work a great gun mounted in their immediate neighbourhood, and might be fully adequate to whatever exertion its exercise might require. The interest they would have in thus contributing to the security of their property and families, which would be at once endangered by any hostile attack, would be even stronger than that which would lead volunteer riflemen to the field.

"14. The same principle which is recommended for the organisation of Riflemen should be adopted for the Artillery Volunteers, except that the latter should be divided into still smaller bodies. For instance, the most effective system would be that which would associate ten or, at most, twelve men, all neighbours intimately acquainted with each other, in the charge and working of a particular gun, mounted, so to speak, at their very door.

"15. One of their number should be appointed to act as captain of the gun, to the charge and working of which their duties would be strictly limited. They might arrange their own time for drill and practice, an artilleryman being charged with the duty of imparting the former, and all that would be required of them would be that they should be able to prove, on a half-yearly inspection, that they had duly profited by the instruction so given, and had qualified themselves for the important trust reposed in them.

"16. Always working and practising with the same gun, they could not but become well acquainted with its range, and the points to which it would have chiefly to be directed.

"17. In the same manner, associations may be formed in many of our commercial ports and open rivers for manning and working boats or ships' launches, armed with single guns in the bow, and which might, on occasion, be even more serviceable than the stationary shore batteries. Considering the vast amount of property in vessels, docks, timber-yards, &c., exposed in most of these rivers to sudden attack from privateers, shipowners and others would probably be well disposed, and think it indeed only a wise precaution on their part, to place any spare boats in their possession which are adapted for the above-named purposes, at the disposal of such associations, and even themselves to promote their organisation."

GRATUITOUS ISSUE OF BEDDING TO ROYAL MARINES.

The following Circular, dated 14th of May, has just been promulgated:—

"My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are pleased to direct that the Royal Marines, on embarkation, be supplied with bedding gratuitously, under the same terms and restrictions as Seamen and boys, by their Lordships Circular Order, No. 364, of 28th April, 1859, and from the same date.

NAVAL CHAPLAINS AND MEDICAL OFFICERS.

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 13th day of May, 1859, present, the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

Whereas there was this day read at the Board a memorial from the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the twelfth day of May, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-nine, in the words following, viz.:—

"Whereas we have had under our consideration the present condition of the Chaplains of your Majesty's Navy, with the view of ameliorating their position, and placing them more on an equality with the Chaplains of your Majesty's Army, in regard to their relative ranks and rates of pay and half pay, pensions to their widows, &c.

"And whereas we are of opinion that it would be for the advantage of your Majesty's Service that the following regulations should be adopted for the Chaplains of the Royal Navy.

"1st. That there shall be Four Classes of Chaplains to rank as follows;—Fourth class, under ten years' service, to rank with Lieutenants; third class, under fifteen years' service, to rank with Commanders; second class, under twenty years' service, to rank with Captains under three years' standing; first class, above twenty years' service, to rank with Captains above three years' standing; and that the Senior Chaplain of Greenwich Hospital shall be recognised as head of the Naval Chaplains, bearing the title of Chaplain of the Fleet, and rank with a Rear Admiral.

"2nd. That the Full Pay shall be:—Chaplains under ten years' service, ten shillings per diem; Chaplains under fifteen years' service, twelve shillings per diem; Chaplains under twenty years' service, fourteen shillings per diem; Chaplains above twenty years' service, sixteen shillings per diem.

"3rd. That the Half Pay shall be:—Chaplains under five years' service, five shillings per diem; Chaplains above five years' service, six shillings per diem; Chaplains above ten years' service, seven shillings and sixpence per diem; Chaplains above fifteen years' service, ten shillings per diem; Chaplains above twenty years' service, twelve shillings per diem.

"4th. That the pensions to the widows of Naval Chaplains shall be as follows, provided the Chaplain shall have served one year after his marriage:—

"Chaplains under ten years' service on Full Pay, fifty pounds per annum. Chaplains under twenty years' service on Full Pay, seventy pounds per annum. Chaplains above twenty years' service on Full Pay, ninety pounds per annum.

"5th. That no alteration shall be made in the present rates of additional pay and half pay allowed to Chaplains of the Royal Navy when holding the office of Naval Instructor.

"6th. That no Naval Chaplain who may avail himself of the Regulations shall be allowed to retire under twenty-five years' service, excepting on the ground of permanent unfitness from ill-health—but that such Chaplains now on the list who may prefer to remain on their present rate of full pay, and under the existing Regulations with regard to half pay and retirement, shall be allowed to do so.

"And we beg leave to present to your Majesty, that the Lords of your Majesty's Treasury have signified their concurrence in the proposed arrangement."

Her Majesty having taken the said Memorial into consideration, was pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to approve of what is therein proposed; and the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

WM. L. BATHURST.

MEDICAL OFFICERS.

Whereas we have had under our consideration the necessity of assimilating, as far as possible, the relative ranks and rates of Pay and Half Pay of the Medical Officers of your Majesty's Navy and Army.

And whereas we are of opinion that it would be for the advantage of your Majesty's Service that the following regulations should be adopted for the Medical Officers of the Royal Navy, viz:—

"1st. That there shall be four grades of Medical Officers, viz.:—1. Inspector General of Hospitals and Fleets. 2. Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals and Fleets. 3. Surgeon, who, after twenty years' service on Full

Pay, ten of which in the rank of Surgeon, shall be styled Staff Surgeon. 4. Assistant Surgeon.

"2nd. That no candidate shall be admitted to the examination for a Commission in the Medical Department of the Royal Navy who does not possess such a diploma as would qualify a civilian to practise medicine and surgery; and no such candidate shall receive a Commission as Assistant Surgeon until he shall have satisfactorily passed an examination in Naval surgery and hygiene before a Board of Examiners appointed by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

"3rd. That no Assistant Surgeon shall be eligible for promotion to the rank of Surgeon until he shall have passed such examination as the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may require, and shall have served on full pay with the Commission of Assistant Surgeon for five years, of which two, at least, shall have been passed on board one of your Majesty's sea-going ships.

"4th. That no Surgeon shall be eligible for promotion to the rank of Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals and Fleets until he shall have served ten years in your Majesty's Navy on full pay, of which three, at least, must have peen passed in one of your Majesty's ships on some one or more foreign stations, with the rank of Surgeon.

"5th. That no Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals and Fleets shall be eligible for promotion to the rank of Inspector General until he shall have served five years at home, or three years abroad, in the rank of Deputy Inspector General.

"That in cases of emergency, however, or when the good of your Majesty's Service may render such alteration desirable, it shall be competent for the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to shorten the several periods of service above-mentioned, in such manner as they shall deem fit and expedient.

"6th. That the rates of Full Pay of the Medical Officers of your Majesty's Navy shall, in future, be in accordance with the following schedule:—

FULL PAY.—Inspector General of Hospitals and Fleets, after thirty years' service on Full Pay, £2 5s.; after twenty-five years' service on Full Pay, £2 5s.; after twenty years' service on Full Pay, £2; or on promotion, should these periods of service not have been already completed. Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals and Fleets, after thirty years' service on Full Pay, £1 14s.; after twenty-five years' service on Full Pay, £1 10s.; after twenty years' service on Full Pay, £1 8s.; or on promotion, should these periods of service not have been already completed. Staff Surgeon, after twenty-five years' service on Full Pay, £1 5s.; after twenty years' service on Full Pay, £1 2s. Surgeon, after fifteen years' service on Full Pay, 18s.; after ten years' service on Full Pay, 15s.; or on promotion, should these periods of service not have been already completed. Assistant Surgeon, after ten years' service on Full Pay, 13s.; after five years' service on Full Pay, 11s. 6d.; under five years' service on Full Pay, 10s.

"7th. That every Medical Officer on the Active List, now on Half Pay, and those who may be placed on it subsequently to the date of your Majesty's Order in Council authorizing this proposal, shall be allowed the Half Pay to which his period of service on Full Pay shall entitle him, according to the following schedule:—

HALF PAY.—Inspector General of Hospitals and Fleets, after 30 years' service on Full Pay, £1 17s. 6d.; after 25 years' service on Full Pay, £1 13s. 6d. after 20 years' service on Full Pay, £1 10s.*; or on promotion, should these periods of service not have been already completed. Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals and Fleets, after 30 years' service on Full Pay, £1 5s. 6d.; after 25 years' service on Full Pay, £1 2s. 6d.; after 20 years' service on full pay, £1 1s.*; or on promotion should these periods of service not have been already completed. Staff Surgeon, after 25 years' service on Full Pay, 18s.

6d.; after 20 years' service on Full Pay, 16s. 6d. Surgeon, after 15 years service on Full Pay, 13s. 6d.; after 10 years' service on Full Pay 11s.*; or on promotion, should these periods of service not have been already completed. Assistant Surgeon, after 10 years' service on Full Pay, 10s.; after five years' service, on Full Pay, 8s.; under five years' service on Full Pay, 6s.

"8th. That with a view to maintain the efficiency of the Service, all Medical Officers of the ranks of Staff Surgeon, Surgeon, and Assistant Surgeon, shall be placed on the Retired List, when they shall have attained the age of sixty years; Deputy Inspectors General shall be placed on such Retired List when they shall have attained the age of sixty-five years; and Inspectors General when they shall have attained the age of seventy years. Officers thus superannuated shall receive the rates of half pay mentioned in the preceding schedule.

"9th. That the relative rank of the Medical Officers of your Majesty's Navy shall be similar to that conferred upon the Medical Officers of the Army, and shall be as follows:—

"An Assistant Surgeon shall rank as a Lieutenant in the Army, according to the date of his Commission, and after six years' service on Full Pay as a Captain in the Army, according to the date of the completion of such service.

"A Surgeon shall rank as Major in the Army, according to the date of his Commission; and a Staff Surgeon as Lieutenant Colonel, but junior of that rank.

"A Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals and Fleets shall rank as Lieutenant Colonel, according to the date of his Commission; and after five years' service on Full Pay, as Deputy Inspector General, shall rank as Colonel, according to the date of completion of such service.

"An Inspector General of Hospitals and Fleets shall rank as Brigadier General, according to the date of his Commission; and after three years' service on Full Pay, as Inspector General, shall rank as Major General, according to the date of completion of such service.

"Provided always, that no Naval Officer, while borne on the books of one of Her Majesty's ships, or employed on establishments on shore, shall be deemed superior in rank to the Officer appointed to command such ship or establishment; but such Commanding Officer shall, under all circumstances, be held to be superior in rank and precedence to every Officer under his command.

"10th. That such relative rank shall carry with it all precedency and advantages attaching to the rank with which it corresponds, and shall regulate the choice of quarters, rates of lodging-money, servants, forage, fuel and light, or allowances in their stead, when Medical Officers of the Navy may be employed on shore on joint service with your Majesty's Land Forces; but that Medical Officers serving in the Fleet, shall, notwithstanding the relative rank thus conferred upon them, in all such details, and also in matters relating to the duties of the Fleet, and the discipline and interior economy of your Majesty's ships, be subject, as heretofore, to the authority of any executive Officer, of the Military branch while on duty, under the general regulations which may from time to time be prescribed by the Lord High Admiral, or the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral; and that Medical Officers shall share prize money according to the Proclamation or Proclamations which may be in force for the time being, for regulating the distribution of the proceeds of prizes in the Royal Navy.

"11th. That Medical Officers shall be entitled to the same allowances, on account of wounds and injuries received in action, as combatant Officers holding the same relative ranks.

* This clause does not extend to the compliments to be paid by Garrison or Regimental Guards, as laid down in pages 50 and 30 of your Majesty's Regulations for the *Army, nor to* corresponding honours paid on board your Majesty's ships.

"12th. That the famillies of Medical Officers shall in like manner be entitled to the same allowances as granted to the famillies of combatant Officers holding the same relative ranks

"13th. That Medical Officers shall be held entitled to the same honours as other Officers of the Royal Navy of equal relative rank. *

"14th. That a Medical Officer retiring after a Full Pay service of 25 years, may, in cases of distinguished service, receive a step of honorary rank, but without increase of half pay.

"15th. That good service medals will be awarded to the most meritorious Medical Officers of the Royal Navy, under such regulations as shall, from time to time, be determined upon on the recommendation of the Lord High Admiral, or the Commissioners for executing that office.

"16th. That *four* of the most meritorious Medical Officers of the Royal Navy shall be named Honorary Physicians, and *four* Honorary Surgeons to your Majesty.

Her Majesty having taken the said Memorial into consideration was pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to approve of what is herein proposed; and the Right Honourable, the Lords Commissioner of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

WM. L. BATHURST.

THE COMMISSARIAT CORPS.

Provisional Rules and Regulations for the Organization of the Commissariat Corps.

1. The commissariat corps shall consist of the ranks, receive the rates of pay, and be subject to the rules and regulations hereinafter specified.

2. This corps shall be officered from the commissariat staff, and shall be liable to serve in all situations, both at home and abroad.

3. The ranks and rates of pay shall be as follows:—Sergeant-major, 3s. 8d.; quarter-master-sergeant, 3s. 2d.; paymaster-sergeant, 2s. 4d.; paymaster-sergeant after three years uninterrupted service as such, 3s. 10d.; orderly-room clerk, 2s. 4d.; orderly-room clerk after three years uninterrupted service as such, 2s. 10d.; colour or company sergeant, 3s. 2d.; sergeant, 2s. 4d.; corporal, 1s. 7½d.; 2nd corporal, 1s. 6d.; private, 1s. 3d.; bugler, 1s. 3d. per diem.

4. The following rates of special pay shall be issued to the non-commissioned officers holding the undermentioned appointments, in addition to the ordinary pay of their rank, while actually employed. But these rates shall not be drawn when in hospital or on furlough:—1 sergeant-major, 2s. 6d.; 1 acting sergeant-major, 2s. 6d.; 1 quartermaster sergeant, 1s. 6d.; 1 paymaster sergeant, 1s. 6d.; 1 orderly-room clerk, 1s. 6d. per diem.

In consideration of these extra rates of pay, the non-commissioned officers in question will be liable to be called upon to perform any commissariat duty which the commissariat officer in charge may see fit to assign to them in addition to that of their appointment.

5. Non-commissioned officers appointed clerks, storekeepers, and assistant storekeepers, shall receive the following rates of pay:—

		On appointment per diem.		After three years' service per diem.	
		s.	d.	s.	d.
1st Class	With the rank of sergeant-major, and in addition to the pay of sergeant	2	0	2	6
2nd Class	With the rank of sergeant, and in addition to the pay of sergeant	1	6	2	0
3d Class		1	0	1	6
Temporary clerks with the rank and pay they may hold in the corps		1	0	No increase.	

6. The classification of these non-commissioned officers will depend upon the extent and importance of the duties on which they are employed, but the pay of assistant storekeepers shall not exceed that of the 3rd class.

7. Working pay shall be allowed to each non-commissioned officer, private, and bugler, for such number of days and parts of a day, as he may be actually employed on other than military duty; but working pay will not be issued for holidays, when on the march, in hospital, or on board ship, unless in the last-mentioned case when employed on some trade or occupation to be specially certified.

8. Working pay shall be divided into three classes, 1st class, at the rate of 1s. 6d.; 2nd class, 1s.; 3rd class, 6d. per diem.

9. The 1st class of working pay shall be considered an extraordinary rate, and reserved as a remuneration for skilled labour of a superior order, or for a situation of trust, and not merely for long service or exemplary conduct. And in no case shall any man be placed in it without a strict investigation into his qualifications, which must be recorded and submitted for the approval of the commissary general-in-chief.

10. Working pay will be paid according to the talent and industry of the individual, the same with respect to the 2nd and 3rd classes, to be determined by the senior commissariat officer at the station, upon a written report from the junior officer under whose immediate direction the men may have been employed.

11. All non-commissioned officers and privates of this corps shall be entitled to clothing, rations of provisions (for which the usual deduction shall be made), together with lodging, fuel, and light, or an allowance in lieu thereof, according to rank.

12. All non-commissioned officers and privates of this corps shall be entitled to the benefits of the good-conduct regulations, rewards for meritorious services, and to pensions on the same conditions as other soldiers, under the general regulations of the army, the period of service being the same as that of the infantry, including service as soldiers in other corps before entering the commissariat corps.

13. The ranks of this corps shall be filled by soldiers volunteering from the ranks of other corps of the army.

14. Volunteers shall not be under 20 nor above 30 years of age, and must have served at least two years as soldiers before entering the commissariat corps.

15. Soldiers who have served two years in the embodied militia, and subsequently enlisted into any regiment or corps of the army, shall be eligible on the same terms as soldiers of two years' service in the army.

16. Volunteers must be of good character, and be recommended by their commanding officers. They should be acquainted with the first four rules of arithmetic, and write a fair legible hand.

17. Volunteers shall be received on probation, for a period not exceeding three months, and at the expiration of the period of probation, shall be either permanently accepted or returned to their regiment or corps.

18. Non-commissioned officers and privates on probation shall remain on the strength and payment of their respective regiments or corps, receiving only from the commissariat additional or working pay, according to class qualification, and time of employment.

19. All non-commissioned officers and privates of this corps shall be liable to be discharged from the service at any time that the commander-in-chief shall think fit, without any claim for compensation beyond the pensions mentioned in Article 12.

20. In all points not specifically detailed, or provided for, in these rules and regulations, the non-commissioned officers and privates of this corps shall be subject to all the rules and regulations affecting the other corps of the army.

21. The commissariat corps shall be under the direction of the commissary general-in-chief, who shall select an officer of the commissariat to act as general staff officer of the corps. This officer shall be charged with the general superintendence of the corps, and the preservation of its records, and all correspondence connected with the corps shall be addressed to the commissary general-in-chief through him.

22. Such officers shall be entitled to the rate of charge pay assigned to his rank by Royal Warrant of the 28th October, 1858.

23. Commissariat officers in charge of detachments of the corps, shall have the powers of officers commanding companies, receiving the rates of contingent allowance prescribed for infantry in the War-Office Regulations.

War-Office, 10th May, 1859. B. HAWES.

STAFF EXAMINATIONS.

HORSE GUARDS, 31st May, 1859.

With reference to paragraph 13 of the Horse Guards Memorandum, dated 17th December, 1857, His Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief is pleased to direct, that this General Order be issued for the information and guidance of those officers who may be desirous to compete at the first final examination of the Staff College, without having previously undergone the course of instruction at that institution.

The first final examination will be held at the College in December next; and those officers who, having served the regulated period, can produce the necessary certificates,* should send in their names to the Adjutant General, through their commanding officer, not later than the 1st of October.

As it is important thoroughly to test the knowledge of candidates as regards the practical subjects taught at the Staff College, such as reconnoitring, field engineering, military equitation, &c., they will, for this purpose, be required to join the College at least one month before the final examination, *i.e.*, on the 1st November next.

The following are the subjects for examination, viz.:—

MATHEMATICS.—The candidates will be examined to the extent stated in paragraph 8 of the Memorandum of the 17th December, 1857.

Candidates desirous to obtain a Syllabus of the Course, as taught at the College, should apply for the same to the Secretary to the Council of Military Education, 1, Whitehall-yard, London, S.W.

FRENCH.—The candidate will be examined both orally and in writing, the latter including French Grammar and Composition, as well as Translation.

FORTIFICATION AND ARTILLERY.—The candidate will be examined as to his knowledge of these subjects; and will, in addition, be required to produce a plan, either of one of the bastioned systems, or of the modern German systems, or of any existing fortress, and also a plan of attack of a fortress.

These and any other plans which the candidate made produce at his option he must certify to have been executed by himself. He will also be required, during the month he is at the College, prior to the examination, to draw some profiles and a field trace from given conditions.

TOPOGRAPHICAL DRAWING, MILITARY SURVEYING, AND SKETCHING.—The candidate will be required to produce a plan of not less than six square miles of country, which also he must certify to be his own work.

RECONNOISANCE.—To be executed while at the College during the month previous to the examination, as already stated.

MILITARY ART AND HISTORY.—The Course of Lectures at the Staff College is shown in the accompanying paper. As, however, the campaigns therein stated may not in all instances have been studied by candidates who have not passed through the college they will be given an opportunity to

show their knowledge of those portions of military history which they may have actually studied; and for this purpose they should send a statement of the campaigns in which they desire to be examined, when applying for permission to compete.

MILITARY ADMINISTRATION AND LAW.—A synopsis of the lectures on this subject is also enclosed.

GERMAN, HINDUSTANI, OR ANY OTHER MODERN LANGUAGE.—The candidate will be examined in the same manner as in the French language.

CHEMISTRY AND GEOLOGY.—As applied to military science.

Of the above subjects, German, Hindustani, and any other modern language, with the exception of French, and also Chemistry and Geology, are optional to the candidate; the rest are obligatory.

By order of His Royal Highness, the General Commanding-in-Chief,

G. A. WETHERALL, Adjutant General.

SYNOPSIS OF THE LECTURES AT THE STAFF COLLEGE.

ON MILITARY ORGANISATION AND ADMINISTRATION.—*Recruiting*—System of, *Organisation of the Three Arms*—Principles to be served; combinations field for service *Organisation of Departments*—Commissariat, medical, and military train, in time of peace, and in field. *Equipment*—Arms and clothing; present regulations and warrants relating to; effect of equipment upon organisation and tactical manœuvres; clothing, tents, tools, &c., for field service; weight of; means of conveyance; reserve stores.—*Ammunition*—Proportion for infantry, cavalry, and artillery, carried in the field and reserved. *Departments*—Respective duties and principles of action of each of the; proportion of military staff for an army in the field. *Finance*—Pay, allowance, and pensions. *Subsistence*—Food forage and allowances in kind; in field; best description, and supply of. *Medical Arrangements*—Formation and supply of hospitals and ambulance. *Transport*—Proportion in the field; best description and distribution.

The respective duties of the different departments illustrated in considering the following subjects, viz:—*Embarkation*—Arrangements for; estimate of time; tonnage required for infantry, cavalry, and artillery. *Duties on board ship—Disembarkation*—Arrangements for; estimate of time. *March*—Order of; extent; time. *Encampment*—Selection and formation.

MILITARY LAW.—The Lectures on Military Legislation have comprised the following subjects: Necessity of a distinct code from that of the civil law; consideration of the mutiny act and articles of war; persons subject to the act; convention, jurisdiction, and powers of courts-martial; appointment and duties of President, members, and Officiating Judge Advocate; framing charges; preliminaries to trial; form and proceedings of trial; duties of prosecutor; nature of evidence; defence; finding and sentence.

The questions which were given on military administration and legislation to the end of the first year's course, in December last, will be some guide as to the nature of these for the final examination.

MILITARY ART AND HISTORY.—Waterloo campaign; military history of India, and operations in Bengal during the mutiny; Blenheim campaign; battle of Blenheim; campaign of 1757; campaign of 1796; Marengo campaign; battle of Marengo; battles of Prague, Kollin, Rosbach, and Leuthen; battles of Talavera, Salamanca, and Vittoria; Radetzky's campaign 1848; campaign of 1809 in the Peninsula; operations in Spain 1810; passage of the Douro; retreat on Torres Vedras; campaign of 1812 in the Peninsula.

* See Paragraph 1, of the Memorandum dated 17th December, 1857.

FURTHER SEARCH FOR THE "SAPPHO."—Her Majesty's colonial steamship Victoria had returned to Hobson's Bay from a cruise in search of traces of the Sappho, and which, we regret, was not attended with success. Having landed Sir Henry Barkly at Port Albert on the 26th of February, the Victoria cruised along the coast in the vicinity of Wilson's Promontory, which was carefully examined; also the Ten Foot Rock Devil's Tower, Curtis Island, Rodondo, Glennie's Isle, Monevent, the islands composing Kent's and Hogan's groups; also Hummock's Islands. The Sappho when last seen, in February, 1858, was about 30 miles west of Cape Otway, the wind easterly, and standing off the island on the port tack; weather fine at the time. She was then at the entrance of Bass's Straits, and if she continued her course would reach about the Harbinger Rocks, which are standing north-west of King's Island.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE BOMBAY ARMY.

The following is the distribution of the Bombay Army, corrected to the 1st February.

HER MAJESTY'S HOME TROOPS.

3rd (The Prince of Wales') Dragoon Guards	Ahmednuggur
Squadron Field Service	Field Service
Detachment	Sattara
Detachment	Sholapore
6th Inniskilling Dragoons	Kirkee
8th Hussars	Seepree
Left Wing	Nusserabad
14th Light Dragoons	Gwalior
Detachment	Field Service
Depot	Kirkee
17th Lancers	Mhow

ROYAL REGIMENT OF BRITISH ARTILLERY.

D Troop Horse Artillery	Mhow
8th Company, 1st Battalion	Rajpootana
2nd Company, 3rd Battalion	Poona
3rd Company, 4th Battalion	Neemuch
2nd Company, 11th Battalion	Aden
7th Company, 11th Battalion	Mhow
2nd Company, 13th Battalion	Baroda
5th Company, 14th Battalion	Calpee
8th Company, 14th Battalion	Kulladghee and Dharwar

ROYAL CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

11th Company	Rajpootana Field Force
21st Company	Gwalior

ROYAL REGIMENTS OF BRITISH INFANTRY.

4th (The King's own Regt.)	Ahmedabad
18th Royal Irish 1st Battalion	Field Service
28th (North Gloucestershire) Regiment	Bombay
Detachment	Nassick
31st Huntingdonshire Regiment	Poona
33rd (The Duke of Wellington's Regiment)	Baroda
46th (South Devonshire) Regiment	Kurrachee
51st Regiment	Mooltan
56th West Essex Regiment	Belgaum
Detachment	Kulladghee
Detachment	Sholapore
Detachment	Sattara
57th Regiment	Field Service Khandeish
Detachment	Malligaum and Dhoolia
Wing	Aden
64th Regiment Foot	Futteghur
Depot	Belgaum
71st Highlanders	Gwalior
72nd Highlanders	Field Service, Rajpootana
74th Highlanders Detachment	Dharwar
78th Highlanders	Bareilly
Depot	Poona
83rd Regiment Foot	Rajpootana
Depot	Deesa
86th Regiment Foot	Gwalior, under orders to Poona
Depot	Poona
89th Regiment	Rajpootana Field Force
92nd Highlanders	Mhow
Detachment	Indore
95th Regiment Wing	Seepree
Depot	Deesa
German Legion	Poona

HER MAJESTY'S INDIAN BRITISH TROOPS

REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY.

Horse Brigade, Head quarters	Poona
1st (or Leslie's) Troop, Head Quarters	Jhansi
2nd Troop	Rajpootana
3rd Troop	Central India
4th Troop	Booranpor
1st Battalion, Head-quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Ahmedabad
2nd Company	Belgaum
3rd Company	Hydrabad
4th Company	Bombay
2nd Battalion, Head-quarters	Bombay
1st Company	Rajpootana
2nd Do.	Sattara

3rd Do.	Sholapore
4th Do.	Gwalior
Reserve Artillery.	
1st Company	Shikarpoor
2nd Do.	Gwalior
Detachment	Jaulna
3rd Company	Kolapoor
4th Do.	Kurrachee
Corps of Engineers.	
Head Quarters	Poona
Infantry.	
1st European Regiment (Fusiliers) Head Quarters	Mooltan
Detachment	Umritseer
Depot	Kurrachee
2nd European Regiment L. I.	Belgaum
Wing	Kolapore
Detachment	Sanglee
3rd European Regiment	Jhansi
Depot	Ahmednuggur
HER MAJESTY'S NATIVE TROOPS.	
Artillery.	
3rd Battalion, Head-quarters	Ahmedabad
1st Company	Ahmedabad and Rajcote
2nd Do.	Ahmedabad
3rd Do.	Deesa
Detachment	Field Service
4th Company	Rajpootana Field Force
5th Do.	Ahmedabad
6th Do.	Aden
4th Battalion, Head Quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Booranpoor
Detachment	Chopra
2nd Company	Ahmednuggur
4th Do.	Mhow
6th Do.	Booranpore
Corps of Sappers and Miners.	
Head Quarters (Bombay)	Poona
1st Company	Poona
2nd Do.	Aden
Detachment	Jhansi
3rd Company	Rajpootana
4th Do.	Poona
5th Do.	Poona
Detachment	Jhansi
Light Cavalry.	
2nd Regiment Madras Light Cavalry	Sholapore
1st Regiment (Lancers)	Gwalior
Wing	Nusserabad
2nd Regiment Light Cavalry	Rajpootana
Detachment	Deesa
3rd Regiment Light Cavalry	Jhansi
Infantry.	
1st Regiment N I. (Grenadiers)	Bombay
2nd do. do	Ahmedabad
3rd Regiment N. I.	Sholapore, under orders to Mhow
Detachment	Malligaum
4th do. do. (Rifles)	Sehore
5th do. N. L. I.	Ahmednuggur
6th do. N. I.	Poona
Detachment	Jaulna
7th do. do.	Bombay
8th do. do.	Baroda
9th do. do.	Central India
10th do. do.	Gwalior
11th do. do.	Ahmedabad
12th do. do.	Nusserabad
13th do. do.	Rajpootana
14th do. do	Kurrachee
Detachment	Ahmedabad
15th do. do.	Kolapore
Left Wing	Kulladghee
16h do. do.	Surat
Detachment	Broach
17th do. do.	Rajkote
18th do. do.	Belgaum
Detachment	North Canara
19th do. do.	Malwa Division
20th do. do.	Dharwar
22nd do. do.	Sattara
Detachment	Mahableshwur
Detachment	Punderpore
23rd do. N. L. I.	Mhow
24th Regiment N. I.	Jhansi
Depot	Mhow
25th do. do.	Gwalior under orders to Poona
Depot	Poona
26th do. do.	Khundera
28th do. do.	Sholapore
29th do. do.	Aden
30th do. do.	Dholia
Detachment	Asseerghur
31st do. do.	Deesa
1st Extra Battalion	Kurrachee
2nd Extra Battalion	Baroda
3rd Extra Battalion	Belgaum
1st Belooch Extra Battalion	Allahabad
Depot	Hydrabad
2nd Belooch Extra Battalion	Deera Ghazee Khan
Depot	Shikarpoor
Enrolled Pensioners.	
Detachment	Tanna
Do.	Poona
Detachment	Doolapee
Do.	Malwan
Do.	Ahmednuggur
Irregular and Local Corps.	
Military.	
Poona Irregular Horse	Field Service Khandeish
1st Regiment Scinde Irregular Horse	Jacobabad
2nd Regiment Do.	Jacobabad
3rd Regiment Do.	Jacobabad
1st Regiment Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse	Kulladghee
Detachment	Beejapore
2nd Regiment Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse	Kulladghee
Detachment	Special Service Malwa Field Force
Marine Battalion	Bombay
1st Regiment Jacobs Rifles	Jacobabad
2nd Regiment Jacobs Rifles	Jacobabad
Native Veteran Battalion	Dapoolie
Civil	
Guzerat Irregular Horse	Ahmedabad
Kutch Irregular Horse	Bhooj
Kutch Legion	Kutch
Guzerat Police Corps	Kaira
1st Khandeish Bheel Corps	Dhurrumgaum
2nd Khandeish Bheel Corps	Dhurrumgaum
Ghaut Police Corps	Tanna
Sawunt Waree Local Corps	Sawunt Waree
Kolapore Infantry Corps	Kolapore
Rutnagherry Rangers	Rutnagherry
Guzerat Coolly Police Corps	Ahmedabad
Aden Police Troop	Special Service Malwa Field Force
Sind Extra Battalion	En route to Deesa

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

The following is the Distribution List of the Madras Army, corrected up to October, 1858.

CAVALRY.

Right Hon the Governor's Body Guard.....Madras
H. M. 1st Dragoon Guards ....Bangalore
H. M. 12th Royal Lancers Head quarters and Rt. Wing .....Secunderabad
Left Wing—Field Service—Gen. Whitlock's Division
1st Regt. Native Light Cavalry..Trichinopoly
2nd do. do.....Sholapore (under orders to Secunderabad.
3rd Regt. Native Light Cavalry, Head quarters. Left Wing.....Bangalore
Right Wing .....Bellary
th Regt. Native Light Cavalry..Bengal Field Force
5th do. do.....Bellary
6th do. do.....Bengal Field Service
7th do. do.....Kamptee
1 squadron Secunderabad

ARTILLERY.

H Troops Royal Horse Artillery. St.Thos.' Mount
Head quarters Madras Horse Artillery .....Bangalore
A. Troop, Field Service Gen. White'ock's Division
B. Troop .....Secunderabad
C. Troop .....Bangalore
D. Troop .....Kamptee
E. Troop.....Bengal Field Service
F. Troop .....Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
No. 5. Comp.1st Bat. Royal Artillery, and No. 1 Field Battery...St.Thos.' Mount
No. 3 Comp. 3rd Bat. Royal Artillery, and No. 9 Field Battery...Bellary
No. 5 Comp. 14th Bat. Royal Artillery, & No. 8 Field Battery..Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
No. 6 Cpy.9th Bat. Ryl. Artillery.Secunderabad

FIRST BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters .....St.Thos. 'Mount
A Company { Head quarters & 2-thirds Co. ..Singapore / Half Company ...Penang / Detachment .....Masulipatan
B. Company .....Moulmein
C. Co. (No. 7 Horse Battery).....Bellary
D. Com. (No. 3 Horse Battery)...Rangoon

SECOND BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters .....Kamptee
A. Cop. (No 8 Bullock Battery) Trichinopoly
B. Co. Head quarters and ½ Co...Tonghoo
Half Company ...Shuaygheen
C. Comp. (No. 5 Horse Battery) Bangalore
D. Copy. (No. 4 Bullock Battery)
Head quarters and half .....Kamptee
Half Company.....Seetabuldee

THIRD BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters .....Rangoon
A Company (No. 2 Horse Bat.) Bengal Service
B. Company (No. 4 Horse Bat.) Tongho
C. Company (No. 2 Bullock Bat.) Thayetmew
D. Company (No. 5 Bullock Bat.) Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division

FOURTH BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters .....Secunderabad
A. Company (No. 1 Horse Bat.)...Field Service Gen. Whitelock
B, Company (No. 10 Bulk. Bat.) Ditto
C. Company (No. 3 Bulk. Bat.)...Secunderabad
... Company Head quarters and two-thirds .....Rangoon
One-third .....Bassein

FIFTH OR GOLUNDAUZE (NATIVE) BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters.....St,Thos.' Mount
A. Company Head quarters and two-thirds Company .....Penang
One-third Company .....Malacca
B. Company.....Singapore
C. Company (No. 1 Bulk. Bat.) Bengal Service
D. Company (No. 7 Bulk. Bat.)...Cannanore and Mangalore
E. Company (No. 9 Bulk Bat.)...Cuttack and Sumbulpore
F. Company .....Meeaday
1st Supplemental Company .....St.Thos.' Mount
2d do. do. .....Vizianagram
Details of several Companies ...Labuan

MADRAS ENGINEERS.

Head quarters .....Fort St. George

MADRAS SAPPERS AND MINERS—NATIVE.

Head quarters .....Dowlaishweram
A. Company.....Ditto
One Section with Gen. Whitlock's Field Service
B. Company .....Nerbudda (Bombay) Field Service
C. Company .....Bengal Service
D. Company .....Rangoon
E. Company ... .Dowlaishweram
One Section with Gen. Whitelock's Division
F. Company .....Secunderabad
One Section .....Paumbum
G. Company .....Padoungmyo
H. Company .....Thayetmew
I .Company .....Tongho
K. Company .....Dowlaishweram
L. Company .....Field Division Gen.Whitelock
M, Company .....Dowlaishweram

INFANTRY.

EUROPEAN.

H.M. 1st Royal Regt. (1st Bat.),.Secunderabad
H.M. 43rd Light Infantry .....Gen.Whitelock's Division Field Service
H.M. 44th Regiment .....Fort St. George
H.M. 60th Royal Rifles (3d. Bat.) Bangalore
3 Companies.....Bellary
1 do. .....Mysore
1 do. .....Hurryhur
H.M. 66th Regiment .....Cannanore
1 Company .....Mangalore
1 do. .....Sircee
H.M. 68th Regiment .....Rangoon
H.M. 69th Regiment .....Tonghoo
H.M. 74th Highlanders .....Berhampore
1 Company .....Sholapore
3 Companies.....Field Service Southern Mahratta Country
The Madras Fusiliers .....Bengal on Field Service
2nd European Light Infantry . Trichinopoly
3rd Madras European Regiment. Field Division under Gen. Whitlock

NATIVE INFANTRY.

1st Regiment N.I. (Rifle Comp.) Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
2nd Regiment N. I.....Quilon
3rd N. I. or Palamcottah Light Infantry.....Cannanore
4th N. I. .....Thayetmew
5th N. I. (Rifle Company) Head quarters Right Wing.....Mangalore

Left Wing .....Sumbulpore
6th N. I. .....Rangoon
7th N. I. .....Secunderabad
8th N. I. .....Tonghoo
9th N. I. .....Secunderabad
10th N. I. .....Secunderabad
11th N. I. .....Bellary
12th N. I. .....Rangoon
13th N. I. .....Maulmein
14th N. I. .....Singapore
15th N. I. .....Thayetmew
16th N. I. (Rifle Company).....Mangalore
17th N. I. .....Bengal Field Service
18th N, I. .....Bellary
19th N. I. .....Service Ger., Whitelock's Division
20th N. I. .....Bangalore
21st N, I. .....Trichinopoly
22nd N. I. .....Penang
23rd N. I. (or Walajahbad Light Infantry) .....Rangoon
24th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Henzedah
25th N. I. .....Madras
26th N. I. .....Kamptee
27th N. I. .....Bengal, on Service
28th N. I. .....Hoosingabad
29th N. I. .....Masulipatam
30th N. I. .....Bellary
31st N. I., or Trichinopoly Light Infantry.....Vizianagram
32nd N. I. .....Kamptee
33rd N. I. .....Kamptee
34th or (Chicacale Lt. Infantry) Trichinopoly
35th N. I. .....Hurryhur
36th (Rifle Company) .....Kurnool
37th N. I., (Grenadiers) Head quarters .....Shuaygheen
Left Wing .....Tonghoo
38th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Vizagapatam
39th N. I. .....Thayetmew
40th N. I. .....Cuttack
41st N. I. .....Burmah
42nd N. I. .....Raichoor Field Service
43rd N.I. .....Russelcondah
44th N, I .....Thayetmew
45th NI .....Madras
46th N. I. .....Vizagapatam
47th N. I. .....Bellary
48th N. I. .....Moulmein
49th N. I (Rifle Company) .....Secunderabad
50th N. I. .....Service Gen. Whitlock's Divisi
51st N. I. .....Palamcottah
52nd N. I. .....Mercara
Left Wing .....French Rocks
1st Extra Regiment N. I. .....Samulcottah
2nd Extra N. I. .....Trichinopoly
3rd Extra N. I. .....Cuddapah
Sappers' Militia .....Madras
Madras Rifles, temporarily formed for Service in Bengal by the Rifle Companies of the 1st, 5th, 16th, 24th, 36th, 49th, Regiments N. I., and 2 Companies 34th N. I.—Service Bengal.

VETERANS' ESTABLISHMENT.

EUROPEAN VETERANS

Artillery Company .....Palaveram
Infantry Company .....Vizagapatam

NATIVE VETERANS

1st or Madras Native Vet. Bat. .Madras
2nd or Arnu Native Vet. Bat. .Arcot

DEPÔTS.

For H.M Regiments .....Poonamallee
European Infantry .....Arcot
Native Infantry .....Palaveram

NATIVE INFANTRY RECRUITING DEPOTS.

No. 1 Recruiting Depot.....Dindigul
No. 2 do. .....Arcot
No. 3 do. .....Chicacole
No. 4 do .....Ellore

STATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

(Corrected up to 27th June, 1859, inclusive.)

[Where two places are mentioned, the last-named is that at which the Depot is stationed.]

1st Life Guards—Hyde Park.
2nd do.—Windsor.
Royal Horse Guards—Regent's Park.
1st Dragoon Guards—Madras: Canterbury.
2nd do.—Bengal: Canterbury.
3rd do.—Bombay: Canterbury.
4th do.—Aldershott.
5th do.—Aldershot.
6th do.—Bengal: Maidstone.
7th do.—Bengal: Canterbury.
1st Dragoons—Curragh.
2nd do.—Newbridge.
3rd do.—Dublin.
4th do.—Birmingham.
5th do.—Newbridge.
6th do.—Bombay: Maidstone.
7th Hussars—Bengal: Canterbury.
8th do.—Bombay: Canterbury.
9th Lancers—Bengal: Maidstone.
10th Hussars—Aldershott.
11th Hussars—Aldershot.
12th Lancers—Madras: Maidstone.
13th Light Dragoons—Dublin.
14th do.—Bombay: Maidstone.
15th Hussars—Hounslow.
16th Lancers—Edinburgh.
17th do.—Bombay: Canterbury.
18th Dragoons—Manchester.
Military Train [1st bat.]—Shorncliffee.
Do. [2nd bat.]—On passage home.
Do. [3rd Bat.]—Woolwich
Do. [4th bat.]—Aldershott. } Depot at Bristol.
Do. [5th bat.]—Curragh. }
Do. [6th bat.] | Woolwich. }
Grenadier Guards [1st bat.]—Windsor.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Wellington Barracks.
Do. [3rd bat.]—Portman-st. barracks.
Coldstream Guards [1st bat.]—St. George's bar
Do. [2nd bat.]—Wellington Barracks.
Scots Fus. Guards [1st bat.]—Tower
Fus. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
1st Foot [1st.] —Madras: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—China: Birr.
2nd do. 1st [bat.]—C. of G. Hope: Walmer.
Do. [2nd bat.]— Corfu: Walmer.
3rd 1st [bat.]—Bengal: Limerick.
Do. do. Malta: Limerick.
4th. do. [1st bat]—Bombay: Chichester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Corfu.
5th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Mauritius, Pembroke.
6th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Cork.
7th do. [1st. bat.]—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Walmer.
8th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Templemore.
9th do. [1st. bat.]—Aldershott: Limerick.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Corfu: Limerick.
10th do. [1st bat.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
11th do. [1st bat.]—Aldershot: Fermoy.

Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershott.
12th do. [1st bat.]—N. S. Wales: Walmer.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Glasgow.
13th do [1st bat.]—Bengal: Fermoy.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Portsmouth, for the Cape
14th do. [1st bat.]—Cephalonia: Fermoy.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
15th do.—Jersey: Pembroke
Do. [2nd bat.]—Malta, Pembroke.
16th do.— Dublin: Templemore.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh
17th do.—Canada: Limerick.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Plymouth.
18th do.—Bombay: Buttevant.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
19th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Shorncliffe.
20th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Dublin.
21st do.—Malta: Birr.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Newport.
22nd do.—Manchester: Parkhurst.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Malta.
23rd do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Depot at Deal; Malta.
24th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
25th do.--Gibraltar: Pembroke.
26th do.—[bat.]—Bermuda: Belfast.
27th do. –Bengal: Buttevant.
28th do.—Bombay: Fermoy.
29th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
30th do.—Dublin: Parkhurst.
31st do —Bombay: Pembroke.
32nd do.—Bengal.
33rd do.—Bombay; Fermoy.
34th do.—Bengal: Colchester.
35th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
36th do.—Aldershott: Athlone.
37th do.—Bengal: Colchhster.
38th do.—Bengal: Colchester.
39th do.—Canada: Templemore.
40th do.—N. S. Wales: Birr.
41st do.—Jamaica: Jersey.
42nd do.—Bengal: Sterling.
43rd do.—Madras: Chatham.
44th do.—Madras: Colchester.
45th do.—Preston: Parkhurst.
46th do.—Bengal: Templemore.
47th do.—Aldershott: Cork.
48th do.—Bengal: Cork.
49th do.—Barbadoes: Belfast.
50th do.—Ceylon: Parkhurst
51st do.—Bombay: Chichester.
52nd do.—Bengal: Chatham
53rd do.—ditto: ditto
54th do.—Bengal: Colchester
55th do.—Curragh: Jersey
56th do.—Bombay: Colchester
57th do.—Bombay: Cork.
58th do.—Shorncliffe: Curragh.
59th do.—Cape: Athlone
60th do.—[1st bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal. Winchester
Do. [3rd bat.]—Madras: Winchester
Do. [4th bat.]—Aldershot.
61st do.—Bengal: Chatham
62nd do.—Nova Scotia: Belfast
63rd do.—ditto: Belfast
64th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
65th do.—New Zealand: Birr.
66th do.—Madras: Colchester
67th do.—Bengal: Athlone
68th do.—Madras: Fermoy
69th do.—Madras: Fermoy
70th do.—Bengal; Canterbury
71st do.—Bombay; Stirling
73nd do.—Bombay; Aberdeen
73rd do.—Bengal: Jersey
74th do.—Madras: Aberdeen
75th do.—Bengal: Chatham
76th do.—Curragh: Belfast
77th do.—Bengal: Jersey
78th do.—Bengal: Aberdeen
79th do.—ditto: Perth,
80th do.—ditto: Buttevant.
81st do.—Bengal: Chatham
82nd do.—Bengal: Canterbury
83rd do.—Bombay: Chichester.
84th do.—On passage home: Chatham
85th do.—Cape: Pembroke
86th do.—Bombay: Buttevant (on passage home)
87th do.—Bengal: Buttevant.
88th do.—Bengal; Colchester
89th do.—Bombay: Fermoy
90th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
91st do.—Bombay: Pembroke
92nd do.—Bombay; Stirling
93rd do.—Bengal; Aberdeen
94th do.—ditto: Chatham
95th do.—Bombay: Fermoy
96th do.—Plymouth: Parkhurst
97th do.—Bengal: Colchester
98th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
99th do.—Bengal: Cork
100th do.—Gibraltar [Winchester.
Rifle Brigade [1st bat.]—Portsmouth.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [3rd bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [4th bat.]—Malta, Winchester
1st West India Regiment—Bahamas
2nd do—Jamaica
3rd do.—Barbadoes
Ceylon Rifle Regiment—Ceylon
Cape Mounted Rifles—Cape of Good Hope
Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment—Canada
St. Helena Regiment—St. Helena
Royal Newfoundland Corps—Newfoundland
Royal Malta Fencibles—Malta
Gold Coast Corps—Cape Coast Castle

STATIONS OF THE EMBODIED MILITIA.

ENGLAND (18).

Bedford—Aldershott.
2nd Cheshire—Tipner
Durham Artillery—Portsmouth
Hampshire Artillery—Pembroke
East Kent—Aldershott
Lancashire Artillery—Dover
4th Lancashire—Warrington
Norfolk Artillery—Sheerness.
North Lincoln—Curragh
5th Middlesex—Curragh
Northumberland Artillery—Hesham.
Nottingham—Newark
Oxford—Aldershott
1st Stafford—Aldershott
2nd Stafford—Curragh.
Suffolk Artillery—Portsmouth
Sussex—Edinburgh
1st Tower Hamlets—Cork
2nd Warwick—Plymouth
Wilts—Portsmouth
1st York, (W. R.)—Aldershott
3rd York—Newcastle

SCOTLAND (3).

Forfar Artillery—Sheerness
Fife Artillery—Pendennis
2nd Lanark—Dublin
Stirling—Aldershott

IRELAND (12).

Antrim Rifles—Aldershot
Antrim Artillery—Kinsale.
North Cork—Aldershot
Donegal—Dover
North Down—Belfast
Dublin (city)—Shorncliffe
Dublin City Artillery—Colchester.
Fermanagh—Chester
Kerry—Bradford
Limerick (County) Portsmouth
Louth (Rifles)—Yarmouth
Tipperary Artil.—Portsmouth
Waterford Artillery—Gosport
Wexford—Waterford

STATIONS OF THE ROYAL NAVY IN COMMISSION.

(Corrected to 27th June.)

With the Dates of Commission of the Officers in Command.

Aboukir, 90, sc., Capt. C. F. Schomberg, 1851, Devonport.
Acorn, 12, Com. R. B. Pearse, 1856, East Indies.
Actæon, 26, Com .J. Ward (b), 1858, East Indies.
Adventure, sc. troop-ship, Com. E. Lacy, 1856, East Indies.
Agamemnon, 91, sc., Capt. T. Hope, 1852, Portland.
Ajax, 60, screw, Captain J. McNeil, Boyd, 1846, Coast Guard.
Alarm, 26, Capt. D. Curry, 1846, Pacific.
Alert, 17, screw, Com. W. A. R. Pearse, 1855, Pacific
Algerine, sc. gunboat, Lieut -Com. W. Arthur, 1854, East Indies.
Algiers, 91, screw, Capt. G. W D. O'Callaghan, 1846, Channel Fleet.
Amethyst, 26, Capt. S. Grenfell, 1850, Pacific.
Amphion, 36, sc., Capt. T. Cochran, 1857, Chatham.
Antelope, 3, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. J. W. Pike, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Arachne, 18, Com. J. E. Montgomerie, 1855, North America and West Indies.
Archer, 13, screw, Capt. J. Sanderson, 1855, Coast of Africa.
Argus, 6, st.-vessel, Com. H. F. W. Ingram, 1856, Mediterranean.
Ariel, 9, sc., Com. C. Bromley, 1856, Mediterranean.
Arrogant, 47. screw, Capt. L. G. Heath, C.B., 1854, Coast Guard.
Asia, 84, Capt. G. T. Gordon, 1846, Portsmouth.
Assistance, screw troop-ship, Com. W. A. J. Heath, 1856, East Indies.
Assurance, 4, screw, Com. C. M. Aynsley, 1856, Mediterranean.
Atalanta, 16, Com. T. M. S. Pasley, 1855, North America and West Indies.
Atholl, 4, Com. E. Wilson, 1845, Greenock.
Banshee, 2, st.-vessel, Com. C. A. Campbell, 1858, Portsmouth.
Banterer, sc.-gunbt., Lieut.-Com. J. Jenkins. 1853, East Indies.
Basilisk, 6, st.-vessel, Com. G. A. Phayre, 1854, North America and West Indies.
Belleisle, hospital ship, Com. J. R. Rodd, 1851, East Indies.
Bittern, tender to Calcutta, East Indies.
Black Eagle, st.-yacht, Mast.-Com. J. E. Petley, 1844, particular service.
Blenheim, 60, screw, Capt. F. Scott, C.B., 1848, Coast Guard.
Boscawen, 70, Rear Admiral the Hon. Sir F. W. Grey, K.C.B., Capt. R. A. Powell, C.B., 1855, Cape of Good Hope.
Brisk, 16, sc., Capt. A. F. R. D'Horsey, 1857, Cape of Good Hope.
Britannia, Training Ship, Capt. R. Harris, 1849, Portsmouth.
Brune, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. E. F. Lodder, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Brunswick, 80, sc , Captain E. Ommanney, 1846, Mediterranean.
Buffalo, screw, Mas.-Com.—particular service.
Bustard, 2, sc -gunbt., Lt.-Com. F. W. Hallowes 1856, East Indies.
Buzzard, 6, st.-vessel, Com. F. Peel, 1855, S.E. Coast of America.
Cadmus, 21, sc., Capt. H. S. Hillyar, C.B., 1854, Mediterranean.
Cæsar, 90, screw, Capt C. Frederick, 1842, Devonport.
Calcutta, 84, Capt. W. K. Hall, C.B., 1853, East Indies.
Calypso, 18, Capt. F. B. Montresor, 1851, Pacific.
Cambrian, 40, Captain J. J, M'Cleverty, C.B. 1848 East Indies.
Cambridge, Gunnery Ship, Capt. A. W. Jerningham, 1851, Devonport.
Camilla, 16, Com. G. T. Colville, 1855, East Indies.
Caradoc, 2, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. C. M. Buckle 1847, Mediterranean.
Centurion. 80, sc., Capt. C. G. E. Patey, 1846, Mediterranean.
Chesapeake, 51, screw, Capt. G. O. Willis, 1856, East Indies.
Clio, 21, screw, Capt. F. Miller, 1855, Sheerness.
Clown, sc.-gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. F. Lee, 1855 1842, East Indies.
Conflict, 8, sc., Com. R. W. Courtenay, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Conqueror, 101, screw, Capt. H. R. Yelverton, C.B., 1843, Mediterranean.
Coquette, 4, sc., Com. the Hon. F. A. Foley, 1855, Mediterranean.
Cordelia, 11, sc., Com. C. E. H. Vernon, 1855, Australia.
Cormorant, 4, sc., Com. A. Wodehouse, 1856, East Indies.
Cornwallis, 60, sc., Captain G. G. Randolph, C.B., 1854, Coast Guard.
Coromandel, st.-vessel, Second Master W. H. Vine (acting, East Indies.
Cossack, 20, sc., Capt. R. Moorman, 1857, Sheerness.
Cressy, 80, screw, Capt. the Hon. C. G. J. B. Elliot, C.B., 1841, Mediterranean.
Crocodile, 8, rec.-ship, Com W. Greet, 1854, off the Tower,
Cruiser, 17, sc., Com. J. Bythesea, 1856, south Coast of America.
Cumberland, 70, Rear Adm. Sir Lushington, K. C. B. Captain H D. Rogers, C. B. 1854, South America
Curaçoa, 31, screw, Capt. T H. Mason, 1849, Devonport.
Cyclops, 6, st.-v., Capt. W. J. S. Pullen, 1856, East Indies.
Dasher, 2, st.-vessel, Com. E. G. Hore, 1854, Portsmouth.
Dauntless, 31, sc., Capt. W. Edmonstone, 1853 Portsmouth.
Dee, 4, troop-ship, Mast-Com. T C. Pullen, 1844, particular service.
Devastation, 6, st.-ves, Com. C. Wake, 1855, North America, and West Indies.
Diadem, 32, sc., Capt. P. W. Moorsom, C.B., Devonport.
Donegal, 101, sc., Capt., W. F. Glanville, 1846, Devonport.
Doris, 32, screw, Capt. E. Heathcote, 1852, Mediterranean.
Dove, screw gunbt., Lieut. C. J. Bullock, 1855, East Indies.
Drake, sc. gunbt., Lieut-Com. A. R. Blane, 1856, East Indies.
Eagle, 50, Capt. E. Tatham, 1854, Coast Guard.
Edgar, 91, sc., Rear-Adm. J. E. Erskine, Capt. J. E. Katon, 1856, Sheerness.
Edinburgh, 58, screw, Capt. Ed C. T. D'Eyncourt, 1849, Coast Guard.
Elk, 12, Com. H. Campion, 1855, Australia.

Emerald, 51, sc. Capt. A. Cumming, 1854, Channel Fleet.
Esk, 20, sc., Rear Admiral J. Hope, C.B., Capt. Sir. R. J. Le M. M'Clure, 1850, East Indies.
Euryalus, 51, sc., Capt. J. W. Tarleton, C.B., 1852, Mediterranean.
Excellent, 46, gunnery ship, Capt. R. S. Hewlett' C.B, 1850, Portsmouth.
Exmouth, 90, sc., Capt. J. J. Stopford, 1841, Mediterranean.
Fairy, sc. yacht, tender to Victoria and Albert yacht. Portsmouth.
Falcon, 17, sc., Com. A. G. Fitz Roy, 1857, Coast of Africa.
Ferret, 8, Com. W. E. Fisher, 1856, particular service.
Firebrand, 6, st.-vessel, Com. J. Dayman, 1858, particular service.
Firm, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. R. Boulton, 1854, East Indies.
Fisguard, 42, Commodore the Hon. J. R. Drummond, C.B., Woolwich
Flying Fish, 6, c., Com. C. W. Hope, 1854, Portsmouth.
Forester, 2, sc. gunbt, Lieut.-Com. A. J. Innes, 1853, East Indies.
Formidable, 84, J. C. Fitzgerald, 1840, Sheerness.
Furious, 16, st.-ves., Capt. O. J. Jones, C.B., 1855, East Indies.
Fury, 6, st.-ves., Com. J.E. Commerell, 1855, E. Indies.
Ganges, 84, Rear-Adm. R. L. Baynes, C.B., Capt. J. Fulford, 1848, Pacific.
Gannett, 11, Com. E. H. G. Lambert, 1854, Mediterranean.
Gladiator, 6, st.-vessel, Commander H. D. Hickley (1858). Devenport.
Gorgon, 6, st.-ves. Com. B. C. T. Pim, 1858, Portsmouth.
Growler, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. H. E. Crozier, 1854, Mediterranean.
Hannibal, 91, sc., Rear-Admiral G. R. Mundy, Capt. M. Connolly, 1858, Mediterranean.
Harrier, 17, screw, Com. Sir M. MacGregor, Bart., (1856), South America.
Hastings, 60, screw, Captain W. R. Mends, C.B., 1852, Coast Guard.
Haughty, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. G. D. Broad, 1851, East Indies.
Havannah, 19, Capt. T. Harvey, 1848, Pacific.
Hawke, 60, sc., Capt. W. Crispin 1852, Coast Guard.
Herald, 8, surv.-ves., Capt. H. M. Denham, 1846, South Seas.
Hermes, 6, st.-v., Com. W. E. A. Gordon, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Hero, 91, screw, Capt. G. H. Seymour, C.B., 1844, Channel Fleet.
Hesper, sc st.-ship, Mast.-Com. J. Loane, 1846, East Indies.
Hibernia, rec.-ship, Rear-Admiral H. J. Codrington, C.B., Captain F. Warden, C.B., 1845, Malta.
Highflyer, 21, sc., Capt. C. F. A. Shadwell, C.B., 1853, East Indies.
Himalaya, sc. store-ship, Com. J. Seccombe, 1855, Devonport
Hogue, 60, screw, Capt. J. Moore, C.B., 1848, Coast Guard.
Hornet, 17, sc., Com. Viscount Gilford, 1858, East Indies.
Hydra, 6, st.-vessel, Com. R. V. Hamilton, 1857, Coast of Africa.
Imaum, 72, Commodore H. Kellett, C.B., Com. H. J. Grant, 1855, rec.-ship, Jamaica.
Impregnable, 104, Vice-Adm. Sir B. Reynolds, K.C.B., Capt. W. H. Stewart, C.B., 1854, Devonport.
Impereuse, 51, screw, Capt. R. Maguire, 1854, Portsmouth.
Indus, 78, Rear-Admiral Sir H. Stewart, K.C.B. Capt. J. C. D. Hay, 1850, North Americ, and West Indies.
Industry, st.-ves., 2, st.-ship, Mast.-Com. G. J. Hodges, 1841. particular service.
Inflexible, 6, st.-ves., Com. G. A. C. Brooker, 1856, East Indies.
Intrepid, 6, screw, Com. J. H. Marryat, 1855, Mediterranean.
Iris, 26, Capt. W. Loring, C.B., 1848, Australia.
Jackal, 4, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. A. G. E. Murray, 1846, particular service.
James Watt, 91, screw, Capt. E. Codd, 1851, Channel Fleet
Janus, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. H. P. Knevitt, 1855, East Indies.
Jasper, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. H. Pym, 1849, W. Indies.
Kestrel, sc. gunboat. Lieut.-Com. G. D. Bevan, 1853, East Indies.
Lapwing, 4, screw, Com. M. F. O. Reilly, 1856, Mediterranean.
Lee, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. H. Jones, 1852, East Indies.
Leopard, 18, st.-ves., Capt. J. F. B. Wainwright, 1856, S. E. Coast of America.
Leven, 3, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. S. Hudson, 1854, East Indies.
Liffey, 51, screw, Capt. G. W. Preedy, CB., 1853, particular service.
Locust, 3, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. J. B. Field, 1846, particular service.
London, 90, screw, Capt. H. Chads, 1848, Mediterranean.
Lynx, 4, screw, Lieut.-Com. H. Berkeley, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Lyra, 9, sc. Com. R. B. Oldfield, 1855, Cape of Good Hope.
Madagascar, receiving ship, Commander E. M. Leycester, 1856, Rio Janeiro.
Magicienne, 16, st.-vessel, Capt. N. Vansittart, C.B., 1854, E. Indies.
Marlborough, 131, sc., Vice Adm. A. Fanshawe, C.B., Capt. the Rt. Hon. Lord F. H. Kerr, 1852, Mediterranean.
Mars, 80, sc., Capt. J. N. Strange (1854), Sheerness.
Medina, st.-ves., 4, Capt. T. A. B. Spratt, C.B. 1855, Mediterranean
Medusa, 4, steam-vessel, Com. W. Bowden, 1854, Coast of Africa
Megæra, 6, sc., Com. G. T. M. Purvis (b), 1852, Portsmouth.
Melpomene, 50, screw, Capt. C. J. F. Ewart, 1855, Mersey.
Mersey, 40, screw, Capt. H. Caldwell, C.B., 1853, Channel Fleet.
Minotaur, E. P. Halsted 1842, Sheerness.
Mohawk, 4, screw. Com. P. C. C. McDougall, 1856, East Indies.
Monkey, steam tug, Sec. Mas. G. Syndercombe (acting), Woolwich.
Naiad, 42, store-ship, Mast.-Com. W. W. Dillon, 1843, Callao
Nautilus, 6, Lieut.-Com. W. B Grant, 1852, apprentice ship, Portsmouth
Neptune, 91, screw, Capt. Sir W. Hoste, Bart., 1848, Portsmouth.
Nereus, 42, store-depôt, Mast.-Com. J. C. Barlow, 1835, Valparaiso
Niger, 14, sc., Capt. P. Cracroft, 1854, East Indies.
Nile, 90, sc., Rear-Adm. C. Talbot, Capt. A. P. E. Wilmot, C.B., 1854, Devonport.
Nimrod, 6, sc., Com. ———— East Indies.
Oberon, 3, st.-vessel, Lieut-Com. F. G. C. Paget, 1852, South America.

Opossum, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. C. J. Balfour, 1850, East Indies.
Orion, 91, screw, Capt. J. B. E. Frere 1854, Mediterranean.
Osborne, st.-vessel, Mas. Com. G. H. K. Bower 1842, Portsmouth.
Osprey, 4, screw, Com. H. J. Blomfield, 1855, Mediterranean
Pelorus, 21, sc., Capt. F. B. P. Seymour, 1854, East Indies.
Pembroke, 60, Capt. E. P. Charlewood, 1855, Coast Guard.
Perseverance, 2 troop ship, Com. E. R. Power, 1850, particular service
Persian, 12, Commander E. Hardinge 1856, Coast of Africa.
Pioneer, 6, screw, Com. C. H. May, 1854, Channel Fleet.
Plover, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. H. Rason, 1855, East Indies
Plumper, 9, screw, Capt. G. H. Richards, 1854, Pacific.
Pluto, 4, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. C. H. Simpson, 1848, Coast of Africa
Porcupine, 3, st.-ves. Capt. H. C. Otter, 1854, Devonport.
Princess Charlotte, 104 Mast.-Com. H. G. Thomsett, 1854, Hong Kong.
Princess Royal, 91, sc., Capt. T. Baillie, 1845, Mediterranean
Pylades, screw, 21, Capt. M. de Courcy, 1852, Pacific
Qua'l, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. N. Osborn 1856, Mediterranean.
Queen Charlotte, 104, Vice-Adm. E. Harvey, Capt. H. Harvey, 1852, Sheerness.
Racer, 11, screw, Com. the Hon. T. A. Pakenham 1856, North America and West Indies.
Racoon, 21, screw, Captain J. A. Paynter, 1854, Mediterranean.
Recruit, 6, st.-v., Com. D. Spain, 1856, Mediterranean.
Renown, 91, screw, Capt. A. Forbes, 1846 Mediterranean.
Retribution, 28, st.-vessel, Commodore H. E. Edgell, East Indias.
Rhadamanthus, 4, st.-ves., Master-Com. F. R Sturdee, 1843, particular service.
Roebuck, 6, sc., Com. E. C. Symons, acting, E.I
Rolla, 6, Lieut.-Com. C. G. Nelson, 1854, Portsmouth.
Royal Albert, 121, sc., Rear-Admiral Sir C. H. Freemantle, K.C.B., Capt. E. B. Rice (1855), Channel Fleet.
Royal Adelaide, 104, Rr.-Ad. Sir T. S. Pasley, Bt.; Capt. W. J. Williams, 1841, Devonport.
Russell, 60, sc., Capt. G. Wodehouse, 1854, Coast Guard.
St. Jean D'Acre, 101, screw, Capt. T. P. Thompson, 1847, Mediterranean.
St Vincent, 102, Rear Admiral G. Grey, Capt. H. Eyres, C.B., 1841, Portsmouth.
Sampson, 6, st.-v., Capt. G. S. Hand, 1852, S.E. Coast of America.
Saracen, 4, Mast.-Com. W. Stanton, 1852, East Indies.
Satelite, sc., 21, Capt. J. C. Prevost, 1856, Pacific.
Saturn, 72, Capt. G. Ramsay, C.B., 1843, Pembroke.
Scourge, 6, sc., Com. Prince of Langenberg, 1857, Mediterranean.
Scout, 21, sc., Capt. J. Corbett, 1857, Sheerness
Scylla, 21, sc., Capt. R. Lambert, 1855, Sheerness.
Seagull, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. Chimmo, 1850, particular service.
Sharpshooter, 8, screw, Lieut.-Com. C. Gibbons, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Shamrock, sc. surveying ves., Com. Edye, Coast of Ireland.
Sidon, 22, st.-ves., Capt. R. B. Crawford, 1856, Portsmouth.
Simoom, 8, sc., Com. J. M. Cooke, 1852, Portsmouth.
Siren, 16, Com. G. M. Balfour, 1856, South America.
Skipjack, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. J. Murray, 1848, Channel Fleet.
Slaney, 2, sc. gunbt., Lt.-Com. R. J. Wynniatt, 1850, East Indies.
Sparrowhawk, 4, sc., Com. J. C. Byng, 1856, East Indies.
Spitfire, 5, st.-v., Lieut.-Com. W. C. Chapman, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Spy, 3, Lieut.-Com. T. B. Collinson, 1856, South America.
Starling, sc.-gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. A. Whitshed, 1854, East Indies.
Staunch, 2, sc.-gunboat, Lt.-Com. E. J. Pollard, 1855, East Indies.
Styx, 6, st.ves., Com. C. Vesey, 1854 N. America and W. Indies.
Supply, st.-sh., Mast.-Com. W. H. Balliston, 1845, particular service.
Surprise, 4, sc., Com. Lord E. H. Cecil, 1857, C. of Africa.
Tartar, 20, sc., Capt. H. Dunlop, 1850, W. Indies and N. America.
Tartarus, 4, st., Com. A. L. Mansell, 1855, Mediterranean.
Termagant, 25, screw, Capt. R. Hall, 1855, Channel Fleet.
Terrible, 21, st.-vessel, Capt. F. H. H. Glasse, C. B., 1846, Mediterranean.
Terror, 16, Capt. F. Hutton, 1844, Bermuda.
Topaze, 51, sc., Capt. the Hon. J. W. S. Spencer 1854, Devonport.
Tortoise, 12, store-ship, Capt. W. F. Burnett, C.B., 1854, Ascension.
Trafalgar, 91, sc., Capt. E. G. Fanshawe, 1845 Sheerness.
Tribune, 30, screw, Captain G. T. P. Hornby, 1846, Pacific.
Trident, 6, st.-v. Com. F. A. Close, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Triton, 3, st.-ves. Lieut.-Com. R. H. Burton, 1849, Coast of Africa
Urgent, sc. troop ship, Com. H. W. Hire, 1854, Portsmouth.
Valorous, 16, st.-ves., Capt. W. C. Aldham, C.B., 1853, West Indies.
Vesuvius, 6, steam-vessel, Commodore C. Wise, Coast of Africa.
Victoria and Albert, 2, steam yacht, Captain the Hon. J Denman, 1841, Portsmouth.
Victor Emanuel, 91, sc., Capt. J. Willcox, C.B. 1850, Mediterranean.
Victory, 101, Admiral W. Bowles, C.B.; Capt. A. Farquhar, 1849, Portsmouth.
Vigilant, 4, sc., Com. W. Armytage, 1855, Mediterranean.
Viper, 4, screw, Com. W. N. W. Hewett, V.C. L.H., 1858, Coast of Africa.
Virago, 6, st.-ves., Com. M. B. Dunn, 1856 Devonport.
Vixen, 6, st.-ves., Com. L. Lambert, 1858, Pacific.
Vulture, 6, st.-v., Captain F. A. Campbell, 1856, Mediterranean.
Wanderer, 4, screw, Com. M. R. Pechell, 1854, Mediterranean.
Watchful, 2, sc.-gunbt, st. Com. F. W. Inglefield, 1857, East Indies.
Wellesley, 72, Captain Superintendent G. Goldsmith, C.B., 1842, Chatham.
Wellington, 72, Capt. R. S. Robinson, 1840, Devonport.
Woodcock, 2, sc., gunbt., Lt.-Com. G. S. Bousanquet, 1855, East Indies.

STATIONS OF THE INDIAN NAVY IN COMMISSION.

(Corrected to the 26th April, 1859.)

With the dates of Commission of the Officers in command

Acbar, 22, Flag-ship of Commodore G. G. Wellesley, C.B., Com. H. A. Drought, 1851, Com. H. W. Grounds, 1856, Gunnery Officer, Bombay.
Assaye, 10, paddle, Commander G. N. Adams, 1858, Zanzibar.
Auckland, 8, paddle, Com. J. Stephen, 1848,
Assyria, 2. paddle, Master-Com. E. Davies, 1858, Aden.
Augusta. 6, yacht, Bombay.
Australian, screw troop ship, Master-Com.—Boon, Bay of Bengal.
Berenice, 2, paddle troop ship, Lieut.-Com. A. W. Chitty, 1847, Malabar Coast.
Bheemah, 4, surveying vessel, Lieut.-Com. A. D. Taylor, 1847, Malabar Coast.
Becas, 2, flat, Master-Com. E. Nash, 1850, River Indus.
Clive, 18, Lieut.-Com. J. Sedley, 1847, school ship, on a Cruize.
Cursetjee, Flat, Master-Com. ———, Indus.
Charlotte, 4, Lieut.-Com. T. N. Philbrick, 1857, Andaman Islands.
Constance, 3, Lieut.-Com. C. H. Walker, 1847, Aden.
Comet, 5, paddle gunboat, Com. W. B. Selby, 1830, Mesopotamia.
Coromandel, screw troop ship, Lieut.-Com. S. B. Hellard, 1847, Bay of Bengal.
Chenaub, 2, paddle, Master-Com. T. Gourley, 1858, River Indus.
Conqueror, 2, paddle, Master-Commander T. K. Linton, 1849, River Indus.
Dalhousie, screw troop ship, Lieut.-Com. T. W. Hopkins, 1858, Bay of Bengal.
Dromedary, Flat, Master-Com. ———, River Indus.
Elphinstone, 18, Lieut.-Com. H. A. Fraser, 1859, Bombay.
Euphrates, Flat, Master-Com. W. Walton, 1858, River Indus.
Ethersey, Flat, Master-Com. T. O. Jones, 1858, River Indus.
Emily, 2, Lieut.-Com. P. W. Tendal, 1857, Persian Gulf.
Falkland, 12, Commodore G. Jenkins, C.B., 1855, Persian Gulf.
Ferooz, 10, paddle, Commander C. J. Cruttenden, 1830, Bombay.
Freere, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J. McNeil, 1852, River Indus.
Goolanair, paddle yacht, Master-Commander J. D. Kennelly, 1850, Bombay
Georgiana, 2, Lieut.-Com. W. Collingwood, 1857, Persian Gulf.
Indus, 2, paddle, Master-Commander E. S. H. Neale, 1856, River Indus.
Jhellum, 2, paddle, Master-Com. R. L. Lawson, 1856, River Indus.
Keddywarree, receiving ship, Master-Com. J. S. Amos, 1856, Kurrache.
Lady Falkland, 2, paddle, Mast.-Com. W. Barras, 1859, Kurrache.
Lady Canning, 4, paddle, Lieut.-Com. E. Peevor, 1846, Red Sea.
Mahi, 3, Lieut.-Com. R. W. Whisk, 1849, Bombay.
Marié, 3, Lieut.-Com. C. G. Constable, 1839, Surveying Ship, Malabar Coast.
Mootvee, 1, pendant ves., Capt. E. W. Daniell, 1857, Kotree.
Napier, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J' Forster, 51, River Indus.
Nerbudda, 2, Lieut.-Com. C. Forster, 1856, Malabar Coast.
Nimrod, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J. B. Butter, 1856, River Indus.
Nitocris, Flat, Master-Com. A. Harrison, 1856, River Indus.
Outram, 4, paddle, Mast.-Com. W. Fivey, 1858, River Indus.
Punjaub, 10, paddle, Commander A. Foulerton, 1857, Calcutta
Planet, 2, paddle, Master-Com. T. K. Fletcher, 1853, River Indus.
Prince Arthur, screw troop-ship, Com. J. Tronson, 1858, *en route* Timor Islands.
Pleiad, 2, screw, Lieut.-Com. J. G. Nixon, 1847, Persian Gulf.
Ravee, Flat, Master-Com. ———, River Indus.
Semiramis, 8 paddle, Com. W. Balfour, 1858, Bombay.
Sutledge, Flat, Master-Com., River Indus.
Satellite, 2, paddle, Master-Com. A. Wilkins, 1852, River Indus.
Snake, paddle, tender to Acbar, Bombay.
Sir H. Havelock, 2, paddle, Master-Com. D. Morrison, 1858, River Indus.
Sir H. Lawrence, 2, paddle, Master-Com. C. Tickel, 1845, River Indus.
Sydney, screw troop ship, Master-Com. J. Nibblet, Bay of Bengal
Tigris, 5, Lieut.-Com. G. T. Robinson, 1847, Persian Gulf.
Victoria, 4, paddle, Lieut.-Com. T. S. W. Twynham, 1845, Bombay.
Zenobia, 10, paddle, Com. F. E. Manners, 1857, Murat.

NAVAL BRIGADE.

1st Brigade, Bombay, 1st Company, Surat, Lieut.-Com. J. B. Bewsher, 1856, commanding.
2nd Brigade, Bengal, Capt. C. D. Campbell, 1857.
1st Company, Fort William, Lieut.-Com. C. B. Templer, 1857.
2nd Company, Guyah Lieut.-Com. T. H. B. Banon, 1854.
do. Dacca, Lieut.-Com. H. W. Etheridge, 1847.
4th do. Andaman Islands, Lieut.-Com. F. Warden, 1857.
5th Company Sasseram, Lieut.-Com. G. O. B Carew, 1855.
6th do. Patna, Lieut.-Com. D. S. Duval, 1854.
7th do. Chybassa, Lieut.-Com. T. E. Lewis, 1848.
8th do. Barackpore, Lieut.-Com. W. H. M. Davis, 1849.
9th do. Jepore, Lieut.-Com. A. T. Winder 1851.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

NAVY.

ADMIRALTY, May 25.

Corps of Royal Marines—First Lieut. C. L. A. Farmar to be Capt.; First Lieut. C. Jolliffe to be Capt.; Second Lieut. W. H. Nantes to be First Lieut., vice Farmar, promoted; Second Lieut. M. H. Farquharson to be First Lieut., vice Jolliffe, promoted.

PROMOTIONS.

Commanders to be Captains—Charles Wake, 1855; Frederick L. A. Selwyn, 1847.

Commander to be Captain on Reserved Half Pay—John Tudor, 1842, vice Parker, deceased.

Lieutenants to be Commanders—T. H. M. Martin, 1848; E. Field, 1851; M. E. Smithett, 1852; Hon. W. C. Talbot, 1854.

Mates to be Lieutenants—Hon. F. G. Orofton; Clavell W. S. Blount and Allen C. Adams, 1857; N. C. Barton, G. W. Bloxsome, P. J. Murray, St. V. D. Lake, A. H. G. Richardson, J. G. J. Hanmer, R. G. Kinahan, H. J. F. Campbell, G. S. Peard, C. N. Streatfield, and F. H. Blair, 1856; W. H. Elton, S. M. Medley, Charles Jenkins, R. B. Nicholetts, C. G. Fane, A. J. V. Collins, L. M. Mallet, C. W. Thackeray, J. B. Warren, R. Sheepshanks, J. L. Hope, A. J. Cheek, C. D. Broughton, G. W. J. Aldham, Francis Durrant, L. C. Keppel, E. B. Pusey, G. D. Bushe, J. M. Morris, C. R. Buckle, R. G. S. Pasley, W. H. Royse, H. Hilton, M. B. Medlycott, Hon. E. L. V. Mostyn, E. P. Pocock, E. J. Jermain, Sir Francis Blackwood, Bart., H. R. Holmes, H. J. Coddington, Robert Woodward, N. B. Smith, C. A. Watts, John Shortt, E. S. Mangan, and A. E. Dupuis, 1857.

Second Masters to be Masters—John D. Switzer, 1849; W. T. Clifton, H. C. Sedmond, John Molloy, A. E. Parks, J. D. Rogers, R. C. Drew, E. J. Kellow, J. R. Ryan, H. R. Harris, A. J. Armstrong, D. Pender, E. L. B. Williams, and J. H. Lawrence, 1853.

APPOINTMENTS.

Rear Admiral of the Blue—John E. Erskine to be second in command of the Channel Fleet, and to hoist his flag on board the *Edgar*.

Captains—W. F. Glanville, 1846, to *Donegal*; J. N. Strange, 1854, to *Mars*; J. J. B. E. Frere, 1854, to *Orion*, vice Houstoun, invalided; Rochfort Maguire, 1855, to *Imperieuse*; Thomas Cochran, 1857, to *Amphion*; Thomas Miller, 1855, to *Clio*; E. G. Fanshawe, 1845, to *Trafalgar*; Sir William Hoste, Bart., 1848, to *Neptune*; William Edmonstone, 1853, to *Dauntless*; R. B. Watson, C.B., to be Superintendent of Sheerness Dockyard, vice Fitzgerald, deceased; Hon. J. W. S. Spenser, 1854, to *Topaze*; Rowley Lambert, 1855, to *Scylla*; R. B. Crawford, 1856, to *Sidon*; John Corbett, 1857, to *Scout*; Charles F. Schomberg, 1851, to *Aboukir*; Richard Moorman, 1857, to *Cossack*; Charles J. F. Ewart, to *Melpomene*.

Commanders—Frederick A. Herbert, 1858, to *Aboukir*; W. J. Pollard, 1854, to *Edgar*; J. C. Soady, 1851, to *Neptune*; H. D. Hickley, 1858, to *Gladiator*.

Lieutenants—R. H. Harington, 1856, to *Agamemnon*; R. H. Roe, 1859, to *Donegal*; W. O. Butler, 1855, to *Flying Fish*; John Burgess, 1848, and Hon. H. D. Lascelles, 1855, to *Topaze*; J. B. Michell, 1854, to *Victory*; C. H. Murphy, 1858, to *Excellent*; Sydney Metcalfe, 1857, to *Dauntless*; J. R. Palmer, 1855, to *Neptune*; C. A. J. Heysham, 1854, to *Ajax*; George Marriott, 1842, and J. J. W. Jervis, 1850, to *Mars*; F. H. S. Flood, 1856, to *Amphion*; William Clark, to *Gladiator*; A. Swinburne, 1846, John G. Boileau, 1851, W. T. W. Hambly, 1854, and R. J. Stotherd, 1856, to *Edgar*; Alfred Luckraft, 1846, E. F. Holme, 1848, W. N. Cornewall, 1853, and W. J. Walker, 1856, to *Aboukir*; C. O. B. Hall, 1847, to *Victory*; C. R. Buckle, 1859, to *Aboukir*; W. B. Pauli, 1854, J. M. Morris, 1859, C. R. Maberley, 1855, A. G. Bogle, 1855, Henry Vaughan, 1856, and A. J. V. Collins, 1859, to *Excellent*; R. P. Fitz-Gerald, 1857, to *Emerald*; F. H. Hastings, 1858, to *Edgar*; W. J. H. Grubbe, 1854, to *Dauntless*; C. D. Sanders, 1856, to *Cressy*; H. W. Brent, 1856, to *Scylla*; M. G. Jackson, 1854, W. O. Butler, 1855, and E. B. Pusey, 1859, to *Topaze*; H. T. Marsden, 1854, and Hon. A. K. H. Legge, 1858, to *Sidon*; B. J. Cooper, 1856, to *Excellent*; Thomas Stackhouse, 1853, to *Hogue*; William Menzies, 1854, to *Scout*; George Todd, 1853, to *Agamemnon*; R. H. H. Mends, 1846, W. W. S. Bridges, 1852, W. H. Cuming, 1855,

and Francis Osburn, 1856, to *Trafalgar*; D. Stewart, 1858, to *London*.

Masters—Edwin Rowe, 1850 (additional) to *Wellington*, for service in *Donegal*; John S. Smith, 1851 (additional) to *Asia*, for service in *Imperieuse*; Christopher Albert, 1853, to *Melpomene*; John Richards, (additional) to *Fisgard*; George Richards, 1852, to *Sidon*; Tom B. Read, 1855, to *Topaze*; Philip Going, 1855, to *Scylla*; G. S. Alldricks, 1855, to *Scout*; Mark Netten, 1856, to *Cossack*; B. J. Hooper, 1849, to *Trafalgar*; D. Mc.D. Jago, 1846, to *Neptune*; T. B. Wells, 1850, to *Cornwallis*; R. P. J. Simpson, 1854, to *Dauntless*; John Thompson, 1855, to *Himalaya*; Edwin Rowe, 1850, to *Donegal*; John S. Smith, 1851, to *Imperieuse*; F. T. Jameson, 1853, to *Dauntless*; W. T. Greet, 1854, (additional) to *Wellington*; W. H. Petch, 1851, to *Mars*; F. B. Youel, 1854, to *Diadem*; Samuel Winnecott, 1856, to *Racoon*; John R. Ryan, 1859, to *Gannet*; F. B. Henwood, 1852, to *Amphion*; G. P. Heather, 1857, to *Clio*; George Giles, 1849, to *Edgar*; W. H. Crane, 1846, to *Blenheim*.

Surgeons—F. F. Morgan, 1852, to *Dauntless*; Mitchel Thompson, 1832, to *Trafalgar*; Thomas W. Jewell, 1838, to *Neptune*; George Gordon, 1856, (additional) to *Neptune*; William Telfer, 1856, (additional) to *Trafalgar*; Seaton Wade, 1854, to *Scout*; T. J. Layton, M.D., 1850, to *Topaze*; T. R. Pickthorn, 1851, to *Sidon*; J. Ward (a) 1851, to *Scylla*; M. Hamilton, M.D. B.A., 1855, to *Cossack*; L. J. Monteith 1854, to *Melpomene*; John B. Ricards, 1854, to *Falcon*; John Nihill, M.D., 1858, (additional) to *Fisgard*; Thomas Somerville, 1846, to *Edgar*; J. T. Gabriel, 1858 (additional) to *Edgar*; James Davidson, M.D., 1848, to *Aboukir*; William Evans (c), 1858 (additional), to *Russell*.

Assistant Surgeons.—J. Caldwell, 1853, to *Mars*; Robert L. Brett, 1859 (acting), to *Donegal*, J. Lighterwood, 1859 (acting), to *Imperieuse*; T. Kipling, 1859, (acting), to *Aboukir*; W. Yarde, M.D. (acting) to *Trafalgar*; A. Rattray M.D., 1854, to *Topaze*.(*Acting*)—Denis McCarthy, 1859, to *Emerald*; James Trimble, 1859, to *Melpomene*; F. M. Suther, M.D., 1859, to *Himalaya*.

Paymasters—S. H. L. Giles, 1846, to *Trafalgar*; G. F. C. Bateman, 1847, to *Neptune*; W. H. Richards, 1853, to *Dauntless*; Edwin R. Miall, 1856 (additional), to *Cornwallis*; C. Saunders, 1854, (additional), to *Trafalgar*; W. T. Biddlecombe, 1852, to *Melpomene*; G. A. V. Welch, 1855 (additional) to *Illustrious*; W. T. Richards, 1854 (additional) to *Excellent*; Robert Bone, 1855 (additional) to *Asia*; Isaac Hearnden, 1857, (additional) to *Minotaur*; H. N. Scaife, 1852, to *Topaze*; W. H. De Carteret, 1855 (additional) to *Edinburgh*; N. Giles, 1852, to *Sidon*; C. J. Martin 1854, to *Scylla*. Robert Long to be Secretary to Rear Admiral Erskine. J. Tweedie, 1850, to *Mars*; W. H. Norman, 1841, to *Donegal*; R. A. Cumming, 1851, to *Imperieuse*; Charles C. Ick, 1854 (additional) to *Eagle*; J. T. Wells, 1853, to *Amphion*; J. W. W. Green, 1854 (additional) to *Trafalgar*; Harry T. Nettleton, 1853, to *Clio*; W. Horniman, 1853, (additional) to *Cambridge*; J. G. Barnes, 1854, to *Gladiator*; H. C. Davy 1856, (additional) to *Wellesley*; James D. Gilpin, 1849, to *Edgar*; Arthur A. Speed, 1850. to *Aboukir*; A. Barren, 1855, (additional) to *Eagle*; C. W. Harris, 1856. (additional) to *St. Vincent*; Willis Price, 1856 (additional), to *Aboukir*; H. C. Davy, 1856 (additional) to *Edgar*.

Mates—F. Stirling, 1858, to *Aboukir*. H. C. Onslow, 1858, to *Brisk*; F. S. Van der Meulen, 1859, to *Edgar*; A. S. Montague, 1859, to *Cadmus*; Hon. M. Wingfield, 1858, R. O'B. Fitz Roy, 1858; and Lord Walter F. Kerr, 1858, to *Victoria and Albert*.

Second Masters—G. W. Rawlinds, (acting,) to *London*; H. R. J. Pearch, (acting,) to *Agamemnon*; Thomas Leethem, to *Cressy*; George S. Webster, 1859, to *Cadmus*; Edward Colburne, 1857, (additional,) to *Minotaur*; G. A. F. Day, 1855, to *Avon*; George Patterson, 1856, to *Nautilus*.

Chief Engineers—C. Moxley, 1855, to *Himalaya*; John Brown, 1858, to *Wellington*; J. MacGregor, 1854, to *Lion*; F. J. Pope, 1855, to *Revenge*; S. C. Derry, 1856, to *Pembroke*; R. Drummond, 1854, to *Topaze*; C. Houghton, 1854, to *Dauntless*; L. Swift, 1854, to *Neptune*; G. Weeks, 1847, to *Charybdis*; J. Robertson (acting), to *Sidon*; Robt. Gow, 1848, to *Aboukir*; Joshua Robinson, 1854, to *Majestic*.

Assistant Engineers—R. Davey, J. Dalton, C. Widdicombe (acting), to *Aboukir*; J. Hodgin, to *Hawke*; G. Rigby (acting), to *Intrepid*; J. Leeson, to *Brisk*; W. Kelly and J. Beech, to

Royal Albert; M. E. Pearce and H. Pitt, to *Wellington*.

Assistant Engineers, First Class—T. Lumley, to *Dauntless*; J. Carpenter, to *Neptune*. *Second Class*—J. Staley, to *Dauntless*; T. Rees, to *Neptune*; J. Holland, to *Wellington*; J. Craven, to *Sidon*. *Third Class*—J. Hopgood, G. Bone, J. Croll, and J. Francis, to *Dauntless*; A. H. Rogers, W. E. Pilcher, R. Glasspole, and W. Webber, to *Neptune*; G. H. Loxdale, R. Mitchell, W. H. Barker, and J. Tapp, to *Topaze*; J. Kay, to *Virago*; J. Dearden, A. Wilson, T. Cross, and C. Deal, to *Sidon*; C. J. Gregory, to *Ajax*.

Midshipmen—A. H. Blair, to *James Watt*; W. H. Leech, to *Emerald*; F. A. Sargeant, to *Brisk*; F. B. Renshaw, to *London*; H. W. Skene, to *Agamemnon*; A. H. Turnor, to *Hero*.

Master's Assistants—Arthur Cazaly, to *Hannibal*; Robert Towers, to *Brisk*; L. Edwards, to *Royal Albert*; E. Brock and F. W. Jarrad, to *Falcon*; B. S. Bradley, to *London*; C. E. E. Peake, to *Emerald*; C. H. Tregidgo, to *Cadmus*: F. T. Helby, to *Mersey*.

Naval Cadets—V. P. Harper, and A. F. Grant, to *Algiers*; J. G. Dennison, D. L. Stuart, and G. H. Noel, to *Hannibal*; C. A. Woodroffe, A. H. Fronde, and A. H. Percy, to *Hero*; E. A. Liardet, and H. L. Veitch, to *Agamemnon*; C. P. Foot, to *Brisk*; Marquis of Queensberry to *Indus*; C. A. Tucker, A. G. Fullerton, H. J. Turnbull, and G. C. Carter, to *London*; C. V. Nepean, to *Mersey*; W. R. Clutterbuck, J. T. Sullivan, A. C. Elwes, and C. D. Eden, to *Emerald*; H. C. Reade, and F. Wilson, to *Exmouth*; J. H. Robinson, and A. S. Philpotts, to *Cressy*; A. J. O'Rorke, to *Cadmus*; J. D. Ryder, to *Doris*; H. F. Grenfell and J. H. Dickson, to *St. Jean d'Acre*; T. James, F. sR. Carr and J. Echlin to *James Watt*; R. W. Wodehouse, to *Royal Albert*; G. Parnell, to *Agamemnon*; Marquis of Queensberry, to *Aboukir*.

Assistant Paymasters—C. A. Shapcote, 1851, to *Wellington*; Arthur B. Cumming, to *Melpomene*; James B. Rawlings, 1854, to *Mars*; J. E. C. Sullivan, to *Donegal*; C. H. Ceeley, to *Imperieuse*; F. M. Wright, 1853, to *Edgar*; A. Edwards, 1854, to *Topaze*; H. M. D. Wilson, to *Sidon*; T. N Frith, to *Scylla*; Derisley Martin, to *Dauntless*.

Clerks—Charles A. Chanter, to *Trafalgar*; Thomas Pullinger, to *Hastings*; Allen F. Gain, to *London*; William Lovely, to *Edgar*; A. G. Young, to *Aboukir*; William Crump, to *Arrogant*; E. C. Taylor, to *Mars*; Donald Baque, to *Donegal*; P. O. M. Presgrave, to *Gladiator*; James H. Wallis, to *Clio*; D. V. Hamilton, to *Amphion*.

Assistant Clerks—R. J. B. Smart to *Ajax*; Alfred Clements to *Agammenon*; Herbert W. Hore, (additional) to *Queen Charlotte*; Alfred P. Freeman to *Emerald*; Thomas Forder to *Hawke*; Alan H. Grey to *Edgar*; W. B. Jennis to *Cornwallis*; H. A. Scrivener to *Formidable*; E. E. Richmond to *Cadmus*; E. M. Ommanney to *London*; A. C. Jeffreys to *Aboukir*; H. W. Hore to *Minotaur*; F. C. W. Sadler to *Asia*; A. Le B. Corrie to *Aboukir*; A. C. Jeffreys to *Edinburgh*; J. W. Backwell to *Wellington*; J. G. Card to *Pembroke*; W. A. Dangerfield to *Hogue*; C. H. Watson to *Sidon*; F. C. B. Wither to *Topaze*; J. D. Austin to *Scylla*

COAST GUARD.

Commander—F. D. Rich, 1858, to be Inspecting Commander.

REMOVALS—*Chief Officers*—Lieut Richard E. Bullen, from Rickham to Mothercombe; Mr. Fraser H. Jennison, from Old Head to Castletownsend.

Lieutenant—Richard E. Bullens' removal from Rickham to Mothercombe has been cancelled.

ARMY.

WAR OFFICE, MAY 31.

(The following Commissions to bear date May 31, 1859.)

Corps of Royal Engineers—Lieut. Gen. G. J. Harding, C.B., to be Col. Commandant, vice Cardew, deceased, May 10.

1st Dragoon Guards—T. A. Gough, gent., to be Cornet, without purchase, vice Fellowes, deceased.

2nd Dragoon Guards—Lieut. W. C. Grant to be Captain, without purchase, vice Blair, deceased; Cornet C. G. A Barnes, to be Lieut., without purchase, vice Grant, March 29.

3rd Dragoon Guards—John L. Eggins,

ton, gent., to be Cornet, by purchase, vice Maunder, promoted.

7th Dragoon Guards—Captain F. G. Smith to be Major, without purchase, vice Middleton, deceased; Lieut. H. Nicholl to be Captain, without purchase, vice Smith; Cornet J. J. L. M'Adam to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Nicholl, April 19.

6th Dragoons—Lieut. and Adj. H. T. Clements, from the 14th Light Dragoons, to be Captain, by purchase, vice Sleigh, who retires.

7th Light Dragoons—Serj. R. Masters to be Cornet, without purchase.

12th Light Dragoons—Lieut. W. C. Goldie has been dismissed the Service by the sentence of a General Court-Martial, Jan. 21.

13th Light Dragoons — Major H. Holden to be Lieut. Col., by purchase, vice Brevet Col. Doherty, who retires; Brevet Major A. Tremayne to be Major, by purchase, vice Holden.

Military Train—The appointment of Cornet J. Baird from Half Pay late Land Transport Corps, to be Ensign, as stated in the *Gazette* of the 29th April, 1859, has been cancelled.

Royal Artillery—Brevet Lieut Col. Hugh A. B. Campbell, C.B., to be Lieut. Col., vice Maude, placed on the Seconded List; Brevet Major C. F. Young to be Capt., vice Campbell; May 15. Second Captain S. Freeling to be Capt., vice Lieut. Col. Morris, promoted to be Major Unattached, under the Royal Warrant of Nov. 3, 1854; May 24. Lieut. C. L. Tredcroft to be Second Captain, vice Young; May 15. Lieut. G. W. Holmes to be Second Capt., vice Blackburne, who resigns; May 17. Lieut. J. E. Ruck-Keene to be Second Captain, vice Freeling; H. W. Vyner, gent., to be Paymaster, May 24.

Royal Engineers—Brevet Colonel J. Twiss, to be Col., vice Hall, removed as a General Officer; Brevet Lieut. Col. T. Fenwick to be Lieut. Col., vice Twiss; Second Captain B. A. Wilkinson to be Capt., vice Fenwicke; Lieut. L. A. Hale to be Second Capt., vice Wilkinson, May 10.

1st Foot—H. S. Bainbridge, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Evans, promoted.

2nd—Ensign F. Squirl to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Eman, who retires.

5th—Lieut. E. M. Mason to be Capt., by purchase, vice Symonds, who retires.

7th—Lieut. H. S. Harrison to be Instructor of Musketry, April 1.

9th—W. H. Hathway, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Layard, promoted; Lieut. G. M. Chadwicke, to be Instructor of Musketry, vice Captain Douglas, who rejoins his Company, May 15.

12th—W. S. Thomson, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Page, promoted.

14th—C. T. M'Mahon, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Frizell, promoted.

16th—Ensign C. J. Horne to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Malone, who retires; Ensign F. Jefferson to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Healy, promoted; A. E. Stabb, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Whitlam, promoted; Lieut. W. H. Carter to be Adjutant, vice Healy, promoted.

19th—Lieut. R. C. Martin to be Capt. by purchase, vice Bissett, who retires; H. Stokes, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Vesey, promoted.

21st—E. Walker, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Channer, promoted; R. Farquharson, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Jackson, promoted.

24th—W. Hitchcock, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Butler, promoted.

25th—R. B. Dowling, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Ramsay, promoted.

37th—N. Gilpin, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice A. Jones, promoted.

40th—R. C. Brook, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Rees, promoted.

43rd—H. B. Osborne, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice McGown, promoted.

58th—Ensign J. Pringle to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Harrison, who retires.

61st—J. D. Wedgwood, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Rowband, appointed to the 75th Foot.

64th—Surgeon J. G. Inglis, M.D. C.B., having completed twenty years Full Pay service, to be Surgeon Major, under the Royal Warrant of the 1st. Oct., 1858; March 29.

70th—J. R. Collins, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Wright, promoted.

71st—H. Fraser, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Leslie, promoted.

72nd—F. T. Pardoe, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Stewart, promoted.

74th—G. W. M. Hall, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Sainsbury, promoted.

77th—W. S. Henderson, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Wordsworth, promoted.

79th—A. Hutton, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice A. R. M'Gwire, who retires.

80th—C. G. Norris, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Graham, promoted.

84th—Ensign W. C. Clayton, from the 96th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Griffin, promoted.

88th—A. A. Owen, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Whitla, promoted.

89th—Ensign W. Sealey to be Lieut., without purchace, vice Harrison, deceased, March 25.

92nd—D. M. M. Crichton, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Bond, who retires. The Christian names of Brevet Major Hamilton, who was promoted to the Brevet rank of Major, in the *Gazette* of 28th January, 1859, are Christian Monteith, and not Charles Monteath, as therein stated.

96th—W. C. Clayton, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Kirkwood, promoted. E. B. H. Curteis, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Wright, promoted, June 1.

98th—S. W. Vardon, gent., to be Ensign, by purchace, vice Woodward, promoted.

99th—W. Skipper, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Gray, promoted.

Rifle Brigade—Ensign E. H. Chamberlin, to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Parr, whose promotion, by purchase, on the 17th December, 1858, has been cancelled; Ensign the Hon. C. E. Edwards, to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Hook, whose promotion, by purchase, on the 11th January, 1859, has been cancelled.

Recruiting District.—Brevet Col. W. Hamilton, C.B., from the 78th Foot, to be Inspecting Field Officer, in succession to Brevet Col. J. Patton, promoted to the rank of Maj. Gen., June 1.

Chaplain's Department.—The Rev. W. Helps to be Chaplain of the Second Class; his Commission as Chaplain of the Third Class with date 16th April, 1856, as stated in *Gazette* of 18th Jan., 1859, has been cancelled, July 11, 1856.

Royal Hibernian School.—Assistant Surgeon F. Bowen, M.D., from the Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards, to be Surgeon, vice Blakeney, promoted to the rank of Surgeon Major.

Brevet.—Major-General J. Oldfield to be Lieut.-Gen., vice Cardew, deceased, May 10. Colonel L. A. Hall, of the Royal Engineers, to be Major-General, vice Oldfield; May 10. Colonel C. Grierson, retired full pay of the Royal Engineers, to be Major-General, in consequence of the promotion of Colonel Hall, who stood below him on the effective list of the Corps at the date of this retiremen; May 10.

The undermentioned promotions to take place consequent on the promotion of Colonel Lewis A. Hall, Royal Engineers, to be Major-General, in succession to Lieut. Gen. G. Cardew, Royal Engineers, who died on the 9th May, 1859:—

Brevet Lieut. Col. H. P. Bourchier, Captain on half pay of the 19th Dragoons, Town Major, Kingston, Canada, to be Colonel; May 10. Brevet Major M. MacGregor, Captain on half pay Unattached, te be Lieut. Col; May 10. Captain D. Jones, half pay Unattached, Aide-de-Camp to the General Officer commanding the Troops in Scotland, to be Major; May 10.

The undermentioned promotions to take place consequent on the death of Lieutenant-General H. Adolphus Proctor, C.B., Colonel of the 97th Regiment, on the 13th May, 1859.

Major-General the Hon. Sir E. Cust, Colonel of the 16th Light Dragoons, to be Lieutenant-General; May 14. Brevet-Colonel R. R. Robertson, C.B., Lieutenant Colonel, on half pay Unattached, to be Major-General; May 14. Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel M. S. H. Lloyd, Major on half pay Unattached, to be Colonel; May 14. Brevet Major W. O'Neill, Captain, on half pay Unattached, Staff Officer of Pensioners, to be Lieutenant Colonel; May 14. Captain T. L. J. Gallwey, Royal Engineers, to be Major; May 14, 1855. Brevet Major J. M. Wemyss, C.B., Royal Marines, to be Lieut.-Col. in the Army.

The promotion of Lieutenant Colonel H. A. Olpherts, Bengal Artillery, to be Lieutenant Colonel in the Army, to bear date 19th January, 1858, instead of the 15th of that month, as previously stated.

War Office, June 3.

97th Foot—Major General E. F. Morris, C.B., to be Colonel, vice Lieutenant General H. A. Proctor, deceased, May 14.

WAR OFFICE, JUNE 3.

The following Commissions to bear date June 3, 1859.

2nd Life Guards—Cornet and Sub-Lieutenant and Adjutant R. Reid to have the rank of Lieutenant; Cornet and Sub-Lieutenant T. Leyland to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Marshall, promoted.

7th Dragoon Guards—H. Bulkeley, gent., to be Cornet, without purchase, vice McAdam, promoted.

2nd Dragoons—Cornet R. A. Herbert has been permitted to retire from the service by the sale of his Commission.

5th Light Dragoons—Troop Serjeant Major G. Griffith, from the 5th Dragoon Guards, to be Quartermaster, vice Addy, who reverts to the Half Pay of Captain of the late Land Transport Corps.

7th Light Dragoons—Cornet the Hon. A. W. E. M. Herbert, to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Bulkeley, promoted.

Military Train—Captain T. E. Green, from the 82nd Foot, to be Captain, vice Palliser, who exchanges.

Royal Artillery—Brevet Major Robt. Talbot to be Lieut. Colonel, vice Montressor, deceased; May 23. Second Capt. O. R. Stokes to be Captain, vice Talbot; May 24. Lieutenant H. A. Doyne to be Second Captain, vice Stokes; May 22. The date of the promotion of the under-mentioned Officers to be altered to May 23, viz.:—Captain Sanford Freeling; Second Captain J. E. Ruck-Keene.

6th Foot—A. Teevan, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Morland, promoted; W. Harrison Falcon, gent., to be Ensign, vice Roworth, promoted.

7th—Captain S. H. Cochrane, from the 16th Foot, to be Captain, vice Twemlow, who exchanges; March 21. G. Brooke Meares, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Flood, promoted.

8th—W. A. Bridge, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Page, promoted.

12th—Capt. Compton A. S. Dickins, from the 38th Foot, to be Capt., vice Martin, who exchanges; March 23.

13th—A. D. Simpson, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Moffett, promoted.

15th—Ensign H. W. R. de Coetlogan, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Tyler, promoted.

16th—Capt. G. H. Twemlow, from the 7th Foot to be Capt., vice Cochrane, who exchanges 21st March. C. S. Bailey, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Walker, who retires.

19th—G. A. Warden, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Biscoe, promoted.

20th—Quartermaster W. Smith, from the 29th Foot, to be Quartermaster, vice Aylett, who exchanges, 23rd March.

22nd—Ensign R. H. Dillon, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Palliser, who retires; J. A. Park, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Vivian, promoted.

23rd—Ensign J. Clayton to be Adjt., vice Lieut. Gregorie, who resigns the Adjutancy only.

26th—Capt. Sir H. St. J. Mildmay, Bart., from Half Pay, 60th Foot, to be Capt., vice Wallace, appointed Adjutant of a depôt Battalion. Lieut. W. E. Lockhart to be Capt. by purchase, vice Sir H. St. J. Mildmay, who retires. Lieut. M. H. Hale to be Capt., by purchase, vice Chute, who retires. Ensign G. P. Fawkes to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Lockhart. Ensign P. C. Story to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Hale. G. Douthwaite, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Fawkes.

29th—F. C. Ruxton, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Shadwell, promoted. W. G. Arnold, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Cochrane, promoted. Quartermaster J. Aylett, from the 20th Foot, to be Quartermaster, vice Smith, who exchanges.

32nd—Ensign C. F. Clery to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Charlton, who retires. H. W. M. Cathcart, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Clery.

35th—Lieut. J. O. Vandelur to be Captain by purchase, vice Harris, who retires.

38th—Capt. D. W. Martin, from the 12th Foot, to be Capt., vice Dickins, who exchanges.

39th—Ensign J. B. Corballis to be Lieut. by purchase, vice W. O. Smith, who retires.

44th—Ensign H. W. Heane to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Kendall, promoted.

51st—H. M. Trenchard, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Cobb, promoted; G. B. Bird, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Barnston, appointed to the 55th Foot, June 4.

52nd—V. E. Knox, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Wilberforce, promoted.

57th—Lieut. J. C. Crawford, from Half Pay 52nd Foot, to be Lieut., vice Grace, promoted to an Unattached Company, without purchase; Ensign R. A. H. Cox to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Crawford, who retires.

58th—Captain A. Rundle, late 40th

Foot, to be Paymaster, vice Timbrell, who retires upon Half Pay.

63rd—Cornet W. J. Pegus, from Half Pay late Land Transport Corps, to be Ensign, vice Slack, appointed Quartermaster to the School of Musketry at Hythe; Major D. Hill, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Pegus, who retires.

64th—Ensign H. Davies to be Lieutenant without purchase, vice Hudson, promoted in the 15th Foot, April 26.

69th—Ensign H. C. St. George, to be Lieutenant without purchase, vice Marcon, promoted in the 12th Foot. Lieut. R. F. Strike, to be Adjutant, vice Marcon, promoted in the 12th Foot.

70th—Ensign H. J. Hill, to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Wright, whose promotion by purchase on the 25th March, 1859, has been cancelled.

74th—E. A. Windsor, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Pavy, promoted.

77th—Ensign R. Hoskins, to be Lieut by purchase, vice Hill, who retires.

80th—Lieutenant F. B. N. Craufurd, to be Adjutant vice Borrowes, promoted, May 24.

82nd—Capt. E. M. Palliser, from the Military Train, to be Capt., vice Green, who exchanges.

85th—Quartermaster J. R. Rouse to be Paymaster, vice Pechell, deceased.

86th—Ensign G. Fowler to be Lieut., without purchase, vice Dartnell, promoted to an Unattached Company, without purchase; Lieut. Duncan Stewart to be Adjutant, vice Dartnell, promoted to an Unattached Company, without purchase.

99th.—Lieut. W. A. Bond, to be Adjutant, vice Clarkson, promoted; April 8.

Rifle Brigade—Captain W. H. Sampson, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Captain, repaying the difference, vice Brevet Major Buller, who exchanges; Lieut. P. Whalley to be Captain by purchase, vice Sampson, who retires; Lieut. R. E. S. Harington to be Captain by purchase, vice Lindsay, who retires; Lieut. G. C. Lane to be Captain by purchase, vice Robertson, who retires; Ensign J. B. Evans to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Mr. J. Guest, who retires; Ensign F. Markham to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Whalley; Ensign W. Arbuthnot to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Harrington; Ensign J. F. M. Winterscale to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Lane; G. J. Fitz Roy Smyth, gent., to be ensign by purchase, vice L. Fox, promoted in the Grenadier Guards.

Royal Canadian Rifles—T. H. S. Donovan, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Jackson, whose appointment, as stated in the *Gazette* of the 30th March, 1858, has been cancelled.

BREVET—Capt. Sir H. St. John Midmay, Bart., 26th Foot, to be Major in the Army, 11th November, 1851.

Capt. W. H. Sampson, Rifle Brigade, to be Major in the Army, 9th November, 1846.

Brevet Major W. H. Sampson, Rifle Brigade, to be Lieut. Colonel in the Army, 20th June, 1854.

Capt. L. F. C. Thomas, of the Madras Artillery, to be Major in the Army, 28th August, 1858.

MEMORANDUM—The exchange between Lieut. J. D. Brockman, of the 86th Foot, and Lieut. J. H. Waterfall, 95th Foot, as stated in the *Gazette* of the 13th of May, 1859, has been cancelled.

St. Helena Regiment—T. England, gent., to be ensign without purchase, vice Hewson, promoted.

DEPOT BATTALION—Captain W. G. E. Webber, 42nd Foot, to be Instructor of Musketry, May 12.

COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT—The undermentioned officers have been placed on Retired Pay, under the Royal Warrant of 28th October, 1858, to have a step of honorary rank, viz.:—

To be Commissaries General—Deputy Commissaries General Charles Anthony Clarke, John Bland, James Duff Watt, Gilbert Hamilton Dinwiddie, James Wilson.

To be Deputy Commissaries General—Josiah Pryce, Henry Addington Bayley, William Stevens, William Stanton; the commissions to bear date May 15.

CHAPLAIN'S DEPARTMENT—The Rev. G. Dacre, Chaplain of the Fourth Class, to be Chaplain of the Third Class; April 17; the Rev. G. Campbell Williams to be Chaplain of the Fourth Class, May 14.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Royal South Gloucester—R. C. Danbeny, gent., to be Ensign, May 23.

Royal North Gloucester—Ensign W. S. M. Goodenough to be Lieut., vice Reed, resigned; W. W. Brown, gent., to be Ensign, vice Goodenough, promoted, May 23.

Hampshire Yeomanry Cavalry—Cornet H. A. Baring to be Lieut., vice Græme, resigned; A. D. Tichborne, gent., to be Cornet, vice Baring, promoted, May 20.

6th Royal Lancashire—E. Hewitt, gent., to be Ensign, May 24.

Royal Glamorgan Artillery — T. Bateman, gent., to be Lieut., May 18.

Durham Artillery—Second Lieut. J. E. A. Mather to be First Lieut., vice Browne, resigned; A. Munro, gent., to be Second Lieut., vice Mather, promoted, May 19.

1st or Western Regiment of Norfolk —Captain the Hon. F. Walpole to be Major, vice Custance, promoted, May 17.

Royal Wilts—Lieut. B. Mahon to be Captain, vice Robinson, resigned; Ensign H. Edwards to be Lieut., vice Blennerhassett, resigned, May 17. Ensign E. J. Hayward to be Lieut., vice Mahon, promoted, May 18. Ensign T. Holman to be Lieut., vice Shaw, resigned, May 19.

East York—G. Maunsell, Esq., to be Adjutant, vice Minchin, resigned from 12th April, 1859, May 9.

King's Own Light Infantry—O. Gibbon, gent., to be Lieut., vice Little, resigned, May 25. R. Wilton, gent., to be Ensign, vice Manners, resigned, May 16.

Royal Bucks King's Own—H. A. Sandford, Esq., late Capt. 43rd Light Infantry, to be Major.

2nd or Eastern Regiment of Norfolk —R. A. Rising, gent., to be Lieut., vice Freeman, resigned, May 25.

WAR-OFFICE, JUNE 7.

BREVET.—To be Aides-de-Camp to the Queen, with the rank of Colonel in the Army:—Lieut. Col. C. Reid, C.B., Bengal; Lieut. Col. R. B. Smith, C.B., Bengal Army; Lieut. Col. Thomas Tapp, C.B., Bombay Army; Lieut. Col. G. H. Robertson, C.B., Bombay.

CAVALRY.

2nd Dragoon Guards—Lieut. W. C. Grant has been appointed to the command of the 1st Regiment of Hodson's Horse, vice Brevet Major Sir H. Havelock, Bt., H.M.'s 18th Regiment, proceeding to Europe on leave of absence.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Hungerford Corps of Yeomanry Cavalry—V. W. Bates Van de Weyer, gent., to be Cornet, May 28; Cornet E. H. F. Dawkins to be Lieut., vice Wemyss, retired, May 27.

Royal Berks—R. Tebbott, gent., to be Lieut., vice Stares, resigned, May 19.

Hampshire Yeomanry Cavalry—W. G. Craven, Esq., to be Capt., vice Fleming, resigned, May 30.

Hampshire—F. J. Bampfylde, Esq., late Captain in Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment, to be Captain, vice Digweed, promoted, May 28.

Isle of Wight Artillery—P. Scott, Esq., Captain Commandant, to serve with the rank of Major, May 26. W. Puckle, gent., to be Second Lieut., May 26.

2nd Warwickshire—Ensign O. L. B. Ward to be Lieut, vice Atty, resigned, May 25.

East Kent—E. H. Hewett, gent., late Royal Bucks Militia to be Ensign, vice Gill, resigned, May 27.

Norfolk Artillery—The Hon. R. Harbord (late Captain 71st Highlanders), to Captain, vice Hobart, resigned, May 30.

City of Edinburgh Artillery—First Lieut. R. Nichol to be Captain vice Chiene, resigned, May 30.

Second Lieut. G. C. Bowman to be First Lieut., vice Nichol promoted, May 30.

Royal Wilts—M. McHugh, gent., to be Quartermaster, vice Paton, resigned; F. T. Baynton, Esq., to be Assist.-Surg., vice Phillips, resigned.

South Salopian Yeomanry Cavalry—Cornet A. P. Lloyd, to be Lieut., vice Badger, resigned.

Shropshire—Lieut. T. Meyrick to be Captain, vice Whitmore, resigned.

East Kent—P. J. Haydock, gent., to be Ensign, vice Lang, promoted.

3rd Duke of Lancaster's Own—L. Feilden, gent., to be Ensign; C. F. Baldwin, gent., to be Ensign, vice W. H. White, promoted; T. Grimshaw, gent., to be Ensign, vice Law, promoted.

4th or Duke of Lancaster's Own (Light Infantry), Lancashire — Ensign H. E. Butler to be Lieut., vice A. H. Lynch, resigned.

3rd Royal Surrey—Resignation—The Queen has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of Ensign P. G. Chapman.

WAR OFFICE, JUNE 14.

(The following Commissions to bear date June 14, 1859.)

10th Light Dragoons—Captain V. Baker to be Major, by purchase, vice Harrison, promoted, by purchase, in the 11th Light Dragoons; Lieut. H. A. Bowyer, to be Capt., by purchase, vice Baker; Cornet O. R. Slack, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Howley, who retires.

11th Light Dragoons—Brevet Lieut. Col. B. Harrison, from the 10th Light Dragoons, to be Lieut. Col. by purchase, vice Miller, who retires; Lieut. A. P.

Garnett to be Capt., by purchase, vice Sir E. C. Cockburn, Bart., who retires; Cornet J. G. Annesley to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Garnett.

13th Light Dragoons—Lieut. S. de A. C. Clarke to be Capt., by purchase, vice Brevet Major Tremayne, promoted; June 4.

Royal Artillery—Lieut. H. G. A. Powell, from Half Pay, 15th Foot, to be Paymaster.

Royal Engineers—Lieut. H. W. H. D. Dumaresq, to be Second Capt., vice Goodall, deceased, May 24. Lieut. D. H. Burnes has been permitted to resign his commission, June 10.

9th Foot—Capt. R. V. S. Grimston, from the 93rd Foot, to be Capt., vice Bell, who exchanges.

19th—D. J. Mansergh, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Frith, promoted.

20th—Ensign W. Unwin to be Lieut., without purchase, vice Macdonegh, deceased, April 11.

22nd—Staff Surgeon T. Carey, to be Surgeon, vice Fairbairn, appointed to the Staff.

23rd—Ensign A. M. Molyneux to be Lieut., by purchase, vice De Vic Tupper, promoted.

26th—J. R. G. Buchanan, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Story, promoted.

39th—H. Stewart, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Corballis, promoted.

41st—Lieut. E. L. B. Lowry, to be Capt., by purchase, vice A. G. Lowry, who retires; Ensign E. F. B. Brooke, to be Lieut., by purchase, vice E. L. B. Lowry.

49th—H. Topp, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Donovan, promoted.

50th—Assist. Surgeon J. Johnston, M.D., from the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, to be Assist. Surgeon, vice Moott, who exchanges.

58th—Captain G. H. Wynyard to be Major, by purchase, vice Brevet Lieut. Col. A. H. Russell, who retires; Lieut. D. Townley to be Capt. by purchase, vice Wynyard; Ensign J. H. Wynyard to be Lieut., vice Townley.

60th—The Hon. W. C. Pepys, to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Hodson, who retires.

69th—Lieut R. C. Hutchinson to be Capt. by purchase, vice Hankey, promoted; Ensign F. H. Dyke to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Hutchinson.

75th—Lieut. R. Wadeson to be Adjt., vice Justice, who resigns the Adjutancy only; March 14.

79th—Ensign R. Stewart to be Adjt., vice Lieut. Wimberley, who resigns the Adjutancy only, Feb. 18. Assist. Surg., G. S. Davie, M.D., from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Roberts, appointed to the Staff.

86th—Ensign M. E. Leadbitter to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Conran, who has retired; J. W. Boulcott, gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Fowler, promoted.

87th—Brevet Major C. F. Campbell to be Major by purchase, vice Lea, who retires.

93rd—Capt. W. J. Bell, from the 9th Foot, to be Capt., vice Grimston, who exchanges; E. A. Raikes, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Macnamara promoted.

94th—Ensign W. F. Godfrey to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Gaskell promoted.

95th—B. W. Faulkner, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Chapple promoted.

96th—Lieut. A. E. Cookson to be Capt. by purchase, vice the Honourable F. B. Pakenham, promoted to an Unattached Majority, by purchase; Ensign M. Aytoun to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Cookson.

Rifle Brigade — The Hon. E. C. Vaughan to be Ensign by purchase, vice Evans, promoted. A. S. Harrington, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Parr, promoted, June 15. G. A. Hillyard, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Edwardes, promoted, June 16. G. Larcom, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Chamberlin, promoted, June 17.

3rd West India Regiment—W. H. Browning, Esq., to be Paymaster, vice Wilson, whose services have been dispensed with.

Ceylon Rifle Regiment—Assist. Surgeon E. G. Noot, from the 50th Foot, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Johnston, who exchanges.

STAFF—Brevet Col. G. T. C. Napier, C. B., Half Pay Unattached, to be Deputy Quartermaster General to the Forces serving in Canada, vice Brevet Col. Holdsworth, whose period of service has expired; July 1.

DEPOT BATTALION — Capt. G. F. Macdonald, 16th Foot, to be Instructor of Musketry; May 14.

RECRUITING DISTRICT — Paymaster J. Marshall, from Half Pay, as Quartermaster, 6th Dragoons, to be Paymaster, vice Kennedy, appointed to the Invalid Depot Chatham; April 1.

INVALID DEPOT (Chatham)—Pay-

master J. M. Kennedy, from a Recruiting District, to be Paymaster, vice Leech, deceased; April 1.

ROYAL HIBERNIAN SCHOOL — For Assistant Surgeon F. Bowen, M.D., from the Coldstream Guards, to be Surgeon, &c., as stated in the *Gazette* of the 31st ult., read Assistant Surgeon F. Bowen, M.D., from the Coldstream Guards, to be Surgeon, with local rank, &c.

UNATTACHED—Capt. the Hon. F. B. Pakenham, from 96th Foot, to be Major, by purchase.

HOSPITAL STAFF — Surgeon W. H. Fairbairn, M.D., from the 22nd Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Carey, appointed to the 22nd Foot.

Assistant Surgeon E. H. Roberts, from the 79th Foot, to be Assist. Surg., vice Davie, appointed to the 76th Foot.

The undermentioned Acting Assistant Surgeons have ceased to do duty, there being no longer occasion for their services; H. J. Shirley, E. Adolphus, M.D.; T. L. Hinton, B. P. M'Donough, M.D.; W. D. Mitchell, M.D.; J. B. Jardine, C. Thompson, M.D; T. H. Burgess, M.D; F. P. Beamish, W. C. Tucker, M.D.; J. G. Campbell, T. H. Somerville, T. Howell, F. Skinner; May 31.

BREVET—Lieut. Colonel E. Wodehouse, C.B., Royal Artillery, to be Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, with the rank of Colonel in the Army.

To be Lieutenant Colonels in the Army—Major A. F. Steele, 9th Light Dragoons; April 26. Brevet Major J. de M. M. Prior, 12th Light Dragoons; April 26.

To be Majors in the Army—Captain H. C. Marriot, 82nd Foot; April 26. Captain E. Palmer, Royal Artillery; April 26. Captain S. P. Jarvis, 82nd Foot; April 25. Captain H. H. A. C. Inglefield, Military Train; April 26. Captain Sir C. F. W. Cuffe, Bart., 56th Foof; April 26. Captain Hon. J. C. Dormer, 13th Foot.

The undermentioned promotions to take place in the Indian Military Forces of Her Majesty, consequent on the deaths of Major General A. Spens, Bengal Infantry, on June 26. General A. Duncan, Bengal Infantry, on May 14. General Sir J. Russell, K.C.B., Madras Cavalry, on May 16. Lieutenant General W. H. Kemm, Bengal Infantry, on May 25. General Sir J. L. Lushington, G.C.B., Madras Cavalry, on May 29.

To be Generals—Lieutenant General G. Swiney, Bengal Artillery, May 15. Lieutenant General Sir G. Pollock, G.C.B., Bengal Artillery, May 17. Lieutenant General Goodfellow, Bombay Engineers, May 30.

To be Lieutenant Generals—Major General C. B. James, Bombay Infantry, May 15. Major General M. C. Paul, Bengal Infantry, May 17. Major Gen. Sir J. Cheape, K.C.B., Bengal Engineers, May 26. Major General J Low, C.B., Madras Infantry, May 30.

To be Major Generals—Colonel Sir. J. Sheil, K.C.B., Bengal Infantry, April 26. Colonel C. Wahab, Madras Infantry, May 15. Colonel J. Manson, Bengal Infantry, May 17. Colonel G. Twemlow, Bengal Artillery, May 26. Colonel T. A. Duke, Madras Infantry, May 30.

The undermentioned Officers of the Indian Military Forces of Her Majesty, retired on Full Pay, to have a step of honorary rank as follows, viz. :—Lieut., Colonel C. Apthorp, Bengal Infantry, to be Colonel; Major W. H. Rickards, Bengal Infantry, to be Lieutenant Col.; Major G. O'Bryen Ottley, Bengal Infantry, to be Lieutenant Colonel; Major H. J. Willoughby, Bombay Infantry, to be Lieutenant Colonel; Captain J. Ash, Bombay Artillery, to be Major.

MEMORANDUM.—Major D. G. A. Darroch, half pay Unattached, has been permitted to retire from the Service by the sale of his commission, he being about to become a settler in Canada.

WAR OFFICE, JUNE 17.

(The following Commissions to bear date 17th June.)

6th Dragoon Guards—Captain R. S Hunter, from the 2nd Dragoons, to be Captain, vice Uniacke, who exchanges.

7th Dragoon Guards—Surgeon E. J. Franklyn, M.D., from the 14th Light Dragoons, to be Surgeon, vice Arden, who exchanges.

2nd Dragoons—Capt. C. H. Uniacke, from the 6th Dragoon Guards, to be Captain, vice Hunter, who exchanges.

10th Light Dragoons—Cornet A. Barthop to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Bowyer, promoted.

14th Light Dragoons—Surgeon W. Arden, from the 7th Dragoon Guards, to be Surgeon, vice Dr. Franklyn, who exchanges.

16th Light Dragoons—Lieut. F. P. Pigott to be Captain by purchase, vice Irvine, who retires; Lieut. T. Boyce to be Captain by purchase, vice Hart, who retires; Cornet M. E. Harmar to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Pigott;

Cornet T. F. Agg to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Boyce.

Royal Artillery—A. S. Murray, Esq., late Paymaster British German Legion, to be Paymaster.

Coldstream Guards—Assistant Surgeon A. Spittall, M.D., has been permitted to resign his Commission.

10th Foot—Ensign J. D. Power to be Lieutenant without purchase, vice Sandwith, promoted, March 13.

11th—Ensign J. F. Oliver to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Burrowes, who retires.

16th—Lieut. A. D. Thomson to be Captain by purchase, vice Mainwaring, who retires; Ensign R. H. Freeman to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Thomson.

17th—W. V. Rolleston, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Braddell, promoted; G. W. Burleigh, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Irvine, promoted, June 18.

18th—Staff Assistant Surgeon J. H. H. Tothill to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Dr Porteous, deceased. Lieutenant J. Wily to be Instructor of Musketry, vice Bishopp, promoted, May 12. The Commission of Lieut. R. W. E. Dawson, as Adjt., to bear date May 1st, 1858, instead of September 7th, 1858, as previously stated.

20th—Ensign R. H. James to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Foster-Melliar, deceased, April 16. Ensign W. Glencross to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Unwin, whose promotion on the 5th May, 1859, has been cancelled, May 5.

21st—Lieut. E. E. D. Boycott to be Instructor of Musketry, vice Cairnes, promoted, May 6.

50th—J. F. Rolleston, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Turner, promoted.

52nd—Lieut. the Hon. G. H. W. Windsor-Clive to be Captain by purchase, vice Heathcote, who retires; Ensign T. B. Cowburn to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Windsor-Clive; E. S. Ker, Gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Prendergast, promoted.

55th—Lieut. G. F. Parke to be Capt. by purchase, vice Roxby, who retires; Ensign P. W. Justice to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Parke; W. King, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Justice.

58th—W. H. Key, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Wynyard, promoted; C. R. D. Reeves, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Pringle, promoted, June 18.

62nd—Assist Surg J. P. Street, M. D., from the Staff, to be Assist Surg., vice Dr. Young, who exchanges.

79th—Ensign and Adjt. R. Stewart to have the rank of Lieut.; Ensign R. P. O. P. Lord Louth to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Gawne, who retires; Ensign W. S. Thomson, from the 12th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Lord Louth.

86th—E. B. Phillips, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Leadbitter, promoted.

92nd—Lieut. A. F. Mackay to be Instructor of Musketry, May 31.

94th—Ensign C. Butler to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Murray, promoted; Ensign R. S. Hall to be Lieut. by purchase vice Hedley, promoted.

97th—Ensign A. P. Martin, from the 71st Bengal Native Infantry, to be Ensign without purchase, vice Lowe, promoted.

Rifle Brigade—R. C. de Grey Vyner, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Markham promoted. The surname of the Ensign promoted in the *Gazette* of the 31st ultimo, is Edwardes, and not Edwards, as therein stated.

Hospital Staff—Assistant-Surgeon D. O. Hone, M.D., from Half Pay 60th Foot, to be Assistant-Surgeon to the Forces, vice Nash, promoted; Assistant-Surgeon J. E. Young, M.D., from the 62nd Foot, to be Assistant-Surgeon to the Forces, vice Street, who exchanges.

Brevet—Brevet Lieut. Colonel R. Pitcairn, Retired Full Pay, late Staff Officer of Pensioners, to be Colonel in the Army, the rank being honorary only, July 1; Brevet Major R. S. Baynes, 8th Foot, to be Lieut. Colonel in the Army; Captain the Hon. A. H. A. Anson, 7th Light Dragoons, to be Major in the Army, May 28; Captain A. A. Douglas, of the Royal Marines, to be Major in the Army.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

3rd Middlesex—J. Lee, Gent., to be Quartermaster; W. Thomas, gent., to be Adjutant, May 27.

Fife Artillery—Lieut. W. Haig to be Paymaster, vice Heseltine, deceased, May 12.

King's Own Light Infantry—C. M. Walmisley to be Capt., vice Knell, who retires, June 1. C. L. Salis, gent., to be Lieut., vice Barton, who retires, June 8.

Kent Artillery—F. K. Cox, gent., late Capt. 25th Foot, to be First Lieut., vice Strother, resigned, June 9.

5th or Elthorpe Light Infantry, Middlesex—Ensign W. A. Turner to be Lieut., vice Nash, resigned, April 20.

F. Barnes, gent., late 1st Middlesex Militia, to be Ensign, vice Turner, promoted, May 27.

MEMORANDUM—The Victoria Rifles—The Queen has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the Commission in this Corps held by Major the Earl of Perth; resignation accepted June 3.

Dumfries, Roxburgh, and Selkirk—Capt. G. Walker to be Major, vice Scott, resigned, June 1.

Royal Flintshire—C. Squire, Esq., to be Capt., vice Foster, resigned.

City of Edinburgh Artillery—E. F. Macgeorge, gent., to be Second Lieut., vice Bowman, promoted, June 9.

Royal Merionethshire—E. G. Jones, to be Lieut., vice Morgan, resigned.

Royal Glamorgan Artillery—J. S. Ballard, gent., to be Lieut., June 9.

Royal Sussex Light Infantry—G. A. Coventry, Esq., to be Paymaster from 12th May.

Hampshire Militia Artillery—E. G. Lillingston, gent., to be Second Lieut.

Royal Bucks King's Own—Captain E. H. Steward, late Captain 60th Regiment, to be Captain; Lieut. E. Baldock to be Captain.

Royal Berks—J. J. Howard, Esq., to be Ensign.

Norfolk Militia Artillery—W. Bedingfield, gent., to be Second Lieut.

Royal Perthshire Rifles—R. H. Wilton, gent., to be Lieut., vice Durdin, resigned.

Royal Wiltshire—H. M. Clarkson, gent., to be Ensign, vice Hayward, promoted.

Queen's Own Yeomanry Cavalry—Cornet R. G. Glyn to be Lieut., vice M. G. Mansel, deceased; M. J. Guest, gent., to be Cornet, vice Glyn, promoted.

1st Company of Lancashire Volunteer Rifles—N. G. P. Bousfield, Esq., to be Captain.

3rd, Duke of Lancaster's Own—J. L. Feilden, gent., to be Ensign.

5th Royal Lancashire—Ensign W. E. Lendrick to be Lieut., vice R. Hall, gazetted to the Royal Lancashire Militia Artillery.

Royal Merionethshire—E. G. Jones, gent., to be Ensign.

THE VICTORIA CROSS.

WAR OFFICE, June 18.—The Queen has been graciously pleased to confirm the grant of the decoration of the Victoria Cross to the undermentioned Officers of Her Majesty's Army, which decoration has been provisionally conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief in India, in accordance with the rules laid down in Her Majesty's Warrant instituting the same, for an act of bravery performed by him in that country, when serving under his personal command, as recorded against his name, viz:—

42nd Regiment—Lieutenant Francis Edward Henry Farquharson, 9th March, 1858.

Her Majesty has also been graciously pleased to signify her intention to confer the decoration of the Victoria Cross on the undermentioned Officers and Privates of Her Majesty's Army and Indian Military Forces, whose claims to the same have been submitted for Her Majesty's approval, on account of acts of bravery performed by them in India, as recorded against their several names, viz.:—

42nd Regiment—Private Walter Cook and Private Duncan Millar, 15th Jan., 1859.

13th Bengal Native Infantry—Lieutenant William George Cubitt, 30th June, 1857.

26th Bengal Native Infantry—Lieutenant Hanson Chambers Taylor Jarrett 14th October, 1858.

1st Bengal Fusiliers—Private John McGovern, 23rd June, 1857.

WAR OFFICE, JUNE 21.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to give orders for the appointment of General Sir Thomas McMahon, Bart., K.C.B., General the Earl of Cathcart, K.C.B., General Sir William Maynard Gomm, K.C.B., and General Sir Robert William Gardiner, K.C.B., to be Ordinary Members of the Military Division of the First Class, or Knights Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath; and of Gen. Henry Wyndham, and Lieut.-Gen. John Aitchinson, to be Ordinary Members of the Military Division of the Second Class, or Knights Commanders of the said Most Honourable Order.

WAR OFFICE, JUNE 21.

COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT.—Deputy Commissary General William Henry Drake, C.B., to be Commissary General; June 21.

CHAPLAIN'S DEPARTMENT.—The Rev. Edward J. Rogers, Chaplain of the Fourth Class, to be Chaplain of the Third Class; March 26.

WAR OFFICE, JUNE 23.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to give orders for the appointment of Rear Admiral George Rodney Mundy and Captain Edmund Gardiner Fish-

bourne, R.N., to be Ordinary Members of the Military Division of the Third Class, or Companions of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath; and of David James Simpson, Esq., one of the Paymasters-in-Chief of the Royal Navy; William David Jeans, Esq, Paymaster in the Royal Navy; and John Edye, Esq., late Assistant Surveyor of the Navy, to be Ordinary Members of the Civil Division of the Third Class, or Companions of the said Most Honourable Order.

WAR OFFICE, JUNE 24.

2nd Regiment of Dragoon Guards—Cornet J. T. Marshall to be Instructor of Musketry, March 4.

7th Dragoon Guards—Cornet A. H. Vincent to be Instructor of Musketry, March 12.

Royal Artillery—Paymaster W. A. Kidd, from Half Pay 27th Foot, to be Paymaster; Quartermaster J. Scott, from Depot Battalion, to be Paymaster; J. B. Thompson, Esq., to be Paymaster, June 24; Assistant Surgeon H. C. Miles, from the 83rd Foot, to be Assist Surgeon, vice Morris, cashiered, May 31.

Military Train—Cornet G. Ramsay, from Half Pay late Land Transport Corps, to be Ensign, vice Bleazby, who reverts to the Half Pay of his former rank of Lieutenant in that Corps, June 24.

Grenadier Regiment of Guards—Ensign and Lieut. L. G. Phillips to be Lieut. and Captain by purchase, vice the Hon. W. F. Forbes, who retires; Ensign L. R. Seymour, from the Rifle Brigade, to be Ensign and Lieut. by purchase, vice Phillips, June 24.

Scots Fusilier Guards—Lieut. and Captain H. C. Fletcher to be Captain and Lieut. Col. by purchase, vice Astley, who retires; Ensign and Lieut. C. Shelley to be Lieut. and Captain by purchase, vice Fletcher; Ensign the Hon. H. T. Fraser, from the 42nd Foot, to be Ensign and Lieut. by purchase, vice Shelley; Lieut. and Captain R. H. White to be adjutant, vice Fletcher, promoted June 24.

7th Foot—H. H. Rice, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Kempson, promoted, June 24.

8th—Lieut. J. E. F. Aylmer to be Instructor of Musketry, May 30.

10th—Ensign H. T. Snooke to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Hunter, who retires; Gentleman Cadet H. E. Poole, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign without purchase, vice Power promoted, June 24; Gentleman Cadet H. R. Bluett, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign without purchase vice R. S. Riddell, appointed to the 70th Foot, June 25.

17th—Gentleman Cadet H. E. Sharpe, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign without purchase, vice Weir, who resigns, June 24; Gentleman Cadet C. W. B. Aylmer, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign without purchase, vice Wrench, promoted, June 25.

20th—Ensign H. R. Bowlby, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Foster Melliar whose promotion, by purchase, on the 26th November, 1858, has been cancelled. Gentleman Cadet B. K. Whiteford, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign without purchase, vice Unwin, promoted, June 24; Gentleman Cadet C. Jones, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign without purchase, vice James, promoted, June 25.

21st—Gentleman Cadet John T. Coke, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign without purchase, in succession to Lieut. Cairns, promoted, June 24.

24th—Gentleman Cadet John L. Bland, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign without purchase, vice Farquharson, promoted, June 24.

29th—Captain R. E. Barry, from the 67th Foot, to be Captain, vice Stehelin, who exchanges, April 23.

30th—Gentleman Cadet R. L. Leir, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign without purchase, vice Calcraft, deceased, June 24.

42nd—Lieutenant W. T. Fraser to be Instructor of Musketry, May 27.

45th—Lieut. J. Franklin, from the 2nd West India Regiment, to be Lieut. vice Smith, who exchanges; Assistant Surgeon J. A. Hanbury, M.B., from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Cunningham, promoted on the Staff, June 24.

48th—Ensign E. A. Windsor, from the 74th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Marshall, promoted, June 24.

54th—Lieutenant G. Fowler, from 86th Foot, to be Lieutenant, vice Grey who exchanges, June 24.

63rd—Lieutenant B. H. Holmes, from Half Pay 36th Foot, to be Lieutenant, vice A. Grey, promoted to an Unattached Company without purchase; Ensign C. H. Kinahan to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Holmes, who retires, June 24,

64th—Gentleman Cadet A. R. Alston from the Royal Military College, to be

Ensign without purchase, vice Davies, promoted, June 24.

66th—Surgeon W. S. Murray, M.B., from the Staff, to be Surgeon, vice Henley, appointed to Staff, June 24.

67th—Captain W. P. Stehelin, from the 29th Foot, to be Captain, vice Barry, who exchanges, April 23.

99th—Gentleman Cadet T. L. Innes, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign without purchase, vice St. George, promoted, June 24.

70th—Gentleman Cadet W. J. F. Feneran, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign without purchase, vice Hill, promoted, June 24.

74th—Gentleman Cadet C. H. Dougherty, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign without purchase, vice Windsor, appointed to the 48th Foot, June 24.

83rd—Assistant Surg. E. O'Connell, from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Miles, appointed to the Royal Artillery, May 31.

86th—Lieut. W. K. Gray, from the 54th Foot, to be Lieut. vice Fowler, who exchanges, June 24.

87th—Ensign R. Throckmorton, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice S. G. L. Fox, who retires, June 24.

88th—Ensign P. Dwyer to be Instructer of Musketry, March 17.

90th—Lieut. C. D. Barwell to be Instructor of Musketry March 2.

91st—Assistant Surgeon J. McLean Marshall, from the Staff, to be Assist. Surg., vice O'Nial, promoted on the Staff, June 24.

96th—Gentleman Cadet F. Henniker, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign without purchase, vice Clayton, appointed to the 84th Foot, June 24.

2nd West Indian Regiment—Lieut. A. G. Smith, from the 45th Foot, to be Lieutenant, vice Franklin, who exchanges, June 24.

UNATTACHED.—Captain H. P. Hutton, 31st Foot, having been appointed a Major in the late Land Transport Corps, by general orders, in the Crimea, pending Her Majesty's pleasure, to be Major, without purchase, April 1, 1857.

HOSPITAL STAFF.—Surg. D. Hanley, M.D., from the 66th Foot, to be Surg., vice Murray, appointed to the 66th Foot, June 24. Assist. Surg. J. O'Nial, from the 91st Foot, to be Surg., vice Halahan, deceased, May 5. Acting Assist. Surg. H. F. Meadows has been permitted to resign his appointment, April 30.

BREVET.—Brevet Lieut. Col. J. M. *B. Neill*, upon Half Pay 40th Foot, having on 9th October, 1858, completed three years' service as Deputy Adjutant General, in Australia, to be Col. in the Army, Oct. 9, 1858. Brevet Major W. K. Orme, 10th Foot, to be Lieut. Col. in the Army, June 24. The promotion of Captain Gallwey, of the Royal Engineers, to the Brevet rank of Major, to bear date 14th May, 1859, and not May 14, 1855, as erroneously stated in the *Gazette* of 31st ultimo.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

90th, or Stirlingshire, &c., Highland Borderers Light Infantry—Lieutenant John Henderson to be Captain, vice R. S. Mc Gregor, resigned.

Western Suffolk—Lord Augustus H. C. Hervey to be Lieutenant.

7th Lancashire—Lieutenant John Hamilton to be Captain vice G. D. Bland, resigned; Ensign Geo. E. Gorton to be Lieut., vice John Hamilton, promoted.

6th Royal Lancashire—J. C. Swanton, gent., to be Lieut.

1st, or Western Regiment of Norfolk—Geo. Hill, gent. to be Lieut.

Royal North Lincoln—C. F. Sharp, gent., to be Ensign.

East Suffolk Artillery—F. Barlow, Esq., late Captain, Suffolk Artillery, to be Paymaster, May 12.

Royal Cornwall and Devon Miners—C. E. Treffry, gent., to be First Lieut., vice Magor, appointed to the 12th Foot, June 8.

MEMORANDUM—Worcestershire—Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of Major E. Winnington.

Norfolk Artillery—F. H. Brice, gent, to be Second Lieut.; June 7.

2nd Royal Lanarkshire—E. E. J Clifford, gent., to be Lieut., vice Tait resigned, June 18. Ensign W. H Bower, gent., to be Lieut., vice Davidson, resigned, June 20. W. Lefroy, gent., to be Ensign, vice Clifford, promoted, June 18.

Ross, Caithness, Sutherland, and Cromarty Rifles—W. D. B. Ketchen, gent., to be Ensign, June 20.

Stirlingshire, &c.,—Highland Borderers Light Infantry—Ensign F. Pringle to be Lieutenant, vice J. Henderson, promoted, June 18.

2nd Royal Cheshire—Ensign W. D. Hannagan, to be Lieut., vice R. Warren resigned, June 20. F. J. Owen, gent., to be Ensign, vice G. W. Barnes, resigned; June 12. MEMORANDUM—Her Majesty has been pleased to accept the resignation Ensigns T. B. Turner and R. H. Salkeld, of the same Regiment.

THE DEFENCE OF LONDON.

By an Officer of Rank.

With the highest possible opinion of the British Navy, and fully concurring in the necessity of maintaining a powerful Channel fleet, I am still dissatisfied with the land defences of the country.

It is unnecessary here to prove the practicability of an invading force landing in these islands, but the possibility of such an event has been admitted by most men who have studied the question since the introduction of steam, and considered the very small standing army on home service for the protection of the United Kingdom, as pointed out by the late Duke of Wellington, in 1847.

A Swiss Engineer undertakes to land three corps d'armée, simultaneously, each exceeding in number the whole of the troops in England.

The grand object of all invaders would certainly be to reach the capital, and as feints would probably be made on several parts of the coast at the same time, it is just possible that the point of landing might not have been watched, and the route to the metropolis left unguarded; or the opposing force might be insufficient to arrest the invading army, and, consequently, it might advance upon London.

What the result would be, in an open city, with wide streets, and totally deficient of defence, I leave to individual imagination; but let each of the many millions who have a stake in the metropolis consider his own case, instead of contenting himself with the hackneyed phrase, that, "if any foreign foe landed in England, he could never leave it"—implying his destruction; but a disciplined army, reinforced to a possible extent of 200,000 or 300,000 men would not be very easily disposed of.

We have been so long accustomed to pronounce our shores inviolable, that even the meditation of such a disagreeable subject as the occupation of the capital by a foreign army, will be scouted by many as the dreams of an alarmist, but who, in reality, are wanting in that moral courage which dares to look calmly on preparation for danger.

That prophylactic means are preferable to all others, in resisting impendent evil, is an admitted maxim, and upon that basis I found the following suggestions on the defence of the metropolis, and the kingdom in general.

First.—That London be surrounded by six detached earth forts, each capable of containing from five to ten thousand men.

The sites to be at, or near the following spots:—

No. 1.—Shooter's Hill, Woolwich.
No. 2.—Penge Common, Anerley.
No. 3.—Wimbledon Common.
No. 4.—Ealing Common.
No. 5.—Hampstead Heath.
No. 6.—Little Epping Forest, Wanstead.

Connected by continuous earthworks, and electric wire, the re-

sources of all would be available for concentration on the point threatened by the enemy, and would render any position within the circuit of the works untenable.

Second.—That the whole of the British Militia be converted into artillery, and trained to both siege and field guns, as well as to battalion movements; to be armed with revolving rifles, and two field guns to be in possession of every hundred men. (The American Militia has partially adopted this principle.)

Third.—That depôts of ship guns and carriages be established at Liverpool, the Clyde, and Newcastle, for the purpose of arming, and commissioning in the service of Government, the whole mercantile Steam Navy of the country at the shortest notice.

Fourth.—That the Royal Marines be increased to twenty thousand, and composed entirely of artillery; to be armed with breach-loading or revolving carbine rifles, with sword bayonet.

Fifth.—That the Yeomanry Cavalry be all formed into "Mounted Riflemen," dressed in green, and armed with revolving carbines (rifles).

Until there is a greater feeling of security at home, as well as a consciousness abroad, that all attempts at the "Invasion of England" would be hopeless, our legitimate influence in the councils of Europe will, to a certain degree, be abrogated.

Need I quote M. de Montalembert? Need I point to official subserviency to foreign influence in the case of one ministry or another?

Was the *power* of the "disavowed threat," whether in addresses of Colonels, or displays at Cherbourg, not as apparent in the introduction of the Orsini bill, as in the rumoured abandonment of Portugal?

I place a cost of £250,000 on each fort and outworks; and when we consider the enormous price of drainage, in these times, and that we are about to pay upwards of a million to Denmark, as compensation for the abolition of sound dues, I think we can afford a million and a half for the security of the metropolis, and the country in general, against foreign inroads; and rescue the British prestige from the abyss to which it has been consigned, as no longer invincible, by the voice of Europe.

March, 1859.

OUR MILITARY ORGANIZATION. THE WAR OFFICE AND THE HORSE GUARDS.

Mr. Sidney Herbert, the new Secretary of State for War, has not lost much time in his attainment of office, in giving an earnest to the country that he does not intend to sleep upon his honours, or to make the duties of that office a sinecure. He has scarcely had time to settle himself in the harness of his new appointment, before he has shown a resolute disposition to throw himself into the collar, and to begin at once the work allotted to him. He had hardly returned from his re-election, on attaining place, when he gave a guarantee of

the sincerity of his desire to remove the defects of administration existing in our military departments, by moving in the House of Commons for the appointment of a select committee, similar to that obtained at the instance of Captain Vivian, who has since lost his seat, inthe last Parliament. The terms of the motion on this occasion, and those used by Captain Vivian in March last, are precisely the same. It is in fact a re-appointment of the same committee, composed of different members. It was granted on the 6th of July, and consists of Sir James Graham, as Chairman, with that experienced veteran, Sir De Lacy Evans, and thirteen others as members. The duty assigned to it is, to enquire into the effects of the alterations in military organization regarding the War-Office and Board of Ordnance, which were made in 1855, and also whether any changes are required to secure the utmost efficiency and economy in the administration of military affairs. The subject is of peculiar interest at the present moment, and amongst those who have taken it up, it is likely at last to be placed in a satisfactory way of settlement.

Full scope is given to the committee for ascertaining where we have gone wrong in what we have lately been doing, and of settling what it is desirable to do now to set ourselves right again. The powers allotted to it are as extensive in this respect as they can well be. They admit not only of an examination into those alterations in the War Department, consequent on the abolition of the Ordnance, many of which were very hurriedly and inconsiderately brought forward and carried out during the excitement and pressure of the Crimean war, but they allow of the suggestion of other measures, and offer a stronger hope and expectation than we have yet had, of a serious determination to place whatever relates to our military organization on a better footing than has hitherto been the case. The result of this committee, in itself of the greatest importance, will be to revive an agitation which must prove fatal to the divided authority which has so long ruled between the War Office and the Horse Guards, and as it will probably end in the latter going to the wall it is not likely to be very popular in some quarters. There has deen a strong desire and tendency for a long time past to bring a more defined and direct responsibility to bear upon those who are at the head of our military departments, and it is scarcely possible but that what is now being done will in some way or the other effect that object. Apart, however, from the reforms which the labours of the committee may suggest, there is quite enough on Mr. Sidney Herbert's hands for the present, and for some time to come. If only a reasonable portion of the rumours current of late, as to the confusion existing in the War Department, is true, it will be no light or easy matter to keep things working, until we either go back and undo a great deal that, with an enormous waste of money, has been done, or contrive other measures to get us out of our difficulties in some other way. It will most probably be found, if it is not to a great degree admitted already, that the abolition, where the improvement only of the Ordnance Department was required, was a great mistake, and that its revival will be necessary, while some decided change will also be required at the Horse Guards and

the War Office, so as to bring the army and everything relating to it under one head.

The present Secretary at War has sagacity and experience enough soon to ascertain without the aid of a committee, that it is in the latter direction the real incubus lies which is weighing on our military efficiency, and marring all the efforts we are so constantly making to effect some improvement in it. It is here at the very commencement that our system is bad, and that it must first be amended. So long as there is a General Commanding-in-Chief, with whom responsibility, for any but the most flagrant act, which no one in the present day would think it for a moment possible that a Commander-in-Chief could commit, must from the nature and constitution of his appointment be a myth; and a Secretary at War, to whom a constitutional authority and control belong, but who in most instances has little or no military experience to guide him, so long must our military affairs be conducted indifferently; and, this defect remaining, it is not reasonable to suppose that any substantial or permanent benefit will ever accrue from the changes we may make in other directions. As we are now, we have to all intents and purposes two powers in the same department, or in what ought to be the same department, whose tendencies are to thwart and obstruct each other. Neither can well act without the other's assistance, and yet they are so constituted as to have none but antagonistic tendencies, the one to the other. There are, or ought to be, the advantages of professional knowledge and practical experience on the one side, which ought to be consulted in the bringing forward of any measures, but all the power of the purse strings, without which nothing, or next to nothing can be done, exists upon the other. Both are great men, with every element of jealousy between them, and if anything of the kind is created, which can scarcely be otherwise than the case in the course of their official intercourse, the public service must suffer. The seeds of dissension between the two are sown broadcast, and it depends entirely on an amount of good sense and high feeling by no means common or to be expected in every case, whether these seeds are to spring up and blossom into mischief or not. There are some parties, and according to the expression of his opinion on the subject in 1858, Mr. Sidney Herbert is one of the number, who consider that in the present state of things the Commander-in-Chief is nobody, or the next thing to it; and that, in his capability of controlling the pecuniary supplies the Secretary at War can do pretty much as he pleases. This may, or may not be, the true state of the case when argued theoretically, but practically the Commander-in-Chief cannot, and if he can, ought not to be made such a cipher in the command of the army, or the bringing forward of the administrative measures connected with it as this would imply him to be. If it is at all necessary or desirable that this should be the case, all we can say is, that the proper description of men to place in such an entirely subordinate position have not generally been selected for this high office. We rather think, and we fancy most people will agree with us, that it has been just the reverse. There may have been an exception in the person of Lord Hardinge, who admitted

the secondary, if not uselessness of his position, before the Sebastopol committee, but we should doubt if this was much the case in any other instance, either before or since. The only conclusion to be drawn from the assertion, if it is a true one, is, that if the Commander-in-Chief is really a person of such negative importance, the sooner he is done away with and some one more suited for a military adviser to the Secretary at War is substituted for him the better. It does seem an absurdity to maintain so high an office and to make it contemptible, or very nearly so. Neither as to patronage nor anything else would it seem that he has any power. The present Secretary at War asserts it emphatically, he says that officers in the army promote themselves, the senior officer buys out the man above him, and the Commander-in-Chief has nothing to do with the matter. He merely registers the fact and nothing more, unless there is some marked unfitness in the purchaser. As to first commissions, these, it was said, were entirely given up by the present Commander-in-Chief for public competition through Sandhurst; and he wound up by the conclusion, logically enough certainly, that the patronage of the Commander-in-Chief was, therefore, nil; and that it might safely be given up to the Secretary of State, for there was nothing to give.

As to the higher appointments—those upon the staff and the appointments of generals to colonial and other commands, they had, it was asserted, never been made without the previous sanction of the Secretary of State, who possessed a check which enabled him, even with regard to the smallest promotions if the regulations had been evaded, or if there were financial reasons for declining to sanction them, to stop them at the very last moment, because the names were always sent to the Secretary of State to be inserted in the Gazette, and without this sanction they could not be gazetted.

This is Mr. Sidney Herbert's own vindication of the undeniable responsibility of the Secretary at War for whatever is done, and the absence it is to be perceived of any necessity to go any further in striving to make it more definite or marked than it is. But after all, what is this system, if fairly examined, but an obstructive one. It may stand still at the best, but can hardly be expected to maintain progressive improvement. It may define what the Secretary at War can do, but it fails to lay down or state, when the Commander-in-Chief has any duty to perform, and still less how apathy or neglect on his part are to be visited. If the head of the War Office was commonly an officer of the highest professional ability it might suffice; but as he is usually just the reverse, it points out plainly where the cause of all our deficiencies lies. If the Commander-in-Chief can be of any real use, it can only be, as things are, in advising the Minister at War upon military subjects, and coming before him with suggestions cut and dry for his consideration and approval. Besides, the discipline of the army, which is after all not a very difficult affair, or a great tax on the intellect or anybody's time to maintain; it might be considered that this was the office of a Commander-in-Chief if he had anything to do at all. If it is not what is it that he is for? If it is, is there any, the slightest security, that we take

the best means, or any means, of having it done? May not some misgiving be allowed (we hope there is no impropriety in speaking so plainly), as to whether Princes of the blood, or those who have attained to the very highest eminence in the State, are exactly the most suitable parties to such secondary employment? Is it the work that any of them can be reckoned upon under ordinary circumstances at all events, cheerfully or cordially to perform in the case of war secretaries such as we have seen? The power most capable of suggesting improvement in our military affairs will most probably not be able to move in them but with the risk of an altercation to carry out his views; while that with which the execution exists must either remain passive, from ignorance what to do, or blunder in his attempts if he tries to do anything.

Nothing can be established from which an approach to the efficiency we are striving after so eagerly can be obtained, so long as there is anything to divide the Horse Guards and the War Office as they are divided at present. No department can flourish in which there are separate interests constituted as these are. The Secretary at War may be able at any and every move to checkmate the Commander-in-Chief—but this is all. If the latter is very capable in his profession—and it is to be presumed that he is so—what does the service or the country gain? If he is not the most capable military man that can be found, or if he is not superior to the War Minister in his professional knowledge, of what use is he at all? Examine it how we may, the absurdity is the same; if the Secretary at War is capable of acting without military advice, so high an office as that of Commander-in-Chief, no matter how subordinate the latter may be in theory, is eviidently in his way. If he is not so capable is he likely to be very cordially supported by an officer who may consider his dignity equal if not superior to his own, and who will not counsel him as to measures for which, if it pleases him, he may allow him to receive no credit. If sound military legislation can come out of such a state of things it can only be produced by a most uncommon amount of self-abnegation somewhere. We may attempt to organize on such a system as this, and add another long list to the numerous changes we have already made, but the result will be a similar disappointment to what we have always had. There will be no one until the Horse Guards and the War Office are, by some means or other, hammered into one to watch over and direct the machinery of our military administration, and when it is once in order, if such should ever be the case in the confusion we have arrived at, to keep it so. With such information as the parliamentary committee may collect it is more than probable some good measures may be inaugurated, but where are we to look for that constant attention and that continual improvement without which everything must soon fall off again? What establishments have we constituted to meet that want? Is it to be found amongst the civilians at the War Office, whose knowledge may reasonably be supposed to be very theoretical and shallow on military questions in which soldierly efficiency is concerned? Can we look for it to the Horse Guards, where, as long as mere discipline is maintained,

there is no inducement whatever to do anything. Except in what relates to their own interests, or to those of their friends, and to watching after patronage, it would be no easy matter to say what our military officials have to do, which if left undone would compromise any of them in the least. We verily believe that things would go on just as well as they do now if there were mere automatons in their places. We ought to know by this time where to find out the defects of our military system, for we have suffered enough by them. We have always had the kind of mixture we have now in it; a civil element meant to be paramount, but which is paralyzed from want of knowledge and experience; and a military element, as a kind of helpmate to the former, in which exemption from work is guaranteed, or at least to the idleness of which no tangible responsibility attaches. We reap the consequence by frequent disasters during war, and in time of peace we are as a nation like a pack of old women continually getting into a panic at the slightest threatening appearance, and the want of confidence we feel in what it is in our own hands to remedy. We are never prepared for war when it comes, nor able to carry it on without the most egregious blundering and the most frightful sacrifices, and, whether in peace or war, the greatest ability we display is that of spending twice as much money as with good management we ought to do. Here we are with our army estimates alone at thirteen millions, or very nearly so, and yet hardly any one is satisfied. The cry is still for more, and the country is inundated with pamphlets and statements, which, if true, ought to cause impeachment somewhere, for the misapplication and waste which must be going on to cause our being so defenceless. The money is fooled away by negligence and incapacity, and by stupid alterations where alterations were never called for or in the least necessary. If the Horse Guards may slumber whatever happens short of a mutiny, and with a happy consciousness that it will never be much trusted in any real danger, the risks of the War Department are scarcely less mythical. War is only an exceptional state of things, and in ordinary times who gives himself the slightest trouble as to the management of our military affairs? Who cares much about the estimates but those who have the spending of them; and, as long as they are kept within tolerably reasonable bounds, who cares about asking any questions or listening to any complaints about them?

Was Lord Panmure ever called to any serious account for taking care of Dowbs innumerable? or for making a host of changes, most of which have ended in nothing but an extravagant and useless outlay of the public money? Was the question ever asked, by what authority he substituted in the payment of the royal artillery a legion of paymasters, for the less costly and far more convenient and efficient services of Messrs. Cox and Co.? How much more is this measure costing the public than it paid for the same amount of work before? We may talk of checks on the Commander-in-Chief, as if he only because of the colour of his coat was the only one necessary to guard against; but where is the check upon a Secretary at War who, if Lord Panmure is any criterion, has apparently much the same liberty

in his office that is usually given to bulls amongst crockery ware. The treasury is not a difficult position to turn, when any real extravagance is intended. It is not possible they can decide with justice or common sense on everything that is brought before them, so they seem to take one general rule as a guide, and that is, to refuse a little that might fairly and justly be bestowed, and to give liberally where the money is likely to be thrown away. They are ready to grant anything to civilians, and equally ready to refuse or cut down military allowances. Lord Panmure managed them with a success for which the country is likely to suffer for many a year to come. Neither that management nor the doings at Weedon, nor the dire confusion which is said to have reigned in his department from the commencement of his career to its close, and even for some time after, have caused any particular display of public indignation. His removal from office was never mooted, and he might, perhaps, have remained there to the present moment, if his party had not been for a time disturbed. He might even, for aught that is known to the contrary, perhaps have come back with them again if it had suited him. The Duke of Newcastle suffered martyrdom for doing his best, and as much as any man could do under the novelty of his position, and the unwonted circumstances in which he was placed, but another, whose incapacity would be exhibited in the strongest light to any impartial enquiry, and under whose management the expenses of every part of the service considerably augmented, with far more detriment than advantage to the country, retired with a notoriety that has added something to the vocabulary of the English language, and which was not a very pleasant one, but quite unscathed in any other respect. It is seldom, in the changes that so frequently take place at the head of the War Department, that responsibility, when anything goes wrong, should fall solely on the shoulders of the party in office, and this is another difficulty in fixing it anywhere with any degree of effect.

Departments are not reformed in a day, and it may be the neglect of years that has brought them into a bad state. There should be a chain of responsibility, moreover, by which small delinquents, as well as great ones, should be made to suffer. Every one should have a stimulant to work. A sense of duty will do much in many cases, but the fear of punishment or the hope of reward is, after all, the safest and best to rely upon. If it is but jumping to a conclusion to say so, and if there are not constitutional reasons to prevent it, of which we are not aware, the plan most likely to promote military efficiency would be to withdraw the army as much as possible from political influences, and to place it under the general commanding-in-chief, just as the artillery and engineers were under the master-general in former days; and to organize a board at the Horse Guards, somewhat after the fashion of the old Board of Ordnance. The military element would then rule supreme and untrammelled in its own proper sphere, while questions of expenditure and finance would be subject of board discussion; and they might, in that manner, be brought as fully as they are now, and far more effectively, under Parliamentary control. If there are insur-

mountable obstacles in the way of this organization, the country has little or nothing else to look to for an efficient administration of its military affairs but the advent of some strong-minded Secretary at War, both capable and conscientious. One acquainted with the army beyond the drawing-rooms of London, and who will make a *coup d'état* by asserting at once and beyond mistake, his entire supremacy in everything military. He must be deaf, or nearly so, to interest, and use no instruments nor allow them to be used, but those of merit, and talent, and industry, and experience in the command of troops. He must not allow a commission to be given away without his sanction, if he has the means, direct or indirect, to prevent it. When the country gets such a *rara avis* as this, and we are at present as near to it as we shall probably ever get, certainly far nearer than we have yet been, the calumet of peace may be thoroughly enjoyed, and even Lord Lyndhurst and Lord Howden may sleep without the nightmare of a French Zouave, after a series of gymnastic feats which give us no chance of successfully defending ourselves, ransacking the treasures of the Bank of England. We do not wish to make light of the possibility of invasion; it may or may not be practicable, the question is not likely to be settled by mere arguments about it; but of this we are quite sure, that the way to increase the difficulties of it is not to give more money to be wasted and flung away as what we give now is, but to introduce good management, and to place better men than are now there, in the military departments. If we cannot arrive at a comfortable assurance for what we are now paying, or it may be even a million or two less, we had better try another mode, and subsidize the expected enemy not to attack us. It would not be a bit less ignoble than what we are now doing, making great sacrifices, and yet always proclaiming the fright we are in, and what little security we have for them. Surely the Cabinet, and not the House of Lords or the House of Commons, is the proper place in which to discuss such delicate questions as the intentions, real or supposed, of foreign countries; and we might more sensibly, without imputations, publicly and insultingly flung in the faces of those who may or may not intend us harm, put our affairs in order in a quiet way, than by making such pitiable and contemptible exhibitions as we are so frequently doing, and the habit of which seems now becoming chronic with us. The Government is, or ought to be, responsible for the maintenance of proper establishments; it knows the contingencies we have to meet, and such displays as those we have lately seen, in which the actors ought to be ashamed of themselves, would be only justifiable, and even then they should, perhaps, be made under some different form, in case the Government was known to be inert, or the House of Commons unwilling to grant the necessary supplies.

There is no necessity to blow a trumpet of triumph, or to make a noise about it when we are buckling on our armour. A resolute enemy is not to be frightened out of his intentions in that way, he well knows what we are doing, however quiet we may be, and it is our manner of doing that he will study. We may build ten thousand line-of-battle ships, and call upon some one, as soon as we have

done it, to come on; but whoever is likely to accept the challenge will measure his chances by the number we can effectively man. He won't count the strength of our army, as we are apt to do ourselves, by the number voted in the estimates, or even by the paper amount, which may satisfy us all that we are irresistible. He will look only, and he will have plenty of means of knowing it, to the number of men we can bring into the field. If we are wise, we ought to form an estimate of ourselves, and of those we think may attack us, or rather our rulers should do it in the same sensible manner. It is almost hopeless to expect anything like this in the present system, for no one has any confidence in it. It would be far better to have the army under a civilian of even moderate capacity, assisted by military advice practically subordinate to him, and under his absolute command and control, than to trust to the present state of things, in which there may be an abundance of checkmating power as regards the Commander-in-Chief, but in which there is nothing which gives the slightest reality to his position as a military adviser to the War Minister; in which there is no satisfactory responsibility, and from which no true efficiency can be expected. What can be more absurd than to place an official at the head of the army, as the War Minister generally is in this country, without any professional qualification to enable him to fulfil its duties, and leaving everything to him, merely aided by such counsel and advice as the powers at the Horse Guards may deign to give, and which he may probably have to go out of his way to obtain? To place parties in their proper relative positions in such a system as this, the Commander-in-Chief should be to the Secretary at War much as the Adjutant-General now is to the Commander-in-Chief. His subordination would then indeed be complete, which it is very far from being now. The Secretary at War may be powerful as a check, but what power has he to set the Commander-in-Chief going, or of extracting any assistance from him at all, if he should choose to withhold it? What could be said of the subordination of an army in which the commander could only say you shan't do this, or you shan't do that, but to which he could give no affirmative command.

The subordination of the Horse Guards to the War Office at the present moment is quite of this character. Consolidation of the military departments is what we have had ringing in our ears for some time past, but the consolidation that is wanted is not that we have been pursuing, it does not consist of tearing up root and branch, old and useful departments such as that of the Ordnance, and imposing the duties on those who know nothing about them; but to bring them, each working in its own orbit, under the control of some one power which may command them in any way necessary for the convenience or efficiency of the service. Division of labour is as essentially necessary for the army, in its different branches, as it can possibly be anywhere; but that division of labour should not act in any disjointed manner. In everything connected with it, it should be under one chief. We are going contrary to all this, and the consequences are, that instead of mending matters we are getting more and more into confusion. The line, the cavalry, the artil-

lery, the engineers, the medical department, the commissariat; all, more or less, require some special knowledge; and for internal administration, it is absolutely requisite that each should have its own officials. If they are worked on what may be called the conglomerate principle, which is that we are rapidly getting into with regard to the fighting branches of the service, there may be a fair show for a time, but there will as assuredly be a break down when it comes to actual warfare. The Ordnance must be as distinct and separate from the line or cavalry, as the medical or any other department. It would be just as wise to work the details of the latter through the Adjutant General at the Horse Guards, as it is to attempt the same thing with the artillery. Every arm should have its own staff, and be kept as distinct and separate as possible; confusion is, otherwise, certain to ensue, and responsibility will be easily evaded. Every step we take at variance with what common sense ought to show to us as right in this respect, will lead to infinite mischief. Whoever is the author of the plan which has done away with the Director General of Artillery, and the Inspector General of Fortifications, and who has established a committee, not a member of which is above the rank of a colonel, to do their duties and a host of others besides, will not have much reason to congratulate himself with the result. The moment there is any pressure the whole thing will collapse; it will be impossible to carry on the duties satisfactorily for a month during actual war under such a system. The artillery used to be looked upon as a model for the rest of the army in all its arrangements; and even throughout the operations in the Crimea, it acquitted itself better than any other part of the service. We might safely, with some amendments, have left this branch alone, or nearly so. All it required was an improvement in its staff, and a riddance of one or two individuals from prominent positions in connection with it who had manifestly exhibited less interest for the efficacy of the corps at large, than in their own power and aggrandizement. Instead of prudently and wisely proceeding in this measure, everything has been revolutionized in this direction. Lord Panmure upset as much as he could, but his freaks, extensive and mischievous as they were, have been entirely thrown into the shade by what has been more lately done. Every tried and approved office which distinguished the old Ordnance Department, and which had, under much discouragement, given our artillery as high a character as any other in the world, has been ruthlessly abolished.

The whole military organization has been changed, the system of foreign reliefs, the simplest and easiest that could have been devised, has been altered; the interior economy, the form of pay lists, the mode of practice, everything, great and small, has been metamorphosed, but the why or the wherefore, or by whom it has been done, no one can tell. If an enemy, intending to attack us, had placed an emissary in a position to work us all the damage he could in distracting and impairing the arm of artillery in this country, more could not have been done than has been accomplished of late in this respect by the folly of some unknown busybody. That able and distinguished officer, Sir R. Gardiner, with a clear head, and the *most untiring zeal and energy* is, with his usual devotedness, striving

to stay the evil; and, by the measures he proposes, if timely adopted, there is no doubt, whatever the future may have in store for us, but that the branch of the service to which he belongs, and in which his long experience and brilliant services make him the very highest authority, would be quite fit to meet any emergency, and capable of bearing any strain upon its management, however continuous it might be. It is absolutely incredible to any one not acquainted with the facts, the worse than useless changes we have been making, and the necessary or desirable ones which we have neglected, we seem to take no account of whatever. Instead of meddling with matters of comparatively no urgent or pressing nature, doing infinite mischief, why did it not strike some of our military authorities to take some of these questions into consideration for reform and improvement, almost all of which are of the most vital importance, which are now in the furnace of some parliamentary or other enquiry to prepare them for legislation? Instead of a plan for improving the artillery, which was quite uncalled for and unnecessary, why did we not have a plan for improving the recruiting of the army, or the organization of the militia, or the prevention of desertion, or a reasonably economical method, founded on some intelligible principles, for the defence of the country? There was surely enough under these heads, and others of a like kind, to have profitably occupied the time of the Horse Guards, and it was scarcely wise in that department to have devoted itself to alterations in artillery matters, the nature and effect of which it could not possibly understand in the least, while there was so much work in its own particular line to attend to, which required the most marked and unquestionable amendment. How much of our increased and daily increasing expenditure is to be put down to this inconsiderate way of doing things, and to what cause is it to be attributed? A department which requires the continual aid of parliamentary committees to get it out of its difficulties is not exactly the one to make judicious reforms where it has only very lately come into possession, as in the case of the Ordnance. The Horse Guards authorities have abdicated, or been turned out, on questions which they ought to understand, and to be able to legislate upon; and, as a sort of compensation, and to give them something to do, they are allowed to make a kind of Aunt Sally of two such important services as the Artillery and Engineers, but especially of the former, in which it is a kind of mania with them to appear to know something. There is a sort of feminine weakness about them which craves after credit for qualities which they don't possess. They dare not deal with the recruiting of the army, or any other questions of that kind, the abominations of which are well known, and for which they are responsible, or rather for which they would be if such a thing as responsibility existed, and they perpetrate all manner of extravagant and ridiculous attempts at reform when there is nothing whatever to show that it is at all wanted, and where, if it is, they are about the last people likely to do it properly.

If the Secretary at War, or the Committee of the House of Commons will examine a little closely into this part of the subject, and take a few competent opinions on what has been done as well as

on what is doing, a very important arm in the public service as well as the public expenditure will be likely to benefit. It would be very hard to say what really decided blot we have yet hit on in our military system, towards the remedy of which we have made any very satisfactory progress. We are forward in proclaiming our weakness and blundering, but slow to the last degree in removing what we complain of. We patch, and repair, and make never ceasing alterations, but there is no substantial reform or improvement. The fact is, we have few or no hands competent to do what is needed, and as long as we are without them, we may go on talking for ever with very little advantage. Let any one acquainted with the *personnel* of our military departments, or with the great majority whom we have got in employment, ask himself, as he reads over the list, are these the names to which the highest military talent and the best administrative ability of the country belong? Are these the most competent officers that can be found, and the most clear-headed, to counsel and advise upon important questions of army efficiency, and the means to obtain it? If this cannot be promptly and affirmatively answered—if, on the contrary, it would be indignantly repudiated, what is the use of having things as they are in this respect, and passing on to other changes, which, dependent on incompetency at their very starting, can never be of any but the most temporary service, however well conceived they may be in the first instance. At every step in our proceedings, there is something to be found which common sense would unhesitatingly condemn, especially in the management of military affairs. We not only ignore the necessity, or at least act as if we did, for the best talent or fitness in the most prominent and important of our military employments, but we have a free and independent press, backed up and encouraged in exposing every mistake that is made. In other words, we choose incompetency, and then expose it to friends and foes alike. The most relished reading in the *Times*, is some spirited attack on the military authorities. Where is the use, if we can't or won't get better men to do what is wanted, of railing continually at those that are in office, and exhibiting their neglect at every turn? If we are compelled by the nature of our institutions, or our deference to any particular class, to do foolish things, the best plan, in fact the only wise thing to do, is to keep silent about them. Unless we can and are determined to alter the system, there is nothing but folly in proclaiming to all the world that we are the victims of stupidity. Confidence is half the battle in military operations; but no one preaches confidence in any of our military chiefs or officials. On the contrary, they are run down in every direction. Our late enemy declared we were an army of lions led by asses, and we have rather plumed ourselves than otherwise on the expression ever since. Will any one be good enough to state what is the advantage of all this? If we must take our officials as they are given to us, it cannot help them along or improve them, to be incessantly pointing out how lax and stupid they are. Mischievous and defective as our system may be, it can only be made worse by battering at it continually, and very often with very little discrimination. The *Times*, which is the oracle with us all, may ask the question when an enemy has landed and is encamped amongst

the Kentish hop-poles, and we are speeding to the encounter with whatever resources we can collect, who, with the confidence of the country to support him, is to command this, our last hope on the occasion? Who but the *Times* can answer its own question? The *Times* can make a general for us on the most improved principle, and out of the very slightest material, in the course of a week, or even less. Where is Mr. Russell? A few strokes of his pen would do the thing at once. Aldershott and a few field days would answer as well for the purpose as Solferino or Magenta. Can the *Times* so easily forget how our Generals were made and unmade in the Crimea? The press does everything in this respect. The army, and the reputation of every individual in it, are quite in its hands. If we had the most capable officers in the world in command, instead of falling considerably short of it, it would be no easy matter to carry on our military affairs in this country, carped at and criticised as every thing is, often by the most absurd ignorance of the subject treated. Confidence is shaken in every direction, and without confidence the most important element of an army is wanting. If the system we pursue is not a likely one to give us able generals, or to carry up our military administration to the point of efficiency we desire to keep it, by all means let the utmost efforts be made to change it; but abusing what we have, so long as we are obliged to keep it, in every individual act, is not a wise or a prudent course. Attack any system that is bad, but it is making out a rather too deplorable case for ourselves to endeavour to show, in the meanwhile, that we cannot meet any emergency. In endeavouring to get reform there may be too much candour in times like these in showing how very badly off we are without it. Mr. Sidney Herbert's accession to office is to be hailed much less for the undoubted ability which he possesses than for the feeling he inspires that under his management and control things are sure to be done well. He has come at a moment when such a man is most wanted, and he has only to assert the power which we have his own word for it that he possesses, to do infinite service in his department. There is a feeling with regard to him that he is at last and for once the right man in the right place, and that feeling will enable him to bear down opposition, and to command support in whatever measures he may consider necessary to a more economical and improved efficiency in our army. He has taken a prominent part for many years past in all discussions relating to military affairs, and he has had experience in administering them under the old and discarded system. He will soon be able to decide where we were unwise in departing from that system, and where it would be advisable to retrace our steps. He will judge of measures on broad principles, for he is free from the shallow professional pretensions of his predecessors. If, with such a Secretary at War as we now have, we still go on in failures in our military legislation, it should be plain that the present state of things must be hopeless. It must show that the best and most earnest man we have can make nothing of them, and that we must either change our system altogether, or be content to go on as we have always done, looking much to Providence and helping ourselves but to a very slight degree by good management. We have little on which to rely as we now

are, but the hope that the good fortune with which we have been so often favoured will still attend upon us. There is, also, one thing further of which there is no symptom that it will fail us. The British soldier will no doubt fight as he has always done, to the deep disgust of his enemies, long after he ought to have given in; and, without, as is his wont, enquiring or caring much by what general he is led to the combat. For the rest there is that ever-ready instrument the income tax; and as we are a rich people, it may be a weakness with us to desire to show how much more we can afford to pay than is requisite or necessary for the maintenance of the national security.

THE STEAM RAM.

WITHIN the last quarter of a century science has placed, and is still placing, very destructive weapons in our hands. It would indeed appear that the further progress we make in civilization the greater are the advances made in our power to kill. The difference between the uncultivated savages of Africa and the scientific European is not more apparent in the outward and visible signs of colour and form than in the weapons forged by them. Both indulge in war, and although there is a wide gap between the bow and arrow, or still ruder club or spear, and the last invention of scientific Christendom, yet every step in the art of destruction may be traced with certainty. It is within the memory of many a soldier, now standing in the ranks, when clumsy "Brown Bess" was a model weapon. Indeed, we believe to this day, a gun of no more power is still used in the majority of the line regiments of the Continental armies. But now in England the Enfield and Lancaster rifle have supplanted the old musket that won Waterloo and Salamanca. However, it is not to be supposed that all improvement has ceased, for Colt's revolvers, the Emperor's rifled cannon, and Armstrong's marvellous invention, show a satisfactory progress; but, nevertheless, destructive as these weapons are, it is only when we come to deal with artillery, as applied to warfare afloat, that the full blossoming of the club of Cain, that early offshoot of the "tree of knowledge of good and evil," is fully developed.

We remember the time when the "wooden walls" of old England were considered our ark and our refuge, and we are not prepared to admit that they are not so still. But the enormous increase of heavy metal, and the improvement made in sea ordnance, have awakened shipwrights to the fact that wood and iron cannot stand the hammering of 68-pounders for any lengthened period. The same may be said of floating batteries coated with iron, they have been proved and found useless against modern guns. Their iron casings have been crushed almost as easily as an egg shell can be by the hand. If ships coated with iron cannot withstand the rude shocks of sea artillery, the question is, what will become of our stately three deckers and dashing wooden frigates, when opposed to the broadsides that science is now prepared to pour into their hulls? How long, for instance, will a couple of wooden three deckers blaze away at each other before one or both are sent to the bottom. One

or two concentrated broadsides will settle the business, so that the days of laying ships "yard arm to yard," and firing into one another for hours, then hauling off to repair damages, and then renewing the fight, are gone for ever.

It is obvious, however, that no invention or discovery in gunnery has created such astounding changes in warfare afloat as steam. For although this new motive power has never been fairly tried in the shock of battle between ships or fleets at sea, yet the results that are likely to take place are so well understood that it has altered or modified naval tactics, and interfered materially with naval architecture by introducing a motive power independent of atmospherical influences. The phases we have passed through from paddle to screw, from the first little steamer of 90 tons, to the Great Eastern of 22,000 tons, are familiar wonders to us all. But now it seems this modern giant is about to introduce a new era in naval warfare, or rather one that brings the mind back to the encounters of the classic periods of Greece and Rome.

The leading maritime powers of Europe have been for some time past endeavouring to devise some means by which an ordinary ship might be for a time rendered invulnerable; but, as we have said, the attempts have proved failures. Both the English and the French batteries at Kinburn and elsewhere, could not stand against 32-pounders. The Emperor of the French then set to work, and endeavoured to steal a march upon us, but we believe all his efforts have, up to this time, been abortive. He is now said to be coating some old sailing three decked ships with iron, but it is impossible that the end desired, viz., velocity and indestructibility, can be obtained by such vessels. In England, however, we have an idea which it seems is about to be realized, viz., of introducing a new monster upon the deep, which is not only to possess great speed, but is to be also invulnerable. The steam ram is to be fire proof and shot proof, capable of not only sinking a single line-of-battle ship, but of smashing up a whole fleet of 120 gun ships in an hour—or so—of destroying a navy before breakfast any morning that would require years to construct. These remarkable and astounding results are confidently expected from the "Steam Ram," which the Government has very recently ordered to be constructed by the Thames Iron Shipbuilding Company for the defence of our shores.

It is evident that this vessel is only an experiment; but, nevertheless, it claims our most serious attention from the important results expected from it when completed. It may not realise all our expectations, indeed it is not likely to do so, but as it is in course of construction, and will be afloat next June, a few anticipatory remarks upon this terrible weapon, while it is in embryo, may enable the reader to form his own conclusions upon the subject.

And what are the solid and substantial reasons for expecting that the "Iron Steam Ram" will run down any wooden fabric, from a three decker to a gun boat, for as the idea stands at present, nothing yet built, no matter how strong, how large, or how small, is capable of holding its head above water in defiance of this new champion of the seas.

A subject of such importance to Englishmen as the Steam Ram

cannot be treated in an off-hand manner. It must be looked at in all its bearings, viz., its indestructibility, its powers of offence and defence, its size, construction, and speed.

The reader is perhaps prepared to hear that this enormous vessel of war is to be built of iron—wrought iron, and that it is to be specially adapted for running down and smashing by irresistible force the largest and strongest ships afloat. This being the object of the Steam Ram, how is this result to be achieved? Of course the vessel must be large, and consequently we find her dimensions to be as follows:—Length 380ft., breadth 59ft., depth 42ft., supposed tonnage 6,200 tons. As the Steam Ram will destroy a ship by impact, it is necessary to have a heavy hull, and consequently we find that the weight of the vessel empty is calculated at about 6,000 tons. To give sufficient impetus to the mass, engines of 1,250 horse power are being built by Penn and Sons, of Greenwich. The weight of these, with their boilers, will be about another thousand tons, and it is estimated that when she has her coals on board, of which the "Ram" will be able to stow away about 1,000 tons, and these, together with her armament, stores, &c., &c., will make a total of about 9,500 tons, which will be driven, when required, through the water at a velocity of sixteen or seventeen miles an hour.

We believe that the conditions required to enable the Steam Ram to sink any line-of-battle ship as now constructed, are to be found in a vast iron mass of the dimensions above, if driven at the speed indicated.

The next consideration is, what will be the effect of the impact upon the "Ram," and how will she escape with impunity from a collision with a line-of-battle ship? To comprehend this part of the subject, a little detail is necessary, particularly as to the strength of the "Ram" to withstand repeated collisions with heavy ships of war. The keel is to be constructed of slabs of wrought iron, more than an inch thick, and three feet and a-half deep; the length of these slabs is not yet determined upon, we believe. The ribs, which are also of massive wrought iron, are to be made in lengths of 5 feet by 2 feet deep, and these are to be 3 feet 8 in. apart everywhere, except where they are bolted to the keel, where they are to be bolted at half that distance asunder. The armour plates commence at 5 feet below the line of flotation, which are to be bolted to beams of teak a foot and a-half thick, which beams, if we understand the subject rightly, are to act as a sort of inner skin between the armour plates and the iron ribs of the Ram. The armour plates are to be 4½-in. thick, which seems to be sufficiently impenetrable for the purpose of resisting for the time the knocks a Ram would be exposed from the impact of 68-pounders. These slabs of armour will coat the Ram to the upper deck, and it may be as well to state, that all the decks, except the orlop, are to be made of iron, but cased with wood. The beams are also to be made of wrought iron, of the most ponderous description, to which both the decks and ribs are to be bolted, but in addition to these, other massive beams, five feet asunder, crossed by diagonal ties, will run along the length of the Ram from the bows to the stern.

The "Ram," it is expected, will be heavily armed, with thirty-six guns of Armstrong's make, each of 100lbs. calibre, having a range of 5½ or 6 miles. These guns are to be arranged as follows:—"The broadside guns will be only fourteen, which with two broadside guns on the upper deck, and two pivot guns forward and two aft, will make up her complement." This disposition of her armament arises in consequence of the armour plates not shielding the whole of the "Ram's" sides, only the fighting part, about 230 feet of broadside being coated with this powerful mail. The other parts of the vessel, viz. the bows and the stern, will be covered with lighter plates of wrought iron, bolted to teak planks, *twenty-four inches thick.* This comparatively *tender* part of the Ram is of little consequence to the safety of the vessel, for supposing that a shot, or hundreds of shots should pass through the all but impenetrable bows or stern, these parts being constructed in water-tight compartments, and each of these extremities being perfectly cut off from the engines and fighting portion of the ship, it would be a matter of no consequence if they were shot away. The Ram would, in the vital parts, viz. the centre, be as impenetrable as ever.

However, it is obvious that for the purpose for which the "Ram" is intended, viz., that of "butting" a line-of-battle ship and sinking her, the bows, or "head," where the whole force of the impact must be sustained, ought to be the strongest part. And here it is intended to have a web of iron stays, beams, and ties, bracing together eight wrought iron decks or spaces, an inch or more thick, and crossed and re-crossed with strengthening supports in every direction.

Leaving out of the question whether the point which would strike an opposing ship ought to be above or below the water line, for this has not, we believe, been absolutely decided upon, we will now proceed to notice what would be likely to follow a collision between such a vessel as above constructed and rigged as an ordinary frigate of the first class, and a line-of-battle ship. Now we should like to see the gear that would support the "Ram's masts" after striking a line-of-battle ship. In our opinion, the shock would carry them away, and encumber her deck with wreckage, some portion of which would very likely foul her screw or paddles, as the case might be, and render her as helpless as the ship she had run into.

Again, what is to become of the crew at the moment of impact? where are they to get to to avoid being crushed by the falling spars of the enemy's ship, to say nothing of their own? We remember that on one occasion we had the misfortune to run into a small brig in the dead of the night, off the Azores, and although we were in a fifty gun ship, and the brig was only about 250 tons, there was scarcely a man that was not either thrown out of his hammock or thrown off his feet and bruised, though at the moment of impact we were moving only about five knots through the water. This was the damage that occurred to us, the "Ram," on that occasion, while the unfortunate brig was split open, and her masts in falling very nearly brought down our own.

Again, what will be the effect of the shock necessary to sink a line-of-battle ship, upon the engines of the Ram? Are they likely

to be stopped, reversed; or what are the tactics of the engine-room on such an occasion? Then there is something to be said about the bowsprit and the gear that sustain the foremast; for the nonsense about a "telescopic bowsprit" to house on board, together with the anchors, just before the "smashing" up of a 120 gun ship, may serve to amuse the marines, to whom we suppose this little bit of a manœuvre is to be especially entrusted.

Now while admitting the possibility of constructing an iron Ram that might be of important service in defending the coast, we cannot realize the idea, as the Americans say, of the utility of rigging the Ram, after the fashion of a heavy ship, with masts, spars, sails, and bowsprit. A Steam Ram ought to rely upon her engines, and have as little top hamper as possible. She ought to be all "Ram," and nothing but a "Ram." We cannot even see the use of an armament to such a vessel. On the contrary, we can, without being possessed of an over lively imagination, fancy the confusion that must ensue, when the concussion takes place. Every 68-pounder on board the Ram, would, we should think, be cast loose, or overthrown, in some way or other again. The fewer hands on board a "Ram" the better; and for this reason we would dispense with masts and spars, and then the vessel being unimpeded by any hamper, would have its speed increased accordingly.

Without being able to say what ought to be the shape and build of a Ram, it is obvious that if "Rams" are to fight after the fashion of their namesakes, viz.—by "butting" with their heads, the strongest and fleetest Ram will be the most destructive. They ought to lie low in the water, and their entire weight afloat should be exclusively devoted to their strength of build. Their momentum must come from their engines, and we cannot imagine the utility of masts and spars, unless it be to deceive an enemy. And this is not likely ever to occur, for could any seaman mistake a "Ram" of 6 or 7,000 tons, rig her as you will, for an ordinary ship of the line. How is a vessel with a broadside of fourteen guns to be painted to look like a ship of 120 guns. The very idea is absurd. Besides, could an iron vessel of the build and make we have described pass muster unobserved, even if she could keep her position in a line of battle? but even then her paint and her disguise would avail nothing. Her guns in a general action would tell as nothing compared with her powers as a "Ram," and to be of any service, or rather to perform her mission, she must leave her position in line, and steam amongst the enemy's ships, running amuck at every one she approaches. And then it seems to us, that her masts and spars would be a serious drawback to her destructive powers, and might entangle her with an enemy's ship, and render her an easy prize.

Instead of investing from 300 to 400,000 in an experiment like the monster now in course of construction on the Thames, it would have been wiser to have tried our hands upon a smaller, and less costly vessel. The "Ram" we have in our "mind's eye" ought to be adapted for our shores, and be constructed of iron frame work, to lie low in the water, be propelled by steam, invulnerable, to be managed by a few hands, of great velocity, and, consequently, with

no masts, spars, or rigging whatever. The cost of such a vessel would be trifling, and they might swarm upon our shores and harbours. Indeed, we cannot imagine the use of one monster Ram, even admitting it fulfils the conditions required of it. One ram cannot be everywhere—it might sink one or two ships, and disperse the rest. This is supposing the "one ram" happens to fall in with the enemy. But it is evident that if this vessel is stationed at Plymouth, it cannot be at Portsmouth at the same time. And what is desirable for our coast defence is a multitude of small rams, stationed at all points of our shores, so as to be ready to act at a moment's notice anywhere. They would indeed be so many floating batteries, which nothing could resist, and against whose invulnerable sides artillery would be powerless. No long range could escape them, their speed would overtake everything encumbered with spars, and they would render all land forts and batteries next to useless, and protect our shores from invasion.

Indeed, this exemption from the absurd panics that occasionally seize us upon the subject of invasion, is one of the advantages likely to be derived from a few steam rams upon our southern shores. They would relieve our home squadron. However, we are reminded while speculating upon these new implements of war, that we are indulging in conjecture. But, nevertheless, we believe that to a country like England, disinclined as she is for war, vessels of this description may prove excellent defenders of our shores. Indeed, we do not see at present how the monster Ram, if built as we have described, can take long cruises. Her sailing powers must, we should think, be small. And her thousand tons of coal must soon be devoured by her engines with their voracious appetite of 1,200 horses. We presume, therefore, from our present knowledge of "Rams," that they had better be constructed to "graze" only in our home pastures, for the protection of our own flocks, leaving to the "screw and sail" for the present, the duty of giving a good account of any presumptuous foe that may wish to dispute with us the empire of the seas.

PORTSMOUTH.

A PROFESSIONAL VISIT TO PORTSMOUTH.

I DON'T quite remember where I read it, but I think it must have been in an article on that fiery old Paladin, Napier's "William the Conqueror," that I found a statement to the effect that "none but professed book makers ought to appear in print." A very disagreeable assertion for an amateur to call to mind who has just decided upon doing so, particularly when he finds the said assertion supported by a terrible array of well-sustained arguments and corroborative facts, the dim recollection of which haunt him like a nightmare. But courage! How few sweeping assertions are there that will bear the narrowing test of scrutiny, and how very few general

rules that are not constructed in opposition to a formidable array of exceptional cases. Such a remark may, perhaps, be true with regard to works of fiction, and all descriptions of writing which require an article to be turned out of hand in a style adapted to the taste of the moment, which taste, in books as well as in beards and crinoline, is never constant, but is subject to such perpetual changes and mutations, that the poor author, who wishes to dispose of his wares, must at one moment allow his ideas to flow in all the wild exuberance of nature, and at another, trim and tone them down till they can be compared to nothing but the clipped yew tree conceits with which the retired citizen of former times loved to decorate his suburban retreat; but we cannot allow that the remark is applicable to either the note book of the naturalist, the journal of the traveller, the diary of the minute recorder of every-day events, or in fact to any of those thousand and one cases in which the interest is so absorbed by the subject of the work, that the captious reader is imperceptibly drawn away from indulging in any criticisms on the style of its composition.

It was thus I reasoned with myself a short time since whilst endeavouring to coax an obstinately disposed dressing gown into my portmanteau, and success crowning my efforts, I brought the two parts of my "warranted solid leather" travelling companion, together with a jerk, and taking advantage of the momentary compression occasioned by my violence, turned the key, and exclaimed with a triumphant air—"Yes—I will commit my thoughts to paper, I too will appear in print."

I was on my way home from a short visit to Portsmouth. Before I proceed to give an account of it, I shall briefly inform the reader why I went there.

Not long before, our member, the honorable Marmaduke Fitzhugh, having come down to give an account of his stewardship, as he invariably did whenever there was a cloud in his political horizon in the shape of a threatened dissolution, for we saw but little of him at other times, proceeded, after a few well-turned compliments, which seemed, somehow, to apply to himself rather than to us, to prove in the clearest possible manner, that our army was too small, that our defences were too weak, and that our navy was on its last legs; whilst the French had an army of 400,000 men, a well-organized and rapidly-increasing fleet, and—Cherbourg.

He had been to Cherbourg; and as I have since discovered, for he carefully concealed the fact, suffered dreadfully from sea sickness when crossing the Channel, which narrow portion of Neptune's dominions he could not at the time have been disposed to estimate so lightly as he affected to do on the occasion of his speech, when he drew a graphic picture of the embarkation of the French army, and descanted in glowing terms on the ease with which the passage might be made, and a successful landing effected upon our unprotected shores. He was listened to with breathless attention, and an old naval friend and brother magistrate of mine, who had tried for a ship for many years without success, and who was disposed to regard the infliction of a sound flogging in the shape of "four

dozen," as the grandest panacea for the cure and reformation of offenders ever invented, growled out with a look expressive of intense satisfaction, "Have I not told you all thousands of times, that the service,"—he always spoke of the navy as "the service"—"is going to the devil."

He was right in saying that he had made this assertion thousands of times, for he was seldom weary of repeating it; though as he never attempted to elucidate his ideas on the subject by any particular instances of naval mismanagement apart from his own individual treatment, he had failed to produce any very great impression upon his hearers; but now people began to think that there really was some truth in what he said, though there might be very little in what he meant by it.

Cherbourg became a household word; Chasseurs and Zouaves nightly invaded our peaceful fire-sides; coast defences, manning the navy, and the embodiment of the militia, became the topics which excited the liveliest interest in our home circles, and even our village belles, in silvery accents, gave most decided, though I fear somewhat erroneous opinions, on military operations and naval tactics.

I was not without experience in naval and military matters, but it referred to the past rather than to the present, and I felt that in order to arrive at a just conclusion with respect to the existing order of things, it would be necessary for me to gain a greater insight into them than could be gleaned from private opinions and newspaper reports; I felt, in fact, that my professional knowledge required to be refreshed by personal observation, so I decided upon making a visit of instruction to Portsmouth.

My first recollections of Portsmouth were of a comparatively early date; some years it is true, after Nelson's cypress wreathed victory had swept from the sea the maritime strength of France and Spain, but there still remained plenty of laurels for our hardy tars to gain, and they reaped an abundant harvest of them. The sympathies of the nation were with our sailors, for the remembrance of how they had fought and saved England, was still fresh in men's minds; though with this feeling was intermixed a painful, though carefully concealed consciousness, that the brave men who had so nobly and unsparingly shed their blood for their country, were, whilst being lauded as heroes, often but little better treated than slaves. The army was then the least popular service of the two, for it had only just commenced under Wellington that brilliant career of victory which, culminating at Waterloo, threw for a time the sister service in the shade, and caused it to be treated with unmerited coldness and neglect. The sailors of those days, ever buffetted by the waves, and battling with enemies or storms, were rough, weather-beaten, war-worn looking fellows, with all the peculiar characteristics of their calling most unmistakeably stamped upon them, and the knowledge of the hardships they had undergone, and the dangers they had encountered, gave rise to a feeling of professional pride in both officers and men, which made them look down upon a landsman with a very considerable degree of contempt.

At the time I speak of, a large fleet was at Spithead, the harbour

was filled with refitting and newly-commissioned ships, and the streets swarmed with officers and men clothed in navy blue—not the quietest or most respectable streets in the world I must confess, for there was much both to shock the ear and offend the eye; but in those days profligacy was less concealed than it is at present, when an attempt is made to enshroud it by a veil of decency from the view of the public; and if Jack were somewhat more coarse and open in his conduct than his neighbours, I very much doubt whether he was in reality one whit more dissipated or depraved.

Some years had elapsed when I again visited Portsmouth; in the interval, the last convulsive throes of war had ceased; Napoleon, Prometheus like, chained to the Atlantic rock, loomed in the distance, an awful warning to the age—a living sacrifice to the Moloch of the past. Peace! peace! was in everybody's mouth, and whilst peace once more smiled her soft smile upon the long-suffering world, nations were for a moment dazzled by the purity of her spotless robe, and forgetting to hate, exclaimed we will have no more war! Acting on an impulse of this nature, and urged on when it had ceased to operate by an endeavour to reduce our enormous expenditure within moderate limits, and relieve the overtaxed people from the weight of some of their heaviest burdens, retrenchment became the order of the day, and our naval and military establishments were cut down with an unsparing hand.

What a change for the navy! what a change for Portsmouth! Sailors paid off from their ships and unable to get employment were starving in the streets; with the natural recklessness of men accustomed to regard money as a mere means of obtaining a certain amount of animal gratification, their hardly-earned wages had become quickly squandered in drunken frolics, scattered in very wantonness, or stolen from them by the miserable occupants of the low lodging-houses which they frequented. Some of them had not been allowed leave from their ships for years; they had become brutalised by the life they had been obliged to lead, and were then reproached for being what they were—for being what a long period of imprisonment and toil had made them. This was the condition of a very large proportion of the men; the mass of the officers were not very much better off, but they had their half-pay, and on it many a poor fellow struggled through a dreary life of poverty and disappointment.

Immediately in front of the hotel, in which I found myself once more domiciled, was the dingy-looking house formerly occupied by the Port Admiral, but which has been for some years past the official residence of the Lieut.-Governor. Instead of the groups of naval officers and sailors by which its neighbourhood was once distinguished, and the uninterrupted stream of blue-jacket comers and goers which flowed between it and the classic shores of Sally-port and Point, a solitary sentinel paced up and down, and two or three lounging soldiers at the shabby entrance of an adjoining house, proclaimed to all the world a public office.

Soldiers passed and repassed in quick succession; a tall man in blue with a book, a short one in red, with a rattan cane—a much bewhiskered officer, with clanking sword and jingling spurs, seem-

ingly determined that he should be heard as well as seen; and now, marching with measured tread, two men in green, with a prisoner between them; a hangdog-looking ruffian, yet defiant withal, and pretending to rejoice in the privilege conferred upon him of having his wrists decorated with iron cuffs; not the less food for powder, and, let us charitably hope, a better soldier in the field than in the camp. The scene was novel and amusing, but after a short time, the painful conviction stole upon me that in this, the chief naval arsenal of the empire, I had not as yet seen one solitary specimen of the British sailor. I consoled myself with the idea that I should find them in the Dockyard, and on the Hard, and I decided upon going to the latter place without delay.

I returned from my ramble dispirited and depressed; I had hoped to have seen our gallant tars, if not in crowds, at least in considerable numbers, and exhibiting in their persons that love for neatness for which they have been for so long a period popularly associated; what was my disappointment! a few dirty-looking men, in ill-cared for blue suits of various shapes and patterns, with badly-made, and, but too often greasy, cloth caps, were chatting together in the close vicinity of the different public houses with which the Hard abounds. They were shabby-looking fellows, who took no notice whatever of the military officers who might pass them, and but little more of those who wore the uniform of her Majesty's navy. I felt that I ought not to regard these as favourable, or perhaps even as average specimens of their class, yet I saw but one exception, and that was a well-dressed, respectable-looking seaman, coming out of a grocer's shop with a basket on his arm, who certainly came up to my idea of what a man-of-war's man ought to be, and was, I found, the coxswain of a captain's gig.

Such were the first impressions created by my last visit to Portsmouth, impressions that may have been a little modified, but were most certainly not destroyed by any information subsequent inquiry enabled me to gain. I find that to enter fully into all that I saw and heard is quite out of the question—it would fill a volume of no small size. I must therefore content myself with laying before the reader some few out of the many conclusions which I was led to adopt, as the result of my observations.

I found that the great evils and defects implicated in the existing state of the navy might be traced to two primary causes—prejudice and ignorance; prejudice on the part of the officers and those officially connected with the service, and ignorance—but too often the offspring of indifference—on the part of the public. Remove this prejudice, and many grave blots which now deface our naval system would be erased; injurious customs, originating in the necessities and demoralization of a bygone period, would be no longer tenaciously adhered to; and a rapid process of reform by pruning away the dead and decaying branches, would give renewed life to a trunk which still possesses a vigorous though vitiated vitality. Dispel this ignorance, and the public would no longer labor under the fatal and erroneous belief that a powerful and efficient navy can be created in a day; and that the most effectual mode of rendering the service popular, and of obtaining a sufficient supply of seamen for it in time of

need, is to bribe them with a bounty. If it were not for these two causes is it possible that, even now, with all our confessedly shortcomings and loudly expressed intentions to improve, we should still continue to imagine that, by what is called "continuous service," we have discovered a sufficient and effective substitute for a thoroughly well-organized standing navy; and that we have done wonders, when by dint of the most strenuous exertions, we have managed to secure the services of a certain number of seamen, and have been able to leaven a huge mass of ignorance with a small modicum of that professional knowledge which is called "gunnery"—that gunnery which is considered as a "specialité," when reason, experience, and common sense impress upon us day by day the necessity of making it the foundation upon which we can alone hope to construct a navy that will enable us to retain our maritime supremacy. Do not let me be mistaken: it is absolutely necessary that we should have ships as perfect in construction as it is possible to make them, and it is equally necessary that their crews should be perfectly instructed in their management. But this management is after all nothing more than the means by which we arrive at a certain end—the most advantageous method of employing our ships (whether singly or in combination) as floating batteries. It is perfect madness to reason on this subject from examples of what took place in our former naval wars, when battles were fought yard-arm to yard-arm, and ships poured into each other broadside after broadside of round shot, and when the greatest amount of activity, physical strength and pluck were, all other things being equal, sure to carry the day. Everything has changed: we now fire shells and red-hot shot from guns of formidable calibre, and that ship which is able to put the greatest number of projectiles into the enemy at a long range is pretty certain of reducing him to a state that will ensure an easy victory at close quarters.

A few words on discipline. How difficult, how very difficult it is to establish it on our present plan, where there is no permanent bond of union between either officers or men, we have the concurring testimony of a large body of officers of all ranks to prove; and yet but three things are wanted—to give the service a military organization, and to keep the officers and men together as much as possible; to do away with hulks; and when seamen return from foreign service, or are attached to fitting out ships, to give them a comfortable home, yet with all necessary service restraints, on shore; and to revise and extend the naval code, and in grave cases to let the decision of a court-martial be substituted for that of the captain. It is true that no suggestion relating to naval reform has met with so sweeping and universal condemnation as this one, and if we were to believe all that has been said and written on the subject, we could but arrive at the conclusion, that to take the power of awarding corporal punishment out of the hands of a commander of a ship, is simply equivalent to the destruction of the navy itself; but I fearlessly assert that it must be done, not less for the sake of the officers themselves than for that of the service; and so objectionable does it seem that so terrible a power should be placed in the hands of an individual, that it is hardly to be believed that naval officers can be in earnest when they

profess to advocate the retention of it. Not that I am one of those puling sentimentalists who object to corporal punishment in toto, and who think that they can purify the world by sprinkling its festering corruptions with rose-water. No, discipline must be upheld, misconduct must be punished, and if a man behave like a brute, I for one would not grudge him a brute's punishment. But let us beware how we entrust such a punishment to the fallible judgment of one man; for I do not believe that any man, however conscientious and impartial he may have been, can look back upon his past career without feeling that he has at times been guilty of great and grievous injustice, with respect to the conduct and motives of others, or without finding reason to suspect from his subsequent knowledge, that he has often been led to mistake concealed physical infirmity or mental disquietude for laziness, sullenness, or discontent.

It is not enough that we create a *large* navy for the defence of our shores, we must decide upon rendering it thoroughly efficient at such a cost to the country, as may permit of its being established on a permanent and not a temporary basis, and this we can only do by making the service thoroughly popular. But here we are at once told by the admirers and supporters of the existing state of things, "that there is nothing at the present day which could possibly stand in the way of the popularity of the navy, were we only able to get rid of the idle and unfounded prejudices of the public against it." Granted, for the sake of argument, that it is so, it leads us to the same result. To obtain the required popularity, we have then but to sacrifice the prejudices of the service to those of the people; the prejudices of the few to the prejudices of the many.

The time is fast approaching when Great Britain will have to rely upon the gallant conduct of her sons, for the safety and protection of all that she holds most dear; for let us not imagine that the storm which has burst with such terrible fury, and which has scattered devastation and death over some of the finest portions of Southern Europe, is to pass by and leave us unscathed; there may be intervals in which the violence of the tempest may seem to abate, or in which it may seem to become each moment more and more remote; but come at last it must and will. Do not let it find us unprepared.

Unfortunately, a large share of ridicule but too surely attaches itself to those who come forward to point out a hidden danger, or to predict evil consequences to those who disregard their warning; they are called "alarmists;" they are accused of being afraid. But it often happens that those who are the most disposed to disregard danger when it is distant are the least prepared to confront it when it is near.

It is one of the fashions of the day to speak of the navy as constituting our first line of defence, and to place it upon a certain equality with those military preparations on shore which are supposed to constitute the second line, thus we often find people, aye, and people who ought to know better, speaking with the utmost complacency of our first line being destroyed or broken through, and of the energetic and successful resistance we should still be able

to make. Have these good people ever given themselves the trouble of inquiring what this first line of defence, as they call it, really means, and what results must inevitably happen in the event of its ceasing to exist? I imagine not, or they would not thus deceive themselves and others with the misapplication of terms which they clearly do not understand.

Lines of defence are simply positions successively held, or capable of being held, by a force which is obliged, when acting upon the defensive, to retire from its exterior line of operations, to inner ones of equal or superior strength, until such time as circumstances may permit of its resuming the offensive, and of its advancing either up to or in advance of its original position. Two or more lines of defence may be occupied at the same time, and then when the force which occupied the one in front is driven back upon the one in rear of it, it receives an accession of strength which may for the moment give it a decided superiority over the enemy. But if the first line consists of ships on the sea, and the second of soldiers on the shore, it is very different; for if the first line composed, we will say, of our whole naval force were defeated, retreat would not increase its strength, the "second line" could not advance to its support, and the sea being free, the enemy could select the weakest and most vulnerable points for his attack, and even if repulsed and forced to re-embark, (should he have landed an invading force) would still possess the command of the sea, and the power of dictating his own terms.

It seems to me that whenever Great Britain shall be induced to rest content with a navy that shall not be in every particular equal to the united navies of the civilized world, her enemies may, indeed, exult and expect her fall, for then but too truly her decline will have commenced.

CAMPAIGN OF 1848 IN LOMBARDY.

(Continued from page 357.)

CHAPTER IV.

Repulse of the Austrians at Goito—Counter March of Radetzky on Vicenza—Storming of the Monti Berici—Loss of Rivoli—Pause in the Campaign.

Two great roads lead from the Mincio to Milan, one from Mantua by Cremona along the left bank of the Po and close to that river, the other from Peschiera, by Brescia, at the foot of the last spurs of the Alps. Of the former of these Radetzky was now master, and along it he had as yet advanced, but, having now passed the flank of the Piedmontese army, he prepared, by wheeling to his right, and directing his columns northward into the space lying between the parallel lines of the Mincio and the Oglio, to threaten their right flank and rear, and the northern road by Brescia, their sole remaining line of retreat. To this purpose, on the 30th May, the 1st corps, followed by the 3rd corps in reserve, advanced up the right bank of the Mincio, by Rivalta on Goito, whilst the 2nd corps moved at a distance of

two leagues to their left, by a parallel road, on Beresara, the former was directed against the flank, the latter against the roads in rear, of the king's army. The movements of, and position assumed by, that monarch during Radetzky's advance, reflect the highest credit, both on his generalship and his firmness. When the Austrians arrived at Mantua, he moved in a parallel line along the heights from Somma Campagna to Vallegio on the Mincio. He there interposed between them and Peschiera, and was ready to give them battle should they ascend the left bank of that river. His greatest fault was not withdrawing the Tuscan division; when he heard of its destruction, and of the Austrian advance on the right bank, under cover of the fortress and lake of Mantua, he at once anticipated the movement against his right flank, and transported his right wing and reserve across the river, where they were posted in a strong position, strengthened by entrenchments, on the heights immediately above Goito. Here were concentrated 20,000 men, and 54 guns, under General Bava, the most trusted and the most skilful of his commanders. Meanwhile, not the slightest intermission took place in the siege of Peschiera, not a man nor a gun was withdrawn. But he held the whole remainder of his army concentrated *à cheval* on the Mincio, on the summit of the bright broken table land which extends on both banks of that river from the Guarda lake to Goito, and across from Castiglione to Somma Campagna. Radetzky now held possession of one of the roads to Milan, and was nearer that capital than he was, but he justly concluded that he would never venture to advance on it, leaving his army in rear, nor did he dread his moving along his rear on the other road by Brescia (his sole line of communication), for to do so Radetzky must have laid open his own communication with Mantua. The only remaining course was to assail his right, and that, trusting to his strong position on the high grounds above Goito, he did not fear. He was there prepared to take his stand and fight a general battle, assured, as long as he held his position, Milan was safe, in spite of the panic and confusion that spread through the rear to the gates of that city.

It was 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 30th, when Benedeck, with the leading brigade of Wratislaw's corps, came unexpectedly upon the Piedmontese in position at Goito. They were received by a severe and well-sustained fire of artillery, which silenced the only guns they had at hand. Whilst Benedeck was arranging his men beneath this shower of grape, Wohlgemuth and Strassoldo moved their respective brigades as they came up to his left, and endeavoured to prolong his line in that direction, so as to be able to attack Bava's right, but the road along which they moved were deep lanes, shut in by high enclosures and vineyards on each side, amongst which the Piedmontese riflemen (the Bessagliari) were strongly posted, and kept up a fire which told with fatal effect on their dense masses. When they had forced they way through, the heads of the columns became exposed to a tremendous discharge from the batteries on the heights, and were assailed by the royal guards, the very flower of the Sardinian army. Against such an overwhelming superiority both of men and metal, Wohlgemuth and Strassoldo could effect nothing, the

head of every formation was swept away, and all attempts to extend the line by debouching to the left failed. Meanwhile, on the high road, Benedeck was unable to maintain his ground beneath the superior fire of the Sardinian artillery, and so alarming did the loss in his ranks become, that not only was he obliged to draw back his men out of range, but Clam had to hasten with his brigade, the only remaining one of the corps, to his support, to prevent the advance of the Piedmontese. The position of the Austrians was now discouraging. The whole of the first corps was engaged, and could with difficulty hold its ground; the third corps was several hours march distant in the rear, and Aspré's corps was two leagues off on the left; no decisive success could be looked for that day. In truth, this engagement was brought on without Radetzky's consent. The advanced guard came suddenly on the enemy's position, and the soldiers, inflamed with previous success, engaged at once. In that difficult country it was impossible to withdraw them without severe loss, and the nearest troops were brought up to enable them to keep their ground till nightfall. Accordingly the action continued till darkness came on, when Wratislaw drew off his corps and retired half a league from the field of battle. This action, though unsuccessful, was creditable to the Austrians, for with only 13,000 men, they held their ground for six hours in the face of 20,000. Their loss consisted of 22 officers and 561 men killed, wounded, and missing; that of the Piedmontese was 7 officers and 325 men.

When Radetzky set out for Mantua, he, expecting that the main body of the Piedmontese would be moved to the right bank of the Mincio, left orders for an attempt to relieve the fortress from the side of Rivoli to be made. In compliance with these orders, Colonel Zobel led his brigade on the 28th down from Rivoli on Bardolino, on the Guarda lake, which he stormed, and from whence he pushed on the next day towards Peschiera, but further than this he could make no progress; the Piedmontese strongly posted on the heights which commanded the road, repulsed all his efforts, and he was obliged to fall back at night with a loss of 6 officers and 70 men *hors de combat*. The failure of this attack could be plainly discerned from the ramparts of Peschiera. On the western shore of the Guarda lake some skirmishes took place between some Lombard battalions and a few companies of Austrian regulars and Tyrolese militia, which ended in the defeat of the former at the castle of Lodron and their retreat out of the Tyrol. The period had now arrived when Peschiera could hold out no longer; the garrison had for long subsisted on horse flesh and pounded maize, but even this wretched food was almost exhausted, many of the guns were dismounted and 40,000 cannon shot had been discharged at the defences. Worn out with fatigue and want of food, they were no longer able to carry on the duties of the siege. On the 29th an armistice for 24 hours was obtained, but on the evening of the 30th, when it had expired, accounts of the defeat of the relieving army at Goito arrived. This took away their last hope, and the next day the fortress surrendered, and the Piedmontese standard was hoisted on its ramparts. The garrison obtained favourable terms; on condition of

their not serving against the Italians, they were to be allowed to march to Ancona, where their arms were to be forwarded after them.

During the 31st of May and the 1st of June, a heavy rain fell incessantly, which, rendering the roads impassable for artillery, had interrupted hostilities. On the 2nd, Radetzky, who was at Rivalta heard of the fall of Peschiera. One great object of his movement had therefore failed, and the result of the action at Goito, convinced him that Charles Albert, fully appreciating the strength, both as a battle ground and as a strategetical point of his position, was determined to maintain it, so that no mere menace of moving on his rear and communications would move him. It remained to be considered therefore, whether he would engage in a general action. Were he successful, the most brilliant prospect lay before him, for he lay between the Sardinians and their own country, his men could fight with their backs to Milan, his enemy with their faces to it: and if defeated, they would be driven back on the shores of the Guarda lake, the rugged country at the foot of the Alps, and the hostile entrenchments of Verona. The Caudine forks lay before them. His army held much the same position as that of Napoleon in 1805, before Ulm, and in 1806 before Jena. But his success was doubtful, the Sardinian army was stronger than his, every engagement had shown that, in position particularly, they would fight both well and stoutly, and their position on the heights of Volta (where their main body was concentrated after the action at Goito) was extremely strong, and could not in any event be forced without an enormous loss. On the other hand, if defeated, his own situation would be most critical, for he would have to lead back a dispirited and shattered army by a long circuit to Verona, and before he could reach it, Rivoli certainly, and Verona probably, would have fallen. Charles Albert lay directly between him and Rivoli, and whilst he was toiling round the circumference by Mantua, he could throw the bulk of his forces by its diameter on that post and Verona, now isolated from all support. Were these lost he would be exactly in the same position as Wurmser after the battles of Lonato and Castiglione. The glacis by Mantua might again witness the surrender of an Austrian marshal. Other and paramount considerations to these were there, to husband his strength. He had just received intelligence of the revolt of Vienna; the Austrian empire seemed on the verge of dissolution; Bohemia was almost in open revolt, the capital was lost; Hungary had practically declared herself independent by the appointment of a war minister; the Emperor was a fugitive in the Tyrol, there and in Croatia alone had the feeling of loyalty as yet burst forth. The army which he now commanded might be the sole prop of a falling empire. It was necessary at all hazards, to preserve it entire and in communication with the Imperial dominions—it was now doubtful whether its presence was most necessary beneath the walls of Verona or Milan.

Influenced by these considerations, he determined to prefer the cautious to the brilliant course, and retire to his central fortified position at Verona. But his was to be no ordinary retreat; it was to be one of the most brilliant instances of the defensive offensive in

the military art; it was to be a movement which should place him alongside of the great warriors of every age and country, of Nero, the consul, of Wellington, the general, of Napoleon, the emperor. His plan was to retire first to Mantua, but from thence, instead of by the right bank of the Adige on Verona, to move by forced marches on Legnago, cross the river there, press on to Vicenza, carry that town by assault at whatever cost of blood, garrison it, and return instantly to Verona. By the capture of Vicenza he would gain three objects, each and all of them of the most vital importance to the fate of their struggle. 1. He would open a new and secure communication with the Tyrol. 2. He would reopen his communications with Carinthia, Carniola, Croatia, and the reserves collecting in Friuli. 3. He would gain, for the subsistence of his army, the command of the resources of the greater part of the Venetian main land, and the whole country between the Alps and the Po in his rear. To the reader who bears in mind the movements of the army of reserve previous to its junction with the main army, the two last of these propositions will be self evident. The first requires some explanation; since the occupation of Northern Italy by the Austrians, they have constructed a fine military road from Vicenza up the valley of Schio, across the summit level, and down that of Arsa to Roveredo in the Italian Tyrol. Vicenza once taken, therefore, a new communication, and a far safer one than that by Rivoli, was secured, for the latter was parallel to, and a direct prolongation of the right flank of, the position at Verona, and was consequently exposed to attack at any moment, but the former led, for a day's march, directly to the rear of, or perpendicular to it, and was then conducted behind the screen of an impenetrable mass of mountains into the heart of the Tyrol. From the moment Vicenza fell, Rivoli became of no importance. It even became a lure to distract the attention of the enemy, for it was more than probable that he would take advantage of his interior line to attack it with an overwhelming force in preference to assailing the army in its decisive movement. To give every encouragement and facility to this false view, Radetzky, far from increasing the garrison of that post, hitherto so vital, had left merely one brigade, under Colonel Zobel, in it. The greatest danger was that the king, penetrating his plan, would attack his army in flank on its march from Mantua to the Mincio, or would take advantage of its absence, some marches to the rear at Vicenza, either to storm with his whole force the entrenched camp at Verona, or, by crossing the river, turn it, and interpose between it and the main body. Everything, therefore, depended upon secresy in the design and celerity in the execution. The movement was the same in principle, equally difficult in execution, and as decisive in its results as that of Nero from Apulia to the banks of the Metaurus, in the year 207 B.C., or that of Napoleon from the valley of the Seine to that of the Maine in 1814.

On the 3rd, the movement commenced by the retreat of the army to Mantua. The next day they halted there, but on the 5th, after reinforcing the garrison with a brigade, they set out along two parallel roads by forced marches for the Adige. Wratislaw's corps

slept that night at Bovolone, Aspré's at Sanguinetto, Wocher's in the rear at Nogara. On the 5th, marching with the utmost expedition Aspré and Wratislaw passed the Adige at Legnago, whilst Wocher with the infantry of his (the reserve) corps wheeled to his left, and moved up the right bank of the river on Verona. On the 6th, Radetzky reached with the two corps under his immediate command, Montagnana and Bevilacqua on the high road to Padua, and there he halted his wearied men for a day. Meanwhile, the Piedmontese army moved slowly; early on the 5th their advance reached Curtalone. Charles Albert appears not in the least to have penetrated his adversary's design, for he kept the bulk of his forces on his own right, apparently fearing a renewed attack on the Milan road, instead of taking advantage of his interior line to throw them from the Villafranca side, on the flank of the Austrian columns. So completely was he deceived, that on the 6th, when the main body of Radetzky's army was across the Adige, he mistook Wocher's weak corps moving on Verona for his whole force, and allowed them to march unmolested to that town, when they were totally unsupported, with the Adige on their one flank, and his whole army on the other, and might have been enveloped and cut off to a man. It was a similar opportunity lost as Marmont's before the heights of Guinaldo. Like Wellington's, Radetzky's star was bright. On the 8th, Radetzky wheeled his columns sharp to their left, and leaving the high road to Padua, threw himself on the cross roads which lead to Vicenza; that night he halted at Ponte Barbarano, and the next day his wearied soldiers toiling on beneath the burning Italian sun beheld the steeples of Vicenza, ere they lay down to rest, while a party detached to the right had cut the bridge at Arlesaga on the railway line to Padua.

Vicenza is situated at the foot of the northern slopes of the Monte Berici. These are a group of hills about three leagues and a half in length by one and a half in breadth, which rise suddenly from the lovely plain which surrounds the town. Their declivities are richly cultivated in numerous terraces, their summits and ravines densely wooded. Many villas and villages are scattered over their sides, and the roads which ascend them are narrow, steep, and stony. On their highest point, overhanging Vicenza, is perched the church and convent of Madonna del Monte, connected with the town by a long colonnade. Two redoubts, mounted with heavy guns, protected the ridge by which you approach it from the south. To its left, lower, down the hill, the villa Rotonda was strongly fortified. In front of the ridge, leading to the convent of the Madonna, as you approach from the south, rises a lofty peaked eminence, called the Bella Vista, on it a blockhouse had been constructed. On lower spurs of the mountain stand Santa Margherita and the villa Ramboldo; the latter, surrounded by a lawn of green turf, scattered over with flowering shrubs, artificial ruins, and winding ponds, is almost concealed by the groves of pines and ilexes which surround it. This strong position, which entirely commands the town, was occupied in force by Durando, with his division of Papal troops, reinforced with volunteers, the whole amounting to about 15,000 men, with 38 guns; but

four Swiss battalions, 3,000 strong, were the only ones who could be perfectly relied on. With two of these and 6,000 volunteers he held the Monte Berici. Two Papal battalions were on their left; the two remaining Swiss battalions and the cavalry in reserve. The remainder of the volunteers and national guards manned the gates and barricades of the town, with a few Swiss at the important points.

While Radetzky was passing round the south-eastern extremity of the Monte Berici, and gaining possession of the roads leading to Padua and Este, a division under General Culoz, 5,000 strong, was, by his orders, approaching it from Verona. Turning off from the main road at Montebello, it struck across to its right by Brendola, over the southern spurs of the Monte Berici, and on the evening of the 9th lay at Arcugnano, in communication with the Field Marshal's left. The arrangements for the attack on the following morning were immediately made. Culoz's division, reinforced by some battalions, was to advance on the left along the heights of Arcugnano by the peak of Bella Vista, against the fortified ridge leading to the Madonna del Monte; Wratislaw's corps, which lay in the centre at Longara and Debba, with its outposts at Croce, was to advance up the right bank of the Bacchiglione, along the Este road, against the eastern slopes of the Monte Berici and the villa Rotonda, detaching Wohlgemuth's brigade to the other side of the river, to keep open the communication with Aspré's corps, which was at Torre Quartesolo on the Padua road, and was to move on the right along it against the eastern suburb of Vicenza. Durando, cut off by Radetzky from both his lines of retreat on Padua and Este, had no resource if defeated but to surrender, or throw himself into the inhospitable Venetian mountains. The attack was fixed to commence at 10 o'clock on the morning of the 10th.

During the night Culoz sent Colonel Hahne with a battalion to gain possession of some points which would impede the march of his division. At daybreak he stormed Santa Margherita and the villa Ramboldo. The garrisons from these two posts fell back on the block-house on the Bella Vista peak. Hahne immediately opened a fire of grape and rockets upon this point, which caused such confusion in the overcrowded redoubt, that he took advantage of it to push on two companies, who carried it with a rush. It was immediately set on fire, and the dense volumes of black smoke rising from its isolated summit, conveyed across the broad plains to Padua the first announcement of the danger of Vicenza. At ten o'clock the Austrian army stood to arms, and its columns forming a vast semi-circle, began their advance. Radetzky took post on a height in the centre, from which he could direct all the movements. He held back his left until the advance of his centre and right, who had to make a protracted sweep round to their left, was completed. By two o'clock all had gained their places, and the fight began. On the left Culoz, bringing all his batteries to the front, and throwing forward a chain of riflemen, opened a vigorous fire, whilst he formed his main body in columns of attack behind the Bella Vista peak, where they were unseen by his adversaries. In the centre Wratislaw pushed Clam's brigade vigorously forward up the eastern slopes of the Monte

Berici against the villa Rotonda, supporting him by Strassoldo, and covering his right over the river by Wohlgemuth. For about two hours the fire continued with great energy, and no decided result on either side. At last, by showers of grape, and volleys of rockets, Clam succeeded in getting under the batteries of the villa Rotonda. He immediately led on his men to the assault, and soon was in possession of this important point, which took in flank the position of the Madonna del Monte. Wohlgemuth, now bringing up his right shoulder, came over to Clam's support, and both united, prepared to assail the Madonna convent in flank.

Meanwhile, in front of that position, the Swiss, galled by the fire of artillery, and seeing no masses of troops before them, made a bold sally along the ridge against the Bella Vista. Culoz allowed them to approach within fifty paces of his guns, when he mowed them down with a discharge of grape, and assailed them, when thrown into disorder by it, with a rifle battalion, supported by two others brought up in haste from behind the Bella Vista. Completely taken by surprise at this vigorous counter attack, the Swiss were driven back along the ridge. The Austrian Jagers following them close, came upon an entrenchment, the guns of which could not fire as the Swiss were between them and their opponents, and both entered it together. Here, Colonel Kopal, the gallant commander of the Jagers, fell, shot through the arm, as he mounted the parapet; he died of his wound the next day. The key of the position, the Madonna del Monte, still remained, and against it Culoz brought up his columns; while Clam and Wohlgemuth, fresh from the storming of the Rotonda, prepared to assail it in flank. But Durando saw that to prolong the defence would endanger the retreat of its garrison, and gave orders for them to withdraw down the colonnade into the town. The brave Swiss obeyed with loud murmurs, and fell back slowly, frequently facing about. Under the arcade they made another vigorous stand, but the advance of Clam against their flank obliged them again to retire, and they withdrew into the town, keeping up a rolling fire to the last.

Meanwhile, far on the right, across the Bacchiglione, Aspré had a sharp battle to maintain. There, so magnificent were the crops, so luxuriant the vineyards and hedgerows, that in that level country, the artillerymen could see to take no aim, so the only aid to be derived from the guns was by the vertical fire of the howitzers and four mortars, which were brought up to within 500 yards of the defences. The fortified suburbs called those of Padua and Santa Lucia lay in his front, they were defended by earthworks, flanked by loopholed houses, and in most places covered by a deep wet ditch, and, though attacked with the utmost gallantry, proved impenetrable; in vain the gallant Hungarian Grenadiers of Franz Karl and the 8th rifle battalion marched forward with the bayonet, the works could not be scaled, the ditch could not be passed, they withered away beneath the deadly fire of the Swiss and Italians. Towards evening the troops on this side were drawn off, for by the fall of the Monte Berici, that of the place was ensured, and to continue it after *that* would have been a mere waste of gallant blood. It was evening

before the last spurs of the Monte Berici were won, and Radetzky ordered the advance of his troops to be stopped, intending to bring up his guns to the heights commanding the town, and storm it the next day. Several times during the evening the white flag had been displayed, but it was always immediately torn down by the Swiss. At midnight, however, a flag of truce arrived at Radetzky's head-quarters from Durando to treat of a surrender. The terms were soon agreed to, for it was everything to the Field-Marshal to obtain instant possession of the place and get back to Verona. The conditions were, that the Papal troops should evacuate the town, taking with them their colours and arms, and retire by Este, to the right bank of the Po, on condition of not serving against the imperialists for three months. The inhabitants were not to be molested. The town to be given up by midday on the 11th. These conditions were all punctually fulfilled. The Austrian loss in this action amounted to 49 officers and 935 men killed, wounded, and missing. Among the former was Major General Prince William Taxis, and the Colonel of the Franz Karl regiment. The loss of the Italians was probably less, for not only the volunteer, but the regular Papal line troops fled at the first shock, many of them in an agony of fear concealing themselves in the cellars of the houses, like old women in a thunder storm. The Swiss, who alone fought the battle, out of their 3,000, lost 14 officers and 600 men. The very evening of the surrender the Culoz division set out on its return to Verona. On the morning of the 12th the Field-Marshal followed with Wratislaw's corps. Aspré was left with his in the town to secure that important post, and reopen communications with the Tyrol by Roveredo on the one hand, and with the troops assembling in Friuli by Belluno on the other. Wearied and exhausted on the evening of the 12th, Culoz's men reached Verona, and on the 13th Wratislaw's came in, but for them there was no rest, the columns of Charles Albert were approaching on the plain, and foot-sore and travel-worn, yet in high spirits from their recent victory, they had again to take the field.

To understand the cause of this, we must now return to Charles Albert's operations. As soon as he learned Radetzky's passage of the Adige at Legnago, he determined to take advantage of his absence from Verona, to throw the bulk of his forces on his own left against the plateau to Rivoli, and by concentrating an overwhelming force upon that vital point to seize the Austrian line of communications. In pursuance of this plan, he marched with all his disposable force to the left, and there united 20,000 men, whom he placed under the orders of Lieutenant General de Sonnaz. Upon the crags of Rivoli, Radetzky, who clearly foresaw this movement, had left only the brigade of Colonel Zobel, and he had directed that officer not to resist a serious attack, but in order to cause as long a delay as possible to the bulk of the Sardinian forces, to retain his position to the last moment with all his outposts, and as soon as the attack was fairly begun, to withdraw rapidly across the Adige to Verona. These instructions were admirably executed by that intelligent officer. On the 10th of June, (the very day of the

storming of Vicenza) the whole Piedmontese left wing advanced to the attack of the diminutive Austrian force, and their numerous columns crossing the Tassio rivulet, began in all directions to ascend the heights of Montebaldo and Rivoli; then, and not till then, the Austrian outposts swiftly fell back at all points, and artificial obstacles on the different roads and paths retarded the advance of their pursuers so much, that they were all enabled to reach the general point of concentration on the plateau Rivoli, from whence the whole rapidly, yet in good order, retired, and crossing to the left bank of the river, gained, unmolested, the road to Roveredo. When the Piedmontese heavy guns and columns gained the summit of the position, Zobel's men were gone. In the highest spirits with this success, batteries were planted and breastworks for musketry thrown up on the heights on the right of the river, which completely swept and commanded the high road on the opposite side. Henceforth, not an Austrian convoy, not a company, could pass to or from the Tyrol; the most decisive success seemed to have been gained; joy was at its height in the army of the King; the whole Italian papers resounded with shouts of victory, and the immediate surrender of the Austrians was confidently predicted; yet that day Vicenza fell. Sharp and eager were the blows struck on both sides, each party aimed at a vital point; the Sardinians' stroke was good, but the old man's sword cut deeper. The great results just gained by the King were reft from his grasp on the same day and at the same hour. The fruits of the occupation of Rivoli perished, when the white flag was hung out from the walls of Vicenza.

It was shortly after this success that Charles Albert received intelligence of the movement of Radetzky on Vicenza, and the commencement of the attack on that town. He immediately perceived the full consequences which would flow from its loss, but, relying on Durando's assurance that he could hold it against any force for five or six days, he believed that he would yet be in time to prevent its fall, and he immediately determined to cross the Adige at Ronco, below Verona, with the bulk of his forces, and throwing himself upon the road from that town to Vicenza, cut off the Field-Marshal from his entrenched camp, force his way through and unite with Durando. This plan was ably conceived, but it came too late. Formed some days sooner it might have led to a second battle amidst the marshes of Arcola. On the 13th Charles Albert having concentrated his whole forces about Villafranca, with a large pontoon train, set out, and his columns were in full march for Ronco, when the astounding intelligence reached him that Vicenza had fallen, whilst the vigor with which the Austrian outposts on the side of Santa Lucia resisted his flanking parties, and the sudden increase of the force they displayed there, announced in unmistakeable language, that the bulk of their forces must have regained Verona. Then with a heavy heart he gave up his movement, which had become at once dangerous to the last degree in execution, and useless, if executed, and withdrew his battalions to their old fortified positions on the heights of Sona and Somma Campagna, and the *neighbourhood* of Villafranca. This movement was the cause of

the sudden advance of Radetsky's wearied men from Verona, already mentioned.

The capture of Vicenza opened to Radetzky the resources of the Venetian mainland, and to the operations which were carrying on there we must now turn. During the whole of May, after the junction of the army of reserve, the forces left behind by it were so weak, that it was all they could do to hold what they had got, to blockade Osopo, and Palma Nuova, and observe Treviso; but they were unable either to attempt the reduction of the country south of the latter town, or that of the insurgent mountain districts at the foot of the Alps. There, the inhabitants being all of Italian descent, and having many causes of jealousy at the immigration of the Germanic races, by which many of them had lost their employment, had joined eagerly in the democratic movement. One circumstance operated prejudicially to the Austrians in this quarter, which was their having lost by the revolt of Venice the command of the Adriatic. The greater part of their small marine had there fallen into the power of the insurgents, who, being soon joined by a strong Sardinian squadron, and for some time by a Neapolitan one, not only swept the seas, so as entirely to prevent any supplies being conveyed coastways to the Austrian forces, but blockaded their only secure port of Pola. This, by depriving them altogether of water carriage, added much to their difficulties, so that it was nearly the end of May before Lieut-General Welden, to whom the formation of the new reserve corps had been entrusted, could collect either a force or supplies sufficient to advance. At last, however, he collected sixteen battalions, four squadrons, and eight batteries. The entire portion of these, consisting of such as could be spared from the blockades above mentioned, he assembled on the Piave. His instructions were to bombard Palma Nuova, take Treviso, reduce the revolted mountain districts, and blockade Venice from the land side. To perform the first, he had only one mortar at disposal, but he left it with 2,500 men under Colonel Kerpen, who conducted the blockade and bombardment with such skill and success, that on the 29th of June it surrendered, with its garrison of 3,000 men, and with 156 guns on its ramparts, commanded by General Zucchi. The terms were the return of the volunteers to their homes, and of the Piedmontese soldiers to their own country, but not to serve for a year. Meanwhile, Welden was engaged in the early part of June in reducing the mountain districts. For this purpose, he directed two columns to advance against them, the one on Ampezzo, the other from Belluno. Both were entirely successful, and after carrying the principal positions, re-opened the communication between Carinthia and Belluno, and completely subdued the district. With the remainder of his forces, Welden had moved upon Treviso, and detached one moveable column towards Bassano, while another moved on Marostica, in order to force the passage of the Val Sugana, and open the communication between Trent and Bassano. The insurgents were here strongly posted in a narrow gorge, and resisted the attacks of the Austrians; but in the night, some companies having been sent, along with a body of Tyrolese militia, to

occupy the heights in their rear, they were attacked on the following day both in front and rear, and after an engagement of three hours, dispersed with the loss of four guns. This success re-established the communication between Bassano and Trent by the Val Sugana, so important in the campaign of 1796. On the 13th, Welden in person reached Treviso, and began to bombard it. The following day it surrendered, the garrison, 4,185 strong, receiving the same conditions as that of Vicenza. This speedy surrender was mainly owing to the panic spread by the fall of the latter place, so great was the consternation, that resistance now almost ceased. Welden moved from Treviso in the direction of Venice, and by the occupation of Mestre, Bodenigo, and Malcontesta, in a semicircle on the edge of the Lagunae, and of Cavanella on the Adige, had by the 25th established an entire blockade of those towns on the land side; and he made good all his posts in spite of repeated sallies from the garrison, who numbered 20,000 men, and were commanded by Generals Pepé and Antonini.

Nor was Aspré less successful in reducing the country around Vicenza. It was an object of the utmost importance, after the fall of Rivoli, to open the road from that town to Roveredo by the vallies of Schio and Arsa, and restore Radetzky's communication by this line with his right wing in the Tyrol. So early as the 7th of June, an attempt was made to open this pass from the Tyrolese side, but the troops employed, after having overcome all obstacles in the Arsa valley, and gained the crest of the ridge, finding that no support had come up from the Italian side, as they had been led to expect, and that the insurgents were closing in on their flanks and rear, retired. To effect this important object, Aspré now detached General Simbschen with a very strong brigade. He ascended the valley of Schio from the Vicenza side, occupied the town of that name on the 12th, disarmed its inhabitants, forced the passage into the Val d'Arsa, and on the 15th reached Roveredo, thus re-establishing Radetzky's communications, and reinforcing at the same time his right wing; for he was ordered temporarily to unite his brigade to the forces in the Tyrol, under Count Thurn's command, which were now formed into a separate corps (the 3rd). Simbschen did not arrive a moment too soon, for Zobel's men had been attacked at Brentino, in the valley of the Upper Adige, and driven back on Avio. Aspré himself on the 13th, moved in person from Vicenza, with another of his brigades, on Padua, which surrendered, without attempting any resistance, on the following day. Thus was effected mainly in consequence of the consternation caused by the fall of Vicenza, the reduction (with the exception of a few blockaded towns) of the whole of the Venetian mainland. The entire resources of that great and important province were now transferred from the support of the Italian to that of the Austrian cause.

After the return of Radetzky to Verona, upon the 13th June, for nearly a month a pause ensued in military operations between the main bodies of the contending armies. This period was marked by nothing but a few insignificant skirmishes between the outposts in front of Verona, and in the rugged country between the bridge of

Guarda and the Adige. The rival armies were too well matched in numbers, and occupied too strong positions, to afford to either an opportunity of engaging with advantage. The attention of each, therefore, became necessarily directed to the progress of events in the rear—to establishing and securing their lines of communication—to bringing up supplies and reinforcements, and preparing their respective armies to take the field for the decisive conflict which was evidently approaching, strengthened with every man and every gun that could be collected. By Radetzky it was spent in carrying on the operations which ended in the entire conquest of the Venetian mainland in his rear, which has just been described—in strengthening to the utmost degree his entrenched camp in front of Verona, at which the whole army laboured, and where, by the successive erection of redoubts and other works, lines were soon formed, almost rivalling the celebrated ones of Torres Vedras in strength and importance, and in strengthening the fortified post of Riva at the upper end of the Lake of Guarda, and establishing upon that inland sea a flotilla, which soon amounted to four large and twelve small gun boats. By Charles Albert, this period of inaction was mostly occupied in making arrangements for the blockade and siege of Mantua, and restoring the defences of Peschiera, and in urging on, by all the means in his power, the raising and forwarding of reinforcements. This, the second pause in the campaign, the interlude between the second and the last act in the drama, we may take advantage of, to cast our eyes over the comparative results of the operations described in the last chapter to the two armies, and then glance at the aspect of political affairs, which now came to exercise a great and decisive influence upon the fate of the campaign and the views of the commanders.

Radetzky began the second period of the campaign with an army not producing 30,000 combatants in the field, occupying an entrenched camp at Verona, with only one exposed and dangerous line of communication, leading from his right flank into the Tyrol, and with no ground in his rear which he could call his own, except the small triangle formed by the Adige, the Aplon, and the Alps; but he held in advance of his position, Mantua and Peschiera. The whole Venetian mainland, up to the town of Vicenza directly in his rear, with all its resources, was at the disposal of his adversaries, and the line of the lower Adige was in their possession, with the exception of the fortress of Legnago. He ended it with 40,000 men ready for action round the ramparts of Verona, with secure communications leading from his rear by Vicenza, to Roveredo, in the Tyrol on the one hand, and through Carinthia and Carniola to Vienna and Croatia on the other. The whole of eastern Italy, from the banks of the Po to the Alps, from the shores of the Adriatic to the Adige, was in his possession, with all its manifold resources for the maintenance of his army; the strong line of the Adige, from the mountains of the Tyrol to the sea, was guarded by his troops, strong reinforcements were on their way to join him from the Imperial states, and 12,000 men, disengaged by the subjection of the Italian territory in his rear, were preparing to advance to his support. On the other

hand, Peschiera had fallen into the hands of his adversaries, and his more direct communication with the Tyrol by Rivoli was lost. Charles Albert's position, on the other hand, was also changed for the better. True, Peschiera had fallen; true, Rivoli was won; true, the Austrian army had retired baffled from the heights of Goito; true, he still maintained his numerical superiority in the field, yet Rivoli and the states of Venice were lost, the Papal troops and insurgent levies hurled with disgrace across the Po, the co-operation of the Neapolitan large auxiliary force hopeless, there was little energy and activity displayed by the Milanese and other Italian states in his rear and on his right, in providing either troops or money for the contest, and he was driven to rely almost entirely on his own kingdom for the means, both in men and specie, of contending for the freedom of Italy. These, indeed, were largely put forth, and great numbers of good troops were hurrying up from his depôts, but they were the last that could be relied on—behind them there was nothing. He was staking his last man and his last guinea on the throw. His adversary instead of being almost surrounded and cut off in his entrenched camp, was now in complete possession of the most formidable military line of defence in Italy, with all his communications with the Imperial states restored, with the resources of a rich province gained, and with large reinforcements coming up. The beam which in May had trembled in the balance, or rather seemed to turn against the Austrians, by the end of June had inclined the other way. To every impartial observer, it was evident that the object of the contest had changed. To Austria the struggle was no longer defensive, it was offensive. Charles Albert's object now was not to win the crown of Italy, but to maintain his position on the banks of the Mincio. Radetzky having proved his skill in defensive, was now to display his power in offensive war, and how he did so, let the events of the next month tell.

About the middle of June the first decided check was received by the hitherto triumphant revolutionary party in Austria, in the bombardment of Prague by Prince Windischgratz, and the consequent dissolution of the democratic party in, and submission of, Bohemia. This was the first successful stand made against the democratic party on the continent, the first dawn of the reaction which was now setting in. Its influence was immediately felt in Italy, as it enabled the war minister, Count Latour, at Vienna, to forward great reinforcements across the Alps. The Austrian empire was still in a state of the greatest danger and weakness, but symptoms of improvement were visible. Hungary, indeed, was with a matchless inconsistency declaring at once its own independence of Austrian rule, and its complete and unlimited dominion over Croatia; but this had led to a violent reaction, and Jellachich was preparing to assert in arms that independence of the Slavonic race towards the Magyar which the latter claimed for themselves from the House of Hapsburg. Vienna, indeed, was still in a state of smouldering insurrection, but Bohemia was subdued, the Tyrol enthusiastic in the Imperial cause, and all the force of united Italy had failed to drive Radetzky from its plains. The first wave of the revolutionary tempest had rolled

over the land, and the rocks were again beginning to appear amidst the subsiding waters.

Of still more importance was the terrible contest and great victory gained by Cavaignac in the streets of Paris at the end of the month. That victory saved France from a second reign of terror, Europe from a second revolutionary war. For four days the streets of Paris ran red with blood; ten thousand men were killed or wounded in the struggle, but the victory was complete; the red republic was vanquished. The revolutionary party had thrown off the mask, engaged in a fierce fight, and been subdued. The ultimate resurrection of Europe was secure. Its immediate escape from a war of propagandism certain. Great was the encouragement which this afforded to Radetzky, for he could now depend upon the non-intervention of France in the struggle. Hitherto the army of the Alps under Oudinot, had hung like a thunder cloud over the frontier of Italy, and there was every reason to fear that on the first serious check of the Sardinian arms, they would pour down once more into the Italian plains, and unite with their fellow revolutionists. Then the fight would have been too unequal, then the Austrian eagle must have taken wing for its mountain home. Now that danger was past and Radetzky could look to Charles Albert alone, without being obliged to cast a far distant gaze beyond the summits of the Alps.

THE ADMIRALTY—OLD AND NEW.

Another of those changes which convulse the naval service at uncertain, but too frequent, intervals, has just taken effect. The seats at the Board of Admiralty have been vacated and refilled by, with one exception, a new set of men. The First Lord, who had just awakened to the full consciousness of the great necessity for a sweeping change in the whole of the arrangements of the navy, and who had discovered that instead of being assisted he was thwarted by the board over which he presided, was about to take a strong course, when it pleased Parliament to place Lord Derby's government in a minority, and all his plans were forthwith committed to the waste paper basket.

We never remember a change so generally accompanied by regret as that which removed Sir John Pakington from Whitehall. Sir John entered the Admiralty a perfect neophyte. Many sneered at him as a country gentleman — "the chairman of the Worcester Quarter Sessions." They remembered, indeed, that under the previous Derby administration he had been Secretary of the Colonies, and knew that he represented the small and unimportant borough of Droitwich. His antecedents inspired no hopes. He had not been long in office, however, before he displayed independence, energy, and talent in an extraordinary degree. He took up the estimates carefully prepared by and for Sir Charles Wood, and by dint of much study gained a large insight into the contents. He would have done better, many thought, had he taken them as they stood; for although

formed on too economical a basis, they had been ably drawn. Sir John undertook to strike off certain items of expenditure, which he afterwards saw cause to regret. By degrees he became acquainted with the state of the navy, although it was a long time before he had gathered information enough to induce him to recommend the introduction of the startling phrase into the Queen's Speech from the throne—the "reconstruction of the navy."

The immediate cause of his employing towards the navy the sweeping word "reconstruction" may be gathered from a perusal of the Report of a Committee appointed in December last by the Treasury, to inquire into the navy estimates from 1852 to 1858, and into the comparative state of the navies of England and France. This report was ordered to be printed on the 12th April. It served to show the grounds upon which Sir John Pakington had based his alarmist speech on the navy estimates, and was a sufficient answer to those who asserted that the First Lord had no foundation for his statements. This Report has already been reviewed in the *United Service Magazine*, and it is therefore unnecessary even to glance at the contents of that paper. The only objection that could be offered to the entire reception of the facts and figures embodied in the Report, is to be found in the names of the gentlemen forming the Committee. They were civilians, and nothing more, and although perfectly competent to certify as to the expenditure of the sums voted for the estimates, it was clear that they were in entire ignorance as to the relative degrees of force and capability of the French and English navies, and that chance directed them, if they were directed, to correct conclusions.

But it was not to the *matériel* of the navy only that Sir John Pakington directed his attention. The manning of the fleet was a subject far too important to escape his ken. In fact, had he been dull as

> "the fat weed
> That rots itself in ease on Lethe wharf,"

he could scarcely have been unconscious of the fact, that though we had comparatively few ships, we had even yet fewer men. The result of this conviction was an assent to the motion of Admiral Sir Charles Napier, and the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into the best means of manning the navy.

We have already referred to the Report of the Royal Commissioners, and will again advert to it, particularly to the Reserve recommended. With regard to the first portions of the Report, it is with regret we find the realisation of our predicted failure. A reference to our pages for May will show that we considered the recommendations of the Commission fell very short of the necessity of the case. We considered the conclusions of the Commissioners to be illogical, insufficient, and unsupported by the evidence. The month which ushered in our observations had not ended, ere it became evident that the recommended "Mode of Manning the Navy in time of Peace," was a complete failure. The paltry measures of giving a quarter pound more of meat which could not be masticated, a trifle more of bread, and a bed and blanket, but without raising the rate

of pay, were treated by the sailors to whom they were offered with scorn. The commissioned and petty officers attached to the several rendezvous, were everywhere treated with insult and contumely. The navy stank in the nostrils of the few good merchant seamen to be met with, and the system of corporal punishment so jealously retained by the Royal Commissioners, was on all occasions cast in the teeth of those who ventured to advocate service under the pendant.

Several naval officers undertook to go among the sailors and espouse the cause of the navy. Sir Charles Napier harangued the men in Sailors' Homes, and was laughed at for his pains. His defence of corporal punishment was flatly contradicted, for he asserted that no man was ever flogged without good and sufficient reason. It was useless to put ships in commission. The large blue posters displayed at the Admiralty and in our sea ports, and the invitation of the decoys—

"Come all ye jolly sailors!"

went just for what they were worth.

Sir John Pakington felt, if he did not confess it, that the Royal Commissioners had wasted much valuable time, spent a great deal of money, and done infinitely more harm than good. And how was this to be remedied? Another set of Royal Commissioners could not be assembled to make up for the shortcomings of their predecessors, and how was "Jack" to be told in plain terms that the Government considered the Report to be chaff, and fit only to be winnowed from the solid grain? Simply by the offer of a ten pound bounty.

A very old friend to the merchant service, an officer of the navy, holding an important position in connection with the merchant seamen, put the best possible face upon the royal service in order to make the bounty succeed. A little tract, entitled "*A Few Words of Advice*," was printed and circulated in every sea port in the kingdom, and certainly to judge from what the author, "A Seaman's Friend," wrote, the navy is little short of Paradise, in comparison with any other maritime service. We make a few short extracts.

"It has been proved by a careful investigation when estimating the income to be derived from a monthly levy upon wages for the support of a merchant seaman's fund, that the average employment of the merchant seaman in foreign-going ships, being that branch in which the greatest portion are engaged, is *nine* months in the year: for the other three months, during which he is waiting for a settlement, or for a new engagement, or spending his money, he earns no wages, and is, moreover, thrown upon his own resources for food and lodging; and, taking the average of wages at the present inordinate rate, to be sixty shillings per month, the merchant seaman earns twenty-seven pounds in the year, supposing that he has incurred no fines during the voyage for misconduct, and made no sacrifice in cashing his advanced note.

"This is presuming he has engaged for, and proved equal to, the

duty of able seaman; for if found deficient in this respect, the law permits a reduction of his wages to a lower rating.

"The seaman in the Royal Navy is subject to no such deductions; for even when sick, or on leave of absence, his pay, and also his time for pension, go on accruing during the whole term of his engagement. In the rating of able seamen, he earns in the year twenty-eight pounds, seventeen shillings, and elevenpence, while superior conduct will insure him good conduct pay as hereafter shown, and improving capacity will assuredly advance him to higher ratings, when he will earn considerably more."

Under the head of additional allowances the gallant writer states the following:—

"Seamen gunners, who are men trained in the Excellent, receive threepence per day in the first class, and twopence per day in the second class, in addition to all other pay of their ratings; and every five years in these ratings reckon for six years time towards long service pension.

"Mechanics and artificers have higher rates of pay than the first and second class petty officers, and have also from twopence to threepence per day additional for tools.

"Petty officers may be promoted to warrant, and warrant to commission officers, with an ample sum for outfit.

"Petty officers of all classes wear distinctive badges on the left arm, and are entitled to badge pay for length of service.

"Badges for good conduct not only distinguish the most efficient and best conducted, but give them substantial advantages in the shape of pay. Thus, with one badge or gold stripe on the arm, an able seaman would be entitled to two shillings and sevenpence; with two badges, to five shillings and twopence; and with three badges, to seven shillings and ninepence per month, or four pounds eleven shillings and threepence per year, which, in addition to the wages of a continuous service man, would be altogether thirty-three pounds nine shillings and twopence per year, and he is now allowed to receive the badge money when he becomes a petty officer; and time in the merchant service, with good character duly verified, counts for badges and pay.

"The pension, after twenty years' service, is certain; but the pensions for ten and fifteen years' service are granted at the discretion of the Admiralty; and as it is to be expected that, with the inducements now offered, the navy shall never henceforth want volunteers, the opportunity will occur for maintaining a reserve of some thousands of these short service pension men well skilled in naval duties, under obligation to serve when called upon, should the necessity arise, but at liberty to follow their inclinations in all other respects."

The craving maw of the service, however, was still unsatiated; but the mystery has by this time been pretty well cleared up, not satisfactorily, but certainly the merchant navy has comparatively no able seamen to give. The vaunted 150,000 dwindles down to 50,000, and out of the 50,000, three-fourths are out of the country, and the other fourth in good employ in our large companies and principal shipowners. Take the following dialogue as an illustration:—

Meeting a fine sailor-like looking individual, evidently just returned from sea, his feet ensconced in carpet slippers, a blue Indian jacket, a straw hat, a copper-coloured face, and a beard which would have given rise to immense envy in the army of our "dear ally," we thus accosted him :—

"You are just returned from a voyage, friend?"

Sailor (with a consequential air, as much as to say, I have not spent my money)—Yes.

Enquirer—What ship, and where from?

Sailor—Bucephalus. India.

Enquirer—What were you on board?

Sailor (rather proudly)—Boatswain!

Enquirer—You have been a man-of-war's man, I think?

Sailor—Yes; and I have a good pension.

Enquirer—You are a young man yet.

Sailor—Forty-five, sir; but I stuck to the service till I could get a pension.

Enquirer—What sort of a crew had you?

Sailor—Like the rest of the merchant ships, I suppose, not worth their salt. There are no sailors in the merchant service now, but a lot of frightened animals, of no use the moment a breeze of wind springs up.

Enquirer—But you say you had bad weather?

Sailor—Yes; and we lost all our masts on the voyage out and home. We had enough to try our crew; but had they been good for anything we should not have sustained half the damage. I have often, as the boatswain of the ship, been obliged to go up to furl a top-gallant-sail, because I could not get a man to go aloft to do it for me.

This digressive dialogue will serve to show the reason why, notwithstanding all the arguments of "A Sailor's Friend" and the eloquence of Sir Charles Napier, only about one thousand A.B.'s were found to take the £10 bounty; but including ordinary seamen and landsmen about 7000 were entered.

But Sir John Pakington's attention was not yet entirely engrossed. A question of officers obtruded itself upon his mind. The increased rank and pay allotted to army medical officers, together with the large demand in the east for medical men, had completely shut up the navy. The Medical Director-General's candidate book was a blank, and many of the young doctors who had accepted naval commissions, had applied, and were continually applying for their discharge. The active list of surgeons was exhausted, for it had become necessary to appoint surgeons to do the duty of assistants.

But what was to be done? Sir John found that the medical officers of the navy were not alone discontented in the service; captains, commanders, and lieutenants complained that there was "no promotion;" that the list was at a dead lock, for that Admirals, although long passed the limit of three-score and ten, still clung to this world. The masters petitioned, showing that the Order in Council, which had emanated from Her Majesty in May, 1846, had

never been acted upon, and that no conduct on their part was ever held to be worth mentioning as a claim. Their appeal was at once so firm and so just, that the First Lord felt it must be attended to. The chaplains adduced the example of the treatment accorded to army chaplains, and craved to receive equal consideration. The paymasters compared their position with that of the Commissariat, and claimed to be similarly advanced in civil rank. The engineers, a large and most important body, upon whose skill, dexterity, and steadiness, depends the care of the costly machinery they are charged with, prayed for an improvement in their position.

And all these questions came pressing one upon the other with irresistible force. How under these circumstances was he to act? Unhappily he had no one in a position to help him. Except a private secretary, whose name will ever be held in grateful remembrance by all lovers of the service—Mr. Herbert Murray—he had scarcely one near him who could or would be troubled with claims so importunate and just. The private secretary was himself a stranger to the navy, and could only rely upon a good sound common sense understanding, and upon the assistance of a limited circle of naval friends. What Sir John actually did under these circumstances may be gathered from the defence of his conduct from the attacks of Sir Charles Napier. It may be as well to state here, that Sir John Pakington, advised by what he thought the most liberal and enlightened officers, had drawn up a scheme of naval reform and retirement. This, with a caution of "most confidential," was passed on from one officer of rank to another, more as a feeler, it would appear, than with the intention of carrying it into immediate operation. It related to nearly, if not all classes, but the "head and front" of Sir John's offence was the proposed retirement of all flag officers who had turned the corner of seventy.

The scheme was a broad one, and although not claiming to be among the favoured few, whose imaginations were permitted to feast upon the tempting *morceaux*, we are not unacquainted with the leading features of the proposed changes. These propositions embraced not only the retirement of the old Admirals, a considerable reduction of the number of the active list, the promotion of twenty captains, and a move upon the other lists; but the absorption of the masters into the lieutenants' and commanders' lists, with an entire rearrangement of naval titles. The arguments, from time to time adduced, in favor of an amended scheme of naval designations, which should make the rank of naval officers as well known as the rank of army officers is, had, it seems, gained favor in the eyes of Sir John Pakington, and under the impression that such a change would give general satisfaction to the profession, and enable him at the same time to place naval medical officers upon a footing with the military, without umbrage to other classes, he gave it his support.

Judging from the sequel, we imagine that the projected scheme was at first circulated so carefully and exclusively, that it did not *reach the* eyes or ears of the senior admirals until on the eve of final

adoption. Sir John Pakington had, in fact, reckoned without his host; and when the latter came to hand in the little bill of exceptions, he found he had better not proceed.

Unfortunately for the credit of his administrative abilities, but happily for the cause of naval reform, the first Lord of the Admiralty had obtained the order in council, giving additional army rank to naval medical officers, and the circular had passed through the board. The order in council, dated May 13, appeared forthwith in the *London Gazette*, thereby securing to that branch of the navy a just and liberal understanding.

Owing, one may conjecture, to the non-adoption of the remaining portions of the scheme, the change instead of removing the objections of the medical officers, only placed them in a more anomalous rank. No order or circular has come out to tell what is to be the officer's naval rank. Like the Captain of the Royal Marines holding army rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, the Naval Inspector General ranks with a Major-General, or Brigadier-General in the army, but "after" a Captain in the navy. The Deputy Inspector General in the field, would take rank with a Colonel, if of sufficient standing; but on board ship ranks in the absurd position of "with but after" a Commander. The naval medical officers, it is said, only asked for a footing corresponding with that enjoyed by their army brethren, and Sir John Pakington may be accused of having taken them at their word. In justice to that liberal-minded statesman, however, we entertain a different opinion, and consider that he relied upon carrying out his whole plan, and, consequently, allowed the medical warrant to come out accompanied only by that intended to be for the benefit of the naval chaplains.

The naval chaplains' warrant, which was issued with the medical warrant, is the most egregious failure on record. Those who understand the naval service are aware that hardly one clergyman in twenty enters the Royal Navy with the intention of serving in it for more than ten or fifteen years at the outside. Before taking priest's orders he must have completed his twenty-fifth year, but seldom accomplishes the object so soon. Service in the navy is not continuous for chaplains, any more than for other officers; but the chaplain labours under the particular disadvantage of not being allowed half-pay when not in commission. The old regulation compelled a chaplain to complete eight years service at sea, or ten in harbour, before being entitled to half-pay at all, and then only to five shillings a day, which, however, was to increase at the rate of sixpence per diem for every year served until it attained the *maximum* of ten shillings a day. There was another peculiarity about the treatment of naval chaplains. If they wished that their widow should be entitled to a pension, they must have taken care to secure the nuptial knot three years before going on half-pay. If they married after going on shore to live, their naval position and services, however long, gave no such prospective claim.

We believe that the chaplains required only that these evils should be remedied, that is, they desired that when paid off, and unable to

obtain re-employment, they should be allowed half-pay; that the widows' pensions should be secured by one year's sea service after marriage, and that the period for retirement should be fifteen years, at which a respectable rate of retired pay should be receivable.

The difference between the duties of navy and army chaplains is considerable. The one has to submit to a very irksome ordeal shut up in a ship, and surrounded by boisterous and uncongenial spirits. The chaplain who has tact and good sense, will always secure for himself respect and attention; yet is his position very different from the army chaplain. The latter has comfortable quarters on shore, and only meets those under his cure in the garrison chapel, or in positions becoming his ministerial occupation. A chaplain enters the army as he would take a curacy or rectorship, with the intention of devoting his life to the profession; not so the naval chaplain, who, from being at best unpleasantly located in a ship, serves for a time in anticipation of rejoining his friends while still able to undertake clerical duties.

All these hopes were dashed to the ground by the Warrant of May 13th, for they found that they gained little, or little better than nothing. After ten years' full-pay service, a period beyond which few contemplated serving, they were to enjoy increased rank, to them at any time worthless; after twenty years, so much more, and after twenty-five years a retirement. Thus the clergyman would have to devote himself to a ship life, where he never can feel at home, and taking broken service into account, would probably attain a patriarchal age before completing the time for retirement.

Let us now hear, however, how Sir John Pakington accounts for his projected dealings towards the admirals. The interference with the supposed vested rights of the admirals, as we have just said, involved weighty considerations, and drew upon him much obloquy. We, therefore, quote his defence from the imputations of Sir Charles Napier:

"I anxiously hope," said Sir John, in the House of Commons on Thursday, the 14th July, "that the new Board of Admiralty will do their best to obviate the present stagnated state of naval promotion. It is absolutely essential, looking to the efficiency of the naval service, that something should be done, and I have seen enough to know that nothing will be done to effect that most important object unless the minister is prepared to approach it in a bold and determined spirit. Sir Charles Napier referred a few nights ago to a plan which I put forward with a view to correct this evil, but as I never published that paper the admiral had no right to make comments on it. I shall not enter into the details of the plan now, but the principle of it was, that some age should be laid down—the same age not to be applicable to all ranks—at which officers should be compelled to retire, receiving as compensation for that compulsory retirement a step in rank and an amount of half-pay—due regard being had to their services to the country. I also proposed to fix a younger age at which officers should have it in their power to retire voluntarily with the same advantages. Such was the principle of the plan. Sir

Charles Napier has seen my paper, though I never made it public. I showed it to a considerable number of officers of all ranks, to ascertain their opinion on the plan. The gallant admiral expressed an opinion that it would bear hardly on officers of his own rank; but I am prepared to contend that officers of his distinguished rank would not have had the least reason to complain. Every man filling the office which I held would have felt it his duty to pay the utmost possible respect to the high claims of those gallant officers who had risen by their merit to the high and distinguished station of the hon. and gallant admiral. No man is willing to make that admission more broadly than myself. But, at the same time, any man who undertakes to deal with this difficult subject must not limit his regard to officers of exalted rank. The poor lieutenant is as much entitled to consideration as any one. Nothing was more painful to me than the numerous cases of this class of officers, who had served their country well, but who in the race of promotion—the difficulties of which they all knew—had not advanced from want of interest. Yes, too true, from the want of interest. But in any case, in making a selection from the large body of men who were seeking for promotion, there must remain a large residuum unemployed and unpromoted. There are men who have held the rank of lieutenant for years and years, till they have become old, and who are now struggling to maintain themselves as officers and as gentlemen on means wholly inadequate. It would be impossible for any one not to feel wounded and grieved by the numberless cases of that kind which came before the First Lord. It therefore behoves men who have been more fortunate in the profession, and who have obtained its highest rewards, not to stand out with too much punctilio about their own position, and to show some consideration—to make some sacrifice, for their less successful brethren of the profession. The plan I drew up was cordially and thoroughly adopted by the cabinet, and had I remained in office I should have exerted myself to carry it into operation with such modifications as might be deemed advisable. Sir Charles Napier has said the plan was opposed by many of the most distinguished officers of the navy, and by some members of my own board. That is a strong statement which I ought not to pass by unnoticed. I will tell the gallant admiral that as far as I know, the disapproval of that plan was mainly, I will not say exclusively, confined to the very small number of officers at the head of the list, and of the same rank as the gallant admiral, who took what I consider a very mistaken view, and one which I much regret.

"The professional members of my own board also differed on the subject. But I did not limit my inquiry to the members of my own board, or to a few distinguished men who stood at the head of the naval profession. I consulted officers of all ranks—flag officers and captains, and all whom I thought would give me a competent opinion on the matter; and I can tell the gallant admiral that an overwhelming majority gave their cordial and decided approbation, and expressed a strong hope that I should pursue the plan and carry it out. As a proof that something must be done, I will state that during twelve months that I held the office of head of the Admiralty

I was able to promote only five lieutenants to be commanders, and two commanders to be post captains. Some promotions were made by the board in consequence of the transactions in China, but that was an exception. As far as the regular promotion was concerned, it was confined to the seven cases I mention between April 1858 and 1859. Is it to be supposed that in a great profession like the navy there can be any contentment when such a stagnation of promotion exists; or that young men of ability will be tempted into the service if something is not done to put an end to the evil? The gallant admiral says that the old generals of the army are not asked to give way at a certain age. But the gallant officer loses sight of the fact that the two professions are governed by totally different principles. The generals of the army do not stop promotion: the admirals in the navy do. There are hundreds of officers who leave the army every year by the sale of their commissions. Every year young men are entering. There has indeed been some restrictions of late years, and a short time since the Queen's ships were commissioned with three or four hundred short of their complement of officers in the junior ranks. But while these young men were coming in none went out of the top. The result was of course stagnation, and they must adopt some mode which will produce the same result as the system of sale in the army, and get rid of the stagnation which is embarrassing and almost endangering the navy. I am not the first head of the Admiralty who has felt this. Year after year new schemes of retirement have been adopted, and in the navy were three or four and twenty retired lists. Each retirement gave relief for a time; but after a few years the list got choked up again and came to a dead lock. Some self-acting system must be adopted which will relieve the top of the list. I wished to establish a system of retirement by age, with proper compensation for the disadvantages inflicted on officers, but have been obliged to leave office before I could introduce it. My plan may be objectionable in some details, but it is sound in principle. I have left it in the hands of the Duke of Somerset, with an earnest request that he would carefully consider it, and endeavour to devise some remedy for the evils that now exist."

There is something very ingenuous about Sir John Pakington's defence, and all who have an interest in this noble arm, must deeply deplore his removal from his important post at a time when the reforms he had in hand were so near completion.

A vote of want of confidence placed the Derby Government in a minority of 13, in the largest house ever assembled. Resignation was the immediate consequence, and Sir John Pakington's place is now occupied by a distinguished nobleman, the representative of the second dukedom in the kingdom. The new board includes only one of the naval lords, Vice-Admiral the Honourable Sir Richard S. Dundas, K.C.B. The character of this, the senior sea lord, has been variously estimated. Some contend that he is cold, aristocratic, and illiberal, difficult to move, and slow to discern the signs of the times. Others think that though slow, he is sure; though apparently cold, and unquestionably reserved, he has a warm heart,

and is, in the main, a steady advocate for real improvements. No one can doubt his earnestness, nor deny that he has sterling merit.

Unfortunately, Sir Richard Dundas has never felt the stings of the service. As the son of the First Lord of the Admiralty, he never had to wait a day for a promotal commission, nor to beg and pray in vain for employment. The service has been to him all plain sailing, and smooth water; in nine years from his entry into the navy he became a post captain. His commissions were dated as follow:—Lieut. 18th of June, 1821, commander 23rd of June, 1823, captain 17th of July, 1824. But it was no small merit on his part, backed up as he was by all-powerful interest, that he invariably made the profession his study. His ambition was to become a seaman and a navigator, and he so far accomplished this that no one knew better how to sail or navigate a ship. Still, there is a total absence of that deep-seated anxiety which pervades the heart of the friendless officer. He may assist a poor officer, but cannot feel for him. He may recognise the need for improving the collateral branches of the service, particularly when he finds, as in the case of the medical officers and masters, the imperative necessity for improvement, arising from a want of those officers; but there will be no heart about his proceedings, and his movements will be more those of a machine, than of a warm-blooded human being. Such at least we gather from an extensive study of the character of Sir Richard Dundas.

The second sea lord is Rear-Admiral the Honourable Frederick T. Pelham, C.B. The advancement of this officer was not so rapid as that of Sir R. Dundas, for ten years elapsed between his lieutenant's and captain's commissions. He has been actively employed in various services, and during the Duke of Northumberland's reign at Whitehall officiated as his Grace's private secretary. He is generally reckoned an agreeable, gentlemanly officer, although rather deficient in energy

The third in order of seniority is Commodore Eden, late of the Coast Guard, but "commodore" no longer. His title of commodore ceased with the lowering of his broad pennant, and he became again "Captain" Eden, and will probably be included in the next list of visitors to the Queen's ball in the same category with officers in reality three grades below him in army rank. In activity, energy, and intelligence, Captain Eden has few equals, and no superiors. He has, however, two or three dangerous crotchets, which hitherto he has supported with all his might and main. We allude to the Coast Guard as a reserve, and to that phantasmagorial body, the Coast Volunteers, or "Naval Volunteers," as they are officially designated.

No one questions the value of the Coast Guard as a defensive body. The officers and men composing it are well disciplined, gallant, and enduring, but they are for the most part old, and far more valuable when stationed at "Battery No. 2" than as forming a portion of a sea-going ship's company. As a reserve to man gun-boats, or block-ships, they are invaluable; but as seamen of the fleet, next to useless. The Naval Volunteers exist chiefly on paper, and on the pay-lists.

Lord Clarence Paget said a short time since, in the House of Commons, that every man of the 6,000 enrolled would come when called, each one bringing a friend with him. We trust the country will never be in a position to rely upon the services of the 12,000 "men in buckram suits."

Captain Eden has professed very liberal sentiments. In his evidence before the Manning Commissioners, we find him advocating promotion for all ranks, without exception. Let us hope he will successfully urge that principle at the Board of Admiralty, so that every bar which now stands in the way of advancement may be removed.

Captain Charles Frederick, the fourth on the list, is known as an excellent, practical officer. It has been said that every new man going to the Admiralty undergoes a process of tarring, by being immersed in a barrel of that commodity prior to taking his place, and hence those who, previously to their becoming initiated into Admiralty mysteries, were looked upon by messmates and shipmates as good fellows, turned out no better than their predecessors. We trust Captain Frederick may prove that he has escaped the ordeal, and that he will preserve the high character which he had before becoming a Lord of the Admiralty. The lay Lord, Mr. Whitbread, is a gentleman who has shown remarkable industry and aptitude for business. He will have enough to do if he attends fully to one half of the departments entrusted to him.

For the first time since the days of the Honourable George Elliot, we have a naval officer in the position of political secretary. But Rear-Admiral Lord Clarence Paget, C.B., is not only the Secretary, he is the mouthpiece of the Admiralty in Parliament, upon all professional subjects. Not long ago he brought forward the Navy Estimates, evincing, by the way, much self-command and knowledge of his subject. His task is an arduous one; but it is that which the Secretary of the Admiralty, as a general rule, ought to be competent to undertake. The First Lord of the Admiralty, as the chief administrator, should be felt by his measures rather than estimated by his speeches. Right or wrong, this is likely to be the case. The Duke of Somerset, though supposed to be gifted with extraordinary powers as an administrator, is no orator. He can perform better than he can explain what he wishes to have done, and his grace will find ample employment in his office, in superintending and controlling the vast complicated machine of the British Navy.

The Duke has been fortunate in his selection of a private secretary. Captain John Moore, C.B., who now fills that post, is greatly esteemed in the service, and assisted as he will be by some of the cleverest officials the country can produce, connected with the private office, he will be at no loss to advise the Duke upon all professional points.

The new board has lots of work cut out. The hollow peace between France and Austria may, for all that is known to the contrary, have some sinister object in view. Who can say that the wish to convert the Mediterranean into a French lake, or to humble the lofty notions of Great Britain by an attempt to take command of the British Channel, may not be at the bottom of the design?

The duty of whatever Government, or whatever Admiralty is in power is a clear and definite one—to place the British navy in a condition to assert the independence of Great Britain on the broad ocean, and in the narrow seas. Ours is no dream of conquest, but a waking sense, and an earnest desire for the peace and prosperity of the entire world. Can we achieve that object without an all powerful navy? And a navy in the full acceptation of the term means more than ships. At this time we have no effective reserve. We have, it is true, nearly thirty sail of the line in commission, with a fair proportion of frigates and smaller vessels; but they are imperfectly manned and badly officered. An addition of five hundred subordinate officers would be immediately absorbed, and not one ship have a superabundance. A reserve of officers, as well as a reserve of seamen is absolutely necessary before the navy can be placed upon a safe footing; and ere the present session closes we hope some means will be adopted to compass this most important design. The Admiralty have done well to extend the bounty to the seamen now serving. Less than that would not have been just; but if the new Board of Admiralty would gain the confidence of the country they must make up for the shortcomings of their predecessors, and so remodel the general character and discipline of the naval service, as to make it sought after by all classes.

THREE DAYS AT WOOLMER.

By One who was There.

This summer the Government made arrangements to have Woolmer Forest as a kind of supplementary camp to Aldershott, where the brigades could be marched in turns, and thus give all an insight into camp life, as it would be were we on service. This I understand was the intention at first, but from the force that has proceeded there lately, I suspect it must have been in some degree modified.

Agreeably with division orders, on Saturday, the 9th instant, a brigade composed of the three arms, under the command of Colonel Ellis, of H. M. 24th Foot, proceeded from Aldershott to Woolmer Forest. The brigade consisted of a wing of the 10th Hussars, a battery of Artillery, a detachment of the Military Train, H. M. 24th Foot, and the Wiltshire Militia. The revielle sounded about 2 A.M. for us of the 10th Hussars; by 3 P.M. we were saddled and ready for breakfast, which had been ordered at this hour, but we were doomed to be disappointed, as regards our rations of bread and meat; coffee there certainly was, and hot, but coffee is a poor breakfast by itself. But it was no use grumbling, hoping, like Jacob Faithful, "to have better luck next time;" and as we can even derive consolation from the misfortunes of others, we reflected that we should not be so ill off as the first brigade that went to Woolmer, for

on their arrival they found to their dismay that there were no rations at all, as those at Aldershott thought they would draw them at Woolmer, and those at Woolmer thought they had brought rations with them, so they had to starve for the day, and grin and bear it.

We started about 4 o'clock, and passed through Farnham with swords drawn, drums beating, and banners waving, before the good people of that town had even dreamt of rising. It was a lovely morning, and none envied the Farnhamites their rest. As our horses walked too fast for the infantry, we were obliged to halt and dismount several times, to allow them to come up, and this delayed our arrival at Woolmer until about 10 o'clock.

The first appearance of Woolmer Forest was by no means cheering, as it looked too much like the place we had left behind; but as we proceeded it lost in a great measure its wilderness-like look, and we could perceive that our lot would be better than we had at first anticipated.

The position was taken up by the infantry and artillery, the 24th being on the right, the Wiltshire on the left, and the Artillery in the centre; the Military Train took up a position to the left of the line, and at right angles to it; we were about three hundred yards in advance of the line, and parallel to it.

On arriving at our ground we were delayed some time waiting for the waggons, there being one for each troop to carry the tents, cooking-kettles, horse-blankets, picket-posts and ropes, &c., &c.; a longer time elapsed in getting them out and measuring the lines. At last we made a start, and, linking our horses together, left them in charge of eight men; the remainder of the men were told off, some to draw forage, others to put down the picket-posts and ropes, heel-pegs and head-ropes. When all this was done, and the horses watered and brought up, two hours had gone —two hours in doing what we could have done formerly in fifteen minutes; but in those days there was no delay waiting for a military train—no time lost in driving picket-posts in the ground with sledge hammers, or hauling the picket-ropes taut. Every man then carried his head and heel-ropes, and head and heel-pegs on the horse: the head-rope fastened round the horse's neck, and heel-rope attached by a ring to the saddle on the near side, rolled up and doubled in a circle, hung over the shoe-case. The head and heel-pegs were strapped on the top of valise.

At one time it came like A B C to us, for when the lines were marked out, the men filed in at one end, the rear rank on one side, the front rank on the other; on arriving at the other end the leading files turned inwards, the remainder taking up their position and distance, as it came to their turn, and dressing towards the hand they formed to; the order was then given to dismount, and every man was in his place; head and heel-pegs were now driven in, the head-ropes were fastened, and heel-ropes put down, the shackles now fastened on, and the horse was secure.

But what a difference there is between the shackles then and those that were now before us; the former were light, strong, and useful, these quite the reverse, heavy, cumbersome, and useless. Doubtless there are plenty of buckles, straps, and rings, neither of which were

used to the Indian shackle—only leather; and yet with all the buckles, &c., they were broken by the least plunge of a horse—either the strap gave way, or the leather which joined the ring to the shackle; to appearance it was strong enough to hold an elephant, still they were scarcely serviceable with these quiet horses, and would have been utterly useless to fasten our little Arabs with, that we had once upon a time.

The principal fault lies in a piece of leather being used to connect the ring and shackle; as the rope is fastened to the ring all the strain is upon the leather. The Indian shackle is very simple in its contrivance, and of great strength, and free from buckles, straps, or rings. It is made from a strip of leather about fourinc hes wide, the sides are folded in, the edges meeting in the centre, a button is formed at one end by doubling it back and rolling about an inch and a half up tightly; this is made secure by cutting a hole close to it, and just large enough to pass the roll through, then let it be pulled tight, and that end is finished. The other end is doubled in, large enough and no more than will hold the button: this is sewn together with a leather thong; a loop is now formed for the rope to be fastened to, by again doubling up the button hole end; this is likewise fastened by sewing, and a leather thong is tied tight round all, which makes it as it ought to be, the strongest part, as on it and the button lies all the strain: when thus fastened the rope might break, but the shackle never.

Iron heel-pegs are another failure, for long as they are, the least exertion (which any person can prove by trying) draws them out of the ground; another disadvantage is their weight, for ring and all, one would weigh half-a-dozen wooden pegs. A wooden peg has the advantage of being light; if lost or broken it is easily replaced; when in the ground it swells from the damp, and offers great resistance when attempted to be got up.

Some may consider that the dragoon's horse has now too much to carry, but the horses we took with us to the Crimea were much less than the English trooper, seldom measuring over fourteen hands, yet they carried, and carried with ease, in addition to what is now borne by the English trooper, two blankets, one under the saddle, the other on the top of the cloak, head and heel ropes, head and heel pegs, a water deck, and forage net and cord; still with all this additional weight, twenty or thirty miles a day was easy work to them.

It may be urged, that as they were entire horses, there is no comparison between those and these, but the late and lamented Captain Nolan, in his work on Cavalry Tactics, gives the preference to geldings for lasting power on the march. He relates, when the 15th Hussars were in India, two squadrons were ordered to march from Bangalore to the Deccanee Hyderabad, a distance of some five hundred miles; this opportunity was embraced, for the purpose of testing the respective qualities of the stallion and gelding, a squadron of each formed the wing, but the latter proved themselves superior to the former, in marching and enduring fatigue. As regards the superiority of the breed, it is the duty of Government to get the

best procurable for the work and duties of the cavalry service. I am decidedly in favour of a small horse for cavalry, for by what I have seen they are more compact and better made about fourteen hands than at sixteen; of course I mean taking them generally, for there are exceptions to every rule.

If we look at the French, Russian, Sardinian, or Turkish cavalry, we find them all mounted on what amongst us would be called ponies. Colonel Macdougall, in his "Theory of War," states, that "the effective force of cavalry is in direct proportion to the *momentum* of its charge. The definition of 'momentum,' is the weight of a body multiplied by its velocity. Hence velocity and weight may be considered as elements in the effect of a charge. The greatest momentum will be obtained by light men on powerful horses." Now, with all due deference to the gallant Colonel, I must beg to differ from his last assertion, for the smallest horses in the 10th Hussars are the swiftest; large horses may look well and imposing, but they lose in speed, when it comes to the push, the little horses always being to the front. I would put light men on light, active horses, and in the summer months have no stabling for them, but let them rough it in the open air, in winter let the stabling just give shelter from the weather; they would not look so well I'll allow, their coats would not be so glossy, but they would be far more fit for service, should we be called on, whether it was to meet the enemy in a foreign land, or to repel an invader from our own shores. But I hope that there will be no such things to delay us as picket posts, &c., for on service a cavalry regiment of six troops, requires no less than fifteen mules to convey those articles.

I find I have digressed greatly from my subject, and got far away from Woolmer, to which I will return. After the horses were picketed and fed, to look after ourselves was the next consideration, so tent-pitching became the order of the day. We had four tents, one to every ten men, these were pitched at the top of the horse lines, and across them; the officers' tents in rear of ours. It being the first time for many of our young hands to be under canvass, more time was occupied at this than there ought to have been, but taking all into consideration it was not done amiss. We now had dinner, and tasted the commissariat rations of bread and meat, both of which were first-rate in quality, the bread especially, it being the best I have ever eaten in England, and was quite a relief from the sour stale stuff we get at Aldershott.

The ovens and shambles here are quite in the primitive style, the first being all or nearly built of clay—the shambles are a kind of gallows, to which the cattle as they are disposed of in an off-hand manner, are hung up and dressed; all, of course, are in the open air. After dining we finished our horses, and then the intrenching of our tents was the next thing to be looked to; at this we all worked well and with a will—pickaxes and shovels flying merrily—and all was done in about the twinkling of a bed-post. Intrenching his tent ought to be the first thing a soldier does, after he has looked to his horse, and should the appearance of the weather be unfavourable, it is done

immediately the tent is pitched; in this case, however, as the weather was so remarkably fine, we put it off until after dinner and stables. As an instance of what may happen when this is neglected, I'll mention what occurred to the 12th Foot, who marched into Aldershott about a fortnight since, taking up their quarters close by the 5th Dragoons, on Cove Common. When their tents were pitched, they did not intrench round them, owing to their receiving an order that the ground was not to be cut up; taking this order in the literal sense the regimental authorities would not allow the men to put a pickaxe or shovel in the ground. That night (it was a Saturday) one of the heaviest and severest thunder storms came on that has been experienced for years, nothing I ever witnessed could be at all compared to it, except the opening of the south-west monsoon in India. The lightning flashed, followed by the sound of the thunder, which low at first, would, as it rolled nearer, increase, until it burst over our heads in a deafening peal, which shook all around; during the intervals the rain could be heard pouring down in torrents, and in all this was the unfortunate 12th, lying, or I ought to say, standing in their tents, through and under which the water ran in floods. I saw them next day, and it was pitiable to mark the drenched appearance they had, everything wet through. When the storm was over they were allowed to dig round their tents, and we have had no rain since. "They lock the stable door after the horse is stolen."

Having been up from two o'clock in the morning, there were none of us required rocking to sleep that night, and with a little straw, our cloaks and a blanket, slept a sounder sleep than we could have done on a bed of down; in truth, an old soldier can no more sleep comfortable on a feather bed, than a civilian accustomed to such luxuries all his life, could do on a hard straw mattress. I recollect when on furlough, that my poor mother, God bless her, would put me into the best bed in the house, thinking it would be a treat, but I could no more sleep among that sea of feathers, than fly—through tossing and tumbling about I very soon had all the clothes off—cold weather as it was, it got at last quite insupportable, I could bear it no longer, and with a portion of the clothes on my arm, I sallied out and took possession of the sofa, which I insisted on retaining for the remainder of my stay.

The next day being Sunday, we expected to have but little to do, there was only church parade in orders, and that over, we were looking forward to some ease and comfort for the remainder of the day, but our anticipations were not realized. After dinner, a message came, intimating that Her Majesty the Queen would visit the camp in the evening, and now the hurly-burly began; the tents all put square, blankets thrown over the straw for carpets; places that had been already swept, were swept again. Then all the saddles had to be placed in line, on end, and there was such pulling up and pushing back of those unfortunate saddles, propping up those that from the unevenness of the ground would not stand in line—they were not in their dressing.—Oh! how I detest that word. Then the horses were tried if *they* could not be brought straight and even; but after getting

them as near to that as made no matter, the obstinate brutes would not remain so, unless every man stood to the head of his horse, and kept him to the toe-line, and that could not be done, as we were required elsewhere, for a crusade was ordered against some poor inoffensive bushes, not because they were in our way, our horses' way, or any one's way; but simply because they had obeyed nature, and got beyond *their* original line of *dressing the ground*.

We had thus one way and another but little peace until Her Majesty's arrival, when we were told to remain inside our tents, and should the royal cortège pass, to fall in in *line* outside. Lucky dogs were we that our position lay in advance of the others, for the remainder of the brigade were all on parade awaiting Her Majesty's coming, for a couple of hours, which event happened about five or six o'clock. Her Majesty then passed slowly along the line formed to receive her, bands playing, and people cheering, as only the loyal hearts of Old England can do.

When Her Majesty arrived at the extreme flank, some of the soldiers' tea and bread were presented to her, which she condescended very kindly to partake of, and I understand spoke favourably of it. But I guess that it was about as good of the kind as a soldier ever gets. I have had stuff served out, said to be tea (there was certainly no Act of Parliament against it being called so), which I should find it difficult to describe. The best idea I can convey is in the words of an orderly officer to whom the tea had been reported bad: coming into the room, and taking up a mess-tin full of the mixture, he tasted it, then turning to the orderly sergeant, inquired in an under tone what it was, whether tea or coffee. Tea, was the whispered reply of the sergeant. Then the officer turning to the complainants said: "It's very good. I never tasted better in my life." If this was the case, it must have been the first he ever tasted.

But a soldier's rations are seldom or never first rate. In a town, the contract only specifies the second quality. In Aldershott, however, they ought to have at least good and bad, a little of both. But I am sorry to say that the meat here is like the nigger's wife, who was all worser. One day the rations were very bad, and were cast by a board of officers. This was of no use; and a board of medical officers then inspected the meat, and came to the same decision. It was now sent back to the commissariat, and the proceedings of the boards forwarded to the authorities. We waited anxiously enough for another lot of meat to come; but one, two, three, and four o'clock passed, and no signs of it. At last, about five o'clock, back came the same lot again to us. A board of field officers had assembled at the request of the Commissary-General, and as they did not have to eat it, brought in a verdict against us, by saying that the meat was of a fair average quality. I suppose they meant by this, that there was both better and worse in the world than what they looked at.

From this we were satisfied that it was useless complaining of our rations in future; and although we have had very indifferent meat and sour bread frequently since, we make no complaints, but take

it, consoling ourselves with the thought that it is a deuced sight better than none.

But I have wandered far away again from my subject, to which I must return. Her Majesty made no further inspection than passing those that were formed up to receive her, but immediately returned to Aldershott. I fancy that Woolmer would have pleased Her Majesty more, had the parading of those troops been dispensed with; at Aldershott there were plenty of men under arms to look at, and after a drive of so many miles, our Queen should have seen us in our rough state, with jackets off and shirt sleeves tucked up, going about our occupation, if we had anything to do, or lounging about smoking or talking with our comrades, with a careless look among us, as if we knew we were far, far off from the view of all barracks and barrack regulations; it is this that makes camp life so agreeable, there is a freedom from restraint, a feeling something similar to what is when the stock and belts come off after a long guard on a sultry day. When situated thus, one can partly imagine that strong love the Arab has for the desert, and the gipsy for his tent, and we soldiers, from our life, have something akin to this in them, their very existence spent going from town to town, from country to country, from one quarter of the globe to another, all tending to give them a liking for change, a dislike to be settled, or stay too long at any place, and from this a sort of vagabondism springs up, and becomes inherent in their nature.

Just watch a soldier when he gets leave, whether it is for a day or a month; as soon as he clears the barrack gate he feels a new man, his spirits are at the highest, and resemble a school boy just let out of school, he goes bounding forward, trying to forget all that lies behind, and it is something of this we feel under canvas; there, there is not that formality, that martinetism, which can only be satisfied by what are termed orders and discipline, but which are only the remains of the soldiering times some seventy years back, those good old times when flogging, cocked hats, queues, tights and gaiters, were what made a soldier good in quarters and brave in the field.

There is a strong leaven of these obsolete times still with us, and those infected can be easily seen by the pertinacity with which they cling to their duties, their Brahma and Vishnu, their pipeclay and leather stock. If half the attention was paid to other things of more importance that is done to pipeclaying of belts, it would be much better for us all.

We turned out on Monday morning at nine o'clock, and had such a splendid ride among the woods, round the woods, and through the woods, then across a wild-looking part of the country, where a house could not be seen for ever so far, until we were among the trees again, the lark singing o'erhead, the plover starting from under our feet, or perhaps a nest of young ones would be frightened, and in trying to get clear away from us, would double back and run between the horses' legs, while the old ones would be flying round and round us, screaming their wild notes, beseeching us to be careful of those that could not as yet take care of themselves. We now had wandered into one of those very beautiful narrow grassy green

lanes, with trees on either side, whose branches entwining one another, made a perfect shade from the noon-day sun, and such beautiful places are only to be met with in our own land.

And what a healthy place this Woolmer must be, I declare I have not seen a grave yard about the place; and a person might really imagine from the healthy look of all the people, that they never die. I am certain that an undertaker does not earn his salt about this place. The young folks have so rosy and robust a glow in their cheeks that would shame a Londoner could he see them; and look at the old people, how firm they walk about: there is an old man now in front of me, that would puzzle any one to guess his age, it might be a hundred, or it might be a hundred and fifty, yet he steps along cheerfully.

A hearty laughing country lass—in answer to our good morning—wished that we were always to remain, and mine, I am sure, was not the only response to it, that I wished we were. By this time we had got close to the village of Liphook, but did not enter it, which I was sorry for; but time would not permit of it, so filing about, we retraced our steps to camp, feeling sorry to drag ourselves away from so much that was lovely.

On Tuesday morning we left at an early hour for Aldershott, where all that was gone through was again enacted; all the blankets, water decks, picket posts and ropes, head and heel ropes, heel pegs, nose bags, tarpaulin, &c., had to be collected and counted. The same mistake about the breakfast happened,—there was coffee but no bread, we had to get that at Aldershott, so off we marched hungry as before; how much more like common sense it would have been had we drawn our rations in Aldershott the day we marched out and from Woolmer the day we marched in; it would have made no difference, for we should still have had three days rations from Woolmer.

We arrived at that splendid specimen of the skill of the R. E. D., the West Cavalry Barracks, at about half-past eight a.m., all safe and sound, and I daresay, all weighing a pound or so heavier than when we left. There had been a forward movement during the three days we had been away, they had got the water pipes laid down, and we have now water at the door; but for all the good it is, barring for the use of the horses, it might as well have remained in the reservoir; no one can drink it, or use it for any cooking purpose, it is dirty, and quite tepid; for the first day or two we thought the pipes might be foul at first, but up to the present time there is no alteration in the taste or temperature of the stuff.

Government has been at great expense for these barracks, and it is wonderful that some one did not inquire where good water was to come from; it is, in fact, a bungled up affair altogether, the blocks are built upon a fashion, being too large for one regiment and not near large enough for two, and so on with the whole concern.

THE IMPORTANCE OF A CORRECT OFFICIAL NAVY LIST.

By Theseus. Late R.N.

There has not been a time for many years past, when there has been so much interest felt by the English public as to the effective strength of the Royal Navy, as at the present period. The daily newspapers have all got their column of naval intelligence; and in addition, frequently publish leading articles criticising the condition of the Navy. The statement that has gone forth as to the equality of the French Navy with our own, has roused a spirit of inquiry in the minds of many Englishmen, who, relying upon the old undoubted naval superiority of England, never before took particular interest in naval matters.

The speeches of all naval men, and especially those of Sir John Pakington, the late First Lord of the Admiralty, have been read with great eagerness. But there are many persons who are not exactly satisfied with the views taken by official persons, and they wish to examine the details themselves. Naturally enough, the first record they refer to is the official Navy List, but unless they have some experienced naval officer to explain the errors and omissions in that publication, they will certainly not be able to make the official statements agree with the details in the Navy List. Now this ought not to be the case, and we have no doubt that had Sir John Pakington remained some time longer at the Admiralty, he would have caused the details in the Navy List to be as correct and as clearly understood by the public, as were the statements made by him when introducing the Navy estimates this year. In the earnest hope that the Duke of Somerset will tread in the footsteps of his predecessor, we beg to draw his attention to the importance of a correct official Navy List, as one out of the very many reforms still wanting to increase the efficiency of the Naval service. We can assure the noble Duke, that if he wishes his administration of the Admiralty to obtain the confidence of his fellow countrymen, he must be explicit, and give them correct information as to the real condition of the Royal Navy. It is well known that up to a late period foreign powers possessed more accurate intelligence regarding the strength of the British Navy, than the English people themselves. We understand that there are two clerks at the Admiralty whose sole duty it is to keep a register of naval officers, and prepare the Navy List for publication, and we believe that two persons are quite sufficient for the task, and that it is as easy for them to issue an accurate Navy List as one full of errors and omissions. That we are not the only persons who complain is easily shown by a reference to the *United Service Gazette*, which frequently contains letters pointing out errors, but which are seemingly taken no heed of, as they recur in the succeeding editions of the Navy List.

A short time ago, Sir John Pakington and Lord Clarence Paget both stated that the British Navy now possessed fifty-six screw line of battle ships, but the July Navy List only enumerates forty-nine

screw steam ships as carrying more than seventy guns. The ships omitted are the Windsor Castle 105, being fitted with her engines at Devonport; the Bulwark 91, building at Chatham; the Repulse 91, building at Woolwich; and the following sailing three-deckers being converted into screw two-deckers: the Nelson 91, Waterloo 91, Royal Frederick 91, and Royal William 91. All these ships have been called screw ships in the different official statements lately published by the Surveyor of the Navy; and, therefore, there is no excuse for there not being inserted correctly in the Navy List.

Then, again, there is the following heading, "List of the effective ships, Royal Navy, with their present stations," and yet in this list we find the names of no less than forty-three sailing line-of-battle ships, while it was only a short time ago that the Surveyor of the Navy stated in a public document, that the navy only contained thirteen effective sailing line-of-battle ships. A difference of thirty sail of the line in two official statements is sufficient to surprise any person unacquainted with the naval service, and it is in this kind of way that our Government officials have tried to blind the public as to the real strength of the Royal Navy. There is the same kind of delusion practised in regard to sailing frigates; for whilst Sir B. Walker enumerates fourteen as being effective, the Navy List contains in the list of effective ships the names of eighty-four frigates, making a difference of seventy. The smaller classes of sailing vessels are named, as heedless of their real condition, as the larger ships. The Navy List contains the names of only twenty-five screw-frigates, whereas there are really thirty-two, and the following are those omitted: Narcissus 50, building at Devonport; Bristol 50, building at Woolwich; Undaunted 50, building at Chatham; and the following sailing frigates at present being converted into screw ships: the Phæton 50, Phœbe 50, Severn 50, and Sutlej 50.

The Navy List also contains no information about the steam ram lately ordered to be built by the Thames Iron Company, or of the eighteen screw gun-boats which are building for the purpose of carrying the Armstrong guns. The following screw corvettes and sloops are also omitted: the Wolverene 22, building at Woolwich; the Rattlesnake 22, and Reindeer 17, building at Chatham; and the Rosario 10, building at Deptford. The Spider, screw gun-boat, has also not been inserted in the list of screw gun-boats. We also believe that the navy possesses some 150 mortar-boats and floats that were built during the Russian war, and yet there is no mention made of them in the official Navy List. Then again there are several mistakes in the stations of different ships. Thus the Agamemnon is at Portland and not in the Mediterranean; the Eurydice is at Portsmouth instead of Chatham; the Volcano at Portsmouth instead of Woolwich; the Ariadne at Woolwich instead of building at Deptford; the Revenge at Devonport instead of building at Pembroke; the Kite is at Bermuda instead of Woolwich; and the stations of the Indian, Gulnare, and Rose are omitted. It would be advisable also, to give the stations of the small gun-boats, and we think they might certainly be classed among the effective ships, as they are of *far more* use than the old sailing hulks and steam tugs which have a

place in that list. The Rattlesnake 8, and Resistance (old troop ship), are still retained on the list, although the newspapers, some months ago, reported that they had been broken up. Many other errors and omissions might be pointed out in this part of the Navy List, but enough have been shown to warrant our complaint.

In reference to the lists of naval officers, we consider the Navy List would be rendered much more intelligible, if the officers on the active list were separated altogether from those on the reserved and retired lists. The present plan of mingling them altogether, and heading the different sections with A. B. C. D. &c., can serve no good purpose, as the reserved and retired officers are still on the yellow list, however close they may be placed to the active list.

There are as numerous errors in the lists of officers, as in the lists of ships. The name of Samuel Thornton is still continued on the list of reserved rear-admirals, although this officer was drowned some months ago in the Bay of Biscay.

The subordinate officers of the Heron, lately lost on the coast of Africa, are still continued on the list, although the name of the ship and her commander, W. H. Truscott, have been left out. The following names have, therefore, to be struck out:—Lieutenants T. H. Collingwood, M. L. Porter, F. H. Blair;Master, C. A. Smart; Paymaster, W. S. E. Freeman; Surgeon, Robert Sproule; and Assistant-Surgeon, Samuel Reid.

Then we have the names of several officers omitted, viz.—W. D. Jeans, paymaster of 1850, and late secretary to Sir Michael Seymour. J. M. D. Elphinstone, mate of 1859, belonging to the Indus; and the following assistant surgeons:—S. Grose, of the Cadmus; J. W. Belcher, of the Agamemnon; W. Roche, of the Falcon; and T. Fulton, of the London. We should like to know the reason why the names of acting second masters are omitted from the list, whilst those of the acting mates and acting assistant surgeons are inserted?

It would be an improvement also if there was some mark made against the names of those officers who are employed in other departments under Government. Thus Captain C. Edmunds is Captain of the Port of Gibraltar; Captain T. E. L. Moore is Governor of the Falkland Isles; Captain J. Caffin and Captain Sir W. S. Wiseman are employed in the Ordnance department; Captain G. G. Wellesley is Superintendent of the Indian navy, and many others hold appointments similar to these.

The last portion of the Navy List comprising the full and half-pay lists and circulars is still more confused. Some of the circulars date back some twenty years, and have long since been cancelled, but the whole of them are so mingled together as to render them quite unintelligible.

As we fear that this subject will not prove very interesting to the general reader, we forbear to extend our observations any further. We believe that we have pointed out numerous and serious errors and omissions in the present official Navy List, and for the benefit of naval officers and the English public, we call upon the Admiralty to issue a correct publication. The details published in the list should be so complete and clear, that the public by referring to it,

should be able easily to comprehend the naval debates in the House of Commons. Of course to obtain this satisfactory point, a great deal of useful information will have to be added, as the navy estimates for the year, &c.; but as the public want to know the real condition of the navy, every endeavour should be made by the Admiralty to comply with their wishes.

THE FIRST NOTICE OF THE MALAKOFF.

To the Editor of the United Service Magazine.

SIR,—In consequence of the appearance of a letter from Captain Leicester Vernon, in the *Illustrated London News* of the 16th inst., which sets forth, that long before General Niel arrived in the Crimea, Sir John Burgoyne expressed his opinion that the Malakoff height was the key of Sebastopol, without questioning the correctness of this assertion, I beg to place before you the following narrative of facts in connexion with this subject:—

In 1834 I visited Sebastopol, and with several of the officers then employed in superintending the construction of docks for ships of war at that place, after inspecting their proceedings below, I ascended to the summit of the height, *since* named the Malakoff, in order to have a general view of the dockyard from thence, and of the town and harbour beyond it. While standing there I immediately perceived that we were on the nearest height to the dockyard, which it perfectly commanded, as well as the town and the harbour generally.

Reaching Constantinople soon after this, I stated to the then Ambassador at that court, that Russia was establishing a naval stronghold in the Black Sea, at little more than twenty-four hours run from the Turkish capital; and in my report, which that Minister forwarded to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I fully described Sebastopol with its new dockyard in the inner harbour, as well as the Crimea generally, and referred to the projected fortifications and the height in question in the following words:—

"The New Works," (then traced out, but not constructed till the war,) "are to extend as nearly as possible in the direction e.e.e., and will completely cover the town and harbour, if executed; *at present the inner harbour is commanded from the height* d, as marked in the accompanying sketch."

You will perceive that in the sketch, of which I send a copy herewith, the letter d indicates the Malakoff; and having again at the close of the war ascended that height and visited the tower and other works upon it, I found that they occupied the identical spot from whence I had viewed the dockyard on my visit more than twenty years before, which had led to my making the statement to the Ambassador at Constantinople.

In 1853, when the prospect of war in that quarter appeared imminent, I called attention to my report of 1834, and copies of it were laid before the General, then Commanding-in-Chief, the Foreign Secretary, and Lord Raglan, as well as other reports furnished by me on various localities, which soon became the seat of war.

Perceiving that as late as the close of December, 1854, no attack had been commenced on the height I had pointed out as the key of the place, marked with the letter d, and where recent plans placed a tower and other works*—a delay which I afterwards learned was caused by the opposition of the French engineers, Bizot, &c. —trusting to my authority as an eye witness being considered of value, I wrote to Lord Raglan from Corfu, on the 1st of January, 1855, to draw to his recollection and notice the following passage in my report of 1834:—

"There is a height which was marked d in a small plan which accompanied a memorandum of mine, written a good many years ago—which your Lordship has seen—near the head of the dockyard harbour which appeared to me entirely to command it, and although some fort or other work may now be constructed on this height, the knowledge of such a circumstance might, I think, add importance to its early capture. The immediate object being, I presume, to destroy the fleet, it has occurred to me, especially if the works towards the country on the Inkerman side of the harbour are not so strong as those on the city side, that an attempt to seize on the dockyard, barracks, &c., and in short the whole ground between the dockyard harbour and Inkerman, merely blockading the city itself, would lead to the destruction of the fleet and the general objects in view."

This letter was forwarded per steamer on the same day to the British head quarters, and its receipt acknowledged in an autograph letter from Lord Raglan.

My letter thus reached his Lordship before General Niel's arrival, which occurred in the beginning of February, and I have never doubted that the initiative on that occasion as to attacking the Malakoff lay with Lord Raglan and Sir John Burgoyne, and that although General Niel came with special powers from the Emperor to advise as to the conduct of the siege, these were of a general nature, and on that occasion I believe that he only overruled the previous opposition of the French engineers.

I have just seen Sir John Burgoyne's "*Military Opinions*," which I have read with great interest; but, at the same time, I must observe, in justice to myself, that the information contained in that portion of the work which is headed "Turkey and Russia in 1854," and said to have been written at Constantinople, in February that year, had been communicated to the British Government by myself, previous to that period, after personal examination of the localities which are treated of.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

A. F. MACINTOSH,

18th July, 1859. LT.-GENERAL.

* The tower was finished on the 18th of August, 1854, and works surrounding it partly completed by the end of September. See—"A Voice from within the walls of Sebastopol."

We regret that we are unable to find room for the sketch accompanying this letter.

THE TWO NAPOLEONS.

Aurons-nous la Guerre, was the title of a pamphlet which appeared in Paris previous to the premeditated war with Austria. *Aurons-nous la paix* may be asked with equal propriety now that an unpremeditated peace is signed. Doubt and uncertainty still prevail, but we evidently expect war sooner or later. In anticipation of a coming struggle we are manning our ships and strengthening our battalions. Indeed war seems to be foreshadowed, for in the history of the world's great drama scenes occasionally occur, in which the same events appear to be performed a second time. There are instances when but for a change of names one might almost imagine that the page of history which instructed our youth was again produced for the edification of our manhood.

A familiar example of the reproduction of events has just been played out before our eyes. Let us lift the curtain. See—The stage and the actors are both the same, for a Napoleon is again the chief performer, Austria is his victim, and Italy is his prize. The marvel is that as nature brings all things about in due season that so much blood and treasure should so soon have been again required. But the war-whoop that so recently was ringing in the ears of Christendom has ceased, and during the pause let us enquire whose hand it was that first lifted the club of Cain. Let who will ask this question there seems to be but one upon whom all fingers are pointed at. All inquiries and all explanations upon this subject echo but one name—Napoleon III. He has followed the instincts of the founder of his house. The miasma of the dead hero has poisoned the air, and under its influence men leaped at each others' throats. The misunderstanding between France and Austria, like a smouldering fire, might have died out, but that the ambition of Napoleon III. sought to produce a historical parallel.

Without pretending to penetrate his mysterious policy, it is now evident that his recent campaign in Italy was conducted after an approved model. The shadow of Napoleon the past was the guide of Napoleon the present. However, with infinitely grander means he has produced very doubtful results. It is the fate of all copyists to be feeble. He has paralyzed mankind by his butcheries, but we look in vain for the consequences of a Marengo, or an Austerlitz, amid the profitless shambles of Magenta or Solferino. Does this Imperial manufacturer of events imagine that men are blind? or that they cannot see that imitation is the sincerest praise? for every one of the million readers of the anecdotes and memoirs of the elder Napoleon can see how the nephew copies the uncle, and they may learn what the living Napoleon will be likely to attempt if they will study for a moment the character upon which he hopes to build his own.

Fortunately for mankind the character of the original Napoleon has been drawn by various hands. He has been sketched in every pose—as citizen, soldier, and king—by German, French, English, American, and Italian masters. Every action of his dazzling career has been studied and pourtrayed, every tint and shadow of his cunning and daring policy brought out in strong colours, but it is

acknowledged by all that he was the most eminent man of the past or present century. He was a thoroughly modern hero, but not in a high or lofty sense. "His mind," says an eminent American, "was largely receptive, and he was so placed that he became the receptacle of all the wit, intelligence, and power of his age and country," so that every sentence spoken by him, and every line of his writing deserve attention, as it is the sense of France. Emmerson, in his "Representative Men," says, "He was the idol of common men because he worked with that great class for wealth and power. But he was specially without any scruple as to his means. He renounced all sentiments and affections, and helped himself with his hands and his head."

To fully comprehend the wondrous power which this man obtained, we must contemplate him in all his phases. He was a worker in earth, roads, buildings, money, and troops; and, moreover, he was a master workman. He acted with the precision and solidity of natural bodies, and men gave way before him as before natural events. "He was," says the same vigorous writer, "a ciphering operative, and knew what he was working with, and what would be its product." This artisan Emperor knew the properties not only of metals—gold as well as iron—machinery as well as ships, but he well understood the duty of troops and diplomatists, and he required that each should do after its kind. Indeed the art of war was the game in which he excelled. By his skilful manœuvring he could beat a large force with a small one. His tactics were simple and efficacious; they consisted in bringing two men to bear upon one at a critical point in a battle.

The bright and shining spots in this man's career still dazzle men's eyes on the continent, and blind them with a flood of false light. He is to thousands a pattern democrat; he had their virtues and activity. He was a man of iron frame and will. He could sit on horseback throughout a long day without rest or food. His hand of iron, he said, was not at the extremity of his arm; it was immediately connected with his head. Unembarrassed by scruples, he was selfish and prudent; but he was superstitious, and alluded to his "Star," and was pleased when he was called the "Child of Destiny."

It would not have been expected that, with a weakness of this sort, so much directness of action, combined with so much comprehension, would have been found in the same man. But Napoleon saw at a glance where a matter hinged, and threw himself body and soul upon the precise point of resistance. "He was strong in the right manner," continues Emmerson, "namely, by insight." He never blundered upon victory, but won his battles in his head before he won them in the field. His actions were as prompt and secret as his thoughts. In the plenitude of his resources every obstacle seemed to vanish. "There shall be no Alps," he said, "and he made his perfect roads, and by graded galleries climbed their steepest precipices until Italy was as open to Paris as any town in France."

The character of Napoleon the First has a direct influence upon

our times, for it is natural to believe in great men. Besides, he is a lense through which the most powerful despot of the day reads the future. The master of "Thirty Legions" of practised warriors has tried his hand at war. He has his ambition; he may hope to produce a historical parallel—In Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena. He is reported to have said "he will avoid the mistakes of his uncle." Does he allude to Moscow, Waterloo, and Trafalgar? His Russian alliance and his superb steam fleet of line-of-battle ships are indications of his future policy, which time alone can develope.

If fighting be the best mode of settling differences of opinion, then Napoleon the First was right in making it thorough. "An army," he said, "ought always to be ready by day and by night, at all times and seasons, and at all hours, to make all the resistance it is capable of." So well did his system work, that he made war support war. Every victory to him, says the author of "Representative Men," "was a new weapon." However, he seldom calculated upon a reverse, and when it came, he was—not a *hero*.

But his chief ability seemed to be his thorough insight into the character of the French people. He was the representative of their genius. He could do what he pleased with them. They submitted to be decimated by conscriptions; to have their land sucked of its nourishment; to see their commerce decay, and their national credit reduced to bankruptcy, so long as he kept open a market for their vanity and military taste. A few brilliant prizes made the ignorant masses blind to the millions of blanks. Seventeen men only were raised from common soldiers to the rank of king, marshal, duke, or general. "I made my generals out of mud," was his reply on one occasion, when solicited to rely more upon the intelligence and aristocracy of France. Of a truth his only nobility was, as he said, "the rabble of the Faubourgs," and the unbounded sacrifices made by this class, can only be reckoned by millions.

Napoleon's moral character also has a great influence upon our times, for so sincere an imitator as his nephew may be tempted or be blinded by his admiration of his idol, to follow his example.

A stern but impartial writer has thus described the elder Napoleon, it is for the student of passing events to see if he recognizes in the following portrait any that will dovetail with his own suggestions. He says, "Bonaparte was singularly destitute of generous sentiments. The highest placed individual in the most cultivated age, yet he had not the merit of common truth and honesty: *he was a boundless liar*. The official paper, his *Moniteurs*, and all his bulletins, are proverbs for saying what he wished to be believed; and worse, he sat in his premature old age, in his lonely isle, coldly falsifying facts, and dates, and characters, and giving to history a theatrical eclat. Like all Frenchmen, he had a passion for stage effect. Every action that breathes of generosity was poisoned by this calculation. His '*star*,' his '*destiny*,' his love of glory, his doctrine of the immortality of the soul, are all French." He said, "I must dazzle and astonish. *If I were to give the liberty of the press, my power could not last three days.*" The same writer further says, "He would steal, slander, assassinate, drown, and poison, as his interest dictated." When allusion was made to the precious blood

of centuries which was spilled by the murder of the Duc d'Enghien, he replied, "Neither is my blood ditchwater."

We close our remarks, with the concluding observations of the same eloquent writer: "he was" alluding to the elder Napoleon, "capable of vulgar hatred, intensely selfish, and perfidious; he cheated at cards; he was a prodigious gossip and opened letters; and delighted in his infamous police, and rubbed his hands with joy when he intercepted some morsel of intelligence concerning the men and women about him, boasting that he knew 'everything;' he interfered with the cutting of women's dresses, and listened after the hurrahs and the compliments of the street incognito. It does not appear that he listened at keyholes, or at least, that he was caught at it. In short, when you have penetrated through all the circles of power and splendour, you were not dealing with a gentleman at last, but with an imposter and a rogue; and he fully deserves the epithet of '*Jupiter Scapin*,' or a sort of Scamp Jupiter."

And what was the result of this vast talent and power? What became of his immense armies, with which he burned cities, squandered treasures, immolated millions of men and demoralised Europe? All has passed away, and left no trace, except that he left France poorer and feebler than he found her. It was the result of an experiment worked out with a sensual and selfish aim.

And what is the consequence? We see, after a lapse of forty years, that the whole contest has to be begun again. For this man is re-produced. Napoleon the Third hopes to be another Napoleon the First. The points of identity are curious. He sprang, like his great prototype, from the throes of a revolution to a throne. The rabble of the Faubourgs is also his "true nobility." They look on him as "flesh of their flesh," and the creature of their party. His elevation to the Tuilleries is due to them; he is their captain and king.

But this "remarkable man" is our "faithful ally." He is the master of a hundred victorious legions, and we must poise our words even while we sketch his portrait. Napoleon the Third, like his uncle, is a working king; like him too, he represents the genius of France; and it is impossible not to admire how his ready hand takes "occasion by the beard." He is also the most eminent man of his day, as well as the most powerful.

While acknowledging his abilities, Englishmen will do well to remember that he expresses the tone of thought and belief of the great masses of France; and her tone is antagonistic to England. He is the leading spirit of a country, which from its geographical position, and according to its government, must always be a curse or the regenerator of Europe. He is just the man to play a desperate game, for he is a dexterous politician. At Bordeaux he said: "*L'Empire c'est la paix;*" but it suits him now to say: "*L'Empire c'est l'epée.*" The words are very similar in sound, but they admit of a different signification. Until recently, Napoleon was France; he now seeks to be European. He, like his uncle, believes in his "star," and that it is his "destiny" to humiliate England. It would seem that a superstitious weakness was common to both uncle and nephew on this *point. Nous verrons.* However, we ought to be on our guard,

for the Emperor only echoes the voices of all parties in France, whether Republicans, Imperialists, or Orleanists, when he threatens us with invasion. A war with England would be the sewer of France; it would drain all discord out of it.

Napoleon the Third in common with Napoleon the First, is a realist. His principal adviser is himself; he seeks no counsel from others; he is firm, sure, self-denying, sacrificing everything to his aim. Like his model, he has strangled public opinion, silenced the press, and driven liberty from France. As President, he started with the motto: "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité." The first it is complained by Frenchmen is now only an article for exportation, and is never seen in Paris, except in some *placarde*, which men read at the corner of the streets, or on the lids of tobacco boxes. Anecdotes may be collected to prove this, but his celebrated *coup d'état* is enough to convince any one how much liberty he allows to a man bold enough to have an opinion of his own.

The points of similarity between the two Napoleons are too numerous to be individualised; but a few more of the most significant are too curious to be passed over in silence. Like his pattern, to the gifts which nature has endowed him, he adds the advantage of having passed through the vicissitudes of poverty and privation. He was a prisoner and an exile before he was a king; his model was a soldier passed through all the subordinate ranks, and became an Emperor. The rough school of adversity was of immense advantage to both. It is the key of the present Emperor's power; it enables him to understand the middle classes, so that when his "true nobility," the rabble of the Faubourgs, strike for bread, he does not give them bayonets, as some kings have done.

He is a good "second edition" of the first Emperor, in his taste for the improvement and embellishment of Paris, for he is a worker in brass and in iron, in earth and in wood, in roads and buildings, in money and in troops. He also is a "ciphering operative"—an artizan king. He has raised an army of prodigious strength, and when we say, that in seven years he has produced a screw steam navy that has given to the first maritime powers on earth considerable uneasiness, we shall only praise him in a mild form.

It is obvious that we cannot pursue the comparisons any further. The conditions are not complete. The "destiny" of Napoleon III. is not fulfilled. Future historians may finish the parallel. The pestilent malady which he fostered in Italy is for a time stayed, but who believes that the scourge will not break out again? Like his great prototype, Napoleon III. seeks to dazzle and astonish Europe by fits and starts. He is impulsive, and lives by springing traps to catch the admiration, or to surprise mankind. His whole life and history is an eccentric wonderment. Like a will-o'-the-wisp, he jerked himself from the stagnant vapours of a prison, and now he hovers with a garish light upon a glittering throne. Men gaped with incredulous wonder when, with the gyratory swoop of a boomerang he aimed at empire at Strasbourg and Boulogne. He flew at a throne and found himself in a prison. His escape from the fortress of Ham was another nine days' wonder. As an exile in London he excited our admiration as a special constable;

but he soon amazed the world again by jumping, staff in hand, into the throne of the Tuilleries. He then became a Jupiter, and thundered accordingly. He stunned us with his *coup d'état*, and struck us dumb when he gagged the press of France. He bewildered us into a war with Russia, and vexed us with his anxiety for an early peace. We were amazed when he kissed our most gracious Sovereign's cheek at Windsor. He astounded us with his impudent braggadocia after Orsini's affair. Took us aback with his superb screw lines-of-battle. Bullied us in the Portuguese slave question. Fascinated us at Cherbourg. Struck us dumb with his secret treaty with Russia. Staggered us with the Austrian war, and we are now in a state of stupefaction at the surprising way he has "freed" Italy, and as a conqueror sued for peace. At the present moment it is doubtful whether we are standing on our head or our heels; the only thing certain is, that we are again all agape, expecting a new surprise from this royal conjuror. However, the moves on the political chessboard are not easily divined, and whether Napoleon III. will checkmate the world, or be checkmated himself, posterity alone can determine.

It is enough for us to know that such is the man who is said to be our "faithful ally." But the most singular phase of the affair is, the standing antagonism that exists between England and her powerful friend. We are arming as fast at we can, and however Lord Palmerston may boast of his intimacy with his Imperial despot, it is from our "faithful ally" that we expect the blow. The instinct of active minds throughout these realms, points to Napoleon as the disturber of our peace, if not the invader of our soil. Our timid, selfish ministers rely upon the promises of a Buonaparte; but the bold and self-relying masses of Englishmen, upon whom the brunt of the difficulty will fall, disbelieve all such assertions, and we trust will manfully rely upon themselves.

History is full to this day of the imbecility of kings, ministers, and governors; but Napoleon III. is an exception. He offers a striking contrast to the universal indecision, indolence, and party selfish spirit of our public men. Our system of routine has become fossilised, and our statesmen petrifactions. What we may expect with such rulers as Gladstone, Newcastle, and Herbert, men who sacrificed our gallant army in the Crimea, when pitted against this master workman is deplorable to contemplate. It may be, that they may be more sensitive to the danger of reducing our defences than they were, but we remember the traditions of Woolwich, and the deficient state of our ordnance just before the Russian war, and then our faith sinks like quicksilver in a hurricane.

Lord Derby's administration was putting the nation in a good fighting condition. In a few months Sir John Pakington doubled the strength of the British fleet, which, it will be remembered, was reduced to a shameful condition of weakness by the Palmerston Government at the period when his attempt to pass his Conspiracy Bill, fortunately for England, relieved him from official responsibility. How we then began to count ships with France, and in the reckoning how deficient we appeared. Thanks to Sir John Pakington, we are *now equal to* our "faithful ally" upon the high seas, and we

trust that the present administration will not reduce our navy so as to render such a wealthy country as England a mark for the cupidity of France and Russia. Our free institutions are a plague spot to these despotic powers. We must pay the penalty attached to wealth as well as liberty, for they have their drawbacks as well as their manifold advantages. The first point, indeed the only point, by the side of which all others sink into insignificance, is to be prepared for the tiger spring that will some day be made at us, for preparation with Englishmen is security. R. P.

FROM CAMP TO QUARTERS.

OR, LIFE IN AN INDIAN CANTONMENT AFTER FIELD SERVICE.

PART IV.

The Climate of India—The Hospital—No Authority—How to Support "Dignity"—Fatalism and its Results—An Adventure—Comfort of Out Door Life—Native Habits—"Chota Hazree"—Tea—Oases in the Desert—Routine of Life—India's Characteristic—The Band—Indian "Ladies" and Indian Children.

We concluded the previous part of this narrative in considering some respects in which the manner of life in India of the British soldier and those dependent upon him does not quite realise the impressions entertained on the subject by the uninitiated at home. The subject is by no means an agreeable one, yet is fertile in capabilities of illustration. We have alluded to the comfort and the care bestowed upon the sick soldier in India, and no doubt very great and very praiseworthy they are. Yet they approach but in a very distant degree what, according to popular opinion, they are believed to be.

Many persons take a vast deal of trouble to impress upon others what they themselves cannot possibly believe to be true; they would have us convinced that there is nothing in the circumstances of a soldier's service in India to render his chances of health and life less than they are at home, and some do not hesitate to assert that not only is the climate in itself not less salubrious than that of Britain, but that it quite equals, if, indeed, it does not excel it. Do not, however, let us be carried away by the fair speeches of any such Indophilus—India is not favourable to British constitutions, whether belonging to officers or soldiers; neither are the proportions of deaths from intemperance anything like so numerous as he would have us suppose.

Fear not, reader, no medical dissertation is about to be passed off upon you clandestinely, and under false pretences. I could not write one if I wished, nor would you probably read it if I did. I trust, however, you will not object to take in imagination at least a walk with me through the hospital of Dandgunge.

We approach the building. It is a long, dreary-looking place surrounded by a high wall; thus as effectively as possible excluding

free circulation of the air of heaven. The guard at the gate permit us to pass, and we find ourselves within the grounds, which are covered with cow dung; small cesspools for the temporary retention of refuse appear here and there, a few natives walk languidly to and fro, and mayhap a few more are busy, that is, as much so as a native can be, milking cows. "Good heavens!" we exclaim, "who is responsible for this? He surely ought to be brought to book for such palpable neglect of all sanitary rules."

Among the train of followers that has already increased to a considerable extent about us is a half-caste, pert-looking young lad, dressed in the style of costume called "loud," and evidently holding an elevated position—in his own estimation. His hat, a regular chimney pot, is sufficiently to one side to be what he rather flatters himself is "just the thing," and with a hand on each hip he at once and without hesitation informs us in unexceptionable *chee chee* accents, that Dr. Cheek is the surgeon in charge of the Queen's corps, but Dr. Snooks is the one in charge of the Company's troops, for at this time there was an East India Company, and a few troops had still been left to them.

Enlightened so far, we continue. "Very good, but who is the senior? who is responsible for the whole?"

"Well, sir," is the response, "I don't exactly know who is senior; Dr. Cheek looks the oldest man, but he has nothing to do with our side of the compound, we always keep the Queen's corps separate."

It were needless further to follow the colloquy, the upshot of which was, that the station authorities having shrunk from the idea of permitting a medical servant to be dictated to by one of her Majesty's service, the result was as described, and considerably worse than has been described, inasmuch as no person cared to maintain discipline. Irregularities committed on one side were speedily repeated on the other; no person cared, because no person had authority to act, and so matters went on from bad to worse.

But we must hurry in and visit the interior of this long, dreary place, that may indeed be likened to a charnel house.

At the door a heavy sickening smell, indicative of organic disease and decomposition, ere yet vitality has ceased, strikes offensively our olfactories; we have seen such scenes before, and need not to ask whence the effluvia arose, we know its haunts to be the fever and the dysentery which fill the wards, and also alas! the two graveyards that are now so crowded with dead that a third has lately to be opened.

The stone flags with which the floor is paved look damp, a sickly green covering of fungus tinges the inner walls to a height of some two or three feet, and along each side of the dreary-looking ward, which is not less than 200 feet from end to end, see ranged our fellow countrymen, prostrated by disease in all its possible forms, the greater portion to rise no more from their beds of agony.

Accustomed as we are to trying scenes, we cannot behold the present without a sigh. It is now the month of August; the temperature exceeds 90°; the air, saturated with moisture, refuses to take up the ordinary perspiration, which, therefore, stands in big drops,

or trickles down the faces of the unhappy sufferers, the drops rendered bigger, and the streams more profuse, by the pain and bodily suffering induced by their disease; wildly and restlessly they toss their arms about, or throw off the flimsy sheet that had formed the only covering they could bear. We now see that their bare arms and exposed chests present one mass of that most irritating complaint called "prickly heat." Their mouths are parched with thirst—many open, while flies innumerable harass them in a manner more intolerable than the disease; above them are suspended punkahs, which move gently and slowly from side to side, drawn by natives more than half asleep, their motion is too inconsiderable to produce natural agitation of the air, and even if it did there would be little use, for, as I have said, evaporation could not take place.

But Indophilus no doubt asks what has become of the enormous establishment of what are called medical subordinates and native attendants that he knows are attached to all European corps, for he is an old Indian—a *very* old Indian, and will not call them what they really are—British regiments.

I will tell you what has become of them. They still exist, perhaps not much changed from what they were many years ago as regards appearance, but, apparently, much altered, and not by any means to the better as regards estimate of their own dignity and importance, and, in consequence, not a little degenerated as regards efficiency; it being their ruling doctrine, that in order to support this supposed dignity, one of the most important points is to neglect this particular duty as much as possible.

A little inquiry, or a little experience, soon teaches us how this object is achieved. No sooner do the medical officers leave their wards than the prescriptions to be prepared, and instructions to be followed, are passed on by the senior subordinate to his immediate junior whilst he retires to his breakfast, or his flute, or his cornopean, or his friends who have come even at the early hour of morning "visit" to have a "rubber."

The next junior, in like manner, passes the orders down to some one else, who repeats them to his "inferior," at last they arrive at Coolies, who know nothing about, and care, if possible, less, than that for any subjects whatever, except pice, rice, and hookah, and, consequently, never carry out whatever orders they receive, unless, in as far as they have a direct bearing upon either of these, to them necessities of life.

Fatalists they are, too, in every sense of the word, and if they ever reason at all, which is more than doubtful, do so somewhat thus: "If it so happen that the fate of this dog of a Feringhee (alluding to some unfortunate sick soldier in hospital) be to die, why, he must die, and what use is there in my giving up my hooka, or my game at Picheesee, to go and attend him, besides which, if he die, there will be one 'gora' less in the land of my forefathers, and his death may be received by the great goddess Devee, whose worshipper I am, as an acceptable sacrifice from her votary.

"But if, on the other hand, his 'kusinat' be to live, why, he must live. What signifies it that he now lies prostrate, muttering

to himself in the delirium of fever, teeth and lips parched, and covered with black incrustation, the odour from which is that of death? What signifies it that the horrible 'flux' that has already claimed as victims some of his comrades, has now prostrated him to the last extremity of feebleness? If so be that he shall live, he shall live. So why should I leave my comfortable mat, on which I sleep away five-sixths of my time, to administer medicine, or moisten the parched lips, or support failing strength by small quantities of wine often repeated, or beef tea, or to change the clothes of a patient rendered loathsome by disease, when, if he is to live, he shall live."

This, be it understood, is no garbled account of the maner in which sick soldiers are treated by the native *attendants* in India, and, as a consequence, many and many a noble fellow falls a sacrifice to the low estimate of the value of human life entertained not only by the natives themselves, but by the half-caste population from which the ranks of the subordinate medical department are principally recruited; and to the horrible doctrine of fatalism that leads its believers to act literally as I have described.

Do these matters not come under the cognisance of the medical officer, and is it not his duty to stop them?

It is seldom, indeed, that they do, and, even when they do, it is not in his power to put a stop to them. Nothing will rouse the energies of the half-castes of India. Praise and censure are alike received by them with the most perfect indifference, and as to exerting themselves in the slightest degree beyond what they are required to do in order to keep their positions, that is what they never will do. Added to these defects of character, it must, I fear, be said of them, as a class, that, small as is their regard for the lives of British soldiers, it is in this respect not smaller than their regard for truthfulness. The immediate effect of this is, that whatever orders are given to them, there can be no certainty of these orders being carried out, the report furnished to the medical officer not being always in accordance with facts.

A change in this particular department is much needed, but as yet, it is to be feared, is far distant, and for this simple reason, that the old Indian medical officers, few of whom know anything practically regarding British regiments, and their love for everything native and Indian being all powerful, they will not be convinced that the whole system of the present hospital establishments are faulty in the extreme, and much in need of most thorough and complete reform.

This is not the place to enter at length into such a subject, but as having a powerful bearing upon the well-being and sufficiency of the British soldier, a brief notice may, perhaps, be permitted in a Magazine that devotes itself to military subjects.

From this subject I turn for a little to one of a less technical nature. Our service had, as already mentioned, been long and arduous, we had suffered much exposure to most trying weather at a most trying season, and for some time had looked forward with no little curiosity, as well as anxiety, to the time when we should enjoy

the luxury of sleeping in a house. But, alas! for all human anticipations. As in many other respects, we found that in this the actual realisation of our hopes fell far short of their anticipation. Accustomed as we had been for months to the free air of heaven, we experienced a feeling of oppression and confinement when we attempted at first to sleep in a house. The walls looked disagreeably solid; we fancied we did not obtain a sufficient supply of air; the punkahs that swung above annoyed us by their slow and monotonous oscillation, while they did not give the slightest relief from the stifling and muggy heat that oppressed us.

What was to be done, thought we? Could we ever hope again to submit to the inconvenience of sleeping within doors? We could only hope to do so, from the knowledge we had previously gained by personal experience of how our nature can, when required, accommodate itself to circumstances; and so we wished to be able, bye and bye, to reconcile ourselves to living in a house.

Our first night's attempt was, however, a decided failure. We tossed about—we stretched ourselves—we got up—walked about—then went to bed—then got up again. It was of no use—we could not succeed in our numerous attempts to secure the drowsy god; at last we resolved to remove our beds once more from the confined precincts of brick and mortar, and place them under the star bespangled firmament, to which we had become accustomed. No sooner was the resolution taken than executed; and no sooner executed than followed by a degree of success we had scarcely calculated upon. Sleep, heavy and sound, now stole over us, burying in sweet oblivion, for a time, our cares, our troubles, and annoyances. How long we should have remained thus enshrouded in forgetfulness it is difficult to say; for sometimes we lay utterly unconscious of all life's troubles, cares, and pleasures, only to be roused into a condition of half dreaminess by the heavy, dull report of the morning gun as it proclaimed the approach of daylight.

Accustomed as we had been to sounds of this description, we were soon sound again in repose, when a rolling as of wheels upon a hard, well metalled road came upon our ears. This was something altogether new—it was unlike the rattle of guns, as they sped across cultivated fields, or over dry arid plains. It was altogether different from, and unlike the creaking, teeth-setting-on-edge sound of native bullock hackeries. It was, in fact, something to which we had for months ceased to be accustomed, and ere we had in our minds solved the mystery, it was unravelled for us by an open carriage and pair sweeping down upon us. With half-opened eyes we beheld the sylph-like figures of two young ladies, as reclining upon and half buried in spring cushions, they proceeded on their morning drive, or in Oriental phrase, "to eat the air." The moment was a trying one, requiring an amount of decision and presence of mind, which, had they been displayed as now in calmer moments I see they might have been, would have saved us from making a sad exposé of ourselves, and, perhaps, also of having afforded the unexpected amusement, if nothing else, we on that unlucky morning did to the fair *beauties* of Dandgunge.

Permit me, my most sedate and "proper" reader, to ask what would you have done under the trying circumstances? But the question is needless. You would have done what we did not. You would have remained stretched upon your couch, would have drawn the coverlet over your face, and thus concealed from angelic gaze, have enjoyed your quiet titter, while outsiders enjoyed theirs at a figure they could not afterwards identify. We, on the contrary, with horror, be it confessed, rushed frantically across the road in front of the approaching carriage, dressed as we were in scant and airy habiliments; and as we disappeared into the inner recesses of what ought to have been our bed room, found our ears assailed by sounds much more like a hearty laugh, than screams of alarm uttered by our fair disturbers.

This small adventure taught us the necessity of once more disciplining our gipsy habits that even already were fast becoming, if they had not actually become, "second nature," so that we should not again shock, if we did shock, the delicate sensibilities of the *elite* of Dandgunge. We must become once more civilised, and to that end must as a set off sleep in the house.

And while night after night we deposit our cot nearer and nearer the door, until we finally succeed in keeping it inside altogether, let me muse for a little on what in our earlier experience of Indian habits we looked upon as the most undomestic of all customs, that of the natives spending the greater part of their time in the open air, and their very houses being generally from construction and materials ill calculated to afford shelter and protection from the rains that periodically fall.

Never, until now, could I understand the greater personal comfort of living in the open air than in a house, there is a freedom and cheerfulness about the former that cannot be experienced in a building; the very atmosphere in the country, away from crowded habitations is never so oppressive and exhausting in its effects as in the vicinity of stations, and that it is actually more healthy, is indicated by the fact that exposure to the sun under such circumstances is far less dangerous than in the neighbourhood of cantonments. Thus we see how very healthy as a body are Europeans, such as indigo planters, whose avocations oblige them to be much in the open air, and how great an amount of sickness affects soldiers and other residents of a crowded cantonment.

We observe that every native hut in the vicinity of Dandgunge, and in fact all over the lower portion of Bengal, is provided with a large open verandah, in which by day sit cross legged the occupants, the male portion engaged in vending such goods as form their stock in trade, from the humble dealer in earthen vessels that cost less than a farthing each, to the wealthy merchants who deal in silks and jewellery of exquisite finish and costly value. Here they receive their visitors, discuss the scandal of their own community and politics of the country, while the menial females of the establishment keep the vicinity tidy by besmearing it with cow dung. At night, the stores are left as they had been during the day, the rude sliding doors that are then put up in front scarcely serve to secure

the space, in which the occupants of the hut, if they do not, as they often do, sleep in the very places they had occupied during the day, distribute themselves about among the articles of merchandise in so promiscuous a manner as would astonish the uninitiated. People in India are not very particular in their tastes, otherwise they would not be inclined to relish confectionary that had been thus flavoured, especially, when in addition to this, it is further impregnated with the dust of a bazaar, to which it is continually exposed.

In the larger native towns, the inhabitants are in a great measure precluded from sleeping outside their houses, except upon the tops, where they still assemble in groups, as represented in biblical history. In the scattered villages, however, that occur in country districts, or Mofussil, as the provinces are here called, the interior of the huts are almost entirely deserted during the night, and it is by no means an uncommon occurrence to find that while the parents have been sound asleep, a child has been carried away by wolves.

This being the case with the natives, it is scarcely to be wondered at that we should soon become habituated to an out-door life. Where houses are obtainable, surrounded by large enclosures, it is the almost invariable custom for gentlemen during the dry hot weather to sleep outside. Ladies cannot well do this, and some men do not adopt the practice for fear of night dues and malaria; but there are some respects in which they follow with comfort to themselves the eastern habit of sitting outside.

For several months in the year the tea table holds its place either on a "chebutra" of masonry at a little distance from the house, or in an open verandah. Here the lady enjoys after a morning drive, her "chota hazree," or small breakfast, consisting of tea and buttered toast. Here she and her husband receive their letters, should the servant, instead of themselves, have called for them at the post-office. And here it must I fear be confessed, advance and ripen an occasional acquaintance, that in this country sometimes ends disastrously.

So after dinner, unless when the presence of a large party renders it incumbent to remain in a stifling drawing-room, listening to bad music and uninteresting conversation, it is customary to retire "outside," where the ladies have tea, listening, it may be, to some regimental band as it plays at a neighbouring mess-room, and where very many a pleasant hour is spent.

There are, it must be confessed, agreeable points in the manner of our life in cantonments—oases in the desert of monotony and ennui of our existence, and being agreeable, their recollection clings to us with fortunate pertinacity; for is it not indeed fortunate that we sooner forget in after days the painful episodes of our life, than we do the chapters that have at the time been most agreeable?

In the daily routine of life at an Indian station, there is, perhaps, the very minimum of useful occupation or excitement to the masses; for we must not include in our remarks the officers and others, who by virtue of appointments of responsibility and trust, have their time more than fully occupied, nor the ladies, upon whom devolve the cares, responsibilities, anxieties, and pleasures of a family, and

who are upright and honourable enough to discharge to the best of their ability, their various duties towards them. Excluding these classes, who certainly constitute the minority at a military station, I will briefly run over the chief events of a day; and those of each are but a repetition of the preceding, and such as the succeeding will in all probability be.

No sooner does morning gun fire, than almost all the white population are astir—soldiers preparing for parade, and so their officers; the "disengaged" to take their morning drive, on which they start shortly after daylight, and unless in an exceptional instance, they happen to meet with a spectacle, such as happened to the fair ones already mentioned, they wile away a couple of hours with nothing to amuse or even interest. On the contrary, until the native army destroyed itself, and even since then, although in a minor degree, their morning drive was rendered disagreeable and often revolting, by one of the many filthy observances of the petted Sepoys, who were permitted, nay encouraged, by their own officers, to outrage public decency, because, forsooth, any interference would be hurtful to their feelings.

The morning drive over, "chota hazree" makes its appearance, after which time is spent variously till ten, when in early families breakfast is served up; but in many, not for an hour or two afterwards. From this till "tiffin," how the idly inclined waste their time; calls, as already mentioned, are made between twelve and two, after which luncheon is served up, and then a siesta, or trifling fills up the time till towards sunset, when really commences the Indian day.

With the disappearance of the last rays, carriages, buggies, equipages of all descriptions, equestrians upon all sorts of steeds, from the magnificent Arab to the wretched tattoo, appear upon the mall, but there are no pedestrians to be seen, unless, mayhap, a military band plays, on which occasions, etiquette permits "society" to walk in the immediate vicinity of the stand, if so inclined. And now we approach India's chief characteristic, in as far as social habits are concerned.

On the mall, the equipages are driven along at the slowest possible pace consistent with locomotion. Occasionally a buggy may, at an unfashionably rapid pace drive past; but if it merely contain gentlemen, no further attention is deigned than a languidly expressed, "the cubs that they are—Queen's officers!" But if by chance a lady is being driven past, delicate it may be, or her husband oppressed by arduous duty throughout the long tedious day, and now intent on breathing a little country air before dinner, then woe betide the unlucky couple. "Ah! there they go, those stuck-up Spences," drawls out one languid denizen of the barrack. "This place is too small for them, forsooth; they cannot breathe the same air as us—but let them go. I dare say we can exist without them."

Then again it may so happen that the avocations of the husband prevent him on that particular evening from taking his accustomed drive. A press of business as office is about to close, delays him; the post is about to start; some correspondence must be attended

to. His wife walks, ready dressed, up and down the verandah; he hurries through his work, but the more he hurries the more he finds his inability increases to get through the heap of papers that lie before him. It perhaps so happens that a gentleman friend at the time drives up. Unthinkingly he asks, "I say old fellow, I'm busy just now, and my wife requires a drive; will you just take her out for an hour?" Alas, alas! The fruits of such an imprudent request soon become gall and bitterness. As Mrs. Spence is being driven along the mall, ill-natured and unkind remarks do not take long to reach her ears.

"Oh, dear; just look at this!" exclaims one lady whose own house is, if report speaks true, made of most delicate and transparent glass. "Just look here, Mrs. Spence has at last picked up a beau; and see how well they seem to be matched, how happy they appear. I should not wonder if they were going straight away along the road."

Should they in reality prolong their drive, the circumstance becomes the subject of talk that very evening at the band stand.

"Aha!" says one lady, "you may depend upon it that couple are much more agreeably engaged in the buggy by themselves, than coming here as other people do."

"And the husband!" chimes in a second. "How sad it is that he allows his wife to drive with everybody but himself; I should not wonder if he has been made to stay at home on purpose."

In this style runs on the commentary, the remarks becoming more and more uncharitable as one crowd after another rolls on the ball of scandal. But it may so happen that while the conversation proceeds, the *errant* pair drive up, and the husband having finished the work in which he was occupied, makes his appearance at the same time.

But even this does not mend matters; if anything, the remarks that are banded about become even more uncharitable than before. It were useless here to follow the usual current of conversation on such occasions. I have at different times heard more than was desirable, and seen coteries of ladies—let us call them ladies for the nonce—assembled upon one of the seats or long forms that are placed at intervals near the band stand at Dandgunge, unmistakeably pointing at, and as unquestionably pulling to shreds, the reputation of some sister more interesting and attractive than themselves, who obtains the 'attention' that they find it impossible to command.

It depends upon the number of regiments at the station how often scenes such as these are enacted. Each band usually plays on two nights a week, so that if there are two corps as at Dandgunge, four evenings a week are spent in this way.

With the evening breeze, comes the first relief from the heat and oppression of an Indian day. Need we wonder, then, if people are inclined to linger till a tolerably late hour at the band? Dinner is usually at half-past seven or eight o'clock, that is fully an hour after complete darkness has closed in, or the pale moonlight has taken the place of the glare and dazzling intensity of the sun's rays. In tolerably cool evenings, it may be that people stroll quietly home,

but more generally the temperature is too high for even this small amount of exercise, and they are driven home in their different conveyances.

Bachelor officers now proceed to their various messes, unless during the afternoon they have had the good fortune to obtain an invitation, of which they seldom indeed omit to avail themselves, especially if there be a lady in the case; nor is there anything strange in this, all things considered! Married families when alone, after partaking of their quiet dinner, bestow the remainder of the evening upon their children; this being the only period of the day when the father can usually pay his family any attention.

It may sound strange to home ears, that children in India sit up till a late hour. Few, indeed, retire so early as they do in England; but then there is no necessity. Within doors all day long as they are obliged to remain, there is in reality to them very little difference between day and night, unless in so far as sunlight characterises the one, and lamplight the other. The intervals of sleeping and waking are tolerably equally distributed over the twenty-four hours, and although children are almost invariably up and astir with the first dawn of day, they perhaps upon the whole sleep during a greater number of hours before sunset than they do from that time till sunrise.

In a narrative of our mode of life in cantonments, we could hardly pass over in silence such a subject as that upon which I am now touching. On field service, ladies or children do not often, if they ever, come across our path; or, to speak more gallantly, we are, for the time being, debarred from the enjoyment of their society. There may, therefore, be the greater excuse, if any apology at all be necessary, why we should doubly appreciate the privilege we enjoy in quarters, of being brought under their civilising influence.

But I was talking of children—Indian children—poor little mortals that they are! Not for them are any of the lightsome joys that consecrate in after years the recollection of that most blest of life's changing scenes, to their more fortunate cousins whose happy lot it is to be born under a western and more temperate clime. The bird's-nesting, the "prowling in the burn," the games at romps, the blithesome race through hill and dale; these, and the thousand other pastimes of the children of our own happy land, are to those of India as if they had no existence.

In their stead, the Indian child is taught by the native servants to pass its time as they themselves do, in listless inactivity. If perchance its infantile instincts should at any time lead it away at a pace at all approaching a romp, it is at once pulled back, shaken, and mayhap pinched slyly, but severely, by the mild and gentle looking swarthy being who, to all appearance, is intently solicitous regarding it.

To sit monkey like in the arms of a nurse, playing with rude toys that evidently give as much amusement to the ayah, or the bearer, as to the child itself; to "hum" snatches of Hindostanee songs, to listen to lascivious anecdotes of Hindoo gods, to speak disrespectfully of their mother, to lie, cheat, and steal; these, and many other

amusements scarcely less reprehensible, form the early education of a British child left to the tuition of native servants of India.

Talk then of colonising the country! Imagine to yourself, whoever you may be whom I have the honour to address, a race of weak apathetic men and women growing up, whose early ideas, feelings, and trains of thought, have been formed on the model now briefly noted; and picture to yourself what would be the characteristics of the race of "colonists" a century hence!

GREENWICH HOSPITAL AS IT IS.

BY AN ANCIENT MARINER.

III.

A FEW days after the visit to Greenwich, the particulars of which I narrated in my last paper, I received the following epistle written in a fine, bold, old-fashioned hand. It was from my old shipmate, Ben, and with a few orthographical corrections, I give it *verbatim*:—

"*Greenwich College Infirmary, June* 1, 1859.

"Honoured Sir,—I was told on Sunday by one of my wardmates, who came to see me in the afternoon, that a gentleman had been making enquiries about me, and afterwards an old shipmate, Boatswain Johnson, came in and gave me your direction, and told me of your kindness to him and his poor dear old woman, for which I thank you, as I am always glad to hear about those who help these poor creatures, so I suppose that you are the gentleman. I write these few lines to say that I am in the doctor's list, and that is the reason why you could not find me, because you did not ask at the main guard when you was down here the other day.

"I have been in the infirmary ever since the day after I saw you, for you must know, honoured sir, that after you went away, I met with an old shipmate, and having a trifle of money in my pocket, owing to your kindness, I asked him to have a glass with me, and we accordingly went into The Cricketers. We stopped there till past ten o'clock, and when I got outside the house to go into the college, I felt my head rather dizzy, although I had only tasted one pint of beer. I and my shipmate got to the gate, and that policeman that we spoke to going out about the hat, made some remark about my not being sober, but he let me pass, and I went on towards my ward. Shortly afterwards I felt giddy again, and fell down on the pavement just by the corner of the infirmary, and hurt my face very much, and the next thing I remember was finding myself in the infirmary, and a sick attendant washing the blood off my face.

"Next day I was told that I was down to go before the Captain of the Month, but, as I told you I never would go again before the

council, and my leg being bad, I asked the doctor, a nice civil young man, to keep me in the infirmary. My liver is diseased, so the surgeon says, and I am here still, and likely to remain for some time.

"Honoured sir, if you can spare an hour or two to come and see me, I shall be very thankful, for I mean to apply for the outbread when the doctor discharges me, and, perhaps, you may know some way of getting a living or to help keep me.

"This is a very long letter for me to write, but we have every convenience in here to write letters, which is more than we have in our ward, and I thought I would fill up the sheet of paper and tell you all about my trouble, and to say that if in trouble it was *quite an accident*, and no fault of mine, and that I have not disgraced you, sir, as your old shipmate.

"I remain, honoured sir, yours respectfully,
"BEN YOUNG.

"I am on the middle floor, east."

"So you are going to Greenwich again," said my affectionate rib, having heard me express an intention to do so, "and you do not want me to go with you. Very well then, and I shall go ——"

"You need not be angry," said I, most dutifully, not waiting to hear the determination of Mrs. B. "I only want to make enquiries into this business, because if Ben is not a notoriously bad character, I think I could get him a little employment although he is so old."

On arriving one fine afternoon at the infirmary gate, I was stopped by one of the "white coliarmen." I told him that my business was to see a patient, and he very civilly went in with my card and obtained permission of the medical officer on duty for my admission. I found that there was a regulation to prevent the patients from being visited at all times, unless in a dangerous state, and I acquiesced in the wisdom of the plan for their sake.

I found my old shipmate on what he called "the leads." A passage extending across from one side of the quadrangle to the other. He was smoking his pipe, and looking very well. When he saw me, his countenance flushed up with joy.

"So," said I, after shaking my old Quartermaster by the hand, "You are trying the old man-of-war dodge, and shamming Abraham—Sly old dog you."

Ben grinned extensively, showing the remains of what had been a good set of teeth.

"It's no good denying it to you," said he. "Fact is, sir, I think my doctor knows that I have some reason for not wishing to go out, and he don't seem anxious to discharge me. He says I have got an obstinate old complaint that requires careful watching, and that I am better here than outside."

"So you prefer being in here then?"

"I should wonder who would not? I have every comfort a poor man, or a rich man either, could desire. I can come out of my cabin, and smoke my pipe. I have a pound of meat and potatoes, nice puddings, if on low diet, and everything the doctor orders,

and if I want to go for a walk in the town the doctor will give me leave."

"And I see you have different clothes too."

"Yes," said Ben, "and a pocket to put my handkerchief in, which is more than I can find in the College clothes. The things we have here are light and comfortable, and a man feels able to breathe, and then you see we have caps to wear, not those heavy hats."

"And you have a servant to attend upon you, I suppose?"

"Yes, at any hour of the night. There is always some one on watch, and ready to attend to our wants. Come in and see my cabin, sir. I can ask you to sit down in my cabin here, which you know I did not like to do when I saw you last."

I gladly availed myself of the offer, and I must say I never was more pleased than with what I saw. Truly, as old Ben said, the rich man could enjoy no more. A beautifully clean white counterpane, clean curtains, bedside table, nice soft mattrass, sweet bed linen, and no vermin, bedside carpet, and everything denoting comfort. The cabin, or room, contained four beds, but only one beside Ben's was occupied. The floor was as clean as soap, water, and manual labour could make it, and the atmosphere of the room had not the smallest disagreeable taint or odour about it, that I could perceive. A deal table was by the side of the bed, upon which books and an inkstand—private property I understood—were placed.

"Here," said Ben, putting his hand on the table, "is where I wrote my long letter. I have no such comfort over there," pointing to the College, "for my cabin is so dark I cannot see to read in it, much less write. Won't you sit down, sir? there is a nice chair," pointing to a Windsor chair of goodly dimensions, "and I will sit on my bed and talk to you, for it is a treat to meet an old shipmate. The only thing against being in the infirmary for a single man," continued Ben, "is that there is some confinement, and visitors are only allowed to come in on certain days. How did you manage it?"

I told him, and he was much pleased that I had so little difficulty.

"A policeman would not have taken so much trouble," said Ben.

"I have been thinking," said I, "since I saw you, and more so, since my last visit on the Queen's birthday, that there are a good many ways want mending here; but then the people who are to do it must know what they are about, or they will do more harm than good. It is not money altogether, nor lax discipline, that will do what is necessary."

"Money would do a great deal," said Ben.

"You are an instance to the contrary," said I. "If you had had no money you would not have tumbled down perhaps."

"True for you, sir," said Ben, somewhat abashed, "you mean that if you had not given me the money I could not have treated my friend, nor yet have taken the last pint which made me feel so giddy. It is very true, sir, and I know very well that great part of the College men don't know that money is of any other use than to pay away for drink; but yet money is not all to blame."

"Why, surely, if, as you say, the College men don't know the use of money except to get drunk with it, money is to blame."

"You don't understand me," said Ben. "This is how I take it. If a man has money now, it is so little that he says it is no use making two bites of it. After paying for one little thing and another, blacking and soap, and an ounce or two of tobacco, there is only enough left for a glass of grog, and it goes for that; and then it makes him eager for more, for an old sailor has always been brought up to like it, and there are some fellows who would go without grub for a week to get a glass of grog; but if they were not so close hauled, they might think of other things, and eat instead of drinking."

"What things?"

"Why if we felt more at home in our wards, and had our little amusements there, and men of the same sort as ourselves for ward-mates, we might purchase newspapers and books, or go up to see our friends in London, and not think so much as we now do about the glass of grog, which is the only sort of comfort like we have."

"You think there ought to be a ward for petty officers, like Charley Johnson proposed."

"I did not know that he had mentioned it to you sir, but I know that nothing is so disagreeable for men who have seen better days as to be mixed up with the scrapings of workhouses, and fellows who have not long been out of gaol. Money won't do all, sir, but it will do a good deal; and if we were sorted like, and the decent sailors were separated from the blackguards, money would make us very happy; and we should feel a pride in ourselves."

"And you don't think it would increase the drunkenness?"

"Not if we were to take the money once a week. I can't answer for the best of us if we felt flush; for somehow a sailor can never be a miser, or keep gold by him."

"Perhaps you think you ought to have your pension?"

"No doubt we ought, sir, if we had fair play. The Governor and all the officers enjoy their pensions, and half-pay, and good salaries, and fine apartments, and why should not the men have their pensions?"

"Only because they would not know how to use the money, I suppose," said I.

"There is a good deal in what you say, sir; but fair play is fair play, and if a man did not know how to use his money, he ought not to have it. But what I should like better than taking the pensions ourselves, would be to put all the pensions in a general bag, if the Institution can't afford to pay us more, and put the men in ratings like petty officers. If I, as an old petty officer, could get my sixpence a day, I should not think so much of the fourteen pence I gave up when I came in, because I have board and lodging in the bargain."

"And you think most of the men would like it better?"

"Yes, I think it would be more satisfactory, for I know several men with twenty or thirty years' service, only because they have an

"R" against them for one part, they have no pension; yet they are as good as any of the men who have pensions."

"But some say that the men who have lost a limb should enjoy their pensions."

"And so should men of long service, then," returned Ben. "Now, sir, I will give you an instance. One of my wardmates not long ago was a young chap who had only been six months at sea, but through an accident he lost an arm, and got a pension of £26 a-year. I served twenty-five years, and was in half-a-dozen hard battles, and I earned my pension of £21 4s. by long service. Now, have I not as good a right to my pension for my long servitude in the navy, as this young fellow, and yet you say he is to have all his £26 and not me. That is not fair, sir. No, tar us all alike as to pensions, and let a petty officer be treated like a petty officer."

"Do you think the marines ought to be parted from the blue jackets?"

"Certainly, answered Ben, "but I expect you would have to give up three parts of the College to the marines, as they are three to one nearly, I should think."

"They don't agree with the sailors, do they?"

"Why, I cannot say who is in the wrong sometimes. Many of the marines are very respectable men; but the blue jackets, you know, have never been used to live and mess with marines. We were always separated on board ship, and sailors and marines were never the best of friends, except in an action, when all worked and fought together. It would be a very good plan to separate us. I am sure the jollies would be happier by themselves, for what does a marine care for a sailor's lingo, or a sailor for a marine's yarn about Sergeant Smith, Corporal Budgings, or Colonel Tomkins? Marines and blue-jackets are like oil and water, they won't mix."

"And who is that fine old fellow with long white hair, that came into the cabin just now?" I enquired.

"He's a marine, sir, and a very clean, respectable man."

"He does not seem to have much the matter with him," I remarked. "I think he must be suffering from your complaint."

"Perhaps he is," said Ben, reddening. "I think he is hanging on for a helpless ward."

"But he does not look helpless."

"No. But he has a weakness upon him which has got him into many scrapes."

"How so?"

"Well, sir, the nurse in his ward has complained of him very often, and he has been several times before the Council and put in the yellow."

"More than once?"

"Oh yes, six or seven times and more; and his money has been stopped to pay the nurse; and he has been mulcted in the bargain; but at the last the doctors examined the man, and found that he had been injured in the back, and that the crime for which he had been so severely punished he couldn't help."

"And what was done then?"

"Why, the poor fellow had some of his money returned to him, and the doctor has now taken him under his own charge; but the man feels his having been disgraced by these abominable yellow sleeves."

I said nothing, as I did not wish to exasperate the old man, who, I could see, could hardly keep his temper while telling his story, but I thought a good deal.

Ben now proposed that I should have a walk round the building, and we descended the wide staircase, and made a tour of the exterior within the railings. The grounds are very contracted, but cheerful, and well kept up. Grass plots, and flower beds, and benches, are placed in convenient situations for the old men. We went into a ground floor building for men who are quite helpless, and here every possible comfort was observable.

"How is it," I asked, "that everything here seems so orderly, and clean, and comfortable, while from what I have seen in the College wards, men seem to have so much to complain of? I suppose you are all under the same commanding officer?"

"The reason I take it is this, sir: the Infirmary is under the orders of the doctor, and you know that these doctors always take care of the sick, and keep them out of harm's way whilst under them. But when I first came into the College, the infirmary was very different from what it is now, and the men had a great dislike to go into it. All that you see has been done by the medical officers, these infirmary clothes and all that. The men used to have a sort of soldier's great coat when I first came here."

"And you can stay here as long as you like?"

"No, not so long as we like, but until the doctor discharges us; but he always consults the men before sending them out. If it was not for the restraints upon our liberty, I could never wish to leave this place. I don't consider I am skulking; I never was a skulker, you know; but as I am on the sheet for Council, I consider that when I am discharged from here I must leave the institution."

"But are you sure that the Council would punish you for falling down?"

"No, not for falling down, but because that policeman will swear I was drunk."

"Well, but the Council may take a lenient view of your case," said I. "Surely, old officers would not be hard upon an old tar like yourself?"

"They can't help me, sir. The rules of the hospital that we have got hanging up in our wards, tell us that a man *must* be punished if found guilty; and how can I get to windward of that policeman? No, sir, as soon I go out of this, I go out of the gates, for sooner than put on the banyan, I will do as lots of good fellows have done before me, suffer myself to be expelled. I would sooner sweep a crossing."

"And will not you being so long in the infirmary plead in your favor."

"No, it will be all against me. The Council will say I stopped in here on purpose; and will, perhaps, accuse me of skulking."

We sat down on a bench, and next to me was a poor decrepit old man, who seemed quite worn down with rheumatism and general debility. "Your work is almost done, my man," said I, addressing him.

"Almost, I am afraid, sir; but for my old woman's sake, I hope to get better."

"And have you to work for your bread still?"

"Not for my own bread, sir, for the institution finds it for me; but I must work for my wife."

"But what can you do?"

"Oh, sir," said the old fellow, lifting his emaciated crippled hand, "I have worked until the last two weeks; but I caught a cold and my limbs would not support me any longer."

"What situation did you hold then?"

"I was a kitchenman."

"And what did you get for that?"

"Ninepence—leastways, elevenpence altogether, a day."

"And what else?"

"Why, there was my tobacco money, which is a shilling a week, and butler's list money, about tenpence a day more."

"So you made up about thirteen shillings a week."

"Yes, sir; but for that I had to work from five o'clock in the morning till six o'clock at night; but I did not care for the work so long as I could do it. I used to put by a shilling a week, so that the poor old woman should have a trifle of a few shillings when I died; but she must live upon that now until I can go to work again."

"That will be a long time first, I am afraid," said I.

"I hope not, sir. I hope, please Providence, to get my breath a little better, for I am rather asthmatic just now, and then the doctor says I shall go out; he gives me all sorts of nourishing things."

"Have you no one to assist your poor wife while in here? how does she live?"

"No one, sir, but One above. Our children are all dead, or dead to us. My wife is on the main guard list, and gets some cocoa and a bit of meat every day—more or less, but she manages to live upon it, and she pays the rent of the room out of the few shillings we have saved. "I am seventy-eight years of age," said the poor man in reply to my question, and I have been married over forty years; my wife is seventy-five, and strong for her age, but not able to work. I hope for her sake, I shall get better, for she must go to the union when I die, and that may be very soon." Here a fit of coughing interrupted his plain but touching story.

Some of my readers will perhaps question the truth of these sketches. Let those who are sceptical go and see for themselves. Not a character is overdrawn, not a scene over-coloured:—

"Nothing extenuate nor set down aught in malice,"

is my maxim. They are plain matter-of-fact sketches of every-day life. Do they not seem to show that "Greenwich Hospital as it is" is very different from "Greenwich Hospital as it should be?"

NOTES ON MILITARY SCIENCE.

Lecture XXIV.

The next memorable battle to be noticed is that of Agincourt, for a trustworthy description of which reference has been made to "The Chronicle of John Hardyng," and "Holinshed's Chronicles;" from which antiquated and valuable publications, I will endeavour in a brief manner, to describe the heroic deeds of the English troops.

Battle of Agincourt, October 25th, 1415.

At the time when this engagement was about to take place, the army of Henry V. had been so diminished by sickness, that it only amounted to 2,000 horsemen, and 13,000 foot soldiers, in which were included archers, billmen, &c. Moreover, "the Englishmen were brought into some distress in this journey, by reason of their victuals in manner spent, and no hope to get more: for the enemies had destroyed all the corn before they came. Rest could they none take, for their enemies with alarms did so infest them: daily it rained, and nightly it freezed: of fuel there was great scarcity, of floods plenty: money enough, but wares for their relief to bestow it on had they none. Yet in their great necessity, the poor people of the country were not spoiled, nor anything taken of them without payment, nor any outrage or offence done by the Englishmen, except one, which was that a soldier took a pix out of a church, for which he was apprehended, and the king not once removed till the box was restored, and the offender strangled. The people of the countries thereabouts, hearing of such zeal in him to the maintenance of justice, ministered to his army victuals and other necessaries, although by open proclamation so to do they were prohibited."

The foregoing extract exhibits not only the hardships patiently endured by the English army, but also their high state of discipline, to the latter of which may be attributed their success in the subsequent battle. The strength of the army of the French monarch is stated to have been 60,000 horsemen, in addition to a numerous body of foot soldiers, altogether amounting to six times the force of the English combatants. In the morning, the French were drawn in three lines of battle, the van consisted of 8,000 knights and squires, 4,000 archers, and 1,500 cross-bow men; 1,600 men-at-arms formed a right wing, and 8,000 selected men-at-arms the left wing; and these were further strengthened by 800 men-at-arms. The second order of battle was formed by the same number, or more than the preceding: and in the rear order were the remaining men-at-arms. The following is the interesting description of the English order of battle:—"King Henry, also like a leader, and not as one led; like a sovereign and not an inferior, perceiving a plot of ground very strong and meet for his purpose, which on the back half was fenced with the village, wherein he had lodged the night before, and on both sides defended with hedges and bushes, thought good there to embattle his host, and so ordered his men in the same place, as he saw occasion, and as stood for his most advantage. First he sent privily, two hundred archers into a low meadow, which was near to the van guard of

his enemies, but separated with a great ditch; commanding them to keep themselves close till they had a token to them given to let drive at their adversaries: besides this, he appointed a vanguard, of which he made captain, Edward Duke of York, who of a haughty courage had desired that office, and with him were the Lords Beaumont, Willoughby, and Fanhope, and this battle was all of archers. The middle ward was governed by the king himself, with his brother the Duke of Gloucester, and the Earls of Marshall, Oxenford, and Suffolk, in the which were all the strong bill-men. The Duke of Exeter, uncle to the king, led the rear-ward, which was mixed with both bill-men and archers. The horsemen, like wings, went on every side."

Having thus judiciously drawn up his army, Henry's next object was to protect his archers, on whom he mainly relied for success, and he therefore encircled them with palisades, which were so constructed, as to be quickly removed when not required to cover the bowmen from the charge of horsemen. The numerical strength of the English being so very inferior to that of the French King, Henry placed his own van-guard, led by himself, on the right of the main order of battle, the distance between the two guards being very short, in order to support each other, the rear-guard being posted on the left, and with similar directions. A small body of men were left for the protection of the camp.

Each of the sovereigns eloquently addressed his troops, exhorting them to do their duty manfully. After both armies had completed the order of battle, each hesitated to begin the conflict, a few horsemen of the French moved forward, but these were speedily repelled by the English archers; at length the courageous English monarch boldly ordered his troops to advance, and commenced the general combat. The archers concealed in the meadows lost not an instant in showering arrows on the French van-guard, who were unable to avoid or repel vollies so unexpected and so destructive, in consequence of the ditch and palisades between the horsemen and themselves, the former of whom continued their deadly storm of arrows until horsemen, footmen, and horses were so galled, wounded, and killed, that the whole body became utterly confused and discomfited. The van-guard of the French army having been routed, the English army cast away their bows, and rushed forward to complete their destruction with axes, swords, bills, &c. Having effected this, and having advanced towards the next order of battle, they were joined by the king at the head of his division of the army, and the English troops, encouraged by their first success, assaulted the second line of the French, which similarly to the preceding one was speedily overthrown and dispersed. Well was it that the English, notwithstanding all their good fortune, preserved their firm array throughout, for the Frenchmen boldly engaged their adversaries in hand to hand combats, and victory was not be gained without a severe struggle. At length, after three hours' hard fighting, at the termination of which the French horsemen, in endeavouring to charge the English over the pit falls, were thrown *into* confusion and slaughtered, the battle was won; for the

King, seeing that the opportune moment had arrived for securing victory, ordered his horsemen to make a circuit, and take the French rearward in reverse, while he, with his resolute followers, attacked them in front. The disheartened French troops perceiving the manœuvre, and anticipating the successful result that would attend it, broke and fled, casting away their armour; and many of them on their knees imploring the clemency of their conquerors. Thus was the battle of Agincourt gloriously won by the English troops against fearful odds, and at a time, too, when the soldiers were suffering severely from hardships and diseases. It is unnecessary to advert to the attack on the English camp, or the subsequent retaliating onset, which terminated fatally for the French, many of whom, as well as the prisoners, were slain by their excited victors.

Much comment would be superfluous on this battle, as from the very opening of it, the judicious arrangements of England's King were such that the disparity in numbers was, in a great measure, counterbalanced by the mode in which he had drawn up his forces; added to which the steady discipline of his troops throughout the whole battle, the courage, firmness, and obedience to orders, exemplified by every combatant, would, combined together, almost have sufficed to produce the glorious results of this day's severe contest.

Battle of Bosworth.

England is once more our battle ground, and the hands of brother countrymen are raised against each other in deadly strife. Far more satisfactory would it be to confine our attention to the records of engagements in which English troops were opposed to foreign; but in doing so I should pass over battles that exemplify the progress of military science in tactical movements, &c.; and, therefore, it would not be advisable to shrink from the relation of these internecine, fratricidal combats. Let me, therefore, now briefly bring before you the eventful battle of Bosworth, for the relation of which I am indebted to the venerable chronicles of the ancient historians. It is unnecessary to allude to the causes which induced the Earl of Richmond to oppose Richard III., and to meet him on his own ground. I will, therefore, commence my narrative at the period when the Earl sailed from Harfleur with but 2,000 men, fully determined to meet King Richard on the field of battle. The Earl landed at Milford Haven, and his forces were soon strengthened by bodies of Welshmen; encouraged by this, and by reports favourable to his enterprise, he commenced his march, arrived at Lichfield, and from thence proceeded to Tamworth. After a conference with Lord Stanley and others at Aderston, the Earl's army was considerably increased by deserters from that of Richard, who had collected his troops together and had encamped near the village of Bosworth, not far distant from Leicester. Earl Richmond was not long in arriving in front of his opponent, and the position being eligible for a battle, both armies resolutely prepared for action.

The following day King Richard moved all his soldiers out of the camp into the plain, extending his front, consisting both of horse and foot, as far as possible, intending by this mode of drawing up

his army to exhibit his great numerical superiority, and thus to intimidate and dishearten his adversaries. In advance of this line, the archers were posted. The vanguard was commanded by the Duke of Norfolk and the Earl of Surrey, and the rear line, consisting of a strong body of selected men, with horsemen on each wing, was led by the King himself.

The Earl of Richmond prepared to draw out his forces, and called upon Lord Stanley, who was posted with his troops in the vicinity of both armies to approach and join his line of battle. To the disappointment of the Earl, Lord Stanley objected to this, stating that he would marshal his own men, and aid the Earl at a suitable moment. Disconcerted in some measure at this unexpected resolution, Earl Richmond was obliged to form his order of battle as strong as he could with the small body of men under his immediate command. This line was, therefore, very weak, the front was covered by archers, the right wing led by Sir Gilbert Talbot, the left wing by Sir John Savage, the Earl of Richmond himself directing the battle, having under his special command a strong corps of horsemen, but a small body of foot soldiers. The whole strength of the Earl's forces did not exceed 5,000 men, in addition to the 3,000 troops in the field under Sir William Stanley, and those under the detached command of Lord Stanley. The array of King Richard was more than double the strength of that of his opponent. Preparatory to the battle each commander addressed his followers, and, from their rather long speeches, I extract the following interesting passages.

Oration of King Richard.

"I doubt not but you know how the devil (continual enemy to human nature, disturber of concord, and source of sedition,) hath entered into the heart of an unknown Welchman (whose father I never knew, nor him personally saw), exciting him to spite, and to covet our realm, crown, and dignity, and thereof clearly to deprive, and spoil us and our posterity. You see further how a company of traitors, thieves, outlaws, and runagates of our own nation, be aiders and partakers of his feat and enterprise, ready at hand to overcome and oppress us. You see also what a number of beggarly Britons, and faint-hearted Frenchmen be with him arrived to destroy us, our wives, and children. Which imminent mischiefs and apparent inconveniences, if we will withstand and repel, we must live together as brethren, fight together like lions, and fear not to die together like men. And observing and keeping this rule and precept, believe me, the fearful hare never fled faster before the greedy greyhound, nor the silly lark before the sparrow-hawk, nor yet the simple sheep before the ravenous wolf, than your proud, bragging adversaries, astonished and amazed only at the sight of your manly visages, will flee, run, and scour out of the field. For, if you consider and wisely ponder all things in your mind, you shall perceive that we have manifest causes, and apparent tokens of triumph and victory. And to begin with the Earl of Richmond, captain of this rebellion, he is a Welch milksop, a man of small courage, and of less experience in martial acts and feats of war; brought up by my

mother's means and mine, like a captive in a close cage, in the court of Francis Duke of Britaine; and never saw army, nor was exercised in martial affairs, by reason whereof he neither can, nor is able by his own will or experience, to guide or rule an host. For in the wit and policy of the captain consisteth the chief adoption of the victory and overthrow of the enemies. Secondly, fear not, but put away all doubts; for when the traitors and runagates of our realm shall see us with banner displayed come against them, remembering their oath, promise, and fidelity made unto us, as unto their sovereign lord and anointed king, they shall be so pricked and stung in the bottom of their scrupulous consciences, that they for very remorse and dread of the divine plague, will either shamefully flee, or humbly submit themselves to our grace and mercy."

From the oration of the Earl of Richmond.

"If ever God gave victory to men fighting in a just quarrel, or if he ever aided such as made war for the wealth of their own natural and nutritive country, or if he ever succoured them which adventured their lives for the relief of innocents, suppressing of malefactors, and apparent offenders; no doubt my fellows and friends, but he of his bountiful goodness will this day send us triumphant victories, and a lucky journey over our proud enemies and arrogant adversaries; for if you remember and consider the very cause of our just quarrel, you will apparently perceive the same to be true, godly, and virtuous. In the which I doubt not but God will rather aid us (yea, and fight for us) than see us vanquished and overthrown by such as neither fear him nor his laws, nor yet regard justice nor honesty. Wherefore let all fear be set aside, and, like sworn brethren, let us join in one; for this day shall be the end of our travail and the gain of our labour, either by honourable death or famous victory. Remember that victory is not gotten with the multitude of men, but with the courage of the heart, and the valiantness of minds. The smaller that our number is, the more glory is it to us if we vanquish; if we be overcome yet no laud is to be attributed to the victors, considering that ten men fought against one. And if we die so glorious a death in so good a quarrel, neither fretting time, nor conquering oblivion, shall be able to darken or raze out of the book of fame, either our names, or our godly attempt. And this one thing I assure you, that in so just and good a cause, and so notable a quarrel, you shall find me this day rather a dead carrion upon the cold ground, than a free prisoner on a carpet in a lady's chamber. Let us, therefore, fight like invincible giants, and set on our enemies like untimerous tigers, and banish all fears like ramping lions. And now advance forward, true men against traitors, true inheritors against usurpers, the scourges of God against tyrants. Display my banner with a good courage, march forth like strong and robust champions, and begin the battle like hardy conquerors. The battle is at hand, and the victory approacheth; and if we shamefully recede, or cowardly flee, we and all our sequel be destroyed and dishonoured for ever. This is the day of gain, and this is the time of loss: get this day victory, and be conquerors; or

lose this battle, and be villains. And, therefore, in the name of God, and St. George, let every man courageously advance forth his standard."

Highly excited by the encouraging exhortations of their respective commanders, the men-at-arms prepared for conflict; the archers having ready their arrows, and the billmen their deadly weapons; and every soldier anxiously awaiting the blast of the trumpet that was to announce the opening of the battle. An extensive marsh was between the two armies, which Earl Richmond, on the advance of his troops, left on his right hand, to afford cover from a flank attack; he had also an advantage in having the rays of the sun in his back, the bright sunshine being in the faces of his antagonists. The marsh having been passed by Richmond's troops, King Richard's bowmen showered their arrows on them, and these were responded to by the archers of the Earl. This distant warfare was of short duration, soon did hand meet hand, and sword and bill hook, used by bold and resolute men, covered the field with a gory harvest of vanquished combatants. In the midst of this strife, Lord Stanley most opportunely joined his forces to the severely pressed soldiers of the Earl of Richmond, and the Earl of Oxford directed his followers to close in to their standard, in order that they might not be individually surrounded, and cut to pieces by their numerous assailants. This movement, having disconcerted their opponents, and caused them to pause in their attacks, the troops of Oxford in a firm body resumed the conflict, and their enemies, hard pressed, similarly strove for victory, diminishing their frontage, and fiercely opposing the solid formation of Oxford's troops in the form of a wedge. While this well contested engagement was in progress, the King was informed that the Earl of Richmond was not far distant from him; directing his course, therefore, to the position pointed out, the two rivals obtained a sight of each other, and both manfully determined to decide the fate of the day by a personal encounter.

The heroic regal duel is thus described:—"Now being inflamed with ire, and vexed with outrageous malice, the King put his spurs to his horse, and rode out of the side of the range of his battle, leaving the vanguard fighting; and like a hungry lion, ran with spear in rest towards him. The Earl of Richmond perceived well the King furiously coming towards him, and because the whole hope of his wealth and purpose was to be determined by battle, he gladly preferred to encounter with him body to body, and man to man. King Richard set on so sharply at the first brunt, that he overthrew the Earl's standard, and slew Sir William Brandon, his standard bearer, and matched hand to hand with Sir John Chenie, a man of great force, and strength, who would have resisted him; but the said John was by him manfully overthrown. And so he, making open passage by dint of sword as he went forward, the Earl of Richmond withstood his violence, and kept him at the sword's point, without advantage, longer than his companions either thought or judged; which being almost in despair of a victory, were suddenly recomforted by Sir William Stanley, which came to his succour with 3,000 tall men; at which very instant King Richard's men were driven back, and fled, and he himself manfully fighting in

the middle of his enemies, was slain, and (as he worthily had deserved) came to a bloody death, as he had led a bloody life."

The death of King Richard terminated the battle, leaving the throne of England as a guerdon for his conqueror. In this engagement the Earl of Richmond evinced sound judgment in his advance to the attack; and the Earl of Oxford, and his immediate adversaries, also proved their worth as good and well-trained soldiers. The odds were much against the success of Richmond, and to the firmness of his troops, to the opportune arrival of Lord Stanley, with his followers, and mainly to the death of King Richard must be attributed the successful result of this battle, in which the victorious troops were in number but half those of the vanquished.

REMINISCENCES OF A VETERAN.

BEING A NARRATIVE OF PERSONAL ADVENTURES DURING A PERIOD OF FORTY-THREE YEARS IN PORTUGAL, SPAIN, FRANCE, MALTA, NEW SOUTH WALES, NORFOLK ISLAND, NEW ZEALAND, ANDAMAN ISLAND, AND INDIA.

(Continued from page 430.)

The Portuguese Wine Company ("*a Companhia d'alto Douro*") was intended to benefit the wine grower of a certain district, where the port wine of commerce only is grown, by breaking up any combination entered into by the British merchants, and maintaining the price fixed each year by the company, who named the minimum of each quality. If there was no demand for the wine, or the British merchants would not pay the price fixed, then the company were obliged to become the purchasers; they reserved the privilege of paying two-thirds of the amount in paper currency, which was always at a considerable discount, at the same time engaging to keep the roads in repair. Such wines as the company did not require for exportation were converted by them, at Oporto, into aqua-ardente. The growers were on no account permitted to sell their wines at a less price than the tariff stipulated, but they might demand as much more as they chose, and generally succeeded in obtaining a higher price from the merchant for the choicest wines. The wine-growers generally were great gamblers and very improvident. To prevent their getting in debt and mortgaging their produce in advance to the British merchant, the Oporto Wine Company had been established; but the whole of their enactments and regulations were of the most arbitrary and tyrannical character, in return for the supposed benefit they conferred on the farmer. In the first place they selected and set apart a certain quantity of the produce for their own exportation, paying no more than their own tariff. They never repaired the roads which it was their duty to keep in order. In no country of the world was attention to this particular more required, as the whole district is a series of abrupt and undulating hills, and the

earth, a very friable blue slate in a state of decomposition, is supported by a succession of walls about five feet in height. This occasionally gives way during the rains, and the whole mass would then be precipitated into the yawning abyss below. The wine is conveyed, not as in Spain, in pig-skins, but in pipes on cars of rude construction, the axle-tree revolving with the wheels. These cars are generally drawn by four oxen to Pezo de Ragoa on the Douro to the company's stores, where the wines are afterwards embarked for Oporto. At a stated season of the year the company send their tasters up the Douro to Pezo-de-Ragoa, whence they proceed to the stores of the different wine growers in order to taste their wines, and fix their quality as 1st, 2nd, or 3rd.

The tasters, carrying with them a small silver shallow basin, highly polished, by which in pouring a small quantity of wine and shaking it round they are, by the manner in which it stains the basin, enabled, by the colouring matter which adheres, to judge whether the wine be thin or not. I observed they never swallowed the wine, which would vitiate the taste, but spat it out again. The wine in large vats is then gauged, and the cellars closed until the time of the sales, and the grower has no further control over it. The minimum price at which the wine is to be sold, is afterwards published by the company.

The locality in which the port wine is grown is very limited. When the vines are pruned, hardly any wood is left on them: they are seldom higher from the ground than two feet at this season, and are not often allowed to retain more than one leader of about two or three inches in height, but if the sap or stock is very strong and healthy, they sometimes allow two leaders to remain. At a particular season they are poled, like hops in England, with stakes about five feet in length, and when they are earthed up it is done with a large heavy hoe.

The growers are not allowed to manure the land, as it is found to increase the quantity, whilst the quality is rendered inferior. The grower will, however, occasionally sow lupins, and dig them in clandestinely as manure. The grape called the Bastardo is small and of a dark colour, very luscious and cloying to the taste, and when the fruit is bruised between the fingers, the juice is very glutinous and adhesive. It is a very singular circumstance beyond the line of demarcation, for the growth of the Vinho da Feitoria, or Port wine, the wine is very different and of inferior quality. In general, where the aspect is towards the morning sun, the best vines are grown. The walls or steeps I have before alluded to, as supporting the earth, have large stones projecting so as to form the steps by which the labourers, during the vintage, ascend to fetch the grapes in large baskets. They are subsequently thrown into a large shallow vat; the men jumping in after delivering their load, to tread out the juice from the grape. It is this treading which gives the port wine its astringent taste, which is derived from the fibrous stems. The treading and walking on the vine juice generally continue about three days. If the grape is thin and inferior it is not trodden so much, or the wine would be spoiled. The people who perform this

task are generally men who come annually as labourers for the vintage, from the north of Spain, and are called Gallegos. This process is most disgusting; the vine growers here have few cattle, and in order to procure manure, straw, small heather, fern, or other vegetable substances, are spread on the road before their houses, as is the case in some parts of Ireland. This, from the passing and repassing of travellers, is soon in a state of decomposition, yet through this dirt the gallegas (naturally not very cleanly about their naked legs and feet) have to pass frequently, without any subsequent cleansing process, with their load, and thus enter the vat to tread the grape. On expressing my disgust at this part of the process, I was told that it was of no consequence, as the vine juice, when in a state of fermentation, purified itself. All extraneous substances would separate themselves, and those of less gravity than the vine would float on the top, whilst the pure juice of the grape would be drawn off below.

The season for the sale of the wine is one of great gaiety, with much feasting and gambling. The company keep an open table at Pezo de Regoa during this period, at which I have dined, and where I met, for the first time, with stall-fed beef, equal to any I have tasted in England.

The Vino da Feitaria, or port wine in the hands of the farmers, bears no resemblance to the port wine of commerce when shipped from Oporto, nor do I think in its natural state it would be marketable in England, for it is scarcely drinkable in Oporto, being too fruity and cloying. To make their wines more saleable to the merchants, I have heard it asserted that some of the growers are in the habit of suspending in nets, small black or Kentish cherries, clandestinely, and others, highly roasted legs of mutton at the bung-hole, after the fermentation has ceased in the pipes or tun, but I will not vouch for the truth of the statement. Of the manner of doctoring the vines at Oporto, by which they are so much improved, I shall have occasion to speak hereafter.

The 3rd Caçadores, to which I now belonged, was one of the corps ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join the Duke of Wellington's army in France, but the Portuguese government, it is said, could not find as many transports to send their contingent round to join the allies as had been stipulated. I therefore lost the opportunity of being at Waterloo, and with that opportunity my chances of gaining a gold chain or a wooden leg. I, however, obtained leave to visit Oporto, and on my way down from Villa Reale stopped for a few hours at Penafiel, where my old battalion, the 6th Caçadores, was quartered. I was desirous to see Lieut.-Col. Adamson, as I had recently received letters from Messrs. Hibbert and Hume, complaining of his conduct in not forwarding to them any money on account of the appointments they had supplied to the officers of that battalion, and requesting me, if I had any influence with the commanding officer, to interest myself in their behalf. The Colonel was a Scotchman, and seemed an odd, uncouth sort of fellow. He had assembled the officers at the inn where I was expected, and he told me that although a sum of money had been collected, and was in the battalion chest,

with that which I had left on giving over the command, he could not conceive why Messrs. Hibbert and Hume should expect any trouble would be taken in a matter which did not concern him. I pointed out the manner it would affect the widow, the late Lieut.-Colonel's poor mother, should the amount not be immediately remitted to them. He then stated that he did not know where to get bills payable in London, or why he should render himself liable. I replied there could be no difficulty in getting bills from any of the Oporto merchants; but if he could not, I had myself no objection to take the sum he had to remit, and give him a bill on Messrs. Greenwood and Cox for the amount, at the current rate of exchange.

This was put round to the officers and agreed to, when the Lieut.-Colonel remarked to them in Portuguese that he would not be answerable, implying a doubt of my ever paying it. I was in a great rage, and told him that his conduct was very unbecoming, particularly as I had never required him to become my security; that it tended to lower me in the estimation of officers I had formerly commanded, and I trusted with credit to myself and to the service. The officers may have understood the angry conversation that was going on between us, for Captain Vas, with whom I had never been on good terms since I supplanted him in the command, stepped forward, saying to the Lieut.-Colonel that although he had had his differences with Major B——, yet he believed him to be a man of honour, and one who might be trusted in money matters to any amount, and without stopping he again put it round to the vote, when it was unanimously carried with acclamations. Of course I gave Vas my hand, and it seems we were reconciled, for I met him some years afterwards, when I had returned to the British service, when he rendered me an essential service. I got an order on a merchant of Oporto for the amount, and I thought that Adamson looked very foolish when he signed the cheque, at finding that I was so popular.

At Oporto I was staying with the Director of the Post-Office, Sinhor Mello, who was also President of the Wine Company. He had a grandson captain in the battalion, who was on leave with me. The old fidalgo was a man of very polished manners, his dinners were good and well cooked, and, what seldom happens with opulent families in Portugal, his table was not overloaded. He was very communicative, and, speaking of the Wine Company, he one day said: "We trade a good deal with merchants in England for our wine, but I do not recollect our ever having more than one private correspondent," the Duke of York, whom they supplied direct with port wines. He had a few bottles of the Duke's wine in the cellar, and he sent for one that I might try it. It was what we term at infantry messes good, strong, full-bodied subaltern's port, a pint of which would go as far towards making a man drunk as a bottle of better wine. But I suppose it wanted age; I cannot say that I approved of it any more than did mine host, the Sinhor Mello himself, who always drank a very light country wine. Apropos of country wines: the wine grown in the immediate vicinity of Oporto is the worst in all Portugal. It is thin and as sour as vinegar. It is grown here on

pollards, and, as much wood is left in pruning, this method produces large crops of very inferior quality.

Whilst I remained at Oporto I received no civilities from any of the British merchants, or from Ashworth, my late brigadier; but at this I rather rejoiced. I was so completely a Portuguese that I found more fun in their parties, where there was a great preponderance of women, than I should have met with in the stiff and formal coteries of my pompous countrymen. Having been joined by Captains Daniel and Sunderland, of the two Oporto Infantry regiments, we hired a house for the bathing season at Matozinhos, a small village near Oporto. Here we found several families from different parts of the country, at whose houses we were always welcome. The principal of these was a family of the name of Mello from Oporto, who were, however, not relatives to my other Oporto friends of that name. They had here a splendid villa, where they resided for a few months every year. This Sinhor Mello had three daughters, and the eldest managed the household. She was a nice lady-like person, though not handsome. I used to sentimentalize with her, sit next her at dinner parties, and carve for her; whilst the other two sisters were flirting with my two friends, Daniel and Sunderland. I say *flirting*, because one or both of my friends were disposed to consider the thing in a more serious light, whilst the two girls were quizzing them most unmercifully. We met there also a family of the name of Brito. Mrs. Brito was a first-rate vocalist. There was a paucity of beaux at these parties, and Mrs. B.'s daughter was very assiduous in her endeavours to detach one of us from the Miss Mellos; she did not care which of us it was, and it gave rise to a deal of fun. The latter ladies, perceiving her drift, played all manner of mischievous tricks upon her. One of them having been brought up in a convent, she was particularly qualified for any mischief; nor did she hesitate to make her own beau a scapegoat on these occasions. A canon from the cathedral of Lamego, with his niece (generally supposed to be his daughter), was always at these parties. I had known them before. The young lady was good-looking, with light hair; she went by the name of "*the Lorda*," a soubriquet she had acquired from having been a great favourite of Lord Wellington's, who was so much pleased with her performance on the pianoforte at the convent of Visien, where his lordship and staff were wont to repair almost every day during their stay there, that he made her a present, I have heard it said, of a piano, which he had sent out to her from England. She certainly played well, and was about to be engaged as organist, by taking the veil at a convent at Oporto, where none but ladies of rich and noble families professed. As she was fond of society I was surprised at her desire to immure herself for life in a convent, and I frequently talked to her on the subject. It did not appear to me that she was affected by any particular religious veneration; on the contrary, she was not an enthusiast, and I think the salary of the appointment, together with the influence and consequence it would give her in the convent, and as a provision for life, had a great deal to do with her decision, which she told me was fixed, and that she preferred the society she would there meet with, describing it as more enjoy-

able than any she had ever met outside the walls. They had even theatrical performances and other amusements in the convent of the order she was about to enter, which was not the case generally with others. I asked her if they had not also their feuds and bickerings, as other people. She said yes, but it was only when a new abbess was to be elected; when the choice was over the nuns soon returned to their former friendly intercourse. I said to her on one occasion, "You have been so often away from any convent, and at liberty in this wicked world we live in to do as you please, pray tell me honestly, have you, when in company with any young gentlemen, never found yourself possessed of some innate sensation and feeling, that you are placed on this earth for some other purpose than to struggle against nature, and snatch a triumph you otherwise never could have gained, but by shutting yourself up for life a prisoner in a convent?" She replied, "I know this world is all vanity and folly; but if you are going to talk nonsense I shall get up and leave you;" and thus our conversation ended.

(To be continued.)

OUR NAVAL POSITION AND POLICY.*

UNDER this title a very interesting book has just been published which, bearing the impress of a former popular work on the same subject, will readily identify the author as a gallant officer, who has for many years past devoted considerable talent to the elucidation of this important subject.

The volume, like its precursor, is written in a pleasing colloquial style, full of anecdote, and contains many statistical facts relating to our own and foreign navies, constituting it a work of reference; and it contains many important suggestions connected with the proper constitution of a naval force. It has, moreover, diagrams showing the different bearings and distances of places from which an invasion of this country may be attempted, and an interesting account of the special arrangements made by Napoleon I. for the concentration of an overwhelming naval force in the British Channel, in order to cover the transport of the army he had assembled at Boulogne, in 1805, for the conquest of England.

We shall probably have future occasion to advert to much of the matter contained in this book, but for the present content ourselves with reference to that portion which now occupies the attention of the public to the exclusion of every other topic, namely, the extension of our effective naval force, and the defence of the coast.

The naval Peer commences his chapter on "Manning the Navy," with the following anecdote:—

"A gentleman farmer, well known for his penurious habits and petty economies, once complained that his horses were always out of condition, and unable to get through their work. The friend addressed, with a shrewd appreciation of "the reason why," answered interrogatively, 'Did you ever try *oats?*' and he applies this quaint remark to the problem which the Admiralty have been endeavouring

* "Our Naval Position and Policy, by a Naval Peer." Longman, 1859.

to solve for a century or more; how to give a practical value to our costly naval machinery without an increased outlay of money for providing the element necessary to put the whole in action.

In exemplication of this, the noble author instances the answer made by Sir Henry Ward, when Secretary of the Admiralty, to a question as to any system that would make the registry of seamen, as it was originally intended, available for manning the fleet.

Being asked by the present First Lord of the Admiralty, when chairman of the Committee on Estimates, in 1848, question 375 "Has not Mr. Brown, the registrar, laid before the Admiralty a plan for this purpose?" He replied, "He has laid before the Admiralty several plans, *but they are based upon an outlay of money*, and would occasion an increase of national expenditure if they were adopted."

From this it appears to be a rule with the Admiralty that any plan for securing a large available reserve of seamen, shall be so designed as to work without a necessity for money influences, and as this would be difficult, if not impossible, on the voluntary principle, we need not be surprised that such a plan has not yet been discovered.

This appears strange logic on the part of a Board pretty generally admitted to be not over chary on the score of expense; whose members are moreover continually complaining of the difficulty of collecting crews, but the truth is, that from that time to the present, or until very lately, a latent feeling has existed in the minds of our statesmen that impressment would, as heretofore, meet the emergency whenever it arose, and hence the disinclination to entertain any plan that professes to obviate it.

It was not many days before the Earl of Hardwicke was selected as chairman of the Royal Commission, appointed to "inquire into the best mode of manning the navy," that his lordship took occasion, at a public meeting, to express very strong opinions on this point. From the tenor of the report of that commission we must suppose that this talented officer has seen reason to alter, or qualify his views. But Sir James Graham, a distinguished statesman, who has presided twice at the Admiralty, and inaugurated the laws which now apply to British seamen, evidently still indulges the feeling, spite of all that has been advanced by practical men, of the difficulty, or rather impossibility of enforcing compulsory service until too late to be useful; for he not only expressed himself to that effect in his examination before the Commission, but in the late Parliamentary debate respecting the Queen's Bounty of Ten Pounds, he states that the effect of a smaller bounty in 1793 was to provide an increase of 40,000 men for the fleet in six months, unaware, we presume, that the increase so provided was comprised of those whom it was usual in those times to call *pressed volunteers*, who accepted the bounty after being impressed.

The fact is, until these views are abandoned, and all idea of impressing seamen to serve the Crown—even supposing them to have the same money advantages as their fellow men employed in merchant vessels—are repudiated, and considered utterly unwarrantable, until such an overwhelming emergency arrives as shall render absolutely necessary the adoption of this arbitrary measure, we shall never have

the cordial assent or support of our leading statesmen and legislators to any comprehensive and practical plan calculated to avert it; neither can we reckon on the concurrence of the peace-at-any-price economists, for such a measure to be successful must necessarily involve a large annual outlay of money.

The chapter on Manning the Navy is neither so comprehensive nor conclusive as other portions of the book, for although the gallant author enumerates some of the schemes that have been proposed from time to time, he comes to no practical result. As his book appears to have been written during the time that the Royal Commission was sitting, it is to be regretted, however, that he has not given a supplementary chapter, with his views of the Report, and the vast mass of evidence, &c., printed in the Blue Book of that inquiry.

The chapter upon Manning is followed by another showing "How they manage these matters in France," and in this will be found some very interesting details of the admirable organization established for the government of every department connected with the French navy. But there is another navy whose organization and discipline assimilate more nearly to our own, and as some very important changes, calculated to allay discontent, and remedy the inconveniences constantly experienced in manning have lately been therein adopted with great success, we think some account thereof will be acceptable to our readers. We shall therefore show "How they manage these matters in America." Many of our naval friends, who have met American ships on foreign stations, are doubtless aware of the severe discipline and restrictions of the United States Navy. Not many years ago, notwithstanding that the wages were liberal as compared with our service, and that for this reason many of our best seamen resorted to them for employment, such was the dread of corporal punishment, inflicted at the will and caprice of the commander, that it was with great difficulty, and after long delay, that a newly commissioned ship obtained a full crew. The relief ship often sailed for a distant station under-manned, trusting to make up her full complement by volunteers from the vessel to be relieved, or in ports abroad; and this inconvenience was felt the more, because the term of the American seaman's entry is limited to three years only.

The first remedy tried was the abolition of flogging, and this was done by a clause in the annual Naval Appropriation Act, dated September 28, 1850.

It became necessary to substitute other punishments, in order to maintain discipline, and these were harassing, and exercised to such a degree as to cause great discontent, and it was at one time seriously contemplated to revive the old system of corporal punishment.

In this extremity a sagacious statesman, no doubt acquainted and deeply imbued with the influence and value of the remedy recommended in the Naval Peer's Anecdote, suggested a "trial of *oats*."

The wages of seamen in the United States Navy were advanced one-third, that is, from twelve dollars a month, at which rate they stood for many years, to eighteen dollars a month; offences, other than those of trivial character, were made punishable by sentence of *general* or ship's court-martial only; and the punishment for each

offence was defined by law. To accomplish these purposes the following regulations were established by the Naval Appropriation Act of March 2nd, and Navy Offices Circular of April 4th, 1855.

AN ACT TO PROVIDE A MORE EFFICIENT DISCIPLINE FOR THE NAVY.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, from and after the passing of this act, it shall be the duty of every commanding officer of any of the vessels of the navy, on returning from a cruise, to forward immediately on his arrival in port, to the secretary of the navy, a list of the names of such of the crew who enlisted for three years as in his opinion, on being discharged, are entitled to an "honorable discharge," as a testimonial of fidelity and obedience; and that he shall grant the same to such, according to the form to be prescribed by the secretary of the navy.

SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted*, That if any seaman, ordinary seaman, landsman, or boy, shall re-enlist for three years, within three months after his discharge, he shall, on presenting his honourable discharge, or on accounting in a satisfactory manner for its loss, be entitled to pay during the said three months, equal to that to which he would have been entitled if he had been employed in actual service.

SEC. 3. *And be it further enacted*, That it shall be the duty of commanders of any vessel in the navy, in granting temporary leave of absence and liberty on shore, to exercise carefully a discrimination in favor of the faithful and obedient.

SEC. 4. *And be it further enacted*, That summary courts-martial may be ordered upon petty officers and persons of inferior ratings by the commander of any vessel in the navy to which such persons belong, for the trial of offences which he may deem deserving of greater punishment than the commander of a vessel himself is by law authorized to inflict of his own authority, but not sufficient to require trial by general court-martial.

SEC. 5. *And be it further enacted*, That summary courts-martial shall consist of three officers, not below the rank of passed midshipman, and of some competent person to act as recorder. Before proceeding to trial, the members shall take the following oath or affirmation, which the recorder is hereby authorized to administer:—"You, A B, do solemnly swear, or affirm, that you will well and truly try, without prejudice or partiality, the case now depending, according to the evidence which shall be adduced, the laws for the government of the navy, and your own conscience. So help you God."

After which, the recorder of the court shall take the following oath or affirmation, which the senior member of the court shall administer:—"You, A B, do solemnly swear, or affirm, that you will keep a true record of the evidence which may be given before this court, and of the proceedings thereof. So help you God."

SEC. 6. *And be it further enacted*, That the commander of a ship shall have authority to order any officer under his command to act as the recorder of a summary court-martial.

SEC. 7. *And be it further enacted*, That all testimony given before such court shall be given orally, on oath or affirmation, which the senior member of the court shall administer.

That summary courts-martial may sentence petty officers and persons of inferior ratings to any one of the following punishments, viz:—

First. Discharge from the service with bad-conduct discharge, but the sentence not to be carried into effect in a foreign country.

Second. Solitary confinement in irons, single or double, on bread and

water, or diminished rations, provided no such confinement shall exceed thirty days.

Third. Solitary confinement in irons, single or double, not exceeding thirty days.

Fourth. Solitary confinement not exceeding thirty days.

Fifth. Confinement not exceeding two months.

Sixth. Reduction to next inferior rating.

Seventh. Deprivation of liberty on shore on foreign station.

Eighth. Extra police duties, and loss of pay, not to exceed three months, may be added to any of the abovementioned punishments.

SEC. 8. *And be it further enacted*, That no sentence of a summary court-martial shall be carried into effect without the approval of the officer ordering the court, who shall have power to remit in part or altogether, but not to commute, any such sentence. And it shall be the duty of any such commanding officer to remit any part or the whole of any sentence by a summary court-martial, the execution of which would, in the opinion of the surgeon or senior medical officer on board, given in writing, produce serious injury to the health of the person sentenced; or in case he shall refuse to do so, it shall be his duty, without delay, to submit the case again to the same or to another summary court-martial, which shall have power, upon the testimony already taken, to remit the former punishment, and to assign some other of the authorized punishments in the place thereof.

SEC. 9. *And be it further enacted*, That the proceedings of summary courts-martial shall be conducted with as much conciseness and precision as may be consistent with the ends of justice, and under such forms and rules as may be prescribed by the secretary of the navy, with the approval of the President of the United States; and all such proceedings shall be transmitted in the usual mode to the navy department.

SEC. 10. *And be it further enacted*, That any punishments authorized by this act to be inflicted by a summary court-martial may likewise be inflicted by any general court martial.

SEC. 11. *And be it further enacted*, That any person who shall entice any seaman, ordinary seaman, landsman, or boy, who may have enlisted into the naval service of the United States, to desert therefrom, or who shall conceal any person who may have so deserted, and shall refuse to deliver him up upon the order of his commanding officer, shall, upon legal conviction thereof, be fined, at the discretion of the court, in any sum not exceeding three hundred dollars, or be imprisoned for any term not exceeding one year.

Approved March 2, 1855.

GENERAL ORDER.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *April* 4, 1855.

In conformity with the 9th section of the "Act to provide a more efficient discipline for the navy," approved March 2, 1855, the following regulations have been submitted to and approved by the President of the United States, and will be observed by summary courts-martial convened under the authority of the said act:

1. Summary courts-martial will adopt the same forms of proceeding and rules of evidence as naval general courts-martial, so far as they shall be applicable and not inconsistent with the conciseness and precision enjoyed by the law, nor with the provisions of this General Order.

2. The form of convening a summary court-martial will be by a brief written order addressed by the commander of the vessel to the senior member of the court, stating the names and rank of the members of the court, and of the recorder, and the time and place of meeting; and by written or verbal orders to the other members of the court and the recorder. The

written order to the senior member will be appended to the record of the proceedings.

3. The record will state that the oath prescribed by the law was duly administered to each member and to the recorder, in the presence of the accused.

4. If objection is made by the accused to any member of the court, it will be so stated in the record of proceedings, and made known, if the court think fit, to the commander of the vessel, who will, at his discretion, order another member of the court, or continue the member objected to.

5. The accused shall be furnished, before trial, with a written specification of the offence or offences for which he is to be tried. The specifications shall be as brief as practicable, without unnecessary repetition or circumlocution, or accumulation of epithets, but explicit; and all offences or misconduct committed at any one time by the same individual and intended to be charged against him, shall be comprised in the same specification, which shall be approved, before trial, by the officer ordering the court, and a duplicate of it to be annexed to the record.

6. The accused shall not be required to plead guilty or not guilty to the specification; but if a plea of guilty be made, the court may, at its discretion, admit testimony as to the character of the offender, or in extenuation of the offence. And, in any case, the court may find the accused guilty of the whole or any part of the misconduct charged, according to the evidence, and adjudge punishment for so much as shall be found proved.

7. Witnesses shall be summoned by the recorder through the executive officer of the vessel, and the summons shall be obeyed, unless disapproved by the commanding officer for some reason to be stated in the record.

8. The court, if requested by the accused, may allow a commissioned, warrant, or petty officer to appear as counsel, and cross-examine witnesses in his behalf; but no written defence or argument, nor any protracted oral defence or argument, shall be admitted. Nor shall any testimony not clearly relevant be admitted, nor any documentary evidence be read to the court or appended to the record.

9. If any more than one case be tried by the same court, the record of each case shall be separate, the order for convening the court shall be appended to the record of the first case, and be referred to in each subsequent record, so as to show that the proceedings of the court are continuous. And in each case the prescribed oath shall be administered anew to the members and the recorder of the court.

J. C. DOBBIN, *Secretary of the Navy.*

All former difficulties connected with manning have disappeared under these regulations. A large portion of the crews of the United States Navy are now native Americans, intelligent young men, who resort to that as the best paid sea service in the world, for the wages in American merchant vessels do not average more than twelve or fourteen dollars per month.

It is true the American sailor has no pension, unless maimed in the national service, but he is, if destitute, provided for in old age in one of their numerous asylums; and he has gratuities and other rewards equal, if not superior, to those established in the British Navy.

It will be seen by reference to the seventh section of the quoted Appropriation Act, that *discharge from the service with bad conduct discharge* is the greatest punishment that can be inflicted on an offender in the American service, and this is looked upon, as in fact it is, a very heavy sentence; for it deprives a skilled seaman of the

opportunity of obtaining the highest wages of his calling, he loses in fact four or five dollars a month. This regulation is found to operate so successfully that their national service has become popular with mariners, and instead of depending upon foreigners, a sufficient number of American seamen are growing up, and attaching themselves to the United States navy.

Now, why should not we adopt the same course, under like circumstances. We know and feel the evil—and the cause of the evil—and why not apply the remedy which has proved successful in a service very similar to our own. Let us try *oats*, and we shall speedily find that by rendering the naval service so attractive to seamen as to make discharge not only a disgrace, but a penalty to be averted, the necessity for the brutal practice which disgusts officers, degrades the service, and deters our best mariners from engaging, will be averted. Those found guilty of offence before competent courts, after milder means had failed, instead of being flogged, should be discharged as worthless, and in heinous cases imprisoned with hard labour, mulct of wages, or forfeit of time for pension might be added, &c. The Queen's service would then become popular, and have the choice of volunteers, and when ample reserves are established as recommended by the Royal Manning Commission, no compulsory means whatever would be necessary for increasing our naval force to the full extent of our resources, particularly if the men who engaged to serve in war were secured the highest wages they could obtain in the merchant service.

But a man entitled to these advantages should be in fact as in name, he should be trained and practised so as to become possessed of the following qualifications, which the noble author has set forth as the beau-ideal of a man-of-war's man:—

"1. A man carrying his life in his hand, at all times to be freely risked, not only in conflict with 'enemy, pirate, or rebel,' but subject to all the perils of fire and water and those accidents peculiar to seamen 'falling from aloft,' which add a considerable proportion to the mortality at sea.

"2. An able seaman—that is, a man who, having served at least seven years to his business, is master not only of all a seaman's duties on deck, aloft, or in boats, but competent to all that neat and skilful handiwork involved in rigging a ship from 'truck to keels on.'

"3. A well-trained, well-disciplined artilleryman, perfectly at home in handling any kind of ordnance, from the huge eighty-four pounder to the light field piece (which the modern seaman handles most expertly), and familiar with shells, rockets, and all the devil's playthings employed in modern warfare.

"4. A well-instructed and efficient infantry soldier, trained to all the ordinary company movements, handy with his musket or rifle, and though not exactly equal to a French or Russian soldier in the field, yet superior to those of the South American States, or those half civilized people of Asia and Africa, with whom we often come into collision.

"5. A good swordsman, a cool hand with the pistol, and, in fact, a *man* able to take his part in ship, boat, or shore contests."

Now these acquirements form the qualification of the present man-of-war's man, and with proper pecuniary encouragement and considerate treatment, tens of thousands of our adventurous and hardy mariners, who now eschew the naval service, would cheerfully undergo the training necessary to become skilled in these duties; and when men of this character are ready to place themselves in our firm line to undergo the first shock, in order to protect the realm from invasion, to preserve our constitutional liberties inviolate, and our homes from spoliation, he must be a miserable, selfish, miserly, and contemptible wretch, unworthy the name of Briton, who could grudge the meed to which such men become fairly entitled.

And after all, what is the sum required, in addition to our present expenditure, to produce such important results?

The sum voted for the "wages to seamen and marines," in the present year's navy estimate, is nearly three millions (£2,966,751), but as this embraces officers, and all other grades, including ordinary seamen, boys, &c., whose present wages need not be disturbed, it would probably require no more than £200,000 to effect what is desired, that is, to make the wages of the petty officers and seamen in the fleet greater than they obtain in the merchant service. A paper is printed in the appendix to the Royal Commission on Manning Report, bearing the signature of the Registrar of Seamen, making the computation considerably less, but as this is dated in January last, before the late increase of men was contemplated, allowance must be made on that score, and possibly he may have fixed the scale he suggests too low.

Be this as it may, it must be admitted that double or treble this sum would be well applied, to effect what has been accomplished in America—the abolition of corporal punishment, the establishment of ship courts-martial, assuring the offender a just and temperate inquiry, and the adoption of a system which shall weed the service of bad characters, on whom it is now necessary to exercise restraints and inflictions, that will no longer be necessary. R. N.

THE MILITARY OPINIONS OF SIR JOHN BURGOYNE.

The conclusion of a peace in Italy, which, in the words of a leading journal, is "made to be broken," but which we rather consider as based on some secret understanding dangerous to Europe, naturally attracts public attention in an increased degree to the military position of England, and the resources at her disposal in the event of her being suddenly engaged in war. All men are by this time aware that the Empire, maugre the famous Bordeaux declaration, is *not* peace. Founded on military traditions, how could it be? There is no pacific element in its composition. By the army it was established, and by the army it is sustained. The Emperor does not conceal that it is on his army, not on his subjects, that his power is based. This very announcement of the peace is made in an order of

the day addressed to the "*soldats*." "Peace is signed between the Emperor of Austria and me." There is no mention of the French people. *L'état, c'est moi*—*moi* and my soldiers. And if we could remain under any delusion—if words, deeds, and the course of events were less convincing in their testimony—a mere glance across the Channel would convey to our minds a distinct impression of the truth. We behold France transformed into a vast barrack. Every fourth man is in uniform; all the public functionaries are soldiers; the whole organization and routine of the State are military. Even now, when peace is signed, and there seems to be no longer an object of attack, the armaments continue. Troops are pouring incessantly through the streets; conscripts are singing in the railway trains; artillery is being dispatched by night no one knows where. What is more, the old warlike spirit of the country is rekindled. France, after forty years of slights, finds herself once more the dominant power of Europe. Her soldiers have fleshed their swords; they have tasted blood and won glory; and, however disposed, the Emperor is impotent to restrain the passion within them. Henceforward—and the blindest Gilpin now admits the fact—the Empire is war.

We should be wrong to assume that France designs an early rupture with England. The perfidious man who sways her destinies is, we may feel pretty sure, too far-sighted to venture on such a step in the present situation of Europe. But that he contemplates a collision, either as an incidental occurrence, or an eventuality, the very nature of his armaments attests. Possibly he may have the forbearance to leave us till the last; but, meanwhile, he prepares to resist our intervention with his plans for remodelling Europe and destroying the balance of power. He did not even attack Austria till he had confronted us with Cherbourg, and constructed a fleet larger than our own. Brest and Toulon are now, while salvoes are proclaiming peace, rife with naval preparations? Against what power can these maritime armaments be directed? Is it not clear that it must be England? All are to have their turn. Our alliance was used to bring down the pride of Russia; Russia was brought to connive at the humiliation of Austria; Austria, if rumour speaks true, is to wink at the chastisement of Prussia; and Montalembert gives us warning that England will not be left out. In truth, the train is laid, and we know not the moment when it may be fired.

It is now fourteen years since the defenceless situation of the country was brought in all its details under the notice of the Duke of Wellington by Sir John Burgoyne, whose communication drew from the great Captain the memorable letter which struck the first note of alarm through England. But for nearly the whole of this period we have been under the domination of family governments, composed either entirely of Whigs, or Whigs diluted with renegade Conservatives. Just as we fall again under such a *régime*, the original memorandum of Sir John Burgoyne is opportunely reproduced, but now for the first time reaches the public, forming the opening paper in a volume entitled *The Military Opinions of General Sir John Fox Burgoyne*, for which we are indebted to the editorial industry of his aide-de-camp, Captain Wrottesley.

Thank Heaven we are no longer in the deplorable plight which Sir John describes in this able and lucid report. The late Ministry, during its short tenure of office, so recruited our navy, that in the event of a sudden rupture we should not now, as then, commence war with an inferior naval force. Something has also been done to strengthen our coast defences. It is, however, still doubtful whether we could muster in England 30,000 regular troops to resist an invading force. Notwithstanding the unwearied efforts of Sir John himself, as Inspector-General of Fortifications, Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Milford Haven are still too open to attack. Hence nearly all the remarks which the gallant General made in 1845 apply, with little variation, to our present condition. They are statements no one can confute, for not only do they emanate from a high military and official source, but they are stamped with the testimony of the great Duke himself. A portion we may term prophetic, and a portion strategic; for while there is a foreshadowing of those outbursts of the martial spirit of France which have illustrated the last four or five years, there is, in connexion with our own position, a precise detail of the dangers to which we are exposed, and the measures necessary to avert them. There is something touching in the warning given to us at such a moment by such a man—an illustrious veteran who, though full of years, is full of honours—some won yesterday at the cannon's mouth. It is true the nakedness of our land is well known—known as well in France and through the whole of Europe as in our own military circles; and, indeed, it is but a couple of months since we reprinted in our pages a German view of our situation, which was only too accurate. But here we have an exposition which must carry conviction, and we are loth to believe that in the present state of the public mind it will not produce a marked effect.

There are three principal points of view from which Sir John Burgoyne canvasses the question of a French invasion—1, The force readily available for the purpose; 2, The practicability of its transport across the Channel; and, 3, Our available means of resistance. With regard to the first, it is clearly shown that 100,000 or 150,000 men might be assembled at any moment—ay, to-morrow—at Cherbourg, without noise or bustle, without attracting the attention even of our newspaper correspondents, and be as rapidly embarked. We have recently seen with what ease French troops have been concentrated and embarked at Marseilles, where the wharves and quays afford no such facilities as exist at Cherbourg, and numbers were packed in the same vessel. At Cherbourg a network of railways, leading to every part of France, can bring up troops in relays, while the spacious quays will accommodate an army without crowding. "France," says Sir John, "could in a very few weeks from her first preparation, by partial movements scarcely to be observed, collect from 100,000 to 150,000 troops on the shores of the Channel, within a few hours' sail of the British coast, and where every coaster or large fishery vessel, aided by steamers, would be an efficient transport." But the innocents will ask, how these improvised transports are to cross the Channel? Of course, if we have the least suspicion—and

some intimation will surely reach us—we shall have a good squadron off the Wight. This is not so certain. At this very moment our lynx-eyed press is announcing that great naval armaments are equipping at Toulon and Brest, yet Lord John Russell stoutly affirms that such is not the case. It would be the same thing if boats were being collected at Cherbourg—and boats are the only part of the expedition not in readiness. The English Government never believes anything that is not communicated by its own ambassador, in a green despatch-box, tied round with red tape. We can by no means count, then, on the English fleet being on the *qui vive* when the French steamers, under cover of night, tow over 50,000 men to Portsmouth. The French have always contended that it would be sufficient for their purpose to have the command of the Channel for a week, and both our naval and military authorities admit the fact. But it is a question for consideration whether the work might not be effected by surprise, in a single night. Or, supposing us in expectation of attack, the French fleet, by manœuvring in another direction, might draw off our squadron, while the descent was effected under the convoy of a few frigates. Nor must we lose sight of another possibility—the junction of the French fleet with that of Russia, in order to secure the command of the Channel. This object was nearly effected by the first Napoleon, when he mustered his forces at Boulogne, through the union of the fleets of France and Spain; and was only foiled by the vigilance of Nelson, who seduced Villeneuve into fighting Trafalgar. Our Channel squadron will probably soon be equal to any force that France alone could bring against it; but, before we can consider it effective, it should be strong enough to meet both France and Russia. Even then, the conditions of maritime warfare are so altered, that, as shown by Sir Howard Douglas in his *Naval Warfare by Steam*, and now by Sir John Burgoyne in the volume before us, a fleet itself cannot be considered a safeguard. Sir John Burgoyne reminds us that, "when the French were far less powerful generally than at present, and their fleets were crippled and intimidated, even then an invasion was considered so possible, that very great efforts were made to prepare for resisting it on shore." The gallant General states the difficulty of maintaining close blockades, now that vessels of war are propelled by steam, which, though affording advantages on both sides, necessarily give the preponderance to an alert foe, watching for an opportunity to sally. It will not only be comparatively easy to break such blockades, but it is doubtful whether they can even be maintained. Putting, however, this consideration aside, we will suppose there is a French squadron in each of the ports of Toulon, Brest, and Cherbourg, and that a blockade is established by three English squadrons of equal strength, Sir John still thinks the Toulon squadron, by taking advantage of favourable circumstances, might elude the vigilance of our Admirals, and make its way to Brest, where the combined force might so manœuvre as to prevent a junction of our Mediterranean and Channel squadrons, and so obtain a temporary superiority. "The conclusion I would come to," adds Sir John, "is, that if not probable, it is at least more than possible, that a temporary superiority might be obtained in the Channel

sufficient for the purpose of invasion in great force; and that if such an attempt should then be made, it is *more than probable* it would be successful, and that London itself might be in the hands of the enemy in less than ten days."

Such is the deliberate opinion of one of our most experienced Generals, an opinion endorsed, moreover, by the great Duke, who, in a letter addressed to Sir John Burgoyne, devoutly wished that he might not live to see it verified. That it is shared by high authorities on the other side of the Channel every one conversant with France can attest. A French commission of officers in an official report to the Government, has put on record these remarkable words:—"It must not be forgotten that the principal alterations in naval affairs since the peace of 1815, as regards the relative position of England and France, are favourable to France." For 200 miles the French coast is *vis-a-vis* with our own, at distances varying from three to twelve hours; and, whatever the superiority of our fleet, can it be believed that this line can be guarded through its whole length, under every circumstance of weather and season, now that ships by the aid of steam act independently of both? Happily, such infatuation no longer prevails among the people. The powerful representations of the press have disabused the public mind, and there is a universal wish to put our country in a proper state of defence. It is our rulers who oppose the work. The Derby Cabinet has the honourable distinction of being exempt from this censure. Under great difficulties and discouragements, and with the support of only a minority, Lord Derby placed our naval and military establishments on a footing they have never before attained in time of peace. They are still miserably inadequate, for we are so affected by the present irresponsible Government in France, that, as a necessity of our situation, we must maintain armaments proportionate to those of our neighbour. A time may come when we shall grow weary of this burden, and prefer actual war. Certainly our outlay would not be much greater, and the suspense would be diminished.

But since Sir Howard Douglas and Sir John Burgoyne consider a descent practicable, though the nautical bias of Sir Howard attaches more importance to the operations of our fleet, let us see how, once the landing effected, the invaders are to be met. "With all the resources to be found in England," says Sir John, "with the possession of the shores on both sides of the narrow parts of the Channel, and of at least some of the small ports of the English side, the 100,000 or 120,000 men would be quite independent of any necessity for further commanding communication with France for some time." Heaven forbid it shall ever come to this; but, seeing such high military testimony to the possibility, we must prepare for the event. Sir John passes in review all the means at our disposal for resistance. These, he tells us plainly, are as fully known to the French as to ourselves. In fact, the acquisition of such intelligence forms part of the French organization. If the French ever effect a landing in England, they will come here with a full appreciation of every resource we can employ against them. That our resistance will be desperate—that our resources may prove even greater under

the pressure than now, in our calm moments, we can estimate—they readily allow. But, so far as our means can be seen, they have taken our measure. Sir John Burgoyne is equally exact. He has no faith in riflemen, fencibles, or even militia, except in concert with regular troops; and he affirms, what recent statements in Parliament confirm, that we should be unable, in case of attack, to bring 30,000 regulars into the field at any one point. At the same time, the gallant General is not disposed to pooh-pooh the auxiliary bodies; he wishes only to take them at their right value. We feel gratified to find so great an authority advocating precisely the same application of this force that we have always urged. "The principal and most useful application of volunteer corps," we are told at p. 106, "would be by a well-considered system of local organization and training, exclusively for action in their own and very neighbouring districts, in case of the extreme emergency of an attack upon them. Within two or three miles of any port or town of any importance, it might be hoped that from 600 to 1,000 such volunteers might be ready to turn out, some of them practised to man any batteries that may have been constructed for their protection, and within ten or twelve miles, that is, in a few hours after, at least as many more. These, under the regulation and control of some officer of experience, would afford great security against the desultory attacks of any but considerable armaments."

But important as such an organization would be for the purpose mentioned, and as a support, Sir John Burgoyne contends that it would present no obstacle to a disciplined army in the open field. It may seem presumptuous to differ from the gallant General on such a question even in the slightest degree; but, considering how loose is the discipline of the Zouaves, we are inclined to think that more ready-made soldiers might turn up amongst us on an emergency than is generally believed. Not only might we look for much from that lion-like spirit which Sir John proudly certifies as inherent in Englishmen—and in an encounter of this character even bull-dog courage would go for something—but we may believe that with Englishmen having every sensibility aroused, a little training would go a great way. Garibaldi's exploits have made it doubtful whether disciplined troops do really possess such a superiority over raw levies. Nay, a great part of our army at Waterloo was composed of recruits, and we have never had cause to blush for their share in that great struggle. But the gallant author of the work before us will not leave the destiny of his country to a thread. He writes with a sense of responsibility—a consciousness that his words will be weighed and his arguments measured by the powers of the state. It is for him, therefore, to speak on the side of caution and to ground his statements, not on conjecture—not on possibilities, but on facts. To meet the threatened invasion of the first Napoleon the Government of the day did not trust entirely to the fleet—potent and irresistible as it then was; but the United Kingdom was garrisoned by 100,000 regular troops; the militia was put into efficient training, and numbered 80,000 men; and there was an effective volunteer force of

300,000—in all, nearly half a million of men. We are now absolutely without defence, except for our Channel squadron. The volunteer movement is a failure, the people not being impressed with a sense of their danger; the militia could not muster 40,000; and, in fact, we are here authoritatively told that "*a year would not suffice, by every effort, and any extent of expenditure, to put us in a condition of resistance.*" The italics are Sir John's, not ours, and show the deliberation with which the opinion is pronounced.

Passing from the consideration of our national defences, the volume before us enters on numerous subjects of high import to the military world, and treats of them in such a manner as to form a study for those who seek a thorough knowledge of their profession. It might be expected that the gallant author would have much to say on the subject of engineering and fortification—and, in truth, one is surprised to see the amount of information he has packed into a small compass, and the very readable way in which it is presented. It seems natural to a clear and logical mind to express itself, even on the dryest subjects, with a characteristic precision, that throws a light over the veriest technical details, rendering them generally intelligible. No one possesses this happy art in a higher degree than Sir John Burgoyne. Perhaps he owes it in some measure to an hereditary taste for literature, which an arduous military career has never prevented him from indulging; but it is also singularly illustrative of his character. This volume would be read with interest for the diction alone, even if its contents were less varied and commanding. Nor can we withhold a word of praise from its gallant editor, Captain Wrottesley. He has executed his task with care, ability, and judgment, arranging the various papers in such sequence, under their several heads, that they merge into each other, forming a compendium of the whole subject. This is particularly remarkable in the papers on sieges, which are most complete, from a review of the preliminary operations to the estimated comparative cost of civil and military artificers, given in a very able paper by Quartermaster Connolly, the well known author of the *History of the Royal Sappers and Miners* and *Romance of the Ranks*. All the operations and all the routine of attack and defence seem to be comprehended in the gallant General's lucid review. At the present moment especial interest attaches to the paper on the effect of rifled cannon on the attack and defence of fortifications. Here we have our ablest engineer declaring that against such ordnance Vauban's art can make no stand. "Towers, old castles, and escarp walls in general that are exposed to view will be readily ruined from greater distances . . . . parapets will be penetrated and ruined with greater facility; the interior of works will be plunged into from heights at greater ranges than have hitherto been practicable; and where magazines, barracks, or other important establishments are exposed to such heights, and have hitherto been safe from them, they will now be liable to direct cannonade or bombardment." The advantage which rifled guns secure to an attacking force in a siege by allowing it to operate at a distance of 9,000 yards, or upwards of five miles, is not greater than

they afford to batteries over ships. The gallant General considers that, regular fortification being out of the question, arsenals and similar extensive establishments can only be protected from destruction by a free use of bomb-proof roofing. All his suggestions on this subject deserve, and we trust will receive the serious consideration of the authorities. The book itself will be extensively read by the public, as well as by the professional man; and it will produce a deep impression.

S. W. F.

PEEPS FROM THE LOOPHOLES OF RETREAT.

By Retired Major Marksman.

Mr. Berington's knapsack is to have a fair trial. It is now some ten years since Lord Frederick Fitzclarence, one of the most practical officers we have had for a long time, in high command, addressed himself to the subject of lightening the toils and sufferings of our soldiers. Whether he acted from the common dictates of humanity, or a conviction that the less a man was burthened the more useful he became in the field, does not much matter. From what I knew of the lamented General I should say it was a combination of both. Through his means the bear skin caps of the Fusiliers were diminished in size. He worked hard to get rid of the cross belts, and he was particularly solicitous about the knapsack. He investigated the claims of several inventions, and at length had experiments tried with Mr. Berington's, which simply differed from others in being attached to the shoulders by broad metallic springs, dispensing altogether with the abominable straps which cut the arms and fettered their actions, impeded respiration, and obliged a soldier to have the aid of a comrade in placing the article on his back. The experiments, I think, consisted in making some men march with the Regulation and the Berington knapsacks, and then reporting the result of their comparative merits. The verdict was entirely in favor of the Berington. One serjeant had, if I remember rightly, marched twenty-five miles and swam rivers with it, and was almost unconscious that he had anything upon his back! Every endeavour was now made to get the pack adopted by the authorities, but there rose up a barrier of prejudice and self-interest, which neither argument nor experiment could surmount. The Horse Guards were fairly sick of model knapsacks. They had had *so* many, and all were failures—the men were content with what they possessed—the time of the authorities could not be taken up any longer with such matters, &c. It was not added, as it might have been, that the Adjutant-General had an invention of his own, and Sir Thomas Something had another; the ostensible objections were considered sufficiently valid to prevent the Berington being a *fait accompli*. But Mr. Berington had friends and perseverance. The

Duke of Cambridge came into office, and to his consideration the invention was submitted. Perhaps no one is more in the habit of judging for himself than the Duke. In this instance, however, either his usual acuteness forsook him, or he adopted the opinions of the staff. I am told that when privately spoken to on the subject he shut up his interlocutor by remarking that he had heard that if the metallic springs or straps are struck by a musket ball the knapsack would be rendered useless. It never occurred to him that if this contingency were to happen the man would receive the shot in a vital spot, and thus become perfectly independent of knapsacks for the future, or that the plate could be temporarily supplied by a strap, leaving the soldier no worse off than he was before the Berington was adopted. And so Mr. Berington was cast again into the "slough of despond," and the soldiers who knew something of the pack by report muttered a passing curse, that red-tape and officialism had destroyed their prospects. But lo! Mr. Sidney Herbert comes into office, and a convenient question from Captain Leicester Vernon, one of the best of our military representatives, elicits from the minister that although general officers had vilified the efforts of Mr. Berington's genius he had resolved to put the question to a thorough practical test. He had directed a considerable number of the packs to be issued to the men of the regiments, and by *their* report Berington will live or die.

I used to think the Secretaries for War ought to be military men. I fancied that none but soldiers could justly appreciate a soldier's feelings, and minister to their true welfare. I recount the notions *sans façon*, and I formally renounce the heresy at once and for ever. The humanity and common sense of the black coat strongly eclipses "the fellow feeling" of the scarlet tunic. I can understand it all. Military men habitually pay too much deference to each other. We see its operation every day; the adjutant accepts literally the allegations of the serjeant major; the lieutenant-colonel, on friendly terms with his officers, adopts the sentiments of the adjutant and captains of companies; the inspector-general of a district finds everything in the corps with which he dines *couleur de rose;* the general, commander-in-chief, comparatively young, and naturally modest, receives *de bonne foi*, the representations of generals in command of corps and divisions. Courtesy comes in aid of confidence, the truth is concealed, and the soldier sacrificed. Hence, the great value of a civil Secretary of State, who can afford to hold opinions at naught, which have not something else to sustain them beyond the rank of their utterers.

Apropos of civil rulers over military destinies, let me put on record a soldier's gratitude for two or three of the measures Sir Charles Trevelyan has adopted since he became Governor of Madras. His first act was to diminish the number of guards in the town of Madras. It is in English theory that nothing should be done by soldiers, which properly falls within the scope of a policeman's duties. On the continent of Europe we are accustomed to see chequered sentry boxes all over a town, and to meet *fantassins* and heavy dragoons in

every street. The doctrine of physical force is recognized in every department of the state, and in the whole scheme of public entertainment. In our well-ordered country, on the contrary, the government is concealed. The army is masked; it only developes itself, with rare exceptions (I speak of peace time), on great occasions of public ceremonial and review, and is then represented by a battalion and a squadron or two. But these exceptions are partially objectionable. Here are red-coated grenadiers, where, in mercy to the soldier, there should only be policemen. What business, for instance, have the Coldstreams at the doors of Drury Lane Theatre whenever the manager opens his establishment for performance? Why are the Scots Fusiliers kept broiling at the portals of the National Gallery, or the British Institution in Pall Mall? I know the men like to pace the *pavé* in front of the theatres for six or seven hours, because they get one shilling per night from the manager. That, however, is no reason for the continuance of the practice. Placed in the very centre of vice and all its allurements, the men contract evil acquaintanceships, which lead to drink and debauchery, and they are needlessly exposed to the damps and fogs of night, which fearfully increase the amount of mortality. Let there be guards over the person of the Sovereign, over the palaces, the arsenals, the dock yards, and the mint, for these would be the favoured points of attack by a wild mob or an invading force; but for all other places our respectable police would amply suffice. It will be a bright day, a day to be marked with a white stone, when Sir Charles Trevelyan's good example is followed in this country. And talking of Sir C. Trevelyan carries me to promotion by purchase. Three or four years ago Lord Panmure procured the issue of a warrant granting the regulation-value of an officer's commission to his widow, child, parent, or sister, if he should fall in battle, and his heirs surrender all title to pension or compassionate allowance. The act was hailed at the time as one of grace, and one of policy also, because it removed from the minds of officers going into battle all anxiety respecting the condition of those objects of affectionate solicitude whom they might leave penniless behind them, if an unlucky bullet gave them their *quietus*. The *Times*, however, as if inspired by the Treasury, employed this benevolent measure as an argument against promotion by purchase. Two or three months ago I made a few remarks on the fallacy of the doctrines to which Sir Charles Trevelyan, the Secretary to the Treasury, attached his name officially, when the increase of the pay of cavalry subalterns, and the abolition of certain expenses were in question. Now read this passage from the *Times*, which has accidentally fallen under my nose. It was published in October, 1855:

"As regards those who have yet to purchase their way up in the army the warrant seems merely to involve a heavy public loss, without any corresponding benefit to the objects of its intended bounty. It is the misfortune of a system of purchase that, so long as it exists, it is impossible permanently to improve the condition of the officer. If, indeed, the regulation and the actual price were the same thing—*that* is to say, if the regulation price were to remain the same, to

whatever extent the condition of the officer might be improved—*we might then go on increasing pay, allowances, and pension with the most perfect confidence that every thing we did tended directly to the benefit of the service;* but, unfortunately, the value of a commission is regulated, not by the estimation which the Commander-in-Chief may choose to put upon it, *but by the number of buyers and the price they are ready to give.* Every increase, therefore, in the value of a commission acts as a bonus to its present possessor, should he sell out, and *raises the price proportionately to all future purchasers.* The commodity becomes more marketable, and those who want to buy it *must pay a higher price for it,* so that a measure intended for the permanent relief of the service may end only in raising the value of commissions by the additional sum that purchasers will be willing to give for the insurance by the public of their lives against death in the field of battle. So long as purchase is permitted it is impossible permanently to benefit the condition of the officer, and every attempt to do so is so far an injury that *it enhances the price to be paid,* and thus places a commission more out of the reach of the poorer aspirants for distinction."

If all this be true as an exposition of the principles of political economy, it has proved to be utterly false in daily practice. I have conversed with not a few officers of the British Army who have been engaged in the sale and purchase of commissions since 1855, and they tell me that they never dreamt of either demanding or giving a single shilling extra to what had been paid and received beyond the Regulation, since the violation of the Act 49 of George III. became habitual. Why, indeed, should they recognize a practice which the Government itself has not adopted? If this theory of proportioning prices to increased value were applicable to the "sordid and degrading" traffic in commissions,* why has not the War Office augmented the regulation price every time a new measure has been adopted for increasing an officer's income, or indirectly improving his circumstances? When my father, rest his soul, paid £450 for my commission in the —th, the pay was precisely what it now remains, but how different were the circumstances of a subaltern, and the officers generally, in other respects! We had no Prince Regent's allowance of wine—no medals—much less fuel and light,—no brevet promotion but what came once in six years; less half-pay by two shillings a day; no regimental classes and musketry instructors; no prospect of staff appointments if we went to India, beyond an accidental A. D. C. ship, or a Brigade Majority; no chance of a staff appointment anywhere unless we had great interest. I look upon it that the value of all commissions, and especially that of captains, has increased at least 50 per cent. in the last few years; and, yet, not one penny more is demanded now (in excess of the Regulation) than a man had the face to ask when I was up the Irawaddy with Sir Willoughby Cotton, and that is thirty-five years ago! If this fact were more generally promulgated, and the fallacy of the politico-economic treasury cum *Times* doctrine demonstrated, we should probably find

* See Major-General Lord West's evidence before the House of Common's Committee.

Sir De Lacy Evans, or Captain Vernon, or some such sincere friend to the army, pushing for an increase of pay to the subalterns. Heaven knows they need it, poor young fellows!

So the Volunteer movement has proved a failure! Instead of getting 500,000 stalwart youth to arm and clothe, and learn to use the rifle, we don't seem to have got together 20,000 under the regulations laid down by General Peel, and followed by Mr. Herbert. It would not have been difficult to provide half a million of the better classes of young men to dress like soldiers of a superior appearance, and play at soldiers from time to time at the expense of the State; but when it came to a tax upon their purses, and conforming to certain rules laid down by the authorities, the fire of patriotism, so speedily lighted up, began to abate—the brilliant flames rapidly subsided, and a little smoke, with an occasional flash of nationality, is all which at this present writing distinguishes the resolution to form rifle clubs and corps for the defence of Great Britain against an invasion of the Zouaves and Chasseurs de Vincennes. I am not sorry for this, because it must open the eyes of the Government and the country to the absurdity of depending upon any but regular troops, good fortifications at feeble parts of the coast, and a large and well-equipped navy for the maintenance of the integrity of our shores. Allowing as much as you please for the constant and steady enthusiasm of a limited number of gentlemen, and respectable yeomen and tradespeople, and their individual proficiency at the rifle, where would they be in the hour of emergency? And if upon the menaced or insulted portions of the coast, how could they act efficiently, if they had not been accustomed to sham fights in the company of regulars, and were perfect masters of all the movements directed by voice of commanding officer, whistle, bugle, or drum? To my thinking, they would be very much in the way. I can only suppose them to be actually serviceable when behind a parapet near the sea shore, and in full view of the landing of a hostile force. Then, possibly, they might pick off a few scores of the many thousands who would simultaneously be let loose upon the sacred soil of Britain only to fall easy victims immediately afterwards to the French masses who would advance into the country. And at what price is this very precious assistance to be bought? At something, I submit, much more considerable than it can possibly be worth. Putting aside the expense of the rifles and the outfit, which may be purchased in lieu of any other toys, or at the sacrifice of less than a week's summer trip, how much of the capital of the country will be withdrawn, while those who follow industrial occupations are wasting their time in rifle practice, "turning to the left and turning to the right;" how much must be spent in the useless consumption of ammunition, the employment of rifle instructors, the hire of rifle grounds, the erection of store-houses, the extra drink which extra exercise will entail, and the extra efforts which will become necessary to recruit for the line and the militia. If country gentlemen, who desire to figure in uniform, and to enjoy military rank, were to subscribe their money, in order to raise and keep up good rifle corps *in their* locality, numbers of men who would otherwise enlist into

the regular service, would remain at home, and we shall then be exchanging soldiers who could be made serviceable everywhere, and at all times, for hybrids who could not be turned to any practical account, should an enemy happen to land in their vicinity.

To all these objections, to a reliance on rifle clubs, or companies, or corps, or volunteer associations, let me add the risks which innocent people run of being shot, while the patriots are nourishing their "young ideas." A few days ago, at Hastings (I quote from a Sussex paper), "the Rev. J. S. Ruddach, curate of St. Mary Magdalen, drew the attention of the magistrates to the practice of rifle firing, which he said was carried on under the East Cliff, where parties fired from the shore down to the rocks at low-water mark. He was on the water on the previous evening, and a boatman told him that as he was passing previously, a ball came whistling past at a very short distance from him, and the firing was continued until he was nearly in a line with it. The boatman called out to the party who were firing, and they stopped until they had passed the line of firing, when they continued to fire again. His worship was no doubt aware, that when a ball was lodged from a Minié rifle, such as he believed was used, there was no knowing where it would rest, and an accident might very easily occur, when boats were passing the spot. He got out of the boat at the time, and saw two gentlemen with rifles, and they said it was not themselves but others who were firing, and expressed their regret at the occurrence. He felt it his duty to bring the matter before the bench, in order to prevent the lives of the public being placed in danger by the practice. The clerk expressed an opinion that as the Rifle Club had no practising ground that had been sanctioned by the Government, they had no right to practice. A conversation among the magistrates ensued, and the clerk was ultimately instructed to write to the secretaries of the club on the subject. The Rev. J. S. Ruddach then acknowledged the courtesy that had been paid him, and retired."

It is well it was no worse. Let honest civilians learn that it is not merely in the direct line of fire that the danger lies; there is such a thing as *ricochet*—a sort of duck and drake oblique movement, which may carry a ball, if it should strike a piece of rock in a diagonal direction, never contemplated by the clumsy marksman. I have known windows broken and servants wounded at Southsea by the eccentric flight of bullets, even when instructed regulars have been firing; what then may not be expected from the unsteady hands and winking eyes of the novices in grey, green, and drab?—VERBUM SAT. SAP.

The trial of Mr. Marshall, the tailor, for trafficing in Army Commissions, which occupied two days, and engaged the talents of some of the most distinguished men at the bar, has been instructive in two or three points. We learn from it first, that he who applies for an army commission without purchase will succeed in his application when a vacancy arises, if he can bring forward satisfactory proof that his relations and ancestors have established a claim on his account by their public services. Secondly, that the patronage of the Prince at the head of the army is dispensed fairly and without favour or affection; and thirdly, that the public is kept rather

in the dark as to the alterations which are made, from time to time in respect to the age of admission to the army. Two points are thus in favour of the Commander-in-Chief. He might resolutely adhere to one established minimum of years in respect to the third; and I would humbly submit to him, to the War Minister, and the Council of Military Education, whether it would not be as well if they were to definitively settle among them some scheme of military education. The chopping and changing of regulations on this head perplexes the public, embarrasses tutors, and the heads of colleges and schools, and seriously diminishes that respect for the authorities at the Horse Guards, which a steadiness of purpose would ensure to them

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On Tuesday evening, the 26th, the Fairy, with the Royal standard at the main, and the Admiralty flag at the fore, with the Elfin paddle yacht in attendance, steamed up to Spithead from Osborne, on a visit to the fleet. Her Majesty was received with a Royal salute, and manned yards from each ship as the Royal yacht steamed slowly past, the Russian frigate Polkan joining in the demonstration. After steaming from east to west of the outer line of the fleet, the Fairy passed down the inner line and round the Polkan, after which Her Majesty returned to Osborne. The fleet is now anchored at Spithead, in two divisions. The outer line, or division commencing from the west part of Spithead, is anchored in the order named:—The James Watt, the Hero, the Algiers, the Royal Albert, the Edgar, and the Neptune. The inner line is formed with the Emerald and the Mersey, also commencing from the westward with the Flying Fish, 6, and the Pioneer, 6, anchored rather closer inshore in shoaler water. The Russian squadron, consisting of the Retvizan, 90; the Gromoboi, 50; and the Polkan, 44, are brought up to the eastward of the squadron. Signal was made yesterday from the Royal Albert for one-fourth of each ship's company to have 48 hours' leave ashore, which has been accordingly granted.

Rear-Admiral Pelham, C.B., and Captain Frederick, two of the Lords of the Admiralty were at Devonport on Tuesday, the 27th, inspecting ships of war in Hamoaze. They visited the screw steamship Royal George, 102, and several gunboats attached to the steam reserve. Their Lordships landed in the evening from the tender Sylph at Devonport. They were attended by several naval officers, among whom was Capt. S. Robinson, of the guardship of steam ordinary Wellington, 72.

EDITOR'S PORTFOLIO;

OR,

NAVAL AND MILITARY REGISTER.

ENGLAND and FRANCE.—The text of the peace of Villafranca is now before the world, and there can no longer be a doubt that the Emperor NAPOLEON has, for some reason of his own, fraternised with Austria, and abandoned Italy. It is impossible to conjecture the Imperial motives, but, although our Foreign Secretary has pronounced the peace to be "just," they are suggestive of a policy anything but ingenuous. Since Austria is to retain Venetia, it is obviously not fair that she should be despoiled of Lombardy, nor is it made clear why this province, torn from its rightful lord, is to be ceded to Sardinia. The Government of VICTOR EMMANUEL seems to consider that its mission is to foment disturbances in all the neighbouring states, and then take possession. In Lombardy it has been successful; but, pursuing the same tactics in Central Italy, Count CAVOUR and his master have overstepped the programme, and so prevented its fulfilment. LOUIS NAPOLEON was probably as much influenced in making peace by the growing hydra of revolution, as by the phantom of the Prussian army. It is understood that he had received an *avertissement* from the French clergy, and a friendly warning from Russia. As a consequence of this two-fold interposition, the Papal authority is to be preserved inviolate, and the Duchies are to receive back their former rulers. We presume the task of restoring the latter will be intrusted to the Austrians, and that France will enforce obedience in the Legations. In Modena and Tuscany, the popular party, if any faith can be placed in appearances, intend to give battle, and, led on by GARIBALDI, they will not be easily vanquished. But it is reasonable to suppose that the powers that concluded the treaty are prepared to enforce its provisions, and Sardinia may have to stand in the humiliating position of suppressing, in conjunction with France and Austria, the movement it has so openly abetted, and to this moment sustains. The exposed plains of Lombardy, commanded by Mantua and Peschiera, are a poor set-off against the sacrifices entailed by the war—a decimated army, a ruined commerce, and an exhausted exchequer; and, on the other hand, the Lombards will not long rejoice in their change of masters,

when they find themselves burdened with the debts of both Austria and Sardinia, while their country is still only a province.

These arrangements may or may not be termed "just," but no one expects them to be lasting; and already it is debated whether Austria will first break the peace by re-occupying Lombardy, or France by attacking Prussia or England. It were absurd to deny that the relations between France and England are on a precarious footing. Recent articles in the French journals, and particularly the comments on our armaments in the *Moniteur*, and the demonstration at Marseilles, believed to have been got up by the police, are indications of a very unfriendly disposition, if not in the French people, in the Government. The immediate object is doubtless to intimidate England into taking part in the meditated Congress, and thus covering the retreat of the French Emperor, by giving the sanction of her name to his compact with Austria. But in view of the naval armaments still in progress at the French ports, and which have not been brought into requisition during the late war—as if reserved for some ulterior purpose—we are convinced there is a deliberate design to assume, sooner or later, a hostile attitude towards this country; and it will indeed fare wofully with our rulers if, after all the warnings they have received, we are at the critical moment found unprepared.

DISCIPLINE OF THE NAVY.—It was hardly to be expected that the 10,000 seamen collected from the four winds of Heaven to man the Navy, under the recent proclamation, should all settle down in their berths without some little outbreak. After all, with every amelioration that has been introduced, and every indulgence granted, the discipline of a man-of-war is necessarily tight. It imposes a restraint which, from being less personal, is not so apparent in the merchant service, and, at the first start, this is severely felt. But the disagreeable impression soon passes away, and the young seaman becomes reconciled to his situation, as he sees everyone in his place, and all move the easier for an overruling authority. To produce such effect, however, discipline must be consistent, and in unison with the spirit of the times. Physical power may accomplish its object, but it will be by sheer force, and through the influence of terror: for moral results we must employ moral means, and those alone. But it is the routine of the service to resort first to severity, and then try coaxing: to commence as unyielding, and end by giving way. Why could not the crew of the *Liffey* be allowed to go on shore, and take leave of their friends, previous to quitting their native land for years on foreign service? Lord CLARENCE PAGET would have thought it no great indulgence in his own case, but would have been extremely indignant had a wish so reasonable been denied. There was no fear that the men would not return to their duty, as they had a good Captain, were well satisfied with their ship, and, to use their own words, were "very happy and comfortable." But they possess human affections as well as the Lords of the Admiralty: and it was natural they should desire to say farewell to their friends, before a separation which, in every case long, with

some will be final. The Admiralty refused this indulgence, and, in consequence, some shot were rolled about the deck. Captain PREEDY attributes the act to a few bad characters, whom he has been unable to discover, but this very fact evinces a certain sympathy in the crew. Whether the Admiralty are of the same opinion we are not informed, but its sapient junta has conceded to insubordination what it denied to good conduct; and the crew of the *Liffey* have received leave to go on shore.

A similar demonstration was made on board the *Hero* at Portland, and was as promptly quelled by the officer in command, Lieutenant STRICKLAND. Here the crew seem to have had less ground for complaint, and, indeed, their conduct can only be attributed to a prevailing spirit of insubordination. They appear to have received from too much liberty the same impulse which the crew of the *Liffey* derived from too much restraint. The right mean, the balance between rigour and licence, seems out of our reach, and we are either all drive or all drift. Surely, a sailor's position on board a man-of-war may be made sufficiently clear to be brought home to his comprehension, so that he may understand what is expected from him, and what he is to receive in return. These squabbles about leave would never have occurred, if leave were known to hinge on established principles, instead of depending on the will of Commanding Officers, or the caprice of the Admiralty. It is not by being lax at one time and too strict at another—by giving a margin to a ship's crew here and enforcing the letter of the bond there—that we shall make the service attractive, and raise the tone of our seamen. Let the nature of the contract be manifest, in all its phases, and all its relations. The authorities may then act with firmness, because they will be supported by right; and the sailor will comprehend that it is by good conduct, not by breaches of discipline, that he will obtain indulgence and consideration.

FLOGGING IN THE NAVY.—At length, there is some hope that the sweet little cherub who sits up aloft, and who operates through the press, will effectually deliver poor JACK. It is announced in Parliament that the lash is to be allowed to "die a natural death." Who can paint the horror of Admiral MARTINET, or the rage of Captain SMITEM? For years these gallant officers have warned us that the service was going to the devil; but now the thing is consummated. Every one knows that the lash is to the British Navy what the palladium was to Troy. It gives us the dominion of the seas; and instead of representing BRITANNIA with a trident, which is a purely imaginary instrument, we ought to depict her with a cat-o'-nine-tails. True, flogging is repudiated by many of our officers, who insist on regarding sailors as men, and, somehow or other, do succeed in maintaining discipline, and even preserve their ships' companies in the best order, without resorting to its use. But is no deference due to the wisdom of our ancestors? Is this time-honoured institution to be extinguished, and not a hand raised in its defence? At this crisis, we may ask where are the eloquent advocates of the lash?—where, among others, the quondam Captain of the *Princess Royal*, that "old

and meritorious officer," as he is described by Lord CLARENCE PAGET, who flogged every man he could plausibly lay hands on? It would now be easy for any of these disciplinarians to effect a diversion in public opinion, by peeling off their coats, and submitting to a sound three dozen, in order to prove the wholesomeness of such correction. Let them take up their parable when the Boatswain's stroke descends, and their mangled flesh is flying in the air. We may then be convinced—not that we are in the wrong, but that they really believe themselves in the right, and are not merely influenced by a brutal disposition. After the recent affair at Devonport, it will hardly be contended that the lash is the best MENTOR for our sailors. Here corporal punishment was administered in presence of the dockyard men, who naturally became excited, and, as it proceeded, evinced their disgust by hisses and groans; but the ship's company lent no encouragement to this demonstration, but, on the contrary, maintained the most perfect discipline. Are such men, we ask, only to be kept in order by terror—by the scourge? We shall have some of our three-dozen champions flogging sailors in the streets next, and Englishmen will be expected to look on, and hold their tongues. The punishment on this occasion was, if ever, well merited, but to inflict it in such a place was a gross breach of public decency. Nor is it credible that a penalty which has to be veiled from the public eye, because it provokes a tumult, can ever produce a good effect on men who, while witnesses of its horrors, know they are liable to its infliction. Punishment is useless as vengeance; its great object is example; and neither our soldiers nor sailors will attain their full moral stature—all our efforts at raising them in the scale will be crippled, until corporal scourging is abolished. The "old and meritorious officer" who commanded the *Princess Royal* belonged to another day, and another system; and we may leave him in the obscurity from which, after flogging so many better men than himself, he thinks it prudent not to emerge. But, thank Heaven, our navy boasts officers who are of another stamp, and who will hold and fight our ships when the lash has died—"a natural death."

GREENWICH HOSPITAL.—We observe that Sir CHARLES NAPIER, on Wednesday, the 27th ult., persisted in bringing forward his motion for an address to Her Majesty, to grant a Commission to inquire into the management of Greenwich Hospital. The Admiral, under all the circumstances, was well supported—eighty-two members voting with him. Sir CHARLES lost his motion, but upon the express condition that the Admiralty would undertake the inquiry forthwith. Our readers will find some faithful pictures of this very interesting institution in our numbers for March, June, July, and the current month of August. Those who desire to arrive at a correct knowledge of "Greenwich Hospital as it is" should read these papers.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

HELEN LINDSAY; OR, THE TRIAL OF FAITH. By a Clergyman's Daughter.

IT is not always that the title of a book indicates its character, but in the present case this object is effected. At the same time, we are not presented with a mere religious novel, but a story of considerable interest, related with pathos and feeling. The career of a young girl, whose first desire is to do her duty in life, at whatever cost, does not promise much excitement, yet it is sure to inspire interest. Helen Lindsay is a spirit of this class, brave and enduring, but withal gentle, ready to make any sacrifice on the side of right. She is first introduced in prosperity, as the heiress of a competent fortune. George Weston seems an unexceptionable lover, and their attachment is mutual and of the tenderest kind. But the bright prospects thus presented are suddenly overcast. The losses and the death of her father reduce Helen to poverty, and she then becomes sensible of a greater misfortune in the lax principles of her lover. After an explanation, which confirms all she had feared, she breaks off the engagement, preferring the lot of servitude to a marriage which can bring no happiness. The trials to which she is now exposed are severe, but they are met with courage, and endured with meekness. This affords room for a charming delineation of character, bringing out all her noble qualities, and all her little blemishes, which to the last give a colouring of truth to the portraiture. Helen proceeds to the Crimea, and becomes a nurse in the hospital, where a dying officer informs her that he had been perverted by Weston, and, through her reasoning, is brought back to the Christian belief. Meanwhile, Weston himself is reclaimed; he appears at the bedside of his friend, and receives his forgiveness; and, in the end, the lovers are reconciled, and the story is brought to a happy conclusion. Out of these simple elements the author has constructed a most entertaining tale; and the religious element is so well managed, that it is never allowed to interrupt its progress.

THE LEES OF BLENDON HALL. By the Author of Alice Wentworth. 3 vols.

No one excels the author of this work in the delineation of the dark side of domestic life. She seems to write under peculiar inspiration, which keeps her to the one theme, though in a diversity of aspects. In all her works, she shows us nature in its frailty and fragility, cast down and broken, as if to give a broader contrast to virtue. Her pages take us into the eddies of the family circle, where, unobserved and unsuspected, evil passions may sweep round, and leave no influence untouched. The details and characters, what may be called the properties of the plot, are all marked out with an eye to effect. But the colouring, though deep, is natural, and reveals a powerful touch. Such subjects could not be so well handled with one less conversant with human impulses, and the secret mechanism of the heart. Whoever the author may be—and her name is not even suspected, she bids fair to take her place among the foremost of our lady novelists, and she has well earned the distinction. The plot of the present work is not easily sketched. "The Lees of Blendon Hall," whose history it relates, live together very unhappily, mainly in consequence of a second marriage, and the introduction of a step-mother. There is soon reason to suspect that this woman has formed a guilty connection with a hanger-on of the family, who becomes odious to all its members. Mr. Lee is on the point of making a discovery, when he is removed from the world by a bullet, supposed to be fired by his own hand, but it is afterwards proved that he was shot by his

betrayer. This man becomes the husband of his widow, and the family is broken up. But the half-brother and sister meet again, and live under the same roof. Each forms new ties, which lead to fresh trials; but, animated by high principles, they pursue their way together through every difficulty. The *dénouement* we must not reveal, for all who like an exciting story, should read the book, and we will not mar their enjoyment.

GŒTHE'S FAUST. With Critical and Explanatory Notes. By G. G. Zerffi, Ph. Dr.

A very good edition of Gœthe's famous poem, copiously illustrated by notes, which display an extraordinary amount of research and critical acumen. To those who desire thoroughly to appreciate the genius and compositions of the great poet, this work will prove a *desideratum*. It is prefaced by admirable introduction, replete with valuable and interesting information.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE.

[With a view of promoting the interests of the Service, this department of the Magazine is open to all authentic communications, and, therefore, the Editor cannot hold himself responsible for the opinions expressed.—ED. U. S. MAG.]

WHAT HAVE THE BARRACK MASTERS DONE?

To the Editor of the United Service Magazine.

SIR,—In behalf of that unfortunate, hard-worked, and neglected department, the barrack, may I in the name of fair play and common justice, appeal to you, if you should be aware of the cause, to be informed why they have alone either been left out, and studiously neglected, when a most liberal Warrant has appeared in favour of I believe many other departments—Medical, Army and Navy, Clerical, Commissariat, &c., whose deserts do not appear greater to an impartial though perchance ignorant person like myself, for I beg to state, thank God, I am no barrack master, although I know several intimately that are, and conscientiously assert that amongst them are as deserving a set of men as can be found in any department, many of them most meritorious old soldiers, as well as civil servants for a great number of years, and whose duties and responsibilities are so great I am utterly astonished how any prudent man could be found to undertake the latter for the miserable pay and advantages to which they are entitled; indeed it could not be more forcibly expressed than some years ago, by an officer of the highest rank, that a barrack master might go to bed without owing a shilling, and get up a ruined man, so great were his responsibilities. From being employed as a civil servant of the crown, I am intimately acquainted and informed both with many barrack masters, and as to their various and onerous duties, and on a late tour of inspection, having inquired if they were always equally neglected and put upon, I was informed by one, the best and oldest in the service, that it was not quite to such an extent even now as I imagined, for lately they had been honoured with the expense of a new uniform (with reference to that greatest of humbug, comparative rank), and that there is a question of depriving them of their houses or quarters, hanging over their heads, built expressly for their accommodation, and of which, unless might made right, they could not be deprived, and the only explanation or answer I could get on the subject was, "My dear fellow, we are an unhappy race, and have no friend since we lost our head, the Master General of the Ordnance, and were unfortunately handed over to a department who have *always* been most hostile and unfriendly, and, under the late ministry, most

pointedly and particularly so, in every possible way." It, however, seems to me that the Barrack Masters are not, or were not, totally friendless, as Mr. Warren, their late, and, I fear, their only champion, who is unfortunately for them no longer an M.P., put a question to the Secretary of State for War, and elicited an answer that was construed into giving some hope that something favourable was in consideration; but the mountains have not as yet brought forth even a miserable mouse. We have, however, now a liberal, and, I trust, an impartial ministry, and they may again hope that something may be done towards which, if you would add the assistance of your powerful pen and influential journal, for I can hardly hope you will find space for this letter, you will be doing an act of justice and mercy, from, dear Mr. Editor, with much respect,

"MIGHT SHOULD MAKE RIGHT."

To the Editor of the United Service Magazine.

Waterford, June 14th, 1859.

SIR,—In the "Reminiscences of a Veteran," for June, I find that the author states that in the enemy's sortie from Bayonne, I was shot in the heel, and as the remark follows an observation, "that he conceived that the 5th Caçadores must have been roughly handled," it might be supposed that we were running away, I beg you will allow insertion to the following facts:

On the evening before the sortie, we heard of the peace concluded at Paris, as also did the governor of Bayonne. Having gone to bed under the impression that the last shot of the war had been fired, I was not a little surprised by being awakened by the enemy's shots flying through my windows. Being in support of the advanced posts, we were under arms in a few minutes, and advanced on the left of the Germans to the relief of the guards, and part of the 5th division, who had suffered severely in the sortie, and having driven the enemy into the citadel, I was in command of a wing of the regiment opposite to it, waiting to see if they would make any further attack. The companies were in column of subdivisions, and a ball from the walls having hit one of my men, I moved the column behind a house on our left flank, and remained on the look out, never dreaming of getting shot, when I felt a blow on the shin, and on looking down found that I had received a shot between the two bones, the ball carrying in the trousers with it. And, it appears, that the last shot of the war was the one received by your humble servant,

JOHN DOBB,
Late Captain of 5th Caçadores and 52nd Regiment.

NAVAL AND MILITARY ORDERS AND CIRCULARS.

MEDALS AND GRATUITIES.

Circular Memorandum.—Horse Guards, 1st June, 1859.—It being desirable that the principles which regulate the grant of annuities and medals to serjeants who may be already in possession of medals and gratuities should be more clearly defined than they are at present, the following rules have been framed by His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief, in concurrence with the Secretary of State for War, for the guidance of the Army generally.

1st. The medal accompanying the annuity, and inscribed for "meritorious service," is to be considered as given for service of the same nature as that accompanying the gratuity "for long service and good conduct;" the former being held by serjeants only, the latter by non-commissioned officers and privates indifferently.

2nd. Both annuity and gratuity are also given, under special circumstances, accompanied by medals similarly inscribed "for distinguished conduct in the field."

3rd. When a serjeant, on becoming an annuitant, receives a medal denoting by its inscription that it is given for service similar to that for which he has already received a medal, he will be required to relinquish the latter medal, together with its accompanying gratuity, and to sign a declaration that he does so voluntarily.

4th. When, however, the inscription on the medal granted to a serjeant, together with an annuity, shows that it is given for service of a different nature from that for which he already holds a medal, he will be required to relinquish the gratuity only, making a like declaration as to the voluntary relinquishment.

5th. Commanding Officers are at liberty to recommend the re-appropriation of a relinquished gratuity to any other deserving soldier or soldiers, provided they shall have been serving in the year for which the gratuity was originally awarded, and shall have fulfilled the required conditions as to service and character in that year.

By command, G. A. Wetherall,
Adjutant General.

MUSKETRY PRACTICE.

General Order.—Horse Guards, 11th June, 1859.—The General Commanding-in-Chief, with a view to prevent the possibility of accidents during ball practice, has directed the accompanying rules, which have been for some time past in use, and with the best success, at the School of Musketry at Hythe, to be circulated for general information and guidance.

Any alteration in these rules which local circumstances may render advisable or necessary, must be submitted through the officer commanding on the spot, to General Officer commanding the division or district; and, when sanctioned by his authority, must be communicated to the Adjutant General for the information of the General Commanding-in-Chief.

TARGET PRACTICE.

Orders for the Non-Commisioned Officer marking in the butt.

1. Not to allow any practice to take place, until the large red flag is hoisted on the long signal staff, or where no such staff exists then not until the sentries, or look-out men, are posted to warn persons against crossing the range.

2. To see that the following flags are hoisted to signal, first, "*the position of hits*,"—second, "*ricochets*,"—third, "*danger*," and "*cease fire*," viz—

1st. White flag ... ... Outer
Dark Blue flag ... ... Centre
Red and White flag... ... Bull's eye
} 1st & 2nd Classes. } 3rd Class.

2nd. Red flag waved horizontally twice to and fro in front of the target ... ... } Ricochet

3rd ...Red flag... ... ...Danger and cease firing.

3. To see that the signal flags are invariably waved when the wind blows up or down the range;—and whenever a shot strikes the target to the right of the centre, that the flag denoting its value is inclined to the right and *vice versa*;—also, when a shot strikes the target high, that the flag is raised as high as possible, and upright;—and when low, that it is only raised high enough to be easily visible above the butt.

4. To see that the "*danger*" flag is hoisted whenever it is necessary to cease firing to re-colour the target, or for any other purpose; and to allow no man, on any account whatever, to leave the marker's butt until the "cease fire" has been sounded, or the danger flag has been raised at the firing point, *in answer to the danger signal*; also to see that the red flag is kept up, and waved so as to attract attention, as long as the markers are out of the butt, or any person is in the line of range.

5. To see that the danger flag is lowered directly the range is clear.

6 To allow no person to enter the marker's butt, except on duty without an order from the senior officer on the range,—and to allow no one to enter or leave the butt, except by the regular path.

7. To check all talking or noise in the marker's butt, as tending to disturb the attention of the person whose duty is to hoist the signals.

8. To see that the "*danger*" flag is hoisted, and shaken about, immediately the look-out man on the tower or elsewhere, either hoists his flag, or gives notice that persons or boats are within the line of fire, and kept up until the range is clear, and the flag on the tower or elsewhere is lowered.

9. When the 1st and 2nd Class shots are firing, to see that all persons in the marker's butt, stand as close as possible to the interior slope, to avoid the chance of being struck by the bullets when falling.

TARGET PRACTICE.

Orders for the Senior Officer at the Firing Point.

1. Not to allow any practice to take place until the large red flag is hoisted on the long signal staff:—or where no such staff exists, then not until the sentries, or look-out men, are posted to warn persons against crossing the range.

2. To see that the men load properly in the ranks, and by word of command.

3. Not to allow a man to fire until the shot of the previous man (should it strike the target) has been signalled.

4. To order the "*cease-fire*" to be sounded, and the "*danger*" flag to be hoisted, immediately the red flag is raised from the marker's butt, or when any person or animal appears in front of the firing party; and on no account to allow any firing to proceed so long as the danger flag is up at the markers' butt. When the said flag is lowered to order the "*commence-fire*" to be sounded, and the "*danger*" flag at the point to be dropped.

5. On ranges situated in pairs, the parties are to fire by classes at the same distances, and not one class in front of another.

6. When the "*cease-fire*" sounds, the firing at both ranges, (occupied in pairs), is to be discontinued until the danger flag at the marker's butt is lowered, and the "*commence-fire*" is again sounded.

7. To see that all persons who desire to watch the practice, stand to the right and clear of the party:—and on no account to allow any noise or talking among the men, whose attention is to be fixed on the practice.

8. To allow no irregularity—to be most particular that the men keep their places in the ranks while the practice is proceeding—and to be alert to prevent accidents.

9. To see that, on the longer range of the pair, *the large red flag* (6 *feet square*) is used in the marker's butt, to signal "*danger.*

MUSKETRY INSTRUCTION.

HORSE GUARDS, S.W., 29th June, 1859.—The General Commanding in Chief understands that it is customary in some Regiments for Captains to bestow, from their private funds, rewards to the best shots in their Companies.

This practice, though commendable in those who can afford it, as showing their *esprit de corps*, is, in other respects, invidious towards Officers who, with every disposition to bestow like rewards, are unable to accomplish it.

Government has liberally granted distinctions, and attendant pecuniary advantages, to those who excel in rifle shooting. His Royal Highness, therefore, requests that you will prohibit the practice above alluded to—being confident, from the returns of Regiments, and from the reports of the Inspector General of Musketry, that Soldiers possess in themselves sufficient emulation to attain perfection in that most important part of their instruction without other inducements than those provided by regulation.

By Command,
G. A. WETHERALL, Adjutant General.

GENERAL ORDER.

HORSE GUARDS, S.W., 9th July, 1859.—The General Commanding-in-Chief has received from the Secretary of State for War, a report from the Board of Trade of the investigation held to inquire into the cause of the destruction by fire of the troop ship *Eastern Monarch*, and, having submitted the same to the Queen, has much gratification in announcing to the Officers and Men who were on board that ship, and to the whole Army, Her Majesty's approbation of the discipline and good order displayed by them under such trying circumstances. The Officers and Men were principally Invalids from India, and belonged to various Regiments; but all behaved as British Soldiers are wont to do in such perilous situations, and exhibited a gratifying proof of the good discipline and manly spirit of the Army generally.

Throughout the eventful career of a Soldier, there is no position in which he can be placed where fortitude, courage, and obedience can be more essential, or more conspicuous, than upon such occasions as shipwreck or fire

at sea. The display of those qualities, in the instance now adverted in is most creditable, and does honor to Lieutenant-Colonel Allan, of the 18th Regiment, in command, and to all the Officers and Soldiers who shared in that dreadful calamity.

MILITARY CHAPLAINS.—The following Circular has been issued:—"Misapprehension having occurred on the part of some Commissioned Chapl ains as well as officiating clergymen to the Troops, in regard to the nature and extent of the duties which are expected to be performed by them in consideration of the remuneration which they receive from the Government, the Secretary of State for War wishes it to be distinctly understood that this remuneration is not given as a seat rent for Sunday services only, but as an equivalent for the ordinary ministerial duties, which include baptisms, churchings, and funerals. Commissioned Chaplains and officiating clergymen are, therefore, not to exact fees for the performance of any of these duties. —B. HAWES."

THE COAST GUARD.

The following General Memoranda, dated the 28th ult. have been issued to the Captains and Officers commanding Coast Guard Districts and Divisions by Commodore EDEN on leaving that Force.—

"The Commodore Comptroller General, having been removed from the command of the Coast Guard to the Board of Admiralty, cannot resign that command without expressing to the Captains of Districts his most grateful thanks for the valuable assistance he has received from them under circumstances of no ordinary importance. He is fully sensible of the hearty and zealous co-operation he has at all times received from them, and this enables him to commit to his successor a Force which is in every way most efficient and creditable to them

"He therefore offers his sincere thanks for the zealous and cordial co-operation which the Captains of Districts have afforded him in re-organising the Coast Guard Service, so as to make it a valuable and efficient reserve for the Royal Navy, whenever the men may be required to embark for the defence, or in the service of their country.

"The Commodore Comptroller General is much indebted to the Inspecting Commanders of Divisions for their assistance, and will ever entertain a recollection of the hearty and efficient aid he has received at their hands. To the Officers in command of tenders and stations he feels the same, for the manner in which they have performed their duties. To the Chief Officers of 2nd class who have been established under his recommendation, he is happy in being able to say that they have in every way, and under all circumstances, justified him in the recommendation he has made in their behalf. He trusts that hereafter they will not forget that 'good service and good conduct' were the sole grounds upon which he was induced to obtain for them their promotion to the rank they now hold.

"He fully appreciates the zealous conduct of the Chief Boatmen in charge and Chief Boatmen of Stations, and the example they have shown; whilst to the remainder of the Force he expresses his admiration of their exemplary conduct under all circumstances.

"The Commodore Comptroller General now takes his leave of the Officers and men he had the honour to command nearly four years; he does so with the most sincere regret, but with the fullest assurance that he leaves a body of men who will ever prove themselves the "Coast Guard of England" whenever their services may be required, either on shore or afloat."

Commodore EDEN has also addressed the following to the Coast Guard Office:—

"C.G.O., 29th June, 1859.

"It is with most sincere regret that the Commodore Comptroller General takes leave of the Deputy Comptroller General and the gentlemen of the Coast Guard Office. He will ever remember with feelings of gratitude the zealous, efficient, and hearty assistance he has received from all, and now leaves them with his very best wishes for their happiness and prosperity."

INDIA.

EUROPEAN NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF THE INDIAN ARMY.—GENERAL ORDER.—The Commander-in-Chief has the satisfaction of announcing to the army, that His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India has been pleased to decide that furlough to Europe shall be granted to well-conducted and deserving European non-commissioned officers of the Indian army, on the following condition :—

Each case is to be made absolutely special and referable to the Commander-in-Chief for approval; and cases of sickness, where the men are not likely to recover without change, will be regarded as special.

Furlough will be granted, subject to the men reporting themselves on arrival in London at the India office, for such orders as they may receive, and with the understanding that they cannot decline to take charge of recruits if ordered by the Secretary of State for India to do so.

Recommendations may be submitted at any period of the year, and the men will be provided with a passage to and from England. The applications to be submitted through the station and divisional authorities, are to be accompanied by certificates of character, signed by the commanding officers, and in cases of sickness, the medical officer of the regiment will state his opinion of the necessity of the measure.

THE MEDICAL AND COMMISSARIAT SERVICES IN INDIA.

INDIA OFFICE, June 27.—The Secretary of State for India in Council has received the following papers :—

No. 1.—GENERAL ORDER.

Fort William, March 29.

"His Excellency the Governor General in Council has much satisfaction in publishing the accompanying letter from the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief, in which Lord Clyde warmly recommends the Medical and Commissariat Department to the notice of the Government of India.

"The Governor General in Council desires to express to the Director General, Dr. Forsyth; to the Inspector General of Her Majesty's Hospitals, Dr. Linton, C.B.; to Col. Ramsay, late Commissary General; and to Lieut. Col. Thomson, C.B., the present Commissary General of the Bengal army; and to all the officers of the Medical and Commissariat Departments who have been employed in the field, or who have elsewhere furthered the service by their exertions in providing for the welfare and the wants of the troops; the cordial acknowledgements of the Government of India for the important services they have rendered."

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

"Lucknow, Feb. 21.

"MY LORD—The Military operations in the Presidency of Bengal which ensued on the great mutiny of 1857, having happily been now brought to a

close, I have the greatest satisfaction in recommending warmly to your Excellency's protection two great departments of the Military administration to which the Troops, and the Officers who have commanded them in their long campaigns, are under real and great obligations. I allude to the Medical and Commissariat Departments.

"The former, being composed of Officers belonging to the two services, has shone equally in the matters of general organization and of regimental arrangements. The Director General, Dr. Forsyth, and the Inspector General of Her Majesty's Forces, Dr. Linton, C.B.. in Calcutta, have worked successfully to meet the great requirements made on them, and the Staff and Regimental Medical Officers have well maintained the credit of their noble profession and the reputation for self-sacrifice which belongs to the Surgeons of Her Majesty's Armies—a reputation which is maintained in the field on all occasions, as well as in the most trying circumstances of the hospital.

"It has been remarked throughout the Army that, from the time of the slender Forces taking the field against Delhi, and Allahabad, in the summer of 1857, the system of the Indian Commissariat has been found equal to the tasks imposed on it, in spite of the extraordinary circumstances in which it was suddenly placed, and of the actual loss of the resources—viz., the great contractors and agents, with which it had been the custom to work.

"For this system the Army is in great measure indebted to the late Commissary General Colonel Ramsay, and his successor, Colonel Thomson. The latter Officer, being a personal charge, supplied the field Force of Delhi under unexampled circumstances, when Sir A. Wilson stood before that city almost cut off from the rest of India.

"The Commissary General has been nobly supported by his subordinates; and I do but speak the truth when I affirm that no department has ever possessed a more efficient Staff of Officers than those forming the establishment of the Bengal Commissariat. I have, &c.,

"CLYDE,

"General, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies."

THE SARAH SANDS.—A gold watch and purse of 150 sovereigns have been presented to Captain Castle, of the Sarah Sands, as a testimonial to the gallant conduct he evinced when his ship with 450 troops on board, took fire at sea in November last.

PENSIONS ON LORD CLIVE'S FUND.—From a return to the House of Lords it appears that last year in England there were 101 officecs, 2,770 men, and 774 widows receiving pensions from Lord Clive's fund to the amount of £86,062.

State of the Executive of the Royal Navy, 1st July, 1859.

Denominations.	Employed.			The Active Lists.			Excess.		
	Afloat.	Elsewhere.	Total.	Excess of	Total on.	Should be	On Active List.	On Reserved Lists	Total.
Admirals.....	16	4	20	80	100	60	80	98	178
Captains	113	7	120	237	357	200	237	100	337
Commanders ...	118	65	183	319	502	275	319	132	451
Lieutenants.....	604	168	772	282	1054	850	282	532	814
Masters	228	61	289	64	353	375	64	124	188
Mates	73	...	73	...	134	850	...	...	...
Second Masters	63	5	68	...	78	375	...	...	...
Totals	1215	310	1525	982	2578	2985	982	986	1968

AFRICAN FEVER.—We regret to hear that several of the ships on the west coast of Africa have been attacked with yellow fever, principally owing to the closeness with which Commodore Wise has kept the cruisers to the west coast. Ships are not allowed to go to Ascension or St. Helena to recruit the health of their crews, until nearly all hands are down with fever—as was the case with the Merlin last year—and too late to save many valuable lives.

THE ARMSTRONG GUN.—The new department of rifled Ordnance for the manufacture of Sir W. Armstrong's gun is now in practical operation, at Woolwich Arsenal, so far as circumstances will permit, and a number of these weapons will shortly be turned out, under the immediate superintendence of Mr. Anderson. As a result of various experiments, this gun will be introduced extensively into the Naval Service, and a new description of carriage is now being constructed from a design by Colonel Tulloch, R.A., which will obviate any inconvenience which might arise from the rolling of a ship at sea, By means of this invention, a practised gunner will be enabled without assistance to fire the gun at any range, and to lower or elevate, or move the weapon from right to left, as may be required, with the utmost ease.

SOLDIERS' AND SEAMEN'S LETTERS.—As some misapprehension is believed to exist with regard to the charge upon Soldiers' and Seamen's letters sent from or brought into the United Kingdom, the Postmaster General feels it necessary to call attention to the following regulations:—Letters sent by Soldiers and Seamen may be forwarded on payment of a British rate of one penny to any part beyond sea with which there is a direct communication by means of British Mail packets. Letters addressed to a Soldier or Seamen brought to the United Kingdom by the British mail packet, without passing through a foreign country, are, in like manner, subject to no higher charge than one penny. But, it this sum of one penny be not prepaid, the letters are chargeable with a rate of twopence. Upon Soldiers' and Seamen's letters addressed to, or originating in, a place with which there is no direct communication by British packet, and which letters are, therefore sent by a private ship, as well as upon letters specially directed to be forwarded by a private ship, the gratuity of one penny payable to the Commander of such ship, must also be paid. When letters sent by Soldiers or Seamen pass through a foreign country, the transit rate due to such country must be paid upon them, in addition to the British rate of one penny, and the following table shows the amount of the transit rate in each of the instances specified:—Soldiers' or Seamen's letters sent to or from Malta, Ionian Islands, India, Ceylon, Mauritius, China, Japan, or Australia, via Marseilles, when not exceeding ¼ oz. 3d. (in addition to the British rate of one penny); above ¼ oz., and not ½ oz., 6d. Panama, or any other place on the Pacific side of New Granada; Valparaiso, or any other place in Chili; Callao, or any other place in Peru, *via* Panama, when not exceeding ¼ oz.. 6d.; above ¼ oz., and not exceeding ½ oz., 6d. Vancouver's Island or British Columbia, via New York and Panama, conveyed between the United Kingdom and the United States by British packets when not exceeding ¼ oz., 5d.; above ¼ oz., and not exceeding ½ oz., 5d., via New York and Panama, conveyed berween the United Kingdom and the United States by United States packets, when not exceeding ¼ oz., 1s. 1d.; above ¼ oz., and not exceeding ½ oz., 1s. 1d.; via St. Thomas and Panama, when not exceeding ¼ oz., 1s. 4d., above ¼ oz., and not exceeding ½ oz., 1s. 4d.; Canada via United States, when not exceeding ¼ oz., 2d.; above ¼ oz., and not exceeding ½ oz., 2d. Upon paid letters sent by Soldiers and Seamen from any of the places above specified to the United Kingdom, and upon letters sent from any of those places addressed to Soldiers or Seamen in the United Kingdom, the same transit rates will be chargeable, in addition to a *British* rate of twopence.—By command of the Postmaster-General.—ROWLAND HILL, Secretary,—General Post-office, June.

STAFF COLLEGE.—The examination of Officers for admission to the Staff College will be held at the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, commencing on the 1st of the present month, before Major-General Cameron, Vice-President, and the following members of the Council of Military Education:—Major-General Portlock, Lieutenant-Colonel Addison, and Colonel Elwyn. The examination will extend over seven days.

SHIPS IN ORDINARY.—There are now lying in ordinary in the Royal Navy about 120 vessels, exclusive of mortar vessels and floats; 17 of these are to be converted into screw ships, and the conversion of seven is under consideration. There is also a list of 67 receiving ships, coaling hulks, &c. Four ships have been broken up or sold since January, 1830, without having been commissioned.

FRENCH SHIP OF WAR IN YARMOUTH.—The *aviso* of his Imperial Majesty the French Emperor's paddle steamer *Galilee*, carrying two guns, is still lying in Yarmouth harbour. Her object is to prevent the French fishing boats buying the fish of English ships, which would, as foreign goods, be liable to duty, and carrying them into French ports as their own goods free of duty. The Galilee has an engine and boiler on board for trying the propulsive power of evaporated chloroform; and we are assured by the Engineer and the First Lieutenant that, so far as the experiment has gone, there is in the use of chloroform a saving of 40 per cent. in fuel. The Galilee came into harbour without the assistance of a pilot, and upon some surprise being expressed to one of the Officers, it was answered that no ship of the French Navy was allowed to take an English pilot to enter any of our ports, with which they were expected to be thoroughly acquainted—a knowledge which, it is suspected, would not be found in some of our own Commanders.

BOUNTY TO SEAMEN.—A supplement to the *London Gazette* of the 15th, contained the following:—At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 8th day of July, 1859, present, the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council:—

"Whereas Her Majesty was graciously pleased, by her Royal Proclamation, bearing date the 30th day of April last, to promise and declare that the bounties of £10 for every Able Seaman, and £5 for every Ordinary Seaman, and 40s. for every landsman, should be paid in the manner therein directed, to every such Able Seaman, Ordinary Seaman, and landsman, not above the age of 45, nor under the age of 20 years, who should enter themselves to serve in Her Majesty's Navy; and it being judged expedient for Her Majesty's Service that a gratuity should be granted to Able Seamen, and Ordinary Seamen, who are not Pensioners, now serving in Her Majesty's Fleet, Her Majesty, by and with the advice of her Privy Council, is pleased to order, and doth hereby order, that a gratuity equal to half of the respective bounties mentioned in Her Majesty's said Royal Proclamation, dated the 30th day of April last, shall be paid to all Seamen above 20 years of age, not being Pensioners, according to their several ratings, who have now at least five years to serve in Her Majesty's Navy, and have not received, nor are entitled to receive, any bounty under Her Majesty's said Proclamation, or under the Order of Her Majesty in Council of the 11th day of June last, relating to such Proclamation; and Her Majesty, by and with the advice aforesaid, is also pleased to order that one-half of the said respective bounties, so mentioned in Her Majesty's said Proclamation, shall be paid to all other Seamen above 20 years of age who are not Pensioners, according to their respective ratings, who have now less than five years to serve in Her Majesty's Navy, and who have not received, nor are entitled to receive, any bounty under Her Majesty's said Proclamation, or under the said Orde in Council of the 11th day of June last, relating to such Proclamation, on condition of their engaging to serve in Her Majesty's Navy for five years, if so required, from the date of this present Order of Her Majesty in Council."—WM. L. BATHURST.

THE ARMY.—General Peel read a memorandum on Tuesday evening of the Military forces constituting our home establishment, which, we fear, must be strangely at variance with facts. The Gallant General said that, excluding the Marines on shore, the enrolled Pensioners, and the Recruits for India, the forces in the United Kingdom on the 1st of June were thus made up:—"Cavalry, 11,698; Foot Guards, 6,184; Infantry, 50,032; Horse Artillery, 1,749; Foot Artillery, 12,669; Royal Engineers, 1,854; Military Train, 1,861; Medical Staff Corps. 375; and embodied Militia 23,218; total, 109,640; or, excluding the embodied Militia, 86,422." Now we must take leave to question the correctness of some of the most important of these items. Take the first—the Cavalry. There are in the United Kingdom three Regiments of Household Cavalry, and the following Regiments of the Line—viz., the 4th and 5th Dragoon Guards, 1st and 2nd Dragoons, 3rd, 4th, and 13th Light Dragoons, 5th and 16th Lancers, and the 10th, 11th, 15th, and 18th Hussars. These 16 Regiments have an enlistment of 520 of all ranks each, so that if they were all up to the establishment (which we doubt very much) the aggregate strength would be 8,320 men. Throwing in the Depot of the 9th Lancers, which cannot be classed under the head of "Recruits for India," inasmuch as the Regiment is on its way home, we may call the whole Cavalry force at home, 8,500 men, or more than 3,000 less than it is represented to be in General Peel's memorandum. A much more important mis-statement is that respecting the Infantry of the Line, which the memorandum makes amount to 50,032. The Infantry Regiments at home are—the 9th (1st Battalion), 10th (2nd Battalion), 11th (two Battalions), 12th (2nd Battalion), 14th (2nd Battalion), 15th (1st Battalion), 16th two Battalions), 17th (2nd Battalion), 18th (2nd Battalion), 19th (2nd Battalion). 20th (2nd Battalion), 21st (2nd Battalion), 22nd, (1st Battalion), 24th (2nd Battalion), 30th, 36th, 45th, 47th, 55th, 58th, 60th, (4th Battalion), 76th, 96th, and Rifle Brigade (1st Battalion). These 26 Battalions, with their Depots, cannot certainly be put down at more than 1,000 men each, or 26,000 in the aggregate. Adding 32 home Depots of Regiments serving in the colonies, which average about 200 men each, or 6,400 altogether, we have a force of Infantry of the Line of 32,000, or nearly 18,000 less than it is represented in the memorandum read by General Peel. We cannot speak with equal certainty of the strength of the embodied Militia Regiments, which is stated to be 23,218; but we have very strong reasons for thinking that it does not come up to 16,000 men at the outside.

On Monday the 25th, Her Majesty's ship Ajax arrived in Belfast Lough, from Kingstown, for the purpose of receiving volunteers for the navy. The Ajax has for some time past been engaged in her present service as a Coast-guard vessel and receiving volunteers for the navy. She mounts 60 guns, and carries a complement of about 500 seamen and Marines, but is not filled up to that complement at the present time. The Wellington Cutter also arrived at Belfast on Monday for the same purpose.

The Russian screw frigate Gromobi, 50 guns, Rear-Admiral Istomin, and the screw line-of-battle ship Retvizan, Captain Baron Taube, arrived at Spithead on the 27th, from Cadiz and Cherbourg. The Grand Duke Constantine is at present at St. Petersburg, but it is expected to arrive at Spithead o t he 4th of August. It is also expected that several other Russian men of war will call at Spithead on their way to the Mediterranean from the Baltic.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE BOMBAY ARMY.

The following is the distribution of the Bombay Army, corrected to the 1st February.

HER MAJESTY'S HOME TROOPS.

3rd (The Prince of Wales') Dragoon Guards	Ahmednuggur
Squadron Field Service	Field Service
Detachment	Sattara
Detachment	Sholapore
6th Inniskilling Dragoons	Kirkee
8th Hussars	Seepree
Left Wing	Nusserabad
14th Light Dragoons	Gwalior
Detachment	Field Service
Depot	Kirkee
17th Lancers	Mhow

ROYAL REGIMENT OF BRITISH ARTILLERY.

D Troop Horse Artillery	Mhow
8th Company, 1st Battalion	Rajpootana
2nd Company, 3rd Battalion	Poona
3rd Company, 4th Battalion	Neemuch
2nd Company, 11th Battalion	Aden
7th Company, 11th Battalion	Mhow
2nd Company, 13th Battalion	Baroda
5th Company, 14th Battalion	Calpee
8th Company, 14th Battalion	Kulladghee and Dharwar

ROYAL CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

11th Company	Rajpootana Field Force
21st Company	Gwalior

ROYAL REGIMENTS OF BRITISH INFANTRY.

4th (The King's own Regt.)	Ahmedabad
18th Royal Irish 1st Battalion	Field Service
28th (North Gloucestershire) Regiment	Bombay
Detachment	Nassick
31st Huntingdonshire Regiment	Poona
33rd (The Duke of Wellington's Regiment)	Baroda
46th (South Devonshire) Regiment	Kurrachee
51st Regiment	Mooltan
56th West Essex Regiment	Belgaum
Detachment	Kulladghee
Detachment	Sholapore
Detachment	Sattara
57th Regiment	Field Service Khandeish
Detachment	Malligaum and Dhoolia
Wing	Aden
64th Regiment Foot	Futteghur
Depot	Belgaum
71st Highlanders	Gwalior
72nd Highlanders	Field Service, Rajpootana
74th Highlanders Detachment	Dharwar
78th Highlanders	Bareilly
Depot	Poona
83rd Regiment Foot	Rajpootana
Depot	Deesa
86th Regiment Foot	Gwalior, under orders to Poona
Depot	Poona
89th Regiment	Rajpootana Field Force
92nd Highlanders	Mhow
Detachment	Indore
95th Regiment Wing	Seepree
Depot	Deesa
German Legion	Poona

HER MAJESTY'S INDIAN BRITISH TROOPS

REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY.

Horse Brigade, Head quarters	Poona
1st (or Leslie's) Troop, Head Quarters	Jhansi
2nd Troop	Rajpootana
3rd Troop	Central India
4th Troop	Booranpor
1st Battalion, Head-quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Ahmedabad
2nd Company	Belgaum
3rd Company	Hydrabad
4th Company	Bombay
2nd Battalion, Head-quarters	Bombay
1st Company	Rajpootana
2nd Do.	Sattara
3rd Do.	Sholapore
4th Do.	Gwalior

RESERVE ARTILLERY.

1st Company	Shikarpoor
2nd Do.	Gwalior
Detachment	Jaulna
3rd Company	Kolapoor
4th Do.	Kurrachee

CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

Head Quarters	Poona

INFANTRY.

1st European Regiment (Fusiliers) Head Quarters	Mooltan
Detachment	Umritseer
Depot	Kurrachee
2nd European Regiment L. I.	Belgaum
Wing	Kolapore
Detachment	Sanglee
3rd European Regiment	Jhansi
Depot	Ahmednuggur

HER MAJESTY'S NATIVE TROOPS.

ARTILLERY.

3rd Battalion, Head-quarters	Ahmedabad
1st Company	Ahmedabad and Rajcote
2nd Do.	Ahmedabad
3rd Do.	Deesa
Detachment	Field Service
4th Company	Rajpootana Field Force
5th Do.	Ahmedabad
6th Do.	Aden
4th Battalion, Head Quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Booranpoor
Detachment	Chopra
2nd Company	Ahmednuggur
4th Do.	Mhow
6th Do.	Booranpore

CORPS OF SAPPERS AND MINERS.

Head Quarters (Bombay)	Poona
1st Company	Poona
2nd Do.	Aden
Detachment	Jhansi
3rd Company	Rajpootana
4th Do.	Poona
5th Do.	Poona
Detachment	Jhansi

LIGHT CAVALRY.

2nd Regiment Madras Light Cavalry	Sholapore
1st Regiment (Lancers)	Gwalior
Wing	Nusserabad
2nd Regiment Light Cavalry	Rajpootana
Detachment	Deesa
3rd Regiment Light Cavalry	Jhansi

INFANTRY.

1st Regiment N I. (Grenadiers)	Bombay
2nd do. do	Ahmedabad
3rd Regiment N. I.	Sholapore, under orders to Mhow
Detachment	Malligaum
4th do. do. (Rifles)	Sehore
5th do. N. I.	Ahmednuggur
6th do. N. I.	Poona

Detachment - - - -	Jaulna
7th do. do. - -	Bombay
8th do. do. - -	Baroda
9th do. do. - -	Central India
10th do. do. - -	Gwalior
11th do. do. - -	Ahmedabad
12th do. do. - -	Nusserabad
13th do. do. - -	Rajpootana
14th do. do - -	Kurracee
Detachment - - - -	Ahmedaba
15th do. do. - -	Kolap d
Left Wing - - - - -	Kulludghee
16h do. do. -	Surat
Detachment - - -	Brosch
17th do. do, -	Rajkote
18th do. do. -	Belgaum
Detachment - - -	North Canara
19th do. do. -	Malwa Division
20th do. do. -	Dharwar
22nd do. do. -	Sattara
Detachment - - -	Mahableshwur
Detachment - - -	Punderpore
23rd do. N. L. I. -	Mhow
24th Regiment N. I. -	Jhansi
Depot - - - -	Mhow
25th do. do. -	Gwalior under orders to Poona
Depot - - - -	Poona
26th do. do. -	Khundera
28th do. do. -	Sholapore
29th do. do. -	Aden
30th do. do. -	Dholia
Detachment - - -	Asseerghur
31st do. do. -	Deesa
1st Extra Battalion -	Kurrachee
2nd Extra Battalion -	Baroda
3rd Extra Battalion -	Belgaum
1st Belooch Extra Battalion	Allahabad
Depot - - - -	Hydrabad
2nd Belooch Extra Battalion	Deera Ghazee Khan
Depot - - - -	Shikarpoor

Enrolled Pensioners.

Detachment - - -	Tanna
Do. - - -	Poona
Detachment - - -	Doolapee
Do. - - -	Malwan
Do. - - -	Ahmednuggur

Irregular and Local Corps.

Military.

Poona Irregular Horse -	Field Service Khandeish
1st Regiment Scinde Irregular Horse - - -	Jacobabad
2nd Regiment Do. -	Jacobabad
3rd Regiment Do. -	Jacobabad
1st Regiment Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse	Kulladghee
Detachment - - -	Beejapore
2nd Regiment Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse	Kulladghee
Detachment - - -	Special Service Malwa Field Force
Marine Battalion - -	Bombay
1st Regiment Jacobs Rifles	Jacobabad
2nd Regiment Jacobs Rifles	Jacobabad
Native Veteran Battalion	Dapoolie

Civil

Guzerat Irregular Horse -	Ahmedabad
Kutch Irregular Horse -	Bhooj
Kutch Legion - - -	Kutch
Guzerat Police Corps -	Kaira
1st Khandeish Bheel Corps	Dhurrumgaum
2nd Khandeish Bheel Corps	Dhurrumgaum
Ghaut Police Corps - -	Tanna
Sawunt Waree Local Corps	Sawunt Waree
Kolapore Infantry Corps -	Kolapore
Rutnagherry Rangers -	Rutnagherry
Guzerat Coolly Police Corps	Ahmedabad
Aden Police Troop - -	Special Service Malwa Field Force
Sind Extra Battalion -	En route to Deesa

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

The following is the Distribution List of the Madras Army, corrected up to October, 1858.

Cavalry.

Right Hon the Governor's Body Guard .....Madras
H. M. 1st Dragoon Guards ....Bangalore
H. M. 12th Royal Lancers Head quarters and Rt. Wing .....Secunderabad
Left Wing—Field Service—Gen. Whitlock's Division
1st Regt. Native Light Cavalry..Trichinopoly
2nd do. do.....Sholapore (under orders to Secunderabad.
3rd Regt. Native Light Cavalry, Head quarters. Left Wing.....Bangalore
Right Wing .....Bellary
th Regt. Native Light Cavalry..Bengal Field Force
5th do. do.....Bellary
6th do. do.....Bengal Field Service
7th do. do.....Kamptee
1 squadron Secunderabad

Artillery.

H Troops Royal Horse Artillery. St.Thos.' Mount
Head quarters Madras Horse Artillery .....Bangalore
A. Troop, Field Service Gen. White'ock's Division
B. Troop .....Secunderabad
C. Troop .....Bangalore
D. Troop .....Kamptee
E. Troop.....Bengal Field Service
F. Troop .....Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
No. 5. Comp.1st Bat. Royal Artillery, and No. 1 Field Battery...St.Thos.' Mount
No. 3 Comp. 3rd Bat. Royal Artil. lery, and No. 9 Field Battery...Bellary
No. 5 Comp. 14th Bat. Royal Artillery, & No. 8 Field Battery..Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
No. 6 Cpy.9th Bat. Ryl. Artillery.Secunderabad

First Battalion Madras Artillery.

Head quarters .....St.Thos. 'Mount
A Company { Head quarters & 2-thirds Co. ..Singapore; Half Company ...Penang; Detachment .....Masulipatan
B. Company .....Moulmein
C. Co (No. 7 Horse Battery).....Bellary
D. Com. (No. 3 Horse Battery)...Rangoon

Second Battalion Madras Artillery.

Head quarters .....Kamptee
A. Cop. (No 8 Bullock Battery) Trichinopoly
B. Co. Head quarters and ½ Co...Tonghoo; Half Company ...Sinaygheen
C. Comp. (No. 5 Horse Battery) Bangalore
D. Copy. (No. 4 Bullock Battery) Head quarters and half.....Kamptee
Half Company.....Seetabuldee

THIRD BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.
Head quarters .....Rangoon
A Company (No. 2 Horse Bat.) Bengal Service
B. Company (No. 4 Horse Bat.) Tonghoo
C. Company (No. 2 Bullock Bat.) Thayetmew
D. Company (No. 5 Bullock Bat.) Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division

FOURTH BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.
Head quarters .....Secunderabad
A. Company (No. 1 Horse Bat.)...Field Service Gen. Whitelock
B. Company (No. 10 Bulk. Bat.) Ditto
C. Company (No. 3 Bulk. Bat.)...Secunderabad
... Company Head quarters and two-thirds .....Rangoon
One-third .....Bassein

FIFTH OR GOLUNDAUZE (NATIVE) BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.
Head quarters..... .....St. Thos.' Mount
A. Company Head quarters and two-thirds Company .....Penang
One-third Company .....Malacca
B. Company.....Singapore
C. Company (No. 1 Bulk. Bat.) Bengal Service
D. Company (No. 7 Bulk. Bat.)...Cannanore and Mangalore
E. Company (No. 9 Bulk Bat.)...Cuttack and Sumbulpore
F. Company .....Meeaday
1st Supplemental Company .....St. Thos.' Mount
2d do. do. .....Vizianagram
Details of several Companies ...Labuan

MADRAS ENGINEERS.
Head quarters .. ..Fort St. George

MADRAS SAPPERS AND MINERS—NATIVE.
Head quarters .....Dowlaishweram
A. Company.....Ditto
One Section with Gen. Whitlock's Field Service
B. Company .....Nerbudda (Bombay) Field Service
C. Company .....Bengal Service
D. Company .....Rangoon
E. Company ... .Dowlaishweram
One Section with Gen. Whitelock's Division
F. Company .....Secunderabad
One Section .....Paumbum
G. Company .....Padoungmyo
H. Company .....Thayetmew
I. Company .....Tonghu
K. Company .....Dowlaishweram
L. Company .....Field Division Gen. Whitelock
M, Company .....Dowlaishweram

INFANTRY.
EUROPEAN.
H.M. 1st Royal Regt. (1st Bat.),.Secunderabad
H.M. 43rd Light Infantry .....Gen. Whitelock's Division Field Service
H.M. 44th Regiment . ...Fort St. George
H.M. 60th Royal Rifles (3d. Bat.) Bangalore
3 Companies.....Bellary
1 do. .....Mysore
1 do. .....Hurryhur
H.M. 66th Regiment .....Cannanore
1 Company .....Mangalore
1 do. .....Sircee
H.M. 68th Regiment .....Rangoon
H.M. 69th Regiment .....Tonghoo
H.M. 74th Highlanders .....Berhampore
1 Company .....Sholapore
3 Companies.....Field Service Southern Mahratta Country
The Madras Fusiliers .....Bengal on Field Service
2nd European Light Infantry . Trichinopoly
3rd Madras European Regiment. Field Division under Gen. Whitlock

NATIVE INFANTRY.
1st Regiment N.I. (Rifle Comp.) Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
2nd Regiment N. I.....Quilon
3rd N. I. or Palamcottah Light Infantry.....Cannanore
4th N. I. .....Thayetmew
5th N. I. (Rifle Company) Head quarters Right Wing.....Mangalore
Left Wing .....Sumbulpore
6th N. I. .....Rangoon
7th N. I. .....Secunderabad
8th N. I. .....Tonghoe
9th N. I. .....Secunderabad
10th N. I. .....Secunderabad
11th N. I. .....Bellary
12th N. I. .....Rangoon
13th N. I. .....Maulmein
14th N. I. .....Singapore
15th N. I. .....Thayetmew
16th N. I. (Rifle Company).....Mangalore
17th N. I. .....Bengal Field Service
18th N, I..... .....Bellary
19th N. I. .....Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
20th N. I. .....Bangalore
21st N, I. .....Trichinopoly
22nd N I. .....Penang
23rd N. I. (or Walajahbad Light Infantry) .....Rangoon
24th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Henzedah
25th N. I. .....Madras
26th N. 1 .....Kamptee
27th N. I... .....Bengal, on Service
28th N. I. ....Hoosingabad
29th N. I. .....Masulipatam
30th N. I. .....Bellary
31st N. I., or Trichinopoly Light Infantry.....Vizianagram
32nd N. I. .....Kamptee
33rd N. I. .....Kamptee
34th or (Chicacole Lt. Infantry) Trichinopoly
35th N. I. .....Hurryhur
36th (Rifle Company) .....Kurnool
37th N. I., (Grenadiers) Head quarters . .....Shuaygheen
Left Wing .....Tonghoo
38th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Vizagapatam
39th N. I. .....Thayetmew
40th N. I. .....Cuttack
41st N. I, ...Burmah
42nd N. I. .....Raichoor Field Service
43rdN.I. .....Russelcondah
44th N, I .....Thayetmew
45th NI .....Madras
46th N. I. .....Vizagapatam
47th N. I. .....Bellary
48th N. I. ... .Moulmein
49th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Secunderabad
50th N. I. .... .Service Gen. Whitlock's Divisi
51st N. I. .....Palamcottah
52nd N. I. .....Mercara
Left Wing .....French Rocks
1st Extra Regiment N. I. .....Samulcottah
2nd Extra N. I. .....Trichinopoly
3rd Extra N. I. .....Cuddapah
Sappers' Militia .....Madras
Madras Rifles, temporarily formed for Service in Bengal by the Rifle Companies of the 1st, 5th, 16th, 24th, 30th, 49th, Regiments N. I., and 2 Companies 34th N. I.—Service Bengal.

VETERANS' ESTABLISHMENT.
EUROPEAN VETERANS
Artillery Company .....Palaveram
Infantry Company .....Vizagapatam

NATIVE VETERANS
1st or Madras Native Vet. Bat. .Madras
2nd or Arnu Native Vet. Bat. .Arcot

DEPÔTS.
For H.M Regiments .....Poonamallee
European Infantry .....Arcot
Native Infantry .....Palaveram

NATIVE INFANTRY RECRUITING DEPOTS.
No. 1 Recruiting Depot.....Dindigul
No. 2 do. .....Arcot
No. 3 do. .....Chicacole
No. 4 do .....Ellore

STATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

(*Corrected up to 27th July, 1859, inclusive.*)

[Where two places are mentioned, the last-named is that at which the Depot is stationed.]

1st Life Guards—Aldershot.
2nd do.—Regent's Park.
Royal Horse Guards—Hyde Park.
1st Dragoon Guards—Madras: Canterbury.
2nd do.—Bengal: Canterbury.
3rd do.—Bombay: Canterbury.
4th do.—Aldershott.
5th do.—Aldershot.
6th do.—Bengal: Maidstone.
7th do.—Bengal: Canterbury.
1st Dragoons—Curragh.
2nd do.—Newbridge.
3rd do.—Dublin.
4th do.—Birmingham.
5th do.—Newbridge.
6th do.—Bombay: Maidstone.
7th Hussars—Bengal: Canterbury.
8th do.—Bombay: Canterbury.
9th Lancers—Emb. for England: Maidstone.
10th Hussars—Aldershott.
11th Hussars—Aldershot.
12th Lancers—Madras: Maidstone.
13th Light Dragoons—Dublin.
14th do.—Bombay: Maidstone.
15th Hussars—Aldershot.
16th Lancers—Edinburgh.
17th do.—Bengal: Canterbury.
18th Dragoons—Manchester.
Military Train [1st bat.]—Shorncliffe.
Do. [2nd bat.]—On passage home.
Do. [3rd Bat.]—Woolwich
Do. [4th bat.]—Aldershott. } Depot at Aldershot
Do. [5th bat.]—Curragh. } Depot at Aldershot
Do. [6th bat.] | Woolwich. } Depot at Aldershot
Grenadier Guards [1st bat.]—Wellington Bar.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Tower.
Do. [3rd bat.]—St. George's Barracks.
Coldstream Guards [1st bat.]—Wellington Bar.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
Scots Fus. Guards [1st bat.]—Windsor.
Fus. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
1st Foot [1st.] —Madras: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—China: Birr.
2nd do. 1st [bat.]—C. of G. Hope: Walmer.
Do. [2nd bat.]— Corfu: Walmer.
3rd 1st [bat.]—Bengal: Limerick.
Do. do. Malta: Limerick.
4th. do. [1st bat]—Bombay: Chichester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Corfu: Chichester.
5th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Mauritius, Pembroke.
6th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Cork.
7th do. [1st. bat.]—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Walmer.
8th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Templemore.
9th do. [1st. bat.]—Aldershott: Limerick.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Corfu: Limerick.
10th do. [1st bat.—Plymouth.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
11th do. [1st bat.]—Aldershot: Fermoy.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershott.
12th do. [1st bat.]—N. S. Wales: Walmer.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
13th do [1st bat.]—Bengal: Fermoy.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Cape of Gd. Hope and Fermoy.
14th do. [1st bat.]—Cephalonia: Fermoy.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
15th do.—Jersey: Pembroke
Do. [2nd bat.]—Malta, Pembroke.
16th do.— Dublin: Templemore.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh
17th do.—Canada: Limerick.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
18th do.—Bombay: Buttevant.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
19th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Shorncliffe.
20th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Dublin.
21st do.—Malta: Birr.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Newport.
22nd do.—Manchester: Parkhurst.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Malta: Parkhurst.
23rd do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Walmer; Malta.
24th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
25th do.—Gibraltar: Athlone.
26th do.—Bermuda: Belfast.
27th do.—Bengal: Buttevant.
28th do.—Bombay: Fermoy.
29th do.—Embarked for England: Chatham.
30th do.—Dublin: Parkhurst.
31st do —Bombay: Pembroke.
32nd do.—Bengal: Dover.
33rd do.—Bombay: Fermoy.
34th do.—Bengal: Colchester.
35th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
36th do.—Aldershott: Athlone.
37th do.—Bengal: Colchhster.
38th do.—Bengal: Colchester.
39th do.—Canada: Templemore.
40th do.—N. S. Wales: Birr.
41st do.—Jamaica: Devonport.
42nd do.—Bengal: Sterling.
43rd do.—Madras: Chatham.
44th do.—Madras: Colchester.
45th do.—Preston: Parkhurst.
46th do.—Bengal: Templemore.
47th do.—Aldershott: Cork.
48th do.—Bengal: Cork.
49th do.—Barbadoes: Belfast.
50th do.—Ceylon: Parkhurst
51st do.—Bengal: Chichester.
52nd do.—Bengal: Chatham
53rd do.—ditto: ditto
54th do.—Bengal: Colchester
55th do.—Curragh: Devonport.
56th do.—Bombay: Colchester
57th do.—Bombay: Cork.
58th do.—Shorncliffe: Birr.
59th do.—Cape: Athlone
60th do.—[1st bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal, Winchester
Do. [3rd bat.]—Madras: Winchester
Do. [4th bat.]—Aldershot.
61st do.—Bengal: Chatham
62nd do.—Nova Scotia: Belfast
63rd do.—ditto: Belfast
64th do.—Bombay: Canterbury
65th do.—New Zealand: Birr.
66th do.—Madras: Colchester
67th do.—Bengal: Athlone
68th do.—Madras: Fermoy
69th do.—Madras: Fermoy
70th do.—Bengal; Canterbury
71st do.—Bengal; Perth.
72nd do.—Bombay; Aberdeen
73rd do.—Bengal: Devonport.
74th do.—Madras: Aberdeen
75th do.—Bengal: Chatham
76th do.—Curragh: Belfast
77th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
78th do.—Embarked for England: Aberdeen
79th do.—Bengal: Stirling.
80th do.—ditto: Buttevant.

81st do.—Bengal: Chatham
82nd do.—Bengal: Canterbury
83rd do.—Bombay: Chichester.
84th do.—On passage home: Chatham
85th do.—Cape: Pembroke
86th do.—Bombay: Buttevant (on passage home)
87th do.—Bengal: Buttevant.
88th do.—Bengal: Colchester
89th do.—Bombay: Fermoy
90th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
91st do.—Madras: Pembroke
92nd do.—Bombay; Stirling
93rd do.—Bengal; Aberdeen
94th do.—ditto: Chatham
95th do.—Bombay: Fermoy
96th do.—Plymouth: Parkhurst
97th do.—Bengal: Colchester
98th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
99th do.—Bengal: Cork
100th do.—Gibraltar [Parkhust.
Rifle Brigade [1st bat.]—Portsmouth.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [3rd bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [4th bat.]—Malta, Winchester
1st West India Regiment—Bahamas
2nd do—Jamaica
3rd do.—Barbadoes
Ceylon Rifle Regiment—Ceylon
Cape Mounted Rifles—Cape of Good Hope
Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment—Canada
St. Helena Regiment—St. Helena
Royal Newfoundland Corps—Newfoundland
Royal Malta Fencibles—Malta
Gold Coast Corps—Cape Coast Castle

STATIONS OF THE EMBODIED MILITIA.

ENGLAND (18).

Bedford—Aldershott.
2nd Cheshire—Portsmouth
Durham Artillery—Gosport
Hampshire Artillery—Pembroke
East Kent—Portsmouth
Lancashire Artillery—Dover
Norfolk Artillery—Sheerness.
North Lincoln—Curragh
5th Middlesex—Dublin
Northumberland Artillery—Tynemouth.
Oxford—Aldershott
1st Stafford—Aldershott
2nd Stafford—Curragh.
Suffolk Artillery—Portsmouth
Sussex—Glasgow
1st Tower Hamlets—Cork
2nd Warwick—Plymouth
Wilts—Aldershot
1st York, (W. R.)—Edinburgh
3rd York—Newcastle on Tyne

SCOTLAND (3).

Edinburgh Artillery: Edinburgh
Forfar Artillery—Sheerness
Fife Artillery—Pendennis
2nd Lanark—Dublin
Stirling—Aldershott

IRELAND (12).

Antrim Rifles—Aldershot
Antrim Artillery—Kinsale.
North Cork—Aldershot
Donegal—Dover
Dublin (city)—Shorncliffe
Dublin City Artillery—Colchester.
Fermanagh—Chester
Kerry—Bradford
Limerick (County) Ptsmouth
Louth (Rifles)—Yarmouth
Tipperary Artil.—Gosport
Waterford Artillery—Prkhrst

STATIONS OF THE ROYAL NAVY IN COMMISSION.

(Corrected to 27th July.)

With the Dates of Commission of the Officers in Command.

Aboukir, 90, sc., Capt. C. F. Schomberg, 1851, Channel Fleet.
Acorn, 12, Com. R. B. Pearse, 1856, East Indies.
Actæon, 26, Com. J. Ward (b), 1858, East Indies.
Adventure, sc. troop-ship, Com. E. Lacy, 1856, East Indies.
Agamemnon, 91, sc., Capt. T. Hope, 1852, Mediterranean.
Ajax, 60, screw, Captain J. McNeil, Boyd, 1846, Coast Guard.
Alarm, 26, Capt. D. Curry, 1846, Pacific.
Alert, 17, screw, Com. W. A. R. Pearse, 1855, Pacific
Algerine, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. Arthur, 1854, East Indies.
Algiers, 91, screw, Capt. G. W D. O'Callaghan, 1846, Channel Fleet.
Amethyst, 26, Capt. S. Grenfell, 1850, Pacific.
Amphion, 36, sc., Capt. T. Cochran, 1857, Sheerness.
Antelope, 3, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. J. W. Pike, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Arachne, 18, Com. J. E. Montgomerie, 1855, North America and West Indies.
Archer, 13, screw, Capt. J. Sanderson, 1855, Coast of Africa.
Argus, 6, st.-vessel, Com. H. F. W. Ingram, 1856, Mediterranean.
Arrogant, 47, screw, Capt. L. G. Heath, C.B., 1854, Coast Guard.
Asia, 84, Capt. G. T. Gordon, 1846, Portsmouth.
Assistance, screw troop-ship, Com. W. A. J. Heath, 1856, East Indies.
Assurance, 4, screw, Com. C. M. Aynsley, 1856, Mediterranean.
Atalanta, 16, Com. T. M. S. Pasley, 1855, North America and West Indies.
Atholl, 4, Com. E. Wilson, 1845, Greenock.
Banshee, 2, st.-vessel, Com. C. A. Campbell, 1858, Mediterranean.
Banterer, sc.-gunbt., Lieut.-Com. J. Jenkins. 1853, East Indies.
Basilisk, 6, st.-vessel, Com. G. A. Phayre, 1854, North America and West Indies.
Belleisle, hospital ship, Com. J. R. Rodd, 1851, Chatham.
Bittern, tender to Calcutta, East Indies.
Black Eagle, st.-yacht, Mast.-Com. J. E. Petley, 1844, particular service.
Blenheim, 60, screw, Capt. F. Scott, C.B., 1848, Coast Guard.
Boscawen, 70, Rear Admiral the Hon. Sir F. W. Grey, K.C.B., Capt. R. A. Powell, C.B., 1855, Cape of Good Hope.
Brisk, 16, sc., Capt. A. F. R. D'Horsey, 1857, Cape of Good Hope.
Britannia, Training Ship, Capt. R. Harris, 1849, Portsmouth.
Brune, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. E. F. Lodder, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Brunswick, 80, sc., Captain E. Ommanney, 1846, Mediterranean.
Buffalo, screw, Mas.-Com. A. Brown, 1854, particular service.
Bustard, 2, sc.-gunbt., Lt.-Com. F. W. Hallowes, 1856, East Indies.
Buzzard, 6, st.-vessel, Com. F. Peel, 1855, S.E. Coast of America.
Cadmus, 21, sc., Capt. H. S. Hillyar, C.B., 1854, Mediterranean.
Cæsar, 90, screw, Capt. T. H. Mason, 1849, Channel Fleet.
Calcutta, 84, Capt. W. K. Hall, C.B., 1853, East Indies.
Calypso, 18, Capt. F. B. Montresor, 1851, Pacific.
Cambrian, 40, Captain J. J. M'Cleverty, C.B., 1848 East Indies.
Cambridge, Gunnery Ship, Capt. A. W. Jerningham, 1851, Devonport.
Camilla, 16, Com. G. T. Colville, 1855, East Indies.
Caradoc, 2, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. C. M. Buckle 1847, Mediterranean.
Centurion, 80, sc., Capt. C. G. E. Patey, 1846, Mediterranean.
Chesapeake, 51, screw, Rear-Admiral J. Hope, C.B., Capt. G. O. Willis, 1856, East Indies.
Clio, 21, screw, Capt. F. Miller, 1855, Sheerness.
Clown, sc.-gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. F. Lee, 1855 1842, East Indies.
Conflict, 8, sc., Com. R. W. Courtenay, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Conqueror, 101, screw, Capt. W. J. C. Clifford, C.B., 1847, Mediterranean.
Coquette, 4, sc., Com. the Hon. F. A. Foley, 1855, Mediterranean.
Cordelia, 11, sc., Com. C. E. H. Vernon, 1855, Australia.
Cormorant, 4, sc., Com. A. Wodehouse, 1856, East Indies.
Cornwallis, 60, sc., Captain G. G. Randolph, C.B., 1854, Coast Guard.
Coromandel, st.-vessel, Second Master W. H. Vine (acting, East Indies.
Cossack, 20, sc., Capt. R. Moorman, 1857, Sheerness.
Cressy, 80, screw, Capt. the Hon. C. G. J. B. Elliot, C.B., 1841, Mediterranean.
Crocodile, 8, rec.-ship, Com W. Greet, 1854, off the Tower,
Cruiser, 17, sc., Com. J. Bythesea, 1856, S. E. Coast of America.
Cumberland, 70, Capt. H. D. Rogers, C.B., 1854, South America
Curaçoa, 31, screw, Capt. A. Philtimere, 1855, Devonport.
Cyclops, 6, st.-v., Capt. W. J. S. Pullen, 1856, East Indies.
Dasher, 2, st.-vessel, Com. E. G. Hore, 1854, Portsmouth.
Dauntless, 31, sc., Capt. W. Edmonstone, 1853, Portsmouth.
Dee, 4, troop-ship, Mast-Com. T C. Pullen, 1844, particular service.
Devastation, 6, st.-ves, Com. C. Wake, 1855, North America, and West Indies.
Diadem, 32, sc., Capt. P. W. Moorsom, C.B., Devonport.
Donegal, 101, sc., Capt., W. F. Glanville, 1846, Devonport.
Doris, 32, screw, Capt. E. Heathcote, 1852, Mediterranean.
Dove, screw gunbt., Lieut. C. J. Bullock, 1855, East Indies.
Drake, sc. gunbt., Lieut-Com. A. R. Blane, 1856, East Indies.
Eagle, 50, Capt. E. Tatham, 1854, Coast Guard
Edgar, 91, sc., Rear-Adm. J. E. Erskine, Capt. J. E. Katon, 1856, Channel Fleet.
Edinburgh, 58, screw, Capt. E. C. T. D'Eyncourt, 1849, Coast Guard.
Elk, 12, Com. H. Campion, 1855, Australia.
Emerald, 51, sc. Capt. A. Cumming, 1854 Channel Fleet.
Esk, 20, sc., Sir R. J. Le M. M'Clure, K.C.B., 1850, East Indies.

Euryalus, 51, sc., Capt. J. W. Tarleton, C.B., 1852, Mediterranean.
Excellent, 46, gunnery ship, Capt. R. S. Hewlett, C.B., 1850, Portsmouth.
Exmouth, 90, sc., Capt. J. J. Stopford, 1841, Mediterranean.
Fairy, sc. yacht, tender to Victoria and Albert yacht, Portsmouth.
Falcon, 17, sc., Com. A. G. Fitz Roy, 1857, Coast of Africa.
Ferret, 8, Com. W. E. Fisher, 1856, particular service.
Firebrand, 6, st.-vessel, Com. J. Dayman, 1858, particular service.
Firm, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. R. Boulton, 1854, East Indies.
Firefly, 4. st.-vessel, ——— Woolwich.
Fisguard, 42, Commodore the Hon. J. R. Drummond, C.B., Woolwich
Flying Fish, 6, c., Com. C. W. Hope, 1854, Portsmouth.
Forester, 2, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. A. J. Innes, 1853, East Indies.
Formidable, 84, J. C. Fitzgerald, 1840, Sheerness.
Forward, 2, sc., Lieut.-Com. C. R. Robson, 1851, Devonport.
Furious, 16, st.-ves., Capt. O. J. Jones, C.B., 1855, East Indies.
Fury, 6, st.-ves., Com. J.E. Commerell, 1855, E. Indies.
Ganges, 84, Rear-Adm. R. L. Baynes, C.B., Capt. J. Fulford, 1848, Pacific.
Gannett, 11, Com. E. H. G. Lambert, 1854, Mediterranean.
Gladiator, 6, st.-vessel, Commander H. D. Hickley (1858), Devenport.
Gorgon, 6, st.-ves. Com. B. C. T. Pim, 1858, Portsmouth.
Growler, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. H. E. Crozier, 1854, Mediterranean.
Grapler, 2, sc., Lieut.-Com. A. P. H. Helby, 1849, Devonport.
Hannibal, 91, sc., Rear-Admiral G. R. Mundy, Capt. M. Connolly, 1858, Mediterranean.
Harrier, 17, screw, Com. Sir M. MacGregor, Bart., (1856), South America.
Hastings, 60, screw, Captain W. R. Menda, C.B., 1852, Coast Guard.
Haughty, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. G. D. Broad, 1851, East Indies.
Havannah, 19, Capt. T. Harvey, 1848, Pacific.
Hawke, 60, sc., Capt. W. Crispin 1852, Coast Guard.
Herald, 8, surv.-ves., Capt. H. M. Denham, 1846, Feejee Islands.
Hermes, 6, st.-v., Com. W. E. A. Gordon, 1854, Cape of Good Hope.
Hero, 91, screw, Capt. G. H. Seymour, C.B., 1844, Channel Fleet.
Hesper, sc st.-ship, Mast.-Com. J. Loane, 1846, East Indies.
Hibernia, rec.-ship, Rear-Admiral H. J. Codrington, C.B., Captain F. Warden, C.B., 1845, Malta.
Highflyer, 21, sc., Capt. C. F. A. Shadwell, C.B., 1853, East Indies.
Himalaya, sc. store-ship, Com. J. Seccombe, 1855, particular service
Hogue, 60, screw, Capt. R. J. J. G. Macdonald, 1854, Coast Guard
Hydra, 6. st.-vessel, Com. R. V. Hamilton, 1857, Coast of Africa.
Illustrious, 72, Com. H. C. Harston, 1845, Portsmouth.
Imaum, 72, Commodore H. Kellett, C.B., Com. H. J. Grant, 1855, rec.-ship, Jamaica.
Impregnable, 104, Vice-Adm. Sir B. Reynolds, K.C.B., Capt. W. H. Stewart, C.B., 1854, Devonport.
Impereuse, 51, screw, Capt. R. Maguire, 1854, Portsmouth.
Indus, 78, Rear-Admiral Sir H. Stewart, K.C.B. Capt. J. C. D. Hay, 1850, North Americ, and West Indies.
Industry, st.-ves., 2, st.-ship, Mast.-Com. G. J. Hodges, 1841. South America.
Inflexible, 6, st.-ves., Com. G. A. C. Brooker 1856, East Indies.
Intrepid, 6, screw, Com. J. H. Marryat, 1855, Mediterranean.
Iris, 26, Commander W. Loring, C.B., Australia.
Jackal, 4, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. A. G. E. Murray, 1846, particular service.
James Watt, 91, screw, Capt. E. Codd, 1851, Channel Fleet
Janus, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. H. P. Knevitt, 1855, East Indies.
Jasper, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. H. Pym, 1849, W. Indies.
Kestrel, sc. gunboat Lieut.-Com. G. D. Bevan, 1853, East Indies.
Lapwing, 4, screw, Com. M. F. O. Reilly, 1856, Mediterranean.
Lee, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. H. Jones, 1852, East Indies.
Leopard, 18, st.-ves., Rear-Admiral Sir S. Lushington, C.B., Capt. J. F. B. Wainwright.
1856, S. E. Coast of America.
Leven, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. S. Hudson, 1854, East Indies.
Liffey, 51, screw, Capt. G. W. Preedy, CB., 1855, Mediterranean.
Locust, 3, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. J. B. Field, 1846, particular service.
London, 90, screw, Capt. H. Chads, 1848, Mediterranean.
Lynx, 4, screw, Lieut.-Com. H. Berkeley, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Lyra, 9, sc. Com. R. B. Oldfield, 1855, Cape of Good Hope.
Madagascar, receiving ship, Commander E. M. Leycester, 1856, Rio Janeiro.
Magicienne, 16, st.-vessel, Capt. N. Vansittart, C.B., 1854, E. Indies.
Marlborough, 131, sc., Vice Adm. A. Fanshawe, C.B., Capt. the Rt. Hon. Lord F. H. Kerr, 1852, Mediterranean.
Mars, 80, sc., Capt. J. N. Strange (1854), Sheerness.
Medina, st.-ves., 4, Capt. T. A. B. Spratt, C.B. 1855, Mediterranean
Medusa, 4, steam-vessel, Com. W. Bowden, 1854, Coast of Africa
Melpomene, 50, screw, Capt. C. J. F. Ewart, 1855, particular service.
Mersey, 40, screw, Capt. H. Caldwell, C.B., 1853, Channel Fleet.
Minotaur, Capt. E. P. Halsted 1842, Sheerness.
Mohawk, 4, screw. Com. ——— East Indies.
Monkey, steam tug, Sec. Mas. G. Synderoomb, (acting), Woolwich.
Naiad, 42, store-ship, Mast.-Com. W. W. Dillon, 1843, Callao
Nautilus, 6, Lieut.-Com. W. B Grant, 1852, apprentice ship, Portsmouth
Neptune, 91, screw, Capt. Sir W. Hoste, Bart., 1848, Portsmouth.
Nereus, 42, store-depôt, Mast.-Com. J. C. Barlow, 1835, Valparaiso
Niger, 14, sc., Capt. C. P. Meads, 1858, East Indies.
Nile, 90, sc., Rear-Adm. C. Talbot, Capt. A. P. E. Wilmot, C.B., 1854, Devonport.
Nimrod, 6, sc., Com. R. J. Wynniatt, acting, East Indies.
Oberon, 3, st.-vessel, Lieut-Com. F. G. C. Page, 1852, South Coast of America.

Opossum, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. C. J. Balfour, 1850, East Indies.
Orion, 91, screw, Capt. J. B. E. Frere 1854, Mediterranean.
Osborne,st.-vessel, Mas. Com. G. H. K. Bower 1842, Portsmouth.
Osprey, 4, screw, Com. H. J. Blomfield, 1855, Mediterranean
Pelorus, 21, sc., Capt. F. B. P. Seymour, 1854, East Indies.
Pembroke, 60, Capt. E. P. Charlewood, 1855, Coast Guard.
Perseverance, 2 troop ship, Com. E. R. Power, 1850, particular service
Persian, 12, CommanderE. Hardinge 1856, Cape of Good Hope.
Pioneer, 6, screw, Com. C. H. May, 1854, Channel Fleet.
Plover, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com.W. H. Rason, 1855, East Indies
Plumper, 9, screw, Capt. G. H. Richards, 1854, Pacific.
Pluto, 4, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. C. H. Simpson, 1848, Coast of Africa
Porcupine, 3, st.-ves. Capt. H. C. Otter, 1854, particular service.
Princess Charlotte, 104 Mast.-Com. H. G Thomsett, 1854, Hong Kong.
Princess Royal, 91, sc., Capt. T. Baillie, 1845, Mediterranean
Pylades, screw, 21, Capt. M. de Courcy, 1852, Pacific
Qua'l, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. N. Osborn 1856, Mediterranean.
Queen Charlotte, 104, Vice-Adm. E. Harvey, Capt. H. Harvey, 1852, Sheerness.
Racer, 11, screw, Com. the Hon. T. A. Pakenham 1856, North America and West Indies.
Racoon, 21, screw, Captain J. A. Paynter, 1854, Mediterranean.
Recruit, 6, st.-v., Com. D. Spain, 1856, Mediterranean.
Renown, 91, screw, Capt. A. Forbes, 1846 Mediterranean.
Retribution, 28, st.-vessel, Commodore H. E. Edgell, East Indias.
Rhadamanthus, 4, st.-ves., Master-Com. F. R Sturdee, 1843, particular service.
Roebuck, 6, sc., Com. E. C. Symons, acting, E.I
Rolla, 6, Lieut.-Com. C. G. Nelson, 1854, Portsmouth.
Royal Adelaide, 104, Rr.-Ad. Sir T. S. Pasley, Bt.; Capt. W. J. Williams, 1841, Devonport.
Royal Albert, 121, sc., Rear-Admiral Sir C. H. Freemantle. K.C.B., Capt. E. B. Rice (1855), Channel Fleet.
Russell, 60, sc., Capt. G. Wodehouse, 1854, Coast Guard.
St. Jean D'Acre, 101, screw, Capt. T. P. Thompson, 1847, Mediterranean.
St. Vincent, 102, Rear Admiral G. Grey, Capt T. Wilson, 1853, Portsmouth.
Sampson, 6, st.-v., Capt. G. S. Hand, 1852, S.E. Coast of America.
Saracen, 4, Mast.-Com. W. Stanton, 1852, East Indies.
Satelite, sc., 21, Capt. J. C. Prevost, 1856 Pacific.
Saturn, 72, Capt. G. Ramsay, C.B., 1843, Pembroke.
Scourge, 6, sc, Com. Prince of Langenberg 1857, Mediterranean.
Scout, 21, sc., Capt. J. Corbett, 1857, Sheerness
Scylla, 21, sc., Capt. R. Lambert, 1855, Sheerness.
Seagull, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. Chimmo, 1850, particular service.
Sharpshooter, 8, screw, Lieut.-Com. C. Gibbons, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Sidon, 22, st.-ves., Capt. R. B. Crawford, 1856, Portsmouth.
Simoom, 8, sc., Com. J. M. Cooke, 1852, particular service.
Siren, 16, Com. G. M. Balfour, 1856, South East Coast of America.
Skipjack, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. J. Murray, 1848, Channel Fleet.
Slaney, 2, sc, gunbt., Lt.-Com. H. R. Leet, 1855, East Indies.
Sparrowhawk, 4, sc., Com. J. C. Byng, 1856, East Indies.
Spitfire, 5, st.-v., Lieut.-Com. W. C. Chapman, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Spy, 3, Lieut.-Com. T. B. Collinson, 1850, South East Coast of America.
Starling, sc.-gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. A. Whitshed, 1854, East Indies.
Staunch, 2, sc.-gunboat, Lt.-Com. E. J. Pollard, 1855, East Indies.
Styx, 6, st.ves., Com. C. Vesey, 1854 N. America and W. Indies.
Supply, st.-sh., Mast.-Com. W. H. Balliston, 1845, particular service.
Surprise, 4, sc., Com. Lord E. H. Cecil, 1857, C. of Africa.
Tartar, 20, sc., Capt. H. Dunlop, 1850, W. Indies and N. America.
Tartarus, 4, st., Com. A. L. Mansell, 1855, Mediterranean.
Termagant, 25, screw, Capt. R. Hall, 1855, Devonport.
Terrible, 21, st.-vessel, Capt. F. H. H. Glasse, C. B., 1846, Mediterranean.
Terror, 16, Capt. F. Hutton, 1844, Bermuda.
Topaze, 51, sc., Capt. the Hon. J. W. S. Spencer, 1854, Devonport.
Tortoise, 12, store-ship, Capt. W. F. Burnett, C.B., 1854, Ascension.
Trafalgar, 91, sc., Capt. E. G. Fanshawe, 1845 Sheerness.
Tribune, 30, screw, Captain G. T. P. Hornby, 1846, Pacific.
Trident, 6, st.-v. Com. F. A. Close, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Triton, 3, st.-ves. Lieut.-Com. R. H. Burton, 1849, Coast of Africa
Urgent, sc. troop ship, Com. H. W. Hire, 1854, Portsmouth.
Valorous, 16, st.-ves., Capt. W. C. Aldham, C.B., 1853, West Indies.
Vesuvius, 6, steam-vessel, Commodore C. Wise, Coast of Africa.
Victor Emanuel, 91, sc., Capt. J. Willcox, C.B., 1850, Mediterranean.
Victoria and Albert, 2, steam yacht, Captain the Hon. J Denman, 1841, Portsmouth.
Victory, 101, Admiral W. Bowles, C.B.; Capt. A. Farquhar, 1849, Portsmouth.
Vigilant, 4, sc., Com. W. Armytage, 1855, Mediterranean.
Viper, 4, screw, Com. W. N. W. Hewett, V.C. L.H., 1858, Coast of Africa.
Virago, 6, st.-ves., Com. M. B. Dunn, 1856 particular service.
Vixen, 6, st.-ves., Com. L. Lambert, 1858, Pacific.
Vulture, 6, st.-v., Captain F. A. Campbell, 1856 Mediterranean.
Wanderer, 4, screw, Com. M. R. Pechell, 1854, Mediterranean.
Watchful, 2, sc.-gunbt. st. East Indies.
Wellesley, 72, Captain Superintendent G. Goldsmith, C.B., 1842, Chatham.
Wellington, 72, Capt. R. S. Robinson, 1840, Devonport.
Woodcock, 2, sc., gunbt., Lt.-Com. G. S. Bousanquet, 1855, East Indies.

LIST OF H. M. INDIAN NAVY IN COMMISSION.

(Corrected to t e 23rd June, 1859.)

With the dates of Commission of the Officers in command.

Acbar, 22, Flag-ship of Commodore G. G. Wellesley, C.B., R.N. Commander-in-Chief I. N.; Capt. J. W. Young, C.B., 1856, Bombay; Mas.-Com. H. W. Grounds, 1856, Gunnery Officer.

Auckland, 6, paddle, Com. J. Stephens, 1848, Red Sea.

Assyria, 2, paddle, Master-Com. E. Davies, 1858, River Indus.

Assaye, 10, paddle, Commander J. N. Adams, 1857, Bombay.

Augusta. 6, sch.-yacht, tender to Acbar, Bombay.

Australian, screw troop ship, Master-Com. — Boon, 1858, Bengal.

Berenice, 2, paddle troop ship, Lieut.-Com. A. W. Chitty, 1847, Bombay.

Becas, 6, flat, Master-Com. E. Nash, 1851, River Indus.

Charlotte, 4, Lieut.-Com. W. Collingwood, 1855, Persian Gulf.

Clive, 12, Lieut.-Com. J. Sedley, 1847, Tranzibar.

Constance, 3, Lieut.-Com. J. B. Dickson, 1851, Red Sea.

Comet, 5, paddle gunboat, Com. W. B. Selby, 1855, River Euphrates.

Conqueror, 2, paddle, Master-Commander T. Linton, 1849, River Indus.

Coromandel, screw troop ship, Lieut.-Com. H. A. Fraser, 1846, Bay of Bengal.

Chenaub, 2, paddle, Master-Com. T. Gourley, 1858, River Indus.

Cursetjee, Flat, Master-Com. ———, Indus.

Clyde, 4, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. G. Nixon, 1847, Bombay.

Dalhousie, screw troop ship, Com. F. W. Hopkins, 1858, Bay of Bengal

Dromedary, Flat, Master-Com. ———, River Indus.

Elphinstone, 12, Lieut.-Com. C. E. Brooman, 1848, Bombay.

Euphrates, Flat, Master-Com. W. Walton, 1858, River Indus.

Ethersey, Flat, Master-Com. T. Jones, 1858, River Indus.

Ferooz, 10, paddle, Commander C. J. Cruttenden, 1855, Bombay.

Freere, 2, paddle, Master Commander J. McNeil, 1852, River Indus.

Falkland, 12, Commodore G. Jenkins, C.B., Persian Gulf.

Goolanair, paddle yacht, Master-Commander T. Kennelly, 1850, Bombay

Georgiana, 2, Lieut.-Com. F. Warden, 1856 Andamana.

Indus, 2, paddle, Master-Commander E. A. S. Neale, 1853, River Indus.

Jhelum, 2, paddle, Master-Com. R. L. Lawson, 1856, River Indus.

Keddywarree, guard ship, Lieut. E. Giles, 1847, Port Officer. Kurrachee.

Lady Falkland, paddle tender to Acbar.

Lady Canning, 4, paddle, Lieut.-Com. E. Peevor, 1846, Red Sea.

Mahi, 3, Lieut.-Com. R. W. Whisk, 1849, Persian Gulf.

Marié, 3, Lieut.-Com. C. G. Constable, 1845, Surveying Vessel, Persian Gulf.

Mootree, 1, pendant vea., Capt. E. W. Daniell, 1857, Kotree.

Napier, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J. Forster, 1851, River Indus.

Nimrod, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J. B. Butter, 1856, River Indus.

Nitocris, Flat, Master-Com. A. Harrison, 1856, River Indus.

Outram, 2, paddle, Mast.-Com. W. Fivey, 1858, River Indus.

Planet, 2, paddle, Master-Com. T. K. Fletcher, 1853, River Indus.

Punjaub, 10, paddle, Commander A. Foulerton, 1857, Calcutta

Prince Arthur, screw troop-ship, Com. J. Tronson, 1858, Bombay.

Pleiad, 2, screw, Mas.-Com. D. White, 1858, Bombay.

Ravee, Flat, Master-Com. ———, River Indus.

Sutledge, Flat, Master-Com.——, River Indus.

Satellite, 2, paddle, Master-Com. A. Wilkins, 1852, River Indus.

Semiramis, 10, paddle, Com. W. Balfour, 1855, Bombay.

Snake, paddle, tender to Acbar, Bombay.

Sir H. Havelock, 2, paddle, Master-Com. D. Morrison, 1858, River Indus.

Sir H. Lawrence, 2, paddle, Master-Com. C. Tickel, 1845, River Indus.

Sydney, screw troop ship, Master-Com, ———, Bay of Bengal

Tigris, 5, Lieut.-Com. G. T. Robinson, 1847, Persian Gulf.

Victoria, 5, paddle, Lieut.-Com. T. S. H. Twynham, 1845, Bombay.

Zenobia, 10, paddle, Com. F. E. Manners, 1857, Persian Gulf.

BENGAL NAVAL BRIGADE.

Head Quarters, Calcutta, Capt. C. D. Campbell, 1857.

1st Company, Fort William, Lieut.-Com. J. Huclock, 1858.

2nd Company, Mootyhary, Lieut-Com. J. H. B. Bavon, 1859.

3rd Company, Chuprall, Lieut.-Com. C. B. Templer, 1857.

4th Company, Allipore, Lieut.-Com. R. Carey, 1856.

5th Company, Dumdum, Lieut. Com. H. W. H. Barnes, 1857.

6th Company, Dacca, Lieut.-Com. H. W. Etheridge, 1847.

7th Company Sasseram, Lieut.-Com. G. O. B. Carew, 1855.

8th do. Barackpore, Lieut.-Com. W. H. M. Davis, 1849.

9th Company, Patna, Lieut.-Com. D. S. Duval, 1854.

10th Company, Jeypore, Lieut.-Com. A. T. Windus, 1851.

11th Company, Andaman Islands, Lieut.-Com. H. Jackson, 1855.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

Commander to be Captain—John Stephens, 1848.

Lieutenant to be Commander—R. A. Stradling, 1844.

Mates to be Lieutenants—R. B. Leefe, 1854; H. J. Edwardes, 1856.

APPOINTMENTS.

Captain—J. W. Young, C.B., 1856, to Acbar, Flag-ship.

Lieutenants—L. G. Lewis, acting, 1856; C. E. Beddome, acting, 1859; C. Forster, 1856; A. D. Taylor, 1847; R. Williams, acting, 1855, to Acbar; J. G. Nixon, 1847, to command sc. gunbt. Clyde; C. E. Brooman, 1848, to command Elphinstone; F. W. Shottowe, 1856, to Semiramis; J. Brebner, acting, 1859, to Semiramis; C. V. D'Arcy, acting, 1858, to Elphinstone; B. Ch. S. Clarke, acting, 1859, to Elphinstone; F. L. Seaton, acting, 1857, to Feroos; J. Clarke, 1857, to Auckland; J. B. Dickson, 1851, to command Constance; C. E. Beddome, acting, 1859, to be Inspector of the Bombay Steam Navigation Company; R. B. Leefe, to be Superintendent of Pattimars.

Acting Masters—D. White, 1858, to command Pleiad.

Midshipmen—J. D. Budd; H. W. Estridge; H. Hewer to Acbar; W. Marshall; J. A. Kettley to Elphinstone; C. Williams; R. Richmond to Semiramis; A. Cambell to Assaye.

Clerks—F. W. Daniell, to Indus Flotilla; H. Barrett to Assaye; A. T. Shuttleworth, 1855, to Clyde, in charge; A. S. Finlinson to Semiramis, in charge.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

NAVY.

ADMIRALTY, June 7.

Corps of Royal Marines—Capt. R. M. Curry to be Lieut. Col., vice A. Fleming, to retired full pay: First Lieut. and Adjutant H. L. Searle to be Capt., vice Curry, promoted; Second Lieut. M. Hogge to be First Lieut., vice Searle, promoted, July 11th; First Lieut. U. L. Morris to be Adjutant.

ADMIRALTY, July 12.

Corps of Royal Marines—Captain Edward Stanley Brown, to be Lieutenant Colonel, vice Fleming, retired on Full Pay; First Lieut. H. Lewis Evans to be Captain, vice Browne, promoted; Second Lieut. Joseph Phillips to be First Lieut., vice Evans, promoted.

ADMIRALTY, June 17.

Corps of Royal Marines—Gentleman Cadet E. M. Messiter to be Second Lieutenant.

ADMIRALTY, June 18.

Corps of Royal Marines—Cadet J. L. Needham, to be Second Lieutenant; Cadet J. Inman, to be Second Lieutenant; Cadet W. G. T. Bickford to be Second Lieutenant; Cadet G. A. G. Martin, to be Second Lieutenant; Cadet H. B. Isaacson, to be Second Lieutenant; Cadet J. M. Dyer, to be Second Lieutenant.

ADMIRALTY.

WHITEHALL, June 27.—The Queen has been pleased to direct letters patent to be passed under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, constituting and appointing the Most Noble Edward Adolphus, Duke of Somerset; Vice Admiral the Honourable Sir Richard Saunders Dundas, K.C.B.; Rear Admiral the Honourable Frederick Thomas Pelham, C.B.; Captain Charles Eden, C.B.; Captain Charles Frederick; and Samuel Whitbread, Esq., to be Her Majesty's Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of the said United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dominions, islands, and territories thereunto belonging.

ADMIRALTY, June 27.

Vice Admiral of the Blue George Frederick Rich has been appointed to receive a pension of £150 a-year, as provided by Her Majesty's Order in Council of 25th June, 1851, vacant by the death of Vice Admiral Sir David Dunn, K.C.H., and the name of Vice Admiral Rich has been removed to the Reserved Half Pay List accordingly, and in consequence of this removal, the following promotions, to date from the 17th inst., have this day taken place: Alexander Thomas Emeric Vidal to be Vice Admiral of the Blue; Charles Talbot to be Rear Admiral of the Red; the Hon. Sir Henry Keppel, K.C.B., to be Rear Admiral of the White.

Captains Francis Decimus Hastings, and George Hathorn, to be Rear Admirals on the Reserved List.

Captain Lewis Tobias Jones, C.B., to be Rear Admiral of the Blue.

ADMIRALTY, May 12.

Corps of Royal Marines—Gentlemen Cadets to be Second Lieutenants—St. Andrew St. John, Charles Rowley Brand, Edward Willoughby Grenville, John Ignatius Morris, Gerald Altham Heseltine, Henry Seton Bourchier, John Holland, Henry Luxmoore Stirling, Edward Benjamin Steele Perkins, William Murray Swinton, George John Airey, Francis Fosbery Evans, Robert William Francis Holt.

May 17.—Gentleman Cadet Robert Hoare Dwyer to be Second Lieutenant.

ADMIRALTY, June 17.

Corps of Royal Marines—Gentlemen Cadets to be Second Lieuts.: Alexander George Anson, Robert Calder Allen, Alfred Wilmot Johnston.

PROMOTIONS.

Commander to be Captain—C. H. May, 1854.

Lieutenant to be Commander—Hon. Armar L. Corry, 1856, and A. P. Arkwright, 1845.

Mates to be Lieutenants—James E. Erskine, Henry Waller, W. N. Tufnell, H. H. Washington, C. E. D. Willcox, H. C. Onslow and Francis Stirling, 1858; A. Marknam, 1858.

To be Paymasters—E. C. Turmine, A. H. Martin, J. Wotton, C. Griffith, and A. Thompson, all of 1850.

Surgeon to be Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals—James Rae (b), 1850.

Assistant Surgeon to be Surgeon—John D. Macdonald, 1849.

Assistant Surgeon—Edwd. McCarthy, 1856, has been confirmed in that rank.

APPOINTMENTS.

Captains—Thomas H. Mason, 1849, to *Cæsar*; Augustus Phillimore, 1855, to *Curacoa*; R. J. J. G. Macdonald, 1854, to *Hogue*; W. J. C. Clifford, C.B., 1847, to *Conqueror*.

Commanders—W. C. De Vere, 1856, to *Agamemnon*; Hugh A. Reilly, 1858, to *Pioneer*; J. K. E. Baird, 1857, to *Devastation*; A. C. Strode, 1856, to *Vulcan*; J. H. Furneaux, 1856, to *Donegal*; C. E. Sidebottom, 1856, to *Agamemnon*.

Lieutenants—Josiah H. Hatchard, 1854, to *Cossack*; P. W. Stephens, 1856, to *Vulcan*; William Howorth, 1856, to *Impregnable*; H. Fawkes, 1857, to *Imperieuse*; Henry E. Stephens, 1857, to *Urgent*; John S. Keats, 1855, to *Cornwallis*, for service in *Spanker*; C. T. Williamson, 1855, to *Arrogant*; E. E. Richards, 1855, to *Imperieuse*; Marcus P. Costello, 1858, to *Curacoa*; H. B. Burnaby, 1849, to *Nile*; H. G. Belson, 1854, to *Sidon*; T. F. Studdert, 1855, to *Diadem*; Louis Geneste to *Excellent*; E. B. H. Franklin, 1854, to *Imperieuse*; G. A. Brine, 1845, to *Donegal*; H. F. Nicholson, 1857, to *Trafalgar*; Fred. J. Protheroe, 1849, to *Wellington*; Charles N. Streatfield, 1859, to *Clio*; R. G. Kinahan, 1859, to *Sidon*; Arthur J. Day, 1854, to *Amphion*; H. H. Washington, 1859, to *Imperieuse*; H. Rogers, 1852, to *Brunswick*; W. N. Tufnell, 1859, to *Terrible*; R. B. Nicholetts, 1859, to *Amphion*; R. Mansel, 1852, to *Nile*; J. E. Erskine, 1859, to *Edgar* as Flag Lieutenant to Rear Admiral Erskine; A. J. Chatfield, 1854, to *Cornwallis*; W. B. A. F. Paterson, 1854, to *Spanker*; H. Kent, 1853, to *Simoom*; F. Stirling, 1859, to *Mars*; Hon. F. G. Crofton, 1857, to *Amphion*.

Masters—W. Mills, 1841, to *Minotaur*; J. E. Mills, 1829, to *Wellington*; F. Kirkham, 1858, to *Gladiator*; John E. Scudamore, 1858, to *Dauntless*; A. E. Parks, 1859, to *Gorgon*; John S. Taylor, 1834, additional to *Fisgard*; John E. Chapple, 1858, to *Simoom*; S. J. W. Moriarty, 1851, additional to *Wellington*; Andrew J. Armstrong, 1859, to *Gorgon*; Richard T. Saunders, 1846 (additional,) to *Asia*; Arthur Thomas, 1854, to *Vulcan*; Francis Taylor, 1855 (additional), to *Asia*.

Second Masters—Henry Aquilar, to *Grappler*; John Williams, to *Forward*; William L. Dodds, 1858 (additional), to *Asia*; Thomas H. Hayman, 1858, to *Rhadamanthus*; William H. Willing, to *Dasher*.

Chief Engineers—J. M'Kie, 1855, to *Hood*; G. Tucker, 1847, to *Donegal*; J. R. Johnson, 1855, to *Gladiator*; M. Kidd, 1858, to *Vulcan*; J. Patterson, 1854, to *Ariadne*.

Chaplain—E. A. Williams, M.A., 1854, to *Emerald*.

Deputy Inspector of Hospitals—Alexander Armstrong, M.D., 1858, to be Deputy Inspector General of the Naval Hospital at Malta.

Surgeons—C. K. Nutt, 1840, to Portsmouth Dockyard; Frederick W. Blake, M.D., 1855, to *Clio*; J. Mitchell, M.D., 1847, to *Vulcan*; R Fulton, M.D., 1840, to *Topaze*; Frederic Harvey, 1849, to *Hero*; John Jack, 1854, to *Liffey*.

Assistant Surgeons—Robt. Edwardes, 1857, confirmed in *Pelorus*; Andrew Mullan, 1857, confirmed in *Tribune*.

Assistant Surgeons (Acting)—Henry A. Close to *Clio*; Henry Hadlow to *Scylla*; George H. Bellringer to *Gladiator*; Thomas L. Bickford to *Scout*; Richard W. Brigstocke to *Sidon*; Wm. J. Asslin to *Cossack*; B. Gregory to *Amphion*.

Paymasters—W. H. Turner, 1852, to *Edinburgh*; John Tompkins, 1856, to *Vulcan*; William F. Lapidge, 1850, to *Trafalgar*; Charles C Ick, 1854, to *Cyclops*; Charles C. Ick, 1854 (additional), to *Edgar*.

Assistant Paymasters—F. M. Wright, 1853, to *Wellesley*; Corbet C. Edwards, 1858, to *Vulcan*; Joseph H. Mauley, 1859, to *Simoom*, W. H. Haswell, 1858, to *Simoom*; H. V. Forrest, 1859, to *Donegal*; Thomas Goodman, 1852, to *Blenheim*; H. F. Alldricks, 1858, to *Sidon*; George F. Norman, 1851, to *Impregnable*; Henry M. Bernard, 1858, to *Edgar*; John T. Farwell, to *Amphion*.

Clerks—J. W. Thompson to *Clio*; T. W. Johnson to *Edgar*; James Wortley to *Neptune*; William J. Ellis to *Imperieuse*; Richard Williams to *Cæsar*.

Assistant Clerks—E. Barker to *Melpomene*; H. A. Haswell to *Topaze*; David Acheson to *Himalaya*; A. Hunter to *Trafalgar*; W. Barnes and W. Notlidge to *Queen Charlotte*; P. H. French to *Mars*; W. W. Murly to *Hero*;

G. W. Aldridge to *Vulcan*; J. T. Price to *Donegal*; James K. Bell to *Diadem*.

Assistant Engineers—1st Class—John Dearden to *Amphion*; J. A. Clarke to *Donegal*; J. Humphries to *Snap*; W. P. Dawe to *Liffey*; J. Hughes to *Gladiator*; W. Brown to *Mars*; 2nd Class—E. Pearce to *Donegal*; J. Charlton to *Topaze*; 3rd Class—P. Rosewarne, J. M. Brankstone, W. Russell, and J. Turner, to *Donegal*; T. H. Garry, F. Wheeler, W. B. Tadd, to *Gladiator*; J. B. Liddle and J. Young to *Diadem*; J. E. Julian to *Wellington*.

Assistant Engineers—1st Class—W. H. Symons to *Lark*. 2nd Class—G. Fitzgerald to *Grappler*; G. W. Cresswell to *Forward*. 3rd Class—W. Smith and M. Blank to *Grappler*; J. O. Shepherd and J. S. Smith to *Forward*.

Midshipmen—H. H. Edwards and H. A. Arundell to *Scout*; Paul Storr and A. B. Glanville to *Topaze*; Hon. V. A. Montague and E. C. Tinling to *Imperieuse*; H. F. Stephenson to *Neptune*; C. E. Foot to *Edgar*.

Masters' Assistants—R. H. Hawes (additional) to *Fisgard*; F. C. H. Petch to *Topaze*; E. F. H. Merewether to *Mars*; Sinclair J. Rogers to *Edgar*; Thomas H. Smith to *Imperieuse*.

COAST GUARD.

APPOINTMENTS — *Inspecting Commander*—Commander H. F. McKillop to Clifden Division, vice Campbell, period of service expired.

Commander—H. F. McKillop to be Inspecting Commander.

REMOVALS—*Chief Officers*—Mr. Thomas Osmer, Master, from Swanage to Ryde; Mr. John Underwood from Lamlash to West Mersea Station.

Lieutenants—William Colls from Abbotsbury Division to Weymouth station; Mr. Adolphus Tudor from Ryde to Abbotsbury Division as Inspecting Chief Officer.

ARMY.

WAR OFFICE, JULY 1.

(The following Commissions to bear date July 1.)

4th Light Dragoons—Gentleman Cadet H. Youl, from the Royal Military College, to be Cornet, without purchase, vice Jones promoted.

7th Light Dragoons—Cornet H. A. Bushman, from the 9th Light Dragoons, to be Cornet, vice the Hon. W. Harbord, promoted.

9th Light Dragoons—C. A. Floyd, gent., to be Cornet by purchase, vice Bushman, appointed to the 7th Light Dragoons.

12th Light Dragoons — Gentleman Cadet J. E. Macaulay, from the Royal Military College, to be Cornet, without purchase, in succession to Lieut. Goldie, dismissed the Service by the sentence of a General Court-Martial.

15th Light Dragoons—Lieut. S. D. D. Cartwright, from the 15th Foot, to be Lieutenant, paying the difference between Infantry and Cavalry, vice Horsfall, who exchanges, receiving the same.

17th Light Dragoons—Major A. Learmouth to be Lieut.-Colonel, by purchase, vice H. Rose, who retires; Brevet Major Sir W. Gordon, Bart., to be Major by purchase, vice Learmouth; Lieut. H. Marshall to be Captain, by purchase, vice Sir W. Gordon, Bart.

Military Train—Cornet M. Cain, from Half-Pay late Land Transport Corps, to be Ensign, vice Churcher, who reverts to Half Pay as Cornet of that Corps.

(The following Commissions to bear date June 22.)

Royal Artillery—The undermentioned gentlemen Cadets to be Lieuts., viz.:—C. Crosthwaite, A. O. Molesworth, H. D. Evans, J. M. Murray, N. S. Perceval, W. J. Tatham, H. F. P. Lewis, J. M. Douglas, F. L. G. Little, J. R. Wilmer, D. M. Wilson, R. H. Grant, H. A. Mackey, P. C. Whalley, T. B. Tyler, D. N. Allan.

Royal Engineers—Brevet Col. J. Walpole, to be Colonel, vice Bolton, removed as a General Officer, June 20. Brevet Major G. F. Mann to be Lieut.-Colonel, vice Walpole, June 20. Lieut. A. R. Lempriere to be Second Captain, vice Nicholson, June 20.

The undermentioned gentlemen Cadets to be Lieutenants, with temporary rank, viz.:—A. B. Haig, H. Cautley, A. Featherstonhaugh, J. H. Satterthwaite, E. M. Lloyd, J. C. Macpherson, T. Howard, F. Bailey.

1st Foot—Serjeant Major J. Moore to be Quartermaster, vice J. Swaine, who retires on Half Pay; Ensign A. Moberly to be Instructor of Musketry. June 15.

11th—Lieut. F. W. H. Petrie to be Captain without purchase, vice Ravenhill, deceased, May 14; Ensign T. G. Miles to be Lieutenant without purchase, vice Petrie, May 14.

14th—Lieut. R. Harmon to be Captain by purchase, vice Dods, who retires; Ensign J. Laing to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Harman.

15th—Lieut. T. M. Horsfall, from the 15th Light Dragoons, to be Lieutenant, vice Cartwright, who exchanges.

19th—Ensign R. G. Traill to be Instructor of Musketry, June 15.

24th—Major the Hon. D. G. Finch, from a Depot Battalion, to be Major, vice Brevet Lieut. Colonel J. H. Laye, who exchanges; Assistant Surgeon J. S. Johnston, M.D., from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Wolseley, appointed to the Staff.

31st—Capt. T. M'Curdy, from Half-Pay Unattached, to be Captain, vice Hutton, promoted without purchase to an Unattached Majority; Lieut. A. Cary to be Captain by purchase, vice M'Curdy, who retires; Lieut. W. H. James, from the 18th Foot, to be Lieutenant, vice Cary.

52nd—Lieut. C. Keyworth to be Instructor of Musketry, June 15.

58th—Lieut. J. Horner to be Captain without purchase, vice Ward, deceased, June 15; Ensign and Adjt. W. Bolton to have the rank of Lieutenant, June 15; Ensign J. V. Hesse to be Lieutenant without purchase, vice Horner, June 15.

63rd—D. F. Tarratt, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Kinahan, promoted.

79th—Ensign A. N. Clay to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Durant, who retires.

83rd—Ensign H. G. Fuller, from the 4th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Blathwayt, deceased.

89th—Gentleman Cadet J. H. Green, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign without purchase, vice Sealy, promoted; Lieut. B. Helme, to be Instructor of Musketry, April 20.

Cape Mounted Riflemen—Lieut. T. J. Lucas to be Captain without purchase, vice Hunt, who retires; Ensign C. Currie to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Lucas.

Depot Battalion—Brevet Lieut. Colonel J. H. Laye, from the 24th Foot, to be Major, vice the Hon. D. G. Finch, who exchanges; Ensign T. Lee, from the 80th Foot, to be Quartermaster, vice Scott, appointed Paymaster Royal Artillery.

Recruiting District—Brevet Col. J. R. Smyth, C.B., from Half Pay Unattached, to be Inspecting Field Officer, vice Brevet Col. G. Bell, C.B., promoted to the rank of Major General.

Hospital Staff—Assistant Surgeon R. Wolseley, from the 24th Foot, to be Assistant Surgeon to the Forces, vice Johnston, appointed to the 24th Foot; Assistant Surgeon J. Greatorex has been permitted to resign his commission.

Unattached—Quartermaster J. Balcombe, 57th Foot, having been appointed a Captain in the late Land Transport Corps, by General Orders, in the Crimea, pending Her Majesty's pleasure, to be Captain without purchase.

Brevet—Col. D. Bolton, of the Royal Engineers, to be Major General, vice Blanchard, deceased, June 20; Brevet Lieut. Colonel J. M. Wood, late of the 5th Foot, to be Colonel in the Army, Nov. 28, 1854; Capt. W. H. Orme, 85th Foot, to be Major in the Army; Capt. H. E. Jerome, 19th Foot, to be Major in the Army; Quartermaster J. Swaine, retired on half pay 1st Foot, to have the honorary rank of Captain, under the Royal Warrant of 17th Dec., 1855.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

2nd Middlesex—Capt. E. M. Love, late 60th Rifles, to be Adjutant, vice Bowie, resigned, April 13.

Victoria Rifles—Capt. E. Clifford to be Major, vice the Earl of Perth, resigned; Lieut. A. Trew, to be Capt., vice Clifford, promoted, June 13.

4th South Middlesex—T. Hunt, Gent., to be Ensign, vice Burrell, resigned, May 19.

1st East Middlesex—The Queen has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the commissions in this Regiment, held by Ensign R. Hall and Lieut. A. J. M'Gregor.

Victoria Rifles—The Queen has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the commission in this Corps held by Capt. H. Cook.

Kent Artillery—First Lieut. W. Bartram to be Capt., vice Mitford, resigned, June 25.

North Durham—H. D. Gaynor, Esq., to be Capt., vice Bramwell, resigned, June 13.

Royal Aberdeenshire Highlanders—C. Fraser, Gent., to be Lieut., vice R. Macfarlane, promoted, June 22.

Fifeshire Artillery—J. S. Tulloh, to be Capt., vice G. J. Simpson, resigned, June 10, A. K. Beveridge, Gent., to be Second Lieut., vice L. K. Cormach, resigned, June 18.

Renfrew — A. Boyd, Gent., to be Lieut., vice Motherwell, resigned, June 18.

Forfar and Kincardine Artillery—C. E. Ilderton, Gent., to be Second Lieut., vice C. B. Fisher, promoted, June 20.

Edinburgh—Lieut. A. Scott to be Capt., vice G. A. Coventry, resigned; W. Currie, Gent., to be Lieut., vice Sinclair, resigned; C. Dyer, Gent., M.D., to be Assistant Surgeon, vice F. A. Palmer, deceased, June 23.

Her Majesty grants permission to Major Coss, late of West Suffolk Militia, Capt. J. Whitbread, late of the Suffolk Artillery, to retain the rank, and wear their uniform, in consequence of their long services in their respective Regiments.

Camberwell or 1st Surrey Company of Volunteer Rifle Corps—J. Boucher, Esq., formerly of the 5th Dragoon Guards, to be Capt., June 14. R. Rouse, Esq., to be Lieut., June 15.

Croydon or 2nd Surrey Company of Volunteer Rifle Corps—J. H. Campbell, Esq., Col., Bengal Artillery, retired, to be Capt., June 16. A. Steuart, Esq., to be Lieut., June 17; J. T. Hyde, Esq., to be Ensign, June 18.

1st Company of Pembrokeshire Volunteer Rifles—Col. the Hon. R. F. Greville to be Capt., June 23.

WAR OFFICE, JULY 8.

(The following Commissions to bear date July 8.)

1st Regiment of Dragoons—Cornet R. Stuart, from Half Pay late Land Transport Corps, to be Cornet, vice Woodward, appointed to the 2nd Foot; Cornet R. Stuart has been permitted to retire from the Service by the sale of his Commission.

13th Light Dragoons—Cornet W. Gore to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Clarke, promoted.

Royal Artillery—Col. W. H. Pickering, from the Supernumerary List, to be Col. vice St. George, removed to the Supernumerary List, June 25; Brevet Major J. F. Pennycuick to be Capt., vice Freeling, placed on the Seconded List, June 28; Lieut. J. T. Daubuz to be Second Captain, vice Pennycuick, June 28; Capt. W. P. Brisley, 4th Royal Middlesex Militia, to be Paymaster; Capt. T. R. Griffiths, Adjt. and Paymaster, Edinburgh Artillery Militia, to be Paymaster; N. E. Robbins, Esq., formerly Lieut., in the 2nd Dragoon Guards, to be Paymaster.

Royal Engineers—The second Christian name of Lieut. Jones, appointed in the *Gazette* of 17th August, 1855, is Helsham, not Hilsham, as therein stated.

5th Foot—Lieut. E. Bolger, from the 13th Foot, to be Lieut., vice Herrick, who exchanges, May 11.

13th—Major W. L. Peto, from the 73rd Foot, to be Major, vice Jones, who exchanges, May 11; Lieut. C. Fraser, from the 86th Foot, to be Lieut., vice Yardley, who exchanges, May 11; Lieut. G. Herrick, from the 5th Foot, to be Lieut., vice Bolger, who exchanges, May 11.

18th—The Commission of Assistant Surgeon J. H. H. Tothill, appointed in the *Gazette* of the 17th June, to bear date 13th June.

19th—Lieut. W. J. Foster to be Capt. by purchase, vice Madden, who retires.

24th—Captain E. F. Tarte, from the 2nd West India Regiment, to be Captain, vice Wyatt, who exchanges.

28th—Ensign A. Humfrey to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Higman, deceased, June 13.

30th—Paymaster G. F. Lamert, from the 60th Foot, to be Paymaster, vice Grant, who exchanges.

45th—The Commission of Assistant Surgeon J. A. Hanbury, M.B., appointed in the *Gazette* of the 24th June, to bear date June 13.

58th—Serjeant Major W. Nunnington to be Ensign without purchase, vice Hesse, promoted. The first Christian name of Ensign Reeves is Conway, and not Conray, as stated in the *Gazette* of June 17.

60th—Paymaster E. C. Grant, from the 30th Foot, to be Paymaster, vice Lamert, who exchanges.

68th—Lieut. Colonel R. C. Lloyd, from the 76th Foot, to be Lieutenant Colonel, vice Brevet Colonel H. Smyth, C.B., who exchanges.

70th—Lieut. H. Leake to be Instructor of Musketry, April 16.

73rd—Major H. M. Jones, from the 13th Foot, to be Major, vice Peto, who exchanges, May 11.

75th—Lieut. T. Carlisle to be Instructor of Musketry, Nov. 1, 1858.

76th — Brevet Colonel H. Smyth, C.B., from the 68th Foot, to be Lieut. Colonel, vice R. C. Lloyd, who exchanges.

86th—Lieut. T. Yardley, from the 13th Foot, to be Lieut., vice Fraser, who exchanges, May 11.

87th—Lieut. C. Lynch to be Captain by purchase, vice Campbell, promoted.

91st—The Commission of Assistant Surgeon J. McL. Marshall, appointed in the *Gazette* of the 24th June, 1859, to bear date 13th June.

96th—Ensign H. Houghton to be Lieut. by purchase, vice J. H. Thompson, who retires.

98th—Lieut. W. Langmead Lewes to be Captain by purchase, vice Brevet Major Sir D. Baird, Bart., who retires.

2nd West India Regiment—Captain F. D. Wyatt, from the 24th Foot, to be Captain, vice Tarte, who exchanges.

UNATTACHED.—Captain J. D. Brabazon, from the 17th Foot, to be Major by purchase; Lieut. J. O'Neill, from Adjutant of a Recruiting District, to be Captain without purchase.

HOSPITAL STAFF.—To be Assistant Surgeons to the Forces—J. Adsetts, Gent., E. H. Lloyd, M.B.; J. Y. Donaldson, M.D., vice Tonnere, cashiered; O. Codrington, Gent., vice Pennington, appointed to the 34th Foot; E. Drew, Gent., vice Marston, appointed to the 34th Foot; J. Adcock, M.D., vice Baker, appointed to the 10th Foot; H. Y. Howisen, M.D., vice Gardiner, appointed to the 16th Foot; H. F. Sory, Gent., vice Ramsbotham, appointed to the 59th Foot; J. T. Milburn, Gent., vice Brien, promoted on the Staff; A. Illingworth, Gent., vice Tothill, appointed to the 18th Foot; R. A. P. Grant, Gent., vice O'Connell, appointed to the 83rd Foot; A. H. Orpen, Gent., vice Hanbury, appointed to the 45th Foot; A. Thompson, M.D., vice Marshal, appointed to the 91st Foot; G. H. Dyer, Gent., vice Griffith, deceased, June 13.

VETERINARY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.—To be Acting Veterinary Surgeons—J. Mills, Gent., vice Hart, appointed to the 2nd Dragoons; H. Dunsford, Gent., vice Lambert, appointed to the Royal Artillery.

BREVET — Major Stephen Francis Charles Annesley, 10th Foot, to be Colonel in the Army, June 24.

Captain George E. Halliday, 82nd Foot, to be Major in the Army, April 26.

Captain William R. Farmar, 82nd Foot, to be Major in the Army, April 26.

Brevet Colonel Augustus Flemyng, Retired Full Pay Royal Marines, to have the honorary rank of Major General, under Her Majesty's Order in Council of 13th November.

The undermentioned promotions to take place consequent on the death of General Gerrard Gosselin, on the 11th June, 1859:—

Lieutenant General Sir James Archibald Hope, K.C.B., Colonel of the 9th Foot, to be General, June 12.

Major General Dennis Daly to be Lieutenant General, June 12.

Brevet Colonel Samuel Braybrooke, Ceylon Rifle Regiment, to be Major General, June 12.

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel James Stuart, Captain Half Pay 84th Foot, Staff Officer of Pensioners, to be Colonel, June 12.

Brevet Major William Carruthers, Captain Half Pay Unattached, to be Lieutenant Colonel, June 12.

Captain Thomas Bourke, Half Pay 37th Foot, Staff Officer of Pensioners, to be Major, June 12.

The undermentioned promotions take place consequent on the promotion of Colonel D. Bolton, of the Royal Engineers, to be Major General, in succession to Major General T. Blanshard, C.B., deceased, on the 19th June, 1859:—

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Henry Anderson, Major-Superintendent of the Infantry and Invalid Depots at Chatham, to be Colonel, June 20.

Brevet Major Henry Claringbold Powell, Half Pay Unattached, Staff Officer of Pensioners, to be Lieutenant Colonel, June 20.

Captain J. G. Cavendish Disbrowe, 43rd Foot, to be Major, June 20.

The undermentioned Gentlemen Cadets of Her Majesty's Indian Forces, at present doing duty at the Royal Engineer Establishment at Chatham, with the rank of Ensign, to have the local and temporary rank of Lieutenant while employed at that establishment.

A. W. Elliott, H. C. Rowcroft, C. V. Riddle, W. J. Heaviside, F. P. Spragge, J. L. L. Morant, E. L. Marryat, C. F. Baldwin, M. J. Macartney, A. R. Edgcome.

MEMORANDUM.—Brevet Lieut. Colonel A. Watson, upon Half Pay, as Major

Unattached, has been permitted to retire from the Service by the Sale of his Commission, he being about to become a settler in Ceylon.

WAR OFFICE, JULY 1.

The undermentioned Quartermasters, who retired upon Half Pay, previous to the declaration of war with Russia, and who had completed in all a service of thirty years, ten of which as Quartermasters, to have the honorary rank of Captain, viz.:—Quartermasters, J. Misset, Half Pay, 1st Dragoon Guards; J. Andrews, Half Pay, 4th Dragoon Guards; A. Langford, Half Pay, 5th Dragoon Guards; J. Partridge, Half Pay, 1st Dragoons; M. Nelson, Half Pay, 2nl Dragoons; J. Landers, Half Pay, 8th Light Dragoons; J. C. Mac Clellan, Half Pay, 10th Light Dragoons; F. Collins, Half Pay, 10th Light Drags.; C. Armstrong, Half Pay, 12th Light Dragoons; William Hall, Half Pay, 17th Light Dragoons; R. France, Half Pay, Grenadier Guards; G. Copeland Half Pay, Scots Fusilier Guards; J Scott, Half Pay, 9th Foot; C. Grant Half Pay, 23rd Foot; J. Ward, Half Pay, 30th Foot; G. Cole, Half Pay, 55th Foot; R. Hamilton, Half Pay, 37th Foot; J. Willox, Half Pay, 54th Foot; J. Duke, Half Pay, 59th Foot; J. Brannan, Half Pay, 60th Foot; E. Joyce, Half Pay, 63rd Foot; J. Hollis, Half Pay, 69th Foot; J. Earrell, Half Pay, 84th Foot; W. Neill, Half Pay, 85th Foot; J. Jerome, Half Pay, 86th Foot; H. Mayne, Half Pay, 49th Foot; S. Goddard, Half Pay, 14th Foot, J. W. Preston, Half Pay, 76th Foot; T. Wright, Half Pay, 9th Light Dragoons; D. Pratt, Half Pay, 16th Light Drags.; P. Conolly, Half Pay, 20th Foot; J. Murray, Half Pay, 24th Foot; J. Stubbs, Half Pay, 48th Foot; J. Morgan, Half Pay, 52nd Foot; J. Booth, Half Pay, 60th Foot; W. Hornby, Half Pay, 66th Foot; S. Wallis, Half Pay, 69th Foot; D. McCurdy, Half Pay, 74th Foot; T. W. Edwards, Half Pay, 84th Foot; G. Edwards, Half Pay, 85th Foot; W. Mackintosh, Half Pay, 93rd Foot; J. Black, Half Pay, Ceylon Regiment; S. Fox, Half Pay, 95th Foot; W. Gates, Half Pay, Royal Artillery; S. Barnes, Half Pay, Royal Artillery; J. Hilton, Half Pay, Royal Engineers.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

West York Rifles—Lieut. T. S. Russell to be Captain, vice M. H. Nepean, Bart., resigned; Ensign T. A. Whittle to be Lieutenant, vice Russell, promoted, June 30.

3rd West York—F. A. Roberts, gent., to be Ensign, vice G. J. Douglas, promoted, June 8. J. R. Clarke, gent., to be Ensign, vice J. H. Palmer, promoted, June 19.

5th West York—Ensign R. Morrison to be Lieutenant, vice T. A. F. Leith, resigned; Ensign H. Broomhead to be Lieutenant; Ensign C. Broomhead to be Lieutenant; Ensign H. Kaye to be Lieutenant, June 24.

6th West York—H. J. Hunter, gent., to be Assistant Surgeon, June 24.

Memorandum—3rd West York—The Queen has been pleased to accept the resignation of the commission held in this regiment by Capt. Thomas Shearburn.

1st West Norfolk—Lieut. R. Morris to be Captain, vice the Hon. F. Walpole, promoted. J. H. Warnes, gent., to be Ensign, June 30.

Memoranda—Worcestershire—Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the commission held by Lieut. H. D. Mitchel. Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the commission held by Ensign W. Mason. Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the commission held by Capt. J. Oldham. Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the commission held by Ensign Edward W. Tayler.

2nd Middlesex—Lieut. C. R. Todd to be Captain, vice the Viscount Bury, resigned, June 24.

Royal North Gloucester—Capt. H. B. Williams to be Major, vice Savile, resigned; Lieut. R. B. Hunte to be Captain, vice Williams, promoted; Ensign W. R. Gee to be Lieutenant, vice Hunte, promoted; June 30.

Royal South Gloucester—Ensign J. W. Berrington to be Lieutenant, vice H. W. Millet, resigned; June 29. Memorandum—Her Majesty has been pleased to accept the resignation of the commission held by Ensign R. Burke in the last-mentioned Regiment.

5th Royal Lancashire—J. J. Mills, gent., to be Ensign, vice R. Blackledge, resigned, July 1.

Royal Radnor—Lieut. H. P. Prickard to be Captain, vice Ricketts, resigned;

Ensign R. W. Ormerod to be Lieutenant, vice Prickard, promoted; June 25.

Leicestershire—T. A. L. Knipe, gent., to be Lieutenant, vice H. Akerman, resigned; A. D. Rawlins, gent., to be Lieutenant, vice J. A. W. Wilson, resigned; T. S. Harding, gent., to be Lieutenant, vice C. F. Powell, resigned; T. J. S. Hotckin, gent., to be Lieutenant, vice C. H. Morris, promoted; J. G. Knight, gent., to be Ensign, vice Knipe, promoted; June 28

Herefordshire—Capt. T. P. Symonds to be Major, vice Sir V. Cornwell, resigned; Capt. J. Berington to be Second Major; Lieut. J. H. Griffiths to be Captain, vice Symonds, promoted; Lieut. E. Williams to be Captain, vice Berington, promoted.

Dumfries, Roxburgh, and Selkirk Regiment—W. H. Garner, Esq., A.B., Licentiate of the Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland, to be Surgeon, vice Adam, resigned; June 28.

Fife Artillery—T. W. Webb to be First Lieutenant, vice Haig, promoted; C. Lyon, gent., to be Second Lieutenant, vice Webb, promoted; June 27.

Hampshire Artillery—J. Frost, gent., to be Adjutant from the 11th May, 1859.

Cornwall Rangers—R. Kelly, Esq., to be Second Lieutenant.

Eastern Suffolk Artillery—G. Haywood, gent., late of the Army Medical Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon; F. G. Wilkinson, gent., to be First Lieutenant; E. S. Hammersley, gent., to be Second Lieutenant.

5th Royal Lancashire—H. J. Barker, gent., to be Lieutenant, vice W. H. Ogden, deceased.

Duke of Lancaster's own Regiment of Yeomanry Cavalry—E. J. W. Patten, Esq., to be Lieutenant, vice Jacson, promoted.

1st Company of Lancashire Volunteer Rifles—J. B. Taylor, gent., to be Lieutenant.

West Kent Light Infantry—W. D. C. G. Moneypenny, to be Captain, vice Sir Edmund Filmer, Bart., M.P., resigned; J. G. Vinter, to be Ensign, vice Garsia, appointed to the 1st West India Regiment.

Royal North Lincoln—J. Whitney, gent., to be Ensign, vice R. Waller, promoted; H. S. Waller, gent., to be Ensign, vice A. Lousada, promoted.

6th West York—R. M. Hammond, Esq., to be Captain, vice Connel, who retires, July 1.

Cambridgeshire—M. J. Masters, late Army Medical Staff to be Surgeon, in the room of W. A. Joberns, June 28.

2nd Somerset—E. G. H. Salter, late of 73rd Regiment of Foot, to be Lieut., vice, Poole, appointed to the 18th Foot, June 25. Ensign W. F. Holt to be Lieut., vice Gyles, promoted, June 27. Ensign W. F. G. Langton to be Lieut., vice Fraser, resigned, June 28. W. W. Rawlins, Gent., to be Ensign, vice Cargill, appointed to the East India Company's Artillery, June 28.

1st Somerset—A De L. Patton, Gent., to be Ensign, vice Hawker, resigned, June 29.

1st King's Own Staffordshire—C. P. Carter, Gent., to be Lieut., vice Akerman, resigned, June 16.

East Kent—Lieut. H. E. Knatchbull to be Captain, vice Nares, resigned, July 4. Ensign D. G. Daly to be Lieut., vice Knatchbull, promoted, July 4.

Northumberland Artillery — P. C. Stanhope, Esq., to be Captain, vice H. C. Allhusen, resigned, July 1.

1st Company of Pembrokeshire Volunteer Rifles—A. B. Starbuck to be Lieut., July 1. H. F. Shute to be Ensign, July 1.

3rd Royal Surrey—Ensign F. G. Walpole to be Lieut., vice Green, appointed to the Rifle Brigade, June 30. F. G. Smith, Gent., to be Ensign, vice Terry, appointed to 60th Rifles, July 1. F. Brown, Gent., to be Ensign, vice Chapman, resigned, July 2.

1st Royal Surrey—Resignation—The Queen has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of Ensign A. de Vere Beauclerk.

3rd Duke of Lancaster's Own—W. Gardner, Gent., to be Ensign, July 4.

6th Royal Lancashire—R. Lomax, Esq., to be Captain, vice W. Buchanan, resigned, July 1.

7th Lancashire—L. Rea, Gent., to be Lieut., July 4.

[The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* on the 1st July instant.]

5th Royal Lancashire—Ensign H. J. Barker, to be Lieut., vice W. H. Ogden, deceased, February 1, 1858.

Royal Ayrshire Rifles—R. Pattison, Gent., to be Lieut., vice Langton, resigned, June 30,

Royal Sussex Artillery Battalion—W. R. Lewis, Gent., to be Second Lieut., vice Bethune, resigned, June 25. D. J. Hall, Esq., M.D., to be Surgeon, vice Smythe, resigned, July 1.

Herefordshire—Ensign F. Aldrich to be Lieut., vice J. H. Griffiths, promoted. Ensign E. M. Cheese to be Lieut., vice E. Williams, promoted. Ensign H. W. Willert, to be Lieut., vice T. B. Myners, resigned.

3rd Royal Surrey—W. F. Rogers, Gent., to be Ensign, July 1.

Merionethshire—Lieut. C. H. L. Lee to be Captain, vice Walker, resigned; Ensign E. G. Jones to be Lieut., vice Ellis, resigned, July 11.

4th Company of the Lancashire Volunteer Rifles—R. Munn, Esq., the younger, to be Capt., July 4.

Royal North Lincoln—F. J. Murray, Gent., to be Ensign, vice A. F. Holdsworth, promoted, July 6.

Oxfordshire—G. M. Buckle, Gent., to be Ensign, vice Phillips, promoted, July 9.

[The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* on the 8th July instant.]

3rd Duke of Lancaster's Own—W. G. Bird, Gent., to be Ensign, July 4.

Norfolk Artillery—A. Russell, Gent., to be Quartermaster, June 14.

Shropshire—Quartermaster Sergeant J. Armstrong, late Renfrew Militia, to be Quartermaster, vice W. Boyce, resigned, July 8.

Herefordshire—Ensign F. Aldrich to be Lieut., vice J. H Griffiths, promoted. Ensign E. N. Cheese to be Lieut., vice E. Williams, promoted; Ensign H. W. Willett to be Lieut., vice T. B. Mynors, resigned.

Royal Carnarvonshire — H. Kneeshaw, Gent., to be Ensign, July 2.

East Suffolk Artillery—H. Whitbread, Esq., to be Capt., July 1.

Worcestershire—Capt. C. S. Hawkins to be Second Major; Capt. T. C. N. Norbury, late Captain 6th Dragoon Guards, to be Senior Major, vice E. Winnington, resigned, Lieut. E. Peel to be Captain, vice Norbury, promoted.

1st Devon—T. W. Northmore to be Ensign, May 15; R. A. Brine to be Lieut., vice Yates, resigned; J. C. D. Agar to be Ensign, vice Brine, promoted, June 28; T. D. Hogg to be Capt., vice Webber, resigned, July 1; J. Tyrrell to be Ensign, July 4; G. A. Pollard to be Ensign, July 5.

2nd Devon—H. C. Vaughan to be Lieut., vice Parr, promoted; G. Marker to be Ensign, vice Vaughan, promoted; B. A. McDonal Macpherson to be Lieut., vice Bower, resigned, June 28.

Devon Artillery—Richard Bury Russell to be Major, vice Hole, deceased, June 29; J. C. New to be Captain, vice Russell, promoted; T. R. Arscott to be First Lieutenant, vice New, promoted, July 4.

2nd West York—Ensign E. T. C. Whittell to be Lieut., vice Wynne, who retires; Ensign W. Whitaker to be Lieut.; Ensign A. Darley to be Lieut.; Ensign J. T. Daniel to be Lieut., July 4.

3rd West York—D. Loftus, Gent., late Lieut. in the Grenadier Guards, to be Captain, vice Searburn, resigned, July 9.

1st West Yorkshire Yeomanry Cavalry—The Right Hon. E. M. G. Stuart, Baron Wharncliffe, to be Lieut. Col., vice the Earl of Scarborough, who retires, July 8.

Royal London—Ensign A. Newton to be Lieut., vice A. C. T. Barrow, promoted, July 9; Ensign F. R. F. Keates to be Lieut., vice F. Peto, promoted, July 11; Ensign T. Smith to be Lieut., vice T. W. Andrews, promoted; Ensign G. C. Childs to be Lieut., vice A. B. de Lasalle, resigned; Lieut, J. V. Moncton, late 1st Welsh York Rifles, to be Lieut., vice J. L. Vivian, resigned, July 12; W. H. Howse, jun., Gent., to be Ensign, vice A. H. Garland, promoted, July 9.

1st Middlesex—E. Parker, Gent., to be Ensign, vice Christian, removed, June 22.

2nd Middlesex—C. L. Peel, Gent., late 7th Hussars, to be Lieut., vice Phillips, retired, June 23; C. H. Read, late Lieut. Ceylon Rifle Regiment, to be Captain, vice Tupper, resigned, June 24.

[The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* on the 5th July, 1859.]

2nd Middlesex—Lieut. C. R. Todd to be Captain, vice Viscount Bury, resigned, July 24.

WAR OFFICE, JULY 19.

(*The following Commissions to bear date July 19.*)

6th Dragoon Guards—Cornet W. D. Pereira to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Russell, promoted, by purchase, to an Unattached Company; Cornet T. M. Turner to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Bird, promoted.

10th Light Dragoons—Cornet G. Houstoun has been superseded, being absent without leave.

15th Light Dragoons—Cornet T. Churcher, from half pay, late Land

Transport Corps, to be Cornet, vice Mann, promoted; Cornet T. Churcher has been permitted to retire from the Service by the sale of his Commission.

16th Light Dragoons—Cornet E. A. Corbet, from the 17th Light Dragoons, to be Cornet, vice Bagenal, appointed to the 13th Light Dragoons.

Scots Fusilier Guards—H. Farquharson, Esq., Page of Honour to the Queen, to be Ensign and Lieut, without purchase.

Military Train—Cornet R. Davies, from half pay late Land Transport Corps, to be Ensign, vice Baird, whose appointment was cancelled in the *Gazette* of May 31.

Royal Artillery—The surname of the Lieut. appointed on April 1 is Loughnam, as stated in the *Gazette* of April 8.

15th Foot—Surgeon T. R. Dyce, having completed twenty years' full pay service, to be Surgeon Major, under the Royal Warrant of 1st October, 1858, June 7.

17th—Gentleman Cadet F. N. B. G. Benson, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Sharpe, appointed to the 34th Foot.

34th—Ensign H. E. Sharp, from the 17th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Jones, deceased.

35th—Assistant Surgeon J. Mahon, from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Patterson, who exchanges.

40th—Ensign E. Toseland, from the Bedfordshire Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Gwyn, appointed to the 2nd Foot.

41st—Lieut. H. D. J. Macleod, from half pay Unattached, to be Lieut., vice J. M'Kay, promoted to be Capt. of the School of Musketry. Lieut. H. D. J. Macleod has been permitted to retire from the Service by the sale of his commission.

52nd—H. F. Barker, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Cowburn, promoted.

60th—Lieut. J. J. Collins to be Capt., by purchase, vice Roe, promoted; Ensign W. K. Murray to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Collins.

64th—The Christian names of Gentleman Cadet Aleton, appointed to an Ensigncy, without purchase, on the 24th June. 1859, are "Arthur Richard."

70th—Lieut. R Whigham to be Capt., without purchase, vice Brevet Col. E. L'Estrange, who retires upon full pay. The Christian names of Gentleman Cadet Feneran, appointed to an Ensigncy, without purchase, on 24th June, 1859, are "William Saunders Ford."

92nd—Surgeon T. B. Reid, from the Staff, to be Surgeon, vice Steward, deceased, May 11.

99th—Lieut. C. Burton to be Captain, without purchase, vice Williams deceased; Ensign H. R. Sayce to be Lieut., without purchase, vice Burton, May 15.

100th—R. E. C. Jarvis, Gent., to be Ensign, without purchase.

Ceylon Rifle Regiment—Brevet Lieutenant Col. W. T. Layard to be Lieut. Col., without purchase, vice Brevet Col. S. Braybrooke, promoted to the rank of Major Gen.; Brevet Major G. R. Campsie to be Major, without purchase, vice Layard; Lieut. W. J. Gorman, to be Capt., without purchase, vice Campsie; Ensign A. Hansard, to be Lieut., without purchase, vice Gorman, June 12; Lieut. A. Randall, from the Royal Elthorne Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Hansard.

Gold Coast Artillery Corps—Lieut. E. N. R. Gatehouse to be Capt., without purchase, vice Taylor, who retires upon Half Pay; Ensign E. W. Smyth to be Lieut., without purchase, vice Gatehouse; J. Thompson, Gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Smyth.

ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE—Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals E. Bradford upon Half Pay, to be Surgeon, vice J. Pickering, M.D., who retires upon Half Pay, as a Surgeon Major, under the Royal Warrant of 1st October, 1858.

HOSPITAL STAFF—Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals D. Dumbreck, M. D., C.B., to be Inspector General of Hospitals, vice J. Barry, M.D., placed upon Half Pay.

Surgeon Major R. J. O'Flaherty to be Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, vice Dumbreck.

Surgeon W. W. Weld, from the Military Train, to be Surgeon, vice Reid, appointed to the 92nd Foot.

Assistant Surgeon L. C. Patterson, from the 35th Foot, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Mahon, who exchanges.

Acting Assistant Surgeon J. Masters has ceased to do duty, there being no longer occasion for his services, June 30.

BREVET—Brevet Col. E. L'Estrange, retired Full Pay, 70th Foot, to be Major General, the rank being honorary only.

Capt. F. W. Lambton, of the 71st Foot, to be Major in the Army.

Lieut. H. W. Norman, of the 31st Bengal Native Infantry, and having the local rank of Brevet Captain in India, to have the local rank of Lieut. Colonel in the East Indies.

Capt. G. R. Weston, of the 65th Bengal Native Infantry, to be Major in the Army, March 24, 1858.

WAR OFFICE, JULY 22.

(*The following Commissions to bear date July 22.*)

2nd Regiment of Life Guards—Lieut. R. Palmer to be Captain by purchase, vice the Hon. C. S. B. Hanbury, who retires; Cornet and Sub-Lieut. H. P. Ewart to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Palmer.

5th Dragoon Guards—H. Darley, gent., to be Cornet by purchase, vice Feilden, who retires.

3rd Light Dragoons—T. Donaldson, gent., to be Cornet by purchase, vice Grant, promoted.

13th Light Dragoons—J. Saunders, gent., to be Cornet by purchase, vice Gore, promoted.

Military Train—Capt. E. R. Berry, from the 61st Foot, to be Captain, vice Hamilton, who exchanges.

Scots Fusilier Guards—Lieut. and Capt. and Brevet Major R. J. Loyd-Lindsay to be Captain and Lieutenant Colonel by purchase, vice the Hon. A. E. Fraser, who retires.

14th Foot—Ensign C. Day, from the 36th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Pigott, who exchanges.

15th—Lieut. F. S. L'E. FitzRoy to be Captain by purchase, vice the Hon. H. J. Liddell, who retires; Ensign R. S. Liddell to be Lieut. by purchase, vice FitzRoy.

16th—Lieut. Col. O. Langley, from the 27th Foot, to be Lieut. Colonel, vice Baumgartner, who exchanges.

17th—Lieut. D. F. Allen to be Instructor of Musketry, vice Lieut. W. F. A. E. Pressgrave, ordered to return to duty as Lieut. of a Company, July 23.

27th—Lieut. Col. R. J. Baumgartner, C.B., from the 16th Foot, to be Lieut. Colonel, vice Langley, who exchanges.

36th—Ensign S. H. Pigott, from the 14th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Day, who exchanges.

55th—Captain R. England to be Major by purchase, vice Barnston, who retires.

57th—Quartermaster T. Martindale, from Half Pay 2nd Light Infantry, British Swiss Legion, to be Quartermaster, vice Balcombe, promoted to an Unattached Company for services in the late Transport Corps.

60th—F. W. Robins, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Murray, promoted.

61st—Lieut. T. J. Sadlier, to be Captain without purchase, vice Brackenbury, deceased, May 28; Capt. T. R. Hamilton, from the Military Train, to be Captain, vice Berry, who exchanges; Ensign A. E. Flood, to be Lieutenant without purchase, vice Sadleir, May 28.

62nd—Ensign J. L. Bland, from the 24th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Colcloug, promoted in the 19th Foot.

69th—The name of the Ensign appointed on the 24th June, 1859, is Thomas Lander Mitchell-Innes, and not Thomas L. Innes, as then stated.

73rd—Lieut. P. F. Shuldham, to be Captain by purchase, vice Cook, who retires.

76th—Ensign T. T. Hodges, from the 38th Foot, to be Lieutenant without purchase, vice Wigelsworth, cashiered by sentence of a General Court-Martial.

85th—Quartermaster W. H. Watts, from Half Pay of the late 4th Regiment, British Italian Legion, to be Quartermaster, vice Rouse, appointed Paymaster.

91st—Ensign W. H. Baillie, to be Lieut., without purchase, vice Allen, deceased, July 2.

94th—J. Mackinlay, Gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Butler, promoted; Lieut. S. Malthus, to be Adjutant, vice Gaskell, promoted, May 21.

99th—Major M. H. Dowbiggin, from a Depot Battalion, to be Major, vice Deering, who exchanges; Lieut. M. B. Purcell, to be Captain by purchase, vice Molson, who retires; Ensign H. R Sayce, to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Bond, deceased, May 6; Ensign H. Townsend, to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Sayce, whose promotion without purchase on the 15th May, 1859, has been cancelled, May 15; Ensign C. Coates, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Purcell; J. A. Stanford, Gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Townsend; Lieut. G. R. S. Black, to be Adjutant, vice Bond, deceased, May 6.

Rifle Brigade—G. Caulfield, Gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Arbuthnot, promoted; A. Ames, Gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Winterscale, promoted, July 23. L. V. Swaine, Gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Seymour, promoted in the Grenadier Guards, July 24.

1st West India Regiment—H. H. Smith, Gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Forbes, promoted; Assistant Surgeon C. F. S. Macauley, from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice O'Brien, appointed to the Staff.

3rd West India Regt—W. T. Croft, Gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Dugmore, promoted; G. F. O'Grady, Gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Duncan, promoted, July 23.

Ceylon Rifle Regiment—E. N. Wood, Gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Hort, promoted.

DEPOT BATTALION.—Maj. R. Deering, from the 99th Foot, to be Major, vice Dowbiggin, who exchanges.

HOSPITAL STAFF.—Surgeon Major T. G. Balfour, M.D., from Surgeon of the Royal Military Asylum, Chelsea, to be Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals.

Assistant Surgeon, T. B. P. O'Brien, from the 2nd West India Regiment, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Macauley, appointed to the 2nd West India Regiment.

BREVET.—Lieut. Col. H. Fleming, Retired Full Pay of the Royal Marines, to be Col. under the Order in Council of 13th Nov. 1858; Capt. W. J. Geils, of the 25th Madras Native Infantry, to be Major in the Army, Jan. 15.

MILITIA GAZETTE.

Durham Artillery — Captain C. G. M'Gregor Skinner to be Paymaster, June 25.

1st King's Own Staffordshire—M. Blake, Gent., to be Lieut., vice Doyle, resigned, July 9; R. G. Marshall, Gent., to be Ensign, vice Mott, promoted; R. H. Playfair, Gent., to be Ensign, vice Hickman, promoted; W. J. Baldwin, Gent., to be Ensign, vice Lambarde, promoted, June 22.

2nd Royal Cheshire—Capt. R. Smyth, late of the 17th Foot, to be Captain, vice W. E. G. Thomas, resigned, July 15.

7th Lancashire—H. W. Matthews, Gent., to be Lieut., June 1.

3rd Royal Surrey—Ensign H. C. Rivers to be Lieut., vice C. Kirk, resigned, July 8.

Royal Pembrokeshire Artillery—H. Ackland to be First Lieut., July 4.

North York Rifles—The Queen has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation, by Major J. M. Jeffery and Capt. the Marquis of Caermarthen, of the Commissions held by them; and her Majesty does not disapprove of Lieut. Col. H. C. Wade bearing the title of Lieut. Col. Commandant of the Regiment.

Royal Berks—H. Morris, Gent., a Member of the Royal College of Surgeons in London, to be Assist. Surgeon, vice Alder, resigned, July 15.

Huntingdonshire — S. R. Woulfe, Gent., to be Captain, vice H. J. Thornhill, resigned, July 8; M. Vane, Esq., to be Ensign; T. Thornhill, the younger, Esq., to be Ensign, July 12.

Royal North Gloucester—D. H. Parry, Gent., to be Ensign, vice Gee, promoted, July 19.

1st Middlesex—Ensign C. W. B. Wells to be Lieut., vice Bent, promoted, June 30.

3rd Middlesex—W. Hurman, Gent., to be Assist. Surg., vice Dixey, resigned, July 2.

4th Middlesex—Count W. C. Rivarola, late Captain 67th Regiment, to be Captain, vice Brisley, resigned, July 6.

Leicestershire—H. Barber, Gent. to be Ensign, July 14.

1st Devon—Rev. J. B. Kitson to be Chaplain, May 8; F. Coleridge to be Cornet, vice Phillpotts, resigned, July 14.

Devon Artillery—H. C. Devon to be Captain, vice Chichester, resigned; R. G. Palmer to be First Lieutenant, vice Devon, promoted, July 14.

Dumfries, Roxburgh, and Selkirk Regiment—Ensign W. R. Thornhill to be Lieutenant, vice Thomson, resigned, July 13; R. L. Gledstanes, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Thornhill, promoted, July 13.

Royal Mid-Lothian Yeomanry Cavalry—Assistant Surgeon T. Peacock to be Surgeon, vice Burt, resigned; W. C. Fowler, Esq., Doctor of Medicine, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Peacock, promoted; Cornet R. Hay to be Lieut., vice Cockburn, resigned; T. E. O. Horne, Gent., to be Cornet, vice Hay, promoted, July 14.

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